Airline Labor Relations: Information on Trends and Impact of	 
Labor Actions (13-JUN-03, GAO-03-652).				 
                                                                 
Labor negotiations in the airline industry fall under the Railway
Labor Act. Under this act, airline labor contracts do not expire,
but instead, become amendable. To help labor and management reach
agreement before a strike occurs, the act also provides a	 
process--including possible intervention by the President--that  
is designed to reduce the incidence of strikes. Despite these	 
provisions, negotiations between airlines and their unions have  
sometimes been contentious, and strikes have occurred. Because	 
air transportation is such a vital link in the nation's economic 
infrastructure, a strike at a major U.S. airline may exert a	 
significant economic impact on affected communities.		 
Additionally, if an airline's labor and management  were to	 
engage in contentious and prolonged negotiations, the airline's  
operations--and customer service--could suffer. GAO was asked to 
examine trends in airline labor negotiations in the 25 years	 
since the industry was deregulated in 1978, the impact of airline
strikes on communities, and the impact of lengthy contract	 
negotiations and nonstrike work actions (such as "sickouts") on  
passengers.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-652 					        
    ACCNO:   A07192						        
  TITLE:     Airline Labor Relations: Information on Trends and Impact
of Labor Actions						 
     DATE:   06/13/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Airline industry					 
	     Airline personnel					 
	     Airline regulation 				 
	     Customer service					 
	     Labor unions					 
	     Strikes (labor actions)				 

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GAO-03-652

Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U. S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

June 2003 AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS

Information on Trends and Impact of Labor Actions

GAO- 03- 652

Since the airline industry was deregulated in 1978, the average length of
negotiations has increased, strikes have declined, and nonstrike work
actions (e. g., sickouts) have increased. After 1990, the median length of
time needed for labor and management at U. S. major airlines to reach
agreement on contracts increased from 9 to 15 months. Of the 16 strikes
that occurred at those airlines since 1978, 12 occurred prior to 1990, and
4 occurred subsequently. All ten court- recognized, nonstrike work actions
and all six presidential interventions occurred since 1993.

Summary of Negotiation Trends Since Deregulation

Airline strikes have had obvious negative impacts on communities,
including lost income for striking and laid off workers, disrupted travel
plans, and decreased spending by travelers and the struck airline.
However, such impacts have yet to be thoroughly and systematically
analyzed. The potential net impacts of a strike on a community would
depend on a number of factors,

such as availability of service from competing (nonstriking) airlines and
the length of the strike. For example, of two recent strikes, one lasted
15 days and one lasted 24 minutes.

GAO*s analysis indicates that passenger service has been affected more
adversely by nonstrike work actions than by an increase in the length of
negotiations. Generally, but not always, as negotiation periods increased,
there has been a slight decline in on- time flights. However, the impact
of these negotiations has been unclear because the decline may also have
been affected by other factors such as poor weather. By comparison, the 10
courtrecognized, nonstrike work actions more clearly resulted in negative
impacts on passengers, as shown through such measures as a decrease in the
number of on- time flights, an increase in the number of flight problem
complaints, and a decrease in passenger traffic. Labor negotiations in the
airline

industry fall under the Railway Labor Act. Under this act, airline labor
contracts do not expire, but instead, become amendable. To help labor and
management reach agreement before a strike occurs, the act also provides a
process*

including possible intervention by the President* that is designed to
reduce the incidence of strikes.

Despite these provisions, negotiations between airlines and their unions
have sometimes been contentious, and strikes have occurred.

Because air transportation is such a vital link in the nation*s economic
infrastructure, a strike at a major U. S. airline may exert a significant
economic impact on affected communities. Additionally, if an airline*s
labor and management were to engage in contentious and

prolonged negotiations, the airline*s operations* and customer service*
could suffer. GAO was asked to examine trends

in airline labor negotiations in the 25 years since the industry was
deregulated in 1978, the impact of airline strikes on communities, and the
impact of lengthy contract negotiations and nonstrike work actions (such
as *sickouts*) on

passengers.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 652. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact JayEtta Z. Hecker at (202) 512- 2834 or HeckerJ@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 652, a report to the

Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U. S. Senate

June 2003

AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS

Information on Trends and Impact of Labor Actions

Page i GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations Letter 1 Results in Brief 3
Background 5 Length of Negotiations and Number of Nonstrike Work Actions
Have Increased, While Number of Strikes Has Declined 9 Airline Strikes
Adversely Affect Communities, but Impacts Have

Not Been Fully Analyzed and Vary from Place to Place 17 Nonstrike Work
Actions Have Greater Impacts on Passengers than Lengthy Negotiations 24
Agency Comments 31 Appendix I Additional Questions 33

Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 35

Appendix III Additional Background Information on the Railway Labor Act 38

Key Provisions of the RLA 38 Collective Bargaining Process under the RLA
39 Appendix IV Contracts Negotiated and Ratified or Settled by the
Amendable Date 41

Appendix V Airline Strikes That Have Occurred Since Deregulation 42

Appendix VI Court- recognized, Nonstrike Work Actions Since Deregulation
43 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations Appendix VII Number of
Presidential Interventions Since

Deregulation 44

Appendix VIII Comments from the National Mediation Board 45

Appendix IX GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 51 GAO Contacts 51
Staff Acknowledgments 51 Tables

Table 1: Unions Representing Selected Crafts or Classes at Major Passenger
Airlines as of February 1, 2003 5 Table 2: States That Include Binding
Arbitration or Last, Best Offer

Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Option 33 Table 3: Congressional
Interventions in Railroad Negotiations 34 Figures

Figure 1: Summary of Negotiation Trends Since Deregulation 3 Figure 2:
Collective Bargaining Process under the Railway Labor Act 8 Figure 3:
Length of Time Taken to Negotiate Contracts, 1978 to 2002 11 Figure 4:
Median Negotiation Lengths by Carrier 12 Figure 5: Frequency of Strikes,
Presidential Interventions, and

Court- recognized, Nonstrike Work Actions by Year 15 Figure 6: 2001 Market
Shares for Major Airlines at Their Hubs 21 Figure 7: Spoke Communities
Served from Cincinnati and Minneapolis- St. Paul Retain Service from
Competing Airlines 23 Figure 8: On- Time Flight Statistics for American
and Delta at

Dallas/ Fort Worth International Airport, August 1998 to December 1999 26
Figure 9: Flight Problem Complaints for American and Delta from August
1998 to December 1999 27

Page iii GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations Figure 10: Passengers
Carried on American and Delta at Dallas/ Fort Worth International Airport,
February 1998

and 1999 28 Figure 11: On- Time Flight Statistics for Delta and
Continental at Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport, August 2000 to
August 2001 29 Figure 12: Flight Problem Complaints for Delta and
Continental,

August 2000 to August 2001 30 Figure 13: Change in Passenger Traffic on
Delta and Continental at Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport in
December 1999 and 1 Year Later during the Nonstrike Work Action in
December 2000 31 Abbreviations

AFA Association of Flight Attendants AIRCon Airline Industrial Relations
Conference ALPA Air Line Pilots Association AMFA Aircraft Mechanics
Fraternal Association APA Allied Pilots Association ATA Air Transport
Association CAPA Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations CESTA
Communities for Economic Strength Through Aviation CWA Communications
Workers of America DOT Department of Transportation IAM International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace

Workers IBT International Brotherhood of Teamsters NMB National Mediation
Board PAFCA Professional Airline Flight Control Association PEB
Presidential Emergency Board RLA Railway Labor Act SAEA Southwest Airlines
Employee Association SWAPA Southwest Airlines Pilots Association TWA Trans
World Airlines TWU Transport Workers Unions UFA Union of Flight Attendants

Page iv GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations This is a work of the U. S.
Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without
further

permission from GAO. It may contain copyrighted graphics, images or other
materials. Permission from the copyright holder may be necessary should
you wish to reproduce copyrighted materials separately from GAO*s product.

Page 1 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

June 13, 2003 The Honorable John McCain Chairman, Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation United States Senate

Dear Senator McCain: Observers of the interactions between airline
management and labor have long characterized these labor relations as
contentious and adversarial. Negotiations between unions and airlines, for
example, have taken up to 4 years to complete. Unions and airlines have
each prolonged negotiations for their financial benefit. The importance of
labor relations has recently

been magnified by the financial crisis facing many airlines. Since
September 11, 2001, US Airways, United Airlines, and Hawaiian Airlines
have entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and American Airlines is fighting to
avoid bankruptcy. US Airways, United, and American have all had to obtain
the consent of their unions for contract concessions to substantially cut
labor costs. At stake, according to industry observers and financial
officials, has been the continued existence of at least two airlines.

The process under which labor negotiations in the airline industry take
place is substantially different than the process of most other
industries. Airline labor contracts do not expire, and their negotiations
can include a series of steps* including mediation, arbitration, and
presidential interventions* specifically designed to avoid an impasse that
would interrupt the flow of essential commerce. Since 1936, airline labor
negotiations have been conducted in accordance with the requirements of
the Railway Labor Act, which contains an established framework to reduce
the incidence of strikes. Although the act is designed to bring about
settlements without unions resorting to a strike, negotiations between the
airlines and their unions have sometimes been contentious, and strikes
have occurred. Recently, negotiations have at times been marked by
nonstrike work actions, such as sickouts and work slowdowns. These actions
are designed to place economic pressure on an airline.

Because of ongoing concerns about the scope and impact of airline labor
negotiations, you asked us to examine a number of issues concerning
airline negotiations, strikes, and nonstrike work actions. As agreed with
your staff, we examined the following three questions:

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

 What have been the major trends of labor negotiations in the airline
industry since the industry was deregulated in 1978, including the number
and length of negotiations and the number of strikes, presidential
interventions to avoid or end strikes, and nonstrike work actions?

 What has been the impact of airline strikes on communities?  What have
been the impacts of the length of negotiations and the

occurrence of nonstrike work actions on passengers? In addition to these
questions, you also requested information on states using binding and last
offer arbitration 1 for essential employees and the number of times
Congress has intervened in railroad labor negotiations in the last 25
years. See appendix I for data on states using binding

arbitration and congressional interventions in railroad negotiations. To
determine the trends of labor negotiations, we analyzed data on
negotiations, strikes, and nonstrike work actions from airlines, labor
unions, the National Mediation Board (NMB), industry groups, and academic
experts. We also interviewed officials with major U. S. airlines, labor
unions, the NMB, industry groups, and academic experts. To determine the
impact of strikes on communities, we reviewed available published studies
from academics and other experts, and we analyzed data on airline
schedules. To determine the impact of nonstrike work actions,

we defined such actions as those in which airlines obtained either
temporary restraining orders or injunctions against unions to prevent
various actions. We then analyzed data from the U. S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) on airline operational performance and passenger
service. Except where noted, all data collected were current as of
December 2002. Because of various data limitations, our analyses are
restricted to major U. S. passenger airlines. 2 We did not evaluate the
efficacy or effectiveness of the Railway Labor Act or the impact of any 1
Last offer arbitration is a form of arbitration in which the dispute
resolution procedure

limits an arbitrator to choosing the final offer made by one of the
parties. 2 DOT defines a *major* airline as one with annual total
operating revenues in excess of $1 billion. For purposes of this report,
we include only those major carriers that were in business as of 2001 for
which we could obtain data (Alaska, America West, American, Continental,
Delta, Northwest, Southwest, TWA, United, and US Airways). We excluded
American Eagle, American Trans Air, cargo, and regional airlines,
including American Eagle, some of which fit the $1 billion criteria,
because data for these airlines were not available.

Page 3 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

possible changes to the act. Appendix II contains a more complete
description of our scope and methodology.

Since the airline industry was deregulated in 1978, labor negotiations
have taken increasing amounts of time and have been marked less by strikes
and more by nonstrike work actions. For the contracts we reviewed that had
been negotiated between major carriers and labor unions since
deregulation, the overall median length for contracts negotiated between
1978 and 1989 was 9 months, while the median negotiation time from 1990 to
2002 increased to 15 months. (See fig. 1.) However, some carriers such as
Continental Airlines, Southwest Airlines, Alaska Airlines, and United
Airlines have been more successful than others at reaching agreement with
their labor unions in much less time. Of the 16 strikes that occurred, 12
took place from 1978 to 1989, and 4 took place since 1990. Various
presidential interventions that have prevented or halted 6 strikes have
all occurred since 1990, and all 10 court- recognized, nonstrike work
actions have also taken place since 1990. Although the complete number of
nonstrike work actions is not known because they are difficult to
document, our evidence suggests that their use has increased in the past
12 years.

Figure 1: Summary of Negotiation Trends Since Deregulation

Results in Brief

Page 4 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

While strikes cause obvious negative impacts on affected communities, we
could identify no published studies that comprehensively analyzed the full
impacts of a past strike. Negative impacts of strikes include the lost

income of striking and laid off workers, disrupted travel plans due to
cancelled flights, decreased spending by the struck airline, and less
spending by travelers. However, the overall economic impact of any past
strike, including direct and indirect effects (and the offsetting effect
of various mitigating factors such as the presence of service from
competing airlines) has not been quantified. Our analysis of past strikes
and other information indicates, however, that a strike*s potential
impacts could vary greatly from community to community. For example, a
community with substantial amounts of service provided by competing
airlines is less likely to be affected than a community that is heavily or
entirely dependent on the service provided by the striking airline,
because passengers have continued access to air service. As a result, a
thorough assessment of a strike*s impact on one community would be
difficult to generalize to other locations.

Our analysis indicates that passenger service has been affected more
adversely by nonstrike work actions than by an increase in the length of
negotiations. Generally, but not always, as negotiation periods increased,
there has been a decline in on- time flights. 3 However, the impact of
these negotiations has been unclear, because the decline may also have
been affected by other factors such as poor weather, aircraft maintenance,
runway closures, air traffic control system decisions, or equipment
failures. By comparison, the 10 court- recognized, nonstrike work actions
more clearly resulted in negative impacts on passengers, as shown through
such measures as a decrease in the number of on- time flights, an increase
in the number of flight problem complaints, and a decrease in passenger
traffic. For example, during an American pilot slowdown in 1999, the
percentage of flights that arrived or departed on time declined by 11.6

percentage points. Also, customer flight complaints with DOT about
American nearly quadrupled during the period of the nonstrike work action,
rising from 53 to 203 complaints, while passenger traffic fell by 15
percent as compared to the year before.

3 DOT defines an on- time flight as one that is less than 15 minutes after
the scheduled gate arrival or gate departure time.

Page 5 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

All the major airlines have some union representation of at least part of
their labor force. The various crafts or classes 4 that unions typically
represent include pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, and dispatchers.
Sometimes unions also represent customer service agents and clerical
workers, aircraft and baggage handling personnel, and flight instructors.

The extent of unionization among the major carriers varies significantly.
At Delta, unions represent the pilots and two small employee groups; at
Southwest, on the other hand, unions represent 10 different employee
groups. Different unions may represent a given employee craft or class at
different airlines. For example, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
represents pilots at United, but the Allied Pilots Association represents
American pilots. Table 1 summarizes the representation of different crafts
or classes at the major airlines.

Table 1: Unions Representing Selected Crafts or Classes at Major Passenger
Airlines as of February 1, 2003

Airline Pilots Flight attendants Mechanics

and related Dispatchers Fleet service/ ramp

Alaska ALPA AFA AMFA TWU IAM America West ALPA AFA IBT TWU TWU American
APA APFA TWU TWU TWU Continental ALPA IAM IBT TWU (none) Delta ALPA (none)
(none) PAFCA (none) Northwest ALPA IBT AMFA TWU IAM Southwest SWAPA TWU
AMFA SAEA TWU United ALPA AFA IAM PAFCA IAM US Airways ALPA AFA IAM TWU
IAM Legend AFA = Association of Flight Attendants ALPA = Air Line Pilots
Association AMFA = Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association APA = Allied
Pilots Association APFA = Association of Professional Flight Attendants

4 NMB defines a craft or class as a group of employees seeking
representation grouped around factors such as their functions, duties,
responsibilities, and the general nature of the work performed. Background

Page 6 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

IAM = International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers IBT =
International Brotherhood of Teamsters PAFCA = Professional Airline Flight
Control Association SAEA = Southwest Airlines Employee Association SWAPA =
Southwest Airlines Pilot Association

TWU = Transport Workers Unions Source: International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers. Note: American completed its purchase of
Trans World Airlines (TWA) in April 2001, and this table lists union
representation as of February 1, 2003; hence TWA is not included in this
table.

In general, airline labor contracts include three major elements: wages,
benefits, and work rules. Work rules generally refer to those sections of
a contract that define issues such as hours to be worked and what work is
to be done by what employees.

Negotiations between airlines and their labor unions on these contracts
are conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Railway Labor Act
(RLA). This act was passed in 1926 after the railroads and their unions
agreed to set in place a legal framework that would avoid disruptions in
rail service. The act was amended in 1936, after discussions with airline
labor and management, to include the airline industry and its labor
unions. See appendix III for a summary of the history and key provisions
of the RLA.

Airline labor contracts do not expire; rather, they reach an amendable
date* the first day that the parties can be required to negotiate the
terms of a new contract. Labor negotiations may begin before or after the
amendable date, however. While a new contract is being negotiated, the
terms of the existing contract remain in effect.

Under the RLA, labor negotiations undergo a specific process that must be
followed before a union can engage in any kind of work action, including a
strike, or before a carrier can change work rules, wages, and benefits. 5
After exchanging proposed changes to contract provisions, the airline and

the union engage in direct bargaining. If they cannot come to an
agreement, the parties must request mediation assistance from the NMB. By
statute, if the NMB receives a properly completed application for

5 This limitation on a union*s legal authority to engage in work actions
or a carrier*s legal authority to change work rules is known as
*maintaining the status quo.*

Page 7 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

mediation, it must make its best effort to mediate an amicable settlement.
If negotiations are deadlocked after mediation, the NMB must then offer
arbitration to both parties. If either party declines arbitration, the NMB
releases the parties into a 30- day cooling- off period. While this
process is set by law, the decision about when the negotiations are
deadlocked is left to the NMB. If the NMB concludes that a labor dispute
threatens to

interrupt essential transportation service to any part of the country, the
act directs the NMB to notify the President of this possibility. The
President then can, at his discretion, convene a Presidential Emergency
Board

(PEB), which issues a nonbinding, fact- finding report. 6 If the President
does not call a PEB, after the 30- day cooling- off period ends the union
is allowed to strike, and the airline is allowed to alter working
conditions unilaterally. These actions are known as self- help. If the
President does convene a PEB, it is given 30 days to hold hearings and
recommend contract terms for a settlement to the parties. The union and
the airline then have an additional 30- day cooling- off period, after the
PEB makes its recommendations to the President, before either can engage
in self- help. After a PEB, Congress may also intervene in the contract
dispute by legislating terms of a contract between a carrier and a union.
Congress, however, has never intervened in airline negotiations since
deregulation. Figure 2 summarizes the key steps in the negotiation process
under the RLA.

6 The NMB notifies the President that a potential strike would result in a
*possible substantial interference with interstate commerce.* At the
President*s discretion, a board can be established to investigate the
dispute between the union and the company and make recommendations for
settlement. The recommendations are not binding on management or labor.
These boards are known as PEBs.

Page 8 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Figure 2: Collective Bargaining Process under the Railway Labor Act

Besides negotiations on contracts that are nearing or have passed the
amendable dates, airline management and labor may also engage in other
negotiations. For example, if an airline introduces a new type of aircraft
into its fleet, management and labor will negotiate *side agreements* to

Page 9 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

the contract that set pay rates and work rules governing the operation of
that aircraft. An example of this situation was when Delta and its pilots
settled on pay rates for flying Delta*s newly introduced Boeing 777s in
1999. This agreement was an amendment to a contract that was ratified in
1996. Conversely, during financially difficult times, an airline*s
management and labor may negotiate concessionary agreements before
contracts reach the amendable date. For example, since 2001, several
airlines have requested pay cuts from their unions due to the precarious
financial condition of the airlines. In April 2003, American employees
agreed to $1.8 billion in wage, benefit, and work rules concessions to
help the airline avoid bankruptcy. In April, United employees represented
by ALPA, Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), the Transport
Workers Union (TWU), and the Professional Airline Flight Control
Association (PAFCA) agreed to $2.2 billion in average yearly savings to
avoid liquidation or having all labor contracts abrogated by the
bankruptcy court. Through January 2003, US Airways employees, including
unionized, nonunionized, and management personnel, agreed to over $1
billion in cuts to avoid liquidation.

In the 25 years since deregulation, airline contract negotiation lengths
have increased while the frequency of strikes has declined, but the number
of nonstrike work actions have increased. For the 236 contracts that the
major passenger airlines negotiated since 1978, available data suggest
that the median time taken to negotiate contracts has risen substantially
since

1990, although this varies among the different carriers. In addition, 75
percent of strikes occurred prior to 1990. By comparison, all presidential
interventions and all identified nonstrike work actions (such as sickouts
or refusals to work overtime) occurred after 1990. Length of

Negotiations and Number of Nonstrike Work Actions Have Increased, While
Number of Strikes Has Declined

Page 10 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

The length of time to negotiate airline contracts has increased since
deregulation. From 1978 to 1989, the median contract negotiation was 9
months while the median negotiation length from 1990 to 2002 increased to
15 months. 7 In other words, from 1978 to 1989, half of the contracts

were negotiated in more than 9 months while from 1990 to 2002, half of the
contracts took more than 15 months to reach an agreement. However, in
1978* 1989, 6 contracts were ratified or settled by the amendable date
where as from 1990* 2002, 9 contracts were ratified or settled by the
amendable date. 8 (In all, during the two time periods from 1978* 1989 and
1990* 2002, the number of negotiations that began before the amendable

date were 65 and 51, respectively.) Conversely, the number of contracts
that required more than 24 months to negotiate more than doubled between
the two periods. Figure 3 summarizes changes in the length of time taken
for airline labor negotiations from 1978 to 2002. 9 7 While we measured
negotiation length from the date the carriers reported as the start of

negotiations through the ratification/ settlement date, the NMB measures
negotiation lengths from when it first receives a request for mediation
services. While NMB*s measure accurately reflects the period of time they
are involved in negotiations, our measure was designed to portray the
total period involved in negotiations.

8 See appendix IV for a list of contracts ratified by their amendable
date. 9 We were not able to calculate negotiation lengths for all 236
contracts because key dates were unavailable for 89 contracts: 83 had
unknown start dates or ratification/ settlement dates, and 6 were listed
as first- time contracts. Airline Contract

Negotiation Lengths Have Increased Since 1978

Page 11 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Figure 3: Length of Time Taken to Negotiate Contracts, 1978 to 2002
Carriers differed in the degree to which their median negotiation lengths
increased* if they increased at all. Negotiation lengths increased at six
carriers that were measured, in some cases more than doubling. On the
other hand, negotiation lengths decreased or remained constant at three:
Continental, United, and Trans World Airlines (TWA). Figure 4 shows the

change in median negotiation lengths at the major U. S. passenger airlines
before and after 1990.

1978- 89

71 contracts Median: 9 months

1990- 2002

75 contracts Median: 15 months

Negotiated before amendable date Less than 1 year

1- 2 years More than 2 years 8% 54%

24% 14%

28% 12%

29% 31%

Page 12 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Figure 4: Median Negotiation Lengths by Carrier

Note: America West Airlines was excluded from the measurement because
negotiations for this airline were not listed prior to 1990. a Continental
had only one contract pre- 1990 that had both a known negotiation start
date and ratification/ settlement date.

Contract complexity may play a role in lengthening negotiations. In the
1980s, for example, scope clauses (provisions in labor contracts of the
major airlines and their unions that limit the number of routes that can
be transferred to smaller, regional jets) could be very short* sometimes
only

one paragraph. Now, however, such scope clauses can be 60 or more pages.
Also, contracts negotiated during the 1980s tended to consist mainly of
wages and benefits, while those negotiated in the 1990s included

Page 13 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

corporate governance issues such as code sharing, 10 regionals, 11 and
furloughs.

Another factor in the length of negotiations is the relationship between
labor and management. According to industry experts who examined labor
relations in the industry, the quality of labor relationships is defined
by the parties* level of trust, their level of communication, and their
ability to problem solve. 12 Those carriers that industry officials and
labormanagement experts 13 regard as having positive labor relations
tended to have shorter negotiation periods than carriers with acrimonious
relationships. Industry officials noted increased tension within
labormanagement relationships during the 1990s, when the industry
recovered from economic hardship to enjoy the biggest boom in its history.
An industry official explained that during the recessionary economic
period of the early 1990s, unions tended to stall negotiations to avoid
making concessions. Conversely, during the peak economic period in the mid
to late 1990s, some airlines* management tried to further improve their
profits by prolonging negotiations.

Carriers described by industry officials and labor- management experts as
having had positive labor relationships include Continental (following
1993) and Southwest. In the 1990s, their median negotiation periods were 7
and 13 months, respectively. Labor- management experts credit
Continental*s current CEO for creating relationships of trust, and
reestablishing Continental as a profitable carrier after its bankruptcy in
the early 1990s. Industry officials also credit Southwest*s labor
relationships to

10 The Regional Airline Association defines code sharing as when one
airline uses the twoletter designator code of another airline to designate
its flights, for example, Comair using Delta*s designator code (DL) to
designate one of its flights. 11 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Aerospace Forecasts defines regional airlines

as those carriers that provide regularly scheduled passenger service and
whose fleets are composed primarily of aircraft having 60 seats or less.

12 Jody Gittell, Andrew von Nordenflycht, and Thomas Kochan, *Mutual Gains
or Zero Sum? Labor Relations and Firm Performance in the Airline
Industry,* Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (forthcoming), and James
Schultz and Marian Schultz, *Northwest Airlines Strike and Labor
Negotiations,* American Association of Behavior Social Sciences Journal 2
(1999) 254- . 13 Industry officials represent airline management, airline
interest groups and/ or industry sponsored research organizations. Labor-
management experts include academics who study airline labor relations,
authors of studies regarding labor relations in the airline industry and
lawyers practicing airline industry labor and employment law.

Page 14 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

30 years of profitability while maintaining its original leadership. Both
companies have been recognized for extended periods of low conflict in
labor negotiations, underpinned by high- trust workplace cultures. 14
Carriers that have been described by labor- management experts as having

had contentious relations with their unions include American, Northwest
Airlines, TWA, and US Airways. Also, all have a history of strikes and/ or
court- recognized, nonstrike work actions. Furthermore, in the 1990s, many
of these airlines had negotiations that tended to take much longer than
Continental*s and Southwest*s. For example, the median length of time to
negotiate contracts at US Airways in the 1990s was 34 months. By contrast,
the length of time to negotiate contracts at Southwest was 13 months.

The incidence of strikes in the airline industry has decreased over time.
Of the 16 strikes that occurred since 1978, 12 occurred prior to 1990, and
4 occurred subsequently. 15 These strikes ranged from as short as 24
minutes

to more than 2 years. Figure 5 summarizes the incidence of strikes,
presidential interventions, and court- recognized, nonstrike work actions
16 between 1978 and 2002.

14 Jody Gittel, Andrew von Nordenflycht, and Thomas Kochan, *Mutual Gains
or Zero Sum? Labor Relations and Firm Performance in the Airline
Industry,* Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (forthcoming). 15 See
appendix V for a description of airline strikes that have occurred since
deregulation. 16 For purposes of this report, we define court- recognized,
nonstrike work actions as any labor actions, other than a strike,
performed outside of the self- help period and judged necessary by a court
of law to warrant a temporary restraining order (TRO) or an injunction.
See appendix VI for details on each of these nonstrike work actions.
Strikes Have Decreased

and Nonstrike Work Actions Have Increased during the 1990s

Page 15 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Figure 5: Frequency of Strikes, Presidential Interventions, and Court-
recognized, Nonstrike Work Actions by Year

Note: There was one presidential intervention and one court- recognized,
nonstrike work action in 2002.

Six presidential interventions have been used to prevent strikes since
deregulation. All six occurred since 1990. 17 Not all presidential
interventions were PEBs. In 1993, the President recommended binding

interest arbitration for American*s flight attendant negotiation. In 1998,
and again in 2001, two PEB warnings occurred; one occurred during

17 In the most recent airline strike* the 89- day strike at Delta
Connection carrier Comair in 2001* NMB regarded the impact as not
significant enough to warrant a presidential intervention, as they did not
believe the strike would substantially threaten to interrupt interstate
commerce to such a degree as to deprive any section of the country
essential

transportation service. (The Comair strike was not included in the list of
strikes as it is not a major carrier. See appendix II for additional
limitations to the scope of this report.)

Page 16 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Northwest*s pilot strike and the second for American flight attendants. 18
Still, PEBs have been used three times in the airline industry since 1978:
during a 1994 American pilot negotiation, a 1996 Northwest mechanic
negotiation, and a 2000 United mechanic negotiation.

Compared to strikes, the pattern for nonstrike work actions has been the
opposite: their incidence has increased over time. In all, 10
courtrecognized, nonstrike work actions have occurred, each since 1998.
Such actions included various forms of slowdowns such as sickouts, work-
torule, and refusals to work overtime. 19 According to a labor- management
expert, carriers believe there have been many more nonstrike work actions
than the 10 recognized by the courts,

but their existence is difficult to prove. Airline management has been
unable to produce the evidence needed to prove the actions are taking
place. 20 Those nonstrike work actions that were not identified by the
court

18 The President can take various measures short of a PEB to put pressure
on the parties to settle. Such measures include sending a presidential
representative to meet with the parties. For example, in the ALPA pilots*
negotiation with Northwest in 1998, the President sent his Senior Counsel
and Transportation Secretary to meet with the federal mediator to help the
parties resolve their differences. The President can also publicly
announce his

readiness to empanel a PEB. For example, during the 2001 APFA negotiations
with American, the Transportation Secretary announced publicly that the
President would use all tools necessary to ensure there was no disruption
in service. See appendix VII for a list of presidential interventions.

19 Slowdowns are an organized effort by workers to decrease production in
order to pressure the employer to take some desired action. Slowdowns can
include refusing to work overtime, sickouts, and work- to- rule. A union
official shared that, typically, minor FAA rules that do not concern
safety may be overlooked in order to maintain flight schedules. According
to two labor- management experts, during a work- to- rule action, airline
labor strictly follows such minor rules in order to slow the flight
schedule. For example, pilots may refuse to fly a plane if a tray table
does not stay in the upright position.

20 According to an International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) union
official, unions do not participate in nonstrike work actions, although
some might admit to performing workto- rule actions to put pressure on the
carriers. The union official also stated that individual employees have
taken actions into their own hands. For example, IBT reported that
individual employees promoted a Northwest flight attendant sickout in 2000
by using the Internet. After IBT leadership accessed the Web site, they
told their members and the airlines that the union was not in favor of the
members* actions. In separate actions, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeal, ruling on behalf of United and Delta, respectively,
declared that unions are responsible for controlling labor actions.
Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that, when
Delta*s pilots engaged in concerted

activity in violation of the RLA, *ALPA* ha[ d] a duty to end* unlawful
action* by its members. According to the court, that duty is not met by
mere statements of policy and exhortations to refrain from unlawful
activity, but must be backed with action, including union- imposed
sanctions (Airline Management Publication).

Page 17 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

include a number of highly publicized labor disruptions. For example, the
reported, but unconfirmed, nonstrike work action taken by United*s pilots
in the summer of 2000 was widely publicized by the media, 21 yet the
airline

never brought the issue before a court of law. Additionally, it has been
reported that the reason why these actions are difficult to detect is
because a concern for safety often masks the source of such actions.

Airline labor strikes have exerted adverse impacts on communities, but we
identified no published studies that systematically and comprehensively
analyzed a strike*s net impact at the community level. For some strikes,
we were able to identify evidence of individual impacts, such as reduced
air service to and from the community, lost salaries or wages by striking
or laid- off airline workers, or lower airport revenues. However, no
studies have yet synthesized such information for a thorough picture of a
strike*s impact on a community. Our analysis indicates that a strike*s
potential impacts would likely vary greatly from community to community,
because of differences in factors such as the amount of service available
from other airlines. Thus, even if the impact of a strike were to be
thoroughly studied at a particular community, it would be difficult to
generalize these results to other locations.

With the reduction of air service stemming from an airline strike,
communities have experienced economic disruptions from a number of
sources. Lost income of airline employees, fewer travelers and less
spending in travel related businesses, and less spending by the airline
are just some of the ways that local economies have been affected by a
strike. For example, canceled flights have lead to the layoff of
nonstriking employees, fewer travelers in the airport spending money in
concessions, and reduced landing fees for airports. Because passenger
traffic dropped, spending at hotels suffered.

Local reports illustrated some of a strike*s economic impacts on a
community during the 2001 Comair pilot strike. Comair, a regional carrier
for Delta, has its main hub at the Cincinnati/ Northern Kentucky 21 See,
for example, *United Pilots* Slow Taxiing Causes Delays at O*Hare,*
Chicago O*Hare Air Traffic Control, TheTracon. com, July 26, 2000,

http:// www. thetracon. com/ news/ times072600. htm, or *United Airlines
Scraps Nearly 2, 000 Flights,* CNN. com, August 8, 2000, http:// www. cnn.
com/ 2000/ TRAVEL/ NEWS/ 08/ 08/ united. cancellations. ap. Airline
Strikes Adversely Affect

Communities, but Impacts Have Not Been Fully Analyzed and Vary from Place
to Place

Airline Strikes Have Had Negative Economic Impacts on Communities

Page 18 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

International Airport. Over the course of the strike, which lasted 89
days, Comair did not operate its 815 daily flights, causing the 25, 000
passengers who would normally have been on those flights in an average day
to curtail

their travel or make arrangements on other airlines. The airline*s 1,350
striking pilots, many of whom are based in the area, lost an estimated $14
million in salaries, and the airline reported laying off an additional
1,600

nonstriking employees in the greater Cincinnati area as well. A concourse
at the Cincinnati/ Northern Kentucky International Airport closed during
the strike. Reports stated that the concourse*s 16 stores and restaurants
lost more than $3 million in sales, and that 152 of 193 workers were laid
off. The airport also lost $1.2 million in landing fees from Comair during
the strike.

Impacts can be felt not only at hub communities like Cincinnati, but also
at smaller spoke communities that may be served only by the striking
airline. When Northwest Airlines pilots struck in 1998, for example,
Mesaba Airlines, a regional affiliate, suspended operations as well. At
least 12 of the communities served by Mesaba during the Northwest strike
had no other air service. One of these locations was Houghton, Michigan.
According to local reports, travelers to and from Houghton had to drive as
far as Green Bay (213 miles from Hancock, Michigan, location of

Houghton*s airport) or Wausau, Wisconsin, (192 miles away) to find
alternative flights. DOT also recognized the possible impacts of halting
all airline service. The department ordered Mesaba to return service to 12

communities served from Minneapolis under the terms of Mesaba*s Essential
Air Service contract. However, before the order was implemented, the
strike ended, and service was restored to these communities.

While the available information indicates that airline strikes can and do
have adverse impacts on communities, we identified no published studies
that attempt to comprehensively measure these impacts at the community
level. The kinds of impacts cited above, for example, may have mitigating
factors that need to be taken into account. In the Comair strike, for
example, union strike funds replaced some of the lost income of strikers.
ALPA approved payments of $1,400 per month to striking Comair pilots
during the strike period, allowing them to spend at a reduced rate in the
community. A study that reliably estimated the impact of a strike at the
community level would need to take factors such as these into account. No
such study has been done. Full Impacts at the

Community Level Are Largely Unknown

Page 19 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Another reason for uncertainty about the full impacts of a strike on a
community is that the impact of a strike on passengers* travel decisions
is often unknown. For example, while more than 100 communities lost Comair
service to and from Cincinnati during the strike, all of these communities
had service to Cincinnati from another airline. Thus, although hotel
occupancy reportedly fell by more than 18 percent in Northern Kentucky in
the strike*s first month, the degree to which this drop was attributable
solely to the strike is unknown.

Apart from community- level analysis of strikes, some studies have
examined the overall economic impacts of aviation on regions or states.
For example, the Campbell- Hill Aviation Group, on behalf of an industry
interest group, published a report examining the state- level impact of a
potential loss of aviation service, but this study did not evaluate the
impact of any particular strikes on local or regional economies. 22 For
example, the study stated that, in the year ending in March 2002, Delta
had 10 percent of the passenger traffic in Texas and projected that a 10
percent reduction in

aviation benefits would cause a daily reduction of $17.7 million in one
measure of the Texas economy, its gross domestic product (GDP). 23 DOT
also has on occasion produced wide- ranging assessments of the

impacts of potential airline strikes, but these studies have never
addressed the impacts of strikes that actually occurred. These studies are
conducted at the request of the NMB, which uses them in evaluating whether
the

labor dispute threatens to interrupt essential transportation services in
any part of the country. Once the NMB makes this assessment, it notifies
the President, who may, at his discretion, empanel a PEB. If the NMB
believes an airline strike is probable, it may request the department to
examine the possible economic consequences of that strike. The department
reports the extent of potentially lost air service to hub and spoke cities
of the affected carrier, the number of passengers that would have no
service if a

22 We found studies published by Wilbur Smith Associates, Wisconsin
Department of Transportation, and the University of Cincinnati that
reported on the total economic impact of aviation on the United States,
the state of Wisconsin, and the greater Cincinnati/ Northern Kentucky
region. None examined any strike impacts. 23 In the above example, one
should not equate a strike against Delta with a 10 percent reduction in
Texas* aviation benefits. Aviation benefits stem from other aviation
related activity such as general and military aviation as well as
scheduled airline service. Also, one

would have to assume that all airline flights in Texas were completely
filled with paying passengers so none of Delta*s 10 percent of Texas
fliers could be accommodated by other airlines.

Page 20 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

strike were to occur, possible financial impacts on the carrier, indirect
impacts on the national economy, and the mitigating and aggravating
factors on the impacts of a strike. While DOT*s reviews may examine many
areas that could be affected by a strike, they examine only potential
strikes and are not conducted after actual strikes.

While comprehensive studies of community- level impacts of past strikes
are not available, one thing that emerges from our analysis is that any
future strike*s impact on a given community is likely to be affected by
the level of service available from other airlines. If alternative service
is greatly limited, travelers may have to take alternative* and less
direct* routes offered by other airlines, or, in extreme cases, travel
great distances to other airports in order to fly at all. Those impacts on
travelers and businesses will vary depending on whether the community is a
hub or spoke destination and even among an airline*s hubs and spoke
destinations.

The impact of a future strike at an airline*s hub locations would depend
in part on which airline is involved in the strike and its market share at
the hub. Some airlines dominate air traffic at their hubs to a much
greater extent than other airlines do, and a strike involving an airline
with a dominant position at most of its hubs would likely have more impact
than a strike involving an airline that is hubbing out of locations where

competition is greater. In 2001, the airlines with the most and least
dominated hubs (based on the percentage of total available seats
controlled by the hubbing airline) were US Airways and America West. (See
fig. 6.) US Airways averaged 81 percent of the seats offered at its hubs,
while America West averaged 32 percent. Thus, based on the loss of seating
capacity at its hubs, a strike at US Airways that halted service would
likely have substantially more impact on its hub communities than a strike
at America West that halted service. Community- Level Impact

of Any Future Strike Would Depend Partly on Service Available from Other
Airlines

Page 21 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Figure 6: 2001 Market Shares for Major Airlines at Their Hubs

Among a single airline*s hub cities, the impact of a strike would also
likely vary depending on service available from alternate carriers at
those cities. Again, the impact of a strike at the hubbing carrier or its
regional partners would be more substantial at more highly dominated hubs.
For example, in 2001, Delta and its regional partners accounted for 91
percent of the seats available in Cincinnati, but only 19 percent of
available seats at the Dallas/ Fort Worth International Airport, which has
the lowest market share among Delta*s hubs. Consequently, a strike against
Delta would likely have caused much greater disruption in Cincinnati than
in Dallas. In contrast to the differences among Delta*s hubs, the impact
of a strike at

Northwest would likely be felt equally at its Minneapolis/ St. Paul,
Detroit, and Memphis hubs. At each of its hubs, Northwest offered between
77 and 80 percent of available seats.

As at hubs, the impacts of strikes on available air service at spoke
cities would also depend on the amount and type of available alternative
service. Those communities with air service from other carriers have a
greater opportunity to mitigate the potential impact of a strike by
enabling travelers to access the national air system using competing
airlines. For

Page 22 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

example, figure 7 shows available air service, as of April 2003, at spoke
communities served by Delta*s regional partner, Comair, from Cincinnati,
and by Northwest*s regional carrier, Mesaba, from Minneapolis- St. Paul.
Comair provided nonstop service to a total of 101 U. S. communities from
Cincinnati. All but one of these communities had alternative service to
Cincinnati from another airline* 64 with nonstop service, 36 with one-
stop

service. 24 Thus, if Comair*s operations were to be disrupted by a strike,
passengers at these communities would still have the opportunity for
service to and from Cincinnati. The picture at Minneapolis- St. Paul is
somewhat different. There, 10 of the 47 spoke cities served by Mesaba
would have no alternative service to Minneapolis- St. Paul.

24 The one exception (Melbourne, Florida) also had one- stop service to
Cincinnati, but not from a competing airline. Melbourne passengers could
still have one- stop service to Cincinnati from a combination of another
Delta regional carrier (to Atlanta) and then a Delta mainline flight to
Cincinnati.

Page 23 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Figure 7: Spoke Communities Served from Cincinnati and Minneapolis- St.
Paul Retain Service from Competing Airlines

Note: Data are from airline schedules for the week of April 21- 25, 2003.

Several other factors could also influence the impact of a future strike
on a community. The length of the strike is one such factor; longer
strikes are more likely to have an adverse impact. Since deregulation,
strikes have varied from 24 minutes for an American pilot strike in 1997
to almost 2 years for a Continental mechanics strike (1983* 1985). Another
likely factor is financial preparation; as already mentioned, the local
impact of the

Comair strike was likely mitigated somewhat by the union*s payments to
striking pilots. Similarly, the ability of airlines to operate through a
strike* whether by hiring replacement workers or having union members
cross picket lines* could also influence a strike*s impact. For example,
during a strike by Continental mechanics lasting almost 2 years, some
Continental workers crossed the picket line and continued working. This
Other Factors Also

Influence the Total Impact of Airline Strikes

Page 24 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

allowed Continental to continue operation after a shutdown of only 3 days.
Tactics used by the striking union can also reduce the overall impact.
Alaska flight attendants used a technique called *CHAOS* (Creating Havoc
Around Our System) that involved intermittent walkouts of certain crews on
certain days. 25 This tactic kept certain flights from operating, but did
not shut down the entire airline.

Our analysis indicates that passenger service has been affected more
adversely by nonstrike work actions than by an increase in the length of
negotiations. Generally, but not always, as negotiation periods increased,
there has been a slight decline in on- time flights. 26 However, the
impact of these negotiations has been unclear, because the decline may
also have been affected by other factors such as poor weather, aircraft
maintenance,

runway closures, air traffic control system decisions, or equipment
failures. By comparison, the 10 court- recognized, nonstrike work actions
more clearly resulted in negative impacts on passengers, as shown through
such measures as a decrease in the number of on- time flights, an increase
in the number of flight problem complaints, 27 and a decrease in passenger
traffic.

Our analyses found a slight correlation between the length of negotiations
and adverse impacts on passengers. 28 We analyzed 23 negotiations between
airlines and pilot unions from 1987 to 2002. 29 As negotiations
lengthened, the frequency of on- time arrivals declined slightly. However,
it is not clear

25 CHAOS, as practiced by the Alaska flight attendants, was found by the
federal courts to be a legal form of self- help and not an illegal work
action. The Alaska flight attendants did not engage in this activity until
after release by the NMB and the 30- day cooling- off period. 26 DOT
defines an on- time flight as one that is less than 15 minutes after the
scheduled gate arrival or gate departure time. 27 Flight problem
complaints include complaints regarding cancellations, delays, or any
other deviations from the schedule, whether planned or unplanned. 28 As a
measure of adverse impact on passengers, we analyzed the number of on-
time

arrivals in relationship to the length of contract negotiations. The
correlation between these two items was -. 25.

29 These 23 pilot contracts were chosen because they had the most complete
information, including amendable dates and ratification dates.
Concessionary agreements ratified before the amendable date, first time
pilot contracts, or pilot contracts with missing information were not used
in this analysis. Nonstrike Work

Actions Have Greater Impacts on Passengers than Lengthy Negotiations

Impact of Negotiation Lengths on Passengers Is Unclear

Page 25 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

if the change in on- time flights is attributable solely to negotiation
lengths, or if other factors may also have contributed to the on- time
performance. DOT*s data on flight arrival and departure timeliness
indicate whether a flight is delayed, but not what caused the delay.
Common factors for delays include severe weather, aircraft maintenance,
runway closures, customer service issues (e. g., baggage and accommodating
passengers with special needs, such as those in wheelchairs or youths
requiring escorts), air traffic control system decisions, and equipment
failures. Thus, despite the apparent relation between lengthening
negotiations and a deterioration of service quality, other exogenous
factors may explain the change in flight delays.

Available data indicates that nonstrike work actions have had adverse
impacts on passengers. While DOT data do not specifically identify these
actions as the causes for the delays or the reasons for the complaints,
increases in the number of late flights, passenger complaints, and
decreases in passenger traffic during the period of the actions suggest a
clearer relationship than is apparent with these same measures and lengthy
negotiations. The periods in which nonstrike work actions occur show
decreases in on- time flights, increases in passenger complaints, and
decreases in passenger traffic. Two examples of such actions, the American
pilot sickout and the Delta pilot slowdown, are described in the next two
sections.

American experienced decreases in on- time flights, increases in customer
complaints, and drops in passenger traffic during a pilot sickout. (Under
FAA regulations, any airline pilot can take himself out of the cockpit if
he is sick, overly stressed, or does not feel *fit to fly.* During a
sickout, pilots utilize these regulations to excuse themselves from work
in order to put economic pressure on the airline during the negotiation.)
In December 1998, AMR Corp, the parent company of American, purchased Reno
Air, whose pilots were then to be integrated into a single workforce. In
early 1999, American pilots began a sickout over a dispute involving a
side agreement that would integrate Reno Air operations. On February 10,
1999, a federal judge ordered the pilots to return to work. Subsequently,
the number of flights cancelled increased. On February 13, 1999, the judge
found the pilots* union in contempt of court. 30 By February 16, the
airline

30 The judge fined the American pilots* union, the Allied Pilots
Association, $45.5 million for contempt. Nonstrike Work Actions

Have Clearer Adverse Impacts on Passengers

American Pilot Sickout

Page 26 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

reported a return to its normal schedule but, reportedly, pilots were
still refusing to work overtime and were adhering to work- to- rule
practices, meaning that they would follow every regulation stipulated by
the FAA in order to slow the airline.

Figure 8 illustrates on- time arrival and departure rates at Dallas/ Fort
Worth International Airport for the period of August 1998 through December
1999 for American and Delta, which also operates a hub at that airport.
The on- time flight statistics for the two airlines are relatively equal
prior to the sickout period. During the next several months, American*s

on- time record fell below that of Delta. Both carrier*s on- time rates
declined somewhat, suggesting that other factors such as weather might
also influence flight operations. However, the difference between the two
airlines during this period is greater than in other periods. In August
1999, when Reno Air*s operations were officially integrated* even though
no

agreement was made* the two airlines* records resumed a more closely
parallel path.

Figure 8: On- Time Flight Statistics for American and Delta at Dallas/
Fort Worth International Airport, August 1998 to December 1999

Page 27 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

The American sickout also caused increases in passenger flight problem
complaints. Figure 9 compares the change in complaints against American
and Delta. The complaints began to rise in February of 1999 and,
generally, continued to increase into the summer, when American reached an
agreement with its pilots.

Figure 9: Flight Problem Complaints for American and Delta from August
1998 to December 1999

A comparison of passenger traffic between American and Delta at Dallas/
Fort Worth International Airport indicates that passenger traffic declined
either to avoid the carrier experiencing the nonstrike work action or due
to grounded flights. (American grounded up to 2,250 flights per day during
the sickout period.) (See fig. 10.) During the American pilot sickout in
February 1999, there was a drop in American*s passenger traffic. Compared
to the year before, American*s passenger traffic declined by 15 percent
while Delta*s passenger traffic rose by 5 percent.

Page 28 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Figure 10: Passengers Carried on American and Delta at Dallas/ Fort Worth
International Airport, February 1998 and 1999

Another example of the impact of nonstrike work actions on passengers is
the Delta slowdown in 2000* 2001. In September 1999, Delta began
negotiations with its pilots and submitted a contract proposal, which
sought to tie future raises to the company*s financial performance. As a
result, Delta pilots began refusing to fly overtime in the winter of 2000.
When compared to Continental*s operations at Atlanta Hartsfield
International Airport, 31 Delta experienced substantial declines in on-
time flights and increases in flight problem complaints while also
experiencing declines in passenger traffic. Delta first went to court on
December 5,

2000, and was denied an injunction. The airline then took the suit to the
Eleventh Circuit on January 18, 2001, and the denial was overturned and
remanded for injunction. 31 AirTran operates more flights than Continental
at Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport.

However, because DOT does not classify AirTran as a major airline, we
compared Delta*s operations with Continental. Delta Pilot Slowdown

Page 29 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Figure 11 shows the percent of on- time flights for both Delta and
Continental at Atlanta*s Hartsfield International Airport for the period
of August 2000 to August 2001. During the slowdown period from December to
January, there is a decline in Delta*s on- time flights relative to
Continental*s. Once the court issued an injunction against the union, the
two airlines resumed a more similar pattern.

Figure 11: On- Time Flight Statistics for Delta and Continental at Atlanta
Hartsfield International Airport, August 2000 to August 2001

Delta*s pilot slowdown also showed an increase in passenger complaints
during this period. Figure 12 compares the change in passenger flight
problem complaints about Delta and Continental during Delta*s slowdown.
Flight complaints rose sharply in December and January, peaking at 185 in
January 2001, and immediately declining after the union was enjoined on
January 18, 2001.

Page 30 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Figure 12: Flight Problem Complaints for Delta and Continental, August
2000 to August 2001

Finally, Delta*s passenger traffic at Atlanta Hartsfield International
Airport also declined during the slowdown, but the pattern was less
pronounced than for the American sickout discussed earlier. (See fig. 13.)
In December 2000, when Delta first pursued an injunction in court, Delta*s
and Continental*s passenger traffic dropped by 9 and 4 percent,
respectively. Unlike the American sickout (when up to 2,250 flights were
grounded per day), Delta pilots* refusal to fly overtime grounded far
fewer flights* about

100 to 125 per day* which means less passengers were affected by cancelled
flights as compared to American.

Page 31 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Figure 13: Change in Passenger Traffic on Delta and Continental at Atlanta
Hartsfield International Airport in December 1999 and 1 Year Later during
the Nonstrike Work Action in December 2000 We provided copies of a draft
of this report to NMB for review and

comment. NMB indicated it generally agreed with the accuracy of our
report, and it provided technical clarifications, which were incorporated
into the report as appropriate. The NMB also provided an additional
statement, which is included in appendix VIII. We also provided selected
portions of a draft of this report to the major airlines and unions to
verify the presentation of factual material. We incorporated their
technical clarifications as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
the report date. At that time, we will provide copies to the Honorable
Francis J. Duggan, Chairman of the National Mediation Board; the Honorable
Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary of Transportation; and other interested
parties. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In
Agency Comments

Page 32 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http:// www. gao. gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me
at (202) 512- 2834, HeckerJ@ gao. gov or Steve Martin at (202) 512- 2834,
MartinS@ gao. gov. Appendix VIII lists key contacts and key contributors
to this report.

Sincerely yours, JayEtta Z. Hecker Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues

Appendix I: Additional Questions Page 33 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor
Relations

In addition to the three primary questions, you asked us how many states
use a system of binding arbitration and last offer arbitration with their
essential service personnel. You also asked how many times in the last 25
years has Congress had to intervene in a dispute with railroads and what
were the outcomes.

As of November 2002, according to information from officials of Harvard
University, 23 states* including the District of Columbia* use binding
arbitration and/ or last offer arbitration as arbitration options. (See
table 2.) Of those, none use last offer arbitration as their sole
arbitration option. Table 2: States That Include Binding Arbitration or
Last, Best Offer Arbitration as a

Dispute Resolution Option State Type of arbitration included in resolution
options

1 California Binding arbitration 2 Maine Binding arbitration 3 Illinois
Last offer arbitration 4 Michigan Last offer arbitration 5 Oklahoma Last
offer arbitration 6 Tennessee Last offer arbitration 7 Colorado Binding
arbitration and last offer arbitration 8 Conneticut Binding arbitration
and last offer arbitration 9 Delaware Binding arbitration and last offer
arbitration 10 District of Columbia Binding arbitration and last offer
arbitration 11 Hawaii Binding arbitration and last offer arbitration 12
Iowa Binding arbitration and last offer arbitration 13 Maryland Binding
arbitration and last offer arbitration 14 Minnesota Binding arbitration
and last offer arbitration 15 Montana Binding arbitration and last offer
arbitration 16 Nevada Binding arbitration and last offer arbitration 17
Ohio Binding arbitration and last offer arbitration 18 Oregon Binding
arbitration and last offer arbitration 19 Pennsylvania Binding arbitration
and last offer arbitration 20 Rhode Island Binding arbitration and last
offer arbitration 21 Texas Binding arbitration and last offer arbitration
22 Washington Binding arbitration and last offer arbitration 23 Wisconsin
Binding arbitration and last offer arbitration Source: Harvard University.

According to information from the National Mediation Board, in the last 25
years Congress intervened in railroad negotiations eight times. These
Appendix I: Additional Questions

Appendix I: Additional Questions Page 34 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor
Relations

interventions occurred between 1982 and 1992. (See table 3.) Congressional
interventions do not involve the airlines.

Table 3: Congressional Interventions in Railroad Negotiations Date Remark

1 6/ 26/ 92 Binding arbitration imposed by Congress 2 6/ 26/ 92 Binding
arbitration imposed by Congress; parties reached

voluntary agreement 3 6/ 26/ 92 Binding arbitration imposed by Congress in
three cases; parties

reached voluntary agreement in all others 4 4/ 18/ 91 Terms imposed by
Congress 5 8/ 4/ 88 Status quo extended by Congress

9/ 9/ 88 Terms imposed by Congress 6 1/ 28/ 87 Status quo extended by
Congress; parties reached voluntary agreement 7 8/ 21/ 86 Status quo
extended by Congress

9/ 30/ 86 Terms imposed by Congress 8 9/ 22/ 82 Terms imposed by Congress
Source: NMB.

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Page 35 GAO- 03- 652
Airline Labor Relations

This report examines the following three questions:  What have been the
major trends of labor negotiations in the airline

industry since the industry was deregulated in 1978, including the number
and length of negotiations and the number of strikes, presidential
interventions to avoid or end strikes, and nonstrike work actions?

 What has been the impact of airline strikes on communities?  What have
been the impacts of the length of negotiations and the

occurrence of nonstrike work actions on passengers? To determine the
trends of airline labor negotiations, including the length of
negotiations, the number of strikes, the number of presidential
interventions, and the number of nonstrike work actions, we analyzed data
from multiple sources. We obtained our data from major U. S. airlines and
various labor organizations. The labor groups included the Air Line Pilots
Association (ALPA), the Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA),
the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), the International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), and the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). We also received substantial negotiation
and contract data from the U. S. National Mediation Board (NMB) and the
Airline Industrial Relations Conference (AIRCon), a group funded by major
U. S. airlines to facilitate the exchange of contract negotiation
information and other labor relations matters among carriers. Because data
were not available for commuter (regional) and all- cargo carriers, we
originally limited our analysis to passenger airlines that are considered
majors by the U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT) that were in
operation during 2001. These airlines were Alaska, America West, American,
American Eagle, American Trans Air (recently renamed as ATA Airlines),
Continental, Delta, Northwest, Southwest, TWA 1 , United, and US Airways.
We later were not able to include American Eagle or American

Trans Air, which met the DOT criteria, in our analysis because we were not
able to obtain information on these airlines.

Dates listed as negotiation start dates differ between the airlines,
AIRCon, and NMB, therefore, limiting the accuracy of the data collected. A
negotiation*s *start date* can be when the carrier*s management or union 1
American completed its purchase of TWA in April 2001, and TWA no longer
exists as a

separate entity. Analysis of activity from deregulation through April 2001
is included in this report. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Page 36 GAO- 03- 652
Airline Labor Relations

exchange a written notice stating that one of the parties desires a change
in rates of pay, work rules, or working conditions or when face- to- face
negotiations actually begin (i. e., when the two parties sit at a table
and verbally negotiate the contract). By contrast, the NMB defines a
*start date* only when it is called for mediation. For the purposes of our
data collection, we first used dates provided by the airlines to AIRCon at
the time the contract was being negotiated. If those were not available,
we turned to the dates provided directly to us by the airlines from their
files when available. We were supplied different dates, including
ratification dates and settlement dates, for the end point of
negotiations. We know of at least one union that did not have its members
vote to ratify contract

changes until after 1982. Again, we first used AIRCon provided
ratification or settlement dates, if possible, and, in cases where these
were not available, we used airline provided dates, or dates provided by
NMB. We were unable to calculate a negotiation length for 83 of the 236
contracts because we could not identify either a start date or a
ratification or settlement date for them. In addition, we did not
calculate negotiation lengths for 6 initial contracts, the first contract
a union signs after a craft or class becomes recognized at an airline.

To obtain information on nonstrike work actions, we also examined media
sources and also reviewed federal court records. Based on the information
we were able to review, we defined court- recognized, nonstrike work
actions as those work actions for which airlines obtained either temporary
restraining orders or injunctions against unions. Officials from the
airlines we spoke with stated that there have been many more nonstrike
work

actions than the 10 judged by the courts. Even some union officials stated
that union members have taken actions that they considered legal under
their contract or Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. These
same actions, on other occasions, have been found to be violations of the
status quo by the courts. Additional cases of nonstrike work actions,

however, have been difficult to prove. Airline management has either been
unable to produce the needed evidence in court or airlines never took
unions to court. Union officials also strenuously deny illegal activity on
the part of their unions.

We interviewed officials from airlines, labor unions, the NMB, and
industry groups. The airlines we spoke with included American, American
Trans Air, Continental, Delta, Northwest, Southwest, Comair, Atlantic
Coast Airlines, Federal Express, United Parcel Service, and Airborne
Express. We only analyzed data from airlines where we could obtain full
data. The labor groups we interviewed included ALPA, CAPA, AFA, IAM, and
IBT. We also held discussions with officials from NMB, the Air Transport

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Page 37 GAO- 03- 652
Airline Labor Relations

Association (ATA), Communities for Economic Strength Through Aviation
(CESTA), and AIRCon. To determine the impact of airline strikes on
communities, we searched for studies of these impacts from airlines,
industry groups, and academic institutions. Specifically, we talked with
United, Delta, Comair, ATA, and CESTA. Based on suggestions from airlines,
unions, interest groups, and our own research we also talked with faculty
at Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of
Cincinnati, and

the University of Kentucky. None of these sources knew of any published
studies on specific impacts of past strikes on any community. In
discussions with NMB, we learned that DOT produces studies, solely at the
request of NMB, on the likely impacts of probable airline strikes on the
airline and local and national economies. We obtained a copy of one of
these studies from DOT. We also analyzed data on airline schedules and

market share from Sabre, Inc.; BACK Aviation Solutions; and the Campbell-
Hill Aviation Group. We also reviewed local media reports from communities
affected by strikes. Due to the lack of published studies or generally
accepted methodology to determine the impact of strikes, we cannot
discount other possible causes for these impacts.

To determine the impact of the length of negotiations and courtrecognized,
nonstrike work actions on passengers, we analyzed data on airline
operational performance from DOT*s Air Travel Consumer Report and
passenger traffic information from BACK Aviation Solutions. To

determine the impact of negotiation lengths, we compared on- time
performance throughout the course of 23 negotiations between airlines and
pilot unions. To determine the impact of nonstrike work actions, we
compared airlines* on- time performance and flight complaints between
airlines before, during, and after the 10 court- recognized, nonstrike
work actions. We also analyzed changes in passenger traffic among airlines
during these actions. Though our analysis included performing a
correlation between on- time arrivals and the length of airline labor
contract negotiations, we did not perform any multivariate analysis, and
thus, cannot rule out possible alternative causes.

We conducted our review between August 2002 and May 2003 in accordance
with generally acceptable government accounting principles.

Appendix III: Additional Background Information on the Railway Labor Act

Page 38 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

The Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. S: 151, et. seq., (RLA) was passed by
Congress in May 1926 to improve labor- management relations in the
railroad industry. In January 1926, a committee of railway executives and
union representatives jointly presented a draft bill to Congress that was

universally supported by those in the industry. Congress did not make any
changes of substance to the bill, and the RLA was signed by the President
on May 20, 1926. 1 Congress has not altered the basic structure of the act
that labor and management use to resolve what are known as *major
disputes,* i. e., disputes over the creation of, or change of, agreements
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. After discussions
with airline management and labor the act was applied to air carriers in
1936. 2 As a method to keep labor disputes from interrupting commerce, the
new

law represented a significant departure from past labor practices by
requiring both sides to preserve the status quo during collective
bargaining and preventing either side from taking unilateral action. When
labor and

management representatives drafted the legislation, they agreed that both
sides of a labor dispute should negotiate the dispute and not make any
change in the working conditions in dispute until all issues were worked
out under the deliberate process outlined in the act.

The RLA is not a detailed statute. The main purposes of the act are
threefold. First, Congress intended to establish a system that resolves
labor disputes without interrupting commerce in the airline and railroad
industries. The statute requires both labor and management *to exert every
reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements ... and to settle all
disputes ....* 3 The Supreme Court has described that duty as being the
*heart* of the act. 4 Second, the act imposes on the parties an obligation
to preserve and to maintain unchanged during the collective bargaining
process *those

actual, objective working conditions and practices, broadly conceived,
which were in effect prior to the time the pending dispute arose and which

1 P. L. No. 257, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 44 Stat. 577 (1926). 2 45 U. S. C.
S: 181. 3 45 U. S. C. S: 152. 4 Chicago & North Western Ry. v. UTU, 402 U.
S. 570, 574 (1971). Appendix III: Additional Background

Information on the Railway Labor Act Key Provisions of the RLA

Appendix III: Additional Background Information on the Railway Labor Act

Page 39 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

are involved in or related to that dispute.* 5 This is generally known as
*maintaining the status quo.*

Finally, the act requires that: *Representatives, for the purposes of this
Act, shall be designated by the respective parties ... without
interference, influence, or coercion exercised by either party over the
self- organization or designation of representatives by the other.* 6 That
obligation was

strengthened in 1934 so as to prohibit either party from interfering with,
influencing, or coercing *the other in its choice of representatives.* 7
The collective bargaining process established by the RLA is designed to

preserve labor relations peace. The carrier is required to maintain the
status quo before, during, and for some time after the period of formal
negotiations. The union and the employees have the reciprocal obligation
to refrain from engaging in actions that are designed to economically harm
the company, such as strikes during the same period. These actions are

termed economic self- help in the act. Airline labor and management
periodically engage in negotiations to reach a comprehensive collective
bargaining agreement that will remain in effect for a defined period,
usually 2 or 3 years. The parties are required to submit written notices
(* Section 6 notices*) of proposed changes in rates of pay, rules, and
working conditions. In some cases, parties may agree that collective
bargaining is required to proceed according to a particular time schedule.
If those direct discussions do not result in an agreement resolving a
dispute, either party or the National Mediation Board (NMB) can initiate
mediation.

The RLA requires both parties to maintain collectively bargained rates of
pay, rules, and working conditions while they negotiate amendments to the
agreement. This requirement extends the status quo after an existing
agreement becomes amendable if no agreement is reached by that time. If
mediation proves unsuccessful, the NMB appeals to the parties to submit
the dispute to binding interest arbitration. If that is unsuccessful, the
statute provides for a 30- day cooling- off period. There can be no lawful

5 45 U. S. C. S:S: 155, 156, and 160. 6 45 U. S. C. S: 152. 7 45 U. S. C.
S: 145. Collective Bargaining

Process under the RLA

Appendix III: Additional Background Information on the Railway Labor Act

Page 40 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

self- help by either side during this period. Even after the termination
of the 30- day period, the self- help option is contingent. If a dispute
threatens *substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such
as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation
services,* the President, upon notification by the NMB, is empowered to
create an emergency board to investigate the dispute and issue a report
that is followed by an additional 30- day period for final negotiations.

After this process, the parties are left to self- help and further
negotiation to reach a settlement. The only alternative is congressional
action, which has never been used in an airline labor dispute.

Appendix IV: Contracts Negotiated and Ratified or Settled by the Amendable
Date

Page 41 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Carrier Union Craft Amendable date Ratification or settlement date

1 Alaska ALPA Pilots 4/ 30/ 80 4/ 15/ 80 2 Alaska ALPA Pilots 4/ 30/ 83 3/
2/ 83 3 Alaska ALPA Pilots 5/ 1/ 91 4/ 29/ 91 4 Alaska ALPA Pilots 4/ 30/
93 2/ 16/ 93 5 Alaska ALPA Pilots 12/ 1/ 97 10/ 15/ 97 6 American TWU
Mechanics 3/ 1/ 93 10/ 7/ 91

7 Continental TWU Dispatchers 4/ 1/ 99 6/ 1/ 98 8 Delta PAFCA Flight
control 1/ 1/ 82 1/ 22/ 81 9 Delta PAFCA Flight control 1/ 1/ 86 10/ 25/
85 10 Northwest ALPA Pilots 7/ 1/ 80 6/ 28/ 80

11 Northwest ALPA Pilots 3/ 1/ 94 7/ 6/ 93 12 Northwest IAM Mechanics 7/
1/ 88 6/ 6/ 88 13 TWA ALPA Pilots 9/ 1/ 95 10/ 3/ 94 14 United ALPA Pilots
11/ 30/ 94 7/ 12/ 94 15 United IAM Dispatchers 11/ 30/ 94 7/ 12/ 94 Legend
ALPA = Air Line Pilots Association TWU = Transport Workers Union PAFCA =
Professional Airline Flight Control Association IAM = International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Sources: National
Mediation Board, airlines, and labor unions. Note: At least one union
notified us that they did not have their members ratify agreements before
1982.

Appendix IV: Contracts Negotiated and Ratified or Settled by the Amendable
Date

Appendix V: Airline Strikes That Have Occurred Since Deregulation

Page 42 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Carrier Union Craft or class Duration of negotiations Dates of strike
Duration of strike

1 Alaska IAM Mechanics 2/ 17/ 84- 6/ 3/ 85 3/ 4/ 85 - 5/ 4/ 85 2 months 2
American APA Pilots 6/ 30/ 94- 5/ 5/ 97 2/ 15/ 97 24 minutes 3 American
APFA Flight attendants 11/ 18/ 92- 10/ 10/ 95 11/ 18/ 93 - 11/ 22/ 93 5
days 4 American TWU Flight instructors Not available 11/ 4/ 79 1 day 5
Continental ALPA Pilots Not available 10/ 1/ 83 - 10/ 31/ 85 2 years 6
Continental IAM Mechanics 1981- 1985 8/ 13/ 83 - 4/ 16/ 85 1 1/ 2 years 7
Continental IBT Flight engineers Not available 9/ 23/ 79 - 10/ 6/ 79 13
days 8 Continental UFA Flight attendants Not available 12/ 5/ 80 - 12/ 21/
80 16 days 9 Continental UFA Flight attendants Not available 10/ 1/ 83 -
4/ 17/ 85 1 1/ 2 years 10 Continental IAM Flight attendants 1985- 1989 3/
15/ 89 - 12/ 15/ 89 9 months 11 Northwest ALPA Pilots 8/ 27/ 96- 9/ 12/ 98
8/ 29/ 98 - 9/ 12/ 98 15 days 12 Northwest IAM Mechanics 9/ 29/ 81- 6/ 16/
82 5/ 22/ 82 - 6/ 25/ 82 1 month

Flight kitchen 13 Southwest IAM Mechanics Not available 1/ 13/ 80 - 2/ 1/
80 19 days 14 United ALPA Pilots 1/ 30/ 84- 6/ 17/ 85 5/ 17/ 85 - 6/ 14/
85 29 days 15 United IAM Mechanics 10/ 1/ 78- 5/ 24/ 79 3/ 31/ 79 - 5/ 27/
79 2 months

Ramp and stores Food services Dispatchers Security officers 16 USAir IAM
Mechanics 2/ 14/ 90- 10/ 13/ 92 10/ 5/ 92 - 10/ 8/ 92 3 days Legend IAM =
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers APA = Allied
Pilots Association APFA = Association of Professional Flight Attendants
TWU = Transport Workers Union of America * AFL- CIO IBT = International
Brotherhood of Teamsters UFA = Union of Flight Attendants ALPA = Air Line
Pilots Association Sources: NMB, airlines, and labor unions.

Appendix V: Airline Strikes That Have Occurred Since Deregulation

Appendix VI: Court- recognized, Nonstrike Work Actions Since Deregulation

Page 43 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Carrier Union Craft Work action Plaintiff request Date of court decision
Outcome

1 American APA Pilots Sickout TRO sought 2/ 10/ 1999 Awarded 2 American
TWU Mechanics Slowdown TRO sought 2001 Awarded 3 American TWU Mechanics
Slowdown TRO sought 1998 Awarded 4 American TWU Mechanics Slowdown
Injunction sought 1999 Granted 5 Delta ALPA Pilots Refuse overtime
Injunction sought 2001 Granted 6 Northwest AMFA Mechanics Refuse overtime
Injunction sought 5/ 11/ 2001 Granted 7 Northwest IAM Clerical Slowdown
Injunction sought 2/ 25/ 1999 Granted

Flight kitchen Stock 8 Northwest IBT Flight attendants Sickout Injunction
sought 1/ 5/ 2000 Granted 9 TWA IAM Mechanics Sickout and work

stoppage TRO sought 1998 Awarded 10 United IAM Mechanics Slowdown
Injunction sought 7/ 1/ 2002 Granted

Legend APA = Allied Pilots Association TWU = Transport Workers Union of
America * AFL- CIO ALPA = Air Line Pilots Association AMFA = Aircraft
Mechanics Fraternal Association IAM = International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers IBT = International Brotherhood of
Teamsters Sources: NMB, airlines, and courts.

Appendix VI: Court- recognized, Nonstrike Work Actions Since Deregulation

Appendix VII: Number of Presidential Interventions Since Deregulation Page
44 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

Carrier Union Craft Amendable date Presidential intervention date Actions
taken

1 American APA Pilots 8/ 31/ 94 2/ 15/ 97 Presidential Emergency Board 2
American APFA Flight attendants 11/ 1/ 98 2001 Presidential Emergency
Board

warning 3 American APFA Flight attendants 12/ 31/ 92 1993 President
recommends binding

interest arbitration 4 Northwest ALPA Pilots 11/ 2/ 96 September 1998
Presidential Emergency Board

warning 5 Northwest AMFA Mechanics 9/ 30/ 96 3/ 12/ 01 Presidential
Emergency Board 6 United IAM Mechanics 7/ 12/ 00 1/ 19/ 02 Presidential
Emergency Board

Legend APA = Allied Pilots Association APFA = Association of Professional
Flight Attendants ALPA = Air Line Pilots Association IAM = International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers AMFA = Aircraft Mechanics
Fraternal Association Sources: NMB and airlines.

Appendix VII: Number of Presidential Interventions Since Deregulation

Appendix VIII: Comments from the National Mediation Board Page 45 GAO- 03-
652 Airline Labor Relations

Appendix VIII: Comments from the National Mediation Board

Appendix VIII: Comments from the National Mediation Board Page 46 GAO- 03-
652 Airline Labor Relations

Appendix VIII: Comments from the National Mediation Board Page 47 GAO- 03-
652 Airline Labor Relations

Appendix VIII: Comments from the National Mediation Board Page 48 GAO- 03-
652 Airline Labor Relations

Appendix VIII: Comments from the National Mediation Board Page 49 GAO- 03-
652 Airline Labor Relations

Appendix VIII: Comments from the National Mediation Board Page 50 GAO- 03-
652 Airline Labor Relations

Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments Page 51 GAO- 03- 652
Airline Labor Relations

JayEtta Z. Hecker (202) 512- 2834 Steven C. Martin (202) 512- 2834

In addition to those individuals named above, Jonathan Bachman, Brandon
Haller, David Hooper, Terence Lam, Dawn Locke, Sara Ann Moessbauer, Stan
Stenersen, and Stacey Thompson made key contributions to this report.
Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Staff Acknowledgments

(544050)

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