Homeland Security: Challenges to Implementing the Immigration
Interior Enforcement Strategy (10-APR-03, GAO-03-660T).
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Immigration Interior
Enforcement Strategy's implementation is now the responsibility
of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE). This
strategy was originally created by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). In the 1990s, INS developed a
strategy to control illegal immigration across the U.S. border
and a strategy to address enforcement priorities within the
country's interior. In 1994, INS's Border Patrol issued a
strategy to deter illegal entry. The strategy called for
"prevention through deterrence"; that is, to raise the risk of
being apprehended for illegal aliens to a point where they would
consider it futile to try to enter. The plan called for targeting
resources in a phased approach, starting first with the areas of
greatest illegal activity. In 1999, the INS issued its interior
enforcement strategy designed to deter illegal immigration,
prevent immigration-related crimes, and remove those illegally in
the United States. Historically, Congress and INS have devoted
over five times more resources in terms of staff and budget on
border enforcement than on interior enforcement.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-660T
ACCNO: A06631
TITLE: Homeland Security: Challenges to Implementing the
Immigration Interior Enforcement Strategy
DATE: 04/10/2003
SUBJECT: Illegal aliens
Immigration or emigration
Law enforcement
Strategic planning
National preparedness
INS Interior Enforcement Strategy
******************************************************************
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GAO-03-660T
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and
Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a. m. EDT Thursday, April
10, 2003 HOMELAND SECURITY
Challenges to Implementing the Immigration Interior Enforcement Strategy
Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director Homeland Security and Justice
GAO- 03- 660T
Page 1 GAO- 03- 660T Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am
pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland
Security*s (DHS) Immigration Interior Enforcement Strategy, whose
implementation is now the responsibility of the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (BICE). As you know, this strategy was originally
created by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). This
statement discusses the interior enforcement strategy and selected issues
pertaining to its implementation and management.
In the 1990s, INS developed a strategy to control illegal immigration
across the U. S. border and a strategy to address enforcement priorities
within the country*s interior. In 1994, INS*s Border Patrol issued a
strategy to deter illegal entry. The strategy called for *prevention
through deterrence*; that is, to raise the risk of being apprehended for
illegal aliens to a point where
they would consider it futile to try to enter. The plan called for
targeting resources in a phased approach, starting first with the areas of
greatest illegal activity. In 1999, the INS issued its interior
enforcement strategy designed to deter illegal immigration, prevent
immigration- related crimes, and remove those illegally in the United
States. Historically, Congress and INS have devoted over five times more
resources in terms of staff and budget on border enforcement than on
interior enforcement.
In my statement today, I make the following points: INS*s interior
enforcement strategy was designed to address (1) the
detention and removal of criminal aliens, (2) the dismantling and
diminishing of alien smuggling operations, (3) community complaints about
illegal immigration, (4) immigration benefit and document fraud, and (5)
employers* access to undocumented workers. These components remain in the
BICE strategy.
INS faced numerous challenges in implementing the strategy. For example,
INS lacked reliable data to determine staff needs, reliable information
technology, clear and consistent guidelines and procedures for working-
level staff, effective collaboration and coordination within INS and with
other agencies, and appropriate performance measures to help assess
program results. As BICE assumes responsibility for strategy
implementation, it should consider how to address these challenges by
improving resource allocation, information technology, program guidance,
and performance measurement.
Page 2 GAO- 03- 660T The creation of DHS has focused attention on other
challenges to implementing the strategy. For example, BICE needs to
coordinate and collaborate with the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services
(BCIS) for the timely and proper adjudication of benefit applications, and
with the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) to assist in
antismuggling investigations and sharing intelligence. In addition, BICE
needs to assure that training and internal controls are sufficient to
govern investigators* antiterrorism activities when dealing with citizens
and aliens.
My testimony today is based primarily on the results of work that we have
completed in recent years, namely, our February 1999 testimony on INS*s
efforts to identify and remove criminal aliens, 1 our April 1999 report on
INS*s worksite enforcement program, 2 our May 2000 report on alien
smuggling, 3 our May 2001 report on the processing of immigration
benefits, 4 our January 2002 report on immigration benefit fraud, 5 our
March 2002 report on INS* Forensic Document Laboratory, 6 our November
2002 report on INS*s alien address information 7 , and our January 2003
1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Criminal Aliens: INS* Efforts to
Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need Improvement, GAO/
T- GGD- 99- 47 (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 25, 1999).
2 U. S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles
to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist, GAO/ GGD- 99- 33
(Washington, D. C.: Apr. 2, 1999). 3 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements Needed to Address
Growing Problem, GAO/ GGD- 00- 103 (Washington, D. C.: May 1, 2000).
4 U. S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefits: Several Factors
Impede the Timeliness of Application Processing, GAO- 01- 488 (Washington,
D. C.: May 4, 2001). 5 U. S. General Accounting Office, Immigration
Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is Needed to Address Problems, GAO- 02- 66
(Washington, D. C.: Jan. 31, 2002). 6 U. S. General Accounting Office, INS
Forensic Document Laboratory: Several Factors Impeded Timeliness of Case
Processing, GAO- 02- 410 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 13, 2002)
7 U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: INS Cannot Locate
Many Aliens Because It Lacks Reliable Address Information, GAO- 03- 188
(Washington, D. C., Nov. 21, 2002).
Page 3 GAO- 03- 660T reports on major management challenges and program
risks at the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice. 8 In these
reports we made many recommendations to improve INS
operations. INS had implemented or was in the process of implementing some
of these recommendations. We plan to follow up on DHS plans to improve the
various programs.
In January 1999, INS issued its Interior Enforcement Strategy. This
strategy focused resources on areas that would have the greatest impact on
reducing the size and annual growth of the illegal resident population.
Certain criteria were used to develop the priorities and activities of the
strategy. The criteria focused on potential risks to U. S. communities and
persons, costs, capacity to be effective, impact on communities, potential
impact on reducing the size of the problem, and potential value for
prevention and deterrence. The strategy established the following five
areas in priority order:
1. Identify and remove criminal aliens and minimize recidivism. Under this
strategic priority, INS was to identify and remove criminal aliens as they
come out of the federal and state prison systems and those convicted of
aggravated felonies currently in probation and parole status.
2. Deter, dismantle, and diminish smuggling or trafficking of aliens. This
strategic priority called for INS to disrupt and dismantle the criminal
infrastructure that encourages and benefits from illegal migration. INS
efforts were to start in source and transit countries and continue inside
the United States, focusing on smugglers, counterfeit document producers,
transporters, and employers who exploit and benefit from illegal
migration.
3. Respond to community reports and complaints about illegal immigration.
In addition to responding to local law enforcement issues and needs, this
strategic priority emphasizes working with local
8 U. S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: Department of Homeland Security, GAO- 03- 102 (Washington, D. C.,
Jan. 2003); and Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department
of Justice, GAO- 03- 105 (Washington, D. C., Jan. 2003). Components of the
Interior Enforcement Strategy
Page 4 GAO- 03- 660T communities to identify and address problems that
arise from the impact of illegal immigration, based on local threat
assessments.
4. Minimize immigration benefit fraud and other document abuse. Under this
strategic priority, INS was to aggressively investigate and prosecute
benefit fraud and document abuse to promote integrity of the legal
immigration system.
5. Block and remove employers* access to undocumented workers. The
strategy emphasizes denying employers access to unauthorized workers by
checking their compliance with the employment verification requirements in
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Coupled with its efforts
to control smuggling activity, this effort could have a multiplier effect
on access of employers to illegal workers and on the overall number of
illegal residents in the country.
Figure 1 shows that INS had generally allocated its interior enforcement
resources consistent with these priorities and that the workyears devoted
to several of INS*s interior enforcement efforts had either declined or
stayed about the same between fiscal years 1998 and 2002.
Page 5 GAO- 03- 660T Figure 1: INS Investigations Workyears
Source: GAO*s analysis of INS*s data. Note: Workyear totals do not include
administrative time.
Our work has shown that INS faced numerous daunting enforcement issues, as
will BICE as it assumes responsibility for the strategy. For example, the
potential pool of removable criminal aliens and fugitives numbers in the
hundreds of thousands. Many are incarcerated in hundreds of federal,
state, and local facilities, while others are fugitives at large across
the country. The number of individuals smuggled into the United States has
increased dramatically, and alien smuggling has become more
sophisticated, complex, organized, and flexible. Thousands of aliens
annually illegally seek immigration benefits, such as work authorization
and change of status, and some of these aliens use these benefits to
enable them to conduct criminal activities. Hundreds of thousands of
aliens
unauthorized to work in the United States have used fraudulent Challenges
to
Implementing the Interior Enforcement Programs
0 200
400 600
800 1000
1200 Criminal alien removal Alien smuggling Noncriminal removals Benefit
and other fraud Employer investigations
Program Workyears
FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002
Page 6 GAO- 03- 660T documents to circumvent the process designed to
prevent employers from hiring them. In many instances, employers are
complicit in this activity. Given the nature, scope, and magnitude of
these activities, BICE needs to
ensure that it is making the best use of its limited enforcement
resources. We found that fundamental management challenges exist in
several of the interior enforcement programs and that addressing them will
require the high- level attention and concerted efforts of BICE.
In several reports we noted that INS did not believe it had sufficient
staff to reach its program goals. Having data on how to effectively
allocate staff and placing sufficient staff in the right locations is
important if BICE is to achieve program goals. Staff shortages had
contributed to INS*s inability to promptly remove the majority of criminal
aliens after they have completed their prison sentences. In 1997 INS did
not place into removal proceedings 50 percent of potentially deportable
criminal aliens who were released
from federal prisons and state prisons from 5 states. In 1999 we reported
that, although the removal of criminal aliens was an INS management
priority, INS faced the same staff shortage issues in 1997 as it had in
1995. In particular, agent attrition * about one- third of the workforce -
continued
to impede INS*s ability to meet its program goals. INS had told us that
since 1997, the attrition rates of agents in this program has stabilized
and that, in fiscal year 2003, the agents from this program would be
reclassified as detention removal officers, which INS believed should
further help
reduce attrition. Even if INS had additional staff working in these
program areas, it lacked good management information to determine how many
staff it needed to meet its program goals and how best to allocate staff
given the limited resources it did have. With respect to its program for
removing incarcerated criminal aliens, INS told us that beginning in
fiscal year 2002, the agency implemented our recommendation to use a
workload analysis model. This was to help identify the resources the
agency needed for its criminal alien program in order to achieve overall
program goals and support its funding and staffing requests. We have not
reviewed this new model to ascertain its usefulness.
With respect to alien smuggling, INS lacked field intelligence staff to
collect and analyze information. Both 1998 and 1999 INS Annual Performance
Plan reports stated that the lack of intelligence personnel hampered the
collection, reporting, and analysis of intelligence information. Although
INS*s Intelligence Program proposed that each Need for Better Staff
Levels and Allocations
Page 7 GAO- 03- 660T district office have an intelligence unit, as of
January 2000, 21 of INS*s 33 districts did not have anyone assigned full-
time to intelligence- related
duties. Our ongoing work at land ports of entry shows this to be a
continuing problem.
The worksite enforcement program received a relatively small portion of
INS*s staffing and budget. In fiscal year 1998, INS completed a total of
6,500 worksite investigations, which equated to about 3 percent of the
estimated number of employers of unauthorized aliens. Given limited
enforcement resources, BICE needs to assure that it targets those
industries where employment of illegal aliens poses the greatest potential
risk to national security. The program now has several initiatives
underway that target sensitive industries.
INS had long- standing difficulty developing and fielding information
systems to support its program operations, and effectively using
information technology continued to remain a challenge. For example, in
2002 we reported that benefit fraud investigations had been hampered by a
lack of integrated information systems. The operations units at the four
INS service centers that investigate benefit fraud operate different
information systems that did not interface with each other or with the
units that investigate benefit fraud at INS district offices. As a result,
sharing information about benefit applicants is difficult. The INS staff
who adjudicate applications did not have routine access to INS*s National
Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS). Not having access to or not
using NAILS essentially means that officers may be making decisions
without access to or using significant information and that benefits may
be
granted to individuals not entitled to receive them. Thus, INS was not in
the best position to review numerous applications and detect patterns,
trends, and potential schemes for benefit fraud. Further, in 2002 we
reported that another INS database, the Forensic
Automated Case and Evidence Tracking System (FACETS), did not contain
sufficient data for managers to know the exact size and status of the
laboratory*s pending workload or how much time is spent on each forensic
case by priority category. As a result, managers were not in the best
position to make fact- based decisions about case priorities, staffing,
and budgetary resource needs. With respect to the criminal alien program,
in 1999 we reported that INS lacked a nationwide data system containing
the universe of foreign- born inmates for tracking the hearing status of
each inmate. In response to our Need for Better
Information Technology
Page 8 GAO- 03- 660T recommendation, INS developed a nationwide automated
tracking system for the Bureau of Prisons and deployed the system to all
federal
institutional hearing program sites. INS said that it was working with the
Florida Department of Corrections to integrate that state*s system with
INS*s automated tracking system. INS also said that it planned to begin
working with New York, New Jersey, and Texas to integrate their systems
and then work with California, Illinois, and Massachusetts. We have not
examined these new systems to determine whether they were completed as
planned or to ascertain their effectiveness.
In 2000 we reported that INS lacked an agencywide automated case tracking
and management system that prevented antismuggling program managers from
being able to monitor their ongoing investigations,
determine if other antismuggling units were investigating the same target,
or know if previous investigations had been conducted on a particular
target. In response to our recommendation, INS deployed an automated case
tracking and management system for all of its criminal investigations,
including alien smuggling investigations. Again, we have not examined the
new system to ascertain its effectiveness.
Our review of the various program components of the interior enforcement
strategy found that working- level guidance was sometimes lacking or
nonexistent. INS had not established guidance for opening benefit fraud
investigations or for prioritizing investigative leads. Without such
criteria, INS could not be ensured that the highest- priority cases were
investigated and resources were used optimally. INS*s interior enforcement
strategy did not define the criteria for opening investigations of
employers suspected of criminal activities. In response to our
recommendation, INS clarified the types of employer- related criminal
activities that should be the focus of INS investigations.
INS*s alien smuggling intelligence program had been impeded by a lack of
understanding among field staff about how to report intelligence
information. Staff were unclear about guidelines, procedures, and
effective techniques for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating
intelligence information. They said that training in this area was
critically needed.
INS had not established outcome- based performance measures that would
have helped it assess the results of its interior enforcement strategy.
For example, in 2000 we reported that while INS had met its numeric goals
for Need for Better Guidance
to Program Staff Need for Better Performance Measures
Page 9 GAO- 03- 660T the number of smuggling cases presented for
prosecution in its antismuggling program, it had not yet developed
outcome- based measures
that would indicate progress toward the strategy*s objective of
identifying, deterring, disrupting, and dismantling alien smuggling. This
was also the case for the INS intelligence program. INS had not developed
outcomebased performance measures to gauge the success of the intelligence
program to optimize the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
intelligence information. In 2002 we reported that INS had not yet
established outcome- based performance measures that would help it assess
the results of its benefit fraud investigations. Additionally, INS had not
established goals or measurement criteria for the service center
operations units that conduct fraud investigation activities. INS*s
interior enforcement strategy did not
clearly describe the specific measures INS would use to gauge its
performance in worksite enforcement. For example, in 1999 we reported that
the strategy stated that INS would evaluate its performance on the basis
of such things as changes in the behavior or business practices of persons
and organizations, but did not explain how they expected the behavior and
practices to change. And although INS indicated that it would gauge
effectiveness in the worksite area by measuring change in the wage scales
of certain targeted industries, it left unclear a number of
questions related to how it would do this. For example, INS did not
specify how wage scales would be measured; what constituted a targeted
industry; and how it would relate any changes found to its enforcement
efforts or other immigration- related causes. The strategy stated that
specific performance measurements would be developed in the annual
performance plans required by the Government Performance and Results Act.
According to INS*s fiscal year 2003 budget submission, the events of
September 11th required INS to reexamine strategies and approaches to
ensure that INS efforts fully addressed threats to the United States by
organizations engaging in national security crime. As a result, with
regard to investigating employers who may be hiring undocumented workers,
INS planned to target investigations of industries and businesses where
there is a threat of harm to the public interest. However, INS had not set
any performance measures for these types of worksite investigations.
Page 10 GAO- 03- 660T Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and with
the formation of DHS, a number of management challenges are evident. Some
of the challenges
discussed above carry over from the INS, such as the need for sound
intelligence information, efficient use of resources and management of
workloads, information systems that generate timely and reliable
information, clear and current guidance, and appropriate performance
measures. Other challenges are emerging. These include creating
appropriate cooperation and collaboration mechanisms to assure effective
program management, and reinforcing training and management controls to
help assure compliance with DHS policies and procedures and the proper
treatment of citizens and aliens.
BICE will need to assure that appropriate cooperation and collaboration
occurs between it and other DHS bureaus. For example, both the Border
Patrol, now located in the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP),
and BICE*s immigration investigations program conducted alien smuggling
investigations prior to the merger into DHS. These units operated through
different chains of command with different reporting structures. As a
result, INS*s antismuggling program lacked coordination, resulting in
multiple antismuggling units overlapping in their jurisdictions, making
inconsistent decisions about which cases to open, and functioning
autonomously and without a single chain of command. It*s unclear at this
time how the anti- smuggling program will operate under DHS. Should both
BCBP*s Border Patrol and BICE*s Investigations program continue to conduct
alien smuggling investigations, Under Secretary Hutchinson will need to
assure that coordination and collaboration exists to overcome previous
program deficiencies.
The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) is responsible
for administering services such as immigrant and nonimmigrant sponsorship,
work authorization, naturalization of qualified applicants for U. S.
citizenship, and asylum. Processing benefit applications is an important
DHS function that should be done in a timely and consistent manner. Those
who are eligible should receive benefits in a reasonable period of time.
However, some try to obtain these benefits through fraud, and
investigating fraud is the responsibility of BICE*s Immigration
Investigations program. INS* approach to addressing benefit fraud was
fragmented and unfocused. INS* interior enforcement strategy did not
address how the different INS components that conducted benefit fraud
investigations were to coordinate their investigations. Also, INS had not
established guidance to ensure the highest- priority cases are
investigated. Secretary Ridge will need to ensure the two bureaus work
closely to Challenges Faced by
DHS Relating to Interior Enforcement
Need for Program Collaboration/ Coordination
Page 11 GAO- 03- 660T assure timely adjudication for eligible applicants
while identifying and investigating potential immigration benefit fraud
cases.
BICE*s Intelligence Program is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and
disseminating immigration- related intelligence. Immigration- related
intelligence is needed by other DHS components such as Border Patrol
agents and inspectors within BCBP and personnel within BCIS adjudicating
immigration benefits. BICE will need to develop an intelligence program
structure to ensure intelligence information is disseminated to the
appropriate components within DHS*s other bureaus.
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and with the formation of DHS,
the linkages between immigration enforcement and national security have
been brought to the fore. Immigration personnel have been tapped to
perform many duties that previously were not part of their normal routine.
For example, as part of a special registration program for visitors from
selected foreign countries, immigration investigators have been
fingerprinting, photographing, and interviewing aliens upon entry to the
U. S. Immigration investigators have also participated in anti- terrorism
task forces across the country and helped interview thousands of
nonimmigrant aliens to determine what knowledge they may have had about
terrorists and terrorist activities. As part of its investigation of the
attacks of September 11, the Justice Department detained aliens on
immigration charges while investigating their potential connection with
terrorism. An integrated Entry/ Exit System, intended to enable the
government to determine which aliens have entered and left the country,
and which have overstayed their visas, is currently under development and
will rely on BICE investigators to locate those who violate the terms of
their entry visas.
All of these efforts attest to the pivotal role of immigration interior
enforcement in national security and expanded roles of investigators in
the fight against terrorism. It is important that BICE investigators
receive training to perform these expanded duties and help assure that
they effectively enforce immigration laws while recognizing the rights of
citizens and aliens. It is also important that DHS reinforce its
management controls to help assure compliance with DHS policies and
procedures. Need to Reinforce Training
and Internal Controls
Page 12 GAO- 03- 660T Having an effective interior enforcement strategy is
an essential complement to having an effective border strategy. To be
sure, BICE*s
tasks with regard to interior enforcement are considerable given the
nature, scope, and magnitude of illegal activity. INS faced significant
challenges in appropriately staffing program areas, providing reliable
information for program management, establishing clear and consistent
guidance for working- level staff to do their jobs consistent with the
goals of the program, and developing outcome- based measures that would
indicate progress toward the strategy*s objectives. With the creation of
DHS, immigration functions are now in several different bureaus that will
require enhanced coordination. Addressing these issues are important if
BICE is to achieve full program potential.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement, I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you or other members of the subcommittees may
have.
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Richard
M. Stana at (202) 512- 8777. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony included Evi L. Rezmovic and Michael P. Dino. Concluding
Observations Contacts and Acknowledgments
(440199)
*** End of document. ***