Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to	 
Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans	 
(24-JUN-03, GAO-03-695).					 
                                                                 
The Department of Defense (DOD) uses contractors to provide a	 
wide variety of services for U.S. military forces deployed	 
overseas. We were asked to examine three related issues: (1) the 
extent of contractor support for deployed forces and why DOD uses
contractors; (2) the extent to which such contractors are	 
considered in DOD planning, including whether DOD has backup	 
plans to maintain essential services to deployed forces in case  
contractors can no longer provide the services; and (3) the	 
adequacy of DOD's guidance and oversight mechanisms in managing  
overseas contractors efficiently.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-695 					        
    ACCNO:   A07326						        
  TITLE:     Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services  
to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans 
     DATE:   06/24/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Contract performance				 
	     Military forces					 
	     Department of Defense contractors			 
	     Contract administration				 
	     Contract oversight 				 
	     Armed forces abroad				 
	     Procurement policy 				 
	     Policy evaluation					 

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GAO-03-695

Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee
on Armed Services, U. S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

June 2003 MILITARY OPERATIONS

Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not
Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans

GAO- 03- 695

While DOD and the military services cannot quantify the totality of
support that contractors provide to deployed forces around the world, DOD
relies on contractors to supply a wide variety of services. These services
range from maintaining advanced weapon systems and setting up and
operating communications networks to providing gate and perimeter
security, interpreting foreign languages, and preparing meals and doing
laundry for the troops. DOD uses contractor services for a number of
reasons. In some areas, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, there are limits on the
number of U. S. military personnel who can be deployed in the region;
contract workers pick up the slack in the tasks that remain to be done.
Elsewhere, the military does not have sufficient personnel with the highly
technical or specialized skills needed in- place (e. g., technicians to
repair sophisticated equipment or weapons). Finally, DOD uses contractors
to conserve scarce skills, to ensure that they will be available for
future deployments. Despite requirements established in DOD guidance
(Instruction 3020.37), DOD and the services have not identified those
contractors that provide

mission essential services and where appropriate developed backup plans to
ensure that essential contractor- provided services will continue if the
contractor for any reason becomes unavailable. Service officials told us
that, in the past, contractors have usually been able to fulfill their
contractual obligations and, if they were unable to do so, officials could
replace them with other contractor staff or military personnel. However,
we found that

this may not always be the case. DOD*s agencywide and servicewide guidance
and policies for using and overseeing contractors that support deployed U.
S. forces overseas are inconsistent and sometimes incomplete, as in the
following examples:

 Of the four services, only the Army has developed substantial guidance
for dealing with contractors.  DOD*s acquisition regulations do not
require any specific contract

clauses or language to cover possible overseas deployments or changes in
deployment locations for contract workers. Of 183 contractor employees
planning to deploy with an Army division to Iraq, for example, some did
not have deployment clauses in their contracts. This omission can lead to
increased contract costs as well as delays in getting contractors into the
field.  At the sites that we visited in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Persian
Gulf, we

found that general oversight of contractors appeared to be sufficient but
that broader oversight issues existed. These include inadequate training
for staff responsible for overseeing contractors and limited awareness by
many field commanders of all the contractor activities taking place in
their area of operations. The Department of Defense (DOD)

uses contractors to provide a wide variety of services for U. S. military
forces deployed overseas. We were asked to examine three related issues:
(1) the extent of contractor

support for deployed forces and why DOD uses contractors; (2) the extent
to which such contractors are considered in DOD planning,

including whether DOD has backup plans to maintain essential services to
deployed forces in case contractors can no longer provide

the services; and (3) the adequacy of DOD*s guidance and oversight
mechanisms in managing overseas contractors efficiently.

We are making a number of recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to
improve the oversight and management of contractors* supporting deployed
forces. These include (1) conducting required reviews to identify mission
essential services

provided by contractors and include them in planning; (2) developing and
implementing the use of standard language for contracts; and (3)
developing comprehensive guidance and doctrine to help the services manage
contractors* supporting

deployed forces. DOD agreed with most of our recommendations but believed
a section of one was too burdensome. We do not agree and have retained the
recommendation its entirety.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 695. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Neal Curtin at (757) 552- 8111 or curtinn@ gao. gov.
Highlights of GAO- 03- 695, a report to the

Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed
Services, U. S. Senate

June 2003

MILITARY OPERATIONS Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces
but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans

Page i GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
Background 4 DOD Uses Contractors for a Wide Range of Services Because of

Force Size Limitations and a Lack of Military Capability and Capacity 6
DOD and the Services Have Not Identified Essential Services

Provided by Contracts or Developed Plans for Their Continuation Should
Contractors Not Be Available 11 Guidance and Contract Language and
Oversight Vary within DOD

and the Services 20 Conclusions 35 Recommendations for Executive Action 36
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 38 Appendix I Scope and Methodology 41

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 47

Table

Table 1: Selected Services Provided by Contractors in Deployed Locations 7
Figures

Figure 1: Selected Countries Where Contractors Are Supporting Deployed
Forces, As of April 2003 5 Figure 2: DOD Instruction 3020.37 Essential
Services Planning Procedures 14 Figure 3: Contracts for Selected Services
in Bosnia Are Awarded by

Many Different Agencies 32 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

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Page 1 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

June 24, 2003 The Honorable John Ensign Chairman The Honorable Daniel K.
Akaka Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Readiness and Management
Support Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The U. S. military has long used contractors to provide supplies and
services to deployed U. S. forces, and more recently contractors have been
involved in every major military operation since the 1991 Gulf War,

including the recent war in Iraq. Although the Department of Defense (DOD)
considers contractors to be part of the total force, neither DOD nor the
services know the totality of contractor support being provided to
deployed forces. 1 However, military officials believe that the use of
contractors for support to these forces has increased significantly since
the 1991 Gulf War. Factors that have contributed to this increase include
reductions in the size of the military, an increase in the numbers of

operations and missions undertaken, and increasingly sophisticated weapons
systems. You asked us to assess (1) the extent of contractor support to
deployed U. S. forces and why DOD uses contractors; (2) the extent to
which such contractors are considered in DOD planning, including whether
DOD has backup plans to maintain essential services to deployed forces in
case contractors can no longer provide them; and

(3) the adequacy of guidance and oversight mechanisms in place to manage
contractors effectively. As agreed with your staff, we focused our efforts
in the Balkans and

Southwest Asia because the contractors in those theaters provide a broad
range of contractor support activities. We examined a wide range of
contracts in order to assess the diversity of contractor support and met
with officials at all levels of command to gain a comprehensive

1 Neither DOD nor the services have a single point that collects
information on contracts to support deployed forces. As a result, DOD
could provide us no information on the total cost of contractor support to
deployed forces. However, based on the information and contracts we
obtained during our review, we estimate that the costs of contractor
support to deployed forces will exceed $4.5 billion for the period fiscal
years 2000 through 2005.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

understanding of the contracting and contract management and oversight
processes. We did not, however, compare the cost of contractors versus the
cost of military personnel or make policy judgments on whether the use of
contractors is desirable. We conducted our review from August 2002 through
April 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. We discuss our scope and methodology in more detail in appendix
I. DOD uses contractors to provide U. S. forces that are deployed overseas

with a wide variety of services because of force limitations and a lack of
needed skills. The types of services contractors provide to deployed
forces include communication services, interpreters, base operations
services, weapons systems maintenance, gate and perimeter security,
intelligence analysis, and oversight over other contractors. The military
uses contractors to support deployed forces for several reasons. One
reason is that in some deployed areas, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, the
Executive Branch has limited the number of U. S. military personnel who
can be deployed in those countries at any one time. When these limits,
known as

force caps, are in place, contractors replace soldiers so that the
soldiers will be available to undertake activities with the potential for
combat. A second reason that DOD uses contractors is because either the
required skills are not available in the military or are only available in
limited numbers and need to be available to deploy for other
contingencies. For example, when the Air Force deployed the Predator
unmanned aerial vehicle, it required contractor support because the
vehicle is still in

development and the Air Force has not trained service members to maintain
the entire vehicle. Finally, DOD uses contractors to conserve scarce
skills to ensure that they will be available for future deployments.

DOD has not fully included contractor support in its operational and
strategic plans. As early as 1988, DOD was aware of the need to identify
contractors providing essential services but has done little to do so in
the ensuing 15 years. In 1991, DOD instructed its components to identify
essential services provided by contractors and develop plans to ensure the
continuation of those services should contractors become unavailable.
However, we found that DOD components have not conducted the directed
reviews to identify those contracts providing essential services. We also
found little in the way of backup plans in operational plans or as
separate documents, finding only one written backup plan among the
locations we visited, which included the Balkans and several Persian Gulf
countries. Many service officials told us that contractors have supported
contingencies in the past and, in their opinion, it was unlikely that
Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

contractors would not be available to provide support to deployed forces.
While most contractors with whom we met in the Persian Gulf stated their
intention to remain in the event of war with Iraq, contractor employees,
could become unavailable due to enemy attack or accidents. Some commanders
noted that although they have not formalized backup plans, they assumed
that should contractor support become unavailable, the personnel needed to
continue the service would be provided either by other contractors or from
military units. However, without firm plans, there is no assurance that
the personnel needed to provide the essential services would be available
when needed. Finally, DOD has done little to include contractor support in
its strategic human capital planning.

While individual contract oversight in deployed locations appeared to be
sufficient, we identified a number of broader issues associated with
managing contractor support. At the sites we visited, contract oversight
personnel for individual contracts were in place, and military members we
spoke to were generally satisfied with contractor performance and service.
However, broader oversight is lacking in key areas, making it difficult
for

commanders to manage contractors effectively. For example, visibility of
all contractor support at a specific location is practically nonexistent
at the combatant commands, component commands, and deployed locations we
visited except in Bosnia, where a concerted effort has been undertaken to
identify all contractor support. As a result, commanders at deployed
locations have limited visibility and understanding of all contractor

activity supporting their operations and frequently have no easy way to
get answers to questions about contractor support. This lack of visibility
inhibits the ability of commanders to resolve issues associated with
contractor support such as force protection issues and the provision of
support to the contractor personnel. Guidance at the DOD, combatant-
command, and service levels regarding the use of contractors to support
deployed forces varies widely, and mechanisms for managing these
contractors are inconsistent, creating challenges that may hinder the
efficient use of contractors. Only the Army has developed substantial
guidance and policies to deal with contractor support to deployed forces.
In addition, there is no standardization of necessary contract language
for deployment of contractors. This situation can increase costs to the

government as well as impede the local commander*s ability to provide
force protection and support to contractor personnel.

We are making a number of recommendations to improve guidance, training,
and contractor visibility at all levels of command.

Page 4 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with three of
our recommendations and partially agreed with three others. We modified
two of our recommendations to address DOD*s concerns. However, DOD
expressed concern that our recommendation to provide commanders more
information about the contracts used to support deployed forces could be
overly burdensome. We continue to believe all the recommendations have
merit and will not impose an undue burden. A detailed discussion of DOD*s
comments and our response is contained in the body of this report.

Since the early 1990s, DOD has used contractors to meet many of its
logistical and operational support needs during combat operations,
peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian assistance missions, ranging from
Somalia and Haiti to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Today, contractors
are used to support deployed forces at a number of locations around the
world as figure 1 shows. Background

Page 5 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

Figure 1: Selected Countries Where Contractors Are Supporting Deployed
Forces, As of April 2003

A wide array of DOD and non- DOD agencies can award contracts to support
deployed forces. Such contracts have been awarded by the individual
services, DOD agencies, and other federal agencies. These contracts
typically fall into three broad categories* theater support, external
support, and systems support. Theater support contracts are normally
awarded by contracting agencies associated with the regional combatant
command, for example, U. S. Central Command or service

component commands like U. S. Army- Europe or by contracting offices at
deployed locations such as Bosnia and Kosovo. Contracts can be for
recurring services* such as equipment rental or repair, minor
construction, security, and intelligence services* or for the one time
delivery of goods and services at the deployed location. External theater
contracts are awarded by commands external to the combatant command or
component commands, such as the Defense Logistics Agency, the U. S. Army
Corps of Engineers, and the Air Force Civil Engineer Support

Agency. Under external support contracts, contractors are generally

Page 6 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

expected to provide services at the deployed location. The Army*s
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contract 2 is an example of an
external theater contact. Finally, system contracts provide logistics
support to maintain and operate weapons and other systems. Systems may be
new or long- standing ones, and often the contracts are intended to
support units at their home stations. These types of contracts are most
often awarded by the commands responsible for building and buying the
weapons or other systems. Within a service or agency, numerous contracting
officers, with varying degrees of knowledge about the needs of contractors
and the military in deployed locations, can award contracts that support
deployed forces.

Depending on the type of service being provided under a contract,
contractor employees may be U. S. citizens, host country nationals, 3 or
third country nationals. 4 Contracts to support weapons systems, for
example, usually require U. S. citizens, while contractors that provide
food and housing services frequently hire local nationals or third country

nationals. Contractors provide the military with a wide variety of
services from food, laundry, and recreation services to maintenance of the
military*s most sophisticated weapons systems. DOD uses contractors during
deployments because limits are placed on the number of U. S. military
personnel assigned to a region, required skills may not be available in
the service, or the services want to husband scarce skills to ensure that
they are available for other contingencies.

2 The Army*s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contract was established
by the Army in 1985 as a means to (1) preplan for the use of contractor
support in contingencies or crises and (2) take advantage of existing
civilian resources in the United States and overseas to augment active and
reserve forces.

3 A host country national is an employee of a contractor who is a citizen
of the country where the work is being preformed. 4 A third country
national is an employee of a contractor who is neither a citizen of the
United States nor the host country. DOD Uses

Contractors for a Wide Range of Services Because of Force Size Limitations
and a Lack of Military Capability and Capacity

Page 7 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

Contractors provide a wide range of services at deployed locations. The
scope of contractor support often depends on the nature of the deployment.
For example, in a relatively stable environment such as the Balkans,
contractors provide base operations support services such as food,
laundry, recreational, construction and maintenance, road maintenance,
waste management, fire- fighting, power generation, and water production
and distribution services. Contractors also provide logistics support such
as parts and equipment distribution, ammunition accountability and
control, and port support activities as well as support to weapons systems
and tactical vehicles. In a less secure environment, as was the case
shortly after U. S. forces deployed to Afghanistan, contractors
principally provided support to weapons systems such as the Apache
helicopter and chemical and biological detection equipment. Table 1
illustrates some types of contractor support provided at selected deployed
locations. We were completing our work as the 2003 war with Iraq began and
so were unable to fully ascertain the extent of contractor support to

U. S. forces inside Iraq.

Table 1: Selected Services Provided by Contractors in Deployed Locations
Service Balkans Southwest

Asia Central Asia

Weapons systems support X X X Intelligence analysis X X X Linguists X X X
Base operations support X X X Logistics support X X Prepositioned
equipment maintenance X Non- tactical communications X X

Generator maintenance X X X Biological/ chemical detection systems X X
Management and control of government property X X X Command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence X X X Continuing education X
Fuel and material transport X X X

Security guards X X Tactical and non- tactical vehicle maintenance X X
Medical service X Mail service X Source: GAO. Contractors Provide a Full
Spectrum of Services to

DOD*s Deployed Forces

Page 8 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

Limits on the number of military personnel allowed in an area, called
*force caps*, lead DOD to use contractors to provide support to its
deployed forces. In some countries or regions the size of the force is
limited due to law, executive direction, or agreements with host countries
or other allies. For example, DOD has limited U. S. troops to 15 percent
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization force in Kosovo while the
Philippine government limited the number of U. S. troops participating in
a recent deployment to 660. Since contractors are not included in most
force caps, as force levels have been reduced in the Balkans, the Army has
substituted contractors for soldiers to meet requirements that were
originally met by soldiers. In Bosnia, for example, the Army replaced
soldiers at the gate and base perimeter with contracted security guards.
In Kosovo, the Army replaced its firefighters with contracted firefighters
as

the number of troops authorized to be in Kosovo decreased. 5 By using
contractors the military maximizes its combat forces in an area.

In some cases, DOD lacks the internal resources to meet all the
requirements necessary to support deployed forces. The military services
do not always have the people with specific skill sets to meet the
mission. Army National Guard members deployed to Bosnia told us that they
used contractors to maintain their Apache and Blackhawk helicopters
because the Guard has no intermediate maintenance capability. 6 , 7 In
addition, recently fielded systems and systems still under development may
have unique technical requirements for which the services have not had
time to develop training courses and train service personnel. For example,
when

the Army*s 4th Infantry Division deployed in support of the recent war in
Iraq, about one- third of the 183 contractor employees that deployed with
the division deployed to support the high tech digital command and control
systems still in development. Similarly, when the Air Force deployed the
Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, it required contractor support because
the vehicle is still in development and the Air Force has not trained
service members to maintain the Predator*s data link system.

5 As of October 2002, the Army estimated that contractors outnumbered
military members 2 to 1 in the Balkans. 6 In the active Army both
contactors and soldiers maintain Apache and Blackhawk helicopters. 7
Intermediate level maintenance is generally responsible for repairs to
aircraft components such as engines, avionics, and armaments as well as
the helicopter airframe. In addition, intermediate level maintenance may
also undertake some of the tasks the helicopter unit is normally
responsible for such as major inspections. DOD Uses Contractors

Because of Limits on Force Size and a Lack of Military Capability and
Capacity

Page 9 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

In addition, some weapons systems, such as the Marine Corp*s new truck,
were designed to be at least partially contractor supported from the
beginning, or the services made the decision to use contractor support
because the limited number of assets made contractor support cost
effective in DOD*s judgment. For example, the Army*s Guardrail
surveillance aircraft is entirely supported by contractors because,
according to Army officials, it was not cost effective to develop an
organic maintenance capability for this aircraft.

The increasing reliance on the private sector to handle certain functions
and capabilities has further reduced or eliminated the military*s ability
to meet certain requirements internally. For example, at Air Force bases
in the United States contractors now integrate base telephone networks
with local telephone systems. Since the Air Force eliminated this internal
capability to integrate the base telephone network with the local
telephone networks, it no longer has the military personnel qualified to
perform this task at deployed locations. Also, the use of commercial
offthe- shelf equipment results in an increased use of contractors. For
example, the Air Force and the Navy use commercial communications systems
at deployed locations in Southwest Asia and support this equipment with
contractors. According to one Navy official with whom we spoke, the Navy
uses contractors because it does not train its personnel to maintain
commercial systems.

In other cases, required skills are limited, and there is a need to
conserve high- demand, low- density 8 units for future operations. Air
Force officials in Southwest Asia told us that they use contractors to
maintain the generators that provide power to the bases there because the
Air Force has a limited number of qualified maintenance personnel, and
their frequent deployment was having a negative impact on retention.

While most commanders believed that replacing service members with
contractors in deployed locations had no negative impact on the training
of military members, some believed that service members who did not deploy
with their units were missing valuable training opportunities. We found
opinions varied depending on the skill or military occupation that

8 These are military units that are in high demand since their unique
capabilities make them essential for a wide range of military operations.
However, there are relatively few of these units. Hence, both their rate
and length of deployment tends to be longer than for other military units.
Impact of Contractors on Training

Page 10 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

was being replaced. For example, commanders told us that food service
personnel and communications personnel would not benefit from deploying to
Bosnia and Kosovo at this time because these locations no longer replicate
field conditions, rather they more closely resemble bases in Germany or
the United States. Other commanders told us that they believed that
logistics personnel as well as vehicle maintenance personnel were missing
the opportunity to work in high volume situations in a more intense
environment.

At some locations, contractor employees who work with military personnel
are providing training although such training may not be a requirement of
the contract. Contractors are training soldiers on systems they ordinarily
would not be exposed to, such as specially modified high mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicles (Humvees) in Bosnia and commercial power
generators in Kuwait. They also train soldiers to operate and maintain the
newest technologies, such as computers and communications systems
supporting intelligence operations in Southwest Asia. Training is
comprised of not only hands- on experience but often structured training
classes as well.

Page 11 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

Contractors provide DOD with a wide variety of services at deployed
locations, and while DOD uses contractors as part of the total force mix
and recognizes the need to continue essential contractor services 9 during
crises, it has not included them in operational and strategic planning.
DOD policy requires its components 10 to annually review all contractor
services, including new and existing contracts to determine which services
will be essential during crisis situations. Where there is a reasonable
doubt about the continuation of essential services during crisis
situations by the

contractor, the cognizant component commander is required to prepare a
contingency plan for obtaining the essential service from alternate
sources. However, we found that the required contract reviews were not
done, and there was little in the way of backup plans. Many commanders
assumed that other contractors or military units would be available to
provide the essential service if the original contractors were no longer
available. However, the commanders had no way of knowing if these assets
would actually be available when needed. Additionally, DOD has not
integrated its contractor workforce into its human capital strategy.

As early as 1988, DOD noted the lack of a central policy or an oversight
mechanism for the identification and management of essential contractor
services. A DOD Inspector General report, 11 issued in November 1988,
noted that DOD components could not ensure that the emergency essential
services performed by contractors would continue during a crisis or
hostile situation. The report also stated that there was *no central

oversight of contracts for emergency essential services, no legal basis to
compel contractors to perform, and no means to enforce contractual terms.*
The report recommended that all commands identify (1) *war- stopper*
services that should be performed exclusively by military personnel and
(2) those services that could be contracted out, if a

contingency plan existed, to ensure continued performance if a contractor
9 According to DOD Instruction 3020.37, contractor services are considered
essential when (1) DOD components may not have military or civilian
employees to perform these services immediately or (2) the effectiveness
of defense systems or operations may be seriously impaired and
interruption is unacceptable when those services are not available
immediately.

10 DOD components include the Military departments, the Joint Staff, the
Combatant Commands, and the Defense agencies. 11 Audit Report, Office of
the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Retention of Emergency-
Essential Civilians Overseas During Hostilities, Report Number 89- 026
(Washington, D. C.: Nov. 7, 1988). DOD and the Services

Have Not Identified Essential Services Provided by Contracts or Developed
Plans for Their Continuation Should Contractors Not Be Available

DOD Has Directed the Identification of Contractor- Provided Essential
Services That Need to Continue During Crises

Page 12 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

does not perform. DOD concurred with the reports findings and
recommendations and drafted a directive to address them. This effort led
to the issuance of DOD Instruction 3020.37, 12 in November 1990, which
addresses the continuation of essential contractor services during crisis
situations.

In 1991, the Department of Defense Inspector General reported 13 on this
issue again. The Inspector General reported that generally *contingency
plans did not exist to ensure continued performance of essential services

if a contractor defaulted during a crisis situation.* The Inspector
General*s report also stated that there was no central policy or oversight
for the identification and management of essential services until DOD
Instruction 3020.37 was issued. The Inspector General*s report noted that
none of the major or subordinate commands that they visited could provide
them with data concerning all contracts vital to combat or crisis
operations. The report concluded that although DOD*s instruction provided
the needed central policy that promotes the continuation of emergency
essential services during crises and hostile situations, the instruction
needed revision to provide additional assurances such as the
identification of war- stopper services and an annual reporting system
identifying the numbers of emergency essential contracts and their
attendant personnel. DOD concurred with the report findings but believed
that since DOD Instruction 3020.37 had just been issued, the services and
agencies should be given time to implement it.

DOD Instruction 3020.37 assigns responsibilities and prescribes procedures
to implement DOD policy to assure that components (1) develop and
implement plans and procedures that are intended to provide reasonable
assurance of the continuation of essential services during crisis
situations and (2) prepare a contingency plan for obtaining the essential
service from alternate sources where there is a reasonable doubt about the
continuation of that service. Responsibility for ensuring that all
contractor services are reviewed annually, to include new and existing
contracts, to determine which services will be essential during crisis
situations rests with the heads of DOD components. They must also

12 Department of Defense Instruction 3020.37, Continuation of Essential
DOD Contractor Services during Crises, Nov. 6, 1990 (Change 1, Jan. 26,
1996). 13 Audit Report, Office of the Inspector General, Department of
Defense, Civilian Contractor Overseas Support During Hostilities, Report
Number 91- 105 (Washington, D. C.: June 26, 1991). DOD Instruction 3020.37

Requires Component Heads to Take Action

Page 13 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

conduct an annual assessment of the unexpected or early loss of essential
contractor services on the effectiveness of support to mobilizing and
deployed forces. The results of these assessments are to be included in
the affected contingency or operations plans.

Planning procedures for component activities using essential contractor
services are specified in DOD Instruction 3020.37. The component is to
identify services that are mission essential and designate them in the
contract statement of work. Where a reasonable assurance of continuation
of essential contractor services cannot be attained, the component
activity

commander is to do one of three things. The first is to obtain military,
DOD civilian, or host nation personnel to perform the services concerned,
and, in consultation with legal and contracting personnel, determine the
proper course of action to transition from the contractor- provided
services. The second is to prepare a contingency plan for obtaining the
essential services from other sources if the contractor does not perform
in a crisis. The third option for the commander is to accept the risk
attendant with a disruption of the service during a crisis situation.
Figure 2 shows

the essential planning process required by DOD Instruction 3020.37.

Page 14 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

Figure 2: DOD Instruction 3020.37 Essential Services Planning Procedures

DOD has also directed regional combatant commanders to identify
contractors providing mission essential services and develop plans to
mitigate their possible loss. In late 2002, the Joint Staff modified the
logistics supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 14 to
require the development of a mitigation plan that details transitioning to
other support should commercial deliveries and/ or support become
compromised. This

14 The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides guidance to the
combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish tasks and
missions based on current capabilities.

Page 15 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

was partly in response to problems with fuel deliveries in Afghanistan
during Operation Enduring Freedom. Also, Joint Staff guidance for the
development of operational plans by the regional combatant commanders
requires that those plans identify mission essential services provided by
contractors and identify the existence of any contingency plans to ensure
these services continue. As noted earlier, DOD Instruction 3020.37 was
issued in response to a 1988

DOD Inspector General report, and in 1991 DOD stated that the components
should be given time to implement it. However, as of April 2003, 12 years
later, we found little evidence that the DOD components are implementing
the DOD Instruction. The heads of DOD components are required by the
instruction to ensure that the instruction*s policies and procedures are
implemented by relevant subordinate organizations. However, none of the
services are conducting the annual review to identify mission essential
services that are being provided by contractors. Service and combatant
command officials we spoke with were generally unaware of the requirement
to review contracts annually and identify

essential services. None of the regional combatant commands, service
component commanders, or installations visited during our review had an
ongoing process for reviewing contracts as required by DOD Instruction
3020.37. Without identifying mission essential contracts, commanders do
not know what essential services could be at risk during operations.
Furthermore, the commanders cannot determine when backup plans are needed,
nor can they assess the risk they would have to accept with the

loss of contractor services. One Air Force official indicated that our
visit had prompted a review of their contracts to identify those that
provided essential services and that he became aware of this requirement
only when we asked about their compliance with the instruction.

Additionally, DOD has limited knowledge of the extent to which DOD
Instruction 3020. 37 is being implemented. The instruction states that an
office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense will *periodically
monitor implementation of this instruction.* However, we found no evidence
that the required monitoring had ever taken place. In discussion with the
office that has primary responsibility for the instruction (located in the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness) we
were told that the monitoring process is informal and that since DOD
components have not advised the office of any significant problems in
implementing the instruction (as required by the instruction) it is
assumed that it is being implemented. Essential Contractor

Services Have Not Been Identified

Page 16 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

We found little in the way of backup plans to replace mission essential
contractor services during crises if necessary. This is not surprising
since a prerequisite to developing a backup plan is the identification of
those contracts that provide essential services. Many of the people we
talked to assumed that the personnel needed to continue essential services
would

be provided, either by other contractors or organic military capability
and did not see a need for a formal backup plan. The only written backup
plan that we found was for maintenance of the Air Force*s C21J executive
aircraft. 15 According to the plan, if contractors are unavailable, Air
Force

personnel will provide maintenance. However, according to Air Force
officials, no one in the Air Force is trained to maintain this aircraft.

Our review of unclassified portions of operations plans 16 addressing
logistics support revealed no backup planning. For example, in our review
of the logistics portion of the operations plan for the war in Iraq, which
addresses contracting, we found that there were no backup plans should
contractors become unavailable to provide essential services. The plan
provides guidance on certain aspects of contracting, such as the creation
of a joint contracting cell, but there is no language pertaining to backup

plans. In addition, our review of operations plans for the Balkans did not
identify any reference to plans for the mitigation of the loss of
contractor support.

In response to our questions about a lack of backup plans, many DOD
officials noted that contractors have always supported U. S. forces in
deployed locations and the officials expect that to continue. 17 While
most of the contractor personnel we spoke with in the Persian Gulf
indicated that they would remain in the event of war with Iraq, they
cannot be

ordered to remain in a hostile environment or replace other contractors
that choose not to deploy. DOD can initiate legal action against a

15 At the time of our review these aircraft were located at Ramstein Air
Base in Germany but could be deployed to the Balkans or Southwest Asia.
During the 1991 Gulf War, these aircraft were deployed to Saudi Arabia.

16 We were able to review sections of a limited number of operations
plans. Our review was restricted to those portions that address logistics
support, including support by contractors.

17 It is DOD policy that contractors providing essential services are
expected to use all means at their disposal to continue to provide such
services, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract
during periods of crisis, until appropriately released or evacuated by
military authority. Backup Planning Is Not Being Done

Lack of Backup Plans May Be Shortsighted

Page 17 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

contractor for nonperformance, but the mission requirement the contractor
was responsible for remains.

Assuming that existing contractor employees will be available to perform
essential services may not always be realistic. Reasons for the loss of
contractor support can extend beyond contractors refusing to deploy to or
remain in the deployed location. Contractors could be killed (seven
contractor employees were killed in the 1991 Gulf War) or incapacitated by
hostile action, accident, or other unforeseen events. Furthermore, there
is no guarantee that a contractor will be willing to deploy to replace the
original contractor.

Should contractors become unavailable, many of the people we talked to
assumed that the personnel needed to continue essential services would be
provided either by other contractors or organic military capability, or
they would do without the service. However, these assumptions have not
been vetted, and key questions remain.

The ability to replace existing contractor services with a new contractor
can be dependent on the support being provided. Assumptions that military
resources will be available may not recognize that multiple commands may
be relying on the same unit as backup and that these units therefore may
not be available, or organic capability may not exist. As we noted earlier
the lack of organic capability is one reason that DOD uses contractors.
The Air Force*s lack of in- house maintenance capability for its C21J
aircraft mentioned earlier and the Army*s total dependence on contractor
support for all its fixed wing aircraft are examples of the lack of
organic capability. For some contracts, comparably skilled contractor
personnel may not be available from other companies. For example, we were
told at one location that only certain contractors have access to
proprietary technical and backup data from the manufacturers of specific
aircraft or systems. Additionally, the contracted services required for
military operations may also be needed by others. For example, shortages
of qualified linguists to support Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan delayed interrogations and signals exploitation. Among the
reasons given for the shortage were the competing demands of other
government agencies for the same skills.

If the decision to do without the essential service is made, the risk
associated with this decision must be examined and determined to be
acceptable, particularly in light of the reliance on contractors. Without
contractor support certain missions would be at risk. For example, Task
Force Eagle in Bosnia relies on contracted linguistic and intelligence

Page 18 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

analyst services. We were told that if the contracted services were lost,
it would mean an immediate critical loss would occur for the military
because DOD does not have service personnel with these skills. Another
example is biological detection equipment used by the Army deployed in
Afghanistan in October 2001. The equipment is operated by Army personnel
but is entirely dependent upon contractor support for

maintenance in the field. The loss of this contractor support would
adversely affect the Army*s ability to detect biological threats at
deployed locations.

DOD relies on contractors as part of the total force. According to Joint
Publication 4- 05, 18 *The total force policy is one fundamental premise
upon which our military force structure is built. It was institutionalized
in 1973 and * as policy matured, military retirees, DOD

personnel, contractor personnel, and host- nation support personnel were
brought under its umbrella to reflect the value of their contributions to
our military capability.* Furthermore, DOD policy states *the DOD
Components shall rely on the most effective mix of the Total Force, cost
and other factors considered, including active, reserve, civilian, host-
nation, and contract resources necessary to fulfill assigned peacetime and
wartime missions.* 19 While DOD policy may consider contractors as part of
the total force, its

human capital strategy does not. As we recently reported, 20 DOD has not
integrated the contractor workforce into its overall human capital
strategic plans. 21 The civilian plan notes that contractors are part of
the unique mix of DOD resources, but the plan does not discuss how DOD
will shape its future workforce in a total force context that includes
contractors. This situation is in contrast to what studies on human
capital planning at DOD have noted. For example, the Defense Science
Board*s

18 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning,
Joint Publication 4- 05 (Washington, D. C.: June 1995). 19 Department of
Defense Instruction 3020.37.

20 U. S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to
Strengthen Civilian Human Capital Strategic Planning and Integration with
Military Personnel and Sourcing Decisions, GAO- 03- 475 (Washington, D.
C.: Mar. 28, 2003).

21 DOD*s overall human capital strategy consists of three separate plans:
one for civilians, one for military personnel, and one for quality of life
issues for service members and their families. Contractors Are Not
Included in DOD*s Human

Capital Strategic Plan

Page 19 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

2000 report on Human Resources Strategy 22 states that DOD needs to
undertake deliberate and integrated force shaping of the civilian and
military forces, address human capital challenges from a total force
perspective, and base decisions to convert functions from military to
civilians or contractors on an integrated human resources plan. In
addition, the National Academy of Public Administration noted that as more
work is privatized and more traditionally military tasks require support
of civilian or contractor personnel, a more unified approach to force
planning and management will be necessary; serious shortfalls in any one
of the force elements (military, civilian, or contractor) will damage
mission accomplishment. 23 DOD disagreed with our March 2003
recommendation that it develop a

departmentwide human capital strategic plan that integrates both military
and civilian workforces and takes into account contractor roles. 24 In
disagreeing, DOD said that it presently has both a military and civilian
plan; the use of contractors is just another tool to accomplish the
mission, not a separate workforce, with separate needs, to manage. The
intent of our recommendation is that strategic planning for the civilian
workforce be undertaken in the context of the total force* civilian,
military, and contractors* because the three workforces are expected to
perform their responsibilities in a seamless manner to accomplish DOD*s
mission. We continue to believe that strategic planning in a total force
context is especially important because the trend toward greater reliance
on contractors requires a critical mass of civilian and military personnel
with the expertise necessary to protect the government*s interest and
ensure

effective oversight of contractors* work. Integrated planning could also
facilitate achieving a goal in the Quadrennial Defense Review to focus
DOD*s resources (personnel) in those areas that directly contribute to war
fighting and to rely on the private sector for non- core functions.

22 The Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy,
February 2000. 23 The 2000 National Academy of Public Administration,
Civilian Workforce 2020: Strategies for Modernizing Human Resources
Management in the Department of the Navy (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 18,
2000).

24 U. S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel: DOD Comments on GAO*s
Report on DOD*s Civilian Human Capital Strategic Planning, GAO- 03- 690R
(Washington, D. C.: Apr. 18, 2003).

Page 20 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

Guidance at the DOD, combatant- command, and service levels regarding the
use of contractors to support deployed forces varies widely as do the
mechanisms for managing these contractors, creating challenges that may
hinder a commander*s ability to oversee and manage contractors

efficiently. There is no DOD- wide guidance that establishes baseline
polices to help ensure the efficient use of contractors that support
deployed forces. The Joint Staff has developed general guidance for
regional combatant commanders. At the service level, only the Army has
developed comprehensive guidance to help commanders manage deployed
contractors effectively. Furthermore, there is little or no visibility of
contractors or contracts at the regional combatant or service component
command level. As a result, contractors have arrived at deployed locations
unbeknownst to the ground commander and without the government support
they needed to do their jobs. Moreover, ground commanders have little
visibility over the totality of contractors that provide services at their
installations, causing concerns regarding safety and security. Guidance
for issues that impact all the components originates at the DOD

level. Typically, DOD will issue a directive* a broad policy document
containing what is required to initiate, govern, or regulate actions or
conduct by DOD components. This directive establishes a baseline policy
that applies across the combatant commands, services, and DOD agencies.
DOD may also issue an instruction* which implements the policy, or
prescribes the manner or a specific plan or action for carrying out the
policy, operating a program or activity, and assigning responsibilities.
For example:

 DOD Directive 2000.12 25 establishes DOD*s antiterrorism and force
protection policy.  DOD Instruction 2000.16 26 establishes specific force
protection standards

pursuant to the policy established by DOD Directive 2000.12. In the case
of contractor support for deployed forces, we found no DODwide guidance
that establishes any baseline policy regarding the use of contractors to
support deployed forces or the government*s obligations to 25 Department
of Defense Directive 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism/ Force Protection Program,

Apr. 13, 1999. 26 Department of Defense Instruction 2000.16, DOD
Antiterrorism Standards, June 14, 2001. Guidance and

Contract Language and Oversight Vary within DOD and the Services

Guidance on the Use of Contractors to Support Deployed Forces Varies
Widely

Page 21 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

these contractors. 27 However, there are varying degrees of guidance at
the joint and service level to instruct commanders on the use of
contractors. The Joint Staff has developed guidance for regional combatant
commanders. Joint Publication 4- 0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint
Operations, *Chapter V, Contractors in the Theater* 28 sets forth doctrine
on the use of contractors and provides a framework for addressing
contractor support issues. The Joint Publication describes the regional
combatant commander*s general responsibilities, including

 integration of contractors as part of the force as reflected in the
Time- Phased Force and Deployment Data, 29 logistics plans, and operation
plans;  compliance with international, U. S., and host nation laws and

determination of restrictions imposed by international agreements on the
status of contractors;  establishment of theater- specific requirements
and policies for contractors

and communication of those requirements to the contractors; and 
establishment of procedures to integrate and monitor contracting

activities. No single document informs the combatant commander of his
responsibilities with regards to contractors. Rather, there is a variety
of guidance that applies to contractors and appears in joint or DOD

publications. For example, in addition to Joint Publication 4- 0, the
following DOD documents address contractors at deployed locations:

 DOD Directive 2000.12 and DOD Instruction 2000.16, define the anti-
terrorism and force protection responsibilities of the military. These
include force protection responsibilities to contractors as well as
requirements placed on contractors who deploy. 27 DOD Instruction 3020. 37
does not provide guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed
forces or the government*s obligations to deployed contractors. Rather, it
focuses on essential services and how to ensure that these services will
be available in a crisis.

28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Logistics Planning of Joint
Operations, Joint Publication 4- 0 (Washington D. C.: June 1995). 29 The
Time- Phased Force and Deployment Data describes force requirements, how
and when those forces are to be deployed, and the transportation assets
needed to deploy them.

Page 22 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

 Joint Publication 3- 11, 30 includes a requirement that mission-
essential contractors be provided with chemical and biological survival
equipment and training.  DOD Directive 4500.54 31 requires all non- DOD
personnel traveling under

DOD sponsorship to obtain country clearance. While the directive does not
specify contractors, it does apply to them, further complicating the
ability of a commander to become aware of this responsibility.

Joint Publication 4- 0 only applies to combatant commanders involved in
joint operations. However, at the regional combatant commands we visited,
contracting, logistics, and planning officials were not implementing the
Joint Publication.

At the service level, only the Army has developed comprehensive guidance
to help commanders manage contractors effectively. As the primary user of
contractors while deployed, the Army has taken the lead in formulating
policies and doctrine addressing the use of contractors in deployed
locations. Army regulations, field manuals, and pamphlets provide a wide
array of guidance on the use of contractors. The following are examples:

 Army Regulation 715- 9* Contractors Accompanying the Force 32 * provides
policies, procedures, and responsibilities for managing and using
contracted U. S. citizens who are deployed to support Army requirements. 
Army Field Manual 3- 100.21* Contractors on the Battlefield 33 *addresses

the use of contractors as an added resource for the commander to consider
when planning support for an operation. Its purpose is to define the role
of contractors, describe their relationships to the combatant commanders
and the Army service component commanders, and explain their mission of
augmenting operations and weapons systems support. It is

also a guide for Army contracting personnel and contractors in
implementing planning decisions and understanding how contractors will be
managed and supported by the military forces they augment.

30 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments, Joint Publication 3- 11
(Washington, D. C: July 2000). 31 DOD Directive 4500.54, Official
Temporary Duty Travel Abroad, May 1991. 32 Department of the Army
Regulation 715.9, Contractors Accompanying the Force, October 1999. 33
Department of the Army Field Manual 3- 100. 21, Contractors on the
Battlefield, November 2002.

Page 23 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

 Army Pamphlet 715- 16* Contractor Deployment Guide 34 *informs
contractor employees, contracting officers, and field commanders of the
current policies and procedures that may affect the deployment of
contractors. The guide focuses on the issues surrounding a U. S. citizen
contractor employee who is deploying from the United States to a theater
of operation overseas.

These documents provide comprehensive and detailed direction to
commanders, contracting personnel, and contractors on what their roles and
responsibilities are and how they should meet them. Officials we spoke
with at various levels of the Army were generally aware of the Army*s
guidance. For example, in Kosovo we received a briefing from the commander
of the Area Support Group that included the applicable Army guidance on
the use of contractors in deployed locations. Additionally, the Army
Materiel Command has established a Web site 35 that contains links to
primary and secondary documents that provide guidance on the use of
contractors on the battlefield.

The other services make less use of contractors to support deployed
forces. Nevertheless, their contractors provide many of the same services
as the Army*s contractors, often under similar austere conditions at the
same locations and therefore have similar force protection and support
requirements as Army contractors. For example, both Air Force and Army
contractors work at bases in Kuwait and do not have significant

differences in terms of their living and working conditions or the types
of threats they face. Also, it is not uncommon to find Air Force
contractors deployed in support of the other services, as is the case in
Bosnia where Air Force contractors maintain the Army*s Apache and
Blackhawk helicopters. However, the other services have not developed the
same level of

guidance as the Army to guide commanders and contracting personnel on how
to meet those requirements. Like the Army, the Air Force uses contractors
for base operations support (including security, trash removal, and
construction services) in deployed locations. Contractors also provide
many essential services to Air Force units deployed to Bosnia and
Southwest Asia. In Southwest Asia contractors provide support for base
communications systems, systems that generate the tactical air picture for

34 Department of the Army Pamphlet 715- 16, Contractor Deployment Guide,
February 1998. 35 http:// www. amc. army. mil/ amc/ rda/ default. htm.

Page 24 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

the Combined Air Operations Center, and maintenance support for both the
Predator unmanned aerial vehicle and the data links it uses to transmit
information. In 2001, the Air Force issued a policy memorandum 36
addressing the use of contractors in deployed locations. The purpose of

the memorandum is to provide consistent and uniform guidance on the use of
U. S. contractor personnel to augment the support of Air Force operations
in wartime and contingency operations. For example, the memorandum states
as follows:

 Any determination regarding commercial support must consider the
essential services that must be maintained and the risks associated due to
contractor non- performance.  Contractors may be provided force
protection and support services such

as housing and medical support commensurate to those provided to DOD
civilians, if the contract requires it.  Contractors should not be
provided uniforms or weapons.

However, the Air Force has not developed the guidance to instruct its
personnel on how to implement this policy. For example, the Air Force does
not have a comparable document to the Army*s Contractor Deployment Guide,
to instruct contracting personnel or contractor employees on deployment
requirements such as training, medical screening, and logistical support.

The Navy and the Marine Corps have also not developed much guidance on
dealing with contractors in deployed locations. The Marine Corps has
issued an order 37 addressing the use of contractors, which is limited to
a statement that contractor personnel should not normally be deployed
forward of the port of debarkation and that contractor logistics support
requirements be identified and included in all planning scenarios. This
guidance only addresses contractor support for ground equipment, ground
weapons systems, munitions, and information systems. As with the Air Force
memorandum, the Marine Corps does not have the guidance in place to
instruct personnel on how to implement this order.

36 Air Force memorandum, USAF Guidance on Contractors in the Theater
(Unpublished: Feb. 8, 2001). 37 Marine Corps Order 4200.32, Contractor
Logistics Support for Ground Equipment, Ground Weapons Systems, Munitions,
and Information Systems, December 2000.

Page 25 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

The Navy does not have any guidance related to contractor support of
deployed forces. Navy officials stressed that because most Navy
contractors are deployed to ships, many of the issues related to force
protection and levels of support do not exist. Nevertheless, some
contractors do support the Navy ashore and therefore may operate in an
environment similar to contractors supporting the Army. In fact, of the
seven contractors killed in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, three were working
for the Navy. Furthermore, we learned that there have been issues with the
support of contractors deployed on ships. For example, officials at the
Navy*s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command told us they were not sure
if the Navy was authorized to provide medical treatment to their
contractors deployed on ships.

The differences in the DOD and service guidance can lead to sometimes
contradictory requirements, complicating the ability of commanders to
implement that guidance. For example, guidance related to providing force
protection to contractor personnel varies significantly. Joint guidance
states that force protection is the responsibility of the contractor; Army
guidance places that responsibility with the commander; and Air Force
guidance treats force protection as a contractual matter, specifically, as
follows:

 Joint Publication 4- 0 *Chapter V,* states *Force protection
responsibility for DOD contractor employees is a contractor
responsibility, unless valid contract terms place that responsibility with
another party.*  Army Field Manual 3- 100.21 states, *Protecting
contractors and their

employees on the battlefield is the commander*s responsibility. When
contractors perform in potentially hostile or hazardous areas, the
supported military forces must assure the protection of their operations
and employees. The responsibility for assuring that contractors receive
adequate force protection starts with the combatant commander, extends
downward, and includes the contractor.*

 The Air Force policy memorandum states, *The Air Force may provide or
make available, under terms and conditions as specified in the contract,
force protection * commensurate with those provided to DOD civilian

personnel to the extent authorized by U. S. and host nation law.* As a
result, the combatant commander does not have a uniform set of
requirements he can incorporate into his planning process but instead has
to work with requirements that vary according to the services and the
individual contracts. In fact, an official on the Joint Staff told us that
the combatant commanders have requested DOD- wide guidance on the use of
Some Guidance Is

Contradictory and Causes Confusion for Military Commanders

Page 26 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

contractors to support deployed forces to establish a baseline that
applies to all the services.

Many of the issues discussed in the balance of this report, such as the
lack of standard contract language related to deploying contractors, the
lack of visibility over contractors, and adequate support to deployed
contractors stem in part from the varying guidance at the DOD and service
levels. According to DOD officials, DOD is in the initial phase of
developing a directive that will establish DOD policy with regard to
managing contractors in deployed locations as well as a handbook providing
greater detail. The officials expect this guidance to be issued by the end
of 2003. DOD officials involved stated this guidance would bring together
all DOD policies that apply to contractors who support deployed forces and
clarify DOD policy on issues such as force protection and training. These
officials indicated that the DOD directive and handbook would be based on
the Army guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces.

There is no standard contract language applicable DOD- wide (such as in
the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement) related to the
deployment and support of contractors that support deployed forces.
Contracting officers therefore may not address potential requirements
related to deployments or may use whatever deployment language they
believe to be appropriate, which may not address the necessary deployment
requirements. The Defense Acquisition Deskbook Supplement entitled
Contractor Support in the Theater of Operations includes

suggested clauses for contracts in support of deployed forces. However,
these clauses are not mandatory and did not appear to be widely known by
contracting officers. As a result, there is no common baseline of contract
language specifically addressing deployment that is required for contracts

that may support deployed forces and no assurance that all of these
contracts will properly address deployment requirements.

The degree to which individual contracts adequately address deployment
requirements varies widely. System support contracts are often written
before the need to deploy is identified, and the contracting officer may
not have considered the possibility of deployment. Also, some weapons
systems are being deployed before they are fully developed, and deployment
language was not included in the development contracts. Some of the system
support contracts we looked at did not include language clearly specifying
that contractors may need to deploy to hostile and austere locations to
provide support to deployed forces, as in the

following examples: Contracts for Support of

Deployed Forces Often Do Not Include the Language to Ensure Efficient
Deployments or Implement Policy

Page 27 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

 The contract for an Army communications system needed to be modified
when the system was relocated from Saudi Arabia to Kuwait (and would need
to be modified again if the system were brought into Iraq) because the
contract did not contain provisions for deployment to other locations. 
The Air Force Predator unmanned aerial vehicle contract did not envision
deployment since the Predator was developed as an advanced technology

concept demonstration project.  An engineering support contract for the
Navy did not contain a specific

deployment clause but only stated that the contractor must support the
Navy ashore or afloat.

The Army*s Combined Arms Support Command found a similar situation when it
reviewed system support contracts for the 4th Infantry Division. The 4th
Infantry Division is the Army*s first digitized division and serves as the
test bed for the latest command and control systems, many of which are
still under development. The Combined Arms Support Command study 38
reviewed 89 contracts that supported the division. The command determined
that 44 of the 89 contracts would likely require that contractor personnel
be deployed and found that 21 of the 44 either had no deployment language
or vague deployment language. However, this did not impede the division*s
deployment for Operation Iraqi Freedom. According to Army officials, 183
contractor employees prepared to deploy in support of the 4th Infantry
Division*s deployment, including some

whose contracts were noted in the 4th Infantry Division study as having
had either no deployment language or vague deployment language. To ensure
that problems do not arise when units deploy, the Army has taken steps to
address some of the issues identified in the study. Specifically, in 2002,
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology issued the following memorandums:  A January 2002 memorandum
39 stating that development contracts

providing support contractor personnel shall contain appropriate
deployment guidance if they have any likelihood of being deployed outside
of the United States.

38 U. S. Army, Combined Arms Support Command, Acquisition Liaison Office,
Systems Contractor Support of 4th Infantry Division. (Ft. Lee, Va.: Aug.
2001). 39 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), Contractor Systems Support
During Contingency Operations,

(Unpublished: Jan. 28, 2002).

Page 28 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

 A June 2002 memorandum 40 stating that Program Executive Officers and
Program Managers should strive to develop systems that do not require
contractor support in forward deployed locations. Military officials we
spoke with told us that the lack of specific

deployment language in contracts could increase the time it would take to
get contractor support to deployed forces as well as the cost of that
support. For example, the contract for support of the Army*s prepositioned
equipment in Qatar did not include language that provided for a potential
deployment to Kuwait. As a result, when the need arose to move the
equipment to Kuwait, the contract needed to be modified. (The cost of the
modification was $53 million although it is not clear what

amount, if any, the government could have saved had deployment language
already been included in the contract.) Contacts may also lack language to
enforce policies pertaining to

contractors in deployed locations. For example, Army policy requires that
contractors follow all general orders 41 and force protection policies of
the local commander. However, these requirements were not always written
into the contract documents and thus may not be enforceable. In such
situations, commanders may not have the ability to control contractor
activities in accordance with general orders. For example, judge advocate
officials in Bosnia expressed their concern that the base commander was
not authorized to prevent contractor personnel from entering a local
mosque in a high threat environment. These officials suggested that
commanders should always be able to control contractor activities where
matters of force protection are concerned. Several officials indicated
that many of these issues could be addressed if DOD implemented a policy
that

required all contracts that support deployed forces to include language
that applies the general orders and force protection policies of the local
commanders to contractor employees.

40 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology), Contractor Support Restrictions, (Unpublished:
June 11, 2002). 41 General Orders are permanent instructions, usually
concerned with matters of policy or administration and issued in order
form, that apply to all members of a command. Examples include orders
restricting travel to or from a base and prohibitions on the use of
alcohol.

Page 29 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

DOD has established specific policies on how contracts, including those
that support deployed forces, should be administered and managed.
Oversight of contracts ultimately rests with the contracting officer who
has the responsibility for ensuring that contractors meet the requirements
set forth in the contract. However, most contracting officers are not
located at the deployed locations. As a result, contracting officers
appoint monitors who represent the contracting officer at the deployed
location

and are responsible for monitoring contractor performance. How contracts
and contractors are monitored at a deployed location is largely a function
of the size and scope of the contract. Contracting officers for

large scale and high value contracts such as the Air Force Contract
Augmentation Program, the Army*s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, and
the Balkan Support Contract have opted to have personnel from the

Defense Contract Management Agency oversee contractor performance. These
onsite teams include administrative contracting officers who direct the
contractor to perform work and quality assurance specialists who ensure
that the contractors perform work to the standards written in the
contracts. For smaller contracts, contracting officers usually appoint
contracting officer*s representatives or contracting officer*s technical
representatives to monitor contractor performance at deployed locations.
These individuals are not normally contracting specialists and serve as

contracting officer*s representatives as an additional duty. They cannot
direct the contractor by making commitments or changes that affect price,
quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of the
contract.

Instead, they act as the eyes and ears of the contracting officer and
serve as the liaison between the contractor and the contracting officer.
At the locations we visited, we found that oversight personnel were
generally in place and procedures had been established to monitor
contractor performance, but some issues were identified. The officials we
spoke with expressed their satisfaction with contractor performance and
with the level of oversight provided for the contracts under their
purview. However, officials mentioned several areas where improvements to
the oversight process could be made. One area involved training of
contracting officer*s representatives. While the contracting officer*s

representatives we spoke with appeared to be providing appropriate
contract oversight, some stated that training before they assumed these
positions would have better prepared them to effectively oversee
contractor performance. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement requires that they be qualified by training and experience
commensurate with the responsibilities to be delegated to them. However,
not all contracting officer*s representatives were receiving this
training. For example, most of the contracting officer*s representatives
we met with Oversight of Individual

Contracts at the Deployed Locations We Visited Appeared to Be Generally
Sufficient

Page 30 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

in Southwest Asia did not receive prior training. As a result, they had to
learn on the job, taking several weeks before they could efficiently
execute their responsibilities, which could lead to gaps in contractor
oversight.

Another area for improvement involved familiarization of commanders with
using contractors. Several of the contracting officials we met with in the
Balkans and Southwest Asia stated there was a lack of training or
education for commanders and senior personnel on the use of contractors;
particularly with regards to the directing of contractor activities and
the roles of the contract monitors such as the Defense Contract Management
Agency and contracting officer*s representatives, as illustrated in the
following examples:

 An Air Force commander sent a contractor from Kuwait to Afghanistan
without going through the appropriate contracting officer. The contractor
was ultimately recalled to Kuwait because the contract contained no
provision for support in Afghanistan.  A Special Operations Command
official told us commanders were unfamiliar with the Defense Contract
Management Agency and believed that the agency represented the contractor
and not the military.  An Army official told us that commanders sometimes
do not know that

they are responsible for requesting and nominating a contracting officer*s
representative for contracts supporting their command. Some efforts are
being made to address this issue. For example, U. S. Army, Europe includes
contract familiarization during mission rehearsal exercises for Balkan
deployments.

We also found that the frequent rotation of personnel into and out of a
theater of operation (particularly in Southwest Asia) resulted in a loss
of continuity in the oversight process as incoming oversight personnel had
to familiarize themselves with their new responsibilities. We previously

reported on the impact of frequent rotations in and out of the theater. 42
In response to a recommendation made in our 2000 report, the Defense
Contract Management Agency changed its rotation policy. According to

42 U. S. General Accounting Office, Contingency Operations: Opportunities
to Improve the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 63,
(Washington, D. C.: Feb. 11, 1997) and U. S. General Accounting Office,
Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract Costs in
the Balkans, GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 225 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 29, 2000).

Page 31 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

officials whom we met with in the Balkans and Southwest Asia, the Defense
Contract Management Agency now staggers the rotation of its contract
administration officials at deployed locations such as the Balkans and
Southwest Asia to improve continuity and oversight. However, the issue of
personnel rotation and the impact on contractor oversight remains for
other officials. For example, the program manager of a major Army contract
in Qatar indicated that it would be beneficial if Army personnel
overseeing the contract were deployed for a longer period of time in order
to develop a more durable relationship. In addition, Air Force officials
in Qatar indicated they were planning on increasing the number of longer-
term deployments for key leadership positions, including contracting
positions, to help alleviate some of their continuity issues.

Some commands have established policies and procedures to provide
additional tools to help manage contractors more efficiently, as in the
following example:

 U. S. Army, Europe established a joint acquisition review board during
contingency operations. This board validates requirements for all proposed
expenditures over $2,500. The board also determines if the requirement is
best met using contractor support, host nation support, or troop labor.
The policy stipulates that U. S. Army, Europe headquarters must review
expenditures over $50, 000.  U. S. Army, Europe has established standards
for facilities and support to

soldiers in contingency operations. These standards specify the level of
quality of life support (i. e. type of housing, size of chapels, provision
of recreational facilities, and other amenities) based on the number of U.
S. troops at the deployed location. Variations from these standards have
to be approved by the U. S. Army, Europe deputy commanding general.
Officials told us these standards helped to limit the growth of contractor
services.

Limited awareness by service and combatant command officials of all
contractor activity supporting their operations can hamper their oversight
and management responsibilities with regards to contractors supporting
deployed forces. This limited awareness is due to the fact that the
decision to use contractors to provide support to a deployed location can
be made

by any number of requiring activities both within and outside of the area
of operations. As discussed earlier, contracts to support deployed forces
can be awarded by many organizations within DOD or by other federal
agencies. Figure 3 illustrates the broad array of contractor services
being provided in Bosnia and the government agency that awarded each Lack
of Visibility Overall

Contractor Support Hampers Broader Oversight

Page 32 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

contract. Bosnia is one of the few places we visited where contract
information is collected centrally, giving the commander visibility over
much of the contracting activity. Commanders at other locations we visited
did not have this information readily available to them.

Figure 3: Contracts for Selected Services in Bosnia Are Awarded by Many
Different Agencies

Because the decision to use contractors is not coordinated at the regional
combatant commands or the component commands other than in Bosnia, no one
knows the totality of contractor support being provided to deployed forces
in an area of operation.

Despite the lack of visibility and involvement in decisions to use
contractors, commanders are responsible for all the people in their area
of

Page 33 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

responsibility, including contractor personnel. This lack of visibility
over contractor personnel inhibits their ability to resolve issues
associated with contractor support. Contractor visibility is needed to
ensure that the

overall contractor presence in a theater is synchronized with the combat
forces being supported and that adjustments can be made to contractor
support when necessary. Additionally, in order to provide operational
support and force protection to participating contractors, DOD needs to
maintain visibility of all contracts and contractor employees. When
commanders lack visibility, problems can arise. For example, one
contractor told us when his employees arrived in Afghanistan, shortly
after the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the base commander had
not been informed that they were arriving and could not provide the
facilities they needed to maintain the biological identification equipment
that they were contracted to maintain. Also, the lack of visibility may
inhibit a commander*s understanding of the impact of certain force
protection decisions. For example, if there is an increased threat at a
base and security is increased, third country nationals may be barred from

entering the base. Third country nationals often provide services
important to the quality of life of deployed soldiers, such as preparing
and serving food and providing sanitation services. Without visibility
over the

totality of contractor support to his command, the commander may not know
which support services rely heavily on third country nationals and is
therefore less able to identify and mitigate the effects of losing that

support. Limited visibility of all contractor activity can create a
variety of problems for ground commanders. Commanders may not be aware of
the total number of contractor personnel on their installations at any
point in time or what they are doing there. In Southwest Asia this
situation is further complicated by the fact that many of the contractor
employees are third country nationals, which can increase security
concerns. While many officials at sites we visited indicated that they
maintain accountability for their contractors by tightly controlling the
process by which contractors receive their identification badges, we found
problems remained. As illustrated in the following examples:

 In Kosovo, we found that badges were issued at multiple locations and
provided access to multiple bases. This situation means a contractor
employee could receive a badge at one site and come onto a different base
without the base commander knowing who they were or why they were there.

Page 34 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

 Temporary badges (for visits of 30 days or less) at Eagle base in Bosnia
have no pictures. The lack of photos means that anyone could use the badge
to gain access to the base.  The contracting officer*s representative for
a forward base in Kuwait told

us that contractor personnel have simply shown up without any advance
notification and that he had to track down other officials to determine
why the contractors were there. Commanders may also be responsible for
providing contractor employees with certain benefits and entitlements
included in their contracts. The commanders* ability to meet these
requirements (including providing chemical and biological protective gear,
military escorts, billeting, and medical support) is hindered by their
lack of visibility over the totality of contractor presence on their base.
In addition, commanders may not be able to account for all their
contractor personnel in the event of an attack on a base. Similarly,
should issues such as those concerning *Gulf War

Syndrome* 43 arise, DOD may be unable to determine if contractor personnel
were in a location where they might have been exposed to potentially
harmful substances. As a result, DOD may have no way to verify the claims
of contractor personnel of health effects resulting from such exposure.

We also found that, at some bases, commanders do not have copies of all
the contracts in effect on their base, as the following examples
illustrate:

 U. S. Army Pacific Command officials told us it took several weeks for
them to obtain the applicable contract terms to resolve questions
regarding medical care for contractor employees in the Philippines because
no one in the command had a copy of the contract.  In the Balkans, some
contractors and federal agencies refused to provide

copies of their contracts to the task force officials. We first reported
this problem in May 2002. 44 At that time we recommended that the
Secretary of Defense direct all components to forward to the executive
agent for operations in a geographical area, such as the Balkans, a copy
of all existing and future contracts and contract

modifications. DOD concurred with this recommendation and agreed to 43
*Gulf War Syndrome* is a non- scientific label that has frequently been
used to describe those veterans who fought in the 1991 Persian Gulf War
who later developed unexplained illnesses often characterized by fatigue,
joint pain, skin rash, memory loss, and/ or diarrhea. 44 U. S. General
Accounting Office, Defense Budget: Need to Strengthen Guidance and
Oversight of Contingency Operations Costs, GAO- 02- 450 (Washington, D.
C.: May 21, 2002).

Page 35 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

modify its Financial Management Regulation to require that a biannual
report outlining the contracts be provided to the area executive agent. 45
The biannual report was limited, however, to contracts that used

contingency appropriations for funding and did not include contracts that
use a service*s base program funds. However, Balkans operations are no
longer being funded using contingency funds and would therefore not be

included under the new financial management regulation. As of April 15,
2003, the change to the Financial Management Regulation had not been
implemented. In addition, as we reported in May 2002, lack of visibility
over contracts hinders DOD*s ability to compare contracts and identify
potential duplication of services or ensure that contractors are only
receiving those services to which they are entitled.

Risk is inherent when relying on contractors to support deployed forces.
DOD recognized this risk when it issued DOD Instruction 3020.37, which
requires the services to determine which contracts provide essential
services and either develop plans for continued provision of those
services during crises or assume the risk of not having the essential
service. However, neither DOD nor the services have taken steps to ensure
compliance with this instruction. While most contractors would likely
deploy or remain in a deployed location if needed, there are many other
reasons contractors may not be available to provide essential services.
Without a clear understanding of the potential consequences of not having
the essential service available, the risks associated with the mission

increase. There are no DOD- wide policies on the use of contractors to
support deployed forces. As a result there is little common understanding
among the services as to the government*s responsibility to contractors
and contractor personnel in the event of hostilities. This lack of
understanding can cause confusion at the deployed location and makes
managing contractors more difficult because commanders often have
contractors from several services at their location with different
requirements, understandings, and obligations.

No standard contract language exists for inclusion in contracts that may
involve contractors deploying to support the force. Therefore, we found

45 The executive agent is the service designated by the regional combatant
commander to provide life support to the forces in an area of operation.
Conclusions

Page 36 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

that contracts have varying and sometimes inconsistent language addressing
deployment requirements. For example, some contracts do not contain any
language related to the potential requirement to deploy while others
include only vague references to deployment. The lack of specific language
can require adjustments to the contract when deployment

requirements are identified. The need to negotiate contract adjustments in
the face of an immediate deployment can result in increased costs to the
government and may delay contractor support.

The lack of contract training for commanders, senior personnel, and some
contracting officer*s representatives can adversely affect the
effectiveness of the use of contractors in deployed locations. Without
training, many commanders, senior military personnel, and contracting
officer*s representatives are not aware of their roles and
responsibilities in dealing with contractors.

Most commanders at the locations we visited had only limited visibility
and limited understanding of the extent and types of services being
provided by contractors. The lack of visibility over the types and numbers
of contractors limits the contract oversight that can be provided and
hampers the commander*s ability to maintain accountability of contractors.
Without this visibility there is no assurance that commanders understand
the full extent of their operational support, life support, and force
protection responsibilities to contractors, and there is no way to assure
that contractors do not receive services they are not entitled to receive.
Additionally, without this visibility commanders cannot develop a complete
picture of the extent to which they are reliant on contractors to perform
their missions and build this reliance into their risk assessments.
Moreover, while DOD agreed to provide executive agents with a biannual
report outlining the contracts in use in a geographical location, it is
not clear that these reports, which are required for contracts funded with
contingency funds only, will provide sufficient information regarding the
services that contractors are providing to deployed forces and the support
and force protection obligations of the government to those contractors to
improve commanders* visibility and understanding of contractor services at
their locations.

To promote better planning, guidance, and oversight regarding the use of
contractors to support deployed forces, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense take the following actions: Recommendations for

Executive Action

Page 37 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

 Direct the heads of DOD components to comply with DOD instruction 3020.
37 by completing the first review of contracts to identify those providing
mission essential services. This review should be completed by the end of
calendar year 2004.  Direct the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness to

develop procedures to monitor the implementation of DOD Instruction 3020.
37.  Develop DOD- wide guidance and doctrine on how to manage contractors

that support deployed forces. The guidance should (a) establish baseline
policies for the use of contractors to support deployed forces, (b)
delineate the roles and responsibilities of commanders regarding the

management and oversight of contractors that support deployed forces, and
(c) integrate other guidance and doctrine that may affect DOD
responsibilities to contractors in deployed locations into a single
document to assure that commanders are aware of all applicable policies.
Additionally, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
service secretaries to develop procedures to assure implementation of the
DOD guidance.  Develop and require the use of standardized deployment
language in contracts that support or may support deployed forces. The
Defense

Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement should be amended to require
standard clauses in such contracts that are awarded by DOD and to address
deployment in orders placed by DOD under other agencies* contracts. This
language should address the need to deploy into and around the theater,
required training, entitlements, force protection, and other deployment
related issues.  Develop training courses for commanding officers and
other senior

leaders who are deploying to locations with contractor support. Such
training could provide information on the roles and responsibilities of
the Defense Contract Management Agency and the contracting officer*s
representative and the role of the commander in the contracting process
and the limits of the commanders* authority. Also, contracting officers
should ensure that those individuals selected as contracting officer*s
representatives complete one of the established contracting officer*s
representative training courses before they assume their duties.  To
improve the commander*s visibility over, and understanding of, the

extent and types of services being provided by contractors, the Secretary
of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to
implement the changes to the department*s Financial Management Regulations
previously agreed to with these modifications: (a) the Financial
Management Regulations should specify that the biannual report include a
synopsis of the services being provided and a list of contractor
entitlements; (b) the report should include all contracts that directly
support U. S. contingency operations including those funded by the

Page 38 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

services base program accounts; and (c) the changes should be finalized by
January 1, 2004.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed fully with three
of our recommendations and agreed in part with three others. The
department*s comments are reprinted in appendix II.

DOD agreed with our recommendations that it develop (1) procedures to
monitor the implementation of DOD Instruction 3020.37, (2) DOD- wide
guidance and doctrine on how to manage contractors that support deployed
forces, and (3) standardized deployment language for contracts that
support or may support deployed forces.

Although DOD agreed with our recommendation regarding the need for the
heads of DOD components to complete the first review of contracts to
identify those providing mission essential services, it expressed concerns
that the components might not be able to complete this review by the end
of calendar year 2003. We amended out recommendation to incorporate this
concern by extending the recommended completion date to the end of
calendar year 2004. We believe a completion date is important to provide
some sense of urgency. DOD also stated that the effort needed to obtain
information on contracts currently in place may outweigh possible benefits
and suggested alternative methods for conducting this review, including
the possibility of only reviewing new contracts. However, DOD Instruction
3020. 37 requires a review of all contracts, and we continue to believe
that a review that fails to include all contracts would not adequately
address the issues that the instruction was designed to resolve*
identifying essential services provided by contractors to deployed forces
and ensuring the continuation of those services should contractors not be
available.

DOD also agreed with our recommendation that appropriate training should
be developed for commanding officers and other senior leaders who are
deploying to locations with contractor support. However, DOD stated that
while Web- based training may be the appropriate medium for such training,
in some cases, alternative methods could be more beneficial. We accepted
DOD*s suggestion and amended the recommendation accordingly.

DOD agreed with our recommendation concerning changes to the department*s
Financial Management Regulations. However, DOD questioned the utility of a
part of this recommendation that called for the Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Page 39 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

biannual report to include a list of contractor entitlements as well as
all contracts that directly support U. S. contingency operations,
including those funded by the services* base program accounts. DOD stated
that the costs of making these changes to the system and collecting
additional information could outweigh the perceived benefits. Further, DOD
stated that the lack of collecting this information has not jeopardized
the operation of any DOD mission in recent memory. DOD stated that other,
less burdensome ways to ensure combatant commanders have all the necessary
information for contractors that are supporting them need to be fully
explored before pursuing more burdensome means, such as a costly
centralized database. DOD said it would review this issue with the

military departments to determine if obtaining the recommended information
would be cost effective. We do not believe this recommendation would be
costly or burdensome to

implement. As noted in the report, the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) has already agreed to amend DOD*s Financial Management
Regulations to require that the components provide a biannual report
outlining the existing and future contracts and contract modifications to
the executive agent for operations in a geographic area, including a
synopsis of services being provided. We believe that since the components
will already be asked to provide the biannual reports, asking them to
provide additional information summarizing contractor entitlements
specified under those contracts would not substantially increase the
effort required to generate these reports. This additional information
would

facilitate DOD*s efforts to ensure that contractors receive only the
services from the government to which they are contractually entitled.
While DOD expressed concern about developing a costly centralized database
to generate these reports, our recommendation contained no guidance on how
the reports should be generated and makes no mention of a

centralized database. We agree that DOD should look for the most
costeffective way to implement the recommendation. We also continue to
believe that the biannual report should include information from contracts
that directly support U. S. contingency operations but are funded from the
services* base program accounts. As noted in the report, this would
include contracts supporting operations in the Balkans. We do not believe
that these contracts should be excluded from the report. While we did not
find evidence that any DOD missions were jeopardized by not having
information summarizing contractor services and entitlements, our
recommendation was based on concerns raised by field commanders about
oversight of contractors and the appropriate provisioning of support to
contractors. As noted in the report, several commanders in the field told
us their limited visibility of the extent and types of services being
provided

Page 40 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

by contractors created challenges for them. We continue to believe that
without a more thorough understanding of contractor support, commanders
will continue to face difficulties in identifying potential duplication of
services or ensuring that contractors are only receiving those services to
which they are entitled. Therefore, we still believe the recommendation in
its entirety has merit.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairman and the Ranking
Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on Armed
Services; other interested congressional committees; the Secretary of
Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will

also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao.
gov.

If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me on (757) 552-
8111 or by E- mail at curtinn@ gao. gov. Major contributors to this report
were Steven Sternlieb, Carole Coffey, James Reid, James Reynolds, and Adam
Vodraska.

Neal P. Curtin Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 41 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

To identify the types of services contractors provide to deployed U. S.
forces we met with officials at the Department of Defense (DOD) who have
responsibility for identifying contractor needs, issuing contracts,
managing contracts once they are executed, and utilizing contractors to
fulfill their missions. Because there was no consolidated list of
contractors supporting deployed forces we asked DOD officials at the
commands and installations we visited to identify their contractor
support. These commands included the Central, European, and Pacific
Commands and most of their service components and major installations in
Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. We focused our efforts in the
Balkans and Southwest Asia because they provide a broad range of
contractor support activities. We were completing our work as the 2003 war
with Iraq began and so were unable to fully ascertain the extent of
contractor

support to U. S. forces inside Iraq. The scope of our review included
system and theater support contracts. We also met with officials of
selected contracting commands in the Air Force, Army, and Navy and at
defense agencies including the Defense Logistics Agency. These officials
included contracting officers and, where applicable, their representatives
at deployed locations. We examined a wide range of contracts in order to
assess the diversity of contractor support. While visiting deployed
locations we met with representatives of the different DOD components and
contractors stationed there to determine what contractor services are used
to accomplish their missions.

To assess why DOD uses contractors to support deployed forces, we reviewed
DOD studies and publications and interviewed DOD and contractor officials.
We met with unit commanders during our visits to deployed locations to
discuss the effects using contractors had on military training. We did
not, however, compare the cost of contractors versus military personnel;
make policy judgments as to whether the use of contractors is desirable;
or look at issues related to government liability to contractors.

To assess DOD*s efforts to identify those contractors that provide mission
essential services and to maintain essential services if contractors are
unable to do so, we reviewed applicable DOD Inspector General reports as
well as DOD and its components* policies, regulations, and instructions
for ensuring the continuation of essential services. In particular, we
reviewed DOD Instruction 3020.37, which sets forth the policies and
procedures for identifying mission essential services and the steps
necessary to assure the continuation of such services. We held discussions
with command, service, and installation officials on the extent to which
the required review of contracts to identify mission essential services
had been Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 42 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

conducted and on their backup planning should contractors not be able to
perform such services for any reason. We also met with officials of the
office responsible for monitoring implementation to ascertain what efforts
they have undertaken. We reviewed the pertinent unclassified sections,
related to contractor support, of operations plans for Iraq and the
Balkans. We also discussed with deployed contractor employees their
opinions of

the extent of their responsibilities to continue to support military
forces in crisis situations. To assess the adequacy of guidance and
oversight mechanisms in place to effectively manage contractors who
support deployed forces we reviewed DOD*s and its components* policies,
regulations, and instructions that relate to the use of contractors that
support deployed forces. We met with officials at all levels of command to
gain an understanding of contracting and the contract management and
oversight processes. At the locations we visited, we asked officials their
opinions of the effectiveness of existing policy in helping them manage
their contractor force and asked them for suggested areas of improvement.
We also reviewed and discussed with them local policies and procedures for
managing their contractors. We met with DOD*s contract management
officials as well as other military members to obtain their opinions of
the quality of contractor- provided services and the quality of contract
oversight. We also met with contractor representatives to discuss contract
oversight and contract management from their perspective. Finally, we
reviewed contracts that support deployed forces to assess the existence
and adequacy of deployment language.

The DOD organizations we visited or contacted in the United States were

Office of the Secretary of Defense

 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, Washington, D. C.  Civilian Personnel Management Service,
Arlington, Va.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

 J- 4 Logistics, Washington, D. C.

Department of the Army

 Headquarters, Washington, D. C.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 43 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

 Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology), Falls Church, Va.  Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Rosslyn, Va.  Army Contracting Agency, Falls Church, Va.  U. S. Army
Forces Command, Headquarters, Ft McPherson, Ga.  3rd Army Headquarters,
Ft McPherson, Ga.  4th Infantry Division, Ft. Hood Tex.  Corps of
Engineers, Headquarters, Washington, D. C.

 Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Programs Center, Winchester, Va. 
Combined Arms Support Command, Ft. Lee, Va.  Communications- Electronics
Command, Ft. Monmouth, N. J.  Training and Doctrine Command, Ft, Monroe,
Va.

 Operations Support Command, Rock Island, Ill.  Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program, Program Office, Rock Island, Ill.  Army Materiel
Command, Alexandria, Va.  Network Enterprise Technology Command, Ft.
Huachuca, Ariz.

Department of the Navy

 Headquarters, Washington, D. C.  Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent
River, Md.

 Naval Air Technical Data and Engineering Service Command, San Diego,
Calif.  Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D. C.  Space and Naval
Warfare Systems Command, San Diego, Calif.

Department of the Air Force

 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition,
Rosslyn, Va.  Air Force Materiel Command, Dayton, Ohio

 F- 117 Special Projects Office, Dayton, Ohio  Air Force Civil Engineer
Support Agency, Tilden Air Force Base, Fla.

Defense Agencies

 Defense Logistics Agency, Ft. Belvoir, Va.  Defense Energy Support
Center, Ft. Belvoir, Va.  Defense Contract Management Agency, Alexandria,
Va.  Defense Contract Audit Agency, Ft. Belvoir, Va. The geographic
combatant commands and component commands we visited or contacted were

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 44 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

 U. S. Central Command,  U. S. Army Forces Central Command  U. S. Naval
Forces Central Command

 U. S. Central Command Air Forces  U. S. Marine Forces Central Command 
U. S. European Command,

 U. S. Army, Europe  U. S. Air Forces in Europe

 U. S. Pacific Command  U. S. Army Pacific  Pacific Air Forces 
Special Operations Command Pacific  U. S. Marine Forces Pacific  U. S.
Pacific Fleet

 Naval Surface Forces, U. S. Pacific Fleet  Naval Air Forces, U. S.
Pacific Fleet  Submarine Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet The overseas
activities and contractors we visited, by country, were

Bahrain

 Naval Support Activity  Naval Regional Contracting Center  USS
Cardinal, MHC 60

Bosnia- Herzegovina

 Eagle Base, U. S. Army  Task Force Eagle, Area Support Group Eagle 
Defense Contract Management Agency

 Eagle Base, Contractors  Mantech  Sprint  ITT

Germany

 Defense Contract Audit Agency, Wiesbaden  Defense Contract Management
Agency, Stuttgart  Defense Energy Support Center, Wiesbaden

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 45 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

 Defense Logistics Agency, Wiesbaden  Army Materiel Command Europe,
Heidelberg

Serbia and Montenegro Province of Kosovo

 Camp Bondsteel, U. S. Army  Task Force Falcon, Area Support Group
Falcon  Defense Contract Management Agency  Army Materiel Command  Camp
Bondsteel, Contractors

 TRW  Kellogg, Brown & Root Services  Premiere Technology Group 
Engineering and Professional Services, Incorporated

 Camp Monteith, U. S. Army  1st Infantry Division

Kuwait

 Camp Doha, U. S. Army  U. S. Army Kuwait  Army Corps of Engineers 
Army Materiel Command  Defense Contract Management Agency

 Coalition Forces Land Component Command  Camp Doha, Contractors

 KGL  Raytheon Aerospace  British Link Kuwait  CSA

 Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base, U. S Air Force  332nd Air Expeditionary Wing

 Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base, Contractors  RMS  Dyncorp  Vinnell  ITT 
Mutual Telecommunications Services

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 46 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations

 Ali Al Salem Air Base, U. S. Air Force  386th Air Expeditionary Wing

 Ali Al Salem Air Base, Contractors  Dyncorp  L3 Communications  TRW 
General Atomics  Litton Integrated Systems  Anteon  RMS

Qatar

 U. S. Embassy, Doha, Qatar  Camp As Sayliyah, U. S. Army

 U. S. Army Forces Central Command- Qatar  U. S. Army Materiel Command 
Defense Contracting Audit Agency

 Camp As Sayliyah, Contractors  ITT  Dyncorp  Stanley Associates 
LESCO

 Al Udeid Air Base, U. S. Air Force  379th Air Expeditionary Wing  Air
Force Civil Augmentation Program, Program Office

 Al Udeid Air Base, Contractors  Dyncorp

We conducted our review between August 2002 and April 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 47 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations Appendix II: Comments from the
Department of Defense

Now on p. 26.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 48 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations Now on p. 35. Now on p. 35.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 49 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations Now on p. 36. Now on p. 36.

Now on pp. 35- 36.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 50 GAO- 03- 695 Military Operations Now on p. 36.

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