Homeland Defense: Preliminary Observations on How Overseas and	 
Domestic Missions Impact DOD Forces (29-APR-03, GAO-03-677T).	 
                                                                 
The way in which the federal government views the defense of the 
United States has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. 
Consequently, the Department of Defense (DOD) is adjusting its	 
Cold War strategic focus (of defending against massed combat	 
forces) to better encompass defense against the asymmetric	 
threats that small terrorist cells represent to U.S. territory.  
GAO was asked to review DOD's participation in domestic missions.
This testimony represents our preliminary work in response to the
request. It addresses (1) the primary differences in military and
nonmilitary missions; (2) how DOD evaluates requests for	 
nonmilitary missions; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act	 
impacts DOD's nonmilitary missions; (4) whether current 	 
management organizations, plans, and forces are adequate to	 
support DOD's domestic missions; and (5) the impact of overseas  
and domestic missions on military personnel tempo. GAO is making 
no recommendations in this testimony.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-677T					        
    ACCNO:   A06748						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Defense: Preliminary Observations on How	      
Overseas and Domestic Missions Impact DOD Forces		 
     DATE:   04/29/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military intervention				 
	     Agency missions					 
	     National preparedness				 

******************************************************************
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GAO-03-677T

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 1: 00 p. m.. EDT Tuesday, April
29, 2003 HOMELAND DEFENSE

Preliminary Observations on How Overseas and Domestic Missions Impact DOD
Forces

Statement of Raymond J. Decker, Director Defense Capabilities and
Management

GAO- 03- 677T

DOD*s military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles,
duration, discretion to accept or reject, and capabilities normally
employed.

DOD evaluates nonmilitary mission requests on the basis of legality,
lethality, risk to DOD forces, the cost, the appropriateness of the
mission, and the impact on military readiness. The 1878 Posse Comitatus
Act prohibits the direct use of federal military

troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by
the Constitution or Acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized
the use of the military in certain situations such as to assist with drug
interdiction or assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction.

It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD*s new management
organizations or plans but some forces may not be tailored for their
domestic missions. DOD established an Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and U. S. Northern Command to plan and
execute domestic missions. U. S. Northern Command*s plan for domestic
military missions was developed before DOD officials had agreed on the
nature of the threat. Forces are not adequately tailored for some domestic
missions and readiness could erode because of it. For example, Air Force
fighter units deployed since September 11, 2001 to perform combat air
patrols are unable to also perform required combat training.

Overseas and domestic missions are stressing U. S. forces as measured in
personnel tempo data. In September 2001, about 1,600 Air Force personnel
had spent 220 to 365 days away from their homes over the previous year,
but by December 2002 almost 22,100 Air Force personnel had been away that
long. The Army reported similar increases. To prevent erosion in combat
capabilities, DOD issued orders, known as stop loss, to involuntarily
retain critical personnel.

F16 Fighter Aircraft Conduct a Combat Air Patrol Over Washington, D. C.
The way in which the federal government views the defense of the United
States has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001.

Consequently, the Department of Defense (DOD) is adjusting its Cold War
strategic focus (of defending against massed combat forces) to better
encompass defense against the asymmetric threats that small terrorist
cells represent to U. S.

territory. GAO was asked to review DOD*s participation in domestic
missions. This testimony represents our preliminary work in response to
the request. It addresses (1) the primary differences in military and
nonmilitary missions; (2) how DOD evaluates nonmilitary mission requests;
(3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act impacts on DOD*s

nonmilitary missions; (4) whether current management organizations, plans,
and forces are adequate to support DOD*s domestic missions;

and (5) the impact of overseas and domestic missions on military personnel
tempo. GAO is making no recommendations in this

testimony.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 677T. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Raymond J. Decker, (202) 512- 6020, deckerr@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 677T, a testimony

before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives

April 29, 2003

HOMELAND DEFENSE

Preliminary Observations on How Overseas and Domestic Missions Impact DOD
Forces

Page 1 GAO- 03- 677T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity
to discuss with you today the demands being placed on the Department of
Defense (DOD) in the post September 11, 2001, environment. DOD*s primary
mission is to deter aggression abroad and fight to win if deterrence
fails. It does this by undertaking major combat operations on a global
basis. However, the federal government view of the defense of U. S.
territory has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. In this
regard, DOD is adjusting its Cold War strategic focus of defending against
massed combat forces attacking allied nations or U. S. territory to
encompass the asymmetric threats that small terrorist

cells represent. You asked us to review DOD*s participation in domestic
military missions. We will issue a final report on this issue later this
spring. My testimony today is based on the preliminary work that we have
completed to date on your request. I will address (1) the primary
differences in military and

nonmilitary missions; (2) how DOD evaluates requests for nonmilitary
missions; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act impacts DOD*s nonmilitary
missions; (4) whether current management organizations, plans, and forces
are adequate to support DOD*s domestic missions; and (5) the impact of
overseas and domestic missions on military personnel tempo. 1 To determine
the differences in DOD*s missions and how DOD evaluates mission requests,
we reviewed appropriate guidance and directives specifying mission types,
and discussed these issues with knowledgeable officials. To identify legal
constraints on DOD*s nonmilitary missions, we reviewed the 1878 Posse
Comitatus Act and related laws. To determine the adequacy of
organizations, plans, and forces, we reviewed DOD reorganizations, visited
the new U. S. Northern Command, reviewed campaign plans and related
documents, and compared the types of missions performed by forces with
their primary missions. Finally, to determine the impact of domestic or
overseas missions on personnel tempo, we obtained personnel tempo
databases from DOD for the period October 2000 through December 2002 (the
most recent data available) and analyzed the data. We conducted this work
from July 2002 through April 2003 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

1 Personnel tempo is the amount of time that a member of the armed forces
is engaged in their official duties at a location that makes it infeasible
to spend off duty time at the member*s home, homeport (for Navy service
members), or in the members* civilian residence (for reserve components*
personnel).

Page 2 GAO- 03- 677T

Military missions differ from nonmilitary missions in terms of roles,
duration, discretion to accept or reject, and capabilities normally
employed. In military missions, DOD is the lead federal agency, operates
without a predefined end date, cannot reject the planned mission, and uses
combat power and combat support capabilities for their intended purposes.
Conversely, in nonmilitary missions, another agency is generally the lead,
the mission has a predefined end date, and DOD has some

discretion to reject the requested mission and uses military capabilities
in a noncombat manner to augment U. S. civil authorities* capabilities.

DOD evaluates all requests by U. S. civil authorities for military
assistance against six established criteria, including legality, safety,
funding, and impact on readiness. DOD has provided a variety of requested
nonmilitary assistance, including over 230 missions in fiscal years 2001
and 2002, such as assisting in fighting wildfires; recovering from
tropical storms;

providing post- September 11, 2001, assistance to New York City and
Virginia; and providing support for the presidential inauguration.

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act 2 prohibits the direct use of federal
military troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress. Congress has expressly
authorized the use of the military in certain situations. For example, DOD
can use its personnel and equipment in response to requests from civilian
law enforcement to assist with drug interdiction efforts and terrorist
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. 3 The Commander of U. S.
Northern Command has stated *We believe the [Posse Comitatus] Act, as
amended, provides the authority we need to do our job, and no modification
is needed at this time.* 4 It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD*s
new management

organizations or their plans for their domestic missions, since the
organizations only recently began operations and the campaign plan was

2 18 U. S. C. S:1385 (2002). The Act expressly prohibits the use of the
Army or the Air Force to execute the laws. It applies to the Navy and
Marine Corps through DOD Directive 5525.5,

DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials and Navy
Instruction (SECNAVISNT) 5820.7B, Mar. 28, 1988, Cooperation with Civilian
Law Enforcement Officials.

3 10 U. S. C. S:S: 371- 378 (excluding S:375) (2002), and 10 U. S. C.
S:382 (2002). 4 Statement of General Ralph E. Eberhart, U. S. Air Force,
Commander, U. S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense
Command, before the House

Committee on Armed Services, March 13, 2003. Summary

Page 3 GAO- 03- 677T

only recently written, although some forces may not be fully tailored to
the missions. First, DOD has established (1) the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and (2) U. S. Northern Command
to provide long- term planning and execution capability for domestic
missions. The new Assistant Secretary is to provide overall supervision of
DOD*s domestic missions. U. S. Northern Command is to provide unity of
command for U. S. military actions to counter threats to U. S. territory
and is to provide military assistance to U. S. civil authorities when
directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Neither
organization was fully functional at the time of our review, so we could
not yet evaluate the adequacy of these organizations for their new
missions. Second, U. S. Northern Command recently completed its campaign
plan for domestic military missions, making it unlikely that the services
have yet trained or equipped their forces for these missions. In addition,
the plan was developed prior to issuance of a Federal Bureau of
Investigation counterterrorism threat assessment and before DOD officials
had agreed amongst themselves on the nature of the threat and thus may not
take into account the current range of identified threats. Finally, forces
are not adequately structured for some current domestic missions, and
military readiness may erode. For example, following the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, the President deployed fighter aircraft to
protect U. S. cities under Operation Noble Eagle. In addition, DOD needed
to enhance installation security and deployed military police units. While
the missions are legitimate, these forces* military readiness may erode
because they get limited training benefit from the missions and do not
have the opportunity to conduct required combat training while performing
the missions. Current overseas and domestic missions are impacting U. S.
forces as

measured by personnel tempo. DOD measures personnel tempo based on three
thresholds: 182 days, 220 days, and 401 days deployed 5 away from home.
DOD believes that if servicemembers spend too much time away

from home, a risk exists that they will eventually leave the service and
military readiness may suffer. From September 2001 through December 2002,
the number of Air Force personnel exceeding the personnel tempo threshold
of 182 days away from home rose from about 2,100 to about 8,300; the
number exceeding the personnel tempo threshold of 220 days away from home
rose even higher, from about 1,600 to about 22,100. Army

5 We used the thresholds to measure days away from home, which includes
deployments and activities such as individual training.

Page 4 GAO- 03- 677T

data also revealed that personnel tempo had increased during the period.
To prevent significant near- term attrition from the force, DOD has used
its stop loss authority 6 to prohibit servicemembers affected by the order
from leaving the service. DOD has acknowledged that stop loss should only
be used for a short period of time and is not to be used as a long- term
force management practice.

Military missions differ from nonmilitary missions on a variety of
factors, as shown in table 1.

Table 1: Differences between DOD Military and Nonmilitary Missions
Military missions Nonmilitary missions

Acts as the lead federal agency and follows orders issued by the
President, as Commander- in- Chief.

Supports a lead federal agency. Performs missions under extraordinary
circumstances that do not necessarily have defined end dates.

Provides support on a temporary or emergency basis with agreed upon end
dates. Generally cannot reject these missions. Has some discretion to
accept or reject

these missions based on six established criteria and uses an approval
process guided by DOD Directive 3025.15 a to determine whether to provide
the requested support. Applies military combat capabilities that only DOD
possesses. Augments U. S. civil authorities*

capabilities with DOD*s own military assets or capabilities from its
existing force, which are applied in a non- combat manner. Source: GAO
analysis. a Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, Feb. 18, 1997.

Military missions involve coordinated military actions, such as campaigns,
engagements, or strikes, by one or more of the services* combat forces.
Operations Desert Storm in 1991 and Iraqi Freedom in 2003 are examples of
overseas military missions, and Operation Noble Eagle is a domestic

military mission started on September 11, 2001, and continuing today. In 6
Stop Loss authority is provided by 10 U. S. C. S:12305 (2002). It
authorizes the President to suspend any provision of law relating to the
promotion, retirement, or separation of any member of the armed forces
when members of a reserve component are called to active

duty and the President determines the forces are essential to the national
security of the United States. DOD*s Military and

Nonmilitary Missions Differ

Page 5 GAO- 03- 677T

the latter mission, the President directed the Commander, North American
Aerospace Defense Command, to order combat air patrols to identify and
intercept suspect aircraft operating in the United States. Since these are
military missions, DOD is the lead federal agency and is prepared to apply

its combat power if needed. Requests for nonmilitary missions are
evaluated against criteria contained in DOD*s Directive, Military
Assistance to Civil Authorities. 7 These requests generally seek DOD
support to help alleviate suffering, recover from disasters or assist
indirectly with law enforcement. 8 DOD*s directive specifies that requests
for nonmilitary support be evaluated against the following criteria:

 legality (compliance with laws),  lethality (potential use of lethal
force by or against DOD forces),  risk (safety of DOD forces),  cost
(who pays, impact on the DOD budget),  appropriateness (whether the
requested mission is in the interest of DOD

to conduct), and  readiness (impact on DOD*s ability to perform its
primary mission).

According to DOD, in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, it supported over 230
nonmilitary missions in a variety of settings, such as assisting in
fighting wildfires, recovering from tropical storms, providing post-
September 11, 2001, assistance to New York City and Virginia, providing
support for the presidential inauguration, and for other purposes.
According to DOD, during this same period, the Department rejected a
handful of missions based on the above criteria.

7 DOD Directive 3025.15, Feb. 18, 1997, which establishes DOD policy and
assigns responsibility for providing military assistance to civil
authorities. 8 DOD Directive 5525.5 provides specific guidance on requests
for law enforcement assistance. DOD Evaluates

Requests for Assistance from Civil Authorities Against Established
Criteria

Page 6 GAO- 03- 677T

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act 9 prohibits the use of the Army and Air Force
*to execute the laws* of the United States except where authorized by the
Constitution or Acts of Congress. Federal courts have interpreted *to
execute the laws* to mean the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of
federal military troops in an active role of direct civilian law
enforcement. 10 Direct involvement in law enforcement includes search,
seizure, and arrest. 11 The act does not apply to military operations at
home or abroad. Further, it does not apply to National Guard personnel
when under the direct command of states* governors.

Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in certain
situations. For example, DOD can use its personnel and equipment to:

 assist with drug interdiction and other law enforcement functions (10 U.
S. C. S:S: 371- 378 (excluding S:375));  protect civil rights or
property, or suppress insurrection (the Civil

Disturbance Statutes; 10 U. S. C. S:S: 331- 334); 12  assist the U. S.
Secret Service (18 U. S. C. S:3056 Notes);  protect nuclear materials and
assist with solving crimes involving nuclear materials (18 U. S. C.
S:831);  assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction

(10 U. S. C. S:382); and  assist with the execution of quarantine and
certain health laws

(42 U. S. C. S:S: 97- 98). The President identified as a major homeland
security initiative a review of the legal authority for military
assistance in domestic security, which would include the Posse Comitatus
Act. The President maintained that the *threat of catastrophic terrorism
requires a thorough review of the laws permitting the military to act
within the United States in order to determine whether domestic
preparedness and response efforts would benefit from greater involvement
of military personnel and, if so, how.* 13 9 18 U. S. C. S:1385 (2002).

10 See, for example, United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D. S.
D. 1975). 11 DOD Directive 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law
Enforcement Officials

provides other examples of prohibited direct involvement. 12 DOD Directive
3025.12, Feb. 4, 1994, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances, which
identifies policy and responsibilities governing the planning and response
by DOD for its assistance to civil authorities, including law enforcement.
13 National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security,
July 2002. The Posse Comitatus

Act Restricts DOD*s Role in Civilian Law Enforcement

Page 7 GAO- 03- 677T

In addition to this review, the Congress directed DOD to review and report
on the legal implications of members of the Armed Forces operating on
United States territory and the potential legal impediments affecting
DOD*s role in supporting homeland security. 14 In March, 2003, the
Commander of U. S. Northern Command has stated, *We believe the [Posse
Comitatus] Act, as amended, provides the authority we need to do our job,
and no modification is needed at this time.* 15 At the time of our review,

neither the President*s nor the congressionally directed legal reviews had
been completed. It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD*s new
management organizations or its plans, although forces may not be fully
tailored to the current domestic missions. DOD has established new
organizations for domestic missions at the policy and operational levels,
and written a new campaign plan for the defense of the United States. At
the same time, DOD has used existing forces for these missions since
September 11, 2001. However, at the time of our review, the organizations
were not yet fully operational; plans had been developed before issuance
of a

counterterrorism threat assessment and before DOD officials had reached
agreement on the nature of the threat; and force capabilities were not
well matched to their domestic missions, potentially leading to an erosion
of military readiness.

Two new organizations* the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense and U. S. Northern Command* together provide long-
term policy direction, planning, and execution capability but are not yet
fully operational, because they have only recently been established and
are not fully staffed. Because these organizations had only recently been

activated and were still being staffed and structured, we did not evaluate
the adequacy of these organizations for their missions. 14 The Bob Stump
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, P. L. 107- 314,
(Dec. 2, 2002), Sec. 921( 7) Report on Establishment of the United States
Northern Command and Sec. 1404( 11) Report on the Role of the Department
of Defense in Supporting Homeland Security.

15 Statement of General Ralph E. Eberhart, U. S. Air Force, Commander, U.
S. Northern Command and North Aerospace Defense Command, before the House
Committee on Armed Services, March 13, 2003. The Adequacy of New

Management Organizations, Plans, and Forces for Domestic Missions

New DOD Organizations to Address Military Domestic Missions Are Not Yet
Fully Operational

Page 8 GAO- 03- 677T

The Senate confirmed the President*s nominee to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense in February 2003, but this office was not
fully operational at the time of our review, with approximately one- third
of the staff positions filled. The new Assistant Secretary is to provide
overall

supervision for domestic missions. U. S. Northern Command was established
by the President in an April 2002 revision to the Unified Command Plan 16
and was activated in October 2002. However, the command is not planned to
be fully operational until

October 2003. As of last week, only about 46 percent of the command*s
positions had been filled. During our trip to U. S. Northern Command, we
found that a key challenge that the command is grappling with is the need
to conduct its ongoing missions while staffing the command*s positions.
The activation of the command marks the first time that there has been a
unity of command for military activities within the continental United

States. Prior to U. S. Northern Command*s activation, U. S. Joint Forces
Command provided for military actions to defend U. S. territory from land-
and sea- based threats. The North American Aerospace Defense Command
defended the United States from airborne threats (and still does). The
Commander of U. S. Northern Command is also the Commander of the North
American Aerospace Defense Command providing the new unity of command for
the three missions.

DOD*s planning process requires the Department and the services to staff,
train, and equip forces for their military missions as outlined in
campaign plans and deliberate plans 17 developed by the combatant
commanders, including the Commander of U. S. Northern Command. U. S.
Northern Command*s campaign plan was completed in October 2002 and is
classified. However, I can note, that although it may reflect current
intelligence from DOD and other intelligence community sources, it was
completed before the January 2003 issuance of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation*s counterterrorism threat assessment, so it may not take all
threats into account. Moreover, an official in the Office of the Secretary
of 16 Unified Command Plans provide guidance to the combatant commanders
and establish

their missions, responsibilities, force structure, and geographic areas of
responsibility, among other things.

17 Campaign plans represent the combatant commander*s vision of the
arrangement of operations to attain strategic objectives. Deliberate plans
are designed to use forces and apportion resources for potential
contingencies. The Nature of the Threat

Was Still Under Discussion When the Campaign Plan Was Written

Page 9 GAO- 03- 677T

Defense acknowledged that DOD officials continue to debate the nature of
the threat to U. S. territory, thus DOD itself has not yet reached
internal agreement on the nature of the threat facing the United States.
Based on our review, DOD*s forces are not tailored for some of the

missions that they have been performing since September 11, 2001, and the
result could be eventual erosion of military readiness. To respond to the
terrorist attacks of that day, the President identified the need to
protect U. S. cities from air attack, and in response, DOD deployed 338
Air force and about 20 Navy aircraft within 24 hours of the attacks. Air
Force

fighter aircraft flew continuously from September 11, 2001, through March
2002, and intermittently thereafter. These combat patrols continue today.
While these forces may obtain some training benefit from actually

conducting the mission, the benefit is limited by the narrow scope of
maneuvers performed during these missions. Specifically, Air Force and Air
National Guard fighter units performing domestic combat air patrols are
inhibited from executing the full range of difficult, tactical maneuvers
with the frequency that the Air Force requires to prepare for their combat
missions. In one Air National Guard wing that we reviewed, the average
pilot could not meet their training requirements in 9 out of 13 months
between September 2001 and September 2002. Consequently, such units may
need to resume training after domestic combat air patrols end or they

are reassigned, to ensure their readiness for combat operations, their
primary missions. Similarly, DOD identified the need to enhance
installation security, and it subsequently deployed active, reserve, and
National Guard military police units for the mission. However, these units
were designed for a different mission, and received limited training
benefit from the domestic mission. For example, officials at a military
police internment and resettlement battalion told us that while the
battalion can provide installation security, its primary mission is to
operate enemy prisoner of war camps. Instead, for nearly a year, the
battalion carried out a domestic installation security mission, which
while important, prevented the battalion from completing required training
for its primary overseas combat mission. As a result, the battalion*s
military readiness may become eroded, which could mean accepting an
increased risk to the battalion if it deploys or resuming training before
it deploys again. DOD*s Forces Are Not

Tailored to Conduct LongTerm Military Missions Domestically

Page 10 GAO- 03- 677T

Current overseas and domestic missions are stressing U. S. forces as
measured in personnel tempo data. DOD believes that if servicemembers
spend too much time away from home, a risk exists that they will leave the
service and military readiness may ultimately suffer.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 18 requires
that DOD formally track and manage for the number of days that each member
of the armed forces is deployed and established two thresholds*
servicemembers deployed more than 182 or 220 days away from home out of
the preceding 365 days. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2001 19 established a third threshold, which requires that
servicemembers who are deployed for 401 or more days out of the preceding
730- day (2- year) period receive a $100 high deployment per diem
allowance. 20 Between September 2001 and December 2002, personnel tempo
increased dramatically for Army and Air Force personnel due to ongoing
missions or commitments around the world and their increasing

support of Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. 21 DOD data that
we obtained indicated tempo is high and increasing. For example, as shown
in figure 1, in September 2001, over 6,600 Army personnel (including
active, reserve, and National Guard personnel) had exceeded a desired
threshold, spending 182 to 219 days away from home during the previous 365
days. By December 2002, that number had risen to over 13,000. During the
same period, the number spending 220 to 365 days away, had risen from
about 800 to over 18,000.

18 P. L. 106- 65 (Oct. 5, 1999), S:586( a) (codified at 10 U. S. C.
S:991). 19 P. L. 106- 398 (Oct. 30, 2000), S:574( c) (codified at 37 U. S.
C. S:436). 20 On October 8, 2001, DOD suspended the counting of deployed
days for payment purposes as permitted by law. Moreover, the statutory
requirement for general and flag officers to personally manage the
deployments of servicemembers exceeding the 182- and 220- day thresholds
was also suspended at the same time.

21 The data does not include the impact on personnel tempo stemming from
participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom, which is not yet fully
available. Operation Enduring Freedom is the ongoing military mission in
Afghanistan. While the Navy and Marine Corps did not experience high
levels of personnel tempo during the October 2000 to December 2002 time
frame, their tempo may have increased due in part to deployments for
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Increased Overseas

and Domestic Missions Add to High Army and Air Force Personnel Tempo

Page 11 GAO- 03- 677T

Figure 1: Army Personnel Exceeding the Desired Personnel Tempo Thresholds

Note: Each data point represents the total number of servicemembers away
from home in the preceding 365 days from the last day of the month
indicated.

The Air Force reported similar trends. As shown in figure 2, in September
2001, about 2,100 Air Force servicemembers were away from home for 182 to
219 days, but that had risen to about 8,300 by December 2002. Also, as
with the Army, Air Force servicemembers away 220 to 365 days had risen

from about 1,600 to over 22,100.

Page 12 GAO- 03- 677T

Figure 2: Air Force Personnel Exceeding the Desired Personnel Tempo
Thresholds

Note: Each data point represents the total number of servicemembers away
from home in the preceding 365 days from the last day of the month
indicated.

The number of Air Force active, Air Force reserve, and Air National Guard
Air Force personnel exceeding the third personnel tempo threshold of 401
or more days away from home in the preceding 730- day period also
increased during the latter period of 2002, starting at about 3,700
personnel in September 2002 and rising to more than 8,100 servicemembers
in December 2002. Of those, about one- half of these personnel were Air
National Guard personnel, some of whom were tasked with conducting air
sovereignty alert missions in the continental United States. 22 In
September 2002, 1,900 had spent more than 401 days away from 22 These
servicemembers are deployed from their home to another installation in the
United

States.

Page 13 GAO- 03- 677T

home over a 2- year period. By December 2002, the number of Air National
Guard personnel spending more than 401 days away from home had increased
to about 3,900. Exceeding the threshold on a sustained basis can indicate
an inadequacy in the force structure or the mix of forces.

DOD has recognized the potential for retention problems stemming from the
current high personnel tempo but has balanced that against immediate
critical skill needs to support ongoing operations. Therefore, to prevent
servicemembers with key skills from leaving the services, DOD issued
orders to prevent degradation in combat capabilities, an action known as
stop loss authority. DOD took these actions because it recognized that
individuals with certain key skills* such as personnel in Army military
police and Air Force fighter units* were needed, in some cases, to perform
the increasing number of military domestic missions. These orders affected
personnel with designated individual job skills or in some cases all of
the individuals in specific types of units that were critical for overseas
combat and military domestic missions. Officials from the four services
who manage the implementation of these

orders cautioned that they are short- term tools designed to maintain
unitlevel military readiness for overseas combat and military domestic
missions. Moreover, the officials added that the orders are not to be used
as a long- term solution to address mismatches or shortfalls in
capabilities and requirements, or as a substitute for the routine
recruiting, induction, and training of new servicemembers. Mr. Chairman,
this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have.

Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

For future questions about this statement, please contact Raymond J.
Decker at (202) 512- 6020. Individuals making key contributions to this
statement include Brian J. Lepore, Deborah Colantonio, Richard K. Geiger,
Kevin L. O*Neill, William J. Rigazio, Susan K. Woodward, and Michael C.
Zola.

Page 14 GAO- 03- 677T

Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to
Terrorism. GAO- 03- 519T. Washington, D. C.: March 3, 2003.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland
Security. GAO- 03- 102. Washington, D. C.: January 2003.

Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership. GAO-
03- 260. Washington, D. C.: December 20, 2002.

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success. GAO- 02- 1013T. Washington, D. C.: August 23, 2002.

Reserve Forces: DOD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations between
Reservists and Their Employers. GAO- 02- 608. Washington, D. C.: June 13,
2002.

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
Uncertainty Remains. GAO- 02- 610. Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002.

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO- 02- 208T. Washington, D. C.: October 31, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations. GAO-
01- 822. Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal
Response. GAO- 01- 660T. Washington, D. C.: April 24, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National
Strategy. GAO- 01- 556T. Washington, D. C.: March 27, 2001.

Military Personnel: Full Extent of Support to Civil Authorities Unknown
but Unlikely to Adversely Impact Retention. GAO- 01- 9. Washington, D. C.:
January 26, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities:
Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination.

GAO- 01- 14. Washington, D. C.: November 30, 2000.

Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources.

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 218. Washington, D. C.: July 26, 2000. Related GAO
Products

Page 15 GAO- 03- 677T

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological
Terrorism. GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 50. Washington, D. C.: October 20, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of
Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 163. Washington, D. C.:
September 7, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism
Operations. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 135. Washington, D. C.: May 13, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism.
GAO/ T- NSIAD/ GGD- 99- 107. Washington, D. C.: March 11, 1999. Combating
Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues.

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 164. Washington, D. C.: April 23, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and
Target Program Investments. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 74. Washington, D. C.: April
9, 1998. Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs

Requires Better Management and Coordination. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 39.
Washington, D. C.: December 1, 1997. Combating Terrorism: Federal
Agencies* Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy. GAO/ NSIAD-
97- 254. Washington, D. C.: September 26,

1997.

(350364)

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