    Firearms Controls: Federal Agencies Have Firearms Controls, but
    Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas (13-JUN-03, GAO-03-688).

    In March 2001, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector
    General reported that the Immigration and Naturalization Service
    could not account for over 500 of its firearms. Furthermore, in
    July 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation disclosed that 449
    of its firearms were lost or stolen. Given the possible threat
    that lost, stolen, or missing firearms poses to the public, GAO
    assessed (1) the consistency of federal agencies' firearms
    controls with federal internal control standards and related
    criteria; and (2) compliance by Justice and Treasury agencies
    with established firearms controls and improvements made to
    strengthen and enforce controls.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-688
        ACCNO:   A07105
      TITLE:     Firearms Controls: Federal Agencies Have Firearms
    Controls, but Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas
         DATE:   06/13/2003
      SUBJECT:   Federal agencies
    	     Firearms
    	     Law enforcement agencies
    	     Internal controls

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    GAO-03-688

    Report to Congressional Requesters

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

    June 2003 FIREARMS CONTROLS

    Federal Agencies Have Firearms Controls, but Could Strengthen Controls in
    Key Areas

    GAO- 03- 688

    GAO found that all 18 federal agencies reviewed, which accounted for over
    95 percent of federal officers and agents authorized to carry firearms,
    had policies and procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms that
    were consistent with federal internal control standards and related
    criteria.

    However, agencies could strengthen their controls in key areas that have
    been consistently recognized as important for effective inventory
    management. These areas include * recording and tracking firearms
    inventory data;  maintaining, controlling, and accounting for firearms
    inventories;  ensuring personal and supervisory accountability for
    firearms; and  requiring investigations, and discipline when deemed
    appropriate, for

    individuals determined not to have followed firearms accountability
    procedures.

    Although agencies established policies and procedures to control firearms,
    audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and the Treasury found that
    agencies did not always follow established procedures, or implement
    procedures, for conducting periodic inventories, reporting and
    investigating missing firearms, and securing firearms inventories. Since
    these weaknesses were identified, we found that agencies have implemented,
    or are in the process of implementing, actions to strengthen their
    firearms controls.

    In addition, 15 of the 18 federal agencies GAO reviewed reported a total
    of 1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession
    between September 30, 1998 and July 2002, further indicating the need for
    stronger controls. Of these firearms, 188 were recovered, leaving 824
    firearms still missing. While we could not determine the exact percentage
    of agency firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears
    that these firearms generally accounted for less than 1 percent of
    agencies* total firearms inventories. In independent reviews of selected
    missing firearms cases, the Departments of Justice and the Treasury
    identified instances of

    firearms recovered in connection with criminal activity or during the
    course of criminal investigations. Federal Agencies with Personnel
    Authorized to Carry Firearms Included in GAO*s Review

    Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms National Institutes of Health
    Bureau of Engraving and Printing National Park Service Drug Enforcement
    Administration U. S. Customs Service Federal Bureau of Investigation U. S.
    Fish and Wildlife Service Federal Bureau of Prisons U. S. Marshals Service
    Federal Emergency Management Agency U. S. Mint Federal Protective Service
    U. S. Postal Inspection Service Immigration and Naturalization Service U.
    S. Secret Service Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation
    Department of Veterans Affairs Source: GAO survey of agencies* data.

    In March 2001, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General
    reported that the Immigration and Naturalization Service could not account
    for over 500 of its firearms. Furthermore, in July 2001, the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation disclosed that 449 of its firearms were lost or
    stolen. Given the possible threat that lost, stolen, or missing firearms
    poses to the public, GAO assessed (1) the consistency of federal agencies*
    firearms controls with federal internal control standards and related
    criteria; and (2) compliance by Justice and Treasury agencies

    with established firearms controls and improvements made to strengthen and
    enforce controls.

    To provide better assurance that firearms are safeguarded from loss,
    theft, or misuse, Department

    officials should reassess, and modify if necessary, existing firearms
    controls based on generally accepted internal control

    standards. The agencies should also document firearms controls in agency
    policies and procedures so

    they can be consistently understood and applied. Officials generally
    agreed with GAO*s findings. Two agencies agreed with our recommendation,
    and three said they had taken

    actions consistent with the recommendation. A fourth agency expressed
    concern about GAO*s recommendation, saying its existing controls were
    effective.

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 688. To view the full report,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (212) 512- 8777 or berrickc@ gao.
    gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 688, a report to

    Congressional Requesters

    June 2003

    FIREARMS CONTROLS

    Federal Agencies Have Firearms Controls, but Could Strengthen Controls in
    Key Areas

    Page i GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control Letter 1 Results in Brief 4
    Background 6 Agencies* Policies and Procedures Were Consistent with
    Internal

    Control Standards, but Agencies Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas 8
    Audits Found Weaknesses in Firearms Controls at Justice and

    Treasury Agencies, but Improvements Are Being Made 15 Majority of Federal
    Law Enforcement Agencies Reviewed Reported Missing Firearms 22 Conclusion
    26 Recommendations 27 Agency Comments 27 Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and
    Methodology 30

    Appendix II Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
    Components 34

    Agencies Established Controls to Account for Other Weapons and Weapons
    Components 34 Agencies Reported Having Inventories of Explosives, Gas and/
    or

    Chemical Agents, and Ammunition 34 Agencies Used Inventory Counts and
    Other Methods to Control Weapons and Weapons Components 35 Appendix III
    Presence of Key Firearms Activities in Agency

    Policies and Procedures 40

    Appendix IV Survey Questionnaire 42

    Appendix V Follow- up Survey Questionnaire 63 Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control Appendix VI Justice and Treasury
    Reports on Internal Controls Over Firearms and Other Sensitive Property 66

    Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services 67

    Appendix VIII Comments from the Department of the Interior 69

    Appendix IX Comments from the Department of Justice 72

    Appendix X Comments from the United States Postal Service 77

    Appendix XI Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs 81

    Appendix XII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 84 GAO Contact 84
    Staff Acknowledgments 84 Tables

    Table 1: Most Recently Completed Firearms Inventories of Federal Law
    Enforcement Agencies Reviewed as of July 2002 3 Table 2: Reporting and
    Investigating Missing Firearms by BOP,

    DEA, FBI, INS, and USMS 17 Table 3: Firearms Reported Missing, Recovered,
    and Unaccounted for between September 30, 1998 and July 2002 at Selected
    Federal Law Enforcement Agencies 24 Table 4: Eighteen Federal Law
    Enforcement Agencies Included in Our Survey of Federal Firearms Control
    Policies, Procedures, and Practices 31

    Page iii GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Table 5: Agencies* Reported Use of Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
    Components 34 Table 6: Agencies* Reported Use of Inventory Procedures for

    Explosives, Gas and/ or Chemical Agents, and Ammunition 36 Table 7: Key
    Firearms Control Activities in Agency Policies and Procedures as Reported
    by Selected Federal Law Enforcement Agencies 40 Table 8: Justice,
    Treasury, and Treasury Inspector General for Tax

    Administration Reports on Internal Controls Over Firearms and Other
    Sensitive Property 66 Abbreviations

    ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms BEP Bureau of Engraving and
    Printing BJS Bureau of Justice Statistics BOP Bureau of Prisons DEA Drug
    Enforcement Administration FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation INS
    Immigration and Naturalization Service IRS/ CI Internal Revenue Service *
    Criminal Investigation NCIC National Crime Information Center NIH National
    Institutes of Health OIG Office of the Inspector General TIGTA Treasury
    Inspector General for Tax Administration USMS U. S. Marshals Service

    VA Department of Veterans Affairs

    This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
    copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
    materials separately from GAO*s product.

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    June 13, 2003 The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Chairman The
    Honorable John Conyers, Jr. Ranking Minority Member Committee on the
    Judiciary House of Representatives

    The Honorable John D. Dingell House of Representatives

    The Honorable Robert C. *Bobby* Scott Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee
    on Crime Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives

    The Honorable Lamar S. Smith House of Representatives

    In March 2001, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG)
    reported that over 500 firearms belonging to the U. S. Immigration and
    Naturalization Service (INS) were lost, stolen, or missing. 1 Four months
    later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) disclosed that 449 of its
    firearms were lost or stolen. 2 The loss of firearms and other weapons by
    federal law enforcement agencies may pose serious risks to the public,
    including the risk that missing firearms may be used to inflict bodily
    harm

    or to further criminal activity. 1 Of the more than 500 missing firearms,
    INS identified 497 as missing during an August 1998 agencywide inventory.
    An additional 42 firearms were subsequently identified as missing by
    Justice*s OIG during an audit of INS property management.

    2 FBI officials reported that 161 of the reported 449 lost or stolen
    weapons were nonfunctional training weapons that could not easily be
    converted to live firearms. In addition, officials said that some of the
    161 training weapons had been given to state/ local

    training institutions and were subsequently destroyed.

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    Page 2 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Given these losses, you expressed concern that federal agencies with
    personnel authorized to carry firearms may lack adequate controls for
    securing and accounting for their firearms. Accordingly, we determined

     the extent to which agencies* policies and procedures for controlling
    and safeguarding firearms were consistent with federal internal control
    standards and related criteria issued by law enforcement and management
    organizations;

     whether reviews conducted by the Departments of Justice and Treasury 3
    identified instances of noncompliance with firearms policies and
    procedures, and whether agencies took actions to correct identified
    weaknesses, particularly related to (1) conducting inventories, (2)
    investigating missing firearms, and (3) disciplining

    employees; and  the number of firearms that federal agencies identified
    as lost, stolen,

    or otherwise not in their possession between September 30, 1998 and July
    2002.

    You also requested that we determine how federal agencies maintain control
    and accountability over weapons other than firearms and associated weapons
    components. Information on these weapons and weapons components can be
    found in appendix II.

    To evaluate agencies* policies and procedures for controlling and
    safeguarding firearms, the number of missing agency firearms, and
    agencies* control over other weapons and weapons components, we reviewed
    the firearms control activities of 18 agencies with personnel authorized
    to carry firearms and make arrests 4 within the executive branch of the
    federal government. We selected these agencies from four strata:

    those with 1,000 or more law enforcement personnel, those with 500- 999
    law enforcement personnel, those with 100- 499 law enforcement

    3 When we initiated our review, INS was part of the Department of Justice;
    U. S. Customs Service, U. S. Secret Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol,
    Tobacco, and Firearms were part of the Department of the Treasury. With
    the enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, INS, U. S. Customs
    Service, and U. S. Secret Service were transferred to the Department of
    Homeland Security on March 1, 2003. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
    Firearms was transferred to the Department of Justice as of January 24,
    2003 (P. L. 107- 296).

    4 Henceforth, these agencies will be referred to as federal law
    enforcement agencies.

    Page 3 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    personnel, and those with less than 100 law enforcement personnel. 5
    Together, these agencies employed over 95 percent of approximately 80,000
    federal officers and agents authorized to make arrests and carry firearms,
    as of June 2000. Table 1 identifies the 18 federal law enforcement
    agencies we surveyed and the number of firearms reported by the agencies
    as of their most recently completed inventories, at the time of our
    survey. Table 1: Most Recently Completed Firearms Inventories of Federal
    Law

    Enforcement Agencies Reviewed as of July 2002 Agency

    Date of completed firearms inventory as of July 2002

    Number of firearms inventoried a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
    January 2002 21,125

    Bureau of Engraving and Printing June 2002 527 Drug Enforcement
    Administration September 2001 14,921 Federal Bureau of Investigation
    January 2002 49,600 Federal Bureau of Prisons April 2002 19,023 Federal
    Emergency Management Agency June 2001 188 Federal Protective Service
    December 2001 1,806 Immigration and Naturalization Service August 2001
    54,930 Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation September 2001
    5,467 National Institutes of Health June 2002 263 National Park Service
    September 2001 10,718 U. S. Customs Service April 2002 24,751 U. S. Fish
    and Wildlife Service September 2001 5,234 U. S. Marshals Service October
    2001 14,495 U. S. Mint October 2001 1,026 U. S. Postal Inspection Service
    December 2002 b 6,228 U. S. Secret Service December 2001 9,396 Department
    of Veterans Affairs March 2003 c 3,319

    Total 243,017

    Source: GAO survey of agencies. a Data were not independently verified.

    b The U. S. Postal Inspection Service provided information as of December
    2002. c The Department of Veterans Affairs does not have a centralized
    inventory, but maintains inventory records at its more than 100
    facilities. For our review, officials calculated its total firearms
    inventory as of March 2003.

    5 We selected all 11 agencies in the 1,000 or more stratum, the 2 largest
    in each of the 3 remaining strata, and 1 additional Treasury agency to
    account for all Justice and Treasury law enforcement agencies.

    Page 4 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    We surveyed the 18 agencies to determine their policies and procedures for
    controlling and safeguarding firearms inventories, and the numbers of
    firearms lost, stolen, or not in their possession, and subsequently
    recovered, between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. We also reviewed
    agency policies and procedures, federal internal control standards, and
    other criteria for controlling inventories to determine whether agencies*
    policies and procedures for safeguarding firearms were consistent with
    established criteria.

    To determine whether the Departments of Justice and the Treasury
    identified instances of noncompliance with firearms policies and
    procedures and have taken action to correct identified weaknesses, we
    reviewed the results of audits conducted by these departments of their
    respective agencies* firearms control practices. We also interviewed
    agency officials and obtained documentation identifying corrective action
    taken in response to departmental reviews. Appendix I contains detailed
    information on the scope and methodology we used during our review.

    All 18 of the federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed had policies
    and procedures designed to control and safeguard firearms that were
    generally consistent with federal internal control standards and related
    criteria. These controls addressed (1) recording and tracking of firearms
    inventory data; (2) maintaining, controlling, and accounting for firearms

    inventories; (3) personal and supervisory accountability for firearms; and
    (4) investigations, and discipline when deemed appropriate, for
    individuals determined not to have followed firearms accountability
    procedures.

    Although agencies had policies and procedures to control and safeguard
    firearms, agencies could strengthen their controls in some of these areas.
    In addition, agencies did not always document these controls in their
    policies and procedures.

    Audits conducted by Justice*s and Treasury*s OIGs and the Treasury
    Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) found weaknesses in
    agency procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms. Specifically,
    they found that some agencies did not conduct periodic firearms
    inventories or report and investigate instances of missing firearms, as
    required by their policies and procedures. However, the OIGs and TIGTA
    found that agencies generally disciplined employees who did not
    appropriately control their firearms or report missing firearms. In
    response to these audits, agencies have taken, or are in the process of
    taking, action to correct all identified weaknesses. Results in Brief

    Page 5 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Although agencies generally established policies and procedures to control
    and safeguard firearms, 15 of the 18 we reviewed reported a total of 1,012
    firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession at some
    point in time between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. Of these firearms,
    188 were recovered during the same time period, leaving 824 firearms still
    missing. While we could not determine the exact percentage of agency
    firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears that
    these firearms generally accounted for less than 1 percent of agencies*
    total firearms inventories. 6 Agencies reported that some losses

    occurred despite employees taking appropriate precautions, and some
    missing firearms did not pose a threat to the public. However, audits
    conducted by Justice*s and Treasury*s OIGs identified instances in which
    firearms were recovered in connection with criminal activity or during a
    criminal investigation.

    In order to assist federal law enforcement agencies in more effectively
    securing firearms, we are recommending that agencies strengthen their
    policies and procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms
    inventories in the key control areas consistently recognized as important
    for effective inventory management and document those controls in agency
    policies and procedures.

    We requested and received comments on a draft of this report from the
    Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of the Interior,
    Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security, the
    Director of the National Institutes of Health (Department of Health and
    Human Services), and the Postmaster General. Officials generally agreed

    with the information presented and suggested technical changes that have
    been incorporated where appropriate. The National Institutes of Health,
    Fish and Wildlife Service (Department of the Interior), U. S. Postal
    Inspection Service, and Department of Veterans Affairs commented on the
    recommendation. The National Institutes of Health and the Fish and
    Wildlife Service agreed with the recommendation and identified actions
    they have taken to strengthen firearms controls. The U. S. Postal
    Inspection Service also identified changes it has made, or is making, to
    its policies and procedures to strengthen its controls over firearms,
    consistent with our recommendation.

    6 Since the firearms inventory and missing firearms data were developed
    from different bases, such as inventory counts or internal agency
    reporting systems, and are based on different time periods, they are not
    directly comparable.

    Page 6 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) expressed concerned about our
    recommendation, saying that its controls were effective in preventing
    firearms losses, as evidenced by its not having any missing firearms
    during the time period of our review. Although the department did not
    report missing firearms during this time period, the potential exists that
    firearms could be lost or stolen at some point in the future. Accordingly,
    we believe that the department as well as other agencies we reviewed
    should periodically assess their firearms controls, particularly when
    their organization or operations have changed or when firearms have been
    identified as missing, to determine whether their controls have been
    effective or should be modified.

    Written comments that we received from the Departments of the Interior,
    Justice, and Veterans Affairs; the National Institutes of Health; and the
    U. S. Postal Service are included in appendixes VII through XI. In 1982,
    Congress enacted the Federal Managers* Financial Integrity Act 7 requiring
    executive agencies to establish and maintain controls that, among other
    things, provide reasonable assurance that assets are safeguarded against
    waste, loss, unauthorized use, and misappropriation. The act also mandated
    that GAO*s internal control standards 8 serve as the framework for
    agencies to use in establishing and maintaining their

    internal control systems. Among other things, GAO*s internal control
    standards require agencies to establish physical controls to secure and
    safeguard vulnerable assets such as cash, securities, inventories, and

    equipment, which might be vulnerable to loss or unauthorized use. In March
    2002, GAO published a supplemental guide for inventory controls, 9 which
    summarized fundamental principles that have been successfully

    implemented by seven private sector firms noted for outstanding inventory
    management. GAO internal control standards provide that in establishing
    internal controls, agencies should assess the risks associated with asset
    losses and establish control activities to help ensure those risks are
    addressed. The

    7 31 U. S. C. 3512. 8 U. S. General Accounting Office, Standards for
    Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/ AIMD- 00- 21. 3.1
    (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 1999). 9 U. S. General Accounting Office,
    Executive Guide: Best Practices in Achieving Consistent, Accurate Physical
    Counts of Inventory and Related Property, GAO- 02- 447G (Washington, D.
    C.: Mar. 2002). Background

    Page 7 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    standards further require that agencies document and monitor control
    activities to ensure they are appropriately implemented and are effective
    in addressing risk inherent in agency operations.

    In addition to the Federal Managers* Financial Integrity Act and GAO
    standards, two other organizations issued advisory criteria addressing
    inventory controls. In June 1995, the Joint Financial Management
    Improvement Program issued advisory criteria for implementing and
    maintaining inventory systems. 10 The criteria addressed management*s
    responsibility to provide guidelines for developing, documenting, and
    implementing physical controls to safeguard and provide accountability for
    inventory items. Furthermore, in August 1983, the Commission on
    Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., an independent
    accrediting authority for law enforcement agencies, 11 published
    accreditation standards to include procedures for inventory and property
    control.

    10 The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program is a financial
    management improvement program involving the Department of the Treasury,
    Office of Management and Budget, Office of Personnel Management, GAO, and
    other agencies under the statutory authority of the Budget and Accounting
    Procedures Act of 1950 [see 31 U. S. C. 3511 (d)]. The purpose of the
    program is to promote the efficient management of assets and provide
    useful financial information on federal government operations.

    11 The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., was
    established as an independent accrediting authority in 1979 by four major
    law enforcement membership associations: International Association of
    Chiefs of Police, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement
    Executives, National Sheriffs* Association, and Police Executive Research
    Forum. The purpose of the accreditation program is to improve law
    enforcement operations by developing standards addressing a wide range of
    law

    enforcement topics.

    Page 8 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    All 18 of the federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed had policies
    and procedures designed to control and safeguard firearms, one of the
    first steps in developing and implementing an effective system of internal
    control. These controls were generally consistent with federal internal
    control standards and related criteria issued by law enforcement and
    management organizations. However, agencies could strengthen controls in
    key areas consistently identified as important for effective inventory
    management. Strengthening controls could assist agencies in ensuring their
    firearms are secured from loss, theft, or unauthorized use.

    In order to assess the consistency of selected agencies* policies and
    procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms with established
    criteria, we reviewed federal and other internal control standards
    designed to help ensure that assets, including firearms, are protected
    against damage, loss, theft, and unauthorized use. The criteria included
    GAO*s internal control standards and supplemental inventory guidelines,
    advisory criteria issued by the Joint Financial Management Improvement
    Program for maintaining inventory systems, and accreditation standards for

    inventory and property control issued by the Commission on Accreditation
    for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. Our analysis of federal internal
    control standards and other related criteria

    found four key areas that were consistently identified as important for
    effective inventory management. These four areas include (1) recording
    firearms inventory data in property management records and systems
    (inventory data); (2) controlling and safeguarding firearms inventories
    (inventory control); (3) assigning responsibility for safeguarding
    firearms and overseeing the conducting of firearms inventories (personal
    and supervisory accountability); and (4) investigating missing firearms
    and considering employee discipline when requirements for maintaining and
    controlling firearms are not met (investigations and discipline).

    Within each of these four areas, federal internal control standards and
    related criteria identify specific controls designed to assist agencies in
    controlling and safeguarding their firearms inventories. For example, in
    the area of inventory control, the standards and criteria recommend that
    agencies (1) have written policies and procedures for issuing agency
    firearms to individuals, organizational units, and functional areas;

    (2) conduct periodic inventory counts of firearms; (3) use occasions other
    Agencies* Policies and

    Procedures Were Consistent with Internal Control Standards, but Agencies
    Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas

    Federal Standards and Other Criteria Provide Guidance for Controlling and
    Safeguarding Firearms

    Page 9 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    than periodic inventories to confirm employees* possession of assigned
    firearms; and (4) limit access to secured firearms storage areas and
    facilities to authorized personnel.

    We compared agency policies and procedures for maintaining firearms with
    controls identified in federal internal control standards and related
    criteria for each of the four key control areas. Appendix III identifies,
    for each agency reviewed, whether the agency established policies and
    procedures addressing specific controls recommended by GAO and other
    management organizations within each of the four areas.

    We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established controls to
    record and update firearms inventory data in agency property records and
    property management systems, consistent with standards issued by GAO and
    other management organizations. Specifically, we determined whether
    agencies had written policies and procedures requiring the update of
    property records and systems (1) upon their receipt of new firearms, (2)
    as a result of discrepancies identified during periodic firearms
    inventories, and (3) upon the removal of firearms from agency inventories.

    The recording and update of firearms inventory data is an important
    component of maintaining and controlling agency firearms. Data on
    activities that monitor the receipt and removal of firearms from
    inventory, as well as discrepancies found during periodic inventories, are
    needed to

    ensure management has adequate oversight over agency firearms. The absence
    of these controls could result in management being unaware of the number
    and location of firearms they have on- hand, and could result in a lack of
    appropriate oversight over these assets.

    The majority of agencies we reviewed usually required in their policies
    and procedures the recording and update of firearms inventory data.
    Specifically, 16 of the 18 agencies required that the date of receipt and
    the specific identification of the firearm, as well as the person and unit
    to which the firearm was assigned, be reported in property management
    records as new firearms are received. In addition, 17 of the 18 agencies
    required that adjustments be made to firearms inventory records as a
    result of discrepancies identified during physical inventory counts.
    Sixteen agencies also required the update of property management records
    upon the removal of firearms from agency inventories. Inventory Data*
    Agencies Required the Recording

    and Update of Firearms Data

    Page 10 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    In the area of inventory control, we surveyed agencies to determine
    whether they established written policies and procedures, consistent with
    federal internal control standards and related criteria, addressing the
    (1) issuance of agency firearms to individuals, organizational units, and
    functional areas; (2) conducting of periodic inventory counts of firearms
    and the manner in which inventories should be conducted; and (3) use of
    occasions other than periodic inventories to confirm employees* possession
    of assigned firearms. We also surveyed agencies to determine whether they
    (4) limited access to secured firearms storage areas and facilities to
    authorized personnel.

    The issuance of firearms, periodic checks of firearms on- hand, and
    limited access to firearms storage areas are important in ensuring that
    agencies appropriately safeguard their firearms. Agencies often learn of
    missing or stolen firearms when conducting periodic inventories, or when
    they use occasions other than inventories to confirm employee*s possession
    of firearms. Without these controls, management may not be alerted when
    firearms are not appropriately maintained, or when stored firearms are not
    adequately protected from loss, theft, or unauthorized use.

    The agencies we reviewed generally established written policies and
    procedures for issuing firearms and conducting firearms inventories, but
    could strengthen other inventory controls. Specifically, agencies
    generally had written policies and procedures addressing the issuance of
    agency

    firearms to individuals (18 out of 18) and organizational units (16 out of
    16 that reported the control applicable). In addition, all 18 agencies
    required the conducting of periodic inventory counts of firearms, and 15
    of these agencies required that the objectives, timing, and instructions
    for the counts be established. However, only 11 of the 18 agencies
    required that persons assigned responsibility for conducting inventories
    be trained in

    inventory counting procedures. In addition, 15 of the 18 agencies required
    counters to verify firearm ID numbers and descriptive information about
    the firearm during inventory counts. However, 9 agencies did not preclude
    individuals from counting firearms if they had firearms custodial
    responsibilities. Furthermore, only 2 of these 9 agencies established
    compensating procedures such as using count teams of 2 or more members, or
    ensuring that counters have no prior knowledge of the firearms inventory
    being counted.

    Agencies also varied in using occasions other than inventories to verify
    employees* possession of an assigned firearm and limiting access to
    secured firearms storage areas. Fifteen of the 18 agencies surveyed
    Inventory Control*

    Agencies Required the Recording of Firearms Data and Periodic Inventories,
    but Could Strengthen Other Controls

    Page 11 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    confirmed an employee*s possession of an assigned firearm during firearms
    retraining or retesting. However, only 8 of the 18 agencies required
    unannounced inspections to verify employees* possession of assigned
    firearms. In addition, of the 15 agencies that reported this control
    applicable, only 7 required limited access to firearms storage areas and
    facilities.

    We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established policies and
    procedures, consistent with federal internal control standards and related
    criteria, requiring individuals to (1) safeguard assigned firearms from
    damage, loss, theft, and unauthorized use, and (2) store firearms in lock

    boxes or secure gun cases, or use trigger locks. We also surveyed agencies
    to determine whether (3) job descriptions included requirements for
    conducting inventories, (4) individual performance in conducting
    inventories is assessed during performance evaluations, and (5) whether
    supervisory oversight is provided over periodic firearms inventories.

    Internal controls addressing an individual*s responsibility in maintaining
    assigned firearms, and a supervisor*s responsibility in overseeing the
    control of those firearms, are needed to help ensure firearms policies are
    adhered to and firearms are appropriately secured. In order to be
    accountable for safeguarding firearms, employees and supervisors must be
    made aware of their responsibilities related to firearms control. The lack

    of these controls could make responsibilities related to firearms control
    unclear and result in difficulties in holding appropriate individuals
    accountable for failing to follow established procedures.

    The agencies we reviewed generally established written policies and
    procedures requiring individuals to safeguard assigned firearms, but could
    strengthen controls for conducting and overseeing firearms inventories.
    Specifically, 17 of the 18 agencies had policies and procedures requiring
    individuals to safeguard assigned firearms from damage, theft, loss, and
    unauthorized use. In addition, all 18 agencies required that firearms be
    secured in lock boxes or secured gun cases or that trigger locks be used.
    However, only 12 agencies assigned responsibility for conducting firearms
    inventories in job descriptions, and only 7 agencies assessed individuals*
    performance in conducting firearms inventories during performance
    evaluations. In addition, only 11 of the 18 agencies required that
    supervisors oversee periodic firearms inventories. Personal and
    Supervisory

    Accountability* Agencies Required that Firearms Be Safeguarded, but Could
    Strengthen Other Controls

    Page 12 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established written
    policies and procedures, in accordance with federal internal controls
    standards and related criteria, to ensure that instances of missing
    firearms are investigated, and employees are appropriately disciplined for
    not safeguarding firearms or reporting missing firearms. Specifically, we
    determined whether agencies had policies and procedures requiring that (1)
    missing firearms be investigated, (2) investigations of missing firearms
    be conducted by an independent body, (3) missing firearms be reported to
    the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), 12 (4) disciplinary action
    be

    taken for failing to report missing firearms, and (5) disciplinary action
    be taken for failing to properly safeguard assigned firearms. Federal
    internal control standards and related criteria provide that agencies
    should have the ability to investigate instances of missing firearms and
    consider appropriate disciplinary action to enforce compliance with
    firearms controls. Instances of missing firearms should be investigated to
    identify the reasons the firearms were missing and to provide management
    with information to implement any corrective actions needed. In addition,
    procedures requiring the discipline of

    individuals who did not appropriately secure their firearm or report a
    missing firearm could act as a deterrent to others in failing to adhere to
    these controls.

    The agencies we reviewed generally had written policies and procedures
    requiring that incidents of missing or stolen firearms be appropriately
    investigated and reported. Specifically, all 18 agencies required that
    physical count discrepancies of firearms be investigated, and 17 agencies
    required that written instructions for investigating such discrepancies be
    developed. In addition, 15 agencies had written policies and procedures
    requiring that an independent body conduct the investigations, and 15
    agencies required that missing firearms be reported to the NCIC.

    Agencies also generally required disciplinary action for employees failing
    to report missing firearms and for not adhering to firearms accountability
    procedures. Fifteen of the 18 agencies required that disciplinary action
    be taken for employees failing to report missing firearms. In addition,

    14 agencies required disciplinary action for employees failing to
    appropriately safeguard their firearms.

    12 NCIC, located in the FBI, provides a computerized database for ready
    access by authorized users to criminal justice information, including
    information on stolen firearms. Investigations and Discipline* Agencies

    Required Investigations of Missing Firearms and Discipline When Deemed
    Appropriate

    Page 13 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Agencies did not always document their controls for maintaining and
    controlling firearms inventories in policies and procedures. Standards for
    Internal Control in the Federal Government issued by GAO require that
    internal control activities be clearly documented in management
    directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals. Although we
    found that agencies documented most of the firearms controls reviewed, 16
    of the 18 agencies reported implementing some firearms controls as a
    matter of practice, without documenting the controls in their policies and
    procedures. Only the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and
    INS reported documenting in their policies and procedures all of the
    controls we reviewed.

    Appendix III identifies, for the four areas reviewed, whether agencies
    relied on control activities that were not documented in their policies
    and procedures. In the area of inventory data, for example, 1 agency
    reported

    updating property management records and systems to identify out-
    ofservice and disposed of firearms, but did not include this requirement
    in its policies and procedures. Another agency reported adjusting
    inventory records as a result of physical inventories, but did not require
    this in its

    policies and procedures. In the inventory control area, 13 of the 18
    agencies surveyed reported conducting some aspect of inventory control
    that was not required by their policies and procedures. For example, 9
    agencies reported taking measures to ensure the integrity of firearms
    counts, and 9 agencies reported limiting access to secured firearms
    storage areas, but did not include these controls in their policies and
    procedures.

    Agencies also reported following unwritten practices to hold individuals
    accountable for firearms inventories and to help ensure that inventories
    are properly performed. For example, 5 agencies reported assessing
    individuals* participation in inventories during performance evaluations,
    and 2 agencies reported providing supervisory oversight of firearms
    inventories, without including these requirements in their policies and
    procedures.

    Regarding the investigation of missing firearms and associated employee
    discipline, 2 agencies reported requiring that an independent body
    investigate missing firearms, but did not include this requirement in
    their policies and procedures. In another example, 3 agencies reported
    that while employees who fail to safeguard their firearms are subject to
    disciplinary action, disciplinary action was not required by the agencies*
    policies and procedures. Agencies Did Not Always

    Document Firearms Controls in Policies and Procedures

    Page 14 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Controls that are not included in policies and procedures may not be
    consistently applied throughout the agency and may not be effective in
    helping ensure that firearms are appropriately controlled and safeguarded.
    Without documented controls, individuals may not know the controls are

    required, and management may not be able to enforce their use. Agencies
    that rely on unwritten practices to protect their firearms run the risk
    that those controls may not be followed, and their firearms may not be
    appropriately secured.

    The key control areas identified in federal internal control standards and
    other criteria* inventory data, inventory control, personal and
    supervisory accountability, and investigations and discipline* provide a
    framework to assist agencies in building their systems of firearms
    controls. However, internal control guidance recommends that agencies
    tailor these controls to reflect their unique needs and circumstances, as
    well as their relative risks for firearms losses. Agency management is
    ultimately responsible for

    implementing the combination of controls deemed reasonable to effectively
    control and safeguard their firearms, based on agency needs. Firearms
    control needs may vary depending on an agency*s operations and

    structure. For example, law enforcement employees at the Bureau of
    Engraving and Printing (BEP) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
    generally secure fixed buildings and store their firearms in one or few
    central locations when they are off- duty. Conversely, employees at the
    FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and INS conduct investigations
    nationwide and generally keep their firearms with them at all times. As a
    result, BEP and NIH may require different methods for conducting firearms
    inventories than may be needed at the FBI, DEA, and INS. In addition, the
    FBI, DEA, and INS may wish to use other occasions to check an employee*s
    possession of an assigned firearm, along with annual inventories, such as
    unannounced inspections and checks during

    retraining or testing in firearms use. Key Controls Provide

    Framework for Controlling and Safeguarding Firearms, but Appropriate Mix
    of Controls Should be Based on Agency Needs

    Page 15 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and Treasury OIGs and TIGTA
    found that agencies did not always comply with agency policies and
    procedures for maintaining and controlling firearms inventories or
    establish needed controls. Specifically, the audits found that some
    agencies did not conduct periodic inventories of firearms or report and
    investigate instances of missing firearms, as required. However, the
    audits found that agencies generally disciplined employees who did not
    appropriately control their firearms or report missing firearms. Although
    these weaknesses were found, agencies have taken, or are in the process of
    taking, actions to improve their controls over firearms inventories. See
    appendix VI for a detailed listing of audits conducted by the OIGs and
    TIGTA of their agencies* controls over firearms.

    The Department of Justice*s OIG reviewed the firearms control activities
    of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), DEA, U. S. Marshals Service (USMS), FBI,
    and INS from March 1999 through March 2002, 13 to assess the effectiveness
    of agencies* controls over firearms and to determine what actions were
    taken by the agencies in response to the identification of lost or stolen
    firearms. The OIG reported that some agencies did not always conduct
    periodic physical inventories of firearms or investigate instances of
    missing firearms, but generally disciplined employees who did not report
    or control missing firearms as required by their policies and procedures.
    In addition, the OIG found that employees did not always report missing

    firearms or follow established procedures for storing firearms in vehicles
    or retrieving firearms from separating employees.

    Justice*s OIG found that FBI, DEA, and INS did not conduct periodic
    physical inventories of firearms as required by their policies and
    procedures. The FBI required that periodic inventories be conducted every
    2 years, while the DEA and INS required annual physical inventories of
    firearms. 14 Despite these requirements, the OIG found that until it began
    its review in 2001, FBI had not completed a firearms inventory since prior
    to 1993. In addition, the OIG found that DEA and INS did not properly

    13 The BOP, DEA, and USMS audits identify firearms that were missing
    between October 1999 and August 2001. The FBI audit identifies firearms
    that were missing between October 1, 1999 and January 21, 2002. The INS
    audit identifies firearms that were determined missing during an
    agencywide inventory of firearms conducted in August 1998, therefore,
    reflecting losses over an extended period.

    14 Prior to 1998, INS required that firearms inventories be conducted
    every 2 years. Audits Found

    Weaknesses in Firearms Controls at Justice and Treasury Agencies, but
    Improvements Are Being Made

    Justice*s OIG Found that Agencies Did Not Always Control and Maintain
    Firearms as Required

    Justice Agencies Did Not Always Conduct Periodic Firearms Inventories

    Page 16 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    conduct or document past inventories, including not inventorying all
    firearms. For example, INS had not completed inventories in accordance
    with its policies and procedures, including tracking inventory adjustments
    and confirming that that appropriate property was inventoried. The OIG
    found that BOP and USMS were generally current in conducting firearms
    inventories. According to the OIG, FBI and DEA officials stated that they
    had not

    conducted or completed required inventories for a variety of reasons,
    including not having the required funds to conduct the inventories and
    relying on other methods to verify inventories. 15 For example, FBI
    officials said that they did not conduct all required inventories due to
    budgetary and equipment limitations and due to the reassignment of
    personnel who had conducted inventories in the past. At DEA, officials
    stated that they relied on the physical check of assigned firearms during
    agents* annual firearms qualifications as a substitute for the required
    annual inventories. Despite this reliance, however, DEA still reported
    firearms as lost or stolen from its inventories.

    While BOP and DEA initiated investigations of all missing firearms, FBI
    and INS did not always initiate investigations, as required by agency
    policies and procedures, or could not provide documentation that

    investigations were conducted. Justice requires that component agencies
    investigate instances of missing property, including firearms, and grants
    agencies the authority to discipline employees determined not to have
    followed property control procedures. However, the OIG determined that 29
    of 74 missing firearms incidents at the INS between January 1996 and
    September 1999 were not investigated. In addition, the OIG could not find
    evidence that the FBI investigated 141 of 212 missing firearms incidents

    reported for the period October 1999 through January 2002. Although the
    OIG found that investigations of missing firearms were not always
    initiated, they found that investigations of missing firearms usually
    resulted in employees found responsible for the loss being disciplined. 16
    15 The OIG did not report the reasons why INS had not conducted
    inventories in accordance with its policies and procedures. 16 The OIG
    reported that BOP did not recommend disciplinary action for the two
    missing

    firearms cases the OIG reviewed, but did not identify whether the BOP
    should have recommended disciplinary action for those cases. For the 12
    USMS cases reviewed, the OIG found that no disciplinary action was taken
    because USMS did not find employee

    negligence. The OIG*s review of INS, undertaken during a different time
    period, did not address the issue of disciplining employees who lost
    firearms. Justice Agencies Did Not

    Always Investigate Missing Firearms, but Generally Disciplined Responsible
    Employees

    Page 17 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    For example, at the DEA, 10 of 15 missing firearms cases reviewed for the
    period October 1999 through August 2001 resulted in disciplinary action,
    including letters of reprimand and recommendations for suspensions

    without pay. In another example, the OIG concluded that 37 of 70
    investigations of missing property (firearms 17 and laptops) at the FBI
    from October 1999 through January 2002, resulted in recommendations for
    disciplinary action, including letters of censure and suspensions without
    pay.

    Justice*s OIG found that agencies did not always report, or report in a
    timely manner, missing firearms internally or to the NCIC. The OIG further
    found that some agencies did not always follow established procedures for
    storing firearms in vehicles or retrieving firearms from separating
    employees. Table 2 identifies the average time taken for employees to
    report missing firearms within their agency and the number of missing
    firearms reported to the NCIC.

    Table 2: Reporting and Investigating Missing Firearms by BOP, DEA, FBI,
    INS, and USMS

    Agency Average time taken to

    report firearms losses internally after discovery Number of missing
    firearms

    not reported to NCIC

    BOP 0.5 days Reporting not required a DEA 15 days 3 of 16 FBI 4.3 years 14
    of 276 INS NA b 394 of 539 USMS 7 days 2 of 6 c Source: GAO analysis of
    Justice data. a BOP did not require the reporting of missing firearms to
    NCIC.

    b The OIG*s data regarding the timing of reported firearms losses within
    INS were not comparable to data obtained from the other components. c
    According to the OIG, USMS identified that the two firearms had not been
    reported to NCIC because both were destroyed and were, therefore,
    accounted for.

    The OIG found that the average timeframe for employees reporting missing
    firearms within their agency ranged from the same day at the BOP 17 The
    OIG did not report how many of the 70 investigations at the FBI were of
    missing

    agency firearms. Justice Agencies Did Not

    Always Report Missing Firearms or Secure and Retrieve Firearms

    Page 18 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    to 4.3 years at the FBI. 18 While the USMS required the immediate
    reporting of missing firearms, and DEA required reporting within 48 hours,
    the FBI and BOP did not include a timetable for reporting missing firearms
    in their policies and procedures. The OIG attributed delays for reporting
    missing firearms at the FBI to the absence of a required timetable for
    reporting missing firearms, but concluded that the BOP generally reported
    missing firearms in a timely manner due to firearms being stored in a
    central location. The OIG could not determine whether USMS experienced
    delays in reporting missing firearms because agency loss reports did not
    identify the date the loss was discovered. The OIG found reporting delays
    of 1 to 89 days in 11 of the 16 DEA lost firearms cases examined, but did
    not identify the reasons for these delays.

    The OIG also found that the agencies had inconsistent practices for
    reporting missing firearms to the NCIC. The OIG discovered that all
    agencies reviewed, with the exception of BOP, 19 had policies and
    procedures requiring that missing firearms be reported to NCIC. However,
    the OIG found that FBI, DEA, and INS had not reported from 2 to more than
    300 of their missing firearms to the NCIC, and that only USMS had reported
    all missing firearms. 20 Reporting missing firearms to NCIC would assist
    agencies in retrieving lost or stolen firearms recovered by the law
    enforcement community, since the NCIC system is generally regarded by law
    enforcement agencies as the primary nationwide method for tracking

    stolen firearms. In addition, Justice*s OIG found that some agencies did
    not always follow established procedures for storing firearms in vehicles
    or retrieving firearms from separating employees. Specifically, the OIG
    found that 4 of 16 firearms losses at DEA, for the period October 1999
    through September

    18 Justice commented that while local officials completed internal
    notification on a timely basis, the notifications of lost firearms were
    not always forwarded to the National Firearms Program or Property
    Management Units until such time as the weapons were called for
    destruction. The failure to report losses or thefts to the National
    Firearms Program

    resulted in the OIG determining a higher average reporting time. 19 BOP
    officials said that they are in the process of revising their policies to
    require the immediate reporting of all lost, stolen, or missing firearms
    to the NCIC.

    20 Justice said that prior to 2000, NCIC only had a category for stolen
    firearms, not lost or missing firearms, resulting in some lost or missing
    firearms not being reported. Additionally, officials reported that some
    firearms that the OIG identified as not being entered into NCIC were
    entered, but subsequently deleted, because the information was not updated
    after a certain time period.

    Page 19 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    15, 2001, occurred as a result of vehicle thefts. In some cases, the
    employees stored their firearms in unattended vehicles, despite internal
    policies prohibiting this practice. At FBI, the OIG found that some of the
    52 21 firearms stolen from FBI or privately owned vehicles, during the
    period October 1999 through January 2002, were due to firearms not being
    properly secured in vehicles. In addition, 3 of the 6 firearms losses at
    USMS were due to thefts from vehicles. 22 Both FBI and USMS allowed the
    storage of firearms in vehicles either temporarily (FBI) or indefinitely
    (USMS), as long as the vehicle was secured and the firearm was placed in a
    locked container.

    The OIG also found weaknesses in the agencies* use of accountable property
    checklists designed to retrieve property from separating employees,
    sometimes resulting in instances of firearms not being retrieved.
    Department of Justice policies require that each agency develop, maintain,
    and distribute an accountable property checklist for employees to complete
    prior to separating from the department to help facilitate the return of
    agency property, including firearms. Despite this requirement, the OIG
    found weakness in the use of these checklists at all of the agencies
    reviewed, including (1) failure to enforce the use of the checklist; (2)
    lack of relevant accountable signatures; and (3) failure to include key
    identifying information, such as the firearm*s serial number. As a result,
    firearms were not always retrieved from separating employees. For example,
    the OIG reported that in 2001, FBI found that at least 31 firearms of
    separated employees could not be accounted for.

    21 The OIG did not report how many of the 52 cases (out of total of the
    212 missing firearms cases reviewed) of FBI firearms stolen from vehicles
    were the result of the firearms not being properly stored.

    22 The loss of two BOP firearms for the period October 1999 through
    February 2002 were determined to have not been lost or stolen from
    employees vehicles. BOP stated that while these missing firearms were not
    reported to NCIC, they were reported to the agency and were investigated.
    The investigations found that the airlines lost one weapon from checked
    baggage and the second was discovered missing after the transfer of
    several weapons by mail between facilities. In addition, the OIG did not
    report firearms losses from vehicles at INS.

    Page 20 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Treasury*s OIG and TIGTA reviewed the firearms control activities of the
    ATF, U. S. Customs Service, U. S. Secret Service, BEP, the U. S. Mint, and
    Internal Revenue Service/ Criminal Investigation (IRS/ CI) for fiscal
    years 1999 through 2001. The purpose of these reviews was to determine
    whether the agencies* inventory practices were sufficient for controlling
    items that, if lost or stolen, might compromise the public*s safety,
    national security, or ongoing criminal investigations. The OIG and TIGTA
    concluded that the agencies generally conducted periodic firearms
    inventories; investigated instances of missing firearms; and disciplined
    employees for not maintaining firearms as required by agency policies and
    procedures. However, the OIG determined that the U. S. Mint did not follow
    all policies and procedures related to conducting periodic inventories or
    identify its firearms from its property management records. In addition,
    TIGTA determined that IRS/ CI did not appropriately record and report
    missing firearms data.

    Treasury*s OIG and TIGTA found that the agencies reviewed, with the
    exception of the U. S. Mint, conducted periodic inventories at least
    annually, as required by their internal policies and procedures. For
    example, at ATF, the OIG concluded that frequent, independent physical
    inventories reduced the risk that weapons would be lost or stolen without
    being promptly detected. At IRS/ CI, TIGTA found that property inventories
    were conducted locally on an annual basis and in accordance with
    established policies and procedures. However, the OIG determined that the
    U. S. Mint had not conducted a complete annual physical inventory of
    firearms during fiscal years 1999, 2000, or 2001, and the firearms
    inventory completed in October 2001 was not conducted in accordance with
    agency policies and procedures.

    In addition, Treasury found that ATF, U. S. Customs Service, Secret
    Service, and IRS/ CI investigated instances of firearms losses and
    appropriately considered employee discipline, as required by agency
    policies and procedures. 23 For example, the OIG determined that ATF*s
    Professional Review Board investigated 15 of 16 instances of missing
    firearms identified during the period October 1, 1998 through September
    30, 2001, and appropriately considered employee discipline in each of
    those cases. The board recommended employee suspensions in 9 of the

    23 Treasury*s OIG determined that the U. S. Mint and BEP did not have any
    firearms losses for the periods October 1, 1998 through September 30,
    2001. Treasury*s OIG and TIGTA

    Found Agencies Safeguarded Firearms, but Could Strengthen and Enforce
    Controls in Some Areas

    Treasury Agencies Generally Conducted Firearms Inventories, Investigated
    Missing Firearms, and Disciplined Employees

    Page 21 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    cases and no disciplinary action in 3 of the cases. The remaining 3 cases
    were still under investigation at the completion of the OIG*s review.

    The OIG also determined that the U. S. Customs Service*s Board of Survey,
    the unit responsible for investigating missing firearms, investigated all
    72 missing firearms identified during the period October 1, 1998 through
    September 30, 2001. The OIG determined that employees were held
    financially responsible for losses in 26 of the cases and not financially
    responsible in 37 of the cases. The remaining 7 cases were still under
    investigation at the completion of the OIG*s review.

    The OIG determined that the U. S. Mint could not provide a listing of
    firearms from its property management records to support reported firearms
    inventories, as required by their policies and procedures. The OIG
    concluded that without this list it would not be possible to reconcile the
    firearms that were on- hand against recorded inventory counts, resulting
    in the possibility that missing firearms might not be identified. The OIG
    concluded that these and other factors, including the number and storage
    of its firearms at several locations, increased the Mint*s risk of lost or
    stolen firearms.

    TIGTA reported that it could not determine the number of IRS/ CI missing
    firearms from its management information system and that the hard copy
    reports of IRS/ CI missing firearms were not always prepared or completed.
    Specifically, TIGTA found that IRS/ CI*s inventory management

    system did not differentiate between lost or stolen firearms and, as a
    result, TIGTA could not rely on that system to identify IRS/ CI missing
    firearms inventories accurately. Although TIGTA was able to review and
    comment on hard copy reports from IRS/ CI field offices in order to
    identify missing firearms, TIGTA found that some of these reports were not
    completely prepared.

    Justice and Treasury agencies have taken many actions designed to
    strengthen and enforce firearms controls, based on recommendations made by
    the OIGs and TIGTA. Specifically, in reports issued in March 2001 and
    August 2002, Justice*s OIG made a total of 63 recommendations to INS, BOP,
    DEA, FBI, and USMS designed to improve firearms control activities.
    Treasury*s OIG and TIGTA also made five firearms- related recommendations
    in reports to the U. S. Mint in May 2002 and to IRS/ CI in November 2001
    and March 2002. According to the OIGs and TIGTA, agencies agreed to all
    recommendations and have taken, or are in the process of taking,
    corrective action addressing all identified weaknesses. U. S. Mint and
    IRS/ CI Did Not

    Always Record or Report Firearms Information

    Justice and Treasury Agencies Are Taking Action to Strengthen and Enforce
    Firearms Controls

    Page 22 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Specifically, the INS, BOP, DEA, FBI, and USMS have implemented 29 of the
    63 recommendations made by the Justice OIG, and are in the process of
    implementing the remaining 34 recommendations. Of the 34 recommendations
    that have not been implemented, management has begun taking corrective
    actions and is working with the OIG to ensure their efforts address the
    weaknesses identified. Completed and ongoing actions include establishing
    procedures requiring periodic firearms inventories on an annual basis and
    the appropriate segregation of duties

    during physical inventories. The agencies are also requiring that missing
    firearms be immediately reported and minimum timeframes for completing
    investigations of missing firearms be established. In addition, agencies
    are requiring that all missing firearms cases be adjudicated and that
    controls for securing firearms in vehicles and recovering firearms from
    separating employees be strengthened.

    In addition, the U. S. Mint and IRS/ CI have implemented all five
    recommendations made by the Treasury OIG and TIGTA. The U. S. Mint now
    requires the performance and documentation of an independent physical
    inventory of firearms annually and the reconciliation of those inventories
    against property management records. Furthermore, IRS/ CI agreed to change
    its inventory management system to be able to differentiate between lost,
    stolen, and damaged items in their property management system, and now
    requires that missing firearms reports be completely prepared. IRS/ CI
    also established guidelines addressing the types of lost or stolen
    equipment that should be referred to TIGTA for investigation.

    Fifteen of the 18 federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed reported
    firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession during some
    point in time between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. Agency officials
    reported that although some firearms were lost due to negligence, some
    losses occurred despite appropriate precautions being taken by employees.
    Audits conducted by Justice*s and Treasury*s OIGs found that some missing
    firearms were recovered during the commission of a crime, or in connection
    with a criminal investigation. Majority of Federal

    Law Enforcement Agencies Reviewed Reported Missing Firearms

    Page 23 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Fifteen of the 18 federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed reported
    1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession
    during some point in time between September 1998 and July 2002. 24 As of
    July 2002, 188 of these firearms had been subsequently recovered, leaving
    824 still missing. 25 While we could not determine the exact percentage of

    agency firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears
    that these firearms generally accounted for less than one percent of
    agencies* total firearms inventories. 26 Only BEP, the U. S. Mint, and
    Veterans Affairs reported having no lost, stolen, or missing firearms.
    Agencies identified missing firearms using internal reporting systems,
    through which personnel reported weapons as missing, and from periodic
    physical inventories of firearms. Table 3 identifies firearms as lost,
    stolen, or otherwise not in an agency*s possession for the 18 agencies
    surveyed, those firearms subsequently recovered, and those firearms still
    missing as of July 2002. 24 Of these missing firearms, 178 had been
    converted to dummy firearms (e. g., training

    weapons) and rendered inoperable. FBI officials said that these weapons
    could not be easily converted to live firearms. 25 Agencies could not
    identify which firearms recovered or still missing were dummy firearms. 26
    Since the firearms inventory and missing firearms data were developed from
    different bases, such as inventory counts or internal agency reporting
    systems, and are based on

    different time periods, they are not directly comparable. Fifteen of 18
    Agencies

    Surveyed Reported Missing Firearms

    Page 24 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Table 3: Firearms Reported Missing, Recovered, and Unaccounted for between
    September 30, 1998 and July 2002 at Selected Federal Law Enforcement
    Agencies

    Agency Firearms identified as

    lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the agency*s possession between
    September 30,

    1998 and July 2002 a Firearms subsequently

    recovered between September 30, 1998 and

    July 2002 a Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise not

    in the agency*s possession as of

    July 2002 a

    ATF 16 7 9 BEP 0 0 0 BOP 2 0 2 DEA 63 4 59 FBI 458 b 72 386 Federal
    Emergency Management Administration 2 0 2 Federal Protective Service 3 0 3
    Fish and Wildlife Service 27 1 26 INS 114 c 13 101 d IRS/ CI 6 3 3
    National Institutes of Health 3 0 3 National Park Service 196 63 133
    Postal Inspection Service 14 0 14 U. S. Customs Service e 94 20 74 USMS 10
    3 7 U. S. Mint 0 0 0 U. S. Secret Service 4 2 2 VA 0 0 0

    Total 1,012 188 824

    Source: GAO survey of these agencies. a Data were not independently
    verified.

    b FBI reported that 458 of its firearms were lost, stolen, or otherwise
    not in the agency*s possession during the period September 30, 1998
    through July 2002. FBI reported to the Senate Judiciary Committee that, as
    of July 2001, 449 of its firearms were not accounted for; of these
    firearms, 161 were training weapons. c INS reported that 114 of its
    firearms were lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the agency*s possession

    during the period September 30, 1998 through July 2002. The more than 500
    missing INS firearms reported by the Justice OIG included those firearms
    found missing during an INS agencywide inventory conducted in August 1998.
    d INS officials said that of the 101 missing firearms, 13 were lost; 74
    were stolen; and 14 were

    otherwise missing. e The U. S. Customs Service reported 22 lost and 72
    stolen firearms; it also reported additional

    firearms destroyed in the World Trade Center bombing.

    Page 25 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Of the 1,012 firearms that agencies reported lost, stolen, or otherwise
    not in their possession, 27 most missing firearms were pistols (541).
    Agencies also reported 187 revolvers or other handguns, 157 training
    weapons, 92 shotguns, 38 rifles, 19 submachine guns, and 1 stun gun as
    missing.

    Agency officials recognized that firearms were sometimes lost due to
    negligent behavior, such as employees not properly securing firearms in
    locked vehicles, as required by agency policies and procedures. However,
    officials also identified that some firearms were lost despite appropriate
    precautions being taken by the employee. For example, one agency reported
    that four firearms were stolen while in the custody of the airlines,

    and that the theft did not occur due to the negligent behavior of the
    employee. Specifically, the firearms were checked in a locked, hard- sided
    gun case, in accordance with agency policies and procedures. Due to the

    manner in which the agencies recorded missing firearms data, they usually
    could not readily identify, for the missing firearms we reviewed, the
    number of firearms determined to have been lost due to negligence.

    Agencies also identified cases where lost firearms, although not in the
    agency*s possession, were not recoverable and could not be used to harm
    the public. For example, several agencies reported firearms being lost in
    the ocean or in a river. These weapons were considered unrecoverable and
    therefore did not pose a threat to the public. Audits conducted by
    Justice*s and Treasury*s OIGs identified several

    incidents where missing firearms had been recovered in connection with
    criminal activity or during a criminal investigation. 28 The OIGs made
    this determination during separate audits of agency controls over weapons,
    laptops, and other sensitive items at FBI, DEA, INS, U. S. Secret Service,
    and U. S. Customs. 29 For example, Justice*s OIG reviewed 16 missing
    firearms cases reported to

    the DEA Board of Professional Conduct, for the time period 27 FBI data
    came from the Justice OIG report. 28 To determine if missing agency
    firearms were used in connection with criminal activity, the OIGs reviewed
    missing firearms recovered from October 1, 1999 through August 27, 2001,
    and October 1, 1998 through September 30, 2001, respectively. For DEA, the
    Justice OIG reviewed cases for the period October 1, 1999 through November
    15, 2001.

    29 See appendix VI for a complete listing of related reports issued by the
    Departments of Justice and Treasury OIGs. Justice and Treasury Audits
    Identified Instances

    of Recovered Firearms Used in Criminal Activity

    Page 26 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    October 1, 1999 through November 15, 2001, and found that 3 had been
    recovered by local law enforcement during an arrest of an individual for a
    handgun violation, and 2 in connection with searches during unrelated
    criminal investigations. In another example, Treasury*s OIG reviewed 10 of
    13 firearms reported missing and recovered by U. S. Customs Service, for
    the time period October 1, 1998 through September 30, 2001, and found that
    5 of the 10 firearms had been recovered in connection with a robbery, a
    drive- by shooting, or during the execution of a search warrant.

    The Federal Managers* Financial Integrity Act requires that executive
    agencies establish and maintain controls that provide reasonable assurance
    that all assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, and
    misappropriation. Standards and guidance for effectively maintaining and
    controlling firearms inventories are available to assist federal law
    enforcement agencies in designing controls to safeguard their firearms.
    Although these controls provide a framework to assist agencies in
    controlling and safeguarding their firearms, agencies should tailor these
    controls to meet their unique needs and circumstances, as well as their
    risks for firearms losses. Accordingly, the appropriate mix of controls
    may vary for each federal law enforcement agency.

    When agencies discover lost, stolen, or missing firearms, they should
    reassess their firearms controls to determine why they were not effective
    and if they should be modified. This is particularly important when
    agencies find that existing controls have not been implemented or have
    been implemented but have not prevented the loss of agency firearms, as

    was the case with some agencies reviewed by the Departments of Justice and
    Treasury OIGs. Internal controls that have been established to safeguard
    firearms, but were not appropriate controls based on the agencies* needs,
    or were not implemented or properly applied, provide little assurance that
    firearms are safe from loss, theft, or misuse.

    In addition, agencies should document their firearms controls in policies
    and procedures. Without documenting these controls, employees may not know
    of their requirement, and the controls may not be uniformly applied
    agencywide. In addition, it may be difficult for management to enforce a
    control that is not required by policy and procedures, such as
    disciplining employees who do not adhere to firearms controls.

    The need for an assessment of firearms controls, and documentation of
    controls in policies and procedures, is demonstrated by the majority of
    Conclusion

    Page 27 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    agencies reviewed reporting missing firearms. These firearms may pose a
    serious risk to the public, including the risk that they may be used to
    inflict bodily harm or to further criminal activity.

    The Attorney General; the Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, Veterans
    Affairs, and Homeland Security; the Director of the National Institutes of
    Health, and the Postmaster General should

     periodically assess existing policies and procedures designed to control
    and safeguard firearms and determine whether they have been effective, or
    should be modified to help prevent future firearms losses. In assessing
    firearms controls, agencies should use as guides (1) internal control
    standards issued by GAO, Joint Financial Management Improvement Program,
    and Commission on Accreditation

    for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc; and (2) audits conducted by the
    Department of Justice OIG, Department of the Treasury OIG, and TIGTA of
    agencies firearms controls, and

     document internal controls in agency policies and procedures to the
    maximum extent practical to help ensure that they are consistently
    understood and applied. We requested and received comments on a draft of
    this report from the

    Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the
    Interior, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security,
    the Director of the National Institutes of Health (Department of Health
    and Human Services), and the Postmaster General. Officials generally
    agreed

    with the information presented. Six agencies provided technical changes
    that have been incorporated, as appropriate. Four agencies* the NIH, Fish
    and Wildlife Service (Department of the Interior), U. S. Postal Inspection
    Service, and Department of Veterans Affairs* provided comments on the
    report recommendation. NIH and Fish and Wildlife Service agreed with the
    recommendation and identified actions taken to strengthen their controls
    over firearms. The U. S. Postal Inspection Service also identified actions

    taken to strengthen firearms controls consistent with the recommendation.
    The Department of Veterans Affairs expressed concerned about our
    recommendation, saying that its controls were effective in preventing
    firearms losses. Appendixes VII, VIII, X, and XI include the written
    comments from these four agencies. In addition, although the Department of
    Justice did not comment on the recommendation, its letter presents general
    observations regarding standards for control over agency firearms and is
    included in appendix IX. Recommendations Agency Comments

    Page 28 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    NIH agreed with the recommendation, saying that in response to a review
    conducted by the department*s OIG, NIH has taken numerous steps to
    strengthen its controls over firearms. These efforts include updating and
    including accurate descriptions of firearms in its firearms inventory

    database, and appointing and training property custodial officers for the
    NIH Police Branch. The Fish and Wildlife Service also agreed with the
    recommendation, and said that as a result of an internal assessment, the
    Service will (1) develop a Web- based firearm training guide addressing
    various internal controls over firearms, (2) conduct unscheduled random
    checks of firearms against property records, and (3) annually review
    reports of any lost and/ or stolen firearms to determine if policies and
    procedures should be modified to prevent future losses.

    Although not saying whether it agreed with our recommendation, the U. S.
    Postal Inspection Service said that it had reviewed the Standards for
    Internal Control in the Federal Government and will assess these standards
    along with the results of a firearms review conducted by the Inspection
    Service Firearms Task Force. In addition, the Service provided us with a
    copy of its proposed policy update that it plans to incorporate into its
    firearms inventory and accountability procedures. We appreciate that the
    Service provided the proposed update and look forward to receiving the
    final updated policy. VA expressed concerned about our recommendation,
    saying that its lack

    of firearms losses during the time period of our review was due to its
    having appropriate internal controls over firearms. VA further said that
    its police officers document the handling of firearms on a daily basis;
    generally do not remove their firearms from department property; check
    their assigned firearms out of and into the armory each day; conduct

    monthly inventories of all firearms, ammunition, and magazines; have
    unannounced inventories and spot checks; and conduct independent annual
    inventories of firearms.

    Although VA did not report missing firearms during the time period of our
    review, the potential exists that firearms could be lost or stolen at some
    point in the future. Accordingly, we believe that VA and other agencies we
    reviewed should periodically assess their firearms controls, particularly
    when their organizations or operations have changed, or when firearms are
    identified as missing. These assessments should be conducted to

    determine whether established controls have been effective, are still
    relevant, or should be modified. For example, VA recently reported that as
    of March 2003, police officers at more than 100 of its field sites were

    assigned firearms. Prior to 2000, officers at only 27 sites were armed. We

    Page 29 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    believe that this is a good example of when an organizational change
    necessitates a reevaluation of an agency*s firearms controls to reduce the
    risk of potential firearms losses. We further believe that federal
    internal control standards and other criteria included in our report
    provide a useful framework from which to conduct these assessments, and
    identify appropriate firearms controls when an agency*s environment has
    changed, or when existing controls have not been effective. In addition,
    six agencies requested that we change some of their original

    responses to our survey regarding firearms controls, usually to identify
    that they had a written policy and procedure addressing a specific
    control. We made these technical changes in all cases in which the agency
    provided documentation of its policy. However, if the agency said that the
    policy change was planned but had not yet been made, we did not change

    the original response and look forward to receiving documentation
    identifying changes that have been incorporated into its policy.

    As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its content
    earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
    its issue date. At that time, we will provide copies of this report to the
    appropriate congressional committees, the Attorney General, Secretary of
    the Treasury, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
    Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the National Institutes of
    Health, and the Postmaster General. We will also make copies available to
    others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge
    on GAO*s

    Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. If you or your staffs have any
    questions on this report, please call me on (202) 512- 8777. Key
    contributors are listed in appendix XII.

    Cathleen A. Berrick, Acting Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    Page 30 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    We reviewed federal law enforcement agencies* control over firearms to
    determine (1) the extent to which these agencies* policies, procedures,
    and practices for controlling and safeguarding firearms were consistent
    with federal internal control standards and related criteria issued by law
    enforcement and management organizations; (2) whether reviews conducted by
    the Department of Justice and Department of Treasury identified instances
    of noncompliance with firearms policies and procedures, and whether
    agencies have taken actions to correct identified weaknesses, particularly
    regarding (a) conducting inventories, (b)

    investigating missing firearms, and (c) disciplining employees; and (3)
    the number of firearms that selected federal law enforcement agencies
    identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession between
    September 30, 1998 and July 2002. We also determined how selected agencies
    maintained control and accountability over weapons other than firearms and
    weapons components. (See app. II.)

    To answer objectives 1 and 3, and to determine how agencies maintained and
    controlled weapons other than firearms and weapons components, we selected
    for review 18 out of 33 federal civilian law enforcement agencies in the
    executive branch identified by the Department of Justice*s Bureau

    of Justice Statistics (BJS), as of June 2000, as having personnel with the
    authority to carry firearms and make arrests. 1 We systematically selected
    the agencies for our review. First, we stratified

    the 33 agencies according to size, based on whether the agency had (1)
    1,000 or more, (2) 500* 999, (3) 100* 499, or (4) less than 100 law
    enforcement personnel. We then selected all agencies with 1,000 or more
    law enforcement personnel (11 agencies) and the 2 agencies with the
    largest number of law enforcement personnel in each of the remaining 3
    strata (6 agencies in total). To account for all Department of Justice and
    Treasury law enforcement agencies, we also included BEP, which fell into

    the 100* 499 strata (1 agency). These 18 agencies employed about 96
    percent (76,510) of the total personnel employed by the federal civilian
    law enforcement agencies (79,910) that are authorized to carry firearms
    and make arrests, as reported in the BJS. Table 4 identifies the 18
    agencies selected for review, along with the strata from which they were
    selected. 1 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.
    S. Department of Justice,

    Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2000 (Washington, D. C.: July 2001).
    Although the survey on which this report was based included certain OIGs,
    we did not include these offices in our review. Appendix I: Objectives,
    Scope, and

    Methodology

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    Page 31 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Table 4: Eighteen Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Included in Our Survey
    of Federal Firearms Control Policies, Procedures, and Practices

    Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and
    carry firearms

    Agency Number of personnel

    authorized to arrest and carry firearms in 2000 a 1,000 or more 500- 999
    100- 499 Less than 100 BEP 211 X Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

    Firearms 1,967 X DEA 4,161 X FBI 11,523 X Federal Bureau of Prisons 13,557
    X Federal Protective Service 803 X FEMA Security Division 33 X INS 17,654
    X IRS- Criminal Investigation Division 2,726 X National Institutes of
    Health Police 39 X National Park Service (Interior) Division of Ranger
    Activities U. S. Park Police X U. S. Customs Service 10,522 X U. S. Fish
    and Wildlife Service 888 X U. S. Mint 354 X USMS 2,735 X U. S. Postal
    Inspection Service 3,412 X U. S Secret Service 4,039 X Department of
    Veterans

    Affairs/ Veterans Health Administration/ Police Service b 342 X Source:
    GAO analysis of BJS data.

    a By 2003, some agencies reported increases in the number of personnel
    with the authority to make arrests and carry firearms. For example, ATF
    reported to have 2031 personnel; VA, 2,200 personnel; and Customs,
    approximately 14,165 personnel with such authorities.

    b VA has authority to arm its police officers under 38 U. S. C. 904. An
    initial pilot program to arm its officers was established at 5 VA sites
    and then expanded to 12 sites. Prior to 2000, police officers at 27 sites
    were armed; as of March 2003, more than 100 sites have armed officers.

    We surveyed the 18 agencies using a detailed questionnaire. We pretested
    the questionnaire with 2 of the 18 agencies and a third federal law
    enforcement agency, not included in the final survey, and made relevant
    changes to the questions based on these pretests. We also surveyed the 18
    agencies using a follow- up questionnaire to obtain additional related
    information. See appendixes IV and V for the initial and follow- up

    questionnaire, respectively.

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    Page 32 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    In the questionnaire, we asked agencies about their firearms inventories
    and the policies, procedures, and practices currently in place to control
    their firearms. We also asked agencies to provide the results of their
    most recently completed 100- percent inventory since September 30, 1998,
    and the date of the inventory. We asked the 18 agencies to identify their
    policies and procedures related to recording firearms inventory data,
    controlling firearms inventories, ensuring personal and supervisory
    accountability for agency firearms, and investigating missing firearms and
    administering associated employee discipline. We also asked agencies to
    identify the number of firearms reported missing since September 30, 1998,
    the number of those missing firearms recovered up to the time of our
    survey, and the sources of the missing firearms information.

    To determine how federal law enforcement agencies maintained control and
    accountability over weapons other than firearms and weapons components,
    specifically ammunition, explosives, and gas and chemical agents, we
    surveyed the 18 agencies regarding their policies, procedures, and
    practices for tracking and controlling these items.

    Because this was not a sample survey, there are no sampling errors.
    However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce
    errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example,
    difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in the sources
    of information that are available to respondents, or in how the data are
    entered into a database or were analyzed can introduce unwanted
    variability into the survey results. We took steps in the development of
    the questionnaires, the data collection, and the data editing and analysis
    to minimize these nonsampling errors. In addition, to the extent possible,
    we obtained and reviewed agencies* firearms control policies and
    procedures to verify their responses to our questionnaire.

    To answer objective 2, we reviewed the results of audits conducted by the
    Departments of Justice and Treasury Offices of Inspector General (OIG) and
    the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). These
    audits evaluated the extent to which Justice and Treasury law enforcement
    agencies adhered to internal controls over firearms inventories and other
    sensitive properties and were completed between

    March 2001 and August 2002. (See app. VI for audit reports and dates
    issued.) In addition, we reviewed documents from selected Justice and
    Treasury law enforcement agencies detailing their firearms control
    policies, procedures, and practices. We also reviewed selected agencies*
    internal reports on compliance with firearms control policies and

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    Page 33 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    procedures and interviewed officials on corrective actions taken in
    response to OIG and TIGTA recommendations.

    We conducted our review between August 2001 and May 2003 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
    Components

    Page 34 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Federal law enforcement agencies generally reported establishing inventory
    controls to account for weapons other than firearms and weapons
    components. The 18 agencies we surveyed reported maintaining
    accountability for their stocks of explosives, gas and/ or chemical
    agents, and ammunition through conducting periodic physical inventory
    counts of the items, or maintaining running balances through perpetual
    inventories. Agencies also reported using other methods, such as tracking
    the

    distribution of items to individuals or organizational units and limiting
    access to areas in which inventories are stored, or a combination of
    methods, to account for the inventories.

    The 18 federal law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported having
    explosives, gas and/ or chemical agents, and ammunition. Table 5
    identifies weapons other than firearms and weapons components reported by
    the agencies surveyed.

    Table 5: Agencies* Reported Use of Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
    Components

    Agency Explosives Gas and/ or chemical agents Ammunition

    ATF X X X BEP X X BOP X X X Customs X X X DEA X FBI X X X Federal
    Protective Service X X Fish and Wildlife Service X FEMA a X INS X X IRS/
    CI X X U. S. Mint X X X National Park Service X NIH X U. S. Postal Service
    X U. S. Secret Service X X X USMS X X X VA X X

    Total 7 12 18

    Source: GAO survey of these agencies. a FEMA is the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency.

    Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
    Components

    Agencies Established Controls to Account for Other Weapons and Weapons
    Components

    Agencies Reported Having Inventories of Explosives, Gas and/ or Chemical

    Agents, and Ammunition

    Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
    Components

    Page 35 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    While all 18 agencies reported having ammunition, only 7 reported having
    explosives, and 12 reported having gas and/ or chemical agents. Seven
    agencies reported inventory in all three categories, including BOP, FBI,
    USMS, ATF, U. S. Customs Service, the U. S. Mint, and U. S. Secret
    Service.

    Agencies reporting inventories of explosives and gas and chemical agents
    responded that the weapons were primarily diversionary devices, defensive
    chemical sprays, and chemical projectiles. Included were items such as
    flash- bangs that distract with a flash and bang effect and smoke grenades
    that dispense chemically based inflammatory agents or membrane irritants.

    The 18 federal law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported having
    accountability procedures for weapons other than firearms and weapons
    components, and these agencies generally reported that they relied on
    inventories to account for these items. As shown in table 6, the agencies
    reported that they controlled weapons and weapons components through
    monthly and annual inventory counts, or by maintaining a running summary
    of the quantities on hand through perpetual inventories. Agencies Used

    Inventory Counts and Other Methods to Control Weapons and Weapons
    Components

    Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
    Components

    Page 36 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Table 6: Agencies* Reported Use of Inventory Procedures for Explosives,
    Gas and/ or Chemical Agents, and Ammunition Ammunition inventories

    Agency Annual a Monthly Perpetual Other a ATF b BEP X BOP X Customs X DEA
    X FBI X X Federal Protective

    Service X Fish and Wildlife Service X c FEMA d X INS X X

    IRS/ CI X U. S. Mint X X X National Park Service X X NIH X U. S. Postal
    Service X

    U. S. Secret Service X X X USMS X VA X Source: GAO survey of these
    agencies.

    Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
    Components

    Page 37 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Explosives inventories Gas and/ or chemical agent inventories Annual
    Monthly Perpetual Other a Annual Monthly Perpetual Other a X X X X X X X X
    X

    X X X X X

    X X X X X X X X

    X X X

    a Other refers to a variety of practices in addition to those identified
    that agencies used to account for ammunition, explosives, or gas/ chemical
    weapons. For example, Customs reported using quarterly or trimester
    inventories to account for these items. b At the time of our survey, ATF
    reported that it was in the final stage of review for a draft order

    *Ammunition Accounting Procedures* to safeguard its ammunition. c The Fish
    and Wild Life Service controlled ammunition by monitoring its distribution
    and limiting

    access to supply. d FEMA is the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

    In addition to relying on monthly, annual, and periodic inventories to
    control weapons other than firearms and weapons components, some agencies
    reported using additional procedures, or a combination of procedures, to
    account for their inventories. For example, IRS/ CI reported controlling
    ammunition and pepper spray by tracking their distribution to field
    installations from a headquarters procurement office, while the National
    Park Service reported that it controlled ammunition by monitoring its
    distribution to law enforcement personnel. In addition, the Fish and
    Wildlife Service reported that it controlled ammunition by monitoring its
    distribution and limiting access to supply. In another

    Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
    Components

    Page 38 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    example, the FBI reported maintaining its supply of gas and/ or chemical
    agents at a military storage facility, thereby reducing access and the
    potential for unauthorized use or loss.

    In addition, the FBI, INS, USMS, ATF, Secret Service, and the VA reported
    using a combination of methods to account for these weapons and weapons
    components. For example, the FBI reported controlling access to ammunition
    supplies in addition to maintaining a record of each time ammunition was
    received or disbursed. INS reported that, in addition to conducting annual
    inventories of ammunition and gas and chemical agents, it maintains logs
    at all locations that record receipts from manufacturers and issuances for
    operational purposes. In another

    example, the ATF reported controlling explosives by maintaining a separate
    record of acquisitions and removals; keeping a daily, perpetual record of
    transactions; and conducting annual inventories and inspections.

    Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons
    Components

    Page 39 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix III: Presence of Key Firearms Activities in Agency Policies and
    Procedures

    Page 40 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Table 7: Key Firearms Control Activities in Agency Policies and Procedures
    as Reported by Selected Federal Law Enforcement Agencies

    Appendix III: Presence of Key Firearms Activities in Agency Policies and
    Procedures

    Description of control Inventory data

    Information required to be included in permanent property record on
    receiving new firearms Date of physical receipt Specific identification
    Organizational unit or functional area to which firearm is assigned Person
    firearm assigned to Adjustments made to firearms inventory records as a
    result of physical inventory counts Update property management systems to
    identify firearms being disposed of as out- of- service Update property
    management system to remove firearms being disposed of from agency's
    firearms inventory

    Inventory control

    Written policies and procedures for issuing agency- owned firearms to
    individuals Written policies and procedures for assigning agency owned
    firearms to organizational units or functional areas Requires periodic
    firearms counts Guidance for firearms counts

    Objectives for inventory established Timing of counts established
    Instructions for conducting inventories established Integrity of
    inventories

    Training or instruction provided to firearms counters

    Selected federal law enforcement agencies

    Employees involved in controlling and safeguarding firearms precluded from
    counting firearms Counters have no prior knowledge of inventory 2- member
    (or more) count teams Counters required to verify firearms ID numbers
    Counters required to verify descriptive information about the firearm Use
    occasions other than inventory to check firearms

    During employee retraining or testing in firearm use Unannounced
    inspections of employee's firearms Other

    BOP

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W

    W W W

    W W W

    W W W W

    W W W

    DEA

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W W

    W W W

    N/ A W

    N N/ A

    W W

    U N W

    FBI

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W

    W W W W

    N/ A W

    W N/ A

    W W

    W W N/ A

    INS

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W W

    W W W

    N N

    W W W W

    W W W

    USMS

    W W W

    N W

    W W

    W W

    W W W W

    N N

    W N W W

    W U N

    USCS

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W N/ A

    W W W

    N/ A W

    W W W W

    W U U

    U. S. SS

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W

    W W

    W W

    N N

    U U W W

    W N N

    AT F

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W

    W W W

    W W

    N W

    W W W

    W N N/ A

    IRS/ CI

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W

    W W W W

    N/ A W

    U N/ A

    W W

    W N N

    FEMA

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W W

    N N W

    N N

    U U W W

    W W W

    BEP

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W W

    W W W

    N/ A W

    W W W W

    W W W

    U. S. Mint

    W W

    N W W

    N N

    W W N/ A

    W U U

    N/ A W

    U U U U

    W N U

    Fish and Wildlife Service

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W W

    W W W

    N N

    U N U U

    N U N

    Federal Protective Service

    W W W

    W N

    U U

    W W W

    W U W

    U N

    U U W W

    W W

    U

    National Park Service

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W W

    W W W

    N N

    W U W W

    W N N

    NIH

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W W

    W W W

    U W

    W U U U

    N N N

    USPIS

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W

    W W

    W W

    U N

    W N W W

    W W W

    VA

    W W W

    W W

    W W

    W W

    W W W

    N/ A W

    W N/ A

    W W

    W W W W

    Appendix III: Presence of Key Firearms Activities in Agency Policies and
    Procedures

    Page 41 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Description of control Selected federal law enforcement agencies

    Access limited to secured firearms storage areas or facilities Single
    person has access

    BOP DEA

    FBI INS

    USMS USCS

    U. S. SS AT

    F

    W

    IRS/ CI FEMA

    BEP U. S. Mint Fish and Wildlife Service

    Federal Protective Service National Park Service NIH

    USPIS VA

    Single person and his/ her designees Single person, his/ her designees,
    and others with one- time access authorizations

    Personal and supervisory accountability

    Individuals must safeguard assigned firearms from Damage Loss Theft
    Unauthorized use Individuals must store firearms in: a

    Lock box and/ or trigger lock and/ or secured gun case Lock box only
    Trigger lock only Secured gun case Other Individuals are held accountable
    for firearms inventory

    Individuals assigned responsibility for conducting firearms inventories in
    job descriptions Individuals' performance in conducting firearms
    inventories assessed during performance evaluations Supervisory Oversight
    of firearms inventories

    Investigations and discipline

    Investigations Require investigation of physical count discrepancies of
    firearms Instructions for investigating discrepancies Require
    investigations be conducted by inspector general or independent authority
    a Report missing firearms to NCIC a Employee discipline

    Disciplinary action for failure to report missing firearms a Disciplinary
    action for persons failing to take appropriate firearms safeguards a

    Source: Agency responses to our survey. Not applicable

    Includes response other and may include additional responses not specified
    N/ A

    Other =

    = Written policy or procedure

    Unwritten practice No policy, procedure, or practice W

    U N

    = = = W

    W N

    W W W W

    W W W

    W W W

    W W W W

    W W W

    N N

    W N

    W W

    N N

    U N

    N W W W

    N W W W

    W W

    N N

    W W W

    W U U W

    W W W

    W W W

    W N W W

    W W W

    U N

    U N

    W U U U

    W W W

    W W W

    W W W W

    W W W

    U U

    U N

    W W W W

    N N

    N W W W

    W W

    N W

    W W W

    W N

    W N

    W N N N

    N N

    N W W W

    U U W W

    W N W

    N U

    U U

    W U U U

    U U

    U W

    U U

    U W

    U W

    W W W

    N N

    U U

    W N N N

    N N

    N W W W

    W W W W

    W W W

    W N

    W N

    W N N N

    W W W

    W W W

    W W W W

    W W W

    W N

    W W

    W N N N

    N W

    N W W W

    W W W W

    W W W

    W N/ A

    N/ A N/ A

    W W

    N W

    U U W

    W W W

    W W W W

    W W W

    N N

    W U

    W N N N

    W W W

    W W W

    W W W W

    W W W

    W N

    N U

    W N N N

    U W W

    W U W

    W W W W

    W W W

    N N

    U U

    W N N N

    U W W

    W N W

    W W W W

    W W W

    N N/ A

    N/ R N/ A

    W N N N

    N W W

    W W W

    W W W W

    W W W

    N N

    U U

    W N N W

    N N W

    W U W

    W U U W

    W W W

    W U

    U N

    W N N W

    W W W

    W W W

    W W W W

    W W

    N N N/ A

    N/ A N/ A

    W W W W

    W W W

    W W W

    W W W W

    W W W

    W a These are practices that, while not specified in the criteria, reflect
    the criteria.

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 42 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 43 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 44 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 45 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 46 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 47 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 48 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 49 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 50 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 51 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 52 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 53 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 54 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 55 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 56 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 57 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 58 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 59 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 60 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 61 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire Page 62 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix V: Follow- up Survey Questionnaire Page 63 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms
    Control

    Appendix V: Follow- up Survey Questionnaire

    Appendix V: Follow- up Survey Questionnaire Page 64 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms
    Control

    Appendix V: Follow- up Survey Questionnaire Page 65 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms
    Control

    Appendix VI: Justice and Treasury Reports on Internal Controls Over
    Firearms and Other Sensitive Property

    Page 66 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Table 8: Justice, Treasury, and Treasury Inspector General for Tax
    Administration Reports on Internal Controls Over Firearms and Other
    Sensitive Property Report title Report number Report issue date

    Justice, Office of the Inspector General The Department of Justice*s
    Control Over Weapons and Laptop Computers - Summary Report Report No. 02-
    31 August 2002 The Federal Bureau of Prisons* Control Over Weapons and
    Laptop Computers Report No. 02- 30 August 2002 The Drug Enforcement
    Administration*s Control Over Weapons and Laptop Computers Report No. 02-
    28 August 2002 The Federal Bureau of Investigation*s Control Over Weapons
    and Laptop Computers Report No. 02- 27 August 2002 Immigration and
    Naturalization Service Management of Property Report No. 01- 09 March 2001
    The U. S. Marshals Service*s Control Over Weapons and Laptop Computers
    Report No. 02- 29 August 2002

    Treasury, Office of Inspector General Protecting the Public: Bureau of
    Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms* Control Over Sensitive Property Is Adequate
    OIG- 02- 097 June 19, 2002 Protecting the Public: Bureau of Engraving and
    Printing*s Control Over Sensitive Property Needs To Be Improved OIG- 02-
    092 May 30, 2002 Protecting the Public: U. S. Customs* Control Over
    Sensitive Property Needs To Be Improved OIG- 02- 109 August 5, 2002
    Protecting the Public: U. S. Mint*s control Over Sensitive Property Needs
    To Be Improved OIG- 02- 094 May 30, 2002 Protecting the Public: U. S.
    Secret Service*s Control Over Selected Sensitive Property Is Adequate OIG-
    02- 095 June 6, 2002 Treasury, Inspector General for Tax Administration
    Management Advisory Report: Follow- on Review of Lost or Stolen Sensitive

    Items of Inventory at the Internal Revenue Service Reference Number: 2002-
    10- 065

    March 2002 Management Advisory Report: Review of Lost or Stolen Sensitive
    Items of Property at the Internal Revenue Service Reference Number:

    2002- 10- 030 November 2001 Source: Compiled by GAO.

    Appendix VI: Justice and Treasury Reports on Internal Controls Over
    Firearms and Other Sensitive Property

    Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
    Page 67 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services

    Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
    Page 68 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior

    Page 69 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior

    Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior

    Page 70 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior

    Page 71 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice

    Page 72 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice

    Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice

    Page 73 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice

    Page 74 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice

    Page 75 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice

    Page 76 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix X: Comments from the United States Postal Service

    Page 77 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix X: Comments from the United States Postal Service

    Appendix X: Comments from the United States Postal Service

    Page 78 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix X: Comments from the United States Postal Service

    Page 79 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix X: Comments from the United States Postal Service

    Page 80 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs

    Page 81 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs

    Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs

    Page 82 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs

    Page 83 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

    Page 84 GAO- 03- 688 Firearms Control

    Cathleen A. Berrick, (202) 512- 3404 Fredrick D. Berry, Miguel A. Salas,
    Barbara A. Stolz, Christine F. Davis, Katherine M. Davis, Stuart M.
    Kaufman, David P. Alexander, Delois N. Richardson, Daniel C. Harris, and
    Miko D. Johnson made key contributions to this report. Appendix XII: GAO
    Contacts and Staff

    Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff Acknowledgments

    (440079)

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