Military Transformation: Army's Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3
Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for		 
Statutorily Mandated Comparison (30-MAY-03, GAO-03-671).	 
                                                                 
The first step of the U.S. Army's ongoing transformation was to  
form two of six planned Interim, or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams
and equip the brigades with a new interim armored vehicle--the	 
Stryker. The fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act 
required the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan to compare  
the operational effectiveness and cost of an infantry carrier	 
variant of the Stryker and a medium Army armored vehicle, the	 
Department of Defense's (DOD) director of testing and evaluation 
approve the plan, and the Army to conduct the operational	 
effectiveness and cost comparison. The Secretary of Defense was  
also to certify to Congress that Stryker Brigades did not	 
diminish the Army's combat power. As part of a series of ongoing 
reviews of Army transformation, GAO monitored the Army's 2002	 
efforts to (1) assess whether the Army's plan for the comparison 
met the legislative requirements and (2) determine whether the	 
evaluation's resulting data were sufficient to measure the two	 
vehicles' relative effectiveness.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-671 					        
    ACCNO:   A07032						        
  TITLE:     Military Transformation: Army's Evaluation of Stryker and
M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for	 
Statutorily Mandated Comparison 				 
     DATE:   05/30/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Evaluation 					 
	     Military vessels					 
	     Comparative analysis				 
	     M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier			 
	     Stryker Armored Vehicle				 

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GAO-03-671

                                       A

Report to Congressional Committees

May 2003 MILITARY TRANSFORMATION Army*s Evaluation of Stryker and M- 113A3
Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily
Mandated Comparison

GAO- 03- 671

Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Army*s Comparative Evaluation
Plan Met Legislative

Requirements 7 Evaluation Provided Sufficient Data for Comparison of
Vehicles 11 Secretary of Defense Certified to the Combat Power of the Army

and Released Funding for the Third Brigade*s Vehicles 21 Agency Comments
22 Scope and Methodology 22

Appendixes

Appendix I: Section from Public Law 106- 398 Concerning Limitations on
Army Transformation Actions 26

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 29 Table Table 1:
Data Source Matrix for the Issues and Sub- Issues in the Army*s Evaluation
Plan of the Medium Armored

Vehicles (MAV) 9 Figures Figure 1: Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle 5

Figure 2: M- 113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier 6 Figure 3: Stryker Infantry
Carrier Ingress Excursion 16 Figure 4: M- 113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier
Egress Excursion 17

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense MANPRINT Manpower and Personnel Integration MAV
Medium Armored Vehicles PA& E Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate

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May 30, 2003 Let er t Congressional Committees

In early 2000, the U. S. Army began transforming its force to one that is
expected to be more strategically responsive, rapidly deployable, and able
to effectively operate in all types of military operations, whether small-
scale contingencies or major theater wars. The first step was to form two
of six planned Interim, or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams and equip the
brigades with a new interim armored vehicle known as the Stryker. The

first two brigades are located at Fort Lewis, Washington. Because these
brigades are an entirely new organizational design, many questions have
arisen as to the unit*s cost, combat effectiveness, and suitability. In
the fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act, 1 Congress
required

 the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan for comparing the
operational effectiveness and cost of an infantry carrier variant of the
interim armored vehicle and a medium armored vehicle currently in the Army
inventory, although the legislation did not provide specifics regarding
the comparison;

 the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of
Defense (DOD) to approve the comparison plan before the Army could carry
it out;

 the Army to conduct the operational effectiveness and cost comparison;
and

 the Secretary of Defense to certify that the Stryker brigade combat team
did not diminish the Army*s combat power. The statute further provided
that vehicles for the third brigade could not be acquired until 30 days
after the certification.

See appendix I for the full text of the law. 1 Floyd D. Spence National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, P. L. 106- 398 (Oct. 30,
2000).

On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we monitored and
assessed the Army*s efforts during 2002 to meet the requirements of the
legislation. In doing so, we observed operational training events held at
Fort Lewis, Washington, which the Army used to collect comparison data,
and a vehicle survivability test at Aberdeen Proving Ground,

Maryland. Our objectives were to (1) assess whether the Army*s plan for
the comparison met the legislative requirements and (2) determine whether
the results of the evaluation provided the data needed to measure the
relative effectiveness of the two vehicles. The report also discusses the
Secretary of Defense*s report to Congress and certification regarding the
combat power of the Army. We are providing this report, our fifth in a
planned series related to Army transformation, 2 to you because of your
committees* oversight responsibility.

Results in Brief The Army developed a plan, approved by DOD*s Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, which met the requirements of the fiscal
year 2001

National Defense Authorization Act. As contained in the congressional
mandate, the plan proposed comparing the operational effectiveness and
cost of the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the troop- carrying
medium armored vehicle currently in the Army inventory* the M- 113A3
armored personnel carrier. With regard to operational effectiveness, the
plan*s scope included the use of various data, such as that obtained
during operational vignettes and technical testing. The plan focused on
three main comparison issues relating to the armored vehicles* their
effectiveness, suitability in support of infantry units such as vehicle
employment and maintenance, and survivability during operational missions.
Regarding the cost comparison, the plan proposed that a comprehensive cost
analysis be conducted between the two vehicles.

2 U. S. General Accounting Office, Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of
External Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the Congressionally
Mandated Review of the Army*s Operational Evaluation Plan, GAO- 03- 484R
(Washington, D. C.: Mar. 28, 2003);

Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of
Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams, GAO- 02- 442 (Washington, D. C.: May
17, 2002); Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for
Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges, GAO- 02- 96
(Washington, D. C.: Nov. 16, 2001); Defense Acquisition: Army
Transformation Faces Weapons Systems Challenges, GAO- 01- 311 (Washington,
D. C.: May 21, 2001).

Based on our observation and analysis of evaluation plans and results, the
Army*s implementation of the plan provided sufficient data to determine
the relative effectiveness of the vehicles. The Army conducted and
evaluated eight operational training events per vehicle type and data from
technical tests to compare the operational effectiveness, suitability, and
survivability between the two vehicles. Prior to the operational
vignettes, all participants and evaluators received training pertinent to
their roles. The Army also conducted a comprehensive cost analysis as part
of the plan. After analyzing the Army*s cost plan and data, we found that
the costs used were reasonable and provided sufficient data to determine
the relative cost of the two vehicles. Based on the results of the
evaluation, the

Secretary of Defense certified to Congress that the Stryker brigade combat
team did not diminish the combat power of the Army. The Secretary of
Defense also approved obligating funds for the Stryker vehicles to equip

the third brigade. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred
with the report*s findings.

Background In October 1999, the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the
Army unveiled their vision to transform the U. S. Army into a more
strategically

responsive force that could dominate across the full spectrum of military
operations* from small- scale contingencies to a major theater war. In
testimony before the U. S. Senate in March 2000, 3 the Chief of Staff of
the Army stated that the Army had to transform to meet current and future
strategic requirements such as the rise of sub- national and

transnational groups, including criminal and terrorist elements that may
pursue objectives that threaten U. S. interests. The Army believes that
the transformation is necessary to respond more effectively to (1) the
growing number of peacekeeping operations and small- scale contingencies
and (2) the challenges posed by nontraditional threats such as urban
operations in biological/ chemical environments. The Army plans to
transform its forces over a 30- year period.

In initial efforts to meet this new vision, the Army*s Training and
Doctrine Command developed a concept that described the capabilities,
organization, and operations of a new brigade combat team. This brigade

3 Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate, Mar. 1,
2000.

would provide a capability that the Army did not possess: a rapidly
deployable, early- entry combat force that is lethal, survivable, and
capable of operating in all types of military operations, from small-
scale

contingencies to a major theater of war. As an early- entry force, the
brigade is expected to have sufficient built- in combat power to conduct
immediate combat operations upon arrival in theater if required. The
brigade would be formed around a new, medium weight, armored vehicle. The
Army chose

an armored wheeled vehicle, designated as the Stryker, as its primary
combat platform. The Army selected one light infantry brigade and one
mechanized infantry brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington, to become the first
Stryker brigade combat teams. The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division
was selected to transform first.

Congress supported the Army*s efforts to transform into a force that not
only was lethal, versatile, suitable, and survivable but could also deploy
rapidly. However, members agreed that the Army must conduct an evaluation
that compared the operational effectiveness and cost between a medium
armored vehicle currently in the Army*s inventory and the Stryker Infantry
Carrier vehicle planned for the brigades. The comparative evaluation was
formalized in the fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act. For
the comparison, the Army selected the M- 113A3 armored personnel carrier
as the medium armored vehicle currently in the inventory. Figures 1 and 2
show the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the M- 113A3, respectively.
The Army began conducting the comparison in September 2002.

Figure 1: Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle

Source: GAO.

Figure 2: M- 113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier

Source: GAO.

Army*s Comparative The Army- developed and the DOD Operational Test and
Evaluation

Evaluation Plan Director- approved plan for evaluating the Stryker
Infantry Carrier vehicle

and the M- 113A3 armored personnel carrier, currently in the Army*s Met
Legislative inventory, met legislative requirements to compare both
operational

Requirements effectiveness and cost. The Army developed a plan that
compared the operational effectiveness and cost between the two vehicles.
The

congressional mandate did not provide specifics regarding the comparison
but specified that DOD*s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
approve the Army*s plan. 4 The purpose of the plan was to (1) assess and
compare measures of operational effectiveness, suitability, and
survivability and (2) compare the costs of the two vehicles. As required
by the statute, the DOD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
approved the operational effectiveness portion of the plan in August 2002
and the cost comparison portion in December 2002.

Army*s Plan Evaluated The primary objective of the comparison evaluation
was to assess Operational Effectiveness, and compare measures of
operational effectiveness, suitability, and

Suitability, and Survivability survivability for each of the vehicles. The
Army Test and Evaluation of the Two Vehicles

Command developed a detailed comparison evaluation plan that, as the law
required, was approved by DOD*s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
on August 23, 2002. 5 The plan*s scope included using existing

data and data developed during physical examination of the vehicles,
modeling and simulation, and live fire testing of vehicle- mounted
weapons. Data collected from production verification tests that evaluated
vehicle performance* such as braking, acceleration, traction, and
sustained speed over various types of terrain* was also included. The
operational portion of the comparison involved a series of platoon level
tasks, including operations in complex rural terrain and urban areas under
various light and weather conditions. The plan focused on 3 main
comparison issues and 10 sub- issues. The main comparison issues were
defined as follows:

4 The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is the principal advisor
to the Secretary of Defense, concerning operational testing, including
assessments of operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability
of the items tested.

5 The Army Test and Evaluation Command is the Army*s independent
operational test activity and is responsible for overall management of the
Army test and evaluation programs.

 Effectiveness: How well the unit performs and what capabilities the
vehicles provide in support of operational missions.

 Suitability: How the vehicles are deployed, operated, and logistically
supported while performing tasks that support the infantry platoons in
conducting their missions.

 Survivability: How well the vehicles protect the crew and infantry
squad, vehicle system survivability, and the effect of vehicle damage on
mission performance.

The plan included evaluating each of the issues and sub- issues (see table
1) during various evaluation events. These events included examination,
modeling and simulation, technical testing, and operational testing.

 Examination: A review and analysis of available vehicle design and
performance data. The vehicles would be physically examined to obtain
specific measures and characteristics. Existing data was the primary
source, but other appropriate data sources such as historical data were
also used.

 Modeling and Simulation: Application of existing and collected data to
determine the mobility characteristics of the vehicles.

 Technical Testing: The measurement of demonstrated performance
characteristics and capabilities not available through existing data or
modeling and simulation. Additional data were provided from events held
during the acquisition process and ballistic survivability testing at the
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, test center.

 Operational Testing: The Army designed operational vignettes to directly
compare two equally organized and trained infantry platoons. The platoons
conducted identical tasks and missions against a common opposing force
with one platoon employing the M- 113A3 and the other

employing the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle. The opposing force
consisted of mounted and dismounted military units, paramilitary forces,
and civilians.

Table 1: Data Source Matrix for the Issues and Sub- Issues in the Army*s
Evaluation Plan of the Medium Armored Vehicles (MAV) DATA SOURCE MATRIX

Modeling and Operational Evaluation Event Examination Simulation Technical
Testing Testing

Issue 1. Effectiveness. Does the vehicle support infantry operations? Sub-
Issue 1- 1. Mission Support

The MAV must support infantry platoon missions and tasks. X

Sub- Issue 1- 2. Payload

The MAV must provide the capability to effectively stow and transport
personnel and prescribed equipment. X XX

Sub- Issue 1- 3. Tactical Mobility

At gross combat weight, the MAV must demonstrate on- road and off- road
mobility characteristics that support the conduct of combat missions. X XX
X

Sub- Issue 1- 4. Firepower

The MAV crew must be able to employ the primary weapon systems to acquire,
identify, engage, and defeat both point and area targets during the day
and during periods of limited visibility. X XX

Issue 2. Suitability. Is the vehicle suitable for infantry operations?
Modeling and Operational Evaluation Event Examination Simulation Technical
Testing Testing

Sub- Issue 2- 1. Transportability

The MAV must be strategically transportable and deployable by C- 17 and/
or C- 5 aircraft to deploy the unit into a theater of operations. The MAV

must also be transportable by C- 130 for intratheater deployment. X X

Sub- Issue 2- 2. Reliability and Maintainability

The MAV must demonstrate acceptable reliability and maintainability
characteristics to permit the brigade to complete its designated

mission. X XX

Sub- Issue 2- 3. Integrated Logistics Support

The MAV must be logistically supportable with existing and special tools,
and the specified support and test equipment; demonstrate detection and
isolation of component failures using its built- in test capability; and
demonstrate an adequate power management capability. X XX

(Continued From Previous Page)

DATA SOURCE MATRIX Modeling and Operational Evaluation Event Examination
Simulation Technical Testing Testing

Sub- Issue 2- 4. Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT)

The MAV must demonstrate characteristics that address human capabilities
and limitations to enhance soldier performance and system operational
effectiveness. X XX

Issue 3. Survivability. Does the vehicle provide protection for crew and
system survivability? Modeling and Operational Evaluation Event
Examination Simulation Technical Testing Testing

Sub- Issue 3- 1. Ballistic Protection

The MAV must meet the following requirements: (1) Minimum direct fire
ballistic protection levels in terms of integral 7. 62- mm armor- piercing
and 14.5- mm and hand- held High Explosive AntiTank

weapons; (2) Overhead crew and passenger indirect fire ballistic
protection against 152- mm high explosive airburst; (3) All- around crew
and passenger protection against blast and overpressure effects of anti-
personnel mines X XX

Sub- Issue 3- 2. Non- Ballistic Protection

The vehicle must perform its mission under battlefield conditions,
including the presence of non- ballistic threats. X XX X

Source: GAO analysis of the U. S. Army Test and Evaluation Command*s
comparison evaluation plan.

Army Compared Costs as The Army directed its Cost and Economic Analysis
Center to conduct a

Required by the Statute cost comparison between the Stryker Infantry
Carrier vehicle and the

M- 113A3 armored personnel carrier. The Analysis Center developed a plan
to determine and compare the life- cycle costs of the Stryker vehicle to
the life- cycle costs of the M- 113A3 currently in the Army inventory. The
Army directed that the Analysis Center examine the costs of equipping,
training, fielding, and maintaining the vehicles for use in the Stryker

brigades. To determine these costs, the Analysis Center emphasized the
costs associated with vehicle manufacturing, military personnel,
replenishment parts, and fuel/ petroleum for each vehicle. On October 4,
2002, the Army submitted the cost comparison portion of the plan to the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, for approval. As required by
the law, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, officially
approved that portion on December 17, 2002, as the Secretary of the Army
submitted the comparison evaluation report to DOD.

Evaluation Provided Based on our observation of the vignettes, unit and
evaluator training, and

Sufficient Data a technical test and on our analysis of the test results
and review of cost

comparison assumptions, the Army*s conduct of the Army Test and for
Comparison

Evaluation Command plan produced enough data to gauge the relative of
Vehicles

effectiveness and cost of the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the M-
113A3 armored personnel carrier. To ensure competency during evaluation
events, the Army certified that the units conducting the

operational vignettes received comparable amounts of training in their
vehicles and that the evaluators were familiar with appropriate infantry
tactics and doctrine. The purpose of the comparison evaluation plan was to
collect data to measure the relative effectiveness, suitability, and
survivability of both vehicles. To do so, the plan consisted of
operational vignettes, augmented by gunnery exercises, modeling and
simulations; physical and other vehicle examinations; and technical
testing. Comparison data included surveys, results of force on force
exercises, and mission

success and task performance ratings. The plan also assessed the costs of
both vehicles.

Unit and Evaluators Prior to conducting the operational effectiveness
segment of the Certified Prior to Conduct

comparison evaluation, the two infantry platoons and the event evaluators
of Operational Vignettes

received training specific to their roles in the comparison. The two
infantry platoons received training that ensured all participating
personnel were proficient with the vehicles, digitized equipment, and the
associated support equipment. For example, one platoon trained on the
Stryker vehicle while the other trained on the M- 113A3 vehicle. All
vehicle commanders were trained on the M2 .50- caliber machine gun and the
MK19 grenade launcher* the weapon systems for the two types of vehicles.
The

two platoons participated in a 20- day training exercise and practiced
incorporating the use of the two types of vehicles in missions assigned to
a platoon in a Stryker brigade combat team. The brigade commander
certified that the two platoons were trained according to doctrine and
that both were similarly manned and trained.

During the comparison evaluation, subject matter experts 6 evaluated the
units* performance during each operational vignette. Similar to the

6 Subject matter experts are usually noncommissioned officers who have
extensive experience with the studied equipment, recent unit experience,
and a background as a trainer or in training development.

two platoons* personnel, the evaluators were certified as trained in
current Infantry doctrine and tactics. Furthermore, personnel from the
Army Test and Evaluation Command trained the subject matter experts in
data collection methods, test instrumentation, and familiarization of the
vehicle

types and the terrain in which the vehicles were compared. Prior to
conducting the operational vignettes, the evaluators participated in a
pilot test where full data collection and test controls were rehearsed.
After completing the pilot test, test officials certified that the subject
matter experts were trained and that they complied with the established
data collection procedures. The subject matter experts observed each unit
and recorded comments on task performance and mission success by filling
out performance matrices. Upon completion of an event, Army Test and
Evaluation Command data collectors harvested and validated data

collected during that particular activity. All data collected and
validated were included in the Army*s database and analyzed by the Army
Test and Evaluation Command.

Vignettes, Gunnery, and Effectiveness is an assessment of the extent to
which a vehicle allows Modeling and Simulation

a unit to successfully perform tasks in support of infantry platoons Used
to Determine

conducting missions in an operational environment. To determine
Operational Effectiveness

effectiveness, the Army compared the two vehicles* capability to (1)
support infantry platoon missions, (2) move around the battlefield, (3)
store and move personnel and equipment, and (4) employ their weapon
systems during day, night, and limited visibility conditions. Data for the

comparison came from operational vignettes, gunnery, physical examination
of the vehicles, modeling and simulation, technical testing, and
operational testing of the vehicles. The most visible of these data
sources were the operational vignettes conducted at Fort Lewis, and the
other data collection methods augmented those findings.

The Army conducted the comparison of the two types of vehicles during a
scheduled training event held from September 12 to October 2, 2002, at
Fort Lewis. The comparison, used to assess mission support, payload, and
mobility, included two 2- hour road marches and two platoon- level
training exercises designed by the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry
Division and approved by the Army Test and Evaluation Command. During each
exercise, the vehicles were loaded with all unit

personnel and equipment according to unit procedures. The two road
marches* designed to demonstrate the vehicles* ability to move on and off
road, store and transport personnel and equipment, and provide

human factors data* were conducted over varying terrain like paved and
gravel roads, rutted and uneven trails.

The operational vignettes required the platoons to execute selected small-
scale contingency missions such as a raid or an attack with events lasting
from 12 to 17 hours. The evaluations were conducted in environments
designed to ensure similar training and conditions for both platoons and
vehicles. For example, the missions were conducted in the same light
conditions, against the same opposing force and using the same doctrine
and tactics. Fort Lewis* terrain is densely wooded and open and
undulating. Rocky terrain is common. During the vignettes, the vehicles
were operated over different types of terrain, including paved and gravel
roads, rutted and uneven wooded trails of varying slopes. In some
vignettes, the vehicles traversed loose soil about 3 to 6 inches in depth.
We observed that the Stryker and M- 113A3 vehicles were operated over the
same terrain during the operational vignettes.

The operational comparison was divided into two exercises. To compare how
the platoons employed the vehicles, we attended the same vignettes for
both exercises. We observed varying phases of the vignettes such as an
obstacle breach, checkpoint security operations, civilian disturbances,
and a rescue of endangered indigenous personnel to determine how the
subject matter experts and the data collection

personnel documented the key actions and outcomes as each of the platoons
conducted its tactical missions.

During the first phase of the training events, we observed that the
employment of the M- 113A3s and the Stryker infantry carriers was minimal.
For example, both platoon leaders used the vehicles primarily

as a troop transport and had their soldiers egress from the vehicles
before reaching the mission site. By doing so, the platoon leaders were
unable to support their mission by employing the vehicles* weapons system.
During the second training exercise, both platoons moved closer to the
mission site and used the vehicles* weapons system to support their
specific mission. Based on our observations and discussions with unit
leadership, we concluded that this was due to the units* limited amount of
experience in employing either of the vehicles. Other factors that
impacted the vehicles* employment included platoon composition and command
guidance. Both platoons were comprised of a mix of soldiers who had and
had not previously served in mechanized infantry units, and the employment
of the vehicle was entirely subjective on the part of the platoon
leadership. Neither platoon had published platoon or company

standard operating procedures for the vehicles. These observations and
conclusions on the employment of the vehicles were validated in the test
team observation section of the Test and Evaluation Command*s test data
report.

Although providing data for all of the sub- issues measuring
effectiveness, the Army augmented data collected from the vignettes
through gunnery exercises and modeling and simulation. Upon completion of
the vignettes, the Army sent both platoons to the Yakima Training Center,
Washington, to conduct gunnery exercises. While at the training center,
live fire of the weapons provided additional data to augment observations
from the vignettes and the previous technical testing. To further evaluate
mobility, the Army used modeling and simulation at Aberdeen Proving Ground
to

determine how well each vehicle would travel over different terrain types.
Measurements included movement over simulated terrain in Korea, Europe,
and Southwest Asia under both wet and dry weather conditions.

We did not observe any significant differences in the way the Army
compared the two vehicles during the operational vignettes. Subject matter
experts and test personnel were consistent in their data collection while
observing vignettes for both the Stryker and the M- 113A3 vehicles.
Moreover, the vignettes provided sufficient data to determine the relative
operational effectiveness of the two vehicles, and the additional data
collected accentuated the findings. According to the Army Test and
Evaluation Command, both vehicles enabled infantry squads to complete
platoon missions and effectively transport personnel and prescribed
equipment. The Stryker infantry carrier provided advantages in employing
its weapon systems and mobility during most situations, and the M- 113A3
had an advantage in off- road mobility.

Human Factors and Suitability is an assessment of the extent to which a
vehicle, when Technical Data Used to

deployed to an objective area, can maneuver, be maintained, and supported
Assess Vehicle Suitability

in combat operations. To determine suitability, the Army compared (1)
transportability, (2) reliability and maintainability, (3) integrated
logistics support, and (4) MANPRINT 7 data for the two vehicles. Primary
data for this comparison came from physical examination, technical
testing, and operational testing of the vehicles. Of the four areas used
to

7 MANPRINT data measures human factors such as vehicle ride- ability,
noise levels, and fatigue.

compare suitability, manpower and personnel integration was the only area
that occurred during events that we directly observed. Data collected for
the other three measures of suitability combined data and information from
a variety of sources.

Data collection for manpower and personnel integration occurred during the
vignettes at Fort Lewis and was used to compare the effect of the vehicles
on soldiers performing necessary tasks. The Army*s MANPRINT data
collection team collected both quantitative and qualitative data by
interviewing soldiers and collecting soldier surveys prior to and after
the completion of certain events. The primary events used to facilitate
MANPRINT collection were road marches and performance of common soldier
tasks. Postvignette interviews with soldiers were also used to

collect data. The road marches were used to determine the effect that
riding in vehicles had on soldiers* stress levels. Two self- assessment
questionnaires, one a list of adjectives that soldiers checked to indicate
their current feelings and the other an individual stress rating, were
administered prior to and after each road march. In addition, data
collectors took saliva samples from soldiers before and after each road
march to determine changes in soldiers* stress levels. 8 To facilitate a
comparison, soldiers rotated vehicles during the second road march.

To determine the effect of vehicles on common soldier tasks, the Army
designed short events, entitled excursions, to collect data on the effects
of entering and exiting the vehicles during a variety of different combat
situations. After the first road march, each platoon arrived into assembly
areas and conducted several excursions, with soldiers entering and exiting
vehicles under duress, in chemical protective gear and while conducting
casualty evacuations. Data collectors measured the length of time for each
of these excursions, and upon completion of all events, soldiers filled
out questionnaires. Figures 3 and 4 show examples of these excursions,
with soldiers entering a Stryker infantry carrier and leaving a M- 113A3.

8 Within saliva, there is an enzyme called amylase. Research has shown
that the concentration of salivary amylase reflects substances produced by
the body in response to stress.

Figure 3: Stryker Infantry Carrier Ingress Excursion

Source: GAO.

Figure 4: M- 113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier Egress Excursion

Source: GAO.

Upon completion of each training exercise, soldiers filled out another
series of questionnaires designed to gauge ergonomic factors.
Questionnaires, again administered by MANPRINT data collectors, asked
soldiers about sound level, space, seat comfort, ability to communicate
within the vehicle, situational awareness, and other safety issues.

To assess transportability, reliability and maintainability, and
integrated logistics support, the Army relied on existing data from
previous events, developed projections where data was lacking, or is in
the process of collecting additional data during the continuing
developmental testing. Using existing data, the Army determined that both
vehicles were

transportable; however, the M- 113A3 was more deployable by air because of
its reduced weight but less deployable by road because, for longer
distances, it required either rail or truck support. To assess the Stryker
vehicle*s reliability and maintainability, the Army is continuing to
collect data. While the Army is able to claim that there are no specific
failure patterns, the relatively low number of Stryker miles prevents a
statistically

reliable forecast. To assess the M- 113A3*s reliability and
maintainability, the Army primarily relied on existing data. Because the
system is still in development, the Army used projections to determine
that the Stryker vehicle is more logistically supportable because the
family of vehicles and higher gas mileage reduce the overall size of the
logistic footprint. For

example, the Stryker vehicles are built on a common chassis and thus
require fewer different parts. Moreover, the Stryker, as a wheeled-
vehicle, requires fewer mechanics to maintain it.

We did not observe any significant differences in the way the Army
compared suitability for both types of vehicles. According to our review
of the Army Test and Evaluation Command report, both vehicles are
transportable and both have manageable failures for maintenance and
reliability. In terms of human factors, the MANPRINT data indicate that
soldiers riding in a Stryker infantry carrier reported reduced fatigue;
more ability to move within, inside, and outside the vehicle; lower levels
of stress; less irritation; and a better ability to communicate than those
riding in a M- 113A3.

Vehicle Survivability Survivability is an assessment of the extent to
which a vehicle survives

Assessed against a under different threat conditions and protects the crew
and the

Variety of Threats equipment. The Army*s Test and Evaluation Command
decided that vehicle

survivability would be determined through a comparison of existing test
data, technical data, and modeling and simulation. The vehicles had to

demonstrate that they could provide an adequate level of protection to the
infantry squad and vehicle crew against threats such as small arms,
artillery, and mines. The M113A3 was designed to provide protection

against a standard 7. 62mm threat. The Army intended the Stryker to have
an all- around 7.62mm armor- piercing protection, plus 14.5 mm protection
on the front, sides, and rear. The top will have 7.62 mm armor- piercing
and 152mm high explosive airburst protection, and protection against
antipersonnel mines through the vehicle floor. Stryker also has an
embedded spall liner. Also assessed was the vehicles* ability to support

missions under different battlefield conditions such as nuclear,
biological, and chemical environments. Most of the technical evaluation
occurred at the Aberdeen Proving Ground test center. The Test Command
concluded that the Stryker vehicle was more survivable than the M- 113A3
against both of these types of threats.

We also observed a vehicle survivability test at the Aberdeen test center.
Based on our observations of the testing and data collection process, we
determined that the test community had systems designed to collect
objective, technical data on the vehicles. We obtained and analyzed the
Test and Evaluation Command*s evaluation report; however, we are unable to
comment on specific test results because the results are classified and
technical testing remains ongoing. Our observations and analysis do allow

us to generally comment that the technical testing procedures appeared to
be objective and sufficient to provide data to determine the relative
survivability of the two types of vehicles.

DOD and the Army The Army*s Cost and Economic Analysis Center and DOD*s
Program

Assessed the Costs Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (PA& E) estimated
the life- cycle costs

of Stryker and the of equipping the brigade teams with either the Stryker
or the M- 113A3

M- 113A3 Vehicles vehicle. The Center included both investment and
operating costs in its

calculations and defined the appropriate life cycle as 20 years. PA& E,
using the Center*s cost calculations, applied a slightly different
methodology to assess the costs for one Stryker brigade. Both PA& E and
the Army concurred that the Stryker infantry carrier is more expensive
than the

M- 113A3. However, each report had a slightly different methodology. We
reviewed the assumptions of the cost comparison and found they conformed
to cost analysis guidance provided to federal agencies by the Office of
Management and Budget. We found no instances in which these cost
assumptions seemed to favor one vehicle over another. Based on this
review, the magnitude of the increased costs of the Stryker vehicle
appeared reasonable.

The Stryker vehicle has a higher investment cost than the M- 113A3.
According to both PA& E and the Army cost reports, acquiring a Stryker
vehicle is $1.42 million each. The acquisition cost for an M- 113A3
depends on how it is acquired, either through reassigning vehicles
currently in the Army inventory or upgrading existing M- 113A2s.

The Army currently has 4,100 M- 113A3s in its inventory, so a zero cost
investment option would be to assign these existing vehicles to the new
Stryker brigades. According to the Army, pursuing this course would
adversely affect the readiness of the losing units, which would then be
equipped with older versions of the M- 113. PA& E noted that the loss of
vehicles could be accepted as an additional risk to the current force
structure, which will begin transforming to the future force in 2008. A
second option would be to upgrade existing M- 113A2s. PA& E and

the Army reports agree that the cost of upgrading an M- 113A2 is about
$303,000 per vehicle with an inherited value of $67,000 per vehicle,
making the total cost of upgrading at least $370, 000 per vehicle.

Capabilities costs are also not reflected in the investment costs of the
M- 113A3. Unlike the M- 113A3, the Stryker vehicle was designed with two
significant capabilities: 14.5- mm armor protection and a Remote Weapon
Station. The M- 113A3*s armor protection is less than the Stryker
vehicle*s and an upgrade package will cost about $73,000 per vehicle. The
M- 113A3 does not have the Remote Weapon Station, which would cost another
$200,000 per vehicle. Not included in this estimate are the costs of
testing and integrating the Remote Weapon Station with the M- 113A3,
assuming that it can be done at all. Moreover, this estimate does not
include the effect that the additional weight from the armor protection
and Remote Weapon Station would have on the M- 113A3*s transportability or
suitability.

PA& E and the Army agreed that the Stryker infantry carrier has lower
operating costs than the M- 113A3. Over a 20- year lifespan, both agencies
estimated that each Stryker vehicle would cost $2.9 million to operate

and maintain compared to $3. 1 million for the M- 113A3. These cost
savings come from three main areas: fuel efficiency, replacement parts,
and training costs. Both agencies agree that the Stryker vehicle is more
fuel- efficient and requires fewer repair parts and consumables.
Additionally, training costs encompass several different areas, namely the
cost to train and staff mechanics, as well as instruct new crews on

how to operate the vehicles.

With the exception of the number of brigades used to calculate costs, the
methodology used by PA& E and the Army to calculate operating costs was
consistent. The Army based its cost calculations on equipping 6 brigades,
for a total of 686 vehicles. In contrast, PA& E based its calculations on
equipping 1 brigade, for a total of 118 vehicles. Although the two methods
result in different total costs for the vehicle systems, they do not
change the relative price difference, or the fact that the Stryker vehicle
is more expensive than the M- 113A3.

The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, officially approved the
Army*s cost comparison on December 17, 2002. The comparison found that the
Stryker infantry carrier vehicle was more costly than the M- 113A3. Based
on our review of the methodologies used, we concluded that the cost

comparison was reasonable. Secretary of Defense

The Army completed the comparison evaluation and developed a report
Certified to the Combat

that included reports from the Army Test and Evaluation Command and the
Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center. On December 17, 2002, the Power of
the Army

Secretary of the Army forwarded a memorandum of certification to the and
Released Funding

Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Army certified that, in terms
of for the Third operational effectiveness, the comparison evaluation
demonstrated that the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle is more survivable
and provides better

Brigade*s Vehicles overall performance and mobility when employed in
combat operations

than the M- 113A3. The Secretary of the Army also certified that the
Stryker brigade combat team increased the aggregate combat power of the U.
S. Army. However, in the report submitted to Congress, DOD*s conclusions
were not quite as positive. The DOD report, prepared by its PA& E
Directorate, summarized conclusions based on the Department of the Army
report that included the Army Test and Evaluation Command and the Army
Cost and Economic Analysis Center reports. The Director, Operational Test
and

Evaluation, also provided comments from a draft report. The DOD report
stated that neither vehicle was preferred for all the criteria. The
Stryker vehicle was superior under some criteria, the M- 113A3 was
superior on others, and the two vehicles were equal on yet others.
However, DOD and

the Army both agreed that the Stryker brigade combat teams would not
diminish the combat power of the Army, and DOD so certified. As a result
of the evaluation, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved obligating the
funding for the Stryker vehicles to equip the third brigade.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred
with the report*s findings. DOD*s response also provided technical
comments for clarifying

two areas in the report, which we incorporated. Appendix II contains the
full text of DOD*s comments.

Scope and To determine whether the Army*s plan for the comparison was
adequate to

Methodology satisfy legislative requirements, we focused our efforts on
understanding

the Army*s overall comparison evaluation plan. We obtained and analyzed
the Army*s Comparative Evaluation plan, data collection plans, and
technical test plans and reviewed comments of the plan provided by various
DOD and Army agencies. We interviewed officials and analysts involved in
both the design and evaluation of the plan at Office of the Secretary of
Defense; Office of the Secretary of the Army; Headquarters, Department of
the Army; Army Forces Command; Army Training and Doctrine Command; Army
Tank and Automotive Command; Army Operational Test Command and Army Test
and Evaluation Command; Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center; and I
Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington.

To determine whether the comparison evaluation plan and its implementation
would provide the data needed to measure the relative effectiveness of the
vehicles, we attended the operational vignettes and

associated training events scheduled in the Army*s plan and reviewed the
results taken from those events. For example, we reviewed the training
procedures and attended the training sessions for the data collectors and

subject matter experts administering the operational vignettes held at
Fort Lewis, Washington. We examined the methods used by the test
administrators to collect, store, and process the data. To determine if
the conditions favored one vehicle over the other, we observed the terrain
to be used during the operational vignettes. We observed 8 of 16 events

conducted during the operational vignettes. These events included the road
march, loading of vehicles, and various tactical missions. In addition, we
rode in and drove both types of vehicles. We also interviewed the Army
Operational Test Command officials who were administering the test, as

well as representatives from the office of DOD*s Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation and the Institute for Defense Analysis and Army
commanders of the unit participating in the evaluation. Upon completion of

the vignettes, we interviewed soldiers who had participated in the events.
For technical testing, we visited Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. We
received briefings from the Developmental Test Command as to how the

Army conducts technical tests on vehicles. We obtained and analyzed
classified and unclassified ballistic testing plans and observed a vehicle
survivability test that was comparable to other types of technical
testing. We also reviewed the reports issued by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense; Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate;
Secretary of the Army; the Army Test and Evaluation Command; and the Army
Cost Economic and Analysis Center. We compared the results and conclusions
of these reports to our own observations.

We reviewed the Army*s Cost Economic and Analysis Center*s cost report and
the comments on the report made by the PA& E and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense regarding cost comparison methodology. While we
verified the general procedures and assumptions used in these analyses, we
did not perform detailed checks of the many calculations they entailed.

Our review was performed from May 2002 to May 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government audit standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
available to appropriate congressional committees and to other interested
parties on request. In addition, the report will be available at no cost
on the

GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. If you or your staff have any
questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512- 8365.

Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Jr.; Leo B.
Sullivan; Robert Ackley; Timothy A. Burke; Kenneth Daniell; M. Jane Hunt;
William McNaught; Jim Melton; and Sidney Schwartz.

William M. Solis Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United
States Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman The Honorable John P. Murtha Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House
of Representatives

Appendi xes Section from Public Law 106- 398 Concerning

Appendi I x Limitations on Army Transformation Actions SEC. 113. REPORTS
AND LIMITATIONS RELATING TO ARMY TRANSFORMATION. (a) SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
REPORT ON OBJECTIVE FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.* The Secretary of the Army
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the
process for developing the objective force in the transformation of the
Army.

The report shall include the following: (1) The operational environments
envisioned for the objective force. (2) The threat assumptions on which
research and development efforts for transformation of the Army into the
objective force are based. (3) The potential operational and
organizational concepts for the objective force. (4) The operational
requirements anticipated for the operational requirements document of the
objective force. (5) The anticipated schedule of Army transformation
activities through fiscal year 2012, together with* (A) the projected
funding requirements through that fiscal year for research and development
activities and procurement activities related to transition to the
objective force; and (B) a summary of the anticipated investments of the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in programs designed to lead to
the fielding of future combat systems for the objective force. (6) A
proposed plan for the comparison referred to in subsection (c).

If any of the information required by paragraphs (1) through (5) is not
available at the time the report is submitted, the Secretary shall include
in the report the anticipated schedule for the availability of that
information.

(b) SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REPORT ON OBJECTIVE FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.*
Not later than March 1, 2001, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report on the process for developing
the objective force in the transformation of the Army. The report shall
include the following:

(1) The joint warfighting requirements that will be supported by the
fielding of the objective force, together with a description of the
adjustments that are planned to be made in the war plans of the commanders
of the unified combatant commands in relation to the fielding of the
objective force. (2) The changes in lift requirements that may result from
the establishment and fielding of the combat brigades of the objective
force. (3) The evaluation process that will be used to support

decisionmaking on the course of the Army transformation, including a
description of the operational evaluations and experimentation that will
be used to validate the operational requirements for the operational
requirements document of the objective force.

If any of the information required by paragraphs (1) through (3) is not
available at the time the report is submitted, the Secretary shall include
in the report the anticipated schedule for the availability of that
information.

(c) COSTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDIUM ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES FOR THE
INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS.*( 1) The Secretary of the Army shall develop
a plan for comparing*( A) the costs and operational effectiveness of the
infantry carrier variant of the interim armored vehicles selected for the
infantry battalions of the interim brigade

combat teams; and (B) the costs and operational effectiveness of the
troopcarrying medium armored vehicles currently in the Army inventory for
the use of infantry battalions. (2) The Secretary of the Army may not
carry out the comparison described in paragraph (1) until the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense approves the
plan for that comparison developed under that paragraph. (d) LIMITATION
PENDING RECEIPT OF SECRETARY OF THE ARMY REPORT.* Not more than 80 percent
of the amount appropriated for fiscal year 2001 for the procurement of
armored vehicles in the family of new medium armored vehicles may be
obligated until*( 1) the Secretary of the Army submits to the
congressional defense committees the report required under subsection (a);
and (2) a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date

of the submittal of such report. (e) LIMITATION PENDING COMPARISON AND
CERTIFICATION.* No funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the
Department of the Army for any fiscal year may be obligated for
acquisition of medium armored combat vehicles to equip a third interim
brigade combat team until*( 1) the plan for a comparison of costs and
operational effectiveness

developed under subsection (c)( 1), as approved under subsection (c)( 2),
is carried out; (2) the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional
defense committees, after the completion of the comparison referred to in
paragraph (1), a certification that*( A) the Secretary approves of the
obligation of funds for that purpose; and (B) the force structure
resulting from the acquisition and subsequent operational capability of
interim brigade combat teams will not diminish the combat power of the

Army; and (3) a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date of the
certification under paragraph (2).

(f ) DEFINITIONS.* In this section: (1) The term *transformation*, with
respect to the Army, means the actions being undertaken to transform the
Army, as it is constituted in terms of organization, equipment, and
doctrine in 2000, into the objective force.

(2) The term *objective force* means the Army that has the organizational
structure, the most advanced equipment that early twenty- first century
science and technology can provide, and the appropriate doctrine to ensure
that the Army is responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal,
survivable, and sustainable for the full spectrum of the operations
anticipated to be required of the Army during the early years of the
twenty- first century following 2010.

(3) The term *interim brigade combat team* means an Army brigade that is
designated by the Secretary of the Army as a brigade combat team and is
reorganized and equipped with currently available equipment in a
configuration that effectuates an evolutionary advancement toward
transformation of the Army to the objective force.

Appendi I I x Comments from the Department of Defense (350179)

a

GAO United States General Accounting Office

The Army developed a plan, approved by DOD*s Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation, that met the requirements of the fiscal year 2001 National
Defense Authorization Act. As required, the plan proposed comparing the
operational effectiveness and cost of the Stryker and a troop- carrying
medium armored vehicle selected by the Army* the M- 113A3 armored
personnel carrier. Regarding the operational effectiveness, the plan*s
scope included the use of various data, such as that obtained during
operational vignettes, for which all participants and observers received
training regarding the vehicles, and from technical testing. The plan
focused on the armored vehicles* effectiveness; suitability in support of
infantry units, such as maintenance; and survivability during operations.
Regarding the cost comparison, the plan proposed that a comprehensive cost
analysis be conducted between the two vehicles.

GAO determined, based on its observation and analysis of evaluation plans
and results, that the Army*s conduct of the plan provided sufficient data
to determine the two vehicles* relative effectiveness. To obtain the data
concerning the vehicles* operational effectiveness, survivability, and
suitability, the Army conducted and evaluated operational training events
and multiple technical tests. According to the Army Test and Evaluation
Command, both the Stryker and the M- 113A3 enabled the infantry to
complete missions. However, the Command concluded that the Stryker
provided more advantages in force protection, support for dismounted
assault, and close fight and mobility and was more survivable against
ballistic and nonballistic threats. The Army also conducted a
comprehensive cost analysis. GAO determined that the costs used in the
analysis were reasonable and provided sufficient data to determine the
vehicles* relative cost* with the Stryker being more expensive to acquire
than the M- 113A3 but less so to operate and maintain. The Secretary of
Defense, as required, certified to Congress that the Stryker Brigade
Combat Team did not diminish

Army combat power.

Army*s Stryker and M- 113A3 Armored Vehicles Used in Comparative
Evaluation The first step of the U. S. Army*s ongoing transformation was
to form two of six planned Interim,

or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams and equip the brigades with a new interim
armored vehicle* the Stryker. The fiscal year 2001 National Defense
Authorization Act

required the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan to compare the
operational effectiveness and cost of an infantry carrier variant of the
Stryker and a medium Army

armored vehicle, the Department of Defense*s (DOD) director of testing and
evaluation approve the plan, and the Army to conduct the operational
effectiveness and cost comparison. The Secretary of Defense was also to
certify to Congress that Stryker Brigades did not diminish the Army*s
combat power.

As part of a series of ongoing reviews of Army transformation, GAO
monitored the Army*s 2002 efforts to (1) assess whether the Army*s plan
for the comparison met the legislative requirements and (2) determine
whether the evaluation*s resulting data were sufficient to measure the two

vehicles* relative effectiveness. GAO is not making any recommendations.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD

concurred with the findings. www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03-
671. To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202)
512- 8365 or solisw@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 671, a report to

Congressional Committees

May 2003

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Army*s Evaluation of Stryker and M- 113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles
Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated Comparison

Page i GAO- 03- 671 Military Transformation

Contents

Contents

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Appendix I

Appendix I Section from Public Law 106- 398 Concerning Limitations on Army
Transformation Actions

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Appendix I Section from Public Law 106- 398 Concerning Limitations on Army
Transformation Actions

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Appendix II

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