Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities,	 
Challenges, and Key Management Issues (08-MAY-03, GAO-03-715T).  
                                                                 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created the Department  
of Homeland Security, brought together 22 diverse organizations  
to help prevent terrorist attacks in the United States, reduce	 
the vulnerability of the United States to terrorist attacks, and 
minimize damage and assist in recovery from attacks that do	 
occur. To accomplish this mission, the act established specific  
homeland security responsibilities for the department, which	 
included sharing information among its own entities and with	 
other federal agencies, state and local governments, the private 
sector, and others. GAO was asked to discuss DHS's information	 
sharing efforts, including (1) the significance of information	 
sharing in fulfilling DHS's responsibilities; (2) GAO's related  
prior analyses and recommendations for improving the federal	 
government's information sharing efforts; and (3) key management 
issues DHS should consider in developing and implementing	 
effective information sharing processes and systems.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-715T					        
    ACCNO:   A06855						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, 
Challenges, and Key Management Issues				 
     DATE:   05/08/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Federal agencies					 
	     Federal agency reorganization			 
	     Government information				 
	     Information disclosure				 
	     Information resources management			 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Interagency relations				 

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GAO-03-715T

HOMELAND SECURITY: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and
Key Management Issues

Statement of Robert F. Dacey, Director, Information Security Issues

Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology Architecture and
Systems Issues

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony Before the Committee on Government

Reform, House of Representatives For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:
00 a. m. EDT Thursday, May 8, 2003 GAO- 03- 715T

This is a work of the U. S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

DHS*s responsibilities include the coordination and sharing of information
related to threats of domestic terrorism within the department and with
and between other federal agencies, state and local governments, the
private sector, and other entities. To accomplish its missions, DHS must,
for example access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information,
intelligence information, and other threat, incident, and vulnerability
information from federal and nonfederal sources; and analyze such
information to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist
threats. DHS must also share information both internally and externally
with agencies and law enforcement on such things as goods and passengers
inbound to the United States and individuals who are known or suspected
terrorists and criminals.

GAO has made numerous recommendations related to information sharing.
Although improvements have been made, more efforts are needed to address
the following challenges, among others, that GAO has identified.

Developing a comprehensive and coordinated national plan to facilitate
information sharing on critical infrastructure.

Developing productive information sharing relationships between the
federal government and state and local governments and the private sector.

Providing appropriate incentives for nonfederal entities to increase
information sharing with the federal government and enhance other critical
infrastructure protection efforts. Through its prior work, GAO has
identified potential information sharing barriers, critical success
factors, and other key management issues that

DHS should consider as it establishes systems and processes to facilitate
information sharing among and between government entities and the private
sector. It will be important for the department to understand the numerous
potential barriers to information sharing and develop appropriate
strategies to address them, considering any related provisions of the
Homeland Security Act. GAO*s work has also identified critical success
factors for information sharing that DHS should consider as it proceeds.
Further, as part of its information technology management, DHS should
develop and implement an enterprise architecture to integrate the many
existing systems and processes required to support its mission and to
guide the department*s investments in new systems to effectively support
homeland security in the coming years. Other key management issues include
ensuring that sensitive information is secured, developing secure
communications networks, integrating staff from different organizations,
and ensuring that the department has properly skilled staff. The Homeland
Security Act of 2002, which created the Department of Homeland Security,
brought together 22 diverse organizations to help prevent

terrorist attacks in the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the
United States to terrorist attacks, and minimize damage and assist in
recovery from attacks that do occur. To accomplish this mission, the act
established specific homeland security

responsibilities for the department, which included sharing information
among its own entities and with other federal agencies, state and local
governments, the private

sector, and others. GAO was asked to discuss DHS*s information sharing
efforts, including (1) the significance of information sharing in
fulfilling DHS's responsibilities; (2) GAO*s

related prior analyses and recommendations for improving the federal
government*s information sharing efforts; and (3) key management issues
DHS should consider in developing and implementing effective information
sharing processes and systems.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 715T. To view the full
testimony, click on the link above. For more information, contact Robert
F. Dacey at (202) 512- 3317 or daceyr@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03-
715T, a testimony

before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives May 8,
2003

HOMELAND SECURITY

Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management
Issues

1 GAO- 03- 715T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am pleased to be here today
to discuss challenges for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
integrating its information gathering and sharing functions. The Homeland
Security Act of 2002 brought together 22 diverse organizations and created
a new cabinet- level department to help prevent terrorist attacks in the
United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorist
attacks, and minimize damage and assist in recovery from attacks that do
occur. To accomplish this mission, the Act established specific homeland
security responsibilities for the department and directed it to coordinate
its efforts and share information among its own entities and with other
federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and
others.

In my testimony today, I will summarize GAO*s analysis of information
sharing as an integral part of fulfilling DHS*s mission and
responsibilities. I will then discuss GAO*s related prior analyses and
recommendations for improving the federal government*s information sharing
efforts. Lastly, I will discuss the key management issues DHS should
consider in developing and implementing effective information sharing
processes and systems.

In preparing this testimony, we relied on prior GAO reports and
testimonies on combating terrorism, critical infrastructure protection
(CIP), homeland security, information sharing, information technology
(IT), and national preparedness, among others. We also reviewed and
analyzed the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the National Strategy for the Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, the National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 1 the Homeland Security Act of

2002, 2 and other relevant federal policies. Our work was performed during
April and May 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

Results in Brief The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and other federal
policy, including the

National Strategy for Homeland Security, assign responsibilities to DHS
for the coordination and sharing of information related to threats of
domestic terrorism, within the department and with and between other
federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and
other entities. For example, to accomplish its missions, the new
department must (1) access, receive, and analyze law enforcement
information, intelligence information, and other threat,

1 The White House, The National Strategy for Homeland Security
(Washington, D. C.: July 2002); The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
(Washington, D. C.: February 2003); The National Strategy for the Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington, D. C.:
February 2003); and The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
(Washington, D. C.: February 2003). 2 Public Law 107- 296.

2 GAO- 03- 715T

incident, and vulnerability information from federal and nonfederal
sources; (2) analyze such information to identify and assess the nature
and scope of terrorist threats; and (3) administer the Homeland Security
Advisory System and provide specific warning information and advice on
appropriate protective measures and countermeasures. Further, DHS must
share information both internally and externally with agencies and law
enforcement on such things as goods and passengers inbound to the United
States and individuals who are known or suspected terrorists and
criminals. It also must share information among emergency responders in
preparing for and responding to terrorist attacks and other emergencies.

GAO has made numerous recommendations over the last several years related
to information sharing functions that have been transferred to DHS. One
significant area concerns the federal government*s CIP efforts, which is
focused on the sharing of information on incidents, threats, and
vulnerabilities, and the providing of warnings related to critical
infrastructures both within the federal government and between the federal
government and state and local governments and the private sector.
Although improvements have been made, further efforts are needed to
address the following critical CIP challenges:

developing a comprehensive and coordinated national plan to facilitate CIP
information sharing that clearly delineates the roles and responsibilities
of federal and nonfederal CIP entities, defines interim objectives and
milestones, sets timeframes for achieving objectives, and establishes
performance measures;

developing fully productive information sharing relationships within the
federal government and between the federal government and state and local
governments and the private sector;

improving the federal government*s capabilities to analyze incident,
threat, and vulnerability information obtained from numerous sources and
share appropriate, timely, useful warnings and other information
concerning both cyber and physical threats to federal entities, state and
local governments, and the private sector; and

providing appropriate incentives for nonfederal entities to increase
information sharing with the federal government and enhance other CIP
efforts.

In addition, GAO recently identified challenges in consolidating and
standardizing watch list structures and policies, which are essential to
effectively sharing information on suspected terrorists and criminals. 3
The success of homeland security also relies on establishing effective
systems and

processes to facilitate information sharing among and between government
entities and the private sector. Through our prior work, we have
identified potential information sharing barriers, critical success
factors, and other key

3 Watch lists are automated databases that contain various types of data
on individuals, from biographical data* such as a person*s name and date
of birth* to biometric data such as fingerprints.

3 GAO- 03- 715T

management issues that DHS should consider as it establishes systems and
processes to facilitate information sharing among and between government
entities and the private sector. It will be important for the department
to understand the numerous potential barriers to information sharing and
develop appropriate strategies to address them, considering any related
provisions of the Homeland Security Act. Our work has also identified
critical success factors for information sharing that DHS should consider
as it proceeds. Further, as part of its information technology management,
DHS must develop and implement an enterprise architecture to integrate the
many existing systems and processes required to support its mission and to
guide the department*s investments in new systems to effectively support
homeland security in the coming years. Other key management issues include
ensuring that sensitive information is secured, developing secure
communications networks, integrating staff from different organizations,
and ensuring that the department has properly skilled staff.

Information Sharing Is Integral to Fulfilling DHS*s Mission With the
terrorist attacks of September 2001, the threat of terrorism rose to the
top of the country*s national security and law enforcement agendas. As
stated by the President in his National Strategy for Homeland Security in
July 2002, our nation*s terrorist enemies are constantly seeking new
tactics or unexpected ways to carry out their attacks and magnify their
effects, such as working to obtain chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons. In addition, terrorists are gaining expertise in less
traditional means, such as cyber attacks. In response to these growing
threats, Congress passed and the President signed the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 creating the DHS. The overall mission of this new cabinetlevel
department includes preventing terrorist attacks in the United States,
reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorist attacks, and
minimizing damage and assisting in recovery from attacks that do occur. To
accomplish this mission, the act established specific homeland security
responsibilities for the department and directed it to coordinate its
efforts and share information within DHS and with other federal agencies,
state and local governments, the private sector, and other entities. This
information sharing is critical to successfully addressing increasing
threats and fulfilling the mission of DHS.

Threats, Incidents, and the Consequences of Potential Attacks Are
Increasing DHS*s responsibilities include the protection of our nation*s
publicly and privately controlled resources essential to the minimal
operations of the economy and government against the risks of physical as
well as computer- based or cyber attacks. Over the last decade, physical
and cyber events, as well as related analyses by various entities, have
demonstrated the increasing threat to the

United States.

4 GAO- 03- 715T

With the coordinated terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in
New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D. C., on September 11,
2001, the threat of terrorism rose to the top of the country*s national
security and law enforcement agendas. Even before these catastrophic
incidents, the threat of attacks against people, property, and
infrastructures had increased concerns about terrorism. The terrorist
bombings in 1993 of the World Trade Center in New York City and in 1995 of
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which killed 168
people and wounded hundreds of others, prompted increased emphasis on the
need to strengthen and coordinate the federal government*s ability to
effectively combat terrorism domestically. The 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin
nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway system also raised new concerns
about U. S. preparedness to combat terrorist incidents involving weapons
of mass destruction. 4 However, as clearly demonstrated by the September
11, 2001, incidents, a terrorist attack would not have to fit the
definition of weapons of mass destruction to result in mass casualties,
destruction of critical infrastructures, economic losses, and disruption
of daily life nationwide.

U. S. intelligence and law enforcement communities continuously assess
both foreign and domestic terrorist threats to the United States. The U.
S. foreign intelligence community* the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
and the Department of State*s Bureau of Research and Intelligence*
monitors the foreignorigin terrorist threat to the United States. In
addition, the FBI gathers intelligence and assesses the threat posed by
domestic sources. According to the U. S. intelligence community,
conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the terrorists*
weapons of choice. The community also believes that terrorists are less
likely to use weapons of mass destruction, although the possibility that
terrorists will use these weapons may increase over the next decade.
Nevertheless, in February 2003, the Director of Central Intelligence
testified 5 that

in his view, we have entered a new world of proliferation, where there are
knowledgeable non- state purveyors of weapons of mass destruction
materials and technology that are increasingly capable of providing
technology and equipment that previously could only be supplied by
countries with established capabilities. He also stated that although
there have been successes on many fronts in the war on terrorism, recent
events underscore the threat that the al Qaeda network continues to pose
to the United States. He further stated that even without an attack on the
U. S. homeland, more than 600 people were killed in acts of terror last
year* 200 in al Qaeda- related attacks alone* including 19 U. S. citizens.
In addition, he stated that terrorism directed at U. S. interests goes
beyond Middle Eastern or religious extremist groups, adding that the
Revolutionary Armed

4 A weapon of mass destruction is a chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear agent or weapon.

5 Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on The Worldwide Threat 2003:
Evolving Dangers in a Complex World (Feb. 11, 2003).

5 GAO- 03- 715T

Forces of Colombia has shown a new willingness to inflict casualties on U.
S. nationals. Table 1 summarizes key physical threats to homeland
security.

6 GAO- 03- 715T

Table 1: Physical Threats to Homeland Security Threat Description

Chemical weapons Chemical weapons are extremely lethal and capable of
producing tens of thousands of casualties. They are also relatively easy
to manufacture, using basic equipment, trained personnel, and precursor
materials that often have legitimate dual uses. As the 1995 Tokyo subway
attack revealed, even sophisticated nerve agents are within the reach of
terrorist groups.

Biological weapons Biological weapons, which release large quantities of
living, disease- causing microorganisms, have extraordinary lethal
potential. Like chemical weapons, biological weapons are relatively easy
to manufacture, requiring straightforward technical skills, basic
equipment, and a seed stock of pathogenic microorganisms. Biological
weapons are especially dangerous because we may not know immediately that

we have been attacked, allowing an infectious agent time to spread.
Moreover, biological agents can serve as a means of attack against humans
as well as livestock and crops, inflicting casualties as well as economic
damage. Radiological weapons Radiological weapons, or *dirty bombs,*
combine radioactive material with conventional explosives. The

individuals and groups engaged in terrorist activity can cause widespread
disruption and fear, particularly in heavily populated areas. Nuclear
weapons Nuclear weapons have enormous destructive potential. Terrorists
who seek to develop a nuclear weapon

must overcome two formidable challenges. First, acquiring or refining a
sufficient quantity of fissile material is very difficult* though not
impossible. Second, manufacturing a workable weapon requires a very high
degree of technical capability* though terrorists could feasibly assemble
the simplest type of nuclear

device. To get around these significant though not insurmountable
challenges, terrorists could seek to steal or purchase a nuclear weapon.
Conventional means Terrorists, both domestic and international, continue
to use traditional methods of violence and destruction

to inflict harm and spread fear. They have used knives, guns, and bombs to
kill the innocent. They have taken hostages and spread propaganda. Given
the low expense, ready availability of materials, and relatively high
chance for successful execution, terrorists will continue to make use of
conventional attacks. Source: National Strategy for Homeland Security

In addition to these physical threats, terrorists and others with
malicious intent, such as transnational criminals and intelligence
services, pose a threat to our nation*s computer systems. As dramatic
increases in computer interconnectivity, especially in the use of the
Internet, continue to revolutionize the way much of the

world communicate and conducts business, this widespread interconnectivity
also poses significant risks to the government*s and our nation*s computer
systems and, more importantly, to the critical operations and
infrastructures they support. For example, telecommunications, power
distribution, water supply, public health services, national defense
(including the military*s warfighting capability), law enforcement,
government services, and emergency services all depend on the security of
their computer operations. If not properly controlled, the speed and
accessibility that create the enormous benefits of the computer age also
allow individuals and organizations to inexpensively eavesdrop on or
interfere with these operations from remote locations for mischievous or
malicious purposes. Government officials are increasingly concerned about
cyber attacks from

individuals and groups with malicious intent, such as crime, terrorism,
foreign intelligence gathering, and acts of war. According to the FBI,
terrorists, transnational criminals, and intelligence services are quickly
becoming aware of and are using information exploitation tools such as
computer viruses, Trojan

7 GAO- 03- 715T

horses, worms, logic bombs, and eavesdropping sniffers that can destroy,
intercept, degrade the integrity of, or deny access to data. 6 In
addition, the disgruntled organization insider is a significant threat,
since these individuals often have knowledge that allows them to gain
unrestricted access and inflict damage or steal assets without possessing
a great deal of knowledge about computer intrusions. As greater amounts of
money are transferred through computer systems, as more sensitive economic
and commercial information is exchanged electronically, and as the
nation*s defense and intelligence communities increasingly rely on
commercially available IT, the likelihood increases that cyber attacks
will threaten vital national interests. Table 2 summarizes the key cyber
threats to our infrastructure.

Table 2: Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure Observed by the FBI
Threat Description

Criminal groups There is an increased use of cyber intrusions by criminal
groups who attack systems for purposes of monetary gain. Foreign
intelligence

services Foreign intelligence services use cyber tools as part of their
information gathering and espionage activities.

Hackers Hackers sometimes crack into networks for the thrill of the
challenge or for bragging rights in the hacker community. While remote
cracking once required a fair amount of skill or computer knowledge,
hackers can now download attack scripts and protocols from the Internet
and launch them against victim sites. Thus, while attack tools have become
more sophisticated, they have also become easier to use. Hacktivists
Hacktivism refers to politically motivated attacks on publicly accessible
Web pages or e- mail servers. These

groups and individuals overload e- mail servers and hack into Web sites to
send a political message. Information warfare Several nations are
aggressively working to develop information warfare doctrine, programs,
and

capabilities. Such capabilities enable a single entity to have a
significant and serious impact by disrupting the supply, communications,
and economic infrastructures that support military power* impacts that,
according to the Director of Central Intelligence, a can affect the daily
lives of Americans across the country. Insider threat The disgruntled
organization insider is a principal source of computer crimes. Insiders
may not need a great

deal of knowledge about computer intrusions because their knowledge of a
victim system often allows them to gain unrestricted access to cause
damage to the system or to steal system data. Virus writers Virus writers
are posing an increasingly serious threat. Several destructive computer
viruses and *worms*

have harmed files and hard drives, including the Melissa Macro Virus, the
Explore. Zip worm, the CIH (Chernobyl) Virus, Nimda, and Code Red. Source:
Federal Bureau of Investigation unless otherwise indicated. a Prepared
Statement of George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, before the
Senate Select Committee

on Intelligence, Feb. 2, 2000.

6 Virus: a program that *infects* computer files, usually executable
programs, by inserting a copy of itself into the file. These copies are
usually executed when the *infected* file is loaded into memory, allowing
the virus to infect other files. Unlike the computer worm, a virus
requires human involvement (usually unwitting) to propagate. Trojan horse:
a computer program that conceals harmful code. A Trojan horse usually
masquerades

as a useful program that a user would wish to execute. Worm: an
independent computer program that reproduces by copying itself from one
system to another across a network. Unlike computer viruses, worms do not
require human involvement to propagate. Logic bomb: in programming, a form
of sabotage in which a

programmer inserts code that causes the program to perform a destructive
action when some triggering event occurs, such as terminating the
programmer*s employment. Sniffer: synonymous with packet sniffer. A
program that intercepts routed data and examines each packet in search of
specified information, such as passwords transmitted in clear text.

8 GAO- 03- 715T

As the number of individuals with computer skills has increased, more
intrusion or *hacking* tools have become readily available and relatively
easy to use. A hacker can literally download tools from the Internet and
*point and click* to start an attack. Experts also agree that there has
been a steady advance in the sophistication and effectiveness of attack
technology. Intruders quickly develop attacks to exploit vulnerabilities
discovered in products, use these attacks to compromise computers, and
share them with other attackers. In addition, they can combine these
attacks with other forms of technology to develop programs that
automatically scan the network for vulnerable systems, attack them,
compromise them, and use them to spread the attack even further. Along
with these increasing threats, the number of computer security incidents

reported to the CERT (R) Coordination Center (CERT/ CC) 7 rose from 9,859
in 1999, to 52,658 in 2001, to 82, 094 in 2002, and to 42,586 for the
first quarter of 2003. And these are only the reported attacks. The
Director, CERT (R) Centers, stated that as much as 80 percent of actual
security incidents goes unreported, in most cases because the organization
(1) was unable to recognize that its systems had been penetrated because
there were no indications of penetration or attack or (2) was reluctant to
report incidents. Figure 1 shows the number of incidents reported to the
CERT/ CC from 1995 through the first quarter of 2003. Figure 1:
Information Security Incidents Reported to Carnegie- Mellon*s CERT
Coordination Center: 1995

through First Quarter 2003

According to the National Security Agency, foreign governments already
have or are developing computer attack capabilities, and potential
adversaries are developing a body of knowledge about U. S. systems and
methods to attack these systems. Since the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, warnings of the potential for terrorist cyber attacks against
our critical infrastructures have also

7 The CERT Coordination Center (CERT/ CC) is a center of Internet security
expertise at the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded
research and development center operated by Carnegie Mellon University.

9 GAO- 03- 715T

increased. For example, in February 2002, the threat to these
infrastructures was highlighted by the Special Advisor to the President
for Cyberspace Security in a Senate briefing when he stated that although
to date none of the traditional terrorists groups, such as al Qaeda, have
used the Internet to launch a known assault on the United States*
infrastructure, information on water systems was discovered on computers
found in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. 8 Also, in his February 2002
statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the director of
central intelligence discussed the possibility of cyber warfare attack by
terrorists. 9 He stated that the September 11 attacks demonstrated the
nation*s dependence on critical infrastructure systems that rely on
electronic and computer networks. Further, he noted that attacks of this
nature would become an increasingly viable option for terrorists as they
and other foreign adversaries become more familiar with these targets and
the technologies required to attack them.

Since September 11, 2001, the critical link between cyberspace and
physical space has also been increasingly recognized. In his November 2002
congressional testimony, the Director, CERT Centers at Carnegie- Mellon
University, noted that supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems and other forms of networked computer systems have been used for
years to control power grids, gas and oil distribution pipelines, water
treatment and distribution systems, hydroelectric and flood control dams,
oil and chemical refineries, and other physical systems, and that these
control systems are increasingly being connected to communications links
and networks to reduce operational costs by supporting remote maintenance,
remote control, and remote update functions. 10 These computer- controlled
and network- connected systems are potential targets for individuals bent
on causing massive disruption and physical damage, and the use of
commercial, off- the- shelf technologies for these systems without
adequate security enhancements can significantly limit available
approaches to protection and may increase the number of potential
attackers.

Not only is the cyber protection of our critical infrastructures important
in and of itself, but a physical attack in conjunction with a cyber attack
has been highlighted as a major concern. In fact, the National
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) has stated that the potential for
compound cyber and physical attacks, referred to as *swarming attacks,* is
an emerging threat to the U. S.

8 *Administrative Oversight: Are We Ready for A Cyber Terror Attack?*
Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Administrative Oversight and the Courts, by Richard A. Clarke, Special
Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security and Chairman of the
President*s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board (Feb. 13, 2002). 9
Testimony of George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 6, 2002.

10 Testimony of Richard D. Pethia, Director, CERT Centers, Software
Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, before the House
Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Efficiency,
Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, Nov. 19, 2002.

10 GAO- 03- 715T

critical infrastructure. 11 As NIPC reports, the effects of a swarming
attack include slowing or complicating the response to a physical attack.
For example, cyber attacks can be used to delay the notification of
emergency services and to deny the resources needed to manage the
consequences of a physical attack. In addition, a swarming attack could be
used to worsen the effects of a physical

attack. For example, a cyber attack on a natural gas distribution pipeline
that opens safety valves and releases fuels or gas in the area of a
planned physical attack could enhance the force of the physical attack.
Information Sharing is Critical to Meeting DHS*s Mission

As our government and our nation has become ever more reliant on
interconnected computer systems to support critical operations and
infrastructures and as physical and cyber threats and potential attack
consequences have increased, the importance of sharing information and
coordinating the response to threats among stakeholders has increased.
Information sharing and coordination among organizations are central to
producing comprehensive and practical approaches and solutions to
combating

threats. For example, having information on threats and on actual
incidents experienced by others can help an organization identify trends,
better understand the risk it faces, and determine what preventive
measures should be implemented. In addition, comprehensive, timely
information on incidents can help federal and nonfederal analysis centers
determine the nature of an attack, provide warnings, and advise on how to
mitigate an imminent attack. Also, sharing information on terrorists and
criminals can help to secure our nation*s borders.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created DHS with the primary
responsibility of preventing terrorist attacks in the United States,
reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorist attacks, and
minimizing damage and assisting in recovery from attacks that do occur. To
help DHS accomplish its mission, the act establishes, among other
entities, five under secretaries with responsibility over directorates for
management, science and technology, information analysis and
infrastructure protection, border and transportation security, and
emergency preparedness and response. Figure 2 shows DHS*s organization and
positions filled, as currently reported by DHS. 11 National Infrastructure
Protection Center, Swarming Attacks: Infrastructure Attacks for
Destruction and Disruption (Washington, D. C.: July 2002).

11 GAO- 03- 715T

Figure 2: Department of Homeland Security

Source: DHS.

As part of DHS*s responsibilities, the act includes several provisions
specifically related to coordinating and sharing information within the
department and among other federal agencies, state and local governments,
the private sector, and other entities. It also includes provisions for
protecting CIP information shared by the private sector and for sharing
different types of information, such as grand jury

Secretary (confirmed)  Deputy Secretary (confirmed)

Commandant of Coast Guard

(assumed) Inspector General

(acting) General Counsel Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Director of the
Secret Service

International Affairs

Counter Narcotics Citizenship and

Immigration Service Ombudsman

Chief of Staff Privacy Officer Director, Bureau of Citizenship and
Immigration Services (acting) Executive Secretary

Legislative Affairs Public Affairs

(appointed) State and Local Coordination

Special Assistant to the Secretary (private sector)

National Capital Region Coordination (appointed) Shared Services

Small and Disadvantaged Business

Under Secretary Information Analysis

and Infrastructure Protection Under Secretary

Science and Technology (confirmed) Under Secretary

Management (confirmed)

Under Secretary Border and Transportation Security

Under Secretary Emergency Preparedness and Response

12 GAO- 03- 715T

and intelligence information. Other DHS responsibilities related to
information sharing include

requesting and receiving information from other federal agencies, state
and local government agencies, and the private sector relating to threats
of terrorism in the United States;

distributing or, as appropriate, coordinating the distribution of warnings
and information with other federal agencies, state and local governments
and authorities, and the public;

creating and fostering communications with the private sector; promoting
existing public/ private partnerships and developing new public/ private
partnerships to provide for collaboration and mutual support; and

coordinating and, as appropriate, consolidating the federal government*s
communications and systems of communications relating to homeland security
with state and local governments and authorities, the private sector,
other entities, and the public. Each DHS directorate is responsible for
coordinating relevant efforts with other

federal, state, and local governments. The act also established the Office
for State and Local Government Coordination to, among other things,
provide state and local governments with regular information, research,
and technical support to assist them in securing the nation. Further, the
act included provisions as the *Homeland Security Information Sharing Act*
that requires the President to prescribe and implement procedures for
facilitating homeland security information sharing and establishes
authorities to share different types of information, such as grand jury
information; electronic, wire, and oral interception information; and
foreign intelligence information. The following sections illustrate how
DHS will require successful information

sharing within the department and between federal agencies, state and
local governments, and the private sector to effectively carry out its
mission. Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate

The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP)
is responsible for accessing, receiving, and analyzing law enforcement
information, intelligence information, and other threat and incident
information from respective agencies of federal, state, and local
governments and the private sector, and for combining and analyzing such
information to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist
threats. IAIP is also tasked with coordinating with other federal agencies
to administer the Homeland Security Advisory System to provide specific
warning information along with advice on appropriate

13 GAO- 03- 715T

protective measures and countermeasures. 12 Further, IAIP is responsible
for disseminating, as appropriate, information analyzed by DHS within the
department, to other federal agencies, to state and local government
agencies, and to private sector entities. The Homeland Security Act of
2002 makes DHS and its IAIP directorate also

responsible for key CIP functions for the federal government. CIP involves
activities that enhance the security of our nation*s cyber and physical
public and private infrastructure that are critical to national security,
national economic security, and/ or national public health and safety.
Information sharing is a key element of these activities. Over 80 percent
of our nation*s critical infrastructures are controlled by the private
sector. As part of their CIP responsibilities, IAIP is responsible for (1)
developing a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources
and critical infrastructure of the United States and (2) recommending
measures to protect the key resources and critical infrastructure of the
United States in coordination with other federal agencies and in
cooperation with state and local government agencies and authorities, the
private sector, and other entities.

Federal CIP policy has continued to evolve since the mid- 1990s through a
variety of working groups, special reports, executive orders, strategies,
and organizations. In particular, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD
63) issued in 1998 established CIP as a national goal and described a
strategy for cooperative efforts by government and the private sector to
protect the physical and cyberbased systems essential to the minimum
operations of the economy and the government. To accomplish its goals, PDD
63 established and designated organizations to provide central
coordination and support. These included the Critical Infrastructure
Assurance Office (CIAO), an interagency office established to develop a
national plan for CIP, and NIPC, which was expanded to address national-
level threat assessment, warning, vulnerability, and law enforcement
investigation/ response. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred
these and certain other CIP entities and their functions (other than the
Computer Investigations and Operations Section of NIPC) to DHS*s IAIP
directorate.

Federal CIP policy beginning with PDD 63 and reinforced through other
strategy documents, including the National Strategy for Homeland Security
issued in July 2002, called for a range of activities intended to
establish a partnership between the public and private sectors to ensure
the security of our nation*s critical infrastructures. To ensure coverage
of critical infrastructure sectors, this policy identified infrastructure
sectors that were essential to our national security, national economic
security, and/ or national public health and safety. For these sectors,
which now total 14, federal government leads (sector liaisons) and
private- sector leads (sector coordinators) were to work with each other
to

12 The Homeland Security Advisory System uses five levels (Severe, High,
Elevated, Guarded, and Low) to inform federal, state, and local government
agencies and authorities, the private sector, and the public of the
nation*s terrorist threat conditions.

14 GAO- 03- 715T

address problems related to CIP for their sector. In particular, they were
to (1) develop and implement vulnerability awareness and education
programs and (2) contribute to a sectoral plan by

assessing the vulnerabilities of the sector to cyber or physical attacks;

recommending a plan to eliminate significant vulnerabilities;

proposing a system for identifying and preventing major attacks; and

developing a plan for alerting, containing, and rebuffing an attack in
progress and then, in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency as appropriate, rapidly reconstituting minimum essential
capabilities in the aftermath of an attack. CIP policy also called for
sector liaisons to identify and assess economic

incentives to encourage the desired sector behavior in CIP. Federal grant
programs to assist state and local efforts, legislation to create
incentives for the private sector and, in some cases, regulation are
mentioned in CIP policy. Federal CIP policy also encourages the voluntary
creation of information sharing

and analysis centers (ISACs) to serve as mechanisms for gathering,
analyzing, and appropriately sanitizing and disseminating information to
and from infrastructure sectors and the federal government through NIPC.
ISACs are critical since privatesector entities control over 80 percent of
our nation*s critical infrastructures. Their activities could improve the
security posture of the individual sectors, as well as provide an improved
level of communication within and across sectors and all levels of
government. While PDD 63 encouraged the creation of ISACs, it left the
actual design and functions of the ISACs, along with their relationship
with NIPC, to be determined by the private sector in consultation with the
federal government. PDD 63 did provide suggested activities, which the
ISACs could undertake, including

establishing baseline statistics and patterns on the various
infrastructures;

serving as a clearinghouse for information within and among the various
sectors;

providing a library for historical data for use by the private sector and
government; and

reporting private- sector incidents to NIPC. As we reported in our April
8, 2003, 13 testimony, table 3 shows the sectors identified in federal CIP
policy, the lead agencies for these sectors, and whether or not an ISAC
has been established for the sector.

13 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Security Progress Made,
But Challenges Remain to Protect Federal Systems and the Nation*s Critical
Infrastructures, GAO- 03- 564T (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 8, 2003).

15 GAO- 03- 715T

Table 3: Lead Agencies and ISAC Status by CIP Sector Sectors Designated
lead agency ISAC

established Sectors identified by PDD 63 Information and
telecommunications Homeland Security* Information technology

16 GAO- 03- 715T

threats, and other security data. For example, the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace calls for the development of a National Cyberspace
Security Response System. To be coordinated by DHS, this system is
described as a public/ private architecture for analyzing and warning,
managing incidents of national significance, promoting continuity in
government systems and private- sector infrastructures, and increasing
information sharing across and between organizations to improve cyberspace
security. The system is to include governmental and nongovernmental
entities, such as private- sector ISACs. The strategies also encourage the
continued establishment of ISACs and efforts to enhance the analytical
capabilities of existing ISACs.

As we previously reported, according to a DHS official, the department is
continuing to carry out the CIP activities of the functions and
organizations transferred to it by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 14
And although NIPC has

experienced the loss of certain senior leadership prior to its transition
to the new department and has identified some staffing needs, this
official stated that the department is able to provide the functions
previously performed by NIPC. Further, he stated that the department is
enhancing those activities as it integrates them within the new department
and is developing a business plan. The official also stated that the
department is continuing previously established efforts to maintain and
build relationships with other federal entities, including the FBI and
other NIPC partners, and with the private sector.

To fulfill its mission, the IAIP directorate will need to ensure effective
information sharing with other federal entities. For example, information
sharing with the recently formed Terrorist Threat Integration Center
(TTIC) is a central function of the directorate. TTIC was created to merge
and analyze terrorist- related information collected domestically and
abroad to enhance coordination, facilitate threat analysis, and enable
more comprehensive threat assessments. DHS plans to provide staff to work
at TTIC, and the center is to provide DHS with a comprehensive assessment
of threat information that will guide the department*s response to any
potential attacks. In addition, IAIP will need to establish effective
information sharing with the numerous CIP entities not transferred to DHS.
In July 2002, we issued a report identifying at least 50 organizations
that were involved in national or multinational cyber CIP efforts,
including 5 advisory committees, 6 Executive Office of the President
organizations, 38 executive branch organizations associated with
departments, agencies, or intelligence organizations, and 3 other
organizations. 15 Only 5 of the CIP organizations transferred to DHS.

14 GAO- 03- 564T. 15 U. S. General Accounting Office, Critical
Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More Coordinated and
Comprehensive Approach for Protecting Information Systems, GAO- 02- 474
(Washington, D. C.: July 15, 2002).

17 GAO- 03- 715T

The Directorate of Border and Transportation Security According to the
act, the Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS) is
responsible for, among other things, (1) preventing the entry of
terrorists and the instruments of terrorism into the United States; (2)
securing the borders, territorial waters, ports, terminals, waterways, and
air, land, and sea transportation systems, including managing and
coordinating those functions transferred to the department; (3) carrying
out immigration enforcement functions; (4) establishing and administering
rules for granting visas, and (5) administering customs laws. A number of
federal entities are under its responsibility, such as the Transportation
Security Administration, U. S. Customs Service, the border security
functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service, and the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center. To successfully protect the borders and transportation systems of
the United

States, BTS faces the challenge of sharing information across the various
organizations under its responsibility. According to the National Strategy
for Homeland Security, to successfully prevent the entry of contraband,
unauthorized aliens, and potential terrorists, DHS will have to increase
the level of information available on inbound goods and passengers to the
border management component agencies under the BTS. For example, the
strategy discusses the need to increase the security of international
shipping containers* noting that 50 percent of the value of U. S. imports
arrives via 16 million containers. To increase security, U. S. inspectors
will need shared information so that they can identify high- risk
containers. In addition, protecting our borders from the entry of
unauthorized aliens and potential terrorists will require the sharing of
information between various law enforcement and immigration services. For
example, we recently reported on the use of watch lists as important tools
to help secure our nation*s borders. 16 These lists provide decision
makers with information about individuals who are known or suspected
terrorists and criminals so that these individuals can either be prevented
from entering the country, apprehended while in the country, or
apprehended as they attempt to exit the country.

The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate According to the act,
the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate (EPR) ensures that the
nation is prepared for, and able to recover from, terrorist attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies. In addition, EPR is responsible for
building a comprehensive national incident management system with federal,
state, and local governments and authorities to respond to such attacks
and disasters. This project will require developing an extensive program
of 16 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Terrorist
Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and
Sharing, GAO- 03- 322 (Washington, D. C: Apr. 15, 2003).

18 GAO- 03- 715T

information sharing among federal, state and local governments. Further,
EPR is to develop comprehensive programs for developing interoperable
communications technology and helping to ensure that emergency response
providers acquire such technology. Among the functions transferred to EPR
are the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Integrated Hazard
Information System of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
and the Metropolitan Medical Response System.

Information sharing is important to emergency responders to prepare for
and respond to terrorist attacks and other emergencies. For example, if a
biological attack were to occur, it would be important for health
officials to quickly and effectively exchange information with relevant
experts directly responding to the event in order to respond
appropriately. To support this type of exchange, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) created the Epidemic Information Exchange
(Epi- X), a secure, Web- based communications network that serves as an
information exchange between CDC, state and local health departments,
poison control centers, and other public health professionals. According
to CDC, Epi- X*s primary goals include informing health officials about
important public health events, helping them respond to public health
emergencies, and encouraging professional growth and the exchange of

information. CDC has also created an emergency operations center to
respond to public health emergencies and to allow for immediate secure
communication between CDC, the Department of Health and Human Services,
federal intelligence and emergency response officials, DHS, and state and
local public health officials.

Information Sharing Challenges GAO has made numerous recommendations over
the last several years related to information sharing functions that have
been transferred to DHS. One significant area of GAO work concerns the
federal government*s CIP efforts, which is focused on the sharing of
information on incidents, threats, and vulnerabilities, and the providing
of warnings related to critical infrastructures both within the federal
government and between the federal government and state and local
governments, and the private sector. Although improvements have been made
in protecting our nation*s critical infrastructures and continuing efforts
are in progress, further efforts are needed to address the following
critical CIP challenges that GAO has identified:

developing a comprehensive and coordinated national plan to facilitate CIP
information sharing, which clearly delineates the roles and
responsibilities of federal and nonfederal CIP entities, defines interim
objectives and milestones, sets timeframes for achieving objectives, and
establishes performance measures;

developing fully productive information sharing relationships within the
federal government and between the federal government and state and local
governments and the private sector;

19 GAO- 03- 715T

improving the federal government*s capabilities to analyze incident,
threat, and vulnerability information obtained from numerous sources and
share appropriate timely, useful warnings and other information concerning
both cyber and physical threats to federal entities, state and local
governments, and the private sector; and

providing appropriate incentives for nonfederal entities to increase
information sharing with the federal government. In addition, GAO recently
identified challenges in consolidating and standardizing

watch list structures and policies, which are essential to effectively
sharing information on suspected criminals and terrorists.

A Complete and Coordinated National CIP Plan Needs to Be Developed An
underlying issue in the implementation of CIP is that no national plan to
facilitate information sharing yet exists that clearly delineates the
roles and responsibilities of federal and nonfederal CIP entities, defines
interim objectives and milestones, sets timeframes for achieving
objectives, and establishes performance measures. Such a clearly defined
plan is essential for defining the relationships among all CIP
organizations to ensure that the approach is comprehensive and well
coordinated. Since 1998, we have reported on the need for such a plan and
made numerous related recommendations.

In September 1998, we reported that developing a governmentwide strategy
that clearly defined and coordinated the roles of federal entities was
important to ensure governmentwide cooperation and support for PDD 63. 17
At that time, we recommended that the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
ensure such coordination.

In January 2000, the President issued Defending America*s Cyberspace:
National Plan for Information Systems Protection: Version 1.0: An
Invitation to a Dialogue as a first major element of a more comprehensive
effort to protect the nation*s information systems and critical assets
from future attacks. The plan proposed achieving the twin goals of making
the U. S. government a model of information security and developing a
public/ private partnership to defend our national infrastructures.
However, this plan focused largely on federal cyber CIP efforts, saying
little about the private- sector role.

In September 2001, we reported that agency questions had surfaced
regarding specific roles and responsibilities of entities involved in
cyber CIP and the timeframes within which CIP objectives were to be met,
as well as guidelines for measuring progress. 18 Accordingly, we made
several recommendations to

17 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Security: Serious
Weaknesses Place Critical Federal Operations and Assets at Risk, GAO/
AIMD- 98- 92 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 23, 1998). 18 U. S. General
Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related
Recommendations,

GAO- 01- 822 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 20, 2001).

20 GAO- 03- 715T

supplement those we had made in the past. Specifically, we recommended
that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs ensure
that the federal government*s strategy to address computer- based threats
define specific roles and responsibilities of organizations involved in
CIP and related

information security activities;

interim objectives and milestones for achieving CIP goals and a specific
action plan for achieving these objectives, including implementing
vulnerability assessments and related remedial plans; and

performance measures for which entities can be held accountable. In July
2002 we issued a report identifying at least 50 organizations that were
involved in national or multinational cyber CIP efforts, including 5
advisory committees, 6 Executive Office of the President organizations, 38
executive branch organizations associated with departments, agencies, or
intelligence organizations, and 3 other organizations. 19 Although our
review did not cover organizations with national physical CIP
responsibilities, the large number of organizations that we did identify
as involved in CIP efforts presents a need to clarify how these entities
coordinate their activities with each other. Our report also stated that
PDD 63 did not specifically address other possible critical sectors and
their respective federal agency counterparts. Accordingly, we recommended
that the federal government*s strategy also

include all relevant sectors and define the key federal agencies* roles
and responsibilities associated with each of these sectors, and

define the relationships among the key CIP organizations. In July 2002,
the National Strategy for Homeland Security called for interim cyber and
physical infrastructure protection plans that DHS would use to build a
comprehensive national infrastructure plan. Implementing a well- developed
plan is critical in effective coordination in times of crises. According
to the strategy, the national plan is to provide a methodology for
identifying and prioritizing

critical assets, systems, and functions, and for sharing protection
responsibility with state and local governments and the private sector.
The plan is also to establish standards and benchmarks for infrastructure
protection and provide a means to measure performance. The plan is
expected to inform DHS on budgeting and planning for critical
infrastructure protection activities and how to use policy instruments to
coordinate between government and private entities to improve the security
of our national infrastructures to appropriate levels. The strategy also
states that the DHS is to unify the currently divided responsibilities for
cyber and physical security. According to the department*s November 2002
reorganization

19 GAO- 02- 474.

21 GAO- 03- 715T

plan, the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection is responsible
for developing a comprehensive national infrastructure plan. As discussed
previously, in February 2003, the President issued the interim

strategies* The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and The National
Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key
Assets (hereafter referred to in this testimony as the cyberspace security
strategy and the physical protection strategy). These strategies identify
priorities, actions, and responsibilities for the federal government,
including federal lead departments and agencies and the DHS, as well as
for state and local governments and the private sector. Both define
strategic objectives for protecting our nation*s critical assets. The
physical protection strategy discusses the goals and objectives for
protecting our nation*s critical infrastructure and key assets from
physical attack. The cyberspace security strategy provides a framework for
organizing and prioritizing the individual and concerted responsibilities
of all levels of

government to secure cyberspace. According to the physical protection
strategy, across government, there are inconsistent methodologies to
prioritize efforts to enhance critical infrastructure protection. This
problem is compounded with ineffective communication among the federal,
state, and local governments that has resulted in untimely, disparate, and
at times conflicting communication between those who need it most. DHS has
been given a primary role in providing cross- sector coordination to
improve communication and planning efforts and serves as the single point
of coordination for state and local governments on homeland security
issues. To fulfill its role as the cross- sector coordinator, DHS will
partner with state and local governments and the private sector to
institute processes that are transparent, comprehensive, and results-
oriented. This effort will include creating mechanisms for collaborative
national planning efforts between the private and public sectors and for
consolidating the individual sector plans into a comprehensive plan that
will define their respective roles, responsibilities, and expectations.

The cyberspace security strategy is the counterpart to the physical
protection strategy and provides the framework for organizing and
prioritizing the individual and concerted responsibilities of all levels
of government to secure cyberspace. DHS serves as the focal point for
managing cybersecurity incidents that could impact the federal government
or the national information infrastructure, and thus, plays a central role
in executing the initiatives assigned in this strategy. While the
cyberspace security strategy mentions the responsibility of DHS in

creating a comprehensive national plan for securing resources and key
infrastructures, much of the strategy*s emphasis remains on coordinating
and integrating various plans with the private sector.

Neither strategy (1) clearly indicates how the physical and cyber efforts
will be coordinated; (2) defines the roles, responsibilities, and
relationships among the key CIP organizations, including state and local
governments and the private sector; (3) indicates time frames or
milestones for their overall implementation or

22 GAO- 03- 715T

for accomplishing specific actions or initiatives; nor (4) establishes
performance measures for which entities can be held responsible. Until a
comprehensive and coordinated plan is completed that unifies the
responsibilities for cyber and physical infrastructures; identifies roles,
responsibilities, and relationships for all CIP efforts; establishes time
frames or milestones for implementation; and establishes performance
measures, our nation risks not having a consistent and appropriate
information sharing framework to deal with growing threats to its critical
infrastructure.

Better Information Sharing on Threats and Vulnerabilities Must Be
Implemented Information sharing is a key element in developing
comprehensive and practical approaches to defending against potential
cyber and other attacks, which could threaten the national welfare.
Information on threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents experienced by
others can help identify trends, better understand the risks faced, and
determine what preventive measures should be implemented. However, as we
have reported in recent years, establishing the trusted relationships and
information- sharing protocols necessary to support such coordination can
be difficult. In addition, the private sector has expressed concerns about
sharing information with the government and the difficulty of obtaining
security clearances. Both Congress and the administration have taken steps
to address information sharing issues in law and recent policy guidance,
but their effectiveness will largely depend on how DHS implements its
information sharing responsibilities.

A number of activities have been undertaken to build information- sharing
relationships between the federal government and the private sector, such
as InfraGard, the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security,
efforts by the CIAO, and efforts by lead agencies to establish ISACs. For
example, the InfraGard Program, which provides the FBI and NIPC with a
means of securely sharing information with individual companies, has
expanded substantially. By early January 2001, 518 entities were InfraGard
members* up from 277 members in October 2000. Members include
representatives from private industry, other government agencies, state
and local law enforcement, and the academic community. As of February
2003, InfraGard members totaled over 6,700.

As stated above, PDD 63 encouraged the voluntary creation of ISACs to
serve as the mechanism for gathering, analyzing, and appropriately
sanitizing and disseminating information between the private sector and
the federal government through NIPC. In April 2001, we reported that NIPC
and other government entities had not developed fully productive
information- sharing relationships but that NIPC had undertaken a range of
initiatives to foster information sharing relationships with ISACs, as
well as with government and international entities. We recommended that
NIPC formalize relationships with ISACs and develop a plan to foster a
two- way exchange of information between them.

23 GAO- 03- 715T

In response to our recommendations, NIPC officials told us in July 2002
that an ISAC development and support unit had been created, whose mission
was to enhance private- sector cooperation and trust so that it would
result in a two- way sharing of information. As shown previously in table
3, as of April 8, 2003, DHS reported that there are 16 current ISACs,
including ISACs established for sectors not identified as critical
infrastructure sectors. DHS officials also stated that they have formal
agreements with most of the current ISACs. In spite of progress made in
establishing ISACs, additional efforts are needed. All

sectors do not have a fully established ISAC, and even for those sectors
that do, our recent work showed that participation may be mixed and the
amount of information being shared between the federal government and
private- sector organizations also varies. Specifically, the five ISACs we
recently reviewed 20 showed different levels of progress in implementing
the PDD 63 suggested activities. For example, four of the five reported
that efforts were still in progress

to establish baseline statistics, which includes developing a database on
the normal levels of computer security incidents that would be used for
analysis purposes. Also, while all five reported that they serve as the
clearinghouse of information (such as incident reports and warnings
received from members) for their own sectors, only three of the five
reported that they are also coordinating with other sectors. Only one of
the five ISACs reported that it provides a library of incidents and
historical data that is available to both the private sector and the
federal government, and although three additional ISACs do maintain a
library, it is available only to the private sector. Table 4 summarizes
the reported status of the five ISACs in performing these and other
activities suggested by PDD 63.

Table 4: ISACs* Progress in Performing Activities Suggested by PDD 63 ISAC

Activity Telecommunications Electricity Information

Technology Energy Water

Establish baseline statistics In progress In progress Yes In progress In
progress Serve as clearinghouse within and among sectors Yes Yes Yes

Only within own sector

Only within own sector

Provide library to private sector and government In progress Yes

Available only to private sector

Available only to private sector

Available only to private sector

Report incidents to NIPC Yes Yes Yes No Yes Source: ISACs. Some in the
private sector have expressed concerns about voluntarily sharing

information with the government. Specifically, concerns have been raised
that industry could potentially face antitrust violations for sharing
information with other industry partners, have their information subject
to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), or face potential liability
concerns for information shared in good faith. For example, neither the IT
nor the energy or the water ISACs share

20 U. S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Challenges for Selected Agencies and Industry Sectors, GAO- 03- 233
(Washington, D. C.: Feb. 28, 2003).

24 GAO- 03- 715T

their libraries with the federal government because of concerns that
information could be released under FOIA. And, officials of the energy
ISAC stated that they have not reported incidents to NIPC because of FOIA
and antitrust concerns. There will be continuing debate as to whether
adequate protection is being

provided to the private sector as these entities are encouraged to
disclose and exchange information on both physical and cyber security
problems and solutions that are essential to protecting our nation*s
critical infrastructures. The National Strategy for Homeland Security
includes *enabling critical infrastructure information sharing* in its 12
major legislative initiatives. It states that the nation must meet this
need by narrowly limiting public disclosure of information relevant to
protecting our physical and cyber critical infrastructures in order to
facilitate

the voluntary submission of information. It further states that the
Attorney General will convene a panel to propose any legal changes
necessary to enable sharing of essential homeland security related
information between the federal government and the private sector. Actions
have already been taken by the Congress and the administration to

strengthen information sharing. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act promotes
information sharing among federal agencies, and numerous terrorism task
forces have been established to coordinate investigations and improve
communications among federal and local law enforcement. 21 Moreover, the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 includes provisions that restrict federal,
state, and local government use and disclosure of critical infrastructure
information that has been voluntarily submitted to DHS. These restrictions
include exemption from disclosure under FOIA, a general limitation on use
to CIP purposes, and limitations on use in civil actions and by state or
local governments. The act also provides penalties for any federal
employee who improperly discloses any protected critical infrastructure
information. Last month DHS issued for comment its proposed rules for how
critical infrastructure information volunteered by the public will be
protected. At this time, it is too early to tell what impact the act will
have on the willingness of the private sector to share critical
infrastructure information. Information sharing within the government also
remains a challenge. In April

2001, we reported that NIPC and other government entities had not
developed fully productive information sharing and cooperative
relationships. 22 For example, federal agencies had not routinely reported
incident information to NIPC, at least in part because guidance provided
by the federal Chief Information Officers Council, which is chaired by
OMB, directs agencies to report such information to the Federal Computer
Incident Response Center (FedCIRC). 23 Further, NIPC and Department of
Defense officials agreed that their information- sharing procedures

21 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Public Law
No. 107- 56, October 26, 2001. 22 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing
National Capabilities, GAO- 01- 323 (Washington, D. C.: April. 24, 2001).
23 The Federal Computer Incident Response Center has been incorporated
into the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

25 GAO- 03- 715T

needed improvement, noting that protocols for reciprocal exchanges of
information had not been established. In addition, the expertise of the U.
S. Secret Service regarding computer crime had not been integrated into
NIPC efforts. The NIPC director stated in July 2002 that the relationship
between NIPC and other government entities had significantly improved
since our review, and that quarterly meetings with senior government
leaders were instrumental in

improving information sharing. Also, in testimony in 2002, officials from
the FedCIRC and the U. S. Secret Service discussed the collaborative and
cooperative relationships that were subsequently formed between their
agencies and NIPC. Also, the private sector has expressed its concerns
about the value of information

being provided by the government. For example, in July 2002 the President
for the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security stated in
congressional testimony that information sharing between the government
and private sector needs work, specifically, in the quality and timeliness
of cyber security information coming from the government. 24 In March 2003
we also reported that the officials from the chemical industry noted that
they need better threat information from law enforcement agencies, as well
as better coordination among agencies providing threat information. 25
They stated that chemical companies do not receive enough specific threat
information and that it frequently comes from multiple government
agencies. Similarly, in developing a vulnerability assessment methodology
to assess the security of chemical facilities against terrorist and
criminal attacks, the Department of Justice observed that chemical
facilities need more specific information about potential threats in order
to design their security systems and protocols. Chemical industry
officials also noted that efforts to share threat information among
industry and federal agencies will be effective only if government
agencies provide specific and accurate threat information. Threat
information also forms the foundation for some of the tools available to
industry for assessing facility vulnerabilities. The Justice vulnerability
assessment methodology requires threat information as the foundation for
hypothesizing about threat scenarios, which form the basis for determining
site vulnerabilities.

The Homeland Security Act, the President*s National Strategy for Homeland
Security, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, and the National
Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key
Assets all acknowledge the importance of information sharing and identify
multiple responsibilities for DHS to share information on threats and
vulnerabilities. In particular:

The Homeland Security Act authorizes the IAIP Under Secretary to have
access to all information in the federal government that concerns
infrastructure or other vulnerabilities of the United States to terrorism
and to use this information to

24 Testimony of Kenneth C. Watson, President, Partnership for Critical
Infrastructure Security, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigation of the Energy and Commerce Committee, U. S. House of
Representatives, July 9, 2002. 25 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical
Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness is Unknown, GAO- 03-
439 (Washington D. C.: Mar. 14, 2003).

26 GAO- 03- 715T

fulfill their responsibilities to provide appropriate analysis and
warnings related to threats to and vulnerabilities of critical information
systems, crisis management support in response to threats or attacks on
critical information systems, and technical assistance upon request to
private sector and government entities to respond to major failures of
critical information systems.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security specifies the need for DHS to
work with state and local governments to achieve *seamless communication*
among all responders. This responsibility includes developing a national
emergency communication plan to establish policies and procedures to
improve the exchange of information. Ensuring improved communications also
involves developing systems that help prevent attacks and minimize damage.
Such systems, which would be accessed and used by all levels of
government, would detect hostile intents and help locate individual
terrorists as well as monitor and detect outbreaks. The cyberspace
security strategy encourages DHS to work with the National

Infrastructure Advisory Council and the private sector to develop an
optimal approach and mechanism to disclose vulnerabilities in order to
expedite the development of solutions without creating opportunities for
exploitation by hackers. DHS is also expected to raise awareness about
removing obstacles to sharing information concerning cybersecurity and
infrastructure vulnerabilities between the public and private sectors and
is encouraged to work closely with ISACs to ensure that they receive
timely and actionable threat and vulnerability data and to coordinate
voluntary contingency planning efforts.

The physical protection strategy describes DHS* need to collaborate with
the intelligence community and the Department of Justice to develop
comprehensive threat collection, assessment, and dissemination processes
that are distributed to the appropriate entity in a timely manner. It also
enumerates several initiatives directed to DHS to accomplish to create a
more effective information- sharing environment among the key
stakeholders, including establishing requirements for sharing information;
supporting state and local participation with ISACs to more effectively
communicate threat and vulnerability information; protecting secure and
proprietary information deemed sensitive by the private sector;
implementing processes for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating threat
data to integrate information from all sources; and developing
interoperable systems to share sensitive information among government
entities to facilitate meaningful information exchange.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security also describes DHS*s need to
engage its partners around the world in cooperative efforts to improve
security. It states that DHS will increase information sharing between the
international law enforcement, intelligence, and military communities.

27 GAO- 03- 715T

Analysis and Warning Capabilities Need to Be Improved Analysis and warning
capabilities should be developed to detect precursors to attacks on the
nation so that advanced warnings can be issued and protective measures
implemented. Since the 1990s, the national security community and the
Congress have identified the need to establish analysis and warning
capabilities to protect against strategic computer attacks against the
nation*s critical computerdependent infrastructures. Such capabilities
need to address both cyber and physical threats and involve (1) gathering
and analyzing information for the purpose of detecting and reporting
otherwise potentially damaging actions or intentions and (2) implementing
a process for warning policymakers and allowing them time to determine the
magnitude of the related risks. In April 2001, 26 we reported on NIPC*s
progress and impediments in developing

analysis and warning capabilities for computer- based attacks, which
included the following: 27 Lack of a generally accepted methodology for
analyzing strategic cyber- based

threats. For example, there was no standard terminology, no standard set
of factors to consider, and no established thresholds for determining the
sophistication of attack techniques. According to officials in the
intelligence and national security community, developing such a
methodology would require an

intense interagency effort and dedication of resources.

Prolonged leadership vacancies and inadequate staff expertise, in part
because other federal agencies had not provided the originally anticipated
number of detailees. For example, at the close of our review in February
2001, the position of Chief of the Analysis and Warning Section, which was
to be filled by the Central Intelligence Agency, had been vacant for about
half of NIPC*s 3- year existence. In addition, NIPC had been operating
with only 13 of the 24 analysts that NIPC

officials estimated were needed to develop analytical capabilities.

Lack of industry- specific data on factors such as critical system
components, known vulnerabilities, and interdependencies. Under PDD 63,
such information is to be developed for each of eight industry segments by
industry representatives and the designated federal lead agencies.
However, at the close of our work, only three industry assessments had
been partially completed, and none had been provided to NIPC. In September
2001, we reported that although outreach efforts had raised awareness and
improved information sharing, substantive, comprehensive analysis of
infrastructure sector interdependencies and vulnerabilities had been
limited.

Another challenge confronting the analysis and warning capabilities of our
nation is that, historically, our national CIP attention and efforts have
been focused on

26 GAO- 01- 323. 27 Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the
functions of NIPC (except for computer investigations and operations) were
transferred over to DHS from the FBI.

28 GAO- 03- 715T

cyber threats. As we also reported in April 2001, although PDD 63 covers
both physical and cyber threats, federal efforts to meet the directive*s
requirements have pertained primarily to cyber threats, since this is an
area that the leaders of the administration*s CIP strategy view as needing
attention. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have
increased the emphasis of physical threats. In addition, in July 2002,
NIPC reported that the potential for concurrent cyber and physical (*
swarming*) attacks is an emerging threat to the U. S. critical
infrastructure. Further, in July 2002, the director of NIPC also told us
that NIPC

had begun to develop some capabilities for identifying physical CIP
threats. For example, NIPC had developed thresholds with several ISACs for
reporting physical incidents and, since January 2002, has issued several
information bulletins concerning physical CIP threats. However, NIPC*s
director acknowledged that fully developing this capability would be a
significant challenge. The physical protection strategy states that DHS
will maintain a comprehensive, up- to- date assessment of vulnerabilities
across sectors and improve processes for domestic threat data collection,
analysis, and dissemination to state and local governments and private
industry. The administration and Congress continue to emphasize the need
for these

analysis and warning capabilities. The National Strategy for Homeland
Security identified intelligence and warning as one of six critical
mission areas and called for major initiatives to improve our nation*s
analysis and warning capabilities. The strategy also stated that no
government entity was then responsible for analyzing terrorist threats to
the homeland, mapping these threats to our vulnerabilities, and taking
protective action. The Homeland Security Act gives such responsibility to
the new DHS. For example, the IAIP Under Secretary is responsible for
administering the Homeland Security Advisory System, and is to coordinate
with other federal agencies to provide specific warning information and
advice to state and local agencies, the private sector, the public, and
other entities about appropriate protective measures and countermeasures
to homeland security threats. An important aspect of improving our
nation*s analysis and warning capabilities is

having comprehensive vulnerability assessments. The President*s National
Strategy for Homeland Security also states that comprehensive
vulnerability assessments of all of our nation*s critical infrastructures
are important from a planning perspective in that they enable authorities
to evaluate the potential effects of an attack on a given sector and then
invest accordingly to protect it. The strategy states that the U. S.
government does not perform vulnerability assessments of the nation*s
entire critical infrastructure. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 states
that the DHS*s IAIP Under Secretary is to carry out comprehensive
assessments of the vulnerabilities of key resources and critical
infrastructures of the United States. Another critical issue in developing
effective analysis and warning capabilities is

to ensure that appropriate intelligence and other threat information, both
cyber and physical, is received from the intelligence and law enforcement
communities.

29 GAO- 03- 715T

For example, there has been considerable public debate regarding the
quality and timeliness of intelligence data shared between and among
relevant intelligence, law enforcement, and other agencies. Also, as the
transfer of NIPC to DHS

organizationally separated it from the FBI*s law enforcement activities
(including the Counterterrorism Division and NIPC field agents), it will
be critical to establish mechanisms for continued communication to occur.
Further, it will be

important that the relationships between the law enforcement and
intelligence communities and the new DHS are effective and that
appropriate information is exchanged on a timely basis. The act gives DHS
broad statutory authority to access intelligence information, as well as
other information relevant to the terrorist threat and to turn this
information into useful warnings. For example, DHS is to be a key
participant in the multi- agency TTIC 28 that reportedly began operations
on May 1, 2003. According to a White House fact sheet, DHS*s IAIP is to
receive and analyze terrorism- related information from the TTIC. 29
Although the purpose of TTIC and the authorities and responsibilities of
the FBI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) counterterrorism
organizations remain distinct, it has been reported that many details of
the new center have not yet been finalized, including the types of reports
that will be provided to other agencies.

In addition, according to NIPC*s director, as of July 2002, a significant
challenge in developing a robust analysis and warning function is the
development of the technology and human capital capacities to collect and
analyze substantial amounts of information. Similarly, the Director of the
FBI testified in June 2002 that implementing a more proactive approach to
preventing terrorist acts and denying terrorist groups the ability to
operate and raise funds require a centralized and robust analytical
capacity that did not exist in the FBI*s Counterterrorism Division. 30 He
also stated that processing and exploiting information gathered
domestically and abroad during the course of investigations requires an
enhanced analytical and data mining capacity that was not then available.
According to DHS*s reorganization plans, the IAIP Under Secretary and the
CIO of the department are to fulfill their responsibilities as laid out by
the act to establish and utilize a secure communications and IT
infrastructure. This infrastructure is to include data- mining and other
analytical tools in order to access, receive, analyze, and disseminate
data and information.

Additional Incentives Are Needed to Encourage Increased Information
Sharing Efforts PDD 63 stated that sector liaisons should identify and
assess economic incentives to encourage sector information sharing and
other desired behavior. Consistent 28 The center was formed from elements
of the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI*s Counterterrorism
Division, the Director of Central Intelligence*s Counterterrorist Center,
and the Department of Defense. 29 The White House, Fact Sheet:
Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America (Washington, D. C.:
Jan. 28, 2003). 30 Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director Federal
Bureau of Investigation, before the Subcommittee for the Departments of
Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies,
Committee on Appropriations, U. S. House of Representatives, June 21,
2002.

30 GAO- 03- 715T

with the original intent of PDD 63, the National Strategy for Homeland
Security

states that, in many cases, sufficient incentives exist in the private
market for addressing the problems of CIP. However, the strategy also
discusses the need to use all available policy tools to protect the
health, safety, or well- being of the American people. It mentions federal
grant programs to assist state and local efforts, legislation to create
incentives for the private sector, and, in some cases, regulation. The
physical protection strategy reiterates that additional regulatory
directives and mandates should only be necessary in instances where the
market forces are insufficient to prompt the necessary investments to
protect critical infrastructures and key assets. The cyberspace security
strategy also states that the market is to provide the major impetus to
improve cyber security and that regulation will not become a primary means
of securing cyberspace.

Last year, the Comptroller General testified on the need for strong
partnerships with those outside the federal government and that the new
department would need to design and manage tools of public policy to
engage and work constructively with third parties. 31 We have also
previously testified on the choice and design of public policy tools that
are available to governments. 32 These public policy tools include grants,
regulations, tax incentives, and regional coordination and partnerships to
motivate and mandate other levels of government or the private sector to
address security concerns. Some of these tools are already being used,
such as in the water and chemical sectors. Without appropriate
consideration of public policy tools, private sector

participation in sector- related information sharing and other CIP efforts
may not reach its full potential. For example, we reported in January 2003
33 on the efforts of the financial services sector to address cyber
threats, including industry efforts to share information and to better
foster and facilitate sectorwide efforts. We also reported on the efforts
of federal entities and regulators to partner with the financial services
industry to protect critical infrastructures and to address information
security. We found that although federal entities had a number of efforts
ongoing, Treasury, in its role as sector liaison, had not undertaken a
comprehensive assessment of the potential public policy tools to encourage
the financial services sector in implementing information sharing and
other CIPrelated efforts. Because of the importance of considering public
policy tools to encourage private sector participation, we recommended
that Treasury assess the need for public policy tools to assist the
industry in meeting the sector*s goals. In addition, in February 2003, we
reported on the mixed progress five ISACs had made in accomplishing the
activities suggested by PDD 63. We recommended that the responsible lead
agencies assess the need for public policy tools to encourage

31 U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Proposal for
Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But Implementation Will B Pivotal to Success,
GAO- 01- 886T (Washington, D. C.: June 25, 2002). 32 U. S. General
Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a
National Preparedness Strategy, GAO- 02- 549T (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 28,
2002). 33 U. S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure
Protection: Efforts of the Financial Services Sector to Address Cyber
Threats, GAO- 03- 173 (Washington, DC,: Jan. 30, 2003).

31 GAO- 03- 715T

increased private- sector CIP activities and greater sharing of
intelligence and incident information between the sectors and the federal
government.

The President*s fiscal year 2004 budget request for the new DHS includes
$829 million for information analysis and infrastructure protection, a
significant increase from the estimated $177 million for fiscal year 2003.
In particular, the requested funding for protection includes about $500
million to identify key critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and
support the necessary steps to ensure that security is improved at these
sites. Although it also includes almost $300 million for warning
advisories, threat assessments, a communications system, and outreach
efforts to state and local governments and the private sector, additional
incentives may still be needed to encourage nonfederal entities to
increase their CIP efforts.

Consolidating and Standardizing Watch List Structures and Policies We
recently reported on the terrorist and criminal watch list systems
maintained by different federal agencies. 34 These watch lists are
important informationsharing tools for securing our nation*s borders
against terrorists. Simply stated, watch lists can be viewed as automated
databases that are supported by certain analytical capabilities. These
lists contain various types of data, from biographical data* such as a
person*s name and date of birth* to biometric data such as fingerprints.
Nine federal agencies, 35 which before the establishment of DHS

spanned five different cabinet- level departments, 36 currently maintain
12 terrorist and criminal watch lists. These lists are also used by at
least 50 federal, state, and local agencies. We found that the watch lists
include overlapping but not identical sets of data,

and that different policies and procedures govern whether and how these
data are shared with others. As a general rule, we found that this
information sharing is more likely to occur among federal agencies than
between federal agencies and either state and local governments agencies
or private entities. According to the

National Strategy for Homeland Security, in the aftermath of the September
11th attacks, it became clear that vital watch list information stored in
numerous and disparate databases was not available to the right people at
the right time. In particular, federal agencies that maintained
information about terrorists and other criminals had not consistently
shared it. The strategy attributed these informationsharing limitations to
legal, cultural, and technical barriers that resulted in the

34 GAO- 03- 322. 35 The nine agencies are the State Department*s Bureau of
Intelligence and Research and Bureau of Consular Affairs; the Justice
Department*s Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, U. S. Marshals Service, and the U. S. National
Central Bureau for Interpol; the Department of Defense*s Air Force Office
of Special Investigations; the Transportation Department*s Transportation
Security Administration; and the Treasury Department*s U. S. Customs
Service. Of these, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
Transportation Security Administration, and the U. S. Customs Service have
been incorporated into the new DHS. 36 These departments are the
Departments of State, Treasury, Transportation, Justice, and Defense.

32 GAO- 03- 715T

watch lists being developed in different ways, for different purposes, and
in isolation from one another. To address these limitations, the strategy
provides for developing a consolidated watch list that would bring
together the information on known or suspected terrorists contained in
federal agencies* respective lists.

Further, we found that the extent to which such information sharing is
accomplished electronically is constrained by fundamental differences in
the watch lists* systems architecture. Agencies have developed their
respective watch lists and managed their use in isolation from each other,
in recognition of each agency*s unique legal, cultural, and technological
environments. The result is inconsistent and limited information sharing.
We found that federal agencies that shared their watch list data with each
other had developed and implemented their own interfaces with other
federal agencies* watch lists. The consequence is the kind of overly
complex, unnecessarily inefficient and potentially ineffective network
that is associated with unstructured and nonstandard database
environments. In particular, this environment consists of nine agencies*
with 12 watch lists* that collectively maintain at least 17 interfaces. A
simplified representation of the number of watch list interfaces and the
complexity of the watch list environment is provided in figure 3.

33 GAO- 03- 715T

Figure 3: Simplified Overview of the Border Security Process, Departments
and Agencies Involved, Watch Lists Used, and Sharing Among Watch Lists

As we recently reported, differences in agencies* cultures have been and
remain one of the principal impediments to integrating and sharing
information from watch lists and other information.

Finally, we found that not all of the nine agencies have policies and
procedures governing the sharing of watch lists. In addition, each agency
had different

34 GAO- 03- 715T

policies and procedures on memorandums of understanding, ranging from one
agency*s not specifying any requirements to others* specifying in detail
that such agreements should include how, when, and where information would
be shared with other parties. We recommended that the Secretary of DHS, in
collaboration with the heads of other departments and agencies that have
or use watch lists, lead an effort to consolidate and standardize the
federal government*s watch list structures and policies to promote better
integration and information sharing. DHS generally agreed with our
findings and recommendations.

Effective Systems and Processes Need to Be Established to Facilitate
Information Sharing

The success of homeland security relies on establishing effective systems
and processes to facilitate information sharing among government entities
and the private sector. In February 2003, the Chief Information Officer
(CIO) of DHS stated that a key goal to protecting our nation is to put in
place mechanisms that provide the right information to the right people
all the time. He further stated that IT would provide homeland security
officials throughout the United States with complete awareness of threats
and vulnerabilities as well as knowledge of the personnel and resources
available to conquer those threats. We have identified potential barriers
and critical success factors to information sharing that DHS should
consider. Also, in addition to the need to develop technological
solutions, key management issues that DHS must overcome to achieve success
include

integrating existing IT resources of 22 different agencies,

making new IT investments,

ensuring that sensitive information is secured,

developing secure communications networks,

developing a performance focus,

integrating staff from different organizations and ensuring that the
department has properly skilled staff, and ensuring effective oversight.
Addressing these issues will be critical to establishing the effective
systems and

processes required to facilitate information sharing within the new
department.

35 GAO- 03- 715T

Potential Barriers to Information Sharing GAO has previous reported
numerous potential barriers to information sharing. that DHS faces,
examples of which are summarized in table 5. 37 It will be important for
the department to understand these barriers, consider any related
provisions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and develop appropriate
strategies to address them.

Table 5: Potential Barriers to Information Sharing Where information
sharing can potentially break down Why Government efforts to sponsor
research and development

efforts to develop new homeland security technologies

 Intellectual property concerns may affect the willingness to contract
with the government, including poor definitions of what technical data are
needed by the government and unwillingness on the part of government
officials to exercise the flexibilities available to them concerning
intellectual property rights.

 Concerns that inadvertent release of confidential business material,
such as attempted or successful attacks, gaps in security, or trade
secrets or proprietary information, could damage reputations, lower
consumer confidence, hurt competitiveness, and decrease market shares of
firms. Government efforts to facilitate data sharing on critical
infrastructures

 Concerns about potential antitrust violations may keep companies from
sharing information with other industry partners.  Concerns that sharing
information with the government could subject data to Freedom of
Information Act disclosures or expose companies to potential liability may
also prevent companies from sharing data with government agencies. 
Reluctance to disclose corporate information. Private sector efforts to
get data from the government on potential vulnerabilities and threats

 National security concerns may prevent agencies from sharing data with
the private sector.  The process of declassifying and sanitizing data
takes time* possibly too long to be of use to private- sector time-
critical operations.  Difficulty obtaining security clearances for
nonfederal personnel.  Quality (specific, accurate, and actionable) and
timeliness of information received from the federal government.
Coordinating law enforcement and intelligence activities  Law enforcement
and intelligence agencies may operate in *distinct universes* separated by

jurisdictional, organizational, and cultural boundaries. At the same time,
however, roles and responsibilities at different levels of government are
not always clear and distinct.  Information may be considered too
sensitive to release to law enforcement colleagues because it could
compromise source and collection techniques.  Certain laws and
regulations as well as privacy concerns may prevent information sharing
between federal agencies, state, and local law enforcement agencies. 
Insufficient direction about what specific steps should be taken when
security alert status is increased.  Lack of access to databases and
problems with interconnectivity may impede information sharing between
agencies.

37 U. S. General Accounting Office, National Preparedness: Integrating New
and Existing Technology and Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland
Security Strategy, GAO- 02- 811T (Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002), GAO-
02- 24, and GAO- 03- 233.

36 GAO- 03- 715T

Where information sharing can potentially break down Why

Issuing attack warnings and responding to attacks  Information- sharing
mechanisms and procedures for warning against attacks, especially

between different levels of government, may be inadequate.  Roles and
responsibilities between emergency, rescue, relief, and recovery
organizations may not always be clear, especially at different levels of
government. Source: GAO. Success Factors for Sharing Information

In October 2001, we reported on information sharing practices of
organizations that successfully share sensitive or time- critical
information. 38 We found that these practices include:

establishing trust relationships with a wide variety of federal and
nonfederal entities that may be in a position to provide potentially
useful information and advice on vulnerabilities and incidents;

developing standards and agreements on how shared information will be used
and protected;

establishing effective and appropriately secure communications mechanisms;
and

taking steps to ensure that sensitive information is not inappropriately
disseminated.

Among the organizations we studied, we found some very good models to
learn from and build on. For example, CERT/ CC is charged with
establishing a capability to quickly and effectively coordinate
communication between experts in order to limit damage, responding to
incidents, and building awareness of security issues across the Internet
community. In this role, CERT/ CC receives Internet security- related
information from system and network administrators, technology managers,
and policymakers and provides them with this information along with
guidance and coordination to major security events. Further, the Agora is
a Seattle- based regional network that at the time of our study had over
600 professionals representing various fields, including information
systems security; law enforcement; local, state, and federal governments;
engineering; IT; academics; and other specialties. Members work to
establish confidential ways for organizations to share sensitive
information about common problems and best practices for dealing with
security threats. They develop and share knowledge about how to protect
electronic infrastructures, and they prompt more research specific to
electronic information systems security.

38 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Sharing: Practices That
Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure Protection, GAO- 02- 24 (Washington,
D. C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

37 GAO- 03- 715T

In addition, we have previously reported on several other key
considerations in establishing effective information sharing, including:

identifying and agreeing on the types of information to be collected and
shared between parties, developing standard terms and reporting
thresholds,

balancing varying interests and expectations, and determining the right
format and standards for collecting data so that disparate agencies can
aggregate and integrate data sets. Some efforts have already taken place
in these areas. For example, NIPC obtained information sharing agreements
with most information sharing and analysis centers, which included
specific reporting thresholds for physical and cyber incidents. Also,
incident reporting thresholds have been publicly issued. It will be
important for DHS to incorporate these considerations into its information
sharing efforts.

Developing Technological Solutions Developing and implementing appropriate
technological solutions can improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
information sharing. We have previously reported on the lack of
connectivity and interoperability between databases and

technologies important to the homeland security effort. 39 Databases
belonging to federal law enforcement agencies and INS, for example, are
not connected, and databases between state, local, and federal governments
are not always connected. The technological constraints caused by
different system architectures that impede the sharing of different
agencies* watch lists illustrate the widespread lack of interoperability
of many federal government information systems. New technologies for data
integration and interoperability could enable agencies

to share information without the need for radical structural changes. This
would allow the component agencies of DHS to work together yet retain a
measure of autonomy, thus removing some barriers hindering agencies from
embracing change. In August 2002, 40 we reported on various existing
technologies that could be more widely implemented to facilitate
information sharing. We reported that Extensible Markup Language (XML) is
useful for better information sharing. XML is a flexible, nonproprietary
set of standards for annotating or *tagging* information so that it can be
transmitted over a network such as the Internet and readily interpreted by
disparate computer systems. If implemented broadly with

39 GAO- 02- 811T 40 U. S. General Accounting Office, National
Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing Challenges, GAO- 02-
1048R (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 30, 2002).

38 GAO- 03- 715T

consistent data definitions and structures, XML offers the promise of
making it significantly easier for organizations and individuals to
identify, integrate, and process information that may be widely dispersed
among systems and organizations. For example, law enforcement agencies
could potentially better identify and retrieve information about criminal
suspects from any number of federal, state, and local databases.

We also reported that various technologies could be used to protect
information in shared databases. For example, data could be protected
through electronically secured entry technology (ESET). ESET would allow
users of separate databases to cross check or *mine* data securely without
directly disclosing their information to others, thus allowing agencies to
collaborate as well as address their needs for confidentiality or privacy.
Such technology could, for example, allow an airline to cross check a
passenger or employee against data held by government agencies in a
single- step process without actually disclosing the data to the airline.
In checking an individual, the airline would not receive any data from the
agencies* databases, rather it would receive a *yes or no* type response
and/ or a referral for further action. Additionally, appropriate
authorities could automatically be notified. We noted that intrusion
detection systems could be used to prevent unauthorized

users from accessing shared information. Intrusion detection uses normal
system and network activity data as well as known attack patterns.
Deviations from normal traffic patterns can help to identify potential
intruders.

We also observed the need to simplify the process of analyzing information
to more efficiently and effectively identify information of consequence
that must be shared. Great emphasis has been placed upon data mining and
data integration, but the third and perhaps most crucial component may be
data visualization. The vast amount of information potentially available
to be mined and integrated must be intelligently analyzed, and the results
effectively presented, so that the right people have the right information
necessary to act effectively upon such information. This may involve
pinpointing the relevant anomalies.

Before DHS was established, OHS had already begun several technological
initiatives to integrate terrorist- related information from databases
from different agencies responsible for homeland security. These included
(1) adopting metadata standards for electronic information so that
homeland security officials understood what information was available and
where it could be found and (2) developing data- mining tools to assist in
identifying patterns of criminal behavior so that suspected terrorists
could be detained before they could act.

To address these technological challenges, the Homeland Security Act
emphasized investments in new and emerging technologies to meet some of
these challenges and established the Science and Technology Directorate,
making it responsible for establishing and administering research and
development efforts and priorities to support DHS missions.

39 GAO- 03- 715T

Improving Information Technology Management Improving IT management will
be critical to transforming the new department. DHS should develop and
implement an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, to integrate
the many existing systems and processes required to support its mission.
This architecture will also guide the department*s investments in new
systems to effectively support homeland security in the coming years.
Other key IT management capacities that DHS will need to establish include
investment and acquisition management processes, effective IT security,
and secure communications networks. An Enterprise Architecture

Effectively managing a large and complex endeavor requires, among other
things, a well- defined and enforced blueprint for operational and
technological change, commonly referred to as an enterprise architecture.
Developing, maintaining, and using enterprise architectures is a leading
practice in engineering both individual systems and entire enterprises.
Enterprise architectures include several components, including a (1)
current or *as is* environment, (2) target or *to be* environment, and (3)
transition plan or strategy to move from the current to the target
environment. Governmentwide requirements for having and using
architectures to guide and constrain IT investment decisionmaking are also

addressed in federal law and guidance. 41 Our experience with federal
agencies has shown that attempts to transform IT environments without
enterprise architectures often result in unconstrained investment and
systems that are duplicative and ineffective. Moreover, our February 2002
report on the federal agencies* use of enterprise architectures found that
their use of enterprise architectures was a work in progress, with much to
be accomplished. 42 DHS faces tremendous IT challenges because programs
and agencies have been

brought together in the new department from throughout the government,
each with their own information systems. It will be a major undertaking to
integrate these diverse systems to enable effective information sharing
among themselves, as well as with those outside the department.

The Office of Homeland Security has acknowledged that an enterprise
architecture is an important next step because it can help identify
shortcomings and opportunities in current homeland- security- related
operations and systems, such as duplicative, inconsistent, or missing
information. Furthermore, the President*s homeland security strategy
identifies, among other things, the lack of an enterprise architecture as
an impediment to DHS*s systems interoperating effectively and efficiently.
Finally, the CIO of DHS has stated that the most

41 U. S. General Accounting Office, Business Systems Modernization:
Longstanding Management and Oversight Weaknesses Continue to Put
Investments at Risk, GAO- 03- 553T (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 31, 2003). 42
U. S, General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Enterprise
Architecture Use across the Federal Government Can Be Improved, GAO- 02- 6
(Washington, D. C.: Feb. 19, 2002).

40 GAO- 03- 715T

important function of his office will be to design and help implement a
national enterprise architecture that will guide the department*s
investment in and use of IT. As part of its enterprise development
efforts, the department has established working groups comprising state
and local CIOs to ensure that it understands and represents their business
processes and strategies relevant to homeland security. In addition, OMB,
in its current review of DHS*s redundant IT for consolidation and
integration, has taken an initial first step to evaluate DHS*s component
systems. 43 The CIO has set two milestones for developing the enterprise
architecture. By June 2003, he intends to complete a baseline inventory of
the department*s current IT resources and business processes, and by
August 2003 he intends to complete the future enterprise architecture. No
target date has been provided for the transition plan to move from the
current to the target environment.

In June 2002, we recommended that the federal government develop an
architecture that defined the homeland security mission and the
information, technologies, and approaches necessary to perform the mission
in a way that was divorced from organizational parochialism and cultural
differences. 44 Specifically, we recommended that the architecture
describe homeland security operations in both (1) logical terms, such as
interrelated processes and activities, information needs and flows, and
work locations and users, and (2) technical terms, such as hardware,
software, data, communications, and security attributes and performance
standards. We observed that a particularly critical function of a homeland
security architecture would be to establish protocols and standards for
data collection to ensure that data being collected were usable and
interoperable and to tell people what they needed to collect and monitor.

The CIO Council, OMB, and GAO have collaborated to produce guidance on the
content, development, maintenance, and implementation of architectures
that could be used in developing an architecture for DHS. 45 In April, we
issued an executive guide on assessing and improving enterprise
architecture management that extends this guidance. 46 Investment and
Acquisition Management Processes

The Clinger- Cohen Act, federal guidance, and recognized best practices
provide a framework for organizations to follow to effectively manage
their IT investments. This involves having a single, corporate approach
governing how an organization*s IT investment portfolio is selected,
controlled, and evaluated across its various components, including
assuring that each investment is aligned with the

43 Office of Management and Budget, Reducing Redundant IT Infrastructure
Related to Homeland Security, Memorandum for the Heads of Selected
Departments and Agencies, July 19, 2002, M- 02- 12. 44 GAO- 02- 811T. 45
See Chief Information Officer Council, A Practical Guide to Federal
Enterprise Architecture, Version 1.0, (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 2001). 46
U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: A Framework for
Assessing and Improving Enterprise Architecture Management (Version 1. 1),
GAO- 03- 584G (Washington, D. C.: April 2003).

41 GAO- 03- 715T

organization*s enterprise architecture. The lack of effective processes
can lead to cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls, and in some cases,
to failed system development efforts. GAO has issued numerous reports on
agency investment and acquisition management challenges, including INS,
which have been transferred into DHS.

INS has had long- standing difficulty developing and fielding information
systems to support its program operations. Since 1990, we have reported
that INS managers and field officials did not have adequate, reliable, and
timely information to effectively carry out the agency*s mission. For
example, INS*s benefit fraud investigations have been hampered by a lack
of integrated information systems. 47 Also, INS*s alien address
information could not be fully relied on to locate many aliens who were
believed to be in the country and who might have knowledge that would
assist the nation in its antiterrorism efforts. 48 Contributing to this
situation was INS*s lack of written procedures and automated

controls to help ensure that reported changes of address by aliens are
recorded in all of INS*s automated databases. Our work has identified
weaknesses in INS*s IT management capacities as the root cause of its
system problems, and we have made recommendations to correct the
weaknesses. INS has made progress in addressing our recommendations. In a
briefing to the House Appropriations Committee in February, the DHS CIO

stated that his objective was to develop an IT investment review process
by March 2003. Moreover, he set March as the milestone for finalizing the
identification of all of DHS*s mission- critical applications and February
of next year as the milestone for having evaluated all major applications
and investments in view of

prioritizing actions to either renew or retire them. Sound acquisition
management is also central to accomplishing the department*s mission. One
of the largest federal departments, DHS will potentially have one of the
most extensive acquisition requirements in government. The new department
is expected to acquire a broad range of technologies and services from
privatesector companies.

Moreover, DHS is faced with the challenge of integrating the procurement
functions of many of its constituent programs and missions. Inherited
challenges exist in several of the incoming agencies. For example, Customs
has major procurement programs under way that must be closely managed to
ensure that it achieves expectations. Despite some progress, we reported
that Customs still lacks important acquisition management controls. 49 For
its new import processing system, Customs has not begun to establish
process controls for determining

47 U. S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused
Approach Is Needed to Address Problems, GAO- 02- 66 (Washington, D. C.:
Jan. 31, 2002). 48 U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: INS
Cannot Locate Many Aliens Because It Lacks

Reliable Address Information, GAO- 03- 188 (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 21,
2002). 49 U. S. General Accounting Office, Customs Service Modernization:
Management Improvements Needed on High- Risk Automated Commercial
Environment Project, GAO- 02- 545 (Washington, D. C.: May 13, 2002).

42 GAO- 03- 715T

whether acquired software products and services satisfy contract
requirements before acceptance, nor to establish related controls for
effective and efficient transfer of acquired software products to the
support organization responsible for software maintenance. Agreeing with
one of our recommendations, Customs continues to make progress and plans
to establish effective acquisition process controls.

Getting the most from its IT investment will depend on how well the
department manages its acquisition activities. High- level attention to
strong system and service acquisition management practices is critical to
ensuring success.

Information Security Challenges The Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002 requires federal agencies to provide information
security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm
resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction of information collected or maintained by or
on behalf of the agency, and information systems used or operated by an
agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of
an agency. 50 Further, the Homeland Security Act specifically requires DHS
to establish procedures to ensure the authorized use and the security and

confidentiality of information shared with the department, including
information on threats of terrorism against the United States;
infrastructure or other vulnerabilities to terrorism; and threatened
interference with, attack on, compromise of, or incapacitation of critical
infrastructure or protected systems by either physical or computer- based
attack. However, establishing an effective information security program
may present significant challenges for DHS, which must bring together
programs and agencies from throughout the government and integrate their
diverse communications and information systems to enable effective
communication and information sharing both within and outside the
department. Since 1996, we have reported that poor information security is
a widespread

problem for the federal government with potentially devastating
consequences. 51 Further, we have identified information security as a
governmentwide high- risk issue in reports to the Congress since 1997*
most recently in January 2003. 52 Although agencies have taken steps to
redesign and strengthen their information system security programs, our
analyses of information security at major federal agencies have shown that
federal systems were not being adequately protected

50 Title III* Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, E-
Government Act of 2002, P. L. 107- 347, December 17, 2002. This act
superseded an earlier version of FISMA that was enacted as Title X of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002. 51 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Information Security: Opportunities for Improved OMB Oversight of Agency
Practices, GAO/ AIMD- 96- 110 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 24, 1996). 52 U.
S. General Accounting Office, High- Risk Series: Protecting Information
Systems Supporting the Federal Government and the Nation*s Critical
Infrastructures, GAO- 03- 121 (Washington, D. C.: January 2003).

43 GAO- 03- 715T

from computer- based threats, even though these systems process, store,
and transmit enormous amounts of sensitive data and are indispensable to
many federal agency operations. For the past several years, we have
analyzed audit results for 24 of the largest federal agencies, 53 and our
latest analyses, of audit reports issued from October 2001 through October
2002, continued to show significant weaknesses in federal computer systems
that put critical operations and assets at risk. 54 In particular, we
found that all 24 agencies had weaknesses in security program management,
which is fundamental to the appropriate selection and effectiveness of the
other categories of controls and covers a range of activities related to
understanding information security risks, selecting and

implementing controls commensurate with risk, and ensuring that the
controls implemented continue to operate effectively. In addition, we
found that 22 of the 24 agencies had weaknesses in access controls*
weaknesses that can make it possible for an individual or group to
inappropriately modify, destroy, or disclose sensitive data or computer
programs for purposes such as personal gain or sabotage, or in today*s
increasingly interconnected computing environment, can

expose an agency*s information and operations to attacks from remote
locations all over the world by individuals with only minimal computer and
telecommunications resources and expertise. In April 2003, 55 we also
reported that many agencies still had not established information security
programs consistent with requirements originally prescribed by government
information security reform legislation 56 and now permanently authorized
by the Federal Information Security Management Act.

Considering the sensitive and classified information to be maintained and
shared by DHS, it is critical that the department implement federal
information security requirements to ensure that its systems are
appropriately assessed for risk and that adequate controls are implemented
and working properly. Federal information security guidance, such as that
issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), can
aid DHS in this process. For example, NIST has issued guidance to help
agencies perform self- assessments of their information security programs,
conduct risk assessments, and use metrics to determine the adequacy of in-
place security controls, policies, and procedures. 57 In addition, as we
have previously reported, agencies need more specific guidance

53 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Security: Serious
Weaknesses Place Critical Federal Operations and Assets at Risk, GAO/
AIMD- 98- 92 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 23, 1998); Information Security:
Serious and Widespread Weaknesses Persist at Federal Agencies, GAO/ AIMD-
00- 295 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 6, 2000);

Computer Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Risk to Critical Federal
Operations and Assets, GAO- 02- 231T (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 9, 2001),
and Computer Security: Progress Made, but Critical Federal Operations and
Assets Remain at Risk, GAO- 02- 303T (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 19, 2002).
54 GAO- 03- 303T.

55 GAO- 03- 564T. 56 Title X, Subtitle G* Government Information Security
Reform, Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001, P. L. 106- 398, October 30, 2000. 57 National Institute of Standards
and Technology, Security Self- Assessment Guide for Information Technology
Systems, NIST Special Publication 800- 26, November 2001; Risk Management
Guide for Information Technology Systems * Recommendations of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Special Publication 800- 30,
January 2002; Security Metrics Guide for Information Technology Systems,
NIST Draft Special Publication 800- 55

(October 2002).

44 GAO- 03- 715T

on the controls that they need to implement to help ensure adequate
protection. 58 Currently, agencies have wide discretion in deciding which
computer security controls to implement and the level of rigor with which
to enforce these controls. One set of specific controls will not be
appropriate for all types of systems and data, but our studies of best
practices at leading organizations have shown that more specific guidance
is important. 59 In particular, specific mandatory standards for varying
risk levels can clarify expectations for information protection, including
audit criteria; provide a standard framework for assessing information
security risk; help ensure that shared data are appropriately protected;
and reduce demands for limited resources to independently develop security
controls. Responding to this need, the Federal Information Security
Management Act (FISMA) requires NIST to develop, for systems other than
national security systems, (1) standards to be used by all agencies to
categorize all of their information and information systems based on the
objectives of providing appropriate levels of information security
according to a range of risk levels; (2) guidelines recommending the types
of information and information systems to be included in each category;
and (3) minimum information security requirements for information and
information systems in each category. DHS has identified implementing its
information security program as a year one

objective. In continuing these efforts, it is important that DHS consider
establishing processes to annually review its information security program
and to collect and report data on the program, as required by FISMA and
OMB. Secure Communications Networks

The *Homeland Security Information Sharing Act,* included in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, provides for the President to prescribe and
implement procedures for federal agencies to share homeland security and
classified information with others, such as state and local governments,
through

information sharing systems. Provisions of the act depict the type of
information to be shared as that which reveals a threat of actual or
potential attack or other hostile acts. Grand jury information;
electronic, wire, or oral information; and foreign intelligence
information are all included in these provisions. The National Strategy
for Homeland Security also refers to the need for a secure intranet to
increase the flow of classified federal information to state and local
entities. According to the strategy, this network would provide a more
effective way to share information about terrorists. The strategy also
refers to putting into place a secure communications network to allow
agencies to share information in their existing databases. 58 GAO- 03-
121.

59 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Security Management:
Learning From Leading Organizations, GAO/ AIMD- 98- 68 (Washington, D. C.:
May 1998).

45 GAO- 03- 715T

To ensure the safe transmittal of sensitive, and, in some cases,
classified, information vertically among everyone from intelligence
entities, including the CIA, to local entities, such as those involved in
emergency response and law enforcement, as well as horizontally across the
same levels of government, requires developing and implementing
communications networks with adequate

security to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
the transmitted information. Furthermore, these communications networks
must be accessible to a variety of parties, from federal agencies to state
and local government entities and some private entities.

There appear to be many efforts under way to implement secure networks.
For example, according to the recently published the cyberspace security
strategy, DHS intends to develop a national cyberspace security response
system, the Cyber Warning Information Network (CWIN), to provide crisis
management support to government and non- government network operation
centers. CWIN is envisioned as providing private and secure network
communications for both government and industry for the purpose of sharing
cyber alert and warning information. Moreover, the National Communications
System, one of the 22 entities that were merged into the DHS, has
implemented a pilot system, the Global Early Warning Information System
(GEWIS), which will measure how critical areas of the Internet are
performing worldwide and then use that data to notify government,
industry, and allies of impending cyberattacks or possible disturbances.

Other agencies are also engaged in efforts to provide homeland security
networking and information management support for crisis management
activities. Earlier, in 2001, the President*s Advisor for Cyberspace
Security outlined the high- level functional requirements for a private,
secure network

called GovNet. Department of Defense officials have also stated that the
Army National Guard*s network GuardNet, which was used to communicate
among the states and the District of Columbia during the 9/ 11 terrorist
attacks, is being considered for homeland security mission support.

It was also recently reported that the Justice Department and the FBI are
expanding two existing sensitive but unclassified law enforcement networks
to share homeland security information across all levels of government.
When fully deployed, their Antiterrorism Information Exchange (ATIX) will
provide law enforcement agencies at all levels access to information. Law
enforcement agencies also can use ATIX to distribute security alerts to
private- sector organizations and public officials who lack security
clearances. Users, who will have different access levels on a need- to-
know basis, will include a broad range of public safety and infrastructure
organizations, including businesses that have homeland security concerns
and duties. They will have access to a secure e- mail system via a secure
Intranet, which the FBI and DHS will use to deliver alerts to ATIX users.
The FBI and other federal agencies, including DHS, will link to ATIX via
Law Enforcement Online, the bureau*s system for sensitive- but-
unclassified law enforcement data that provides an encrypted
communications service for law

46 GAO- 03- 715T

enforcement agencies on a virtual private network. The second Department
of Justice and FBI network, the Multistate Antiterrorism Regional
Information Exchange System, will enable crime analysts working on
terrorism investigations to quickly check a broad range of criminal
databases maintained by federal, state, and local agencies.

In March of this year, it was also reported that DHS*s CIO had announced
that DHS is opening up a network for secure videoconferencing to
communicate with the nation*s governors in the event of another terrorist
attack. The CIO has also stated that a major initiative in implementing
the department*s IT strategy for providing the right information to the
right people at all times is establishing the DHS Information Sharing
Network Pilot project. Moreover, he sets 2005 as a milestone for DHS to
build a *network of networks.* However, no specifics on the latter two
projects have been provided. Managing Performance

As we have previously reported, 60 the new department has the challenge of
developing a national homeland security performance focus, which relies on
related national and agency strategic and performance planning efforts of
the OHS, OMB, and the other departments and agencies. Indeed, the
individual planning activities of the various component departments and
agencies represent a good start in the development of this focus. However,
our past work on implementation of the Government Performance and Results
Act (GPRA) has highlighted ongoing difficulty with many federal
departments and agencies setting adequate performance goals, objectives,
and targets. Accordingly, attention is needed to developing and achieving
appropriate performance expectations and measures for information sharing
and in ensuring that there is linkage between DHS*s plans, other agencies*
plans, and the national strategies regarding information sharing. Ensuring
these capabilities and linkages will be vital in establishing
comprehensive planning and accountability mechanisms that will not only
guide DHS*s efforts but also help assess how well they are really working.
As we previously reported to this committee, 61 one of the barriers the
new

department faces in establishing effective homeland security is
interagency cooperation, which is largely attributed to *turf* issues
among the 22 component agencies subsumed by the new department. Strong and
sustained commitment of agency leaders would provide performance
incentives to managers and staff to break down cultural resistance and
encourage more effective information sharing pertaining to homeland
security. Moreover, agency leaders have a wide range of tools at their
disposal for enforcing and rewarding cooperative efforts, including

60 U. S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of Homeland Security, GAO- 03- 102 (Washington,
D. C.: January 2003). 61 GAO- 02- 1048R.

47 GAO- 03- 715T

performance bonuses for senior executives and incentive award programs for
staff.

Our studies of other cross- cutting federal services with similar *turf*
problems have also shown that agency performance plans, which are required
by GPRA, offer a good avenue for developing incentives to cooperate.
Specifically, agencies can set up goals in their performance plans for
participation in cross- cutting programs and report on their progress in
meeting these goals to Congress. Congress could also build similar
incentives into budget resolutions.

Shared programmatic goals and metrics would also encourage cooperation and
coordination. Agencies subsumed by DHS should all participate in the
development of goals, milestones, and metrics to measure progress and
success, and such indicators should be clearly articulated and endorsed by
senior management. Such goals and metrics must be carefully chosen since
how performance is measured greatly influences the nature of the
performance itself; poorly chosen metrics may lead to unintended or
counter- productive results. However, visible, clearly articulated and
carefully chosen shared goals and metrics can effectively overcome *turf*
issues. Developing metrics to measure the success of these activities is
critical to ensuring a successful effort. Similar indicators more directly
related to information sharing could be developed.

Emphasizing Human Capital Human capital is another critical ingredient
required for ensuring successful information sharing for homeland
security. The cornerstones to effective human capital planning include
leadership; strategic human capital planning; acquiring, developing, and
retaining talent; and building results- oriented organizational cultures.
The homeland security and intelligence communities must include these
factors in their management approach in order to benefit from effective
collaboration in this critical time. As we have previously reported, the
government- wide increase in homeland

security activities has created a demand for personnel with skills in
areas such as IT, foreign language proficiencies, and law enforcement,
without whom critical information has less chance of being shared,
analyzed, integrated, and disseminated in a timely, effective manner. 62
We specifically reported that shortages in staffing at some agencies had
exacerbated backlogs in intelligence and other information, adversely
affecting agency operations and hindering U. S.

military, law enforcement, intelligence, counterterrorism, and diplomatic
efforts. 63 62 GAO- 02- 1122T. 63 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign
Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and
Proficiency Shortfalls, GAO- 02- 375 (Washington, D. C.: January 2002).

48 GAO- 03- 715T

We have also previously reported that some of the agencies that moved into
DHS have long- standing human capital problems that will need to be
addressed. One of these challenges has been the ability to hire and retain
a talented and motivated staff. For example, we reported that INS has been
unable to reach its program goals in large part because of such staffing
problems as hiring shortfalls and agent

attrition. 64 We also reported that several INS functions have been
affected by the lack of a staff resource allocation model to identify
staffing needs. 65 We concluded then that it was likely that increased
attention to the enforcement of immigration laws and border control would
test the capacity of DHS to hire large numbers of inspectors for work at
our nation*s border entry points. Moreover, we reported that other
agencies being integrated into DHS were also expected to experience
challenges in hiring security workers and inspectors. For example, we
reported that the Agriculture Department, the Customs Service, INS, and
other agencies were all seeking simultaneously to increase the size of
their inspections staffs. 66 To overcome its significant human capital
shortfalls, DHS must develop a

comprehensive strategy capable of ensuring that the new department can
acquire, develop, and retain the skills and talents needed to prevent and
protect against terrorism. This requires identifying skill needs;
attracting people with scarce skills into government jobs; melding diverse
compensation systems to support the new department*s many needs; and
establishing a performance- oriented, accountable culture that promotes
employee involvement and empowerment. In February, the DHS CIO
acknowledged the lack of properly skilled IT staff within the component
agencies. Challenges facing DHS in this area, he stated, include
overcoming political and cultural barriers, leveraging cultural beliefs
and diversity to achieve collaborative change, and recruiting and
retaining skilled IT workers. He acknowledged that the department would
have to evaluate the talent and skills of

its IT workforce to identify existing skill gaps. He further stated that a
critical component of DHS*s IT strategic plan would address the actions
needed to train, reskill, or acquire the necessary skills to achieve a
world- class workforce. He committed to working closely with the
department*s Chief Human Capital Officer and with the Office of Personnel
Management to achieve this goal. He set July 2003 as a milestone for
developing a current inventory of IT skills, resources, and positions and
September 2003 as the targeted date for developing an action plan.

64 U. S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Enforcement: Challenges to
Implementing the INS Interior Enforcement Strategy, GAO- 02- 861T
(Washington, D. C.: June 19, 2002). 65 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of Recurring Management
Challenges, GAO- 02- 168T (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 17, 2001). 66 GAO- 03-
260.

49 GAO- 03- 715T

Ensuring Institutional Oversight It is important to note that
accountability is also a critical factor in ensuring the success of the
new department. The oversight entities of the executive branch* including
the Inspectors General, OMB and OHS* have a vital role to play in ensuring
expected performance and accountability. Likewise, congressional
committees and GAO, as the investigative arm of the legislative branch,
with their long- term and broad institutional roles, also have roles to
play in overseeing that the new department meets the demands of its
homeland security mission. * * * *

In conclusion, our country is at a critical point in its history where
information sharing with and between all levels of government and the
private sector must become an integral part of everyday operations if we
are to be able to identify terrorist threats and protect against attack.
As such, information sharing is an essential part of DHS*s
responsibilities and is critical to achieving its mission. To implement
these responsibilities, DHS will need to develop effective information
sharing systems and other information sharing mechanisms, as well as
develop strategies to address other challenges in establishing its
organization and information architecture and in developing effective
working relationships,

cooperation, and trust with other federal agencies, state and local
governments, and the private sector.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions that you or members of the committee may have at this time.

Contacts and Acknowledgement If you should have any questions about this
testimony, please contact Robert F. Dacey at (202) 512- 3317 or daceyr@
gao. gov or Randolph C. Hite at (202) 512- 3439 or hiter@ gao. gov.

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