Defense Inventory: Air Force Plans and Initiatives to Mitigate	 
Spare Parts Shortages Need Better Implementation (27-JUN-03,	 
GAO-03-706).							 
                                                                 
Despite reporting $10.5 billion in appropriations spent on spare 
parts since fiscal year 2000, the Air Force continues to report  
shortages of spare parts. The service has taken numerous actions 
to address these shortages. GAO examined whether the Air Force's 
strategic plan addresses the mitigation of spare parts shortages,
whether key initiatives are likely to mitigate the shortages, and
the impact on readiness identified from increased investments for
spare parts.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-706 					        
    ACCNO:   A07398						        
  TITLE:     Defense Inventory: Air Force Plans and Initiatives to    
Mitigate Spare Parts Shortages Need Better Implementation	 
     DATE:   06/27/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Air Force procurement				 
	     Equipment inventories				 
	     Inventory control					 
	     Logistics						 
	     Military inventories				 
	     Spare parts					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     B-1 Aircraft					 
	     F-111 Aircraft					 
	     F-15E Aircraft					 
	     H-60 Helicopter					 
	     Aardvark Aircraft					 
	     Eagle Aircraft					 
	     Pavehawk Helicopter				 

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GAO-03-706

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

June 2003 DEFENSE INVENTORY

Air Force Plans and Initiatives to Mitigate Spare Parts Shortages Need
Better Implementation

GAO- 03- 706

The Air Force Strategic Plan generally provides an appropriate framework
for mitigating spare parts shortages. However, one of two subordinate
plans does not contain performance measures and targets linked to the
strategic plan, and the other does not contain any performance targets.
Therefore, the Air Force is not in a position to determine if the actions
taken pursuant to its

subordinate plans overcome spare parts shortages and provide assurance
that it is getting the greatest readiness return on its spare parts
investment.

Key logistics initiatives under the Spares Campaign and Depot Maintenance
Reengineering and Transformation (DMRT) efforts may help to mitigate spare
parts shortages, but the initiatives* potential effectiveness is limited
because of some key problems. First, the Air Force is not starting all
identified initiatives that relate to the causes of shortages because it
did not have needed personnel and funding. It assessed its logistics
processes and identified more than 80 initiatives to solve more than 300
deficiencies; 43 initiatives were to improve processes that affect spare
parts shortages, with about half relating to depot maintenance and the
other half to supply. As shown below, although all depot maintenance-
related initiatives have been started, 12 of the supply related
initiatives have not been started. Second, 23 of the 31 initiatives lack
both output- related performance measures and targets. Without output-
related measures and targets to assess the initiatives* impact, the Air
Force has little means of determining the extent to which it has
successfully mitigated spare parts shortages and improved readiness.
Third, the Air Force chose not to use the results of one of its
initiatives, which identified a new total spares requirement as the basis
for its fiscal year 2004 budget request. This decision resulted in a $578
million unfunded spare parts requirement. Finally, management problems*
including failure to articulate the need for change, a lack of top- level
commitment, and failure to address organizational issues* have hampered
implementation of the initiatives. In February 2003, the Air Force
established the Innovation and Transformation Directorate to address these
problems, but its plans and priorities have not been set.

The Air Force can estimate the impact of increased funding on individual
weapon systems* supply availability and has done so. Based on its
approximately $5. 3 billion fiscal year 2004 spare parts budget request,
the Air Force reported that aircraft supply availability would range from
73 to 100 percent. However, it cautioned that higher supply availability
does not automatically result in higher mission capable rates because of
other factors.

Air Force Initiatives Identified and Started Initiatives identified Parts-
related initiatives Initiatives started

Spares Campaign 20 19 7 DMRT 64 24 24

Totals 84 43 31

Source: GAO Analysis.

Despite reporting $10. 5 billion in appropriations spent on spare parts
since fiscal year 2000, the Air Force continues to report shortages of
spare parts. The service has taken

numerous actions to address these shortages.

GAO examined whether the Air Force*s strategic plan addresses the
mitigation of spare parts shortages, whether key initiatives are likely to

mitigate the shortages, and the impact on readiness identified from
increased investments for spare

parts. GAO recommends the Secretary of Defense  incorporate Strategic
Plan*s performance measures and targets relating to spare parts

into its subordinate plans,  start remaining initiatives to

address the causes of parts shortages or show how they were incorporated
into others,  adopt performance measures and targets to show impact of
initiatives on parts shortages,  direct the Innovation and Transformation
Directorate to

operate consistent with the

Strategic Plan, and  request funds in the Air Force budget consistent
with results

of its spare parts requirements determination process. In its written
comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense concurred
with the intent

of our recommendations, but not all actions.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 706. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact William M. Solis at (202) 512- 8365 or solisw@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 706, a report to the

Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives

June 2003

DEFENSE INVENTORY

Air Force Plans and Initiatives to Mitigate Spare Parts Shortages Need
Better Implementation

Page i GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages Letter 1 Results in Brief 3
Background 6 Strategic Plan Has an Appropriate Framework but Is Not

Adequately Supported by Subordinate Plans 8 Initiatives Might Help
Mitigate Spare Parts Shortages, but Their Potential Effectiveness Is
Limited 11 The Air Force Can Identify the Impact of More Funding on Supply
Availability, but Not on Readiness 15 Conclusions 16 Recommendations for
Executive Action 17 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 17 Scope and
Methodology 18 Appendix I Air Force Projected Aircraft Supply Availability

Rates for Fiscal Year 2004 21

Appendix II Description and Estimated Completion Dates of Spares Campaign
and Depot Maintenance Reengineering and Transformation Spare- Parts-
Related Initiatives 22

Appendix III Not- Mission- Capable Supply Rate Targets by Weapon System 25

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 26

Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 29 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages Tables

Table 1: Focus of Spares Campaign Review Teams 7 Table 2: Summary of
Initiatives Related to Spare Parts 8 Table 3: Status of Spares Campaign
Initiatives 12 Table 4: Projected Air Force Aircraft Availability Rates 21
Table 5: Spares Campaign Spare- Parts- Related Initiatives 22 Table 6:
Depot Maintenance Reengineering and Transformation Spare- Parts- Related
Initiatives 23 Table 7: Not- Mission- Capable Supply Rate Targets by
Weapon System 25 Figure

Figure 1: Relationship between Air Force Strategic Plan and Major
Subordinate Plans 9 Abbreviations

DMRT Depot Maintenance Reengineering and Transformation GPRA Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993

This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
materials separately from GAO*s product.

Page 1 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

June 27, 2003 The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman: Since fiscal year 2000, the Air Force reportedly has
spent approximately $10.5 billion from its annual operations and
maintenance appropriations for spare parts, including additional
supplemental funding totaling approximately $745 million. 1 The Air Force
has reportedly exceeded the Department of Defense*s overall supply
performance goal of having parts available 85 percent of the time when
they are requested. Nevertheless, the Air Force continues to report spare
parts shortages. While recognizing that spare parts shortages may never be
eliminated, it is reasonable to expect the services to place a priority on
efforts to mitigate (reduce) those shortages that adversely impact
readiness. This priority should be inherent in their overall stewardship
of funds they request from Congress and their accountability for making
spare parts investment decisions that provide a good readiness return. 2
In numerous reports, we have stated that DOD*s inventory management is a
high- risk area because of long- standing management weaknesses that could
result in unnecessarily spending funds that could be directed to higher
priorities, such as modernization or readiness. 3 This report is one in a
series that responds to your request that we assist

your committee in determining ways to improve the availability of spare 1
These figures are based on the Air Force*s fiscal year 2002 through 2004
OP- 31 Budget exhibits about which GAO recently reported concerns. U. S.
General Accounting Office, Defense Inventory: Better Reporting on Spare
Parts Spending Will Enhance Congressional Oversight, GAO- 03- 18
(Washington, D. C.: October 2002). 2 Office of Secretary of Defense,
Inventory Management Study (Washington, D. C.: August 2002) 3 U. S.
General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:
Department of Defense, GAO- 03- 98 (Washington, D. C.: January 2003) and
U. S. General Accounting Office, Air Force Inventory: Parts Shortages Are
Impacting Operations and Maintenance Effectiveness, GAO- 01- 587
(Washington, D. C.: June 27, 2001).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

parts. 4 As agreed with your office, this report focuses on the following
issues:

1. Does the Air Force*s strategic plan address the mitigation of critical
spare parts shortages* those that adversely affect readiness? 5 2. How
likely will key Air Force initiatives mitigate critical spare

parts shortages? 3. Does the Air Force have the ability to identify the
impact on readiness

of increased investments for spare parts? To address these questions, we
visited the Air Force Headquarters* Logistics Directorate and the Air
Force Materiel Command, and we interviewed officials responsible for
strategic planning, initiatives development and implementation, and
requirements determination for spare parts funding. We also analyzed the
strategic plans and key initiatives identified by the Air Force that
address spare parts shortages and logistics support. We used the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, prior GAO reports, and
other key DOD documents as criteria to evaluate the Air Force*s strategic
plans and initiatives. 6 4 U. S. General Accounting Office, Defense
Inventory: The Department Needs a Focused Effort to Overcome Critical
Spare Parts Shortages, GAO- 03- 707 (Washington, D. C.:

June 27, 2003); U. S. General Accounting Office, Defense Inventory: The
Army Needs a Plan to Overcome Critical Spare Parts Shortages, GAO- 03- 705
(Washington, D. C.: June 27, 2003); U. S. General Accounting Office,
Defense Inventory: Navy Logistics Strategy and Initiatives Need to Address
Spare Parts Shortages, GAO- 03- 708 (Washington, D. C.: June 27, 2003); U.
S. General Accounting Office, Defense Inventory: Several Actions Are
Needed to Further DLA's Efforts to Mitigate Shortages of Critical Parts,
GAO- 03- 709 (forthcoming); and U. S. General Accounting Office, Defense
Inventory: Air Force

Item Manager Views of Repair Parts Issues Consistent With Issues Reported
in the Past,

GAO- 03- 684R (Washington, D. C.: May 21, 2003). 5 In the Air Force,
critical spare parts are those that would prevent a weapon system from
accomplishing its assigned mission. For example, the Air Force routinely
reports the top items that prevent an aircraft from being mission capable,
such as hydraulic manifolds for the C- 5.

6 Pub. L. 103- 62, Aug. 3, 1993.

Page 3 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

The Air Force Strategic Plan, issued between April 1998 and May 2000,
generally provides an appropriate framework for mitigating critical spare
parts shortages that affect readiness. However, its two subordinate
logistics plans do not incorporate the same performance measures and
targets, key elements of this framework. As a result, the Air Force is not
in a position to determine if the actions taken pursuant to its
subordinate plans mitigate the critical spare parts shortages, giving it
the greatest readiness return on its spare parts investment. The Strategic
Plan contains three long- term strategic goals, output- related
performance measures, and performance targets. Goal 2 of the plan
addresses two mission critical tasks that relate to mitigating spare parts
shortages and identifies 19 performance measures, many specifically
related to improving spare parts inventories. For example, one mission
critical task is *to improve mission effectiveness while minimizing risk.*
To measure progress in implementing this task, the plan cites the need to
track the percentage of time that aircraft cannot perform their mission
because spare parts are not available. Moreover, the plan specifies
performance targets for reducing the frequency at which this should occur,
such as 9 percent for the F- 15E and 22 percent for the B- 1. Rather than
use these performance measures

and targets to guide its efforts, the Air Force in its subordinate
Logistics Support Plan usually cited measures, such as the need to develop
and apply combat support doctrine, without reference to a particular
output that could be used to measure progress. 7 Although the other
subordinate logistics plan, the Supply Strategic Plan, cited output-
related performance measures like those in Goal 2 of the Air Force
Strategic Plan, it did not contain any performance targets against which
to measure progress.

While key Air Force logistics initiatives that are intended to improve
logistics processes might help mitigate spare parts shortages, their
potential is limited for several reasons. First, the Air Force has not
started 12 of the 43 initiatives it had identified as necessary to address
the causes of spare parts shortages nor have they demonstrated that all
key aspects of these 12 have been incorporated into other initiatives.
According to the Air Force, it intends to reevaluate when and which of
these initiatives should be started but has not specified a date for doing
this. Without a

commitment to implement all of the necessary initiatives, the Air Force is
not assured that all the causes of shortages will be sufficiently
addressed. Second, 23 of the 31 initiatives implemented lack both
performance

7 Output means the tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity or
effort and can be expressed in a quantitative or qualitative manner.
Results in Brief

Page 4 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

measures and targets. Without output- related performance measures and
targets to assess the initiatives* impact, the Air Force has little means
of determining the extent to which it has successfully mitigated spare
parts shortages and improved readiness. Third, the Air Force chose not to
use the results of one of its initiatives, which compiled all of the
service*s spare parts requirements to identify a total requirement of
approximately $5.9 billion. Instead, in its fiscal year 2004 budget
request, the Air Force asked for approximately $5.3 billion and identified
a $578 million unfunded requirement, thereby raising questions about the
validity of its new

requirements computation process and its budget request. Finally, in 2002
an Air Force review team identified several management problems, which
have hampered implementation of its initiatives. These problems include
failure to clearly articulate the need for change, a lack of strong top-
level commitment, and failure to address organizational issues. Although a
directorate established in February 2003 is intended to address these
issues, it has not established its plans or priorities. If concerns about
these initiatives are not resolved, the Air Force cannot be assured that
it has taken all the actions necessary to address the causes of spare
parts shortages, measured the affect of its initiatives, and established
effective management oversight.

The Air Force can estimate the impact of increased spare parts funding on
individual weapon systems* supply availability and has done so. In its
fiscal year 2004 budget request, the Air Force reported how its spare
parts funding request would allow each of its major weapon systems to
achieve a specified aircraft supply availability rate (see app. I for the
rate for each aircraft). 8 Based on its approximately $5.3 billion fiscal
year 2004 budget request, the Air Force reported that aircraft supply
availability would range from 73 percent for the H- 60 helicopter to 100
percent for the F- 111 attack aircraft. This information came from the
service*s Funding/ Availability Multi- Method Allocator for Spares model,
which was developed to predict the affects of supply funding on mission
capable rates. Using this model, the Air Force can also estimate how 1
percent

increments in additional funding could increase spare parts availability.
The Air Force cautioned, however, that increased supply availability does
not automatically result in increased mission capable rates because other
factors, such as maintenance and transportation can affect these rates.

8 The Air Force defines aircraft supply availability as 1 minus the total
not- mission capable supply rate. For example, a not- mission capable
supply rate of 9.6 percent would equate to 90.4 percent aircraft supply
availability.

Page 5 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Due to the critical impact of spare parts shortages on readiness as well
as the Air Force*s need to make good investment decisions, we are making
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed at ensuring that the Air
Force Strategic Plan, subordinate plans, and initiatives have

consistent performance measures and targets to show how successful the
service has been at improving spare parts availability and readiness. We
also recommend that the Air Force commit to starting the remaining
initiatives that are aimed at addressing the causes of spare parts
shortages or clearly identify how the initiatives are included in other
initiatives already started. In addition, we recommend the Air Force
request funds in its budget consistent with its spare parts requirements
determination process. In written comments on a draft of this report, the
Department of Defense concurred with the intent of our five
recommendations, but not all actions cited in our second recommendation.
In concurring with the second recommendation related to starting the
remaining initiatives, the Department of Defense*s position was that the
initiatives were either already incorporated into other initiatives or
overtaken by other events. Given the importance of overcoming causes of
shortages that reduce the overall effectiveness of the Air Force*s
logistics efforts, the thrust of our

recommendation is for the service to show clearly which initiatives have
been incorporated into those already started and what events have
overtaken the others to ensure that all causes of spare parts shortages
identified by the Air Force are adequately addressed. Therefore, we
continue to believe the actions prescribed in the recommendation are
needed. In concurring with the funding recommendation, the Air Force
stated that its 2004 budget request was developed consistent with its new
requirements process, but its funding was constrained. This response
confirms our statement that the Air Force has underfunded its spare parts
requirements and thereby created the potential for a supplemental budget
request or for additional shortages that could negatively affect
readiness. The department*s comments and our evaluation are on pages 17
and 18 of this report.

Page 6 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

The Air Force recognized that reductions in spare parts inventories since
the early 1990s have negatively affected aircraft readiness indicators
such as mission capable rates, not- mission- capable supply, not-
missioncapable maintenance, and cannibalizations. 9 Recognizing the need
to reverse this trend and that previous attempts to pinpoint specific
spare parts shortages were piecemeal, temporary, and lacked adequate
personnel to implement, the Air Force began a 5 to7 year logistics
transformation effort in 1999 aimed at improving the efficiency and
economy of the entire logistics process to enhance support to the
warfighter. Rather than focusing on fully eliminating specific spare parts
shortages, the Air Force chose to focus on addressing the process
disconnects that caused the shortages. This included an end- to- end look
at all aspects of the logistics process including commercial supply chain
management, supply, maintenance, transportation, logistics planning, and
financial management. The Spares Campaign initiated in February 2001 and
the Depot Maintenance Reengineering and Transformation (DMRT) effort
started in July 2001 were two key parts of the end- to- end review. 10 In
total, they identified the need for 84 initiatives, 43 of which related to

spare parts. The Spares Campaign focused on supply process deficiencies,
and it was intended to improve parts supportability to weapon systems and
reverse declining readiness related to spares management. This was
considered a major transformation effort and included five teams that
reviewed the processes needed to produce spares and identified disconnects
and solutions that would improve mission capability and manage cost (see
table 1).

9 Mission capable rates indicate the percentage of aircraft that can
perform at least one of its assigned missions. Not- mission- capable
supply and not- mission- capable maintenance are indicators that aircraft
cannot perform any of their assigned missions because of supply shortages
and maintenance requirements, respectively. Cannibalizations represent the
removal of a good part from one aircraft in order to install it on another
aircraft.

10 Originally called Depot Maintenance Review Team. Background

Page 7 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Table 1: Focus of Spares Campaign Review Teams Spares campaign teams Team
focus

Programming and financial management Reviewed how spares budgets are
determined, funding obtained, and cost managed Requirements determination
Reviewed processes for identifying spares

requirements Requirements allocation, execution, and distribution Analyzed
the processes and policies

involved in getting spares and repair parts to depots and field locations
Spares command and control Studied management control of the

spares processes Supplier relationships Explored options for improving how
the

Air Force deals with suppliers of parts Source: U. S. Air Force. Each team
developed a flowchart showing how it believed processes

related to its focus area should function and be managed to improve weapon
system availability and cost management. The teams also identified
disconnects or barriers preventing the processes from functioning as they
should and recommended solutions to correct

these disconnects. Twelve major deficiencies were noted, and more than 190
corrective actions were identified, which resulted in 20 initiatives, 19
of which were related to spare parts shortages. As of February 2003, 7 of
19 spare parts initiatives have been started.

The DMRT effort, focused on deficiencies in depot maintenance processes.
Various teams identified disconnects and barriers in these processes,
reviewed Air Force current initiatives that affected depot maintenance,
and identified industry best practices and benchmarking, receiving input
from Air Force management, major commands, and Air Logistics Centers. More
than 300 barriers to depot maintenance operational and financial
performance were identified and consolidated into more than 40 major
issues organized around 8 overarching focus areas. This resulted in 64
initiatives, 24 of which were related to spare parts. All 24 of the spare
parts related initiatives have been started. Table 2 below summarizes the
status of the Spares Campaign and DMRT initiatives

as of February 2003. Appendix II provides a description of the 31 Spares
Campaign and DMRT initiatives that have been started and estimated
completion dates.

Page 8 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Table 2: Summary of Initiatives Related to Spare Parts Initiatives
identified

Initiatives related to

spares Initiatives started

Spares campaign 20 19 7 Depot maintenance reengineering and transformation
64 24 24

Totals 84 43 31

Source: U. S. Air Force. The Air Force Strategic Plan is appropriately
structured to provide a framework for mitigating spare parts shortages,
but its two subordinate plans are not aligned with it in terms of
performance measures. Consistent with sound management principles
underlying the Government

Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), the strategic plan includes a
mission statement, long- term goals, and performance measures and targets,
and some of these elements relate to spare parts shortages. However, the
performance measures and targets in the subordinate plans are not
consistent with those in the strategic plan or none are stated. This lack
of alignment with the Air Force Strategic Plan*s performance measures and
targets means that the service cannot measure the contribution of the
actions it takes in response to the subordinate plans toward overcoming
spare parts shortages and be assured that implementing the subordinate
plans will mitigate critical spare parts shortages and give the Air Force
its greatest readiness return on investment.

The Air Force Strategic Plan, issued between April 1998 and May 2000,
generally includes an effective strategy consistent with GPRA guidelines,
and it generally represents an effective framework for reducing spare
parts shortages. The plan applies to the Air Force as a whole and contains
a mission statement, strategic goals, and output- related performance

measures and targets. Specifically, the strategic plan has three goals:
Goal 1 is to ensure a high quality force of people, Goal 2 is to enable
commanders to respond to all types of crises, and Goal 3 is to prepare

for an uncertain future by pursuing a modernization program. Each goal
contains mission critical tasks (such as *Maximize the efficiency of
operating and maintaining Air Force resources*) along with related

performance measures and targets for determining progress toward achieving
its strategic goals.

Strategic Plan Has an Appropriate Framework but Is Not Adequately
Supported by Subordinate Plans

Strategic Plan Complies with Most GPRA Requirements

Page 9 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Of the three strategic goals, Goal 2 addresses the mitigation of spare
parts shortages. It has two mission critical tasks and 19 performance
measures, many specifically related to improving spare parts inventories.
One mission critical task, to *improve mission effectiveness while
minimizing risk,* cites the percentage of aircraft that cannot perform
their mission because spare parts are not available as a performance
measure. It also cites performance targets for each aircraft. For example,
the target for the F- 15E is 9 percent and for the B- 1 it is 22 percent,
meaning that percent of the aircraft cannot perform their mission because
of spare

parts shortages (see appendix III for the not mission capable supply rate
targets). The second mission critical task, to *maximize the efficiency of
operating and maintaining the Air Force resources,* has the elapsed time
between when a customer submits an order and receives the part as a
performance measure.

The major subordinate plans for implementing the Air Force Strategic Plan
include goals similar to those in the strategic plan. However, their
performance measures and targets are not linked to those in the strategic
plan. The subordinate plans are the Logistics Support Plan and the

Supply Strategic Plan (see fig. 1).

Figure 1: Relationship between Air Force Strategic Plan and Major
Subordinate Plans Performance Measures and Targets in Subordinate

Plans Are Not Consistent with Strategic Plan

Page 10 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

The Logistics Support Plan was developed to provide authoritative,
strategic direction and front- end guidance for Air Force logistics
capabilities planning. It includes the same goals as the higher plan, and
it contains objectives for accomplishing these goals. The plan does not
include quantitative or qualitative output- related performance measures
and targets that will yield the performance information needed to assess
goal accomplishment at either the subordinate or strategic plan levels in
order to measure results. Instead, it includes measures that will only
yield information about whether or not a specific process was implemented.
For example, the completion of combat support doctrine is the performance
measure cited for accomplishing the objective to improve combat support to
warfighters by developing and applying an Agile Combat Support doctrine.
Another nonquantitative or qualitative performance measure was full
fielding of identified total asset visibility capabilities for the
objective to fully implement total asset visibility.

The Supply Strategic Plan was intended to (1) create an integrated process
for Air Force supply planning, (2) establish the planning infrastructure
to facilitate information exchange throughout Air Force Supply, and (3)
improve Air Force Supply*s measures of effectiveness. This plan contains
five long- term goals that are consistent with the higher plan*s goals,
and it has 19 objectives, 71 tasks to accomplish these objectives, and a
projected end- state for some of these tasks. 11 Some end- states are
similar to the strategic plan*s output- related performance

measures, but do not have corresponding performance targets. For example,
one end- state discusses incidents of aircraft being not mission capable
due to the lack of spare parts, but it does not specify a target (i. e.,
the desired percentage of incidences) against which to measure
improvement. Other end- states did not discuss performance measures at
all. For example, one end- state is completion of the new Air Force Supply
Stockage Policy Guide and making it available to supply officers
worldwide.

11 An end- state is the desired outcome of the task.

Page 11 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Without effective quantitative and qualitative measures that flow from the
Strategic Plan structure to the subordinate plans, the Air Force cannot
determine the extent to which the implementation of these plans is
contributing to its overall strategic goal relating to overcoming spare
parts shortages. Furthermore, the Air Force cannot be assured that
implementing the subordinate plans will give them the greatest readiness
return on their investment.

Key logistics initiatives being implemented by the Air Force may help to
mitigate spare parts shortages, but their potential effectiveness is
limited for several reasons. The Air Force has begun a major logistics
transformation effort intended to improve the entire logistics process and
identified numerous initiatives to improve its logistics process by
addressing deficiencies, barriers, or disconnects. However, it has not
implemented 12 of the 43 initiatives it identified as needed to address
spare parts shortages nor demonstrated that all key aspects of these 12
have been incorporated into other initiatives underway. In addition, 23 of
the 31 initiatives being implemented lack performance measures and
targets. The Air Force also chose not to use the results of one of its
initiatives, which identified a new consolidated requirement for spare
parts; consequently, additional spare parts shortages could occur. Lastly,
management problems identified by an Air Force review team in 2002 have
hampered implementation of the initiatives, and its new directorate,
established in February 2003, has not established a plan or priorities to
address these problems.

In 2001, the Air Force identified 43 initiatives to improve processes
related to spare parts shortages* 19 as part of the Spares Campaign and 24
as part of the DMRT. As of February 2003, 31 of the 43 initiatives have
been started. The Air Force has started all 24 DMRT initiatives that
relate to improving spare parts shortages, but has started only 7 of the
19 initiatives that relate to spare parts shortages arising from the
Spares Campaign. Table 3 shows the implementation status of Spares
Campaign initiatives. Initiatives Might Help Mitigate Spare

Parts Shortages, but Their Potential Effectiveness Is Limited

Air Force Has Not Started All Initiatives

Page 12 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Table 3: Status of Spares Campaign Initiatives Initiatives Started Not
started

Improve depot- level repair throughput x Establish virtual single
inventory control point x Improve spares budgeting x Improve item demand
and repair workload forecasting x Develop alternative stockage policies to
support warfighter x Ensure a competent and skilled workforce x Improve
financial management x Create common operating view and improve data
accuracy x Designate a single authority for spares management x Implement
integrated supply chain management x Develop process to manage and reduce
demands x Align supply chain management focus x Improve/ restructure
working capital fund x Develop appropriate metrics x Actively manage
suppliers and supply base x Enable a single logistics proponent x
Standardize use and role of regional supply squadrons x Adopt improved
purchasing and supply chain management x Develop e- business strategy x
Source: U. S. Air Force.

According to the Air Force, it chose to start the seven Spares Campaign
initiatives that reflected its highest priorities, provided greatest
impact to the logistics processes, and resulted in highest payback to the
Air Force. The remaining 12 initiatives have not been started because the
Air Force said it did not have the needed personnel and funding. Although
the Air Force provided a document showing that some aspects of the
remaining initiatives had been embedded into the Ten Focus Initiatives of
the Spares Campaign, we could not verify that all of these initiatives had
been started. Also, we could not validate that all of the deficiencies,
disconnects, or barriers intended to be addressed by the remaining 12
initiatives were actually being addressed. Consequently, some of the
process problems identified in the Spares Campaign that cause spare parts
shortages may not be addressed, thereby reducing the overall effectiveness
of the Air Force*s efforts to mitigate spare parts shortages.

Page 13 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Twenty- three of the 31 Air Force initiatives that have been started lack
output- related performance measures and targets. One of the 23
initiatives, the Material Policy initiative, has revision of all policies
as its performance target. The other 22 initiatives were part of the DMRT
effort and did not have any performance measure or any performance
targets. Air Force officials said they are still trying to develop
measures and targets for each of these initiatives. The other eight
initiatives* such as the Weapon System Supply Chain Manager, Regional
Supply Squadron, and Demand

and Repair Workload Forecasting* have output- related measures, including
how effective they are in making weapon systems available, the amount of
cannibalization done to keep aircraft available, and the amount of
aircraft that are not mission capable due to supply or maintenance
problems. Without quantitative or qualitative performance- related
measures and targets relating to improving spare parts availability, the
Air Force lacks the means to determine the extent to which these
initiatives have improved readiness by reducing spare parts shortages.

One Spares Campaign initiative recently established a new total
requirement for spare parts, but the service chose not to request all the
funds to meet the requirement. The Spares Campaign*s Improve Spares
Budgeting initiative created a Spares Requirement Review Board to identify
a single, consolidated requirement for spare parts and consumable items.
In the past, the Air Force had budgeted for spares based on annual flying-
hour requirements with little consideration for the spares needed to meet
non- flying- hour requirements, such as the pipeline or safety stock. 12
As a result, the Air Force experienced parts shortages because demands

for non- flying- hour spare parts had not been sufficiently budgeted. The
review board compiled flying- hour and non- flying- hour requirements into
a single, agreed upon requirement to be used for planning, programming,
and budgeting.

The Air Force*s new process yielded a new total spare parts requirement of
approximately $5.9 billion for the fiscal year 2004 budget submission.
However, in its fiscal year 2004 budget the service chose to only request
$5.3 billion. After the service submitted its fiscal year 2004 budget, the
Secretary of the Air Force reported $578 million in unfunded spares

12 Pipeline represents the process flow from the source of procurement of
a part to its point of use. Safety stocks represent the quantity of parts,
in addition to amounts needed for day to day operations, required to be
available to permit continuous operations should normal replacement
systems become interrupted. Most Initiatives Lack

Output- Related Performance Measures and Targets

Air Force Did Not Apply the Results of a Completed Initiative

Page 14 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

requirements: $166 million of this was for pipeline and other
requirements, and $412 million was for the flying- hour program. The Air
Force*s decision to request less funding than identified in their most
recent requirements determination process raises concerns. Either the Air
Force*s new spare parts requirements determination process is not a valid
basis for future budget decisions, or by not requesting the full amount to
meet the requirement, the Air Force has created the potential for
additional spare parts shortages that could negatively affect readiness or
has created the need for a supplemental budget request. Air Force
officials said they took a risk that the $5.3 billion budget request would
be sufficient based on the actual flying- hour cost experienced in fiscal
year 2002. That year, they said, the flying- hour program was executed at
a cheaper rate than budgeted.

The Air Force recently established a new directorate to address several
management issues that it believes adversely affects its logistics
transformation initiatives, but the extent to which this directorate will
improve overall management of these initiatives is not clear. In 2002, the
Air Force formed a review team composed of retired general officers,
senior executives, and industry leaders that assessed initiative
implementation plans, identified problems with its logistics
transformation efforts, and developed recommendations to solve these
problems. The team concluded that a high risk of failure existed for the
transformation efforts because (1) the Air Force is not clearly
articulating throughout its organization the need for changes, (2) top-
level commitment to implementing initiatives is not as strong as needed as
evidenced by schedule slippage and lack of funding for initiatives, and
(3) clear roles and responsibilities concerning the Spares Campaign are
not being addressed. One of the team*s recommendations was to merge the
Spares Campaign and DMRT efforts into a single, full- time logistics
transformation program. In February 2003, the Air Force established the
Innovation and Transformation Directorate, a new organization under the
Logistics Division, which according to an Air Force briefing, consolidated
the two efforts and placed oversight responsibility for all Air Force
logistics transformation efforts on top- level leadership within one
office. According to the Air Force, some of the first steps for the new
directorate

will be to review existing Spares Campaign and DMRT initiatives, resolve
deficiencies in the two efforts, set aggressive timelines, goals,
objectives, and performance measures, and obtain senior leadership
approval of their actions. However, according to Air Force officials, the
plans and priorities of this new directorate had not been set as of April
2003. Without such Management Weaknesses

Impeded Implementation of Initiatives

Page 15 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

plans, priorities, and senior leadership commitment guiding the Air
Force*s efforts to overcome these problems, the potential benefits from
its initiatives to mitigate spare parts shortages that impact readiness
may be delayed or possibly not achieved.

The Air Force can show that additional funding for spare parts would
improve aircraft supply availability if the funds were provided directly
to the working capital fund. However, the Air Force does not link funding
for spare parts directly to readiness because other factors also affect
readiness. In its fiscal year 2004 budget request for spare parts funding,
the Air Force included information on how spare parts funding in the
working capital fund affected the supply availability for various types of
aircraft (see app. I for projected aircraft availability rates). 13 The
budget request indicated that spare parts funding of approximately $5.3
billion would allow for aircraft supply availability ranging from 73
percent for the H- 60 to 100 percent for the F- 111.

The Air Force drew this data from its Funding/ Availability Multi- Method
Allocator for Spares model, which estimates how many and which additional
parts (i. e. supply availability) it can procure with different amounts of
operating authority. 14 The Air Force said that the model has some
weaknesses, but it does provide a good mechanism for projecting aircraft
supply availability. One weakness, according to DOD, is that while the
model attempts to optimize supply parts availability, it is generally
biased towards the purchase of low cost/ high- demand items versus those
critical spare parts that would most improve mission capable rates.

The Air Force can also use this model to show how additional funding could
increase spare parts availability by estimating the cost of additional
supply availability in 1 percent increments by weapon system. For

example, in 2002 the cost for the F- 15E to achieve an 88 percent supply
availability rate was approximately $237 million. To increase this
availability 1 percent would have cost an additional $7 million.
Similarly, it cost the Air Force approximately $301 million for the C- 5
to achieve an

13 The 2004 budget request included supply availability data consistent
with modifications in the budget exhibit, see Office of Secretary of
Defense, Inventory Management Study

(Washington, D. C.: August 2002). 14 We did not independently verify the
quality or validity of the Air Force*s model to predict supply
availability. The Air Force Can

Identify the Impact of More Funding on Supply Availability, but Not on
Readiness

Page 16 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

82 percent supply availability rate. To achieve an additional 1 percent
supply availability would have cost an additional $3.6 million.

According to the Air Force, additional supply availability results in
improved stockage effectiveness and reduced customer wait time, back
orders, and cannibalization rates, which all contribute to increased
readiness. However, the Air Force cautioned that increased supply
availability does not automatically result in increased mission capable
(readiness) rates because other factors, such as maintenance and

transportation, affect these rates. For example, if maintenance staffing
levels at depots are inadequate, then even with 100 percent supply
availability, mission capability will not be at its highest possible
level.

An Air Force strategic goal is to address problems that adversely affect
mission accomplishment, such as critical spare parts shortages that reduce
readiness. While it has a strategic plan that provides a good management
framework, places emphasis on mitigating spare parts shortages, and cites
performance measures and targets for assessing progress, the Air Force*s
potential for successful implementation of the plan is hindered by several
problems. Subordinate plans have not adopted the Strategic Plan*s
readiness- related performance measures and targets; all identified

initiatives to deal with the causes of spare parts shortages have not been
started or key aspects clearly incorporated into other initiatives; and
many of those that have been started lack effective performance measures
and targets. Additionally, some management weaknesses could significantly
impede successful initiative oversight and implementation. By not adopting
specific performance measures and targets related to mitigating the
critical spare parts shortages into subordinate plans and initiatives,
following through on initiatives to address the causes of parts shortages
and determine spare parts requirements, and resolving program management
deficiencies, the Air Force has little assurance that its

program emphasis and initiatives will improve spare- parts- related
readiness. Furthermore, as part of its stewardship and accountability for
funds, the Air Force will not be assured that the service*s spare parts
spending is yielding the best readiness return on investment. Conclusions

Page 17 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Air Force to take the following steps:  Incorporate the Air Force
Strategic Plan*s performance measures and

targets into the subordinate Logistics Support Plan and the Supply
Strategic Plan.

 Commit to start those remaining initiatives needed to address the causes
of spare parts shortages or clearly identify how the initiatives have been
incorporated into those initiatives already underway.  Adopt performance
measures and targets for its initiatives that will show

how their implementation will affect critical spare parts availability and
readiness.  Direct the new Innovation and Transformation Directorate to
establish

plans and priorities for improving management of logistics initiatives
consistent with the Air Force Strategic Plan.

 Request spare parts funds in the Air Force*s budget consistent with
results of its spare parts requirements determination process.

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
concurred with the intent of all five recommendations, but not all
actions. The Department of Defense*s written comments are reprinted in
their entirety in appendix IV. In concurring with our first, third, and
fourth recommendations

concerning incorporating and adopting performance measures and targets
into subordinate plans and initiatives, the Department of Defense
responded that the establishment of the Directorate of Innovation and
Transformation, the directorate*s efforts to develop a balanced scorecard
and supporting metrics, and its draft campaign plans which spell out and
track milestones for each initiative were consistent with the direction of
the Strategic Plan. 15 We believe that if the Department of Defense
follows through with its plans for the new directorate, as laid out in its
written response, these planned actions should meet the thrust of

our recommendations. The Department of Defense concurred with the intent
of our second recommendation related to starting those remaining
initiatives needed to address the causes of shortages, but not the
specific actions. In its

15 The balanced scorecard links goals, strategies, objectives and measures
to an organization*s plan. Recommendations for

Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Page 18 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

comments the Department of Defense stated the original 19 initiatives have
been either consolidated into the Ten Focus Initiatives or overtaken by
other events making it unnecessary to separately track progress for each
of the individual actions. Based on this action, the Department of Defense
concluded that it had complied with this recommendation. We disagree that
the department*s actions fully respond to our recommendation. The thrust
of our recommendation is that the Air Force identify which of the 12
remaining initiatives that were not started were incorporated into the Ten
Focus Initiatives and what events have overtaken the others to ensure that
all causes of spare parts shortages identified by the Air Force are being
adequately addressed.

In concurring with our fifth recommendation that the Air Force request
spare parts funds consistent with results of its spare parts requirements
determination process, the Department of Defense responded that the Air
Force*s spare parts budget was developed consistent with the new
requirements determination process, but the amount of funding requested
was constrained. This response confirms our statement that the Air Force
has underfunded its spare parts requirements and thereby created the
potential for a supplemental budget request or for additional spare parts
shortages that could negatively affect readiness.

To accomplish our three objectives, we visited the Air Force Headquarters*
Logistics Directorate, in Washington, D. C., the Air Force Material
Command, in Dayton, Ohio and contractor representatives at Bearing Point
(formerly KPMG Consulting) in McLean, Virginia.

To determine whether the strategic plans address the mitigation of spare
parts shortages, we reviewed the Air Force Strategic Plan, its two
subordinate plans* Logistics Support Plan and Supply Strategic Plan*

as well as other strategic planning documents and interviewed officials to
determine whether these plans included key actions targeted at mitigating
critical spare parts shortages and improving readiness. We also reviewed
these plans to determine if performance measures and targets in the
subordinate plans were similar and linked to those in the higher- level
strategic plan. Additionally, we reviewed these plans to determine whether
they included the elements of a strategic plan as defined by the GPRA.
Scope and

Methodology

Page 19 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

To determine the likelihood of whether key initiatives would mitigate
spare parts shortages to improve readiness, we interviewed Air Force
officials to identify the initiatives that they believe will mitigate
spare parts shortages and improve readiness. We obtained and reviewed
documents related to the 31 spare- parts- related initiatives that have
been started to determine the likelihood of whether they would mitigate
spare parts shortages. We evaluated these initiatives to determine whether
they included quantifiable and measurable performance targets as described
by GPRA that would allow an assessment of how implementation of the

initiatives would impact spare parts shortages. We also assessed whether
these initiatives included all identified actions needed to overcome the
causes of spare parts shortages. In addition, we obtained a briefing and
discussed with Air Force officials the results of an Air Force review
team*s assessment of its logistics transformation efforts that identified

management weaknesses. To determine what impact the Air Force could
identify from additional funding for spare parts, we interviewed officials
and obtained documents related to the Air Force*s fiscal year 2004 budget
submission. We also discussed with Air Force budget officials their
Funding/ Availability Multi- Method Allocator for Spares model, which
includes projected supply availability rates based on estimated funding
amounts and was used to provide the budget information. 16 We performed
our review from August 2002 to March 2003 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Air Force; the Director, Office of Management and Budget;
and other interested congressional committees and parties. We will also
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

16 We did not independently verify the quality or validity of the Air
Force*s model to predict supply availability.

Page 20 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Please contact me on (202) 512- 8365 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are
included in appendix V. Sincerely,

William M. Solis, Director Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Air Force Projected Aircraft Supply Availability Rates for
Fiscal Year 2004 Page 21 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

In response to a recommendation in the Inventory Management Study of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force included supply
availability rates for its weapons systems in its fiscal year 2004 budget
submission. As shown in table 4, the Air Force projected aircraft supply
availability rates ranging from 73 percent to 100 percent based on
requested funding of approximately $5.3 billion.

Table 4: Projected Air Force Aircraft Availability Rates Aircraft

Budget request (dollars in millions) Availability rate (percent)

A- 10 177.702 85.70 B- 1B 258.001 77.60 B- 2 109.886 93.60 B- 52 147.867
88.20 C- 5 371.571 81.30 C- 130 310.825 85.70 C- 135 367.465 89.40 C- 141
16.009 84.50 E- 3 82.819 89.90 E- 4 0.121 89.00 E- 8 0.000 95.10 F- 4
5.659 94.40 F- 15 572.037 89.30 F- 16 392.210 86.90 F- 111 0.26 100.00 F-
117 0.067 95.10 H- 1 9.413 100.00 H- 53 51.095 87.30 H- 60 5.101 73.20
Trainers 64.592 95.00 Other Aircraft 9.842 94.00 Special Operations Forces
30.765 88.60 Other a 2,358.843

Total $5,342.150

Source: U. S. Air Force. a Engines, missiles, electronic warfare, etc. The
Air Force does not compute supply availability for

these items.

Appendix I: Air Force Projected Aircraft Supply Availability Rates for
Fiscal Year 2004

Appendix II: Description and Estimated Completion Dates of Spares Campaign
and Depot Maintenance Reengineering and Transformation Spare- Parts-
Related Initiatives

Page 22 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Table 5: Spares Campaign Spare- Parts- Related Initiatives Initiative
Description Estimated

completion date a 1. Establish virtual inventory control point Provide
single visibility over buy and repair requirements and distribution. Feb.
2004 2. Align supply chain manager focus

(Weapon system supply chain manager) Single weapons system manager to
execute buy and repair priorities and other management decisions. Mar.
2003

3. Standardize use and expand role of regional supply squadron Provides
for supply management on a regional basis,

visibility of items in region. Sept. 2004 4. Improve financial management
Tracks weapons system support against plans and budget Sept. 2002 5.
Improve demand & repair workload

forecasting Predict more accurately number and type of items needing
repair and number of new items. Sept. 2007

6. Improve spares budgeting (Spares requirement review board) Consolidated
requirements determination. Jan. 2003 7. Adopt improved purchasing and
supply

chain management Implement commercial best practices into Air Force supply
management. Mar. 2006 Source: U. S. Air Force

a This represents reported completion dates as of February 2003. The
Innovation and Transformation Directorate plans to review each initiative
and determine what further actions should be taken.

Appendix II: Description and Estimated Completion Dates of Spares Campaign
and Depot Maintenance Reengineering and Transformation Spare- Parts-
Related Initiatives

Appendix II: Description and Estimated Completion Dates of Spares Campaign
and Depot Maintenance Reengineering and Transformation Spare- Parts-
Related Initiatives

Page 23 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Table 6: Depot Maintenance Reengineering and Transformation Spare- Parts-
Related Initiatives Initiative Description Estimated completion date a 1.
Standard process improvement

strategy Establish and implement a corporate strategy for directing,
overseeing,

coordinating, improving, and facilitating depot maintenance operations.

Sept. 2003 2. Maintenance training Develop a maintenance training

organization as a single training entity for all depot maintenance
training. Build maintenance orientation and technical training plans.

Sept. 2003 3. Maintenance first line supervisory

training Establish program that will train first line supervisory
candidates prior to assumption

of duties. Oct. 2003

4. Maintenance professional development Train and develop maintenance
workers

and leaders. Oct. 2002 5. Awards/ appraisal systems Establish performance
plans that focus on

cost, schedule, performance and quality goals. Motivate work force by
establishing incentive programs, which instill a desire to excel.

Sept. 2003 6. Unresponsive hiring process Establish hiring authorities to
appoint the

best qualified candidates and streamline the staffing process (external &
internal).

June 2003 7. Engineering hiring/ retention Develop compensation packages

competitive with the commercial market. Sept. 2004 8. Multi- skilling
Determine how to employ multi- skilling for

best value implementation. Jan. 2003 9. Supervisor*s distractors Continue
to assess impact of data systems

on 1st level supervisor*s time. Review regulatory mandates assigning
additional duties to first levels.

Feb. 2003 10. Formalize the depot integrated infrastructure master plan
Formalize the depot infrastructure strategic

planning process. Sept. 2004 11. Incentivize infrastructure investment in

maintenance and repair Incentivize infrastructure investment in
maintenance and repair. Sept. 2003

12. Train the depot workforce in capital purchase program and economic
analysis processes

Train the depot workforce in capital purchase program and economic
analysis. Apr. 2004

13. Improve preventative/ predictive maintenance programs Improve
preventative maintenance

program. Oct. 2003 14. Identify and remove impediments to

facility and equipment maintenance system usage

Remove impediments to broad use of facility and equipment maintenance
system.

May 2003 15. Streamline maintenance & repair

process and procedures Improve maintenance and repair facility project
delivery process. June 2003

16. Provide greater flexibility for implementing workload changes Provide
greater flexibility for implementing workload changes. Oct. 2003 17. Add
surge requirements to

infrastructure planning and programming

Add surge requirements to infrastructure planning and programming. Sept.
2004

Appendix II: Description and Estimated Completion Dates of Spares Campaign
and Depot Maintenance Reengineering and Transformation Spare- Parts-
Related Initiatives

Page 24 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Initiative Description Estimated completion date a 18. Improve capital
purchase program process Improve capital purchase program process. Apr.
2003 19. Create a depot capital investment

funding appropriation Create two depot capital investment funding
appropriations lines* new system

investments and recap of existing systems (legacy).

Nov. 2002 20. Information technology master plan Establish a comprehensive
vision for

managing information resources Sept. 2002 21. Automated information
technology

initiative Insert devices used to automate data collection on the shop
floor to enhance

depot productivity. Mar. 2003

22. Depot X Establish a lab environment across air logistics centers,
which will enhance the ability to rapidly test solutions to meet user
requirements/ enhancements across depot maintenance systems.

Apr. 2003 23. Improve stock level processes Improve stock levels for low
demand items

through policy changes. Sept. 2002 24. Improve material support policies
Clarify material support policies to better

state objectives and establish standards. Jan. 2004 Source: U. S. Air
Force.

a This represents reported completion dates as of February 2003. The
Innovation and Transformation Directorate plans to review each initiative
and determine what further actions should be taken.

Appendix III: Not- Mission- Capable Supply Rate Targets by Weapon System
Page 25 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Goal 2 of the Air Force Strategic Plan cites the percentage of aircraft
that cannot perform their mission because spare parts are not available,
referred to as not- mission- capable supply, as a performance measure.

Table 5 provides the not- mission- capable supply rates for the Air
Force*s weapons systems.

Table 7: Not- Mission- Capable Supply Rate Targets by Weapon System
Aircraft Target

(percent)

A- 10 8 B- 1 22 B- 52 12 C- 5 8.5 C- 130 12 C- 141 6 C- 17 4.6 E- 3 6 F-
15 9 F- 15E 9 F- 16 8 F- 117 7 KC- 135 8.5 Source: U. S Air Force Note:
Not- mission- capable supply rate is the percentage of time a weapon
system is down because

parts are not available.

Appendix III: Not- Mission- Capable Supply Rate Targets by Weapon System

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 26 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 27 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 28 GAO- 03- 706 Air Force Parts Shortages

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments Page 29 GAO- 03- 706
Air Force Parts Shortages

Richard G. Payne, (757) 552- 8119 Connie W. Sawyer, Jr., (757) 552- 8140

In addition to the names above, Gina O. Ruidera, Alfonso Q. Garcia, Susan
K. Woodward, and Barry L. Shillito also made significant contributions to
this report. Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contact Acknowledgements

(350249)

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