Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S.	 
Forces for Domestic Military Missions (11-JUL-03, GAO-03-670).	 
                                                                 
The way in which the federal government views the defense of the 
United States has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. 
Consequently, the Department of Defense (DOD) has adjusted its	 
strategic and operational focus to encompass not only traditional
military concerns posed by hostile states overseas but also the  
asymmetric threats directed at our homeland by both terrorists	 
and hostile states. GAO was asked to review DOD's domestic	 
missions, including (1) how DOD's military and nonmilitary	 
missions differ; (2) how DOD's military and nonmilitary missions 
have changed since September 11, 2001; (3) how the 1878 Posse	 
Comitatus Act affects DOD's nonmilitary missions; and (4) the	 
extent to which DOD's organizations, plans, and forces are	 
adequate for domestic military missions and the consequent	 
sustainability of the current mission approach. 		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-670 					        
    ACCNO:   A07532						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of   
U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions			 
     DATE:   07/11/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Defense capabilities				 
	     Military operations				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Agency missions					 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Combat readiness					 

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GAO-03-670

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

July 2003 HOMELAND DEFENSE DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U. S.
Forces for Domestic Military Missions

GAO- 03- 670

DOD*s military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles,
duration, acceptance, and capabilities normally employed.

The threat of terrorism has altered some military operations. For example,
as of September 11, 2001, the North American Aerospace Defense Command
orders combat air patrols over U. S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks.

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct use of federal military
troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by
the Constitution or acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized
the use of the military in certain situations such as to assist with
terrorist incidents

involving weapons of mass destruction. DOD has established new
organizations (such as U. S. Northern Command) and implemented a campaign
plan for domestic military missions, but it has not evaluated or adjusted
its force structure. GAO did not assess the adequacy of the new
organizations or the campaign plan because the organizations were not yet
fully operational, and the campaign plan was only recently completed.
DOD*s force structure is not well tailored to perform domestic military
missions and may not be able to sustain the high pace of operations that
preceded and followed the attacks on September 11, 2001. While on domestic
military missions, combat units are unable to maintain proficiency because
these missions provide less opportunity to practice the varied skills
required for combat and consequently offer little training value. In
addition, from September 2001 through December 2002, the number of
servicemembers exceeding the established personnel tempo thresholds
increased substantially, indicating that the present force structure may
not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas
military missions. As a result, U. S. forces could experience an
unsustainable

pace that could significantly erode their readiness to perform combat
missions and impact future personnel retention.

F16 Fighter Aircraft Conduct a Combat Air Patrol over Washington, D. C.
The way in which the federal government views the defense of the United
States has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001.

Consequently, the Department of Defense (DOD) has adjusted its strategic
and operational focus to encompass not only traditional military concerns
posed by hostile

states overseas but also the asymmetric threats directed at our homeland
by both terrorists and hostile states. GAO was asked to review DOD*s

domestic missions, including (1) how DOD*s military and nonmilitary
missions differ; (2) how DOD*s military and nonmilitary missions have
changed since September 11, 2001; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act
affects DOD*s nonmilitary missions; and (4) the extent to

which DOD*s organizations, plans, and forces are adequate for domestic
military missions and the consequent sustainability of the current mission
approach. GAO recommends that DOD

assess domestic military mission requirements and determine what steps
should be taken to structure

U. S. forces to better accomplish domestic military missions while
maintaining proficiency for

overseas combat missions. DOD generally concurred with the need to do an
assessment that is expressed in our recommendation.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 670. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Raymond J. Decker at (202) 512- 6020 or deckerr@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 670, a report to

the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives July 2003

HOMELAND DEFENSE

DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U. S. Forces for Domestic Military
Missions

Page i GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
Background 5 Key Differences Between DOD*s Military and Nonmilitary
Missions 8 The Threat of Terrorism Altered Some Military Operations 10 The
Posse Comitatus Act Restricts DOD*s Role in Civilian Law Enforcement 11
DOD Created Organizations and a Plan for Domestic Military

Missions, but Force Structure Adjustments Have Not Been Made 12
Conclusions 23 Recommendation for Executive Action 23 Agency Comments and
Our Evaluation 23 Appendix I Scope and Methodology 26

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 30

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 39

Related GAO Products 40

Tables

Table 1: Key Differences between DOD*s Military and Nonmilitary Missions 8
Table 2: Estimated Military Personnel Affected by DOD*s Usage of

Stop Loss Authority as of April 30, 2003 22 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense Figures

Figure 1: U. S. Northern Command*s Area of Responsibility 6 Figure 2: Army
Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel Tempo Thresholds 19 Figure
3: Air Force Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel Tempo
Thresholds 20 Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
materials separately from GAO*s product.

Page 1 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

July 11, 2003 The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats,

and International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives

The Department of Defense*s (DOD) primary mission is to deter and prevent
aggression abroad and fight to win if these measures fail. This is
accomplished through military presence and power projection. However, the
federal government*s view of the defense of U. S. territory has
dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. DOD has adjusted its
strategic and operational focus to encompass not only traditional military
concerns posed by hostile states overseas but also the asymmetric threats
directed at our homeland by both terrorists and hostile states.

You requested us to review DOD*s domestic missions. As agreed with your
office, we (1) determined how DOD*s military and nonmilitary missions 1
differ; (2) determined how DOD*s military and nonmilitary missions have

changed since September 11, 2001; (3) determined how the 1878 Posse
Comitatus Act affects DOD*s nonmilitary missions; and (4) assessed the
extent to which DOD*s organizations, plans, and forces are adequate for
domestic military missions and the consequent sustainability of the
current mission approach.

To address these objectives we assessed key national and defense
strategies; DOD plans, mission orders, documents (such as training
manuals), and directives; and laws governing DOD assistance to U. S.
civilian authorities. We conducted interviews with knowledgeable officials
including those in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the services
and their various commands; U. S. Northern Command; and met with units
performing domestic military missions at various locations nationwide. We
analyzed Army military police and other combat unit installation security
deployments, Air Force fighter wing operational data, 1 We define domestic
military missions as DOD activities to protect the U. S. sovereignty,

territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure from
external threats and aggression (i. e., homeland defense). We define
nonmilitary missions as military assistance to U. S. civil authorities*
federal, state, and local governments.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

and personnel tempo data. 2 We also attended congressional hearings that
addressed the establishment of new DOD organizations and their roles and
responsibilities. Appendix I has a complete discussion of our scope and
methodology.

DOD*s military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles,
duration, acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. In military
missions, DOD is the lead federal agency, operates without a predefined
end date, can not reject the proposed mission, and uses combat and combat
support capabilities for their intended purposes. In nonmilitary missions,
another agency is generally the lead, the mission has a predefined end
date, and DOD has some discretion to reject the requested mission and uses
military capabilities in a noncombat manner to augment U. S. civil
authorities* capabilities. Generally, military missions are those primary
warfighting functions that DOD performs in defense of the nation at the
direction of the President functioning as the Commander- in- Chief.
Conversely, in nonmilitary missions, DOD provides military capabilities in
support of U. S. civil authorities.

Since September 11, 2001, the threat of catastrophic terrorism has altered
some operations of military missions. Prior to September 11, 2001, DOD
emphasized deterring and defeating military adversaries through power
projection overseas and still does. However, The National Security
Strategy of the United States, published in September 2002, calls for the
United States through its military forces, if necessary, to act
preemptively against terrorist threats before they materialize or reach
the United States. Moreover, some aspects of domestic military missions
have also changed since September 11, 2001. Before that day, the North
American Aerospace

Defense Command (NORAD) had planned to order Air Force units to intercept
military adversaries* bombers. NORAD still plans to do so should these
threats emerge in the future. However, as of September 11, 2001, NORAD
also orders combat air patrols over U. S. cities to prevent terrorist
attacks. Also, in April 2002, the President approved a revision to DOD*s

2 Personnel tempo is the amount of time that a member of the armed forces
is engaged in their official duties at a location that makes it infeasible
to spend off duty time at the member*s home, homeport (for Navy
servicemembers), or in the member*s civilian residence (for reserve
components* personnel). We reviewed personnel tempo for each of the
military services and their respective reserve components for the period
October 1, 2000, (when DOD started collecting data) through December 31,
2002 (the latest data available). Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

Unified Command Plan, 3 creating the new U. S. Northern Command, which has
responsibility to militarily defend the continental United States and
other nearby areas. Moreover, DOD continues to support U. S. civil
authorities for nonmilitary missions as it did prior to September 11,
2001. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act 4 prohibits the direct use of federal
military

troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by
the Constitution or acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized
the use of the military in certain situations. For example, DOD can use
its personnel and equipment in response to requests from civilian law
enforcement to assist with drug interdiction and some terrorist incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction. 5 DOD has made progress in creating
new organizations and a plan to

support domestic military missions, but it is too early to assess their
adequacy. However, DOD has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure
to perform these missions. As a result of the events of September 11,
2001, the new security environment required that DOD take appropriate
actions to defend the United States at home against terrorists, which are
nontraditional adversaries. Nonetheless, some forces are generally not
well tailored to perform domestic military missions. As a result, service-
members may not be able to sustain a high personnel tempo under the
current approach.

 The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
was created to provide overall supervision of DOD*s domestic military
missions. In addition, U. S. Northern Command was created to provide unity
of command for domestic military operations. However, neither was fully
operational at the time of our review. Both organizations were identifying
key staff and organizing their operations.  U. S. Northern Command has
only recently completed its campaign plan

for domestic military missions, and therefore the services have had little
3 Unified command plans provide guidance to combatant commanders and
establish their missions, responsibilities, force structure, geographic
area of responsibility, and other attributes.

4 18 U. S. C. S:1385 (2002). The act expressly prohibits the use of the
Army or the Air Force to execute the laws. As a matter of policy, DOD
applies the law to the Navy and Marine Corps through DOD Directive 5525.5,
Dec. 20, 1989, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law

Enforcement Officials and Navy Instruction (SECNAVISNT) 5820.7B, Mar. 28,
1988,

Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.

5 10 U. S. C. S:124 (2002), and 10 U. S. C. S:382 (2002).

Page 4 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

time to determine what adjustments to training or equipment are required
for these missions.  DOD has not tailored its force structure to perform
domestic military

missions and may not be able to sustain the high personnel tempo that
preceded and followed the attacks on September 11, 2001. First, while on
domestic military missions, combat units are unable to maintain
proficiency because these missions provide less opportunity to practice
the varied skills required for combat and consequently offer little
training value. Second, from September 2001 through December 2002, 6 the
number of servicemembers exceeding two established personnel tempo
thresholds increased substantially, indicating that present force
structure may not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and
overseas military missions. As a result, U. S. forces could experience an
unsustainable pace that could significantly erode their readiness to
perform combat missions and impact future personnel retention.

We are making a recommendation that DOD assess domestic military mission
requirements and determine what steps should be taken to structure U. S.
forces to better accomplish domestic military missions. DOD generally
concurred with the need to do an assessment that is expressed in our
recommendation. However, in its comments, DOD stated that it does not
believe that an independent force structure assessment is

required to better match force structure to perceived new domestic support
requirements; rather, DOD stated, force structure changes should be
determined through the ongoing force management processes that will
culminate with the fiscal year 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. If DOD can
incorporate a force structure assessment as part of its ongoing force
management processes, then it would generally fulfill the intent of our
recommendation. However, we believe that DOD should examine the merits of
actions to alleviate stress on the forces in the near term. DOD*s comments
are presented and evaluated at the end of this letter following our
recommendation and in appendix II.

6 For two thresholds, DOD measures the time that servicemembers spend away
from home in the preceding 365 days counting from the last day of any
month indicated. Therefore, if a servicemember spent time away from home
that exceeded a threshold in September 2001, the measurement period is
October 1, 2000, through September 30, 2001.

Page 5 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

Every 4 years, as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 7 DOD conducts a
comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force
structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and
other elements of the defense program, and establishes a defense program
for the next 20 years. This process helps ensure that DOD can effectively
support the broader national security strategy of the United States. The
2001Quadrennial Defense Review Report was issued shortly after the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and outlines a new defense strategy
to (1) assure allies and friends that the United States can fulfill its
commitments, (2) dissuade adversaries from undertaking activities that

threaten U. S. or allied interests, (3) deter aggression and coercion, and
(4) decisively defeat any adversary, if deterrence fails. Operation Noble
Eagle was an immediate response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks; is intended to directly defend the homeland; and is ongoing. 8
Operation Noble Eagle missions include combat air patrols over major
American cities and enhanced security at federal installations. A combat
air patrol is an airborne air defense activity involving fighter aircraft
patrolling a given area. To support fighter coverage, other military
activities have included aerial refueling and airborne early warning;
comprehensive radio and radar coverage of the patrolled area; and command
and control centers to direct fighter pilots when a threatening aircraft
is detected. Concerns about terrorist threats to federal installations
increased following the 9- 11 attacks; therefore, DOD enhanced
installation security to harden facilities against attacks and deter
future attacks through the deployment of additional personnel (such as
military police).

In April 2002, the President approved a revision to DOD*s Unified Command
Plan, creating the new U. S. Northern Command. U. S. Northern Command was
activated on October 1, 2002, and is scheduled to be fully operational on
October 1, 2003. Its area of responsibility includes the continental
United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding waters out to
approximately 500 nautical miles, which includes Cuba, the Bahamas,
British Virgin Islands, and Turks and Caicos. 9 7 As directed by 10 U. S.
C. S:118 (2002).

8 Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, U. S. Air Force, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Feb. 5, 2002. 9 U. S. Southern Command retains certain responsibilities
for contingency planning, operations, security cooperation, and force
protection for these islands. Background

Page 6 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

Figure 1 displays U. S. Northern Command*s area of responsibility as
indicated by the darkened boundary line.

Figure 1: U. S. Northern Command*s Area of Responsibility

Note: U. S. Northern Command is responsible for defending Alaska; however,
U. S. forces stationed in Alaska remain assigned to U. S. Pacific Command.

Page 7 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

U. S. Northern Command is responsible for the air, land, and maritime
defense of the continental United States. Its mission is to conduct
operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at
the United States, its territories and interests within assigned areas of
responsibility, and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense,
provide military assistance to U. S. civil authorities, including
consequence management operations. In June 2002, the President proposed
creation of the Department of

Homeland Security and in November 2002, Congress approved legislation
consolidating 22 federal agencies within the new department. In July 2002,
the administration published the National Strategy for Homeland

Security, which defines homeland security as a *concerted national effort
to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America*s
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from
attacks that do occur.* 10 The National Strategy for Homeland Security
broadly defines DOD*s contributions to national homeland security efforts

to include the prosecution of military missions abroad that reduce the
terrorist threat to the United States; military missions conducted within
the United States that DOD conducts under extraordinary circumstances with
support, as needed, by other agencies; and support to U. S. civil
authorities under emergency circumstances, where DOD is asked to act

quickly and provide capabilities that other agencies do not have or for
limited scope missions where other agencies have the lead.

In August 2002, DOD proposed the creation of a new Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. Congress approved it with
passage of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003. 11 The new office establishes a senior civilian officer within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense with a principal focus on the
supervision of the homeland defense activities of DOD (i. e., the
assistant secretary supervises the execution of domestic military missions
and military support to U. S. civil authorities and develops policies,
conducts analyses, provides advice, and makes recommendations for these
activities as well as emergency preparedness and domestic crisis
management matters to the Under Secretary for Policy and the Secretary of
Defense). The assistant secretary also supports the development of policy
direction 10 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland
Security,

Washington, D. C.: July 2002), 2. 11 P. L. 107- 314 (Dec. 2, 2002), S:902.

Page 8 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

to the Commander of U. S. Northern Command and guides the development and
execution of U. S. Northern Command plans and activities. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is also responsible for
representing DOD when interacting with federal, state, and local
government entities. In September 2002, the President released The
National Security Strategy

of the United States of America. 12 The strategy identifies U. S.
interests, goals, and objectives vital to U. S. national security; and
explains how the United States uses its political, economic, military, and
other elements of national power to protect or promote the interests and
achieve the goals and objectives identified above.

Military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration,
acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. Generally, military
missions are those primary warfighting functions that DOD performs in
defense of the nation and at the direction of the President functioning as
the Commander- in- Chief. Conversely, in nonmilitary missions, DOD
provides military capabilities in support of U. S. civil authorities as
directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. Table 1 provides more
details on the key differences.

Table 1: Key Differences between DOD*s Military and Nonmilitary Missions
Military missions Nonmilitary missions

Acts as the lead federal agency and executes orders issued by the
President functioning as the Commander- in- Chief. Supports a lead federal
agency as directed by the President or

the Secretary of Defense. Performs duties under extraordinary
circumstances that do not necessarily have defined end dates. Provides
support on a temporary or emergency basis normally

with agreed upon termination dates. Cannot reject these missions. Has some
discretion to accept or reject these requests based on

six established criteria and uses a review process guided by DOD Directive
3025. 15. a Applies military combat capabilities that only DOD possesses.
Augments U. S. civil authorities* capabilities with DOD*s assets or

capabilities, which are applied in a noncombat manner. Source: GAO
analysis. a Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, Feb. 18, 1997.

12 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The
White House, Washington, D. C.: Sept. 2002). Key Differences Between DOD*s
Military and

Nonmilitary Missions

Page 9 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

Military missions involve warfighting functions, such as campaigns,
engagements, or strikes, by one or more of the services* combat forces.
Operations Desert Storm in 1991 and Iraqi Freedom in 2003 are examples of
overseas military missions, and Operation Noble Eagle is a domestic

military mission started on September 11, 2001, and ongoing today. In the
latter mission, the President directed the Commander, North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), to order combat air patrols to identify
and intercept suspect aircraft operating in the United States. Because
this is a military mission, DOD is the lead federal agency and is prepared
to apply its combat power, if needed.

Requests for nonmilitary missions generally seek DOD support to help after
the impact of natural or man- made disasters, or assist indirectly with
law enforcement. 13 These requests are evaluated against criteria
contained in DOD*s Directive, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. 14
DOD*s

directive specifies that requests for nonmilitary support be evaluated
against the following criteria:  legality (compliance with laws), 
lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces),  risk
(safety of DOD forces),  cost (who pays, impact on the DOD budget), 
appropriateness (whether it is in the interest of DOD to conduct the

requested mission), and  readiness (impact on DOD*s ability to perform
its primary mission).

According to DOD, in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, it supported over 230
nonmilitary missions, in a variety of settings, such as assisting in
fighting wildfires, recovering from tropical storms, providing support for
national security special events (such as the presidential inauguration
and 2002 Olympic Games), and for other purposes. According to DOD, during

this same period, it rejected several missions based on the above
criteria. For example, in November 2001, DOD declined a request from the
U. S. Capitol Police to provide military medical personnel; however, DOD
did not indicate which criteria were used to reach this decision.

13 DOD Directive 5525.5, Dec. 20, 1989, provides specific guidance on
responding to requests for law enforcement assistance. 14 DOD Directive
3025.15, Feb. 18, 1997, establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibility
for providing military assistance to civil authorities.

Page 10 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

Since September 11, 2001, the threat of another catastrophic terrorist
event has altered some military operations. Before September 11, 2001, DOD
generally emphasized deterring and defeating adversaries through overseas
power projection, and still does. Since then, DOD has deployed U. S.
forces overseas to prosecute the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and
elsewhere. Moreover, The National Security Strategy of the United States
of America, published after September 11, 2001, emphasizes preventing

terrorist attacks against the United States. The strategy states that the
immediate focus of the United States will be those terrorist groups having
a global reach and any terrorist or nation that sponsors terrorism which

attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction. Such threats may now
be subject to a preemptive strike by U. S. military forces if necessary,
to prevent these threats from materializing or reaching the United States.
Some operations associated with domestic military missions have

also changed to proactively respond to terrorist threats. Prior to
September 11, 2001, DOD*s strategy defended air, land, and sea approaches
to U. S. territory from military adversaries presumed to originate outside
the United States. If necessary, DOD had planned to deploy U. S. military
forces within the United States to counter the military threats. DOD still
plans to do so should these threats emerge in the future. However, the
current defense strategy, published in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report, states that the highest priority of the U. S. military

is to defend the homeland from attack by any enemy, which includes
terrorists. An example of how domestic military operations have changed to
meet terrorists* threats can be seen in NORAD operations. Before

September 11, 2001, NORAD primarily focused its attention on aircraft
approaching U. S. airspace and acted to prevent a hostile aircraft from
entering U. S. airspace. Since then, NORAD has expanded its focus so that
it now also monitors aircraft operating within the United States as well
as aircraft approaching U. S. airspace. Also, before September 11, 2001,
NORAD had planned to order Air Force units to intercept military
adversaries* bombers. NORAD still plans to do so if these threats emerge
in the future. However, as of September 11, 2001, NORAD also orders combat
air patrols over U. S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks. In another
example, before the attacks of 9- 11, many federal installations operated
at a normal force protection condition or routine security posture that
allowed for open access to the installations, in many cases. However,
since then, DOD has used additional military personnel to enhance security
by verifying identification of all personnel and vehicles entering the
installation and conducting patrols of critical infrastructure on the
installation. Also, in April 2002, the President approved a revision to
DOD*s Unified Command Plan, creating the new U. S. Northern Command, which
has responsibility to militarily defend the continental United States The
Threat of

Terrorism Altered Some Military Operations

Page 11 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

and other nearby areas. Moreover, DOD continues to support U. S. civil
authorities for nonmilitary missions as it did prior to September 11,
2001. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act 15 prohibits the use of the Army and

Air Force *to execute the laws* of the United States except where
authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. Federal courts have
interpreted *to execute the laws* to mean the Posse Comitatus Act
prohibits the use of federal military troops in an active role of direct
civilian law enforcement. 16 Direct involvement in law enforcement
includes search, seizure, and arrest. 17 The act does not apply to
military operations at home or abroad, and it does not apply to National
Guard personnel when under the direct command of states* governors.

Congress has authorized DOD to use its personnel and equipment in a number
of circumstances, for example, to:

 assist with drug interdiction and other law enforcement functions (10 U.
S. C. S:124 and 10 U. S. C. S:S: 371- 378 (excluding 375));  protect
civil rights or property, or suppress insurrection (the Insurrection

Statutes; 10 U. S. C. S:S: 331- 334); 18  assist the U. S. Secret Service
(18 U. S. C. S:3056 Notes);  protect nuclear materials and assist with
solving crimes involving nuclear materials (18 U. S. C. S:831);  assist
with some terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction

(10 U. S. C. S:382); and  assist with the execution of quarantine and
certain health laws

(42 U. S. C. S:S: 97- 98). The President identified as a major homeland
security initiative a review of the legal authority for military
assistance in domestic security, which would include a review of the Posse
Comitatus Act. The President maintained that the *threat of catastrophic
terrorism requires a thorough review of the laws permitting the military
to act within the United States in

15 18 U. S. C. S:1385 (2002). 16 See, for example, United States v. Red
Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D. S. D. 1975). 17 DOD Directive 5525.5
provides other examples of prohibited direct involvement. 18 DOD Directive
3025.12, Feb. 4, 1994, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances,

identifies policy and responsibilities governing the planning and response
by DOD for its assistance to civil authorities, including law enforcement.
The Posse Comitatus Act Restricts DOD*s

Role in Civilian Law Enforcement

Page 12 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

order to determine whether domestic preparedness and response efforts
would benefit from greater involvement of military personnel and, if so,
how.* 19 In addition to this review, Congress directed DOD to review and
report on the legal implications of members of the armed forces operating
on U. S. territory and the potential legal impediments affecting DOD*s
role in supporting homeland security. 20 In March 2003, the Commander of
U. S. Northern Command stated, *We believe the [Posse Comitatus] Act, as
amended, provides the authority we need to do our job, and no modification
is needed at this time.* 21 According to DOD, on May 29, 2003,

DOD informed Congress of the results of its legal review, which concluded
that the President has sufficient authority to order the military to
provide military support to civilian law enforcement authorities, when
necessary. DOD does not believe that the Posse Comitatus Act would in any
way impede the nature or timeliness of its response.

In response to adjustments in its strategic focus, DOD has created new
organizations and is implementing a campaign plan for domestic military
missions, but it has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure. The
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, required that the nation,
including DOD, take extraordinary actions on that day. In the new security
environment, DOD continues to defend the United States at home against
terrorists, which are nontraditional adversaries. We could not assess the
adequacy of the organizational changes and the plan at the time of our
review because the organizations were not yet fully operational, and the
campaign plan was only recently completed. However, DOD has not evaluated
its force structure for domestic operations and these forces remain
organized, trained, and equipped to fight overseas military adversaries.
Domestic military missions provide less opportunity to practice varied
skills required for combat and consequently offer limited training value;
thus, some forces have not been tailored to perform their domestic
military missions. In addition, servicemembers are experiencing 19
National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security,

Washington, D. C.: July 2002), 48. 20 P. L. 107- 314, (Dec. 2, 2002),
S:921( 7) Report on Establishment of the United States Northern Command
and S:1404( 11) Report on the Role of the Department of Defense in
Supporting Homeland Security.

21 Statement of General Ralph E. Eberhart, U. S. Air Force, Commander, U.
S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, before
the House Committee on Armed Services, Mar. 13, 2003. DOD Created

Organizations and a Plan for Domestic Military Missions, but Force
Structure Adjustments Have Not Been Made

Page 13 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

high personnel tempo. These factors indicate that the current mission
approach may not be sustainable and risks eroding readiness. Two new
organizations* the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and U. S. Northern Command* together provide

long- term policy direction, planning, and execution capability, but were
not yet fully operational at the time of our review, because they had only
recently been established and were not fully staffed. First, the Senate
confirmed the President*s nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Homeland Defense in February 2003. The assistant secretary is to
provide overall supervision for domestic military missions and military
support to U. S. civil authorities. This office was not fully operational
at the time our review was completed, with approximately two- thirds of
the staff positions vacant. Second, U. S. Northern Command was activated
only in October 2002 and was not planned to be fully operational before

October 2003. As of mid- April 2003, only 46 percent of U. S. Northern
Command*s staff positions had been filled. According to a U. S. Northern
Command official, the command was grappling with the need to conduct its
ongoing missions while staffing the command*s remaining positions.

The activation of U. S. Northern Command provides unity of command for
military activities within the continental United States. Prior to U. S.
Northern Command*s activation, U. S. Joint Forces Command provided
military forces to defend U. S. territory from land- and sea- based
threats while NORAD defended the United States from airborne threats (and
still does). The Commander of U. S. Northern Command is also the Commander
of NORAD, thereby providing unity of command for air, land, and sea
missions.

DOD*s planning process requires DOD and the services to staff, train, and
equip forces for their military missions as outlined in campaign plans and
deliberate plans 22 developed by the combatant commanders, including the
Commander of U. S. Northern Command. U. S. Northern Command*s campaign
plan was completed in October 2002 and is classified. Since the plan was
only recently completed, the services have had little time to determine if
training and equipment adjustments were needed to support the plan.

22 Campaign plans represent the combatant commander*s vision of the
arrangement of operations to attain strategic objectives. Deliberate plans
are designed to use forces and apportion resources for potential
contingencies. New DOD Organizations

to Address Domestic Military Missions Were Not Yet Fully Operational

The U. S. Northern Command Campaign Plan Was Recently Issued

Page 14 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

DOD has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure, which generally
remains organized, trained, and equipped to fight military adversaries
overseas. However, some forces are not well tailored to perform domestic
military missions. When performing domestic military missions, combat
units are unable to maintain proficiency in combat skills 23 through
practice in normal training. Domestic missions to date generally have
required only basic military skills and thus offered limited training
value* which can have an adverse affect on unit readiness. In our review,
we found that four Army military police combat units guarding federal
installations in the

United States could not train for battlefield conditions, as the Army
requires. Similarly, Air Force fighter units performing domestic combat
air patrols were inhibited from executing the full range of difficult,
tactical maneuvers with the frequency that the Air Force requires.
Moreover, from September 2001 through December 2002, the number of
personnel exceeding the established personnel tempo thresholds increased
substantially, an indicator that the present force structure may not be
sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas military
missions. To prevent significant near- term attrition from the force, a
key concern during periods of high personnel tempo, DOD has used its stop
loss authority to prohibit servicemembers affected by the order from
leaving the service. Under high personnel tempo, U. S. forces could
experience an unsustainable pace that may lead to an erosion of unit
readiness for combat if servicemembers leave the service.

While on domestic military missions, some servicemembers cannot practice
their primary combat training to maintain proficiency. During Operation
Noble Eagle, DOD provided enhanced domestic installation security and
combat air patrols, both of which generally require only basic military
skills but offer little opportunity to practice the varied combat skills
needed for wartime proficiency. As a result, military readiness may erode.
According to Army and Air Force officials, because combat skills for these
units are perishable, to maintain or regain proficiency, a resumption of
normal combat training may be required before subsequent overseas
deployment.

23 Combat skills are critical tasks that every servicemember must be able
to perform to fight and win in war. Forces Continue to Reflect an Overseas
Emphasis

and May Not Be Able to Sustain Current Personnel Tempo

Forces* Skills Are Mismatched with Needs of Domestic Military Missions,
and Some Forces Lose Critical Training Opportunities

Page 15 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

Army training focuses on combat mission performance that replicates
battlefield conditions. To acquire the skills necessary for combat, each
unit commander establishes a mission essential task list consisting of
critical tasks that the unit needs to be proficient on to perform its
overseas wartime mission. However, the four military police units that we
reviewed were often unable to train and, thus, they were unable to
maintain proficiency for their required mission essential tasks due to the
long Operation Noble Eagle deployments. For example, one unit could not
practice for two of its mission essential tasks* to establish and sustain
an internment and resettlement facility, and process and account for
internees* that it performs in combat. In another example, two military
police units could not practice their combat skills, which include
providing battlefield control of roads and logistical pipelines. Instead,
the four Army military police units from the active, reserve, and National
Guard we reviewed were generally guarding gates, checking identification,
inspecting vehicles, and conducting security patrols of critical
installation infrastructure, such as command and control centers, and
housing,

shopping, and recreation areas. Moreover, we found that some Army
servicemembers on Operation Noble Eagle deployments used skills unrelated
to their normal missions. Consequently, their units* combat proficiency
may be at risk. Specifically, the Army provided over 8,100 Army National
Guard personnel from about 100 units to provide installation security at
domestic Air Force bases. However, only one unit, a military police unit,
had primary skills relevant to the mission; the remaining units were
comprised of field artillery, engineer, and infantry personnel that have
specialized combat skills such as providing fire support to tactical
combat units; rehabilitating the combat zone to enhance lines of supply
and communication; and destroying or capturing the enemy or repelling
enemy assaults by fire. None of these units needed its combat skills on
its Operation Noble Eagle missions.

Similarly, the domestic combat air patrol mission represents another
instance where servicemembers cannot always practice their primary combat
training for proficiency. To maintain their warfighting skills, fighter
pilots perform training sorties when not deployed abroad. Training sorties
involve the employment of tactical maneuvers, and the use of weapons or
weapons simulators against other aircraft or ground targets. For example,
an offensive counterair- training sortie is designed to train for

destroying, disrupting, or degrading enemy air and missile threats located
in enemy territory. When on a domestic combat air patrol, a pilot may gain
some training benefit by performing certain activities, such as an aerial
refueling or a night landing. However, according to several Air Force

Page 16 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

officials, domestic combat air patrols do not constitute adequate training
for overseas combat missions. For example, one Air Force official said
that combat air patrols involve little more than making left turns flying
in a circle in contrast to the difficult, tactical, defensive, and
offensive maneuvers performed while on a training sortie or possibly on a
combat mission.

Air Force fighter units performing domestic combat air patrols are
inhibited from executing the full range of difficult, tactical maneuvers
with the frequency that the Air Force requires to maintain proficiency for
their combat missions. For example, in one of the seven most heavily
tasked Air National Guard fighter wings, 24 the average pilot was unable
to

meet training requirements in 9 out of 13 months between September 2001
and September 2002. 25 Another wing reported that Operation Noble Eagle
had resulted in a 5- month period when no training was performed. Even a
short- term tasking can inhibit training needed to maintain combat
proficiency. According to Air Force officials, three training sorties are
generally lost for every short- notice, 4- hour domestic combat air patrol
performed.

To mitigate the impact on pilot readiness, the Air Force rotates the units
tasked to perform domestic combat air patrols when a continuous airborne
alert posture 26 is required. In doing so, the Air Force has sought to
ensure that all fighter units are able to train sufficiently for overseas
combat missions, thereby preserving flexibility in the use of these units
for both domestic combat air patrols and for combat missions overseas.
However, it is unclear whether managing the force structure in this way
fully mitigates the impact on pilot training, particularly during periods
of frequently performed domestic combat air patrol missions. According to
one Air Force official, under the current force structure, domestic combat
air patrols operating at levels experienced in the months after September
11, 2001, would not be sustainable for more than a few weeks

24 Seven Air National Guard fighter wings accounted for 50 percent of the
Operation Noble Eagle flying hours performed by all Air National Guard
fighter wings from September 1, 2001, through September 30, 2002.

25 Similar data from other wings were not available. According to Air
National Guard and Air Combat Command officials, there is no requirement
for wings to maintain or report this metric to higher authorities.
Moreover, Air National Guard officials said that providing us with this
metric would entail a significant undertaking by the affected units;
therefore, we did not attempt to obtain it.

26 Airborne alert posture is a state of aircraft readiness when combat-
equipped aircraft are airborne and ready for immediate action. This
posture is designed to reduce reaction time.

Page 17 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

before the units began suffering severe training effects and thus an
erosion in military readiness.

DOD is undertaking planned changes to the Defense Readiness Reporting
System, which are designed to assess the impact of homeland defense and
civil support missions on the readiness of forces to execute their

warfighting mission. In March 2003, 27 we reported that as of January
2003, DOD had not developed an implementation plan for the Defense
Readiness Reporting System that contained measurable performance goals,
identified resources, suggested performance indicators, or included an
evaluation plan to assess progress in developing this system. Even though
the new system may have the potential to improve readiness reporting,
without an implementation plan there is little assurance that the new
system will actually improve readiness assessments by the time of its
expected full capability, in 2007. Without such a plan, it will also
remain difficult to gauge progress toward meeting the 2007 target date.
DOD did not agree with the recommendations from our March 2003 report that
it (1) develop an implementation plan with, among other things,
performance goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable, and
(2) provide annual updates to Congress on the new readiness reporting

system*s development. However, as stated in the March 2003 report, we
retained those two recommendations because we continue to believe that it
is important for DOD to develop an implementation plan to gauge

progress in developing and implementing the new readiness reporting system
and to provide annual updates to Congress.

Personnel tempo data indicate that the current mission approach is
significantly stressing U. S. forces. Between September 2001 and December
2002, personnel tempo increased dramatically for Army and Air Force
personnel due to ongoing missions or commitments around the world and
increasing support for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. 28 DOD
believes that if servicemembers spend too much time away from

27 U. S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: New Reporting
System Is Intended to Address Long- Standing Problems, but Better Planning
Is Needed, GAO- 03- 456 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 28, 2003). 28 Operation
Enduring Freedom is the ongoing military mission in Afghanistan. The data
did not include the impact on personnel tempo stemming from participation
in Operation Iraqi Freedom, which is not yet fully available. While the
Navy and Marine Corps did not experience high levels of personnel tempo*
as we measured it* during the October 2000 to December 2002 time frame,
their tempo may have subsequently increased due in part to

deployments for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The personnel tempo data we
received from DOD did not record a servicemember*s assigned operation, for
example, Operation Noble Eagle. High Army and Air Force

Personnel Tempo Also Indicates a Potential Imbalance in Force Structure

Page 18 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

home, a risk exists that they will leave the service and that military
readiness may ultimately suffer.

Personnel tempo is the amount of time that a member of the armed forces is
engaged in their official duties that makes it infeasible to spend off
duty time at the member*s home, home port (for Navy servicemembers), or in
the member*s civilian residence (for reserve components* personnel). The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 29 requires that
DOD formally track and manage for the number of days that each member of
the armed forces is deployed, and it established two thresholds*
servicemembers deployed more than 182 or 220 days away from home out of
the preceding 365 days. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2001 30 established a third threshold, which requires that
servicemembers who are deployed for 401 or more days out of the preceding
730- day (2- year) period receive a $100 high deployment per diem
allowance. 31 DOD data indicate that tempo is high and increasing for
active, reserve,

and National Guard personnel. For example, in September 2001, over 6,600
Army personnel had exceeded the first threshold, spending 182 to 219 days
away from home during the previous 365 days. By December 2002, that number
had risen to over 13, 000 (of which Army Reserve and Army National Guard
personnel represented about

20 percent). During the same period, the number exceeding the second
threshold and spending 220 to 365 days away had risen from about 800 to
over 18,000 (which was comprised of about 75 percent Army Reserve and Army
National Guard personnel), as shown in figure 2.

29 P. L. 106- 65 (Oct. 5, 1999), S:586( a) (codified at 10 U. S. C.
S:991). 30 P. L. 106- 398 (Oct. 30, 2000), S:574( c) (codified at 37 U. S.
C. S:436). 31 We used the three thresholds to measure days away from home,
which includes deployments and activities such as individual training.
Although the 401- day threshold

was established for high deployment per diem allowance, we analyzed data
to determine whether servicemembers exceeded this threshold for the
purpose of measuring the pace of operations. On October 8, 2001, DOD
suspended the counting of deployed days for payment purposes as permitted
by law. Moreover, the additional statutory requirement for general and
flag officers to personally manage the deployment of servicemembers
exceeding the 182- and 220- day thresholds was also suspended at the same
time. However, according to DOD, as a matter of policy, the services
continue to track and report requirements as established by the acts.

Page 19 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

Figure 2: Army Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel Tempo
Thresholds Note: Each data point represents the total number of
servicemembers away from home in the preceding 365 days counting from the
last day of the month indicated.

The number of Army personnel exceeding the third threshold of 401 or more
days away from home in the preceding 730 days increased slightly, starting
at about 650 in September 2002 and rising to about 990 (of which about 35
percent were Army Reserve and Army National Guard personnel)

in December 2002. The Air Force reported similar trends. In September
2001, about 2,100 Air Force servicemembers were away from home for 182 to
219 days, but that had risen to about 8,300 (which were comprised of about
75 percent Air

Force Reserve and Air National Guard personnel) by December 2002. Also, as
with the Army, Air Force servicemembers away 220 to 365 days had risen
from about 1,600 to over 22,100 (of which Air Force Reserve and Air
National Guard personnel represented about 70 percent), as shown in figure
3.

Page 20 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

Figure 3: Air Force Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel Tempo
Thresholds

Note: Each data point represents the total number of servicemembers away
from home in the preceding 365 days counting from the last day of the
month indicated.

Page 21 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

The number of Air Force personnel exceeding the third personnel tempo
threshold of 401 or more days away from home in the preceding 730- day
period also increased during the latter period of 2002, starting at about
3,700 in September 2002 and rising to more than 8, 100 (of which Air Force
Reserve and Air National Guard personnel represented about 65 percent)

in December 2002. DOD believes that the potential exists for retention
problems stemming from high personnel tempo. To prevent servicemembers
with key skills from leaving the services, DOD issued 23 orders since
September 11, 2001, to prevent erosion in combat capabilities that may
stem from attrition, an action known as stop loss authority. 32 These
orders affected personnel with designated individual job skills or, in
some cases, all of the individuals in specific types of units that were
critical for overseas combat and domestic military missions. However, many
of the stop loss orders had been terminated since September 11, 2001. For
example, the Navy*s individual stop loss order went into effect on April
27, 2003, and subsequently the Navy terminated this order in mid- May
2003. Table 2 shows the estimated number of personnel affected by the stop
loss orders in effect as of April 30, 2003.

32 Stop loss authority is provided by 10 U. S. C. S:12305 (2002). It
authorizes the President to suspend any provision of law relating to the
promotion, retirement, or separation of any member of the armed forces
when members of a reserve component are called to active

duty and the President determines the forces are essential to the national
security of the United States.

Page 22 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

Table 2: Estimated Military Personnel Affected by DOD*s Usage of Stop Loss
Authority as of April 30, 2003 Estimated numbers of personnel under stop

loss orders Numbers of personnel

involuntarily held past their separation date

Services* estimated numbers of additional

personnel potentially affected by stop loss orders

who could retire or whose service contracts expire if the orders remain in
effect from May 1, 2003, through

September 30, 2003 Army unit orders

Active 230,000 3, 500 17,000 Reserve 66,700 a a National Guard 80,100 a a

Army individual job skill order b Active 42,000 3, 800 3,800 Reserve
40,400 10,000 12,300 National Guard 3,200 1,400 1,600

Air Force individual job skill order c Active 11,000 c 4,700 Reserve 3,900
c 1,600

Navy individual job skill order d Active 11,000 d 1,500 Reserve 3,000 d d

Marine Corps unit order

Active 175,000 3,000 14,400 Reserve 39,600 500 1,100 Source: Military
services* data. Notes: All estimates are rounded to the nearest hundred.

a The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard do not have information
management systems that can identify these numbers. b Data on Army Reserve
and Army National Guard for individual job skill and unit stop loss orders
are

not maintained separately. Consequently, the estimates for Army National
Guard and reserve stop loss under individual job skills and unit orders
may reflect double counting of individuals and we could not correct for
the double counting. c We provide estimates for the Air Force stop loss
order as of May 2, 2003, because the order went

into effect on that date and no service member was held past their
separation date on April 30, 2003. d In mid- May 2003, the Navy terminated
its individual job skill stop loss order that had gone into effect on
April 27, 2003. Even though the Navy terminated its stop loss order, we
provide the Navy*s

estimates to demonstrate the impact if the order had remained in effect.
Also, if the Navy*s stop loss order had remained in effect, according to a
Navy official, mobilized Navy reservists would not have had separation
dates from May 2003 through September 2003 because they must be able to
serve 13 months on active duty, and the order went into effect on April
27, 2003.

Page 23 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

Officials from the four services who manage the implementation of these
orders cautioned that they are short- term tools designed to maintain
unit- level military readiness for overseas combat and domestic military
missions. Moreover, the officials added that the orders are not to be used
as a long- term solution to address mismatches or shortfalls in
capabilities and requirements, or as a substitute for the routine
recruiting, induction, and training of new servicemembers. DOD must
balance domestic and overseas missions with a renewed

emphasis on homeland defense. Moreover, current operations both home and
abroad are stressing the forces, as shown in personnel tempo data.
Complicating the situation is the fact that some units are not well
structured for their domestic missions, cannot practice the varied skills
needed to maintain combat proficiency while performing domestic missions,
and receive little training value from their assigned domestic duties.
Therefore, military force readiness may erode and future personnel
retention problems may develop, if action is not taken to address these
problems.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense assess domestic military
mission requirements and determine if steps should be taken to structure
U. S. forces to better accomplish domestic military missions while
maintaining proficiency for overseas combat missions.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred
with the need to do an assessment that is expressed in our recommendation.
DOD stated that our draft report provides an accurate assessment of DOD*s
need to balance its domestic and overseas mission

with a renewed emphasis on homeland defense. DOD added that our draft
report describes the stress that high operational tempo could have on
personnel. However, in its comments, DOD stated that it does not believe

that an independent force structure assessment is required to better match
force structure to perceived new domestic support requirements; rather,
DOD stated that force structure changes should be determined through the
ongoing force management processes that will culminate with the fiscal
year 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. If DOD can incorporate a force
structure assessment as part of its ongoing force management processes,
then it would generally fulfill the intent or our recommendation.
Conclusions

Recommendation for Executive Action

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Page 24 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

However, we believe that DOD should examine the merits of taking actions
to alleviate stress on the forces in the near term rather than wait until
the fiscal year 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review because the missions
causing the stress are continuing. Based on our analysis of personnel
tempo trends through December 2002 and on discussions with officials
conducting domestic military missions, we believe that U. S. military
force readiness may erode because of the poor match between the types of
forces needed for the domestic military missions we reviewed, the forces
available, and the limited training value derived from the missions.
Moreover, future personnel retention problems may develop in the meantime
due to the pace of operations, which consequently may become
unsustainable. Additionally, current operations in Iraq, which were not

considered in our analysis of military personnel tempo data, can be
expected to impact a significant portion of the military force structure
for the foreseeable future. Lastly, homeland defense missions are another
factor of military personnel tempo because these missions are ongoing.
Therefore, we believe our recommendation is valid as originally drafted.
DOD*s comments are reprinted in appendix II, along with our evaluation of
them. In addition, DOD provided technical comments, which we incorporated
as appropriate.

We conducted our review from July 2002 through April 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that
time, we will send copies of this report to other appropriate
congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make
copies available to other interested parties upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www. gao. gov.

Page 25 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

If you or your staff have any questions about this report please call me
at (202) 512- 6020 or e- mail me at deckerr@ gao. gov. The GAO contact and
key contributors are listed in appendix III.

Raymond J. Decker Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 26 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

To determine how the Department of Defense*s (DOD) military and
nonmilitary missions differ and how they have changed since September 11,
2001, we conducted in- depth interviews with officials from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, including but not limited to the Office of the
Executive Secretary, Office of the Special Assistant for Homeland
Security, 1 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, and the General Counsel; the Joint Staff*s J- 3 Directorate for
Operations and J- 5 Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy; U. S.
Joint Forces Command*s Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security; 2
the Director of Military Support; the U. S. Army Reserve Command; the
National Guard Bureau Homeland Defense Office; and the Army and Air
National Guard. We visited and met with officials from U. S. Northern
Command, who also provided detailed responses to our written questions,
which we analyzed and used to continue a dialogue with the officials. We
also analyzed documents prepared by U. S. Northern Command and the Joint
Force Headquarters for Homeland Security. We reviewed DOD directives that
govern civil support missions, including

DOD Directive 3025.1 Military Support to Civil Authorities issued January
15, 1993, and DOD Directive 3025.15 Military Assistance to Civil
Authorities issued February 18, 1997. Also, we analyzed Director of
Military Support data for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 to learn about the
types of nonmilitary support that DOD provided to federal agencies. To
better understand DOD*s missions, we reviewed key documents such as the
Secretary of Defense*s Annual Report to the President and the Congress for
2002, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, The National Security
Strategy of the United States, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
and the defense strategy issued as part of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review Report.

To more fully understand the legal context of DOD*s civil support missions
in the United States, we reviewed laws and defense directives relevant to
DOD*s civilian support activities. We also examined the 1878 Posse

Comitatus Act and its restrictions on direct DOD assistance to civilian
law enforcement. We identified and examined a series of statutory

1 During our review, the Senate confirmed the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense in February 2003. The Special Assistant for
Homeland Security became the principal deputy for the recently established
assistant secretary. 2 During our review, the Joint Force Headquarters for
Homeland Security was transferred from U. S. Joint Forces Command to U. S.
Northern Command when U. S. Northern Command reached its initial
operational capability on October 1, 2002, and assumed

responsibility for the defense the United States. Appendix I: Scope and
Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 27 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act. In addition, we reviewed DOD*s
directives governing civil support missions and assistance to law
enforcement to identify DOD*s criteria for accepting or rejecting requests
for such assistance.

To assess whether DOD*s organizations, plans, and force structure are
adequate to address domestic military missions, we identified DOD*s new
organizations and responsibilities with DOD officials and visited the U.
S. Northern Command, reviewed plans, and compared the types of domestic
missions performed by the forces with their primary missions. Specifically
for DOD*s organizations, we reviewed appropriate documents, including the
U. S. Northern Command Campaign Plan and the April 2002 revision to the
Unified Command Plan, and we discussed organizational changes with
knowledgeable officials throughout DOD. We also attended several
congressional hearings that addressed the establishment of new
organizations and their roles and responsibilities. With respect to
understanding how plans address DOD*s domestic missions, we reviewed our
prior audit work related to the review of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review Report and risk management. Also, we discussed DOD*s planning
process with an official at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and at
U. S. Northern Command and we discussed the development of the campaign
plan with U. S. Northern Command officials. To obtain an understanding of
whether forces performing domestic military missions are tailored to
perform these missions, we selected two Operation Noble Eagle missions
performed in the continental United States by DOD forces since September
11, 2001. Specifically, we reviewed installation security provided by Army
military police units and combat air patrols flown by Air Force fighter
units. We selected these specific missions because: (1) Joint Force
Headquarters for Homeland Security officials indicated that Army military
police combat units were deploying at high rates due to the events of
September 11, 2001, and (2) the combat air patrol mission was the first

domestic military mission performed under Operation Noble Eagle.  To
understand installation security missions, we interviewed officials

at U. S. Forces Command; the U. S. Army Reserve Command; and the U. S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command. We also visited and interviewed
officials at military police combat units that deployed for these
missions, including an Army active duty combat support company, an Army
Reserve internment and resettlement battalion, and an Army National Guard
guard company. We also conducted a 2- day videoconference with command
officials from an Army National Guard combat support company. We analyzed
documentation such as briefings, mission orders, and training documents
from the four units. We selected

these military police units judgmentally based on the deployment data

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 28 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

received from U. S. Forces Command, taking into consideration the number
of days the units had performed installation security; the number of
personnel deployed on the missions; the type of military police unit
involved; whether the unit was from the active Army, Army Reserve, or Army
National Guard; and whether the unit completed its mission or would do so
prior to the conclusion of our review. To better understand whether the
skills required for installation security were well matched to the unit*s
primary wartime missions, we compared the required combat training for
these units to the types of duties they routinely performed for enhanced
installation security. Further, we reviewed Army training regulations and
manuals. We also analyzed data pertaining to the Army National Guard
deployments to Air Force installations in the continental United States.
We determined the types of units that deployed on these missions,
including those most frequently deployed, and we examined the primary
combat training requirements these units must perform to maintain combat
proficiency in their particular specialties.  To gain first- hand
information about the combat air patrols, we

interviewed officials at active duty Air Force and Air National Guard
units that performed combat air patrol missions, and analyzed extensive
operational, training, and maintenance data. To gain an understanding
about operational requirements and command and control issues for combat
air patrol missions, we interviewed officials at the Department of the Air
Force; the Air National Guard; the Air Force Reserve Command; the Air
Combat Command; the Continental United States Region, North American
Aerospace Defense Command; and North American Aerospace Defense Command.
We selected units to visit based on their participation in combat air
patrols since September 11, 2001. We obtained and analyzed flying hours
and sortie data for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 for fighter (F15 and F16)
wings from Air Combat Command, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force
Reserve Command. We also obtained and reviewed Air Force training
instructions and unit training performance reports.  To determine if
military personnel experienced increases in time away

from home while performing official military duties, we reviewed data for
personnel tempo for each of the military services and their respective
reserve components for the period October 1, 2000, through December 31,
2002 (the latest data available). The services report their data to the
Defense Manpower Data Center under the direction of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness. We obtained the Army*s data directly
from the Army Personnel Command because at the time of our review, the
Defense Manpower Data Center did not have the Army*s recent data in its
information management system. To gain further insight into the personnel
tempo data, we conducted in- depth interviews with officials from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 29 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

and Readiness, the Defense Manpower Data Center, and the Departments of
the Army and the Air Force. We also reviewed DOD*s use of stop loss
authority by obtaining the stop loss orders and estimates of affected
personnel from officials in the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Military Personnel Policy, and each of the military services. We discussed
the estimates with the officials to determine the most appropriate way to
demonstrate the impacts of stop loss orders.

We reviewed the data provided by the Army, Army Reserve, Army National
Guard, Air National Guard, Air Force, Defense Manpower Data Center, and
Army Personnel Command for completeness and reliability. For the analysis
of flying hours and military police deployments, we found and corrected
some errors in the data. Specifically, we found errors in the Air Force*s
flying hour records and corrected the data by incorporating data provided
by the affected unit. For military police deployments we found duplicate
deployments in some cases and eliminated the duplicate records.

For the analysis of Air Force, Marine Corps, Army, and Navy personnel
tempo data, we found and corrected some errors where possible, and did not
use the data or specific fields where the data were unreliable or we could
not correct the problems. Specifically, for the Air Force data, we
eliminated duplicate records and deleted all records of personnel who had
overlapping duty dates. For all services, where the personnel tempo end
date was missing, we assumed the personnel were still away from home and
set the end date to a date after our analytic period. To the extent that
the missing date represents completed duties where the end date had not
been entered, we are overstating the number of personnel and the extent of
days away from home. Through corroborating evidence from comparisons with
other DOD data

files and our corrections, we confirmed that the data we used present a
reliable depiction of the active Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard,
active Air Force, and Air National Guard units involved in Operation Noble
Eagle activities; and Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel
deployments from October 1, 2000, to December 31, 2002.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 30 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

See comment 3. See comment 2.

See comment 1.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 31 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

See comment 5. See agency comments

and our evaluation on p. 23.

See comment 1. Report language now on p. 12.

See comment 4.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 32 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

See comment 9. Report language now on p. 23. See comment 8.

See comment 3. See comment 7.

See comment 2. See comment 6.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 33 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

See comment 11. See comment 10.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 34 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

The following are GAO*s comments on the Department of Defense*s letter
dated June 30, 2003.

1. DOD stated that it is now studying and implementing significant changes
in the force structure to better support civil authorities during domestic
events. First, during our audit we were not presented with evidence of
such studies as they relate to either civil support or homeland defense
missions. Second, in our follow- up conversation with a DOD official
concerning this statement, the DOD official did not provide specific
information about the scope, content, or completion dates of the studies.
Finally, DOD stated that it has adjusted its strategic and operational
focus to encompass traditional military threats from hostile states,
asymmetric threats posed by terrorists, and asymmetric threats posed by
hostile states. Our draft report acknowledged the shifts for traditional
military threats and the asymmetric threats posed by terrorists. Based on
DOD*s comment, we added asymmetric threats posed by hostile states.

2. DOD stated that it is important for the report to note that DOD
military forces are not first responders. Rather, DOD provides support as
directed by the President or Secretary of Defense using defense
capabilities to assist other federal, state, and local authorities in
response to their requests. Additionally, DOD stated that our report fails
to emphasize that DOD is not the long- term solution to the nation*s
domestic prevention, response, and recovery requirements. Our report
clearly states that DOD assesses requests from civil authorities based
upon its own criteria from DOD Directive 3025.15,

Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, and that DOD has some discretion
to accept or reject these requests. Moreover, DOD suggested that we use
this opportunity to recommend a solution involving the fostering of a more
robust state and local response structure. We disagree. We did not comment
on such a solution in our draft report because this type of assessment was
outside the scope of our review. Ultimately, the President and Congress
will determine the future role of DOD, if any, in domestic response
missions.

3. DOD commented that our draft report does not mention the planned
changes to the Defense Readiness Reporting System. According to DOD, the
system*s changes are designed to assess the impact of homeland defense and
civil support missions on the readiness of forces to execute their
warfighting mission. At DOD*s request, we have GAO Comments

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 35 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

incorporated information about this system on page 17. However, in March
2003, 1 we reported that as of January 2003, DOD had not developed an
implementation plan for the Defense Readiness Reporting System that
contained measurable performance goals, identified resources, suggested
performance indicators, or included an evaluation plan to assess progress
in developing this system. 4. DOD commented that our draft report used
non- standard terminology,

referring to military missions (what DOD calls homeland defense) and
nonmilitary missions (support to civil authorities). We added language on
page 1 (see footnote 1) to establish the meaning of the terms used in our
report.

5. DOD stated that it believes it is not clear that homeland defense and
support to civil authorities missions are key factors in high personnel
tempo. On the contrary, our draft report acknowledges that overseas
missions as well as domestic missions contribute to high personnel tempo.
Indeed, current personnel tempo could be even higher than is depicted in
our draft report because the data displaying high personnel tempo stemming
from participation in homeland defense missions or other deployments after
December 2002, or from Operation Iraqi Freedom, were not yet fully
available at the time of our review. In addition, the personnel tempo data
we received from DOD did not record a servicemember*s assigned operation*
for example, Operation Noble Eagle. However, we added a statement to
footnote 28 in our report that acknowledges this limitation in the
personnel tempo data we received. DOD also commented that since 9/ 11/ 01,
increased requirements have

been driven more significantly by overseas operations in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and elsewhere in the war on terrorism. While DOD may be correct, our
report discussed personnel tempo, not requirements. Personnel tempo refers
to the amount of time during which a member of the armed forces is engaged
in official duties at a location that makes it infeasible to spend off
duty time at the servicemember*s home, homeport (for Navy servicemembers),
or civilian residence (for reserve components* personnel). Therefore, we
stand by our finding that high personnel tempo is an indicator that
present force structure may not be sufficient to address the increase in
domestic and

1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: New Reporting
System Is Intended to Address Long- Standing Problems, but Better Planning
Is Needed, GAO- 03- 456 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 28, 2003).

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 36 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

overseas military missions and could lead to an erosion of unit readiness.

Lastly, because the assessment of rotating units to maintain combat
readiness was outside the scope of our review, we could not evaluate DOD*s
statements.

6. DOD commented that activities such as mobilization and preparation for
war would almost certainly have an impact on the resources available to
respond to homeland defense and support to civil authorities missions. DOD
added that our draft report leaves the inaccurate impression that this
situation is the norm. However, DOD did not specifically point out where
the report suggested such an interpretation. We disagree that our report
leaves an inaccurate impression, because it does not have statements
implying this cause and effect. However, because servicemembers cannot be
in both domestic and overseas locations at the same time, we believe that
mobilization and preparation for any one mission, even including war, will
necessarily make them unavailable for other missions.

DOD also commented that it is important to note that, even during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, over 200,000 soldiers and airmen were still
available after the mobilization. We agree that a significant number of
personnel have not been mobilized even during Operation Iraqi Freedom, but
it is unclear what DOD*s figure means. DOD did not provide evidence to
support this figure, and we believe that, in any case, it is tangential to
our point* that, in general, some forces are not optimally suited to
perform domestic military missions. We found that some forces* skills are
mismatched with the needs of domestic military missions and that these
forces lose critical training opportunities. Thus, DOD*s statement that
200,000 servicemembers were available does not necessarily signify that
these members are well suited for the missions at hand.

Lastly, we did not discuss overseas missions at length in this report,
because the report reviewed DOD*s domestic military missions.

7. DOD commented that when identifying Title 10 statutes that allow
federal forces to perform domestic law enforcement missions, the report
does not make clear that these missions are based on worst case scenarios
and are not the norm. We agree that the use of federal forces to perform
law enforcement missions is not the norm. As suggested by each of the
authorized uses of federal forces in domestic law enforcement roles that
we identified, such uses are in fact the exception rather than the rule.
DOD is correct when it states that it

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 37 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

undertakes missions to support civil authorities at the direction of the
President or the Secretary of Defense, and, as DOD has pointed out, these
missions may be undertaken upon requests for assistance from civil
authorities.

8. DOD disagreed with our statement on page 14 that domestic military
missions to date have offered limited training value because these
missions generally have required only basic military skills. DOD stated
that basic military skills require practice, just as do the more
sophisticated skills. We agree that basic skills also need practice, and
our report made clear that, while performing Operation Noble Eagle

missions (such as domestic installation security and combat air patrols),
forces are able to employ basic military skills. However, our discussions
with service officials revealed that servicemembers were inhibited from
executing the full range of difficult tactical maneuvers or from
replicating battlefield conditions while deployed on Operation Noble Eagle
missions. Moreover, we reviewed DOD training requirements for all the
military skills of these forces, both basic and advanced, as well as the
DOD requirements for their frequency of practice in order to ensure
proficiency. Also, DOD asserts that there will be ample opportunity to
increase readiness prior to operational employment. However, DOD did not
explain how it could predict the amount of time available to prepare for a
future contingency. In any case, based on DOD*s requirements, we have
concluded that overall combat readiness may erode.

In addition, based on the length or frequency for Operation Noble Eagle
deployments that we reviewed, we concluded that although basic military
skills have been frequently practiced, combat skills have not generally
been practiced. As a result, the combat proficiency of many servicemembers
could be jeopardized. Moreover, because DOD did not provide specific
criteria for what constitutes the limited scope and duration of domestic
missions, we cannot address these comments. Finally, Operation Noble Eagle
began on 9/ 11/ 01, is continuing, and has no known end in sight, which
raises questions

about whether this is a *limited duration* mission. Therefore, we stand by
our report as originally drafted.

9. In its comments, DOD pointed out that we concluded (now on p. 23) that
some units are not well structured for their domestic missions, cannot
practice the varied skills needed to maintain combat proficiency while
performing domestic missions, and receive little training value from their
assigned domestic missions. DOD then asserts that a temporary reduction in
a unit*s effectiveness for its

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 38 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

primary mission due to homeland security or peacekeeping missions is not
necessarily a bad thing. A key DOD official explained to us that
effectiveness refers to the extent to which a unit was successful in
completing a mission to which it was assigned. However, we did not
evaluate the extent to which any military units were successful in
completing assigned missions, thus DOD*s comment missed our point. We
believe that a unit*s readiness may erode in the future from performing a
mission for which it was not designed. DOD also asserted

that the ability of units to prepare for and execute a variety of missions
with inherent capability adds flexibility. While DOD is apparently
asserting that the missions we reviewed are adding flexibility and
enhancing responsiveness, DOD did not explain how practicing the basic
skills of flying aircraft and standing guard adds flexibility.
Consequently, we stand by our conclusion.

10. DOD commented that the report confused the interpretation and
application of the Posse Comitatus Act with regard to the use of the
military to enforce the laws of the United States. We disagree. Our report
identified and summarized laws associated with the 1878 Posse Comitatus
Act. We explained the laws* impact on requests for DOD assistance in
domestic law enforcement operations. We also reported that DOD does not
believe the act impedes the nature or timeliness of its response.

11. DOD commented that our report indicated that DOD did not complete a
congressionally directed legal review on the use of military forces in the
United States and any legal impediments affecting DOD*s role in supporting
homeland security. We have updated our report to reflect information that
DOD has recently provided to us, although DOD did not provide this report
to us.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 39 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512- 4523 In addition to the person named above,
Deborah Colantonio, Richard K. Geiger, Kevin L. O*Neill, William J.
Rigazio, Susan K. Woodward, Michael C. Zola, Rebecca Shea, and Arthur L.
James Jr. also made key contributions to this report. Appendix III: GAO
Contact and Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contact Acknowledgments

Related GAO Products Page 40 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

Homeland Defense: Preliminary Observations on How Overseas and Domestic
Missions Impact DOD Forces. GAO- 03- 677T. Washington, D. C.: April 29,
2003.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to
Terrorism. GAO- 03- 519T. Washington, D. C.: March 3, 2003.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland
Security. GAO- 03- 102. Washington, D. C.: January 2003.

Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership.

GAO- 03- 260. Washington, D. C.: December 20, 2002.

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success. GAO- 02- 1013T. Washington, D. C.: August 23, 2002.

Reserve Forces: DOD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations between
Reservists and Their Employers. GAO- 02- 608. Washington, D. C.: June 13,
2002.

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
Uncertainty Remains. GAO- 02- 610. Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002.

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO- 02- 208T. Washington, D. C.: October 31, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations. GAO-
01- 822. Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal
Response. GAO- 01- 660T. Washington, D. C.: April 24, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National
Strategy. GAO- 01- 556T. Washington, D. C.: March 27, 2001.

Military Personnel: Full Extent of Support to Civil Authorities Unknown
but Unlikely to Adversely Impact Retention. GAO- 01- 9. Washington, D. C.:
January 26, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities:
Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination.

GAO- 01- 14. Washington, D. C.: November 30, 2000. Related GAO Products

Related GAO Products Page 41 GAO- 03- 670 Homeland Defense

Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources.

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 218. Washington, D. C.: July 26, 2000.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological
Terrorism. GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 50. Washington, D. C.: October 20, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of
Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 163. Washington, D. C.:
September 7, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism
Operations. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 135. Washington, D. C.: May 13, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism.
GAO/ T- NSIAD/ GGD- 99- 107. Washington, D. C.: March 11, 1999. Combating
Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues.

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 164. Washington, D. C.: April 23, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and
Target Program Investments. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 74. Washington, D. C.: April
9, 1998. Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs

Requires Better Management and Coordination. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 39.
Washington, D. C.: December 1, 1997. Combating Terrorism: Federal
Agencies* Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy. GAO/ NSIAD-
97- 254. Washington, D. C.:

September 26, 1997.

(350225)

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