    Military Transformation: Army's Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3
    Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for
    Statutorily Mandated Comparison (30-MAY-03, GAO-03-671).

    The first step of the U.S. Army's ongoing transformation was to
    form two of six planned Interim, or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams
    and equip the brigades with a new interim armored vehicle--the
    Stryker. The fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act
    required the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan to compare
    the operational effectiveness and cost of an infantry carrier
    variant of the Stryker and a medium Army armored vehicle, the
    Department of Defense's (DOD) director of testing and evaluation
    approve the plan, and the Army to conduct the operational
    effectiveness and cost comparison. The Secretary of Defense was
    also to certify to Congress that Stryker Brigades did not
    diminish the Army's combat power. As part of a series of ongoing
    reviews of Army transformation, GAO monitored the Army's 2002
    efforts to (1) assess whether the Army's plan for the comparison
    met the legislative requirements and (2) determine whether the
    evaluation's resulting data were sufficient to measure the two
    vehicles' relative effectiveness.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-671
        ACCNO:   A07032
      TITLE:     Military Transformation: Army's Evaluation of Stryker and
    M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for
    Statutorily Mandated Comparison
         DATE:   05/30/2003
      SUBJECT:   Evaluation
    	     Military vessels
    	     Comparative analysis
    	     M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier
    	     Stryker Armored Vehicle

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    GAO-03-671

                                           A

    Report to Congressional Committees

    May 2003 MILITARY TRANSFORMATION Army*s Evaluation of Stryker and M- 113A3
    Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily
    Mandated Comparison

    GAO- 03- 671

    Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Army*s Comparative Evaluation
    Plan Met Legislative

    Requirements 7 Evaluation Provided Sufficient Data for Comparison of
    Vehicles 11 Secretary of Defense Certified to the Combat Power of the Army

    and Released Funding for the Third Brigade*s Vehicles 21 Agency Comments
    22 Scope and Methodology 22

    Appendixes

    Appendix I: Section from Public Law 106- 398 Concerning Limitations on
    Army Transformation Actions 26

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 29 Table Table 1:
    Data Source Matrix for the Issues and Sub- Issues in the Army*s Evaluation
    Plan of the Medium Armored

    Vehicles (MAV) 9 Figures Figure 1: Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle 5

    Figure 2: M- 113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier 6 Figure 3: Stryker Infantry
    Carrier Ingress Excursion 16 Figure 4: M- 113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier
    Egress Excursion 17

    Abbreviations

    DOD Department of Defense MANPRINT Manpower and Personnel Integration MAV
    Medium Armored Vehicles PA& E Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate

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    May 30, 2003 Let er t Congressional Committees

    In early 2000, the U. S. Army began transforming its force to one that is
    expected to be more strategically responsive, rapidly deployable, and able
    to effectively operate in all types of military operations, whether small-
    scale contingencies or major theater wars. The first step was to form two
    of six planned Interim, or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams and equip the
    brigades with a new interim armored vehicle known as the Stryker. The

    first two brigades are located at Fort Lewis, Washington. Because these
    brigades are an entirely new organizational design, many questions have
    arisen as to the unit*s cost, combat effectiveness, and suitability. In
    the fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act, 1 Congress
    required

     the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan for comparing the
    operational effectiveness and cost of an infantry carrier variant of the
    interim armored vehicle and a medium armored vehicle currently in the Army
    inventory, although the legislation did not provide specifics regarding
    the comparison;

     the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of
    Defense (DOD) to approve the comparison plan before the Army could carry
    it out;

     the Army to conduct the operational effectiveness and cost comparison;
    and

     the Secretary of Defense to certify that the Stryker brigade combat team
    did not diminish the Army*s combat power. The statute further provided
    that vehicles for the third brigade could not be acquired until 30 days
    after the certification.

    See appendix I for the full text of the law. 1 Floyd D. Spence National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, P. L. 106- 398 (Oct. 30,
    2000).

    On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we monitored and
    assessed the Army*s efforts during 2002 to meet the requirements of the
    legislation. In doing so, we observed operational training events held at
    Fort Lewis, Washington, which the Army used to collect comparison data,
    and a vehicle survivability test at Aberdeen Proving Ground,

    Maryland. Our objectives were to (1) assess whether the Army*s plan for
    the comparison met the legislative requirements and (2) determine whether
    the results of the evaluation provided the data needed to measure the
    relative effectiveness of the two vehicles. The report also discusses the
    Secretary of Defense*s report to Congress and certification regarding the
    combat power of the Army. We are providing this report, our fifth in a
    planned series related to Army transformation, 2 to you because of your
    committees* oversight responsibility.

    Results in Brief The Army developed a plan, approved by DOD*s Director,
    Operational Test and Evaluation, which met the requirements of the fiscal
    year 2001

    National Defense Authorization Act. As contained in the congressional
    mandate, the plan proposed comparing the operational effectiveness and
    cost of the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the troop- carrying
    medium armored vehicle currently in the Army inventory* the M- 113A3
    armored personnel carrier. With regard to operational effectiveness, the
    plan*s scope included the use of various data, such as that obtained
    during operational vignettes and technical testing. The plan focused on
    three main comparison issues relating to the armored vehicles* their
    effectiveness, suitability in support of infantry units such as vehicle
    employment and maintenance, and survivability during operational missions.
    Regarding the cost comparison, the plan proposed that a comprehensive cost
    analysis be conducted between the two vehicles.

    2 U. S. General Accounting Office, Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of
    External Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the Congressionally
    Mandated Review of the Army*s Operational Evaluation Plan, GAO- 03- 484R
    (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 28, 2003);

    Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of
    Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams, GAO- 02- 442 (Washington, D. C.: May
    17, 2002); Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for
    Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges, GAO- 02- 96
    (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 16, 2001); Defense Acquisition: Army
    Transformation Faces Weapons Systems Challenges, GAO- 01- 311 (Washington,
    D. C.: May 21, 2001).

    Based on our observation and analysis of evaluation plans and results, the
    Army*s implementation of the plan provided sufficient data to determine
    the relative effectiveness of the vehicles. The Army conducted and
    evaluated eight operational training events per vehicle type and data from
    technical tests to compare the operational effectiveness, suitability, and
    survivability between the two vehicles. Prior to the operational
    vignettes, all participants and evaluators received training pertinent to
    their roles. The Army also conducted a comprehensive cost analysis as part
    of the plan. After analyzing the Army*s cost plan and data, we found that
    the costs used were reasonable and provided sufficient data to determine
    the relative cost of the two vehicles. Based on the results of the
    evaluation, the

    Secretary of Defense certified to Congress that the Stryker brigade combat
    team did not diminish the combat power of the Army. The Secretary of
    Defense also approved obligating funds for the Stryker vehicles to equip

    the third brigade. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred
    with the report*s findings.

    Background In October 1999, the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the
    Army unveiled their vision to transform the U. S. Army into a more
    strategically

    responsive force that could dominate across the full spectrum of military
    operations* from small- scale contingencies to a major theater war. In
    testimony before the U. S. Senate in March 2000, 3 the Chief of Staff of
    the Army stated that the Army had to transform to meet current and future
    strategic requirements such as the rise of sub- national and

    transnational groups, including criminal and terrorist elements that may
    pursue objectives that threaten U. S. interests. The Army believes that
    the transformation is necessary to respond more effectively to (1) the
    growing number of peacekeeping operations and small- scale contingencies
    and (2) the challenges posed by nontraditional threats such as urban
    operations in biological/ chemical environments. The Army plans to
    transform its forces over a 30- year period.

    In initial efforts to meet this new vision, the Army*s Training and
    Doctrine Command developed a concept that described the capabilities,
    organization, and operations of a new brigade combat team. This brigade

    3 Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate, Mar. 1,
    2000.

    would provide a capability that the Army did not possess: a rapidly
    deployable, early- entry combat force that is lethal, survivable, and
    capable of operating in all types of military operations, from small-
    scale

    contingencies to a major theater of war. As an early- entry force, the
    brigade is expected to have sufficient built- in combat power to conduct
    immediate combat operations upon arrival in theater if required. The
    brigade would be formed around a new, medium weight, armored vehicle. The
    Army chose

    an armored wheeled vehicle, designated as the Stryker, as its primary
    combat platform. The Army selected one light infantry brigade and one
    mechanized infantry brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington, to become the first
    Stryker brigade combat teams. The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division
    was selected to transform first.

    Congress supported the Army*s efforts to transform into a force that not
    only was lethal, versatile, suitable, and survivable but could also deploy
    rapidly. However, members agreed that the Army must conduct an evaluation
    that compared the operational effectiveness and cost between a medium
    armored vehicle currently in the Army*s inventory and the Stryker Infantry
    Carrier vehicle planned for the brigades. The comparative evaluation was
    formalized in the fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act. For
    the comparison, the Army selected the M- 113A3 armored personnel carrier
    as the medium armored vehicle currently in the inventory. Figures 1 and 2
    show the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the M- 113A3, respectively.
    The Army began conducting the comparison in September 2002.

    Figure 1: Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle

    Source: GAO.

    Figure 2: M- 113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier

    Source: GAO.

    Army*s Comparative The Army- developed and the DOD Operational Test and
    Evaluation

    Evaluation Plan Director- approved plan for evaluating the Stryker
    Infantry Carrier vehicle

    and the M- 113A3 armored personnel carrier, currently in the Army*s Met
    Legislative inventory, met legislative requirements to compare both
    operational

    Requirements effectiveness and cost. The Army developed a plan that
    compared the operational effectiveness and cost between the two vehicles.
    The

    congressional mandate did not provide specifics regarding the comparison
    but specified that DOD*s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
    approve the Army*s plan. 4 The purpose of the plan was to (1) assess and
    compare measures of operational effectiveness, suitability, and
    survivability and (2) compare the costs of the two vehicles. As required
    by the statute, the DOD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
    approved the operational effectiveness portion of the plan in August 2002
    and the cost comparison portion in December 2002.

    Army*s Plan Evaluated The primary objective of the comparison evaluation
    was to assess Operational Effectiveness, and compare measures of
    operational effectiveness, suitability, and

    Suitability, and Survivability survivability for each of the vehicles. The
    Army Test and Evaluation of the Two Vehicles

    Command developed a detailed comparison evaluation plan that, as the law
    required, was approved by DOD*s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
    on August 23, 2002. 5 The plan*s scope included using existing

    data and data developed during physical examination of the vehicles,
    modeling and simulation, and live fire testing of vehicle- mounted
    weapons. Data collected from production verification tests that evaluated
    vehicle performance* such as braking, acceleration, traction, and
    sustained speed over various types of terrain* was also included. The
    operational portion of the comparison involved a series of platoon level
    tasks, including operations in complex rural terrain and urban areas under
    various light and weather conditions. The plan focused on 3 main
    comparison issues and 10 sub- issues. The main comparison issues were
    defined as follows:

    4 The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is the principal advisor
    to the Secretary of Defense, concerning operational testing, including
    assessments of operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability
    of the items tested.

    5 The Army Test and Evaluation Command is the Army*s independent
    operational test activity and is responsible for overall management of the
    Army test and evaluation programs.

     Effectiveness: How well the unit performs and what capabilities the
    vehicles provide in support of operational missions.

     Suitability: How the vehicles are deployed, operated, and logistically
    supported while performing tasks that support the infantry platoons in
    conducting their missions.

     Survivability: How well the vehicles protect the crew and infantry
    squad, vehicle system survivability, and the effect of vehicle damage on
    mission performance.

    The plan included evaluating each of the issues and sub- issues (see table
    1) during various evaluation events. These events included examination,
    modeling and simulation, technical testing, and operational testing.

     Examination: A review and analysis of available vehicle design and
    performance data. The vehicles would be physically examined to obtain
    specific measures and characteristics. Existing data was the primary
    source, but other appropriate data sources such as historical data were
    also used.

     Modeling and Simulation: Application of existing and collected data to
    determine the mobility characteristics of the vehicles.

     Technical Testing: The measurement of demonstrated performance
    characteristics and capabilities not available through existing data or
    modeling and simulation. Additional data were provided from events held
    during the acquisition process and ballistic survivability testing at the
    Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, test center.

     Operational Testing: The Army designed operational vignettes to directly
    compare two equally organized and trained infantry platoons. The platoons
    conducted identical tasks and missions against a common opposing force
    with one platoon employing the M- 113A3 and the other

    employing the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle. The opposing force
    consisted of mounted and dismounted military units, paramilitary forces,
    and civilians.

    Table 1: Data Source Matrix for the Issues and Sub- Issues in the Army*s
    Evaluation Plan of the Medium Armored Vehicles (MAV) DATA SOURCE MATRIX

    Modeling and Operational Evaluation Event Examination Simulation Technical
    Testing Testing

    Issue 1. Effectiveness. Does the vehicle support infantry operations? Sub-
    Issue 1- 1. Mission Support

    The MAV must support infantry platoon missions and tasks. X

    Sub- Issue 1- 2. Payload

    The MAV must provide the capability to effectively stow and transport
    personnel and prescribed equipment. X XX

    Sub- Issue 1- 3. Tactical Mobility

    At gross combat weight, the MAV must demonstrate on- road and off- road
    mobility characteristics that support the conduct of combat missions. X XX
    X

    Sub- Issue 1- 4. Firepower

    The MAV crew must be able to employ the primary weapon systems to acquire,
    identify, engage, and defeat both point and area targets during the day
    and during periods of limited visibility. X XX

    Issue 2. Suitability. Is the vehicle suitable for infantry operations?
    Modeling and Operational Evaluation Event Examination Simulation Technical
    Testing Testing

    Sub- Issue 2- 1. Transportability

    The MAV must be strategically transportable and deployable by C- 17 and/
    or C- 5 aircraft to deploy the unit into a theater of operations. The MAV

    must also be transportable by C- 130 for intratheater deployment. X X

    Sub- Issue 2- 2. Reliability and Maintainability

    The MAV must demonstrate acceptable reliability and maintainability
    characteristics to permit the brigade to complete its designated

    mission. X XX

    Sub- Issue 2- 3. Integrated Logistics Support

    The MAV must be logistically supportable with existing and special tools,
    and the specified support and test equipment; demonstrate detection and
    isolation of component failures using its built- in test capability; and
    demonstrate an adequate power management capability. X XX

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    DATA SOURCE MATRIX Modeling and Operational Evaluation Event Examination
    Simulation Technical Testing Testing

    Sub- Issue 2- 4. Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT)

    The MAV must demonstrate characteristics that address human capabilities
    and limitations to enhance soldier performance and system operational
    effectiveness. X XX

    Issue 3. Survivability. Does the vehicle provide protection for crew and
    system survivability? Modeling and Operational Evaluation Event
    Examination Simulation Technical Testing Testing

    Sub- Issue 3- 1. Ballistic Protection

    The MAV must meet the following requirements: (1) Minimum direct fire
    ballistic protection levels in terms of integral 7. 62- mm armor- piercing
    and 14.5- mm and hand- held High Explosive AntiTank

    weapons; (2) Overhead crew and passenger indirect fire ballistic
    protection against 152- mm high explosive airburst; (3) All- around crew
    and passenger protection against blast and overpressure effects of anti-
    personnel mines X XX

    Sub- Issue 3- 2. Non- Ballistic Protection

    The vehicle must perform its mission under battlefield conditions,
    including the presence of non- ballistic threats. X XX X

    Source: GAO analysis of the U. S. Army Test and Evaluation Command*s
    comparison evaluation plan.

    Army Compared Costs as The Army directed its Cost and Economic Analysis
    Center to conduct a

    Required by the Statute cost comparison between the Stryker Infantry
    Carrier vehicle and the

    M- 113A3 armored personnel carrier. The Analysis Center developed a plan
    to determine and compare the life- cycle costs of the Stryker vehicle to
    the life- cycle costs of the M- 113A3 currently in the Army inventory. The
    Army directed that the Analysis Center examine the costs of equipping,
    training, fielding, and maintaining the vehicles for use in the Stryker

    brigades. To determine these costs, the Analysis Center emphasized the
    costs associated with vehicle manufacturing, military personnel,
    replenishment parts, and fuel/ petroleum for each vehicle. On October 4,
    2002, the Army submitted the cost comparison portion of the plan to the
    Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, for approval. As required by
    the law, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, officially
    approved that portion on December 17, 2002, as the Secretary of the Army
    submitted the comparison evaluation report to DOD.

    Evaluation Provided Based on our observation of the vignettes, unit and
    evaluator training, and

    Sufficient Data a technical test and on our analysis of the test results
    and review of cost

    comparison assumptions, the Army*s conduct of the Army Test and for
    Comparison

    Evaluation Command plan produced enough data to gauge the relative of
    Vehicles

    effectiveness and cost of the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the M-
    113A3 armored personnel carrier. To ensure competency during evaluation
    events, the Army certified that the units conducting the

    operational vignettes received comparable amounts of training in their
    vehicles and that the evaluators were familiar with appropriate infantry
    tactics and doctrine. The purpose of the comparison evaluation plan was to
    collect data to measure the relative effectiveness, suitability, and
    survivability of both vehicles. To do so, the plan consisted of
    operational vignettes, augmented by gunnery exercises, modeling and
    simulations; physical and other vehicle examinations; and technical
    testing. Comparison data included surveys, results of force on force
    exercises, and mission

    success and task performance ratings. The plan also assessed the costs of
    both vehicles.

    Unit and Evaluators Prior to conducting the operational effectiveness
    segment of the Certified Prior to Conduct

    comparison evaluation, the two infantry platoons and the event evaluators
    of Operational Vignettes

    received training specific to their roles in the comparison. The two
    infantry platoons received training that ensured all participating
    personnel were proficient with the vehicles, digitized equipment, and the
    associated support equipment. For example, one platoon trained on the
    Stryker vehicle while the other trained on the M- 113A3 vehicle. All
    vehicle commanders were trained on the M2 .50- caliber machine gun and the
    MK19 grenade launcher* the weapon systems for the two types of vehicles.
    The

    two platoons participated in a 20- day training exercise and practiced
    incorporating the use of the two types of vehicles in missions assigned to
    a platoon in a Stryker brigade combat team. The brigade commander
    certified that the two platoons were trained according to doctrine and
    that both were similarly manned and trained.

    During the comparison evaluation, subject matter experts 6 evaluated the
    units* performance during each operational vignette. Similar to the

    6 Subject matter experts are usually noncommissioned officers who have
    extensive experience with the studied equipment, recent unit experience,
    and a background as a trainer or in training development.

    two platoons* personnel, the evaluators were certified as trained in
    current Infantry doctrine and tactics. Furthermore, personnel from the
    Army Test and Evaluation Command trained the subject matter experts in
    data collection methods, test instrumentation, and familiarization of the
    vehicle

    types and the terrain in which the vehicles were compared. Prior to
    conducting the operational vignettes, the evaluators participated in a
    pilot test where full data collection and test controls were rehearsed.
    After completing the pilot test, test officials certified that the subject
    matter experts were trained and that they complied with the established
    data collection procedures. The subject matter experts observed each unit
    and recorded comments on task performance and mission success by filling
    out performance matrices. Upon completion of an event, Army Test and
    Evaluation Command data collectors harvested and validated data

    collected during that particular activity. All data collected and
    validated were included in the Army*s database and analyzed by the Army
    Test and Evaluation Command.

    Vignettes, Gunnery, and Effectiveness is an assessment of the extent to
    which a vehicle allows Modeling and Simulation

    a unit to successfully perform tasks in support of infantry platoons Used
    to Determine

    conducting missions in an operational environment. To determine
    Operational Effectiveness

    effectiveness, the Army compared the two vehicles* capability to (1)
    support infantry platoon missions, (2) move around the battlefield, (3)
    store and move personnel and equipment, and (4) employ their weapon
    systems during day, night, and limited visibility conditions. Data for the

    comparison came from operational vignettes, gunnery, physical examination
    of the vehicles, modeling and simulation, technical testing, and
    operational testing of the vehicles. The most visible of these data
    sources were the operational vignettes conducted at Fort Lewis, and the
    other data collection methods augmented those findings.

    The Army conducted the comparison of the two types of vehicles during a
    scheduled training event held from September 12 to October 2, 2002, at
    Fort Lewis. The comparison, used to assess mission support, payload, and
    mobility, included two 2- hour road marches and two platoon- level
    training exercises designed by the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry
    Division and approved by the Army Test and Evaluation Command. During each
    exercise, the vehicles were loaded with all unit

    personnel and equipment according to unit procedures. The two road
    marches* designed to demonstrate the vehicles* ability to move on and off
    road, store and transport personnel and equipment, and provide

    human factors data* were conducted over varying terrain like paved and
    gravel roads, rutted and uneven trails.

    The operational vignettes required the platoons to execute selected small-
    scale contingency missions such as a raid or an attack with events lasting
    from 12 to 17 hours. The evaluations were conducted in environments
    designed to ensure similar training and conditions for both platoons and
    vehicles. For example, the missions were conducted in the same light
    conditions, against the same opposing force and using the same doctrine
    and tactics. Fort Lewis* terrain is densely wooded and open and
    undulating. Rocky terrain is common. During the vignettes, the vehicles
    were operated over different types of terrain, including paved and gravel
    roads, rutted and uneven wooded trails of varying slopes. In some
    vignettes, the vehicles traversed loose soil about 3 to 6 inches in depth.
    We observed that the Stryker and M- 113A3 vehicles were operated over the
    same terrain during the operational vignettes.

    The operational comparison was divided into two exercises. To compare how
    the platoons employed the vehicles, we attended the same vignettes for
    both exercises. We observed varying phases of the vignettes such as an
    obstacle breach, checkpoint security operations, civilian disturbances,
    and a rescue of endangered indigenous personnel to determine how the
    subject matter experts and the data collection

    personnel documented the key actions and outcomes as each of the platoons
    conducted its tactical missions.

    During the first phase of the training events, we observed that the
    employment of the M- 113A3s and the Stryker infantry carriers was minimal.
    For example, both platoon leaders used the vehicles primarily

    as a troop transport and had their soldiers egress from the vehicles
    before reaching the mission site. By doing so, the platoon leaders were
    unable to support their mission by employing the vehicles* weapons system.
    During the second training exercise, both platoons moved closer to the
    mission site and used the vehicles* weapons system to support their
    specific mission. Based on our observations and discussions with unit
    leadership, we concluded that this was due to the units* limited amount of
    experience in employing either of the vehicles. Other factors that
    impacted the vehicles* employment included platoon composition and command
    guidance. Both platoons were comprised of a mix of soldiers who had and
    had not previously served in mechanized infantry units, and the employment
    of the vehicle was entirely subjective on the part of the platoon
    leadership. Neither platoon had published platoon or company

    standard operating procedures for the vehicles. These observations and
    conclusions on the employment of the vehicles were validated in the test
    team observation section of the Test and Evaluation Command*s test data
    report.

    Although providing data for all of the sub- issues measuring
    effectiveness, the Army augmented data collected from the vignettes
    through gunnery exercises and modeling and simulation. Upon completion of
    the vignettes, the Army sent both platoons to the Yakima Training Center,
    Washington, to conduct gunnery exercises. While at the training center,
    live fire of the weapons provided additional data to augment observations
    from the vignettes and the previous technical testing. To further evaluate
    mobility, the Army used modeling and simulation at Aberdeen Proving Ground
    to

    determine how well each vehicle would travel over different terrain types.
    Measurements included movement over simulated terrain in Korea, Europe,
    and Southwest Asia under both wet and dry weather conditions.

    We did not observe any significant differences in the way the Army
    compared the two vehicles during the operational vignettes. Subject matter
    experts and test personnel were consistent in their data collection while
    observing vignettes for both the Stryker and the M- 113A3 vehicles.
    Moreover, the vignettes provided sufficient data to determine the relative
    operational effectiveness of the two vehicles, and the additional data
    collected accentuated the findings. According to the Army Test and
    Evaluation Command, both vehicles enabled infantry squads to complete
    platoon missions and effectively transport personnel and prescribed
    equipment. The Stryker infantry carrier provided advantages in employing
    its weapon systems and mobility during most situations, and the M- 113A3
    had an advantage in off- road mobility.

    Human Factors and Suitability is an assessment of the extent to which a
    vehicle, when Technical Data Used to

    deployed to an objective area, can maneuver, be maintained, and supported
    Assess Vehicle Suitability

    in combat operations. To determine suitability, the Army compared (1)
    transportability, (2) reliability and maintainability, (3) integrated
    logistics support, and (4) MANPRINT 7 data for the two vehicles. Primary
    data for this comparison came from physical examination, technical
    testing, and operational testing of the vehicles. Of the four areas used
    to

    7 MANPRINT data measures human factors such as vehicle ride- ability,
    noise levels, and fatigue.

    compare suitability, manpower and personnel integration was the only area
    that occurred during events that we directly observed. Data collected for
    the other three measures of suitability combined data and information from
    a variety of sources.

    Data collection for manpower and personnel integration occurred during the
    vignettes at Fort Lewis and was used to compare the effect of the vehicles
    on soldiers performing necessary tasks. The Army*s MANPRINT data
    collection team collected both quantitative and qualitative data by
    interviewing soldiers and collecting soldier surveys prior to and after
    the completion of certain events. The primary events used to facilitate
    MANPRINT collection were road marches and performance of common soldier
    tasks. Postvignette interviews with soldiers were also used to

    collect data. The road marches were used to determine the effect that
    riding in vehicles had on soldiers* stress levels. Two self- assessment
    questionnaires, one a list of adjectives that soldiers checked to indicate
    their current feelings and the other an individual stress rating, were
    administered prior to and after each road march. In addition, data
    collectors took saliva samples from soldiers before and after each road
    march to determine changes in soldiers* stress levels. 8 To facilitate a
    comparison, soldiers rotated vehicles during the second road march.

    To determine the effect of vehicles on common soldier tasks, the Army
    designed short events, entitled excursions, to collect data on the effects
    of entering and exiting the vehicles during a variety of different combat
    situations. After the first road march, each platoon arrived into assembly
    areas and conducted several excursions, with soldiers entering and exiting
    vehicles under duress, in chemical protective gear and while conducting
    casualty evacuations. Data collectors measured the length of time for each
    of these excursions, and upon completion of all events, soldiers filled
    out questionnaires. Figures 3 and 4 show examples of these excursions,
    with soldiers entering a Stryker infantry carrier and leaving a M- 113A3.

    8 Within saliva, there is an enzyme called amylase. Research has shown
    that the concentration of salivary amylase reflects substances produced by
    the body in response to stress.

    Figure 3: Stryker Infantry Carrier Ingress Excursion

    Source: GAO.

    Figure 4: M- 113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier Egress Excursion

    Source: GAO.

    Upon completion of each training exercise, soldiers filled out another
    series of questionnaires designed to gauge ergonomic factors.
    Questionnaires, again administered by MANPRINT data collectors, asked
    soldiers about sound level, space, seat comfort, ability to communicate
    within the vehicle, situational awareness, and other safety issues.

    To assess transportability, reliability and maintainability, and
    integrated logistics support, the Army relied on existing data from
    previous events, developed projections where data was lacking, or is in
    the process of collecting additional data during the continuing
    developmental testing. Using existing data, the Army determined that both
    vehicles were

    transportable; however, the M- 113A3 was more deployable by air because of
    its reduced weight but less deployable by road because, for longer
    distances, it required either rail or truck support. To assess the Stryker
    vehicle*s reliability and maintainability, the Army is continuing to
    collect data. While the Army is able to claim that there are no specific
    failure patterns, the relatively low number of Stryker miles prevents a
    statistically

    reliable forecast. To assess the M- 113A3*s reliability and
    maintainability, the Army primarily relied on existing data. Because the
    system is still in development, the Army used projections to determine
    that the Stryker vehicle is more logistically supportable because the
    family of vehicles and higher gas mileage reduce the overall size of the
    logistic footprint. For

    example, the Stryker vehicles are built on a common chassis and thus
    require fewer different parts. Moreover, the Stryker, as a wheeled-
    vehicle, requires fewer mechanics to maintain it.

    We did not observe any significant differences in the way the Army
    compared suitability for both types of vehicles. According to our review
    of the Army Test and Evaluation Command report, both vehicles are
    transportable and both have manageable failures for maintenance and
    reliability. In terms of human factors, the MANPRINT data indicate that
    soldiers riding in a Stryker infantry carrier reported reduced fatigue;
    more ability to move within, inside, and outside the vehicle; lower levels
    of stress; less irritation; and a better ability to communicate than those
    riding in a M- 113A3.

    Vehicle Survivability Survivability is an assessment of the extent to
    which a vehicle survives

    Assessed against a under different threat conditions and protects the crew
    and the

    Variety of Threats equipment. The Army*s Test and Evaluation Command
    decided that vehicle

    survivability would be determined through a comparison of existing test
    data, technical data, and modeling and simulation. The vehicles had to

    demonstrate that they could provide an adequate level of protection to the
    infantry squad and vehicle crew against threats such as small arms,
    artillery, and mines. The M113A3 was designed to provide protection

    against a standard 7. 62mm threat. The Army intended the Stryker to have
    an all- around 7.62mm armor- piercing protection, plus 14.5 mm protection
    on the front, sides, and rear. The top will have 7.62 mm armor- piercing
    and 152mm high explosive airburst protection, and protection against
    antipersonnel mines through the vehicle floor. Stryker also has an
    embedded spall liner. Also assessed was the vehicles* ability to support

    missions under different battlefield conditions such as nuclear,
    biological, and chemical environments. Most of the technical evaluation
    occurred at the Aberdeen Proving Ground test center. The Test Command
    concluded that the Stryker vehicle was more survivable than the M- 113A3
    against both of these types of threats.

    We also observed a vehicle survivability test at the Aberdeen test center.
    Based on our observations of the testing and data collection process, we
    determined that the test community had systems designed to collect
    objective, technical data on the vehicles. We obtained and analyzed the
    Test and Evaluation Command*s evaluation report; however, we are unable to
    comment on specific test results because the results are classified and
    technical testing remains ongoing. Our observations and analysis do allow

    us to generally comment that the technical testing procedures appeared to
    be objective and sufficient to provide data to determine the relative
    survivability of the two types of vehicles.

    DOD and the Army The Army*s Cost and Economic Analysis Center and DOD*s
    Program

    Assessed the Costs Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (PA& E) estimated
    the life- cycle costs

    of Stryker and the of equipping the brigade teams with either the Stryker
    or the M- 113A3

    M- 113A3 Vehicles vehicle. The Center included both investment and
    operating costs in its

    calculations and defined the appropriate life cycle as 20 years. PA& E,
    using the Center*s cost calculations, applied a slightly different
    methodology to assess the costs for one Stryker brigade. Both PA& E and
    the Army concurred that the Stryker infantry carrier is more expensive
    than the

    M- 113A3. However, each report had a slightly different methodology. We
    reviewed the assumptions of the cost comparison and found they conformed
    to cost analysis guidance provided to federal agencies by the Office of
    Management and Budget. We found no instances in which these cost
    assumptions seemed to favor one vehicle over another. Based on this
    review, the magnitude of the increased costs of the Stryker vehicle
    appeared reasonable.

    The Stryker vehicle has a higher investment cost than the M- 113A3.
    According to both PA& E and the Army cost reports, acquiring a Stryker
    vehicle is $1.42 million each. The acquisition cost for an M- 113A3
    depends on how it is acquired, either through reassigning vehicles
    currently in the Army inventory or upgrading existing M- 113A2s.

    The Army currently has 4,100 M- 113A3s in its inventory, so a zero cost
    investment option would be to assign these existing vehicles to the new
    Stryker brigades. According to the Army, pursuing this course would
    adversely affect the readiness of the losing units, which would then be
    equipped with older versions of the M- 113. PA& E noted that the loss of
    vehicles could be accepted as an additional risk to the current force
    structure, which will begin transforming to the future force in 2008. A
    second option would be to upgrade existing M- 113A2s. PA& E and

    the Army reports agree that the cost of upgrading an M- 113A2 is about
    $303,000 per vehicle with an inherited value of $67,000 per vehicle,
    making the total cost of upgrading at least $370, 000 per vehicle.

    Capabilities costs are also not reflected in the investment costs of the
    M- 113A3. Unlike the M- 113A3, the Stryker vehicle was designed with two
    significant capabilities: 14.5- mm armor protection and a Remote Weapon
    Station. The M- 113A3*s armor protection is less than the Stryker
    vehicle*s and an upgrade package will cost about $73,000 per vehicle. The
    M- 113A3 does not have the Remote Weapon Station, which would cost another
    $200,000 per vehicle. Not included in this estimate are the costs of
    testing and integrating the Remote Weapon Station with the M- 113A3,
    assuming that it can be done at all. Moreover, this estimate does not
    include the effect that the additional weight from the armor protection
    and Remote Weapon Station would have on the M- 113A3*s transportability or
    suitability.

    PA& E and the Army agreed that the Stryker infantry carrier has lower
    operating costs than the M- 113A3. Over a 20- year lifespan, both agencies
    estimated that each Stryker vehicle would cost $2.9 million to operate

    and maintain compared to $3. 1 million for the M- 113A3. These cost
    savings come from three main areas: fuel efficiency, replacement parts,
    and training costs. Both agencies agree that the Stryker vehicle is more
    fuel- efficient and requires fewer repair parts and consumables.
    Additionally, training costs encompass several different areas, namely the
    cost to train and staff mechanics, as well as instruct new crews on

    how to operate the vehicles.

    With the exception of the number of brigades used to calculate costs, the
    methodology used by PA& E and the Army to calculate operating costs was
    consistent. The Army based its cost calculations on equipping 6 brigades,
    for a total of 686 vehicles. In contrast, PA& E based its calculations on
    equipping 1 brigade, for a total of 118 vehicles. Although the two methods
    result in different total costs for the vehicle systems, they do not
    change the relative price difference, or the fact that the Stryker vehicle
    is more expensive than the M- 113A3.

    The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, officially approved the
    Army*s cost comparison on December 17, 2002. The comparison found that the
    Stryker infantry carrier vehicle was more costly than the M- 113A3. Based
    on our review of the methodologies used, we concluded that the cost

    comparison was reasonable. Secretary of Defense

    The Army completed the comparison evaluation and developed a report
    Certified to the Combat

    that included reports from the Army Test and Evaluation Command and the
    Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center. On December 17, 2002, the Power of
    the Army

    Secretary of the Army forwarded a memorandum of certification to the and
    Released Funding

    Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Army certified that, in terms
    of for the Third operational effectiveness, the comparison evaluation
    demonstrated that the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle is more survivable
    and provides better

    Brigade*s Vehicles overall performance and mobility when employed in
    combat operations

    than the M- 113A3. The Secretary of the Army also certified that the
    Stryker brigade combat team increased the aggregate combat power of the U.
    S. Army. However, in the report submitted to Congress, DOD*s conclusions
    were not quite as positive. The DOD report, prepared by its PA& E
    Directorate, summarized conclusions based on the Department of the Army
    report that included the Army Test and Evaluation Command and the Army
    Cost and Economic Analysis Center reports. The Director, Operational Test
    and

    Evaluation, also provided comments from a draft report. The DOD report
    stated that neither vehicle was preferred for all the criteria. The
    Stryker vehicle was superior under some criteria, the M- 113A3 was
    superior on others, and the two vehicles were equal on yet others.
    However, DOD and

    the Army both agreed that the Stryker brigade combat teams would not
    diminish the combat power of the Army, and DOD so certified. As a result
    of the evaluation, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved obligating the
    funding for the Stryker vehicles to equip the third brigade.

    Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred
    with the report*s findings. DOD*s response also provided technical
    comments for clarifying

    two areas in the report, which we incorporated. Appendix II contains the
    full text of DOD*s comments.

    Scope and To determine whether the Army*s plan for the comparison was
    adequate to

    Methodology satisfy legislative requirements, we focused our efforts on
    understanding

    the Army*s overall comparison evaluation plan. We obtained and analyzed
    the Army*s Comparative Evaluation plan, data collection plans, and
    technical test plans and reviewed comments of the plan provided by various
    DOD and Army agencies. We interviewed officials and analysts involved in
    both the design and evaluation of the plan at Office of the Secretary of
    Defense; Office of the Secretary of the Army; Headquarters, Department of
    the Army; Army Forces Command; Army Training and Doctrine Command; Army
    Tank and Automotive Command; Army Operational Test Command and Army Test
    and Evaluation Command; Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center; and I
    Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington.

    To determine whether the comparison evaluation plan and its implementation
    would provide the data needed to measure the relative effectiveness of the
    vehicles, we attended the operational vignettes and

    associated training events scheduled in the Army*s plan and reviewed the
    results taken from those events. For example, we reviewed the training
    procedures and attended the training sessions for the data collectors and

    subject matter experts administering the operational vignettes held at
    Fort Lewis, Washington. We examined the methods used by the test
    administrators to collect, store, and process the data. To determine if
    the conditions favored one vehicle over the other, we observed the terrain
    to be used during the operational vignettes. We observed 8 of 16 events

    conducted during the operational vignettes. These events included the road
    march, loading of vehicles, and various tactical missions. In addition, we
    rode in and drove both types of vehicles. We also interviewed the Army
    Operational Test Command officials who were administering the test, as

    well as representatives from the office of DOD*s Director of Operational
    Test and Evaluation and the Institute for Defense Analysis and Army
    commanders of the unit participating in the evaluation. Upon completion of

    the vignettes, we interviewed soldiers who had participated in the events.
    For technical testing, we visited Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. We
    received briefings from the Developmental Test Command as to how the

    Army conducts technical tests on vehicles. We obtained and analyzed
    classified and unclassified ballistic testing plans and observed a vehicle
    survivability test that was comparable to other types of technical
    testing. We also reviewed the reports issued by the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense; Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate;
    Secretary of the Army; the Army Test and Evaluation Command; and the Army
    Cost Economic and Analysis Center. We compared the results and conclusions
    of these reports to our own observations.

    We reviewed the Army*s Cost Economic and Analysis Center*s cost report and
    the comments on the report made by the PA& E and the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense regarding cost comparison methodology. While we
    verified the general procedures and assumptions used in these analyses, we
    did not perform detailed checks of the many calculations they entailed.

    Our review was performed from May 2002 to May 2003 in accordance with
    generally accepted government audit standards.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and the
    Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
    available to appropriate congressional committees and to other interested
    parties on request. In addition, the report will be available at no cost
    on the

    GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. If you or your staff have any
    questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512- 8365.

    Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Jr.; Leo B.
    Sullivan; Robert Ackley; Timothy A. Burke; Kenneth Daniell; M. Jane Hunt;
    William McNaught; Jim Melton; and Sidney Schwartz.

    William M. Solis Director, Defense Capabilities

    and Management

    List of Congressional Committees

    The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
    Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

    The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United
    States Senate

    The Honorable Duncan Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
    Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

    The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman The Honorable John P. Murtha Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House
    of Representatives

    Appendi xes Section from Public Law 106- 398 Concerning

    Appendi I x Limitations on Army Transformation Actions SEC. 113. REPORTS
    AND LIMITATIONS RELATING TO ARMY TRANSFORMATION. (a) SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
    REPORT ON OBJECTIVE FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.* The Secretary of the Army
    shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the
    process for developing the objective force in the transformation of the
    Army.

    The report shall include the following: (1) The operational environments
    envisioned for the objective force. (2) The threat assumptions on which
    research and development efforts for transformation of the Army into the
    objective force are based. (3) The potential operational and
    organizational concepts for the objective force. (4) The operational
    requirements anticipated for the operational requirements document of the
    objective force. (5) The anticipated schedule of Army transformation
    activities through fiscal year 2012, together with* (A) the projected
    funding requirements through that fiscal year for research and development
    activities and procurement activities related to transition to the
    objective force; and (B) a summary of the anticipated investments of the
    Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in programs designed to lead to
    the fielding of future combat systems for the objective force. (6) A
    proposed plan for the comparison referred to in subsection (c).

    If any of the information required by paragraphs (1) through (5) is not
    available at the time the report is submitted, the Secretary shall include
    in the report the anticipated schedule for the availability of that
    information.

    (b) SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REPORT ON OBJECTIVE FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.*
    Not later than March 1, 2001, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
    congressional defense committees a report on the process for developing
    the objective force in the transformation of the Army. The report shall
    include the following:

    (1) The joint warfighting requirements that will be supported by the
    fielding of the objective force, together with a description of the
    adjustments that are planned to be made in the war plans of the commanders
    of the unified combatant commands in relation to the fielding of the
    objective force. (2) The changes in lift requirements that may result from
    the establishment and fielding of the combat brigades of the objective
    force. (3) The evaluation process that will be used to support

    decisionmaking on the course of the Army transformation, including a
    description of the operational evaluations and experimentation that will
    be used to validate the operational requirements for the operational
    requirements document of the objective force.

    If any of the information required by paragraphs (1) through (3) is not
    available at the time the report is submitted, the Secretary shall include
    in the report the anticipated schedule for the availability of that
    information.

    (c) COSTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDIUM ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES FOR THE
    INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS.*( 1) The Secretary of the Army shall develop
    a plan for comparing*( A) the costs and operational effectiveness of the
    infantry carrier variant of the interim armored vehicles selected for the
    infantry battalions of the interim brigade

    combat teams; and (B) the costs and operational effectiveness of the
    troopcarrying medium armored vehicles currently in the Army inventory for
    the use of infantry battalions. (2) The Secretary of the Army may not
    carry out the comparison described in paragraph (1) until the Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense approves the
    plan for that comparison developed under that paragraph. (d) LIMITATION
    PENDING RECEIPT OF SECRETARY OF THE ARMY REPORT.* Not more than 80 percent
    of the amount appropriated for fiscal year 2001 for the procurement of
    armored vehicles in the family of new medium armored vehicles may be
    obligated until*( 1) the Secretary of the Army submits to the
    congressional defense committees the report required under subsection (a);
    and (2) a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date

    of the submittal of such report. (e) LIMITATION PENDING COMPARISON AND
    CERTIFICATION.* No funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the
    Department of the Army for any fiscal year may be obligated for
    acquisition of medium armored combat vehicles to equip a third interim
    brigade combat team until*( 1) the plan for a comparison of costs and
    operational effectiveness

    developed under subsection (c)( 1), as approved under subsection (c)( 2),
    is carried out; (2) the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional
    defense committees, after the completion of the comparison referred to in
    paragraph (1), a certification that*( A) the Secretary approves of the
    obligation of funds for that purpose; and (B) the force structure
    resulting from the acquisition and subsequent operational capability of
    interim brigade combat teams will not diminish the combat power of the

    Army; and (3) a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date of the
    certification under paragraph (2).

    (f ) DEFINITIONS.* In this section: (1) The term *transformation*, with
    respect to the Army, means the actions being undertaken to transform the
    Army, as it is constituted in terms of organization, equipment, and
    doctrine in 2000, into the objective force.

    (2) The term *objective force* means the Army that has the organizational
    structure, the most advanced equipment that early twenty- first century
    science and technology can provide, and the appropriate doctrine to ensure
    that the Army is responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal,
    survivable, and sustainable for the full spectrum of the operations
    anticipated to be required of the Army during the early years of the
    twenty- first century following 2010.

    (3) The term *interim brigade combat team* means an Army brigade that is
    designated by the Secretary of the Army as a brigade combat team and is
    reorganized and equipped with currently available equipment in a
    configuration that effectuates an evolutionary advancement toward
    transformation of the Army to the objective force.

    Appendi I I x Comments from the Department of Defense (350179)

    a

    GAO United States General Accounting Office

    The Army developed a plan, approved by DOD*s Director, Operational Test
    and Evaluation, that met the requirements of the fiscal year 2001 National
    Defense Authorization Act. As required, the plan proposed comparing the
    operational effectiveness and cost of the Stryker and a troop- carrying
    medium armored vehicle selected by the Army* the M- 113A3 armored
    personnel carrier. Regarding the operational effectiveness, the plan*s
    scope included the use of various data, such as that obtained during
    operational vignettes, for which all participants and observers received
    training regarding the vehicles, and from technical testing. The plan
    focused on the armored vehicles* effectiveness; suitability in support of
    infantry units, such as maintenance; and survivability during operations.
    Regarding the cost comparison, the plan proposed that a comprehensive cost
    analysis be conducted between the two vehicles.

    GAO determined, based on its observation and analysis of evaluation plans
    and results, that the Army*s conduct of the plan provided sufficient data
    to determine the two vehicles* relative effectiveness. To obtain the data
    concerning the vehicles* operational effectiveness, survivability, and
    suitability, the Army conducted and evaluated operational training events
    and multiple technical tests. According to the Army Test and Evaluation
    Command, both the Stryker and the M- 113A3 enabled the infantry to
    complete missions. However, the Command concluded that the Stryker
    provided more advantages in force protection, support for dismounted
    assault, and close fight and mobility and was more survivable against
    ballistic and nonballistic threats. The Army also conducted a
    comprehensive cost analysis. GAO determined that the costs used in the
    analysis were reasonable and provided sufficient data to determine the
    vehicles* relative cost* with the Stryker being more expensive to acquire
    than the M- 113A3 but less so to operate and maintain. The Secretary of
    Defense, as required, certified to Congress that the Stryker Brigade
    Combat Team did not diminish

    Army combat power.

    Army*s Stryker and M- 113A3 Armored Vehicles Used in Comparative
    Evaluation The first step of the U. S. Army*s ongoing transformation was
    to form two of six planned Interim,

    or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams and equip the brigades with a new interim
    armored vehicle* the Stryker. The fiscal year 2001 National Defense
    Authorization Act

    required the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan to compare the
    operational effectiveness and cost of an infantry carrier variant of the
    Stryker and a medium Army

    armored vehicle, the Department of Defense*s (DOD) director of testing and
    evaluation approve the plan, and the Army to conduct the operational
    effectiveness and cost comparison. The Secretary of Defense was also to
    certify to Congress that Stryker Brigades did not diminish the Army*s
    combat power.

    As part of a series of ongoing reviews of Army transformation, GAO
    monitored the Army*s 2002 efforts to (1) assess whether the Army*s plan
    for the comparison met the legislative requirements and (2) determine
    whether the evaluation*s resulting data were sufficient to measure the two

    vehicles* relative effectiveness. GAO is not making any recommendations.
    In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD

    concurred with the findings. www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03-
    671. To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
    on the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202)
    512- 8365 or solisw@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 671, a report to

    Congressional Committees

    May 2003

    MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

    Army*s Evaluation of Stryker and M- 113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles
    Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated Comparison

    Page i GAO- 03- 671 Military Transformation

    Contents

    Contents

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    Appendix I

    Appendix I Section from Public Law 106- 398 Concerning Limitations on Army
    Transformation Actions

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    Appendix I Section from Public Law 106- 398 Concerning Limitations on Army
    Transformation Actions

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    Appendix II

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