Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States From
Certain Western Hemisphere Countries Not Detected (13-MAY-03,
GAO-03-713T).
This testimony discusses the results of security tests we
performed in which agents of the Office of Special Investigations
(OSI), acting in an undercover capacity, entered the United
States from various countries in the Western Hemisphere using
counterfeit documentation and fictitious identities. This work
was initially undertaken at the request of the Senate Finance
Committee and was continued at the request of the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, House Committee on the
Judiciary. The purpose of our tests was to determine whether U.S.
government officials conducting inspections at ports of entry
would detect the counterfeit identification documents.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-713T
ACCNO: A06907
TITLE: Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States
From Certain Western Hemisphere Countries Not Detected
DATE: 05/13/2003
SUBJECT: Identification cards
Identity verification
Immigration or emigration
Inspection
National preparedness
Passports
Barbados
Canada
Jamaica
Mexico
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GAO-03-713T
A
Test i mony Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and
Claims, House Committee on the Judiciary
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2: 00 p. m. EDT COUNTERFEIT Tuesday,
May 13, 2003 DOCUMENTS USED TO
ENTER THE UNITED STATES FROM CERTAIN WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES NOT
DETECTED
Statement of Robert J. Cramer, Managing Director Office of Special
Investigations
GAO- 03- 713T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am here today to discuss the
results of security tests we performed in which agents of the Office of
Special Investigations (OSI), acting in an undercover capacity, entered
the United States from various countries in the Western Hemisphere using
counterfeit documentation and fictitious
identities. This work was initially undertaken at the request of the
Senate Finance Committee and was continued at your request. 1 The purpose
of our tests was to determine whether U. S. government officials
conducting inspections at ports of entry would detect the counterfeit
identification documents.
I am accompanied this morning by Ronald Malfi, Director for
Investigations, and Special Agent Ramon Rodriguez.
In summary, we created counterfeit identification documents in order to
establish fictitious identities for our agents by using off- the- shelf
computer graphic software that is available to any purchaser. The agents
entered the
United States from Jamaica, Barbados, Mexico, and Canada using fictitious
names, counterfeit driver*s licenses and birth certificates. Bureau of
Customs & Border Protection (BCBP) 2 staff never questioned the
authenticity of the counterfeit documents, and our agents encountered no
difficulty entering the country using them. On two occasions, BCBP staff
did not ask for any identification when our agents entered the United
States from Mexico and Canada. We have briefed BCBP officials on the
results and methods of our work. Background Immigration regulations
require that all persons who arrive at a U. S. port of
entry be inspected by a government official. A U. S. citizen traveling
from countries in the Western Hemisphere, such as those we visited for
purposes
1 Part of this work is described in our January 30, 2003, testimony before
the Finance Committee entitled Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the
United States (GAO- 03- 438T).
2 Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the inspection of people
and goods functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
and U. S. Customs Service were transferred to the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). On March 1, 2003, BCBP became an official agency of DHS,
which includes the portions of INS and Customs that monitor individuals
entering the United States. For purposes of describing our border
crossings prior to the date that BCBP was established officially, we refer
to staff formerly employed by INS and Customs as staff of BCBP.
of these tests, is not required to show a passport when entering the
United States but is required to prove citizenship. BCBP accepts as proof
of citizenship documents, such as a United States* state or federally
issued birth certificate or a baptismal record, and photo identification
such as a driver*s license. However, since the law does not require that
U. S. citizens who enter the United States from Western Hemisphere
countries present documents to prove citizenship they are permitted to
establish U. S. citizenship by oral statements alone.
Border Crossings U. S. Border Crossing from Two of our agents traveling on
one- way tickets from Jamaica arrived at an Jamaica
airport in the United States. After landing at the U. S. airport, the two
agents proceeded to the immigration checkpoint and presented to BCBP
immigration inspectors counterfeit driver*s licenses in fictitious names
along with fictitious birth certificates purportedly issued by two
different states. One BCBP inspector asked one of the agents for his date
of birth, and inquired about where and when the agent had obtained the
birth
certificate. The agent stated that he had obtained the birth certificate
about 4 or 5 years earlier. A different BCBP inspector did not question
the second agent. The BCBP inspectors did not recognize any of the
documents presented as counterfeit and allowed the agents to enter the
United States.
U. S. Border Crossing from Barbados immigration officials provide visitors
entering Barbados with a
Barbados two- part immigration form to complete. They collect one part and
return the second part to the visitor stamped with the date of entry into
Barbados. Visitors are instructed to return the second part to immigration
officials
upon departing Barbados. In May 2003, two of our agents departed Barbados
and provided Barbados immigration officials with unstamped immigration
forms in fictitious names. Barbados officials accepted the
forms without questioning why they were not stamped. Two agents traveled
on one- way tickets from Barbados and arrived at an airport in the United
States. The two agents separately proceeded to the immigration checkpoint
and were checked by the same BCBP immigration inspector. One agent was
asked for his passport, and he responded that did not have one. The agent
provided a fictitious birth certificate and a
Customs declaration form. The BCBP inspector reviewed the documents and
asked for picture identification. In response to this request, the agent
provided a counterfeit driver*s license. The BCBP inspector then asked the
agent several questions, reviewed the documents again, asked additional
questions, and instructed the agent to proceed through Customs. The agent
provided the BCBP customs officer with the Customs form and subsequently
left the airport without any further scrutiny.
The second agent had a similar experience. The BCBP immigration inspector
asked for a passport. The agent explained that he did not have one and
provided a counterfeit birth certificate. The BCBP inspector then asked
for picture identification and the agent offered to produce a driver*s
license. The BCBP inspector did not ask to see the driver*s license but
asked several questions and then instructed the agent to proceed to
Customs. The agent turned in his Customs form to a Customs official and
then left the airport without any further scrutiny.
The BCBP immigration inspector did not question any of the counterfeit
documents.
U. S. Border Crossings from On two occasions our agents crossed the border
from Mexico into the
Mexico United States. On one occasion, at a land border crossing, a BCBP
immigration inspector asked our agent if he was a U. S. citizen and
whether
he had brought anything across the border from Mexico. After the agent
responded that he was a U. S. citizen and that he was not bringing
anything into the United States from Mexico, the inspector allowed him to
proceed without requiring any proof of identity.
On a subsequent occasion at the same border crossing, two of our agents
were asked for identification by separate BCBP inspectors. Both agents
presented counterfeit driver*s licenses and were allowed to cross into the
United States.
U. S. Border Crossings from On three occasions our agents crossed the
border from Canada into the
Canada United States. The first border crossing occurred when two agents
entered
the United States through a sea port of entry from Canada. On that
occasion, the agents were not asked to show identification. On a
subsequent occasion, two agents, driving a rented car with Canadian
plates, using fictitious names and counterfeit documents, crossed the
border into the United States at a Canadian border crossing. A BCBP
immigration inspector asked for identification and was provided the
counterfeit documents. After the inspector reviewed the documents, the
agents were allowed to cross the border.
During the Canadian land border crossing, the agents discovered a further
potential security problem. A park straddles the U. S. and Canada at this
border crossing. One of our agents was able to walk across this park into
the United States from Canada without being stopped or questioned by any
U. S. government official. Later, that agent walked back to Canada through
this park without being inspected by Canadian authorities.
Conclusion We recognize that weaknesses in inspection processes for
entrants into the United States raise complex issues, and we are currently
performing an
evaluation of those processes, which will be reported to Congress in the
coming months. 3 Although BCBP inspects millions of people who enter the
United States and detects thousands of individuals who attempt to enter
illegally each year, the results of our work indicate that BCBP inspectors
are not readily capable of detecting counterfeit identification documents.
Further, people who enter the United States are not always asked to
present identification. While current law does not require that U. S.
Citizens who enter the U. S. from Western Hemisphere countries provide
documentary proof of U. S. citizenship, this does provide an opportunity
for individuals to enter the United States illegally.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. We will be pleased to
respond to any questions you or other members of the committee may have at
this time.
3 This evaluation of the inspection process is being performed pursuant to
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996.
(601122)
GAO United States General Accounting Office
A
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