Firearms Controls: Federal Agencies Have Firearms Controls, but  
Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas (13-JUN-03, GAO-03-688).  
                                                                 
In March 2001, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector	 
General reported that the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
could not account for over 500 of its firearms. Furthermore, in  
July 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation disclosed that 449
of its firearms were lost or stolen. Given the possible threat	 
that lost, stolen, or missing firearms poses to the public, GAO  
assessed (1) the consistency of federal agencies' firearms	 
controls with federal internal control standards and related	 
criteria; and (2) compliance by Justice and Treasury agencies	 
with established firearms controls and improvements made to	 
strengthen and enforce controls.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-688 					        
    ACCNO:   A07105						        
  TITLE:     Firearms Controls: Federal Agencies Have Firearms	      
Controls, but Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas		 
     DATE:   06/13/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Federal agencies					 
	     Firearms						 
	     Law enforcement agencies				 
	     Internal controls					 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-03-688

Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

June 2003 FIREARMS CONTROLS

Federal Agencies Have Firearms Controls, but Could Strengthen Controls in
Key Areas

GAO- 03- 688

GAO found that all 18 federal agencies reviewed, which accounted for over
95 percent of federal officers and agents authorized to carry firearms,
had policies and procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms that
were consistent with federal internal control standards and related
criteria.

However, agencies could strengthen their controls in key areas that have
been consistently recognized as important for effective inventory
management. These areas include * recording and tracking firearms
inventory data;  maintaining, controlling, and accounting for firearms
inventories;  ensuring personal and supervisory accountability for
firearms; and  requiring investigations, and discipline when deemed
appropriate, for

individuals determined not to have followed firearms accountability
procedures.

Although agencies established policies and procedures to control firearms,
audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and the Treasury found that
agencies did not always follow established procedures, or implement
procedures, for conducting periodic inventories, reporting and
investigating missing firearms, and securing firearms inventories. Since
these weaknesses were identified, we found that agencies have implemented,
or are in the process of implementing, actions to strengthen their
firearms controls.

In addition, 15 of the 18 federal agencies GAO reviewed reported a total
of 1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession
between September 30, 1998 and July 2002, further indicating the need for
stronger controls. Of these firearms, 188 were recovered, leaving 824
firearms still missing. While we could not determine the exact percentage
of agency firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears
that these firearms generally accounted for less than 1 percent of
agencies* total firearms inventories. In independent reviews of selected
missing firearms cases, the Departments of Justice and the Treasury
identified instances of

firearms recovered in connection with criminal activity or during the
course of criminal investigations. Federal Agencies with Personnel
Authorized to Carry Firearms Included in GAO*s Review

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms National Institutes of Health
Bureau of Engraving and Printing National Park Service Drug Enforcement
Administration U. S. Customs Service Federal Bureau of Investigation U. S.
Fish and Wildlife Service Federal Bureau of Prisons U. S. Marshals Service
Federal Emergency Management Agency U. S. Mint Federal Protective Service
U. S. Postal Inspection Service Immigration and Naturalization Service U.
S. Secret Service Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation
Department of Veterans Affairs Source: GAO survey of agencies* data.

In March 2001, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General
reported that the Immigration and Naturalization Service could not account
for over 500 of its firearms. Furthermore, in July 2001, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation disclosed that 449 of its firearms were lost or
stolen. Given the possible threat that lost, stolen, or missing firearms
poses to the public, GAO assessed (1) the consistency of federal agencies*
firearms controls with federal internal control standards and related
criteria; and (2) compliance by Justice and Treasury agencies

with established firearms controls and improvements made to strengthen and
enforce controls.

To provide better assurance that firearms are safeguarded from loss,
theft, or misuse, Department

officials should reassess, and modify if necessary, existing firearms
controls based on generally accepted internal control

standards. The agencies should also document firearms controls in agency
policies and procedures so

they can be consistently understood and applied. Officials generally
agreed with GAO*s findings. Two agencies agreed with our recommendation,
and three said they had taken

actions consistent with the recommendation. A fourth agency expressed
concern about GAO*s recommendation, saying its existing controls were
effective.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 688. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (212) 512- 8777 or berrickc@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 688, a report to

Congressional Requesters

June 2003

FIREARMS CONTROLS

Federal Agencies Have Firearms Controls, but Could Strengthen Controls in
Key Areas

Page i GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control Letter 1 Results in Brief 4
Background 6 Agencies* Policies and Procedures Were Consistent with
Internal

Control Standards, but Agencies Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas 8
Audits Found Weaknesses in Firearms Controls at Justice and

Treasury Agencies, but Improvements Are Being Made 15 Majority of Federal
Law Enforcement Agencies Reviewed Reported Missing Firearms 22 Conclusion
26 Recommendations 27 Agency Comments 27 Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology 30

Appendix II Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
Components 34

Agencies Established Controls to Account for Other Weapons and Weapons
Components 34 Agencies Reported Having Inventories of Explosives, Gas and/
or

Chemical Agents, and Ammunition 34 Agencies Used Inventory Counts and
Other Methods to Control Weapons and Weapons Components 35 Appendix III
Presence of Key Firearms Activities in Agency

Policies and Procedures 40

Appendix IV Survey Questionnaire 42

Appendix V Follow- up Survey Questionnaire 63 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control Appendix VI Justice and Treasury
Reports on Internal Controls Over Firearms and Other Sensitive Property 66

Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services 67

Appendix VIII Comments from the Department of the Interior 69

Appendix IX Comments from the Department of Justice 72

Appendix X Comments from the United States Postal Service 77

Appendix XI Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs 81

Appendix XII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 84 GAO Contact 84
Staff Acknowledgments 84 Tables

Table 1: Most Recently Completed Firearms Inventories of Federal Law
Enforcement Agencies Reviewed as of July 2002 3 Table 2: Reporting and
Investigating Missing Firearms by BOP,

DEA, FBI, INS, and USMS 17 Table 3: Firearms Reported Missing, Recovered,
and Unaccounted for between September 30, 1998 and July 2002 at Selected
Federal Law Enforcement Agencies 24 Table 4: Eighteen Federal Law
Enforcement Agencies Included in Our Survey of Federal Firearms Control
Policies, Procedures, and Practices 31

Page iii GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Table 5: Agencies* Reported Use of Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
Components 34 Table 6: Agencies* Reported Use of Inventory Procedures for

Explosives, Gas and/ or Chemical Agents, and Ammunition 36 Table 7: Key
Firearms Control Activities in Agency Policies and Procedures as Reported
by Selected Federal Law Enforcement Agencies 40 Table 8: Justice,
Treasury, and Treasury Inspector General for Tax

Administration Reports on Internal Controls Over Firearms and Other
Sensitive Property 66 Abbreviations

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms BEP Bureau of Engraving and
Printing BJS Bureau of Justice Statistics BOP Bureau of Prisons DEA Drug
Enforcement Administration FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation INS
Immigration and Naturalization Service IRS/ CI Internal Revenue Service *
Criminal Investigation NCIC National Crime Information Center NIH National
Institutes of Health OIG Office of the Inspector General TIGTA Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration USMS U. S. Marshals Service

VA Department of Veterans Affairs

This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
materials separately from GAO*s product.

Page 1 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

June 13, 2003 The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Chairman The
Honorable John Conyers, Jr. Ranking Minority Member Committee on the
Judiciary House of Representatives

The Honorable John D. Dingell House of Representatives

The Honorable Robert C. *Bobby* Scott Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee
on Crime Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives

The Honorable Lamar S. Smith House of Representatives

In March 2001, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG)
reported that over 500 firearms belonging to the U. S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) were lost, stolen, or missing. 1 Four months
later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) disclosed that 449 of its
firearms were lost or stolen. 2 The loss of firearms and other weapons by
federal law enforcement agencies may pose serious risks to the public,
including the risk that missing firearms may be used to inflict bodily
harm

or to further criminal activity. 1 Of the more than 500 missing firearms,
INS identified 497 as missing during an August 1998 agencywide inventory.
An additional 42 firearms were subsequently identified as missing by
Justice*s OIG during an audit of INS property management.

2 FBI officials reported that 161 of the reported 449 lost or stolen
weapons were nonfunctional training weapons that could not easily be
converted to live firearms. In addition, officials said that some of the
161 training weapons had been given to state/ local

training institutions and were subsequently destroyed.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Given these losses, you expressed concern that federal agencies with
personnel authorized to carry firearms may lack adequate controls for
securing and accounting for their firearms. Accordingly, we determined

 the extent to which agencies* policies and procedures for controlling
and safeguarding firearms were consistent with federal internal control
standards and related criteria issued by law enforcement and management
organizations;

 whether reviews conducted by the Departments of Justice and Treasury 3
identified instances of noncompliance with firearms policies and
procedures, and whether agencies took actions to correct identified
weaknesses, particularly related to (1) conducting inventories, (2)
investigating missing firearms, and (3) disciplining

employees; and  the number of firearms that federal agencies identified
as lost, stolen,

or otherwise not in their possession between September 30, 1998 and July
2002.

You also requested that we determine how federal agencies maintain control
and accountability over weapons other than firearms and associated weapons
components. Information on these weapons and weapons components can be
found in appendix II.

To evaluate agencies* policies and procedures for controlling and
safeguarding firearms, the number of missing agency firearms, and
agencies* control over other weapons and weapons components, we reviewed
the firearms control activities of 18 agencies with personnel authorized
to carry firearms and make arrests 4 within the executive branch of the
federal government. We selected these agencies from four strata:

those with 1,000 or more law enforcement personnel, those with 500- 999
law enforcement personnel, those with 100- 499 law enforcement

3 When we initiated our review, INS was part of the Department of Justice;
U. S. Customs Service, U. S. Secret Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms were part of the Department of the Treasury. With
the enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, INS, U. S. Customs
Service, and U. S. Secret Service were transferred to the Department of
Homeland Security on March 1, 2003. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms was transferred to the Department of Justice as of January 24,
2003 (P. L. 107- 296).

4 Henceforth, these agencies will be referred to as federal law
enforcement agencies.

Page 3 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

personnel, and those with less than 100 law enforcement personnel. 5
Together, these agencies employed over 95 percent of approximately 80,000
federal officers and agents authorized to make arrests and carry firearms,
as of June 2000. Table 1 identifies the 18 federal law enforcement
agencies we surveyed and the number of firearms reported by the agencies
as of their most recently completed inventories, at the time of our
survey. Table 1: Most Recently Completed Firearms Inventories of Federal
Law

Enforcement Agencies Reviewed as of July 2002 Agency

Date of completed firearms inventory as of July 2002

Number of firearms inventoried a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
January 2002 21,125

Bureau of Engraving and Printing June 2002 527 Drug Enforcement
Administration September 2001 14,921 Federal Bureau of Investigation
January 2002 49,600 Federal Bureau of Prisons April 2002 19,023 Federal
Emergency Management Agency June 2001 188 Federal Protective Service
December 2001 1,806 Immigration and Naturalization Service August 2001
54,930 Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation September 2001
5,467 National Institutes of Health June 2002 263 National Park Service
September 2001 10,718 U. S. Customs Service April 2002 24,751 U. S. Fish
and Wildlife Service September 2001 5,234 U. S. Marshals Service October
2001 14,495 U. S. Mint October 2001 1,026 U. S. Postal Inspection Service
December 2002 b 6,228 U. S. Secret Service December 2001 9,396 Department
of Veterans Affairs March 2003 c 3,319

Total 243,017

Source: GAO survey of agencies. a Data were not independently verified.

b The U. S. Postal Inspection Service provided information as of December
2002. c The Department of Veterans Affairs does not have a centralized
inventory, but maintains inventory records at its more than 100
facilities. For our review, officials calculated its total firearms
inventory as of March 2003.

5 We selected all 11 agencies in the 1,000 or more stratum, the 2 largest
in each of the 3 remaining strata, and 1 additional Treasury agency to
account for all Justice and Treasury law enforcement agencies.

Page 4 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

We surveyed the 18 agencies to determine their policies and procedures for
controlling and safeguarding firearms inventories, and the numbers of
firearms lost, stolen, or not in their possession, and subsequently
recovered, between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. We also reviewed
agency policies and procedures, federal internal control standards, and
other criteria for controlling inventories to determine whether agencies*
policies and procedures for safeguarding firearms were consistent with
established criteria.

To determine whether the Departments of Justice and the Treasury
identified instances of noncompliance with firearms policies and
procedures and have taken action to correct identified weaknesses, we
reviewed the results of audits conducted by these departments of their
respective agencies* firearms control practices. We also interviewed
agency officials and obtained documentation identifying corrective action
taken in response to departmental reviews. Appendix I contains detailed
information on the scope and methodology we used during our review.

All 18 of the federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed had policies
and procedures designed to control and safeguard firearms that were
generally consistent with federal internal control standards and related
criteria. These controls addressed (1) recording and tracking of firearms
inventory data; (2) maintaining, controlling, and accounting for firearms

inventories; (3) personal and supervisory accountability for firearms; and
(4) investigations, and discipline when deemed appropriate, for
individuals determined not to have followed firearms accountability
procedures.

Although agencies had policies and procedures to control and safeguard
firearms, agencies could strengthen their controls in some of these areas.
In addition, agencies did not always document these controls in their
policies and procedures.

Audits conducted by Justice*s and Treasury*s OIGs and the Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) found weaknesses in
agency procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms. Specifically,
they found that some agencies did not conduct periodic firearms
inventories or report and investigate instances of missing firearms, as
required by their policies and procedures. However, the OIGs and TIGTA
found that agencies generally disciplined employees who did not
appropriately control their firearms or report missing firearms. In
response to these audits, agencies have taken, or are in the process of
taking, action to correct all identified weaknesses. Results in Brief

Page 5 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Although agencies generally established policies and procedures to control
and safeguard firearms, 15 of the 18 we reviewed reported a total of 1,012
firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession at some
point in time between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. Of these firearms,
188 were recovered during the same time period, leaving 824 firearms still
missing. While we could not determine the exact percentage of agency
firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears that
these firearms generally accounted for less than 1 percent of agencies*
total firearms inventories. 6 Agencies reported that some losses

occurred despite employees taking appropriate precautions, and some
missing firearms did not pose a threat to the public. However, audits
conducted by Justice*s and Treasury*s OIGs identified instances in which
firearms were recovered in connection with criminal activity or during a
criminal investigation.

In order to assist federal law enforcement agencies in more effectively
securing firearms, we are recommending that agencies strengthen their
policies and procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms
inventories in the key control areas consistently recognized as important
for effective inventory management and document those controls in agency
policies and procedures.

We requested and received comments on a draft of this report from the
Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of the Interior,
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Director of the National Institutes of Health (Department of Health and
Human Services), and the Postmaster General. Officials generally agreed

with the information presented and suggested technical changes that have
been incorporated where appropriate. The National Institutes of Health,
Fish and Wildlife Service (Department of the Interior), U. S. Postal
Inspection Service, and Department of Veterans Affairs commented on the
recommendation. The National Institutes of Health and the Fish and
Wildlife Service agreed with the recommendation and identified actions
they have taken to strengthen firearms controls. The U. S. Postal
Inspection Service also identified changes it has made, or is making, to
its policies and procedures to strengthen its controls over firearms,
consistent with our recommendation.

6 Since the firearms inventory and missing firearms data were developed
from different bases, such as inventory counts or internal agency
reporting systems, and are based on different time periods, they are not
directly comparable.

Page 6 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) expressed concerned about our
recommendation, saying that its controls were effective in preventing
firearms losses, as evidenced by its not having any missing firearms
during the time period of our review. Although the department did not
report missing firearms during this time period, the potential exists that
firearms could be lost or stolen at some point in the future. Accordingly,
we believe that the department as well as other agencies we reviewed
should periodically assess their firearms controls, particularly when
their organization or operations have changed or when firearms have been
identified as missing, to determine whether their controls have been
effective or should be modified.

Written comments that we received from the Departments of the Interior,
Justice, and Veterans Affairs; the National Institutes of Health; and the
U. S. Postal Service are included in appendixes VII through XI. In 1982,
Congress enacted the Federal Managers* Financial Integrity Act 7 requiring
executive agencies to establish and maintain controls that, among other
things, provide reasonable assurance that assets are safeguarded against
waste, loss, unauthorized use, and misappropriation. The act also mandated
that GAO*s internal control standards 8 serve as the framework for
agencies to use in establishing and maintaining their

internal control systems. Among other things, GAO*s internal control
standards require agencies to establish physical controls to secure and
safeguard vulnerable assets such as cash, securities, inventories, and

equipment, which might be vulnerable to loss or unauthorized use. In March
2002, GAO published a supplemental guide for inventory controls, 9 which
summarized fundamental principles that have been successfully

implemented by seven private sector firms noted for outstanding inventory
management. GAO internal control standards provide that in establishing
internal controls, agencies should assess the risks associated with asset
losses and establish control activities to help ensure those risks are
addressed. The

7 31 U. S. C. 3512. 8 U. S. General Accounting Office, Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/ AIMD- 00- 21. 3.1
(Washington, D. C.: Nov. 1999). 9 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Executive Guide: Best Practices in Achieving Consistent, Accurate Physical
Counts of Inventory and Related Property, GAO- 02- 447G (Washington, D.
C.: Mar. 2002). Background

Page 7 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

standards further require that agencies document and monitor control
activities to ensure they are appropriately implemented and are effective
in addressing risk inherent in agency operations.

In addition to the Federal Managers* Financial Integrity Act and GAO
standards, two other organizations issued advisory criteria addressing
inventory controls. In June 1995, the Joint Financial Management
Improvement Program issued advisory criteria for implementing and
maintaining inventory systems. 10 The criteria addressed management*s
responsibility to provide guidelines for developing, documenting, and
implementing physical controls to safeguard and provide accountability for
inventory items. Furthermore, in August 1983, the Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., an independent
accrediting authority for law enforcement agencies, 11 published
accreditation standards to include procedures for inventory and property
control.

10 The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program is a financial
management improvement program involving the Department of the Treasury,
Office of Management and Budget, Office of Personnel Management, GAO, and
other agencies under the statutory authority of the Budget and Accounting
Procedures Act of 1950 [see 31 U. S. C. 3511 (d)]. The purpose of the
program is to promote the efficient management of assets and provide
useful financial information on federal government operations.

11 The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., was
established as an independent accrediting authority in 1979 by four major
law enforcement membership associations: International Association of
Chiefs of Police, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement
Executives, National Sheriffs* Association, and Police Executive Research
Forum. The purpose of the accreditation program is to improve law
enforcement operations by developing standards addressing a wide range of
law

enforcement topics.

Page 8 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

All 18 of the federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed had policies
and procedures designed to control and safeguard firearms, one of the
first steps in developing and implementing an effective system of internal
control. These controls were generally consistent with federal internal
control standards and related criteria issued by law enforcement and
management organizations. However, agencies could strengthen controls in
key areas consistently identified as important for effective inventory
management. Strengthening controls could assist agencies in ensuring their
firearms are secured from loss, theft, or unauthorized use.

In order to assess the consistency of selected agencies* policies and
procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms with established
criteria, we reviewed federal and other internal control standards
designed to help ensure that assets, including firearms, are protected
against damage, loss, theft, and unauthorized use. The criteria included
GAO*s internal control standards and supplemental inventory guidelines,
advisory criteria issued by the Joint Financial Management Improvement
Program for maintaining inventory systems, and accreditation standards for

inventory and property control issued by the Commission on Accreditation
for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. Our analysis of federal internal
control standards and other related criteria

found four key areas that were consistently identified as important for
effective inventory management. These four areas include (1) recording
firearms inventory data in property management records and systems
(inventory data); (2) controlling and safeguarding firearms inventories
(inventory control); (3) assigning responsibility for safeguarding
firearms and overseeing the conducting of firearms inventories (personal
and supervisory accountability); and (4) investigating missing firearms
and considering employee discipline when requirements for maintaining and
controlling firearms are not met (investigations and discipline).

Within each of these four areas, federal internal control standards and
related criteria identify specific controls designed to assist agencies in
controlling and safeguarding their firearms inventories. For example, in
the area of inventory control, the standards and criteria recommend that
agencies (1) have written policies and procedures for issuing agency
firearms to individuals, organizational units, and functional areas;

(2) conduct periodic inventory counts of firearms; (3) use occasions other
Agencies* Policies and

Procedures Were Consistent with Internal Control Standards, but Agencies
Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas

Federal Standards and Other Criteria Provide Guidance for Controlling and
Safeguarding Firearms

Page 9 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

than periodic inventories to confirm employees* possession of assigned
firearms; and (4) limit access to secured firearms storage areas and
facilities to authorized personnel.

We compared agency policies and procedures for maintaining firearms with
controls identified in federal internal control standards and related
criteria for each of the four key control areas. Appendix III identifies,
for each agency reviewed, whether the agency established policies and
procedures addressing specific controls recommended by GAO and other
management organizations within each of the four areas.

We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established controls to
record and update firearms inventory data in agency property records and
property management systems, consistent with standards issued by GAO and
other management organizations. Specifically, we determined whether
agencies had written policies and procedures requiring the update of
property records and systems (1) upon their receipt of new firearms, (2)
as a result of discrepancies identified during periodic firearms
inventories, and (3) upon the removal of firearms from agency inventories.

The recording and update of firearms inventory data is an important
component of maintaining and controlling agency firearms. Data on
activities that monitor the receipt and removal of firearms from
inventory, as well as discrepancies found during periodic inventories, are
needed to

ensure management has adequate oversight over agency firearms. The absence
of these controls could result in management being unaware of the number
and location of firearms they have on- hand, and could result in a lack of
appropriate oversight over these assets.

The majority of agencies we reviewed usually required in their policies
and procedures the recording and update of firearms inventory data.
Specifically, 16 of the 18 agencies required that the date of receipt and
the specific identification of the firearm, as well as the person and unit
to which the firearm was assigned, be reported in property management
records as new firearms are received. In addition, 17 of the 18 agencies
required that adjustments be made to firearms inventory records as a
result of discrepancies identified during physical inventory counts.
Sixteen agencies also required the update of property management records
upon the removal of firearms from agency inventories. Inventory Data*
Agencies Required the Recording

and Update of Firearms Data

Page 10 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

In the area of inventory control, we surveyed agencies to determine
whether they established written policies and procedures, consistent with
federal internal control standards and related criteria, addressing the
(1) issuance of agency firearms to individuals, organizational units, and
functional areas; (2) conducting of periodic inventory counts of firearms
and the manner in which inventories should be conducted; and (3) use of
occasions other than periodic inventories to confirm employees* possession
of assigned firearms. We also surveyed agencies to determine whether they
(4) limited access to secured firearms storage areas and facilities to
authorized personnel.

The issuance of firearms, periodic checks of firearms on- hand, and
limited access to firearms storage areas are important in ensuring that
agencies appropriately safeguard their firearms. Agencies often learn of
missing or stolen firearms when conducting periodic inventories, or when
they use occasions other than inventories to confirm employee*s possession
of firearms. Without these controls, management may not be alerted when
firearms are not appropriately maintained, or when stored firearms are not
adequately protected from loss, theft, or unauthorized use.

The agencies we reviewed generally established written policies and
procedures for issuing firearms and conducting firearms inventories, but
could strengthen other inventory controls. Specifically, agencies
generally had written policies and procedures addressing the issuance of
agency

firearms to individuals (18 out of 18) and organizational units (16 out of
16 that reported the control applicable). In addition, all 18 agencies
required the conducting of periodic inventory counts of firearms, and 15
of these agencies required that the objectives, timing, and instructions
for the counts be established. However, only 11 of the 18 agencies
required that persons assigned responsibility for conducting inventories
be trained in

inventory counting procedures. In addition, 15 of the 18 agencies required
counters to verify firearm ID numbers and descriptive information about
the firearm during inventory counts. However, 9 agencies did not preclude
individuals from counting firearms if they had firearms custodial
responsibilities. Furthermore, only 2 of these 9 agencies established
compensating procedures such as using count teams of 2 or more members, or
ensuring that counters have no prior knowledge of the firearms inventory
being counted.

Agencies also varied in using occasions other than inventories to verify
employees* possession of an assigned firearm and limiting access to
secured firearms storage areas. Fifteen of the 18 agencies surveyed
Inventory Control*

Agencies Required the Recording of Firearms Data and Periodic Inventories,
but Could Strengthen Other Controls

Page 11 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

confirmed an employee*s possession of an assigned firearm during firearms
retraining or retesting. However, only 8 of the 18 agencies required
unannounced inspections to verify employees* possession of assigned
firearms. In addition, of the 15 agencies that reported this control
applicable, only 7 required limited access to firearms storage areas and
facilities.

We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established policies and
procedures, consistent with federal internal control standards and related
criteria, requiring individuals to (1) safeguard assigned firearms from
damage, loss, theft, and unauthorized use, and (2) store firearms in lock

boxes or secure gun cases, or use trigger locks. We also surveyed agencies
to determine whether (3) job descriptions included requirements for
conducting inventories, (4) individual performance in conducting
inventories is assessed during performance evaluations, and (5) whether
supervisory oversight is provided over periodic firearms inventories.

Internal controls addressing an individual*s responsibility in maintaining
assigned firearms, and a supervisor*s responsibility in overseeing the
control of those firearms, are needed to help ensure firearms policies are
adhered to and firearms are appropriately secured. In order to be
accountable for safeguarding firearms, employees and supervisors must be
made aware of their responsibilities related to firearms control. The lack

of these controls could make responsibilities related to firearms control
unclear and result in difficulties in holding appropriate individuals
accountable for failing to follow established procedures.

The agencies we reviewed generally established written policies and
procedures requiring individuals to safeguard assigned firearms, but could
strengthen controls for conducting and overseeing firearms inventories.
Specifically, 17 of the 18 agencies had policies and procedures requiring
individuals to safeguard assigned firearms from damage, theft, loss, and
unauthorized use. In addition, all 18 agencies required that firearms be
secured in lock boxes or secured gun cases or that trigger locks be used.
However, only 12 agencies assigned responsibility for conducting firearms
inventories in job descriptions, and only 7 agencies assessed individuals*
performance in conducting firearms inventories during performance
evaluations. In addition, only 11 of the 18 agencies required that
supervisors oversee periodic firearms inventories. Personal and
Supervisory

Accountability* Agencies Required that Firearms Be Safeguarded, but Could
Strengthen Other Controls

Page 12 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established written
policies and procedures, in accordance with federal internal controls
standards and related criteria, to ensure that instances of missing
firearms are investigated, and employees are appropriately disciplined for
not safeguarding firearms or reporting missing firearms. Specifically, we
determined whether agencies had policies and procedures requiring that (1)
missing firearms be investigated, (2) investigations of missing firearms
be conducted by an independent body, (3) missing firearms be reported to
the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), 12 (4) disciplinary action
be

taken for failing to report missing firearms, and (5) disciplinary action
be taken for failing to properly safeguard assigned firearms. Federal
internal control standards and related criteria provide that agencies
should have the ability to investigate instances of missing firearms and
consider appropriate disciplinary action to enforce compliance with
firearms controls. Instances of missing firearms should be investigated to
identify the reasons the firearms were missing and to provide management
with information to implement any corrective actions needed. In addition,
procedures requiring the discipline of

individuals who did not appropriately secure their firearm or report a
missing firearm could act as a deterrent to others in failing to adhere to
these controls.

The agencies we reviewed generally had written policies and procedures
requiring that incidents of missing or stolen firearms be appropriately
investigated and reported. Specifically, all 18 agencies required that
physical count discrepancies of firearms be investigated, and 17 agencies
required that written instructions for investigating such discrepancies be
developed. In addition, 15 agencies had written policies and procedures
requiring that an independent body conduct the investigations, and 15
agencies required that missing firearms be reported to the NCIC.

Agencies also generally required disciplinary action for employees failing
to report missing firearms and for not adhering to firearms accountability
procedures. Fifteen of the 18 agencies required that disciplinary action
be taken for employees failing to report missing firearms. In addition,

14 agencies required disciplinary action for employees failing to
appropriately safeguard their firearms.

12 NCIC, located in the FBI, provides a computerized database for ready
access by authorized users to criminal justice information, including
information on stolen firearms. Investigations and Discipline* Agencies

Required Investigations of Missing Firearms and Discipline When Deemed
Appropriate

Page 13 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Agencies did not always document their controls for maintaining and
controlling firearms inventories in policies and procedures. Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government issued by GAO require that
internal control activities be clearly documented in management
directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals. Although we
found that agencies documented most of the firearms controls reviewed, 16
of the 18 agencies reported implementing some firearms controls as a
matter of practice, without documenting the controls in their policies and
procedures. Only the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and
INS reported documenting in their policies and procedures all of the
controls we reviewed.

Appendix III identifies, for the four areas reviewed, whether agencies
relied on control activities that were not documented in their policies
and procedures. In the area of inventory data, for example, 1 agency
reported

updating property management records and systems to identify out-
ofservice and disposed of firearms, but did not include this requirement
in its policies and procedures. Another agency reported adjusting
inventory records as a result of physical inventories, but did not require
this in its

policies and procedures. In the inventory control area, 13 of the 18
agencies surveyed reported conducting some aspect of inventory control
that was not required by their policies and procedures. For example, 9
agencies reported taking measures to ensure the integrity of firearms
counts, and 9 agencies reported limiting access to secured firearms
storage areas, but did not include these controls in their policies and
procedures.

Agencies also reported following unwritten practices to hold individuals
accountable for firearms inventories and to help ensure that inventories
are properly performed. For example, 5 agencies reported assessing
individuals* participation in inventories during performance evaluations,
and 2 agencies reported providing supervisory oversight of firearms
inventories, without including these requirements in their policies and
procedures.

Regarding the investigation of missing firearms and associated employee
discipline, 2 agencies reported requiring that an independent body
investigate missing firearms, but did not include this requirement in
their policies and procedures. In another example, 3 agencies reported
that while employees who fail to safeguard their firearms are subject to
disciplinary action, disciplinary action was not required by the agencies*
policies and procedures. Agencies Did Not Always

Document Firearms Controls in Policies and Procedures

Page 14 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Controls that are not included in policies and procedures may not be
consistently applied throughout the agency and may not be effective in
helping ensure that firearms are appropriately controlled and safeguarded.
Without documented controls, individuals may not know the controls are

required, and management may not be able to enforce their use. Agencies
that rely on unwritten practices to protect their firearms run the risk
that those controls may not be followed, and their firearms may not be
appropriately secured.

The key control areas identified in federal internal control standards and
other criteria* inventory data, inventory control, personal and
supervisory accountability, and investigations and discipline* provide a
framework to assist agencies in building their systems of firearms
controls. However, internal control guidance recommends that agencies
tailor these controls to reflect their unique needs and circumstances, as
well as their relative risks for firearms losses. Agency management is
ultimately responsible for

implementing the combination of controls deemed reasonable to effectively
control and safeguard their firearms, based on agency needs. Firearms
control needs may vary depending on an agency*s operations and

structure. For example, law enforcement employees at the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing (BEP) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
generally secure fixed buildings and store their firearms in one or few
central locations when they are off- duty. Conversely, employees at the
FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and INS conduct investigations
nationwide and generally keep their firearms with them at all times. As a
result, BEP and NIH may require different methods for conducting firearms
inventories than may be needed at the FBI, DEA, and INS. In addition, the
FBI, DEA, and INS may wish to use other occasions to check an employee*s
possession of an assigned firearm, along with annual inventories, such as
unannounced inspections and checks during

retraining or testing in firearms use. Key Controls Provide

Framework for Controlling and Safeguarding Firearms, but Appropriate Mix
of Controls Should be Based on Agency Needs

Page 15 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and Treasury OIGs and TIGTA
found that agencies did not always comply with agency policies and
procedures for maintaining and controlling firearms inventories or
establish needed controls. Specifically, the audits found that some
agencies did not conduct periodic inventories of firearms or report and
investigate instances of missing firearms, as required. However, the
audits found that agencies generally disciplined employees who did not
appropriately control their firearms or report missing firearms. Although
these weaknesses were found, agencies have taken, or are in the process of
taking, actions to improve their controls over firearms inventories. See
appendix VI for a detailed listing of audits conducted by the OIGs and
TIGTA of their agencies* controls over firearms.

The Department of Justice*s OIG reviewed the firearms control activities
of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), DEA, U. S. Marshals Service (USMS), FBI,
and INS from March 1999 through March 2002, 13 to assess the effectiveness
of agencies* controls over firearms and to determine what actions were
taken by the agencies in response to the identification of lost or stolen
firearms. The OIG reported that some agencies did not always conduct
periodic physical inventories of firearms or investigate instances of
missing firearms, but generally disciplined employees who did not report
or control missing firearms as required by their policies and procedures.
In addition, the OIG found that employees did not always report missing

firearms or follow established procedures for storing firearms in vehicles
or retrieving firearms from separating employees.

Justice*s OIG found that FBI, DEA, and INS did not conduct periodic
physical inventories of firearms as required by their policies and
procedures. The FBI required that periodic inventories be conducted every
2 years, while the DEA and INS required annual physical inventories of
firearms. 14 Despite these requirements, the OIG found that until it began
its review in 2001, FBI had not completed a firearms inventory since prior
to 1993. In addition, the OIG found that DEA and INS did not properly

13 The BOP, DEA, and USMS audits identify firearms that were missing
between October 1999 and August 2001. The FBI audit identifies firearms
that were missing between October 1, 1999 and January 21, 2002. The INS
audit identifies firearms that were determined missing during an
agencywide inventory of firearms conducted in August 1998, therefore,
reflecting losses over an extended period.

14 Prior to 1998, INS required that firearms inventories be conducted
every 2 years. Audits Found

Weaknesses in Firearms Controls at Justice and Treasury Agencies, but
Improvements Are Being Made

Justice*s OIG Found that Agencies Did Not Always Control and Maintain
Firearms as Required

Justice Agencies Did Not Always Conduct Periodic Firearms Inventories

Page 16 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

conduct or document past inventories, including not inventorying all
firearms. For example, INS had not completed inventories in accordance
with its policies and procedures, including tracking inventory adjustments
and confirming that that appropriate property was inventoried. The OIG
found that BOP and USMS were generally current in conducting firearms
inventories. According to the OIG, FBI and DEA officials stated that they
had not

conducted or completed required inventories for a variety of reasons,
including not having the required funds to conduct the inventories and
relying on other methods to verify inventories. 15 For example, FBI
officials said that they did not conduct all required inventories due to
budgetary and equipment limitations and due to the reassignment of
personnel who had conducted inventories in the past. At DEA, officials
stated that they relied on the physical check of assigned firearms during
agents* annual firearms qualifications as a substitute for the required
annual inventories. Despite this reliance, however, DEA still reported
firearms as lost or stolen from its inventories.

While BOP and DEA initiated investigations of all missing firearms, FBI
and INS did not always initiate investigations, as required by agency
policies and procedures, or could not provide documentation that

investigations were conducted. Justice requires that component agencies
investigate instances of missing property, including firearms, and grants
agencies the authority to discipline employees determined not to have
followed property control procedures. However, the OIG determined that 29
of 74 missing firearms incidents at the INS between January 1996 and
September 1999 were not investigated. In addition, the OIG could not find
evidence that the FBI investigated 141 of 212 missing firearms incidents

reported for the period October 1999 through January 2002. Although the
OIG found that investigations of missing firearms were not always
initiated, they found that investigations of missing firearms usually
resulted in employees found responsible for the loss being disciplined. 16
15 The OIG did not report the reasons why INS had not conducted
inventories in accordance with its policies and procedures. 16 The OIG
reported that BOP did not recommend disciplinary action for the two
missing

firearms cases the OIG reviewed, but did not identify whether the BOP
should have recommended disciplinary action for those cases. For the 12
USMS cases reviewed, the OIG found that no disciplinary action was taken
because USMS did not find employee

negligence. The OIG*s review of INS, undertaken during a different time
period, did not address the issue of disciplining employees who lost
firearms. Justice Agencies Did Not

Always Investigate Missing Firearms, but Generally Disciplined Responsible
Employees

Page 17 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

For example, at the DEA, 10 of 15 missing firearms cases reviewed for the
period October 1999 through August 2001 resulted in disciplinary action,
including letters of reprimand and recommendations for suspensions

without pay. In another example, the OIG concluded that 37 of 70
investigations of missing property (firearms 17 and laptops) at the FBI
from October 1999 through January 2002, resulted in recommendations for
disciplinary action, including letters of censure and suspensions without
pay.

Justice*s OIG found that agencies did not always report, or report in a
timely manner, missing firearms internally or to the NCIC. The OIG further
found that some agencies did not always follow established procedures for
storing firearms in vehicles or retrieving firearms from separating
employees. Table 2 identifies the average time taken for employees to
report missing firearms within their agency and the number of missing
firearms reported to the NCIC.

Table 2: Reporting and Investigating Missing Firearms by BOP, DEA, FBI,
INS, and USMS

Agency Average time taken to

report firearms losses internally after discovery Number of missing
firearms

not reported to NCIC

BOP 0.5 days Reporting not required a DEA 15 days 3 of 16 FBI 4.3 years 14
of 276 INS NA b 394 of 539 USMS 7 days 2 of 6 c Source: GAO analysis of
Justice data. a BOP did not require the reporting of missing firearms to
NCIC.

b The OIG*s data regarding the timing of reported firearms losses within
INS were not comparable to data obtained from the other components. c
According to the OIG, USMS identified that the two firearms had not been
reported to NCIC because both were destroyed and were, therefore,
accounted for.

The OIG found that the average timeframe for employees reporting missing
firearms within their agency ranged from the same day at the BOP 17 The
OIG did not report how many of the 70 investigations at the FBI were of
missing

agency firearms. Justice Agencies Did Not

Always Report Missing Firearms or Secure and Retrieve Firearms

Page 18 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

to 4.3 years at the FBI. 18 While the USMS required the immediate
reporting of missing firearms, and DEA required reporting within 48 hours,
the FBI and BOP did not include a timetable for reporting missing firearms
in their policies and procedures. The OIG attributed delays for reporting
missing firearms at the FBI to the absence of a required timetable for
reporting missing firearms, but concluded that the BOP generally reported
missing firearms in a timely manner due to firearms being stored in a
central location. The OIG could not determine whether USMS experienced
delays in reporting missing firearms because agency loss reports did not
identify the date the loss was discovered. The OIG found reporting delays
of 1 to 89 days in 11 of the 16 DEA lost firearms cases examined, but did
not identify the reasons for these delays.

The OIG also found that the agencies had inconsistent practices for
reporting missing firearms to the NCIC. The OIG discovered that all
agencies reviewed, with the exception of BOP, 19 had policies and
procedures requiring that missing firearms be reported to NCIC. However,
the OIG found that FBI, DEA, and INS had not reported from 2 to more than
300 of their missing firearms to the NCIC, and that only USMS had reported
all missing firearms. 20 Reporting missing firearms to NCIC would assist
agencies in retrieving lost or stolen firearms recovered by the law
enforcement community, since the NCIC system is generally regarded by law
enforcement agencies as the primary nationwide method for tracking

stolen firearms. In addition, Justice*s OIG found that some agencies did
not always follow established procedures for storing firearms in vehicles
or retrieving firearms from separating employees. Specifically, the OIG
found that 4 of 16 firearms losses at DEA, for the period October 1999
through September

18 Justice commented that while local officials completed internal
notification on a timely basis, the notifications of lost firearms were
not always forwarded to the National Firearms Program or Property
Management Units until such time as the weapons were called for
destruction. The failure to report losses or thefts to the National
Firearms Program

resulted in the OIG determining a higher average reporting time. 19 BOP
officials said that they are in the process of revising their policies to
require the immediate reporting of all lost, stolen, or missing firearms
to the NCIC.

20 Justice said that prior to 2000, NCIC only had a category for stolen
firearms, not lost or missing firearms, resulting in some lost or missing
firearms not being reported. Additionally, officials reported that some
firearms that the OIG identified as not being entered into NCIC were
entered, but subsequently deleted, because the information was not updated
after a certain time period.

Page 19 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

15, 2001, occurred as a result of vehicle thefts. In some cases, the
employees stored their firearms in unattended vehicles, despite internal
policies prohibiting this practice. At FBI, the OIG found that some of the
52 21 firearms stolen from FBI or privately owned vehicles, during the
period October 1999 through January 2002, were due to firearms not being
properly secured in vehicles. In addition, 3 of the 6 firearms losses at
USMS were due to thefts from vehicles. 22 Both FBI and USMS allowed the
storage of firearms in vehicles either temporarily (FBI) or indefinitely
(USMS), as long as the vehicle was secured and the firearm was placed in a
locked container.

The OIG also found weaknesses in the agencies* use of accountable property
checklists designed to retrieve property from separating employees,
sometimes resulting in instances of firearms not being retrieved.
Department of Justice policies require that each agency develop, maintain,
and distribute an accountable property checklist for employees to complete
prior to separating from the department to help facilitate the return of
agency property, including firearms. Despite this requirement, the OIG
found weakness in the use of these checklists at all of the agencies
reviewed, including (1) failure to enforce the use of the checklist; (2)
lack of relevant accountable signatures; and (3) failure to include key
identifying information, such as the firearm*s serial number. As a result,
firearms were not always retrieved from separating employees. For example,
the OIG reported that in 2001, FBI found that at least 31 firearms of
separated employees could not be accounted for.

21 The OIG did not report how many of the 52 cases (out of total of the
212 missing firearms cases reviewed) of FBI firearms stolen from vehicles
were the result of the firearms not being properly stored.

22 The loss of two BOP firearms for the period October 1999 through
February 2002 were determined to have not been lost or stolen from
employees vehicles. BOP stated that while these missing firearms were not
reported to NCIC, they were reported to the agency and were investigated.
The investigations found that the airlines lost one weapon from checked
baggage and the second was discovered missing after the transfer of
several weapons by mail between facilities. In addition, the OIG did not
report firearms losses from vehicles at INS.

Page 20 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Treasury*s OIG and TIGTA reviewed the firearms control activities of the
ATF, U. S. Customs Service, U. S. Secret Service, BEP, the U. S. Mint, and
Internal Revenue Service/ Criminal Investigation (IRS/ CI) for fiscal
years 1999 through 2001. The purpose of these reviews was to determine
whether the agencies* inventory practices were sufficient for controlling
items that, if lost or stolen, might compromise the public*s safety,
national security, or ongoing criminal investigations. The OIG and TIGTA
concluded that the agencies generally conducted periodic firearms
inventories; investigated instances of missing firearms; and disciplined
employees for not maintaining firearms as required by agency policies and
procedures. However, the OIG determined that the U. S. Mint did not follow
all policies and procedures related to conducting periodic inventories or
identify its firearms from its property management records. In addition,
TIGTA determined that IRS/ CI did not appropriately record and report
missing firearms data.

Treasury*s OIG and TIGTA found that the agencies reviewed, with the
exception of the U. S. Mint, conducted periodic inventories at least
annually, as required by their internal policies and procedures. For
example, at ATF, the OIG concluded that frequent, independent physical
inventories reduced the risk that weapons would be lost or stolen without
being promptly detected. At IRS/ CI, TIGTA found that property inventories
were conducted locally on an annual basis and in accordance with
established policies and procedures. However, the OIG determined that the
U. S. Mint had not conducted a complete annual physical inventory of
firearms during fiscal years 1999, 2000, or 2001, and the firearms
inventory completed in October 2001 was not conducted in accordance with
agency policies and procedures.

In addition, Treasury found that ATF, U. S. Customs Service, Secret
Service, and IRS/ CI investigated instances of firearms losses and
appropriately considered employee discipline, as required by agency
policies and procedures. 23 For example, the OIG determined that ATF*s
Professional Review Board investigated 15 of 16 instances of missing
firearms identified during the period October 1, 1998 through September
30, 2001, and appropriately considered employee discipline in each of
those cases. The board recommended employee suspensions in 9 of the

23 Treasury*s OIG determined that the U. S. Mint and BEP did not have any
firearms losses for the periods October 1, 1998 through September 30,
2001. Treasury*s OIG and TIGTA

Found Agencies Safeguarded Firearms, but Could Strengthen and Enforce
Controls in Some Areas

Treasury Agencies Generally Conducted Firearms Inventories, Investigated
Missing Firearms, and Disciplined Employees

Page 21 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

cases and no disciplinary action in 3 of the cases. The remaining 3 cases
were still under investigation at the completion of the OIG*s review.

The OIG also determined that the U. S. Customs Service*s Board of Survey,
the unit responsible for investigating missing firearms, investigated all
72 missing firearms identified during the period October 1, 1998 through
September 30, 2001. The OIG determined that employees were held
financially responsible for losses in 26 of the cases and not financially
responsible in 37 of the cases. The remaining 7 cases were still under
investigation at the completion of the OIG*s review.

The OIG determined that the U. S. Mint could not provide a listing of
firearms from its property management records to support reported firearms
inventories, as required by their policies and procedures. The OIG
concluded that without this list it would not be possible to reconcile the
firearms that were on- hand against recorded inventory counts, resulting
in the possibility that missing firearms might not be identified. The OIG
concluded that these and other factors, including the number and storage
of its firearms at several locations, increased the Mint*s risk of lost or
stolen firearms.

TIGTA reported that it could not determine the number of IRS/ CI missing
firearms from its management information system and that the hard copy
reports of IRS/ CI missing firearms were not always prepared or completed.
Specifically, TIGTA found that IRS/ CI*s inventory management

system did not differentiate between lost or stolen firearms and, as a
result, TIGTA could not rely on that system to identify IRS/ CI missing
firearms inventories accurately. Although TIGTA was able to review and
comment on hard copy reports from IRS/ CI field offices in order to
identify missing firearms, TIGTA found that some of these reports were not
completely prepared.

Justice and Treasury agencies have taken many actions designed to
strengthen and enforce firearms controls, based on recommendations made by
the OIGs and TIGTA. Specifically, in reports issued in March 2001 and
August 2002, Justice*s OIG made a total of 63 recommendations to INS, BOP,
DEA, FBI, and USMS designed to improve firearms control activities.
Treasury*s OIG and TIGTA also made five firearms- related recommendations
in reports to the U. S. Mint in May 2002 and to IRS/ CI in November 2001
and March 2002. According to the OIGs and TIGTA, agencies agreed to all
recommendations and have taken, or are in the process of taking,
corrective action addressing all identified weaknesses. U. S. Mint and
IRS/ CI Did Not

Always Record or Report Firearms Information

Justice and Treasury Agencies Are Taking Action to Strengthen and Enforce
Firearms Controls

Page 22 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Specifically, the INS, BOP, DEA, FBI, and USMS have implemented 29 of the
63 recommendations made by the Justice OIG, and are in the process of
implementing the remaining 34 recommendations. Of the 34 recommendations
that have not been implemented, management has begun taking corrective
actions and is working with the OIG to ensure their efforts address the
weaknesses identified. Completed and ongoing actions include establishing
procedures requiring periodic firearms inventories on an annual basis and
the appropriate segregation of duties

during physical inventories. The agencies are also requiring that missing
firearms be immediately reported and minimum timeframes for completing
investigations of missing firearms be established. In addition, agencies
are requiring that all missing firearms cases be adjudicated and that
controls for securing firearms in vehicles and recovering firearms from
separating employees be strengthened.

In addition, the U. S. Mint and IRS/ CI have implemented all five
recommendations made by the Treasury OIG and TIGTA. The U. S. Mint now
requires the performance and documentation of an independent physical
inventory of firearms annually and the reconciliation of those inventories
against property management records. Furthermore, IRS/ CI agreed to change
its inventory management system to be able to differentiate between lost,
stolen, and damaged items in their property management system, and now
requires that missing firearms reports be completely prepared. IRS/ CI
also established guidelines addressing the types of lost or stolen
equipment that should be referred to TIGTA for investigation.

Fifteen of the 18 federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed reported
firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession during some
point in time between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. Agency officials
reported that although some firearms were lost due to negligence, some
losses occurred despite appropriate precautions being taken by employees.
Audits conducted by Justice*s and Treasury*s OIGs found that some missing
firearms were recovered during the commission of a crime, or in connection
with a criminal investigation. Majority of Federal

Law Enforcement Agencies Reviewed Reported Missing Firearms

Page 23 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Fifteen of the 18 federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed reported
1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession
during some point in time between September 1998 and July 2002. 24 As of
July 2002, 188 of these firearms had been subsequently recovered, leaving
824 still missing. 25 While we could not determine the exact percentage of

agency firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears
that these firearms generally accounted for less than one percent of
agencies* total firearms inventories. 26 Only BEP, the U. S. Mint, and
Veterans Affairs reported having no lost, stolen, or missing firearms.
Agencies identified missing firearms using internal reporting systems,
through which personnel reported weapons as missing, and from periodic
physical inventories of firearms. Table 3 identifies firearms as lost,
stolen, or otherwise not in an agency*s possession for the 18 agencies
surveyed, those firearms subsequently recovered, and those firearms still
missing as of July 2002. 24 Of these missing firearms, 178 had been
converted to dummy firearms (e. g., training

weapons) and rendered inoperable. FBI officials said that these weapons
could not be easily converted to live firearms. 25 Agencies could not
identify which firearms recovered or still missing were dummy firearms. 26
Since the firearms inventory and missing firearms data were developed from
different bases, such as inventory counts or internal agency reporting
systems, and are based on

different time periods, they are not directly comparable. Fifteen of 18
Agencies

Surveyed Reported Missing Firearms

Page 24 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Table 3: Firearms Reported Missing, Recovered, and Unaccounted for between
September 30, 1998 and July 2002 at Selected Federal Law Enforcement
Agencies

Agency Firearms identified as

lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the agency*s possession between
September 30,

1998 and July 2002 a Firearms subsequently

recovered between September 30, 1998 and

July 2002 a Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise not

in the agency*s possession as of

July 2002 a

ATF 16 7 9 BEP 0 0 0 BOP 2 0 2 DEA 63 4 59 FBI 458 b 72 386 Federal
Emergency Management Administration 2 0 2 Federal Protective Service 3 0 3
Fish and Wildlife Service 27 1 26 INS 114 c 13 101 d IRS/ CI 6 3 3
National Institutes of Health 3 0 3 National Park Service 196 63 133
Postal Inspection Service 14 0 14 U. S. Customs Service e 94 20 74 USMS 10
3 7 U. S. Mint 0 0 0 U. S. Secret Service 4 2 2 VA 0 0 0

Total 1,012 188 824

Source: GAO survey of these agencies. a Data were not independently
verified.

b FBI reported that 458 of its firearms were lost, stolen, or otherwise
not in the agency*s possession during the period September 30, 1998
through July 2002. FBI reported to the Senate Judiciary Committee that, as
of July 2001, 449 of its firearms were not accounted for; of these
firearms, 161 were training weapons. c INS reported that 114 of its
firearms were lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the agency*s possession

during the period September 30, 1998 through July 2002. The more than 500
missing INS firearms reported by the Justice OIG included those firearms
found missing during an INS agencywide inventory conducted in August 1998.
d INS officials said that of the 101 missing firearms, 13 were lost; 74
were stolen; and 14 were

otherwise missing. e The U. S. Customs Service reported 22 lost and 72
stolen firearms; it also reported additional

firearms destroyed in the World Trade Center bombing.

Page 25 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Of the 1,012 firearms that agencies reported lost, stolen, or otherwise
not in their possession, 27 most missing firearms were pistols (541).
Agencies also reported 187 revolvers or other handguns, 157 training
weapons, 92 shotguns, 38 rifles, 19 submachine guns, and 1 stun gun as
missing.

Agency officials recognized that firearms were sometimes lost due to
negligent behavior, such as employees not properly securing firearms in
locked vehicles, as required by agency policies and procedures. However,
officials also identified that some firearms were lost despite appropriate
precautions being taken by the employee. For example, one agency reported
that four firearms were stolen while in the custody of the airlines,

and that the theft did not occur due to the negligent behavior of the
employee. Specifically, the firearms were checked in a locked, hard- sided
gun case, in accordance with agency policies and procedures. Due to the

manner in which the agencies recorded missing firearms data, they usually
could not readily identify, for the missing firearms we reviewed, the
number of firearms determined to have been lost due to negligence.

Agencies also identified cases where lost firearms, although not in the
agency*s possession, were not recoverable and could not be used to harm
the public. For example, several agencies reported firearms being lost in
the ocean or in a river. These weapons were considered unrecoverable and
therefore did not pose a threat to the public. Audits conducted by
Justice*s and Treasury*s OIGs identified several

incidents where missing firearms had been recovered in connection with
criminal activity or during a criminal investigation. 28 The OIGs made
this determination during separate audits of agency controls over weapons,
laptops, and other sensitive items at FBI, DEA, INS, U. S. Secret Service,
and U. S. Customs. 29 For example, Justice*s OIG reviewed 16 missing
firearms cases reported to

the DEA Board of Professional Conduct, for the time period 27 FBI data
came from the Justice OIG report. 28 To determine if missing agency
firearms were used in connection with criminal activity, the OIGs reviewed
missing firearms recovered from October 1, 1999 through August 27, 2001,
and October 1, 1998 through September 30, 2001, respectively. For DEA, the
Justice OIG reviewed cases for the period October 1, 1999 through November
15, 2001.

29 See appendix VI for a complete listing of related reports issued by the
Departments of Justice and Treasury OIGs. Justice and Treasury Audits
Identified Instances

of Recovered Firearms Used in Criminal Activity

Page 26 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

October 1, 1999 through November 15, 2001, and found that 3 had been
recovered by local law enforcement during an arrest of an individual for a
handgun violation, and 2 in connection with searches during unrelated
criminal investigations. In another example, Treasury*s OIG reviewed 10 of
13 firearms reported missing and recovered by U. S. Customs Service, for
the time period October 1, 1998 through September 30, 2001, and found that
5 of the 10 firearms had been recovered in connection with a robbery, a
drive- by shooting, or during the execution of a search warrant.

The Federal Managers* Financial Integrity Act requires that executive
agencies establish and maintain controls that provide reasonable assurance
that all assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, and
misappropriation. Standards and guidance for effectively maintaining and
controlling firearms inventories are available to assist federal law
enforcement agencies in designing controls to safeguard their firearms.
Although these controls provide a framework to assist agencies in
controlling and safeguarding their firearms, agencies should tailor these
controls to meet their unique needs and circumstances, as well as their
risks for firearms losses. Accordingly, the appropriate mix of controls
may vary for each federal law enforcement agency.

When agencies discover lost, stolen, or missing firearms, they should
reassess their firearms controls to determine why they were not effective
and if they should be modified. This is particularly important when
agencies find that existing controls have not been implemented or have
been implemented but have not prevented the loss of agency firearms, as

was the case with some agencies reviewed by the Departments of Justice and
Treasury OIGs. Internal controls that have been established to safeguard
firearms, but were not appropriate controls based on the agencies* needs,
or were not implemented or properly applied, provide little assurance that
firearms are safe from loss, theft, or misuse.

In addition, agencies should document their firearms controls in policies
and procedures. Without documenting these controls, employees may not know
of their requirement, and the controls may not be uniformly applied
agencywide. In addition, it may be difficult for management to enforce a
control that is not required by policy and procedures, such as
disciplining employees who do not adhere to firearms controls.

The need for an assessment of firearms controls, and documentation of
controls in policies and procedures, is demonstrated by the majority of
Conclusion

Page 27 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

agencies reviewed reporting missing firearms. These firearms may pose a
serious risk to the public, including the risk that they may be used to
inflict bodily harm or to further criminal activity.

The Attorney General; the Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, Veterans
Affairs, and Homeland Security; the Director of the National Institutes of
Health, and the Postmaster General should

 periodically assess existing policies and procedures designed to control
and safeguard firearms and determine whether they have been effective, or
should be modified to help prevent future firearms losses. In assessing
firearms controls, agencies should use as guides (1) internal control
standards issued by GAO, Joint Financial Management Improvement Program,
and Commission on Accreditation

for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc; and (2) audits conducted by the
Department of Justice OIG, Department of the Treasury OIG, and TIGTA of
agencies firearms controls, and

 document internal controls in agency policies and procedures to the
maximum extent practical to help ensure that they are consistently
understood and applied. We requested and received comments on a draft of
this report from the

Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the
Interior, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security,
the Director of the National Institutes of Health (Department of Health
and Human Services), and the Postmaster General. Officials generally
agreed

with the information presented. Six agencies provided technical changes
that have been incorporated, as appropriate. Four agencies* the NIH, Fish
and Wildlife Service (Department of the Interior), U. S. Postal Inspection
Service, and Department of Veterans Affairs* provided comments on the
report recommendation. NIH and Fish and Wildlife Service agreed with the
recommendation and identified actions taken to strengthen their controls
over firearms. The U. S. Postal Inspection Service also identified actions

taken to strengthen firearms controls consistent with the recommendation.
The Department of Veterans Affairs expressed concerned about our
recommendation, saying that its controls were effective in preventing
firearms losses. Appendixes VII, VIII, X, and XI include the written
comments from these four agencies. In addition, although the Department of
Justice did not comment on the recommendation, its letter presents general
observations regarding standards for control over agency firearms and is
included in appendix IX. Recommendations Agency Comments

Page 28 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

NIH agreed with the recommendation, saying that in response to a review
conducted by the department*s OIG, NIH has taken numerous steps to
strengthen its controls over firearms. These efforts include updating and
including accurate descriptions of firearms in its firearms inventory

database, and appointing and training property custodial officers for the
NIH Police Branch. The Fish and Wildlife Service also agreed with the
recommendation, and said that as a result of an internal assessment, the
Service will (1) develop a Web- based firearm training guide addressing
various internal controls over firearms, (2) conduct unscheduled random
checks of firearms against property records, and (3) annually review
reports of any lost and/ or stolen firearms to determine if policies and
procedures should be modified to prevent future losses.

Although not saying whether it agreed with our recommendation, the U. S.
Postal Inspection Service said that it had reviewed the Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government and will assess these standards
along with the results of a firearms review conducted by the Inspection
Service Firearms Task Force. In addition, the Service provided us with a
copy of its proposed policy update that it plans to incorporate into its
firearms inventory and accountability procedures. We appreciate that the
Service provided the proposed update and look forward to receiving the
final updated policy. VA expressed concerned about our recommendation,
saying that its lack

of firearms losses during the time period of our review was due to its
having appropriate internal controls over firearms. VA further said that
its police officers document the handling of firearms on a daily basis;
generally do not remove their firearms from department property; check
their assigned firearms out of and into the armory each day; conduct

monthly inventories of all firearms, ammunition, and magazines; have
unannounced inventories and spot checks; and conduct independent annual
inventories of firearms.

Although VA did not report missing firearms during the time period of our
review, the potential exists that firearms could be lost or stolen at some
point in the future. Accordingly, we believe that VA and other agencies we
reviewed should periodically assess their firearms controls, particularly
when their organizations or operations have changed, or when firearms are
identified as missing. These assessments should be conducted to

determine whether established controls have been effective, are still
relevant, or should be modified. For example, VA recently reported that as
of March 2003, police officers at more than 100 of its field sites were

assigned firearms. Prior to 2000, officers at only 27 sites were armed. We

Page 29 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

believe that this is a good example of when an organizational change
necessitates a reevaluation of an agency*s firearms controls to reduce the
risk of potential firearms losses. We further believe that federal
internal control standards and other criteria included in our report
provide a useful framework from which to conduct these assessments, and
identify appropriate firearms controls when an agency*s environment has
changed, or when existing controls have not been effective. In addition,
six agencies requested that we change some of their original

responses to our survey regarding firearms controls, usually to identify
that they had a written policy and procedure addressing a specific
control. We made these technical changes in all cases in which the agency
provided documentation of its policy. However, if the agency said that the
policy change was planned but had not yet been made, we did not change

the original response and look forward to receiving documentation
identifying changes that have been incorporated into its policy.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its content
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
its issue date. At that time, we will provide copies of this report to the
appropriate congressional committees, the Attorney General, Secretary of
the Treasury, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the National Institutes of
Health, and the Postmaster General. We will also make copies available to
others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge
on GAO*s

Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. If you or your staffs have any
questions on this report, please call me on (202) 512- 8777. Key
contributors are listed in appendix XII.

Cathleen A. Berrick, Acting Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 30 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

We reviewed federal law enforcement agencies* control over firearms to
determine (1) the extent to which these agencies* policies, procedures,
and practices for controlling and safeguarding firearms were consistent
with federal internal control standards and related criteria issued by law
enforcement and management organizations; (2) whether reviews conducted by
the Department of Justice and Department of Treasury identified instances
of noncompliance with firearms policies and procedures, and whether
agencies have taken actions to correct identified weaknesses, particularly
regarding (a) conducting inventories, (b)

investigating missing firearms, and (c) disciplining employees; and (3)
the number of firearms that selected federal law enforcement agencies
identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession between
September 30, 1998 and July 2002. We also determined how selected agencies
maintained control and accountability over weapons other than firearms and
weapons components. (See app. II.)

To answer objectives 1 and 3, and to determine how agencies maintained and
controlled weapons other than firearms and weapons components, we selected
for review 18 out of 33 federal civilian law enforcement agencies in the
executive branch identified by the Department of Justice*s Bureau

of Justice Statistics (BJS), as of June 2000, as having personnel with the
authority to carry firearms and make arrests. 1 We systematically selected
the agencies for our review. First, we stratified

the 33 agencies according to size, based on whether the agency had (1)
1,000 or more, (2) 500* 999, (3) 100* 499, or (4) less than 100 law
enforcement personnel. We then selected all agencies with 1,000 or more
law enforcement personnel (11 agencies) and the 2 agencies with the
largest number of law enforcement personnel in each of the remaining 3
strata (6 agencies in total). To account for all Department of Justice and
Treasury law enforcement agencies, we also included BEP, which fell into

the 100* 499 strata (1 agency). These 18 agencies employed about 96
percent (76,510) of the total personnel employed by the federal civilian
law enforcement agencies (79,910) that are authorized to carry firearms
and make arrests, as reported in the BJS. Table 4 identifies the 18
agencies selected for review, along with the strata from which they were
selected. 1 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.
S. Department of Justice,

Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2000 (Washington, D. C.: July 2001).
Although the survey on which this report was based included certain OIGs,
we did not include these offices in our review. Appendix I: Objectives,
Scope, and

Methodology

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 31 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Table 4: Eighteen Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Included in Our Survey
of Federal Firearms Control Policies, Procedures, and Practices

Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and
carry firearms

Agency Number of personnel

authorized to arrest and carry firearms in 2000 a 1,000 or more 500- 999
100- 499 Less than 100 BEP 211 X Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearms 1,967 X DEA 4,161 X FBI 11,523 X Federal Bureau of Prisons 13,557
X Federal Protective Service 803 X FEMA Security Division 33 X INS 17,654
X IRS- Criminal Investigation Division 2,726 X National Institutes of
Health Police 39 X National Park Service (Interior) Division of Ranger
Activities U. S. Park Police X U. S. Customs Service 10,522 X U. S. Fish
and Wildlife Service 888 X U. S. Mint 354 X USMS 2,735 X U. S. Postal
Inspection Service 3,412 X U. S Secret Service 4,039 X Department of
Veterans

Affairs/ Veterans Health Administration/ Police Service b 342 X Source:
GAO analysis of BJS data.

a By 2003, some agencies reported increases in the number of personnel
with the authority to make arrests and carry firearms. For example, ATF
reported to have 2031 personnel; VA, 2,200 personnel; and Customs,
approximately 14,165 personnel with such authorities.

b VA has authority to arm its police officers under 38 U. S. C. 904. An
initial pilot program to arm its officers was established at 5 VA sites
and then expanded to 12 sites. Prior to 2000, police officers at 27 sites
were armed; as of March 2003, more than 100 sites have armed officers.

We surveyed the 18 agencies using a detailed questionnaire. We pretested
the questionnaire with 2 of the 18 agencies and a third federal law
enforcement agency, not included in the final survey, and made relevant
changes to the questions based on these pretests. We also surveyed the 18
agencies using a follow- up questionnaire to obtain additional related
information. See appendixes IV and V for the initial and follow- up

questionnaire, respectively.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 32 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

In the questionnaire, we asked agencies about their firearms inventories
and the policies, procedures, and practices currently in place to control
their firearms. We also asked agencies to provide the results of their
most recently completed 100- percent inventory since September 30, 1998,
and the date of the inventory. We asked the 18 agencies to identify their
policies and procedures related to recording firearms inventory data,
controlling firearms inventories, ensuring personal and supervisory
accountability for agency firearms, and investigating missing firearms and
administering associated employee discipline. We also asked agencies to
identify the number of firearms reported missing since September 30, 1998,
the number of those missing firearms recovered up to the time of our
survey, and the sources of the missing firearms information.

To determine how federal law enforcement agencies maintained control and
accountability over weapons other than firearms and weapons components,
specifically ammunition, explosives, and gas and chemical agents, we
surveyed the 18 agencies regarding their policies, procedures, and
practices for tracking and controlling these items.

Because this was not a sample survey, there are no sampling errors.
However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce
errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example,
difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in the sources
of information that are available to respondents, or in how the data are
entered into a database or were analyzed can introduce unwanted
variability into the survey results. We took steps in the development of
the questionnaires, the data collection, and the data editing and analysis
to minimize these nonsampling errors. In addition, to the extent possible,
we obtained and reviewed agencies* firearms control policies and
procedures to verify their responses to our questionnaire.

To answer objective 2, we reviewed the results of audits conducted by the
Departments of Justice and Treasury Offices of Inspector General (OIG) and
the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). These
audits evaluated the extent to which Justice and Treasury law enforcement
agencies adhered to internal controls over firearms inventories and other
sensitive properties and were completed between

March 2001 and August 2002. (See app. VI for audit reports and dates
issued.) In addition, we reviewed documents from selected Justice and
Treasury law enforcement agencies detailing their firearms control
policies, procedures, and practices. We also reviewed selected agencies*
internal reports on compliance with firearms control policies and

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 33 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

procedures and interviewed officials on corrective actions taken in
response to OIG and TIGTA recommendations.

We conducted our review between August 2001 and May 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
Components

Page 34 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Federal law enforcement agencies generally reported establishing inventory
controls to account for weapons other than firearms and weapons
components. The 18 agencies we surveyed reported maintaining
accountability for their stocks of explosives, gas and/ or chemical
agents, and ammunition through conducting periodic physical inventory
counts of the items, or maintaining running balances through perpetual
inventories. Agencies also reported using other methods, such as tracking
the

distribution of items to individuals or organizational units and limiting
access to areas in which inventories are stored, or a combination of
methods, to account for the inventories.

The 18 federal law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported having
explosives, gas and/ or chemical agents, and ammunition. Table 5
identifies weapons other than firearms and weapons components reported by
the agencies surveyed.

Table 5: Agencies* Reported Use of Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
Components

Agency Explosives Gas and/ or chemical agents Ammunition

ATF X X X BEP X X BOP X X X Customs X X X DEA X FBI X X X Federal
Protective Service X X Fish and Wildlife Service X FEMA a X INS X X IRS/
CI X X U. S. Mint X X X National Park Service X NIH X U. S. Postal Service
X U. S. Secret Service X X X USMS X X X VA X X

Total 7 12 18

Source: GAO survey of these agencies. a FEMA is the Federal Emergency
Management Agency.

Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
Components

Agencies Established Controls to Account for Other Weapons and Weapons
Components

Agencies Reported Having Inventories of Explosives, Gas and/ or Chemical

Agents, and Ammunition

Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
Components

Page 35 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

While all 18 agencies reported having ammunition, only 7 reported having
explosives, and 12 reported having gas and/ or chemical agents. Seven
agencies reported inventory in all three categories, including BOP, FBI,
USMS, ATF, U. S. Customs Service, the U. S. Mint, and U. S. Secret
Service.

Agencies reporting inventories of explosives and gas and chemical agents
responded that the weapons were primarily diversionary devices, defensive
chemical sprays, and chemical projectiles. Included were items such as
flash- bangs that distract with a flash and bang effect and smoke grenades
that dispense chemically based inflammatory agents or membrane irritants.

The 18 federal law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported having
accountability procedures for weapons other than firearms and weapons
components, and these agencies generally reported that they relied on
inventories to account for these items. As shown in table 6, the agencies
reported that they controlled weapons and weapons components through
monthly and annual inventory counts, or by maintaining a running summary
of the quantities on hand through perpetual inventories. Agencies Used

Inventory Counts and Other Methods to Control Weapons and Weapons
Components

Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
Components

Page 36 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Table 6: Agencies* Reported Use of Inventory Procedures for Explosives,
Gas and/ or Chemical Agents, and Ammunition Ammunition inventories

Agency Annual a Monthly Perpetual Other a ATF b BEP X BOP X Customs X DEA
X FBI X X Federal Protective

Service X Fish and Wildlife Service X c FEMA d X INS X X

IRS/ CI X U. S. Mint X X X National Park Service X X NIH X U. S. Postal
Service X

U. S. Secret Service X X X USMS X VA X Source: GAO survey of these
agencies.

Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
Components

Page 37 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Explosives inventories Gas and/ or chemical agent inventories Annual
Monthly Perpetual Other a Annual Monthly Perpetual Other a X X X X X X X X
X

X X X X X

X X X X X X X X

X X X

a Other refers to a variety of practices in addition to those identified
that agencies used to account for ammunition, explosives, or gas/ chemical
weapons. For example, Customs reported using quarterly or trimester
inventories to account for these items. b At the time of our survey, ATF
reported that it was in the final stage of review for a draft order

*Ammunition Accounting Procedures* to safeguard its ammunition. c The Fish
and Wild Life Service controlled ammunition by monitoring its distribution
and limiting

access to supply. d FEMA is the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

In addition to relying on monthly, annual, and periodic inventories to
control weapons other than firearms and weapons components, some agencies
reported using additional procedures, or a combination of procedures, to
account for their inventories. For example, IRS/ CI reported controlling
ammunition and pepper spray by tracking their distribution to field
installations from a headquarters procurement office, while the National
Park Service reported that it controlled ammunition by monitoring its
distribution to law enforcement personnel. In addition, the Fish and
Wildlife Service reported that it controlled ammunition by monitoring its
distribution and limiting access to supply. In another

Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
Components

Page 38 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

example, the FBI reported maintaining its supply of gas and/ or chemical
agents at a military storage facility, thereby reducing access and the
potential for unauthorized use or loss.

In addition, the FBI, INS, USMS, ATF, Secret Service, and the VA reported
using a combination of methods to account for these weapons and weapons
components. For example, the FBI reported controlling access to ammunition
supplies in addition to maintaining a record of each time ammunition was
received or disbursed. INS reported that, in addition to conducting annual
inventories of ammunition and gas and chemical agents, it maintains logs
at all locations that record receipts from manufacturers and issuances for
operational purposes. In another

example, the ATF reported controlling explosives by maintaining a separate
record of acquisitions and removals; keeping a daily, perpetual record of
transactions; and conducting annual inventories and inspections.

Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
Components

Page 39 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix III: Presence of Key Firearms Activities in Agency Policies and
Procedures

Page 40 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Table 7: Key Firearms Control Activities in Agency Policies and Procedures
as Reported by Selected Federal Law Enforcement Agencies

Appendix III: Presence of Key Firearms Activities in Agency Policies and
Procedures

Description of control Inventory data

Information required to be included in permanent property record on
receiving new firearms Date of physical receipt Specific identification
Organizational unit or functional area to which firearm is assigned Person
firearm assigned to Adjustments made to firearms inventory records as a
result of physical inventory counts Update property management systems to
identify firearms being disposed of as out- of- service Update property
management system to remove firearms being disposed of from agency's
firearms inventory

Inventory control

Written policies and procedures for issuing agency- owned firearms to
individuals Written policies and procedures for assigning agency owned
firearms to organizational units or functional areas Requires periodic
firearms counts Guidance for firearms counts

Objectives for inventory established Timing of counts established
Instructions for conducting inventories established Integrity of
inventories

Training or instruction provided to firearms counters

Selected federal law enforcement agencies

Employees involved in controlling and safeguarding firearms precluded from
counting firearms Counters have no prior knowledge of inventory 2- member
(or more) count teams Counters required to verify firearms ID numbers
Counters required to verify descriptive information about the firearm Use
occasions other than inventory to check firearms

During employee retraining or testing in firearm use Unannounced
inspections of employee's firearms Other

BOP

W W W

W W

W W

W W

W W W

W W W

W W W W

W W W

DEA

W W W

W W

W W

W W W

W W W

N/ A W

N N/ A

W W

U N W

FBI

W W W

W W

W W

W W

W W W W

N/ A W

W N/ A

W W

W W N/ A

INS

W W W

W W

W W

W W W

W W W

N N

W W W W

W W W

USMS

W W W

N W

W W

W W

W W W W

N N

W N W W

W U N

USCS

W W W

W W

W W

W W N/ A

W W W

N/ A W

W W W W

W U U

U. S. SS

W W W

W W

W W

W W

W W

W W

N N

U U W W

W N N

AT F

W W W

W W

W W

W W

W W W

W W

N W

W W W

W N N/ A

IRS/ CI

W W W

W W

W W

W W

W W W W

N/ A W

U N/ A

W W

W N N

FEMA

W W W

W W

W W

W W W

N N W

N N

U U W W

W W W

BEP

W W W

W W

W W

W W W

W W W

N/ A W

W W W W

W W W

U. S. Mint

W W

N W W

N N

W W N/ A

W U U

N/ A W

U U U U

W N U

Fish and Wildlife Service

W W W

W W

W W

W W W

W W W

N N

U N U U

N U N

Federal Protective Service

W W W

W N

U U

W W W

W U W

U N

U U W W

W W

U

National Park Service

W W W

W W

W W

W W W

W W W

N N

W U W W

W N N

NIH

W W W

W W

W W

W W W

W W W

U W

W U U U

N N N

USPIS

W W W

W W

W W

W W

W W

W W

U N

W N W W

W W W

VA

W W W

W W

W W

W W

W W W

N/ A W

W N/ A

W W

W W W W

Appendix III: Presence of Key Firearms Activities in Agency Policies and
Procedures

Page 41 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Description of control Selected federal law enforcement agencies

Access limited to secured firearms storage areas or facilities Single
person has access

BOP DEA

FBI INS

USMS USCS

U. S. SS AT

F

W

IRS/ CI FEMA

BEP U. S. Mint Fish and Wildlife Service

Federal Protective Service National Park Service NIH

USPIS VA

Single person and his/ her designees Single person, his/ her designees,
and others with one- time access authorizations

Personal and supervisory accountability

Individuals must safeguard assigned firearms from Damage Loss Theft
Unauthorized use Individuals must store firearms in: a

Lock box and/ or trigger lock and/ or secured gun case Lock box only
Trigger lock only Secured gun case Other Individuals are held accountable
for firearms inventory

Individuals assigned responsibility for conducting firearms inventories in
job descriptions Individuals' performance in conducting firearms
inventories assessed during performance evaluations Supervisory Oversight
of firearms inventories

Investigations and discipline

Investigations Require investigation of physical count discrepancies of
firearms Instructions for investigating discrepancies Require
investigations be conducted by inspector general or independent authority
a Report missing firearms to NCIC a Employee discipline

Disciplinary action for failure to report missing firearms a Disciplinary
action for persons failing to take appropriate firearms safeguards a

Source: Agency responses to our survey. Not applicable

Includes response other and may include additional responses not specified
N/ A

Other =

= Written policy or procedure

Unwritten practice No policy, procedure, or practice W

U N

= = = W

W N

W W W W

W W W

W W W

W W W W

W W W

N N

W N

W W

N N

U N

N W W W

N W W W

W W

N N

W W W

W U U W

W W W

W W W

W N W W

W W W

U N

U N

W U U U

W W W

W W W

W W W W

W W W

U U

U N

W W W W

N N

N W W W

W W

N W

W W W

W N

W N

W N N N

N N

N W W W

U U W W

W N W

N U

U U

W U U U

U U

U W

U U

U W

U W

W W W

N N

U U

W N N N

N N

N W W W

W W W W

W W W

W N

W N

W N N N

W W W

W W W

W W W W

W W W

W N

W W

W N N N

N W

N W W W

W W W W

W W W

W N/ A

N/ A N/ A

W W

N W

U U W

W W W

W W W W

W W W

N N

W U

W N N N

W W W

W W W

W W W W

W W W

W N

N U

W N N N

U W W

W U W

W W W W

W W W

N N

U U

W N N N

U W W

W N W

W W W W

W W W

N N/ A

N/ R N/ A

W N N N

N W W

W W W

W W W W

W W W

N N

U U

W N N W

N N W

W U W

W U U W

W W W

W U

U N

W N N W

W W W

W W W

W W W W

W W

N N N/ A

N/ A N/ A

W W W W

W W W

W W W

W W W W

W W W

W a These are practices that, while not specified in the criteria, reflect
the criteria.

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 42 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 43 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 44 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 45 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 46 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 47 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 48 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 49 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 50 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 51 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 52 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 53 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 54 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 55 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 56 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 57 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 58 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 59 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 60 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 61 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 62 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix V: Follow- up Survey Questionnaire Page 63 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms
Control

Appendix V: Follow- up Survey Questionnaire

Appendix V: Follow- up Survey Questionnaire Page 64 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms
Control

Appendix V: Follow- up Survey Questionnaire Page 65 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms
Control

Appendix VI: Justice and Treasury Reports on Internal Controls Over
Firearms and Other Sensitive Property

Page 66 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Table 8: Justice, Treasury, and Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration Reports on Internal Controls Over Firearms and Other
Sensitive Property Report title Report number Report issue date

Justice, Office of the Inspector General The Department of Justice*s
Control Over Weapons and Laptop Computers - Summary Report Report No. 02-
31 August 2002 The Federal Bureau of Prisons* Control Over Weapons and
Laptop Computers Report No. 02- 30 August 2002 The Drug Enforcement
Administration*s Control Over Weapons and Laptop Computers Report No. 02-
28 August 2002 The Federal Bureau of Investigation*s Control Over Weapons
and Laptop Computers Report No. 02- 27 August 2002 Immigration and
Naturalization Service Management of Property Report No. 01- 09 March 2001
The U. S. Marshals Service*s Control Over Weapons and Laptop Computers
Report No. 02- 29 August 2002

Treasury, Office of Inspector General Protecting the Public: Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms* Control Over Sensitive Property Is Adequate
OIG- 02- 097 June 19, 2002 Protecting the Public: Bureau of Engraving and
Printing*s Control Over Sensitive Property Needs To Be Improved OIG- 02-
092 May 30, 2002 Protecting the Public: U. S. Customs* Control Over
Sensitive Property Needs To Be Improved OIG- 02- 109 August 5, 2002
Protecting the Public: U. S. Mint*s control Over Sensitive Property Needs
To Be Improved OIG- 02- 094 May 30, 2002 Protecting the Public: U. S.
Secret Service*s Control Over Selected Sensitive Property Is Adequate OIG-
02- 095 June 6, 2002 Treasury, Inspector General for Tax Administration
Management Advisory Report: Follow- on Review of Lost or Stolen Sensitive

Items of Inventory at the Internal Revenue Service Reference Number: 2002-
10- 065

March 2002 Management Advisory Report: Review of Lost or Stolen Sensitive
Items of Property at the Internal Revenue Service Reference Number:

2002- 10- 030 November 2001 Source: Compiled by GAO.

Appendix VI: Justice and Treasury Reports on Internal Controls Over
Firearms and Other Sensitive Property

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
Page 67 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
Page 68 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior

Page 69 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior

Page 70 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior

Page 71 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice

Page 72 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice

Page 73 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice

Page 74 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice

Page 75 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice

Page 76 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix X: Comments from the United States Postal Service

Page 77 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix X: Comments from the United States Postal Service

Appendix X: Comments from the United States Postal Service

Page 78 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix X: Comments from the United States Postal Service

Page 79 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix X: Comments from the United States Postal Service

Page 80 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs

Page 81 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs

Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs

Page 82 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs

Page 83 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 84 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

Cathleen A. Berrick, (202) 512- 3404 Fredrick D. Berry, Miguel A. Salas,
Barbara A. Stolz, Christine F. Davis, Katherine M. Davis, Stuart M.
Kaufman, David P. Alexander, Delois N. Richardson, Daniel C. Harris, and
Miko D. Johnson made key contributions to this report. Appendix XII: GAO
Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff Acknowledgments

(440079)

The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm
of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of
the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of
public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO*s commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through the Internet. GAO*s Web site (www. gao. gov) contains abstracts
and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding
archive of older products. The Web site features a search engine to help
you locate documents using key words and phrases. You can print these
documents in their entirety, including charts and other graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as *Today*s Reports,* on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full- text document files.
To have GAO e- mail

this list to you every afternoon, go to www. gao. gov and select
*Subscribe to daily E- mail alert for newly released products* under the
GAO Reports heading.

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to: U. S. General Accounting Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D. C. 20548 To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512- 6000

TDD: (202) 512- 2537 Fax: (202) 512- 6061

Contact: Web site: www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm E- mail:
fraudnet@ gao. gov Automated answering system: (800) 424- 5454 or (202)
512- 7470 Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@ gao. gov (202) 512-
4800

U. S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.
C. 20548 GAO*s Mission Obtaining Copies of

GAO Reports and Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal
Programs Public Affairs
*** End of document. ***