    Airline Labor Relations: Information on Trends and Impact of
    Labor Actions (13-JUN-03, GAO-03-652).

    Labor negotiations in the airline industry fall under the Railway
    Labor Act. Under this act, airline labor contracts do not expire,
    but instead, become amendable. To help labor and management reach
    agreement before a strike occurs, the act also provides a
    process--including possible intervention by the President--that
    is designed to reduce the incidence of strikes. Despite these
    provisions, negotiations between airlines and their unions have
    sometimes been contentious, and strikes have occurred. Because
    air transportation is such a vital link in the nation's economic
    infrastructure, a strike at a major U.S. airline may exert a
    significant economic impact on affected communities.
    Additionally, if an airline's labor and management  were to
    engage in contentious and prolonged negotiations, the airline's
    operations--and customer service--could suffer. GAO was asked to
    examine trends in airline labor negotiations in the 25 years
    since the industry was deregulated in 1978, the impact of airline
    strikes on communities, and the impact of lengthy contract
    negotiations and nonstrike work actions (such as "sickouts") on
    passengers.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-652
        ACCNO:   A07192
      TITLE:     Airline Labor Relations: Information on Trends and Impact
    of Labor Actions
         DATE:   06/13/2003
      SUBJECT:   Airline industry
    	     Airline personnel
    	     Airline regulation
    	     Customer service
    	     Labor unions
    	     Strikes (labor actions)

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    GAO-03-652

    Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U. S. Senate

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

    June 2003 AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS

    Information on Trends and Impact of Labor Actions

    GAO- 03- 652

    Since the airline industry was deregulated in 1978, the average length of
    negotiations has increased, strikes have declined, and nonstrike work
    actions (e. g., sickouts) have increased. After 1990, the median length of
    time needed for labor and management at U. S. major airlines to reach
    agreement on contracts increased from 9 to 15 months. Of the 16 strikes
    that occurred at those airlines since 1978, 12 occurred prior to 1990, and
    4 occurred subsequently. All ten court- recognized, nonstrike work actions
    and all six presidential interventions occurred since 1993.

    Summary of Negotiation Trends Since Deregulation

    Airline strikes have had obvious negative impacts on communities,
    including lost income for striking and laid off workers, disrupted travel
    plans, and decreased spending by travelers and the struck airline.
    However, such impacts have yet to be thoroughly and systematically
    analyzed. The potential net impacts of a strike on a community would
    depend on a number of factors,

    such as availability of service from competing (nonstriking) airlines and
    the length of the strike. For example, of two recent strikes, one lasted
    15 days and one lasted 24 minutes.

    GAO*s analysis indicates that passenger service has been affected more
    adversely by nonstrike work actions than by an increase in the length of
    negotiations. Generally, but not always, as negotiation periods increased,
    there has been a slight decline in on- time flights. However, the impact
    of these negotiations has been unclear because the decline may also have
    been affected by other factors such as poor weather. By comparison, the 10
    courtrecognized, nonstrike work actions more clearly resulted in negative
    impacts on passengers, as shown through such measures as a decrease in the
    number of on- time flights, an increase in the number of flight problem
    complaints, and a decrease in passenger traffic. Labor negotiations in the
    airline

    industry fall under the Railway Labor Act. Under this act, airline labor
    contracts do not expire, but instead, become amendable. To help labor and
    management reach agreement before a strike occurs, the act also provides a
    process*

    including possible intervention by the President* that is designed to
    reduce the incidence of strikes.

    Despite these provisions, negotiations between airlines and their unions
    have sometimes been contentious, and strikes have occurred.

    Because air transportation is such a vital link in the nation*s economic
    infrastructure, a strike at a major U. S. airline may exert a significant
    economic impact on affected communities. Additionally, if an airline*s
    labor and management were to engage in contentious and

    prolonged negotiations, the airline*s operations* and customer service*
    could suffer. GAO was asked to examine trends

    in airline labor negotiations in the 25 years since the industry was
    deregulated in 1978, the impact of airline strikes on communities, and the
    impact of lengthy contract negotiations and nonstrike work actions (such
    as *sickouts*) on

    passengers.

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 652. To view the full product,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact JayEtta Z. Hecker at (202) 512- 2834 or HeckerJ@ gao.
    gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 652, a report to the

    Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U. S. Senate

    June 2003

    AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS

    Information on Trends and Impact of Labor Actions

    Page i GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations Letter 1 Results in Brief 3
    Background 5 Length of Negotiations and Number of Nonstrike Work Actions
    Have Increased, While Number of Strikes Has Declined 9 Airline Strikes
    Adversely Affect Communities, but Impacts Have

    Not Been Fully Analyzed and Vary from Place to Place 17 Nonstrike Work
    Actions Have Greater Impacts on Passengers than Lengthy Negotiations 24
    Agency Comments 31 Appendix I Additional Questions 33

    Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 35

    Appendix III Additional Background Information on the Railway Labor Act 38

    Key Provisions of the RLA 38 Collective Bargaining Process under the RLA
    39 Appendix IV Contracts Negotiated and Ratified or Settled by the
    Amendable Date 41

    Appendix V Airline Strikes That Have Occurred Since Deregulation 42

    Appendix VI Court- recognized, Nonstrike Work Actions Since Deregulation
    43 Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations Appendix VII Number of
    Presidential Interventions Since

    Deregulation 44

    Appendix VIII Comments from the National Mediation Board 45

    Appendix IX GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 51 GAO Contacts 51
    Staff Acknowledgments 51 Tables

    Table 1: Unions Representing Selected Crafts or Classes at Major Passenger
    Airlines as of February 1, 2003 5 Table 2: States That Include Binding
    Arbitration or Last, Best Offer

    Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Option 33 Table 3: Congressional
    Interventions in Railroad Negotiations 34 Figures

    Figure 1: Summary of Negotiation Trends Since Deregulation 3 Figure 2:
    Collective Bargaining Process under the Railway Labor Act 8 Figure 3:
    Length of Time Taken to Negotiate Contracts, 1978 to 2002 11 Figure 4:
    Median Negotiation Lengths by Carrier 12 Figure 5: Frequency of Strikes,
    Presidential Interventions, and

    Court- recognized, Nonstrike Work Actions by Year 15 Figure 6: 2001 Market
    Shares for Major Airlines at Their Hubs 21 Figure 7: Spoke Communities
    Served from Cincinnati and Minneapolis- St. Paul Retain Service from
    Competing Airlines 23 Figure 8: On- Time Flight Statistics for American
    and Delta at

    Dallas/ Fort Worth International Airport, August 1998 to December 1999 26
    Figure 9: Flight Problem Complaints for American and Delta from August
    1998 to December 1999 27

    Page iii GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations Figure 10: Passengers
    Carried on American and Delta at Dallas/ Fort Worth International Airport,
    February 1998

    and 1999 28 Figure 11: On- Time Flight Statistics for Delta and
    Continental at Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport, August 2000 to
    August 2001 29 Figure 12: Flight Problem Complaints for Delta and
    Continental,

    August 2000 to August 2001 30 Figure 13: Change in Passenger Traffic on
    Delta and Continental at Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport in
    December 1999 and 1 Year Later during the Nonstrike Work Action in
    December 2000 31 Abbreviations

    AFA Association of Flight Attendants AIRCon Airline Industrial Relations
    Conference ALPA Air Line Pilots Association AMFA Aircraft Mechanics
    Fraternal Association APA Allied Pilots Association ATA Air Transport
    Association CAPA Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations CESTA
    Communities for Economic Strength Through Aviation CWA Communications
    Workers of America DOT Department of Transportation IAM International
    Association of Machinists and Aerospace

    Workers IBT International Brotherhood of Teamsters NMB National Mediation
    Board PAFCA Professional Airline Flight Control Association PEB
    Presidential Emergency Board RLA Railway Labor Act SAEA Southwest Airlines
    Employee Association SWAPA Southwest Airlines Pilots Association TWA Trans
    World Airlines TWU Transport Workers Unions UFA Union of Flight Attendants

    Page iv GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations This is a work of the U. S.
    Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United
    States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without
    further

    permission from GAO. It may contain copyrighted graphics, images or other
    materials. Permission from the copyright holder may be necessary should
    you wish to reproduce copyrighted materials separately from GAO*s product.

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    June 13, 2003 The Honorable John McCain Chairman, Committee on Commerce,
    Science, and Transportation United States Senate

    Dear Senator McCain: Observers of the interactions between airline
    management and labor have long characterized these labor relations as
    contentious and adversarial. Negotiations between unions and airlines, for
    example, have taken up to 4 years to complete. Unions and airlines have
    each prolonged negotiations for their financial benefit. The importance of
    labor relations has recently

    been magnified by the financial crisis facing many airlines. Since
    September 11, 2001, US Airways, United Airlines, and Hawaiian Airlines
    have entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and American Airlines is fighting to
    avoid bankruptcy. US Airways, United, and American have all had to obtain
    the consent of their unions for contract concessions to substantially cut
    labor costs. At stake, according to industry observers and financial
    officials, has been the continued existence of at least two airlines.

    The process under which labor negotiations in the airline industry take
    place is substantially different than the process of most other
    industries. Airline labor contracts do not expire, and their negotiations
    can include a series of steps* including mediation, arbitration, and
    presidential interventions* specifically designed to avoid an impasse that
    would interrupt the flow of essential commerce. Since 1936, airline labor
    negotiations have been conducted in accordance with the requirements of
    the Railway Labor Act, which contains an established framework to reduce
    the incidence of strikes. Although the act is designed to bring about
    settlements without unions resorting to a strike, negotiations between the
    airlines and their unions have sometimes been contentious, and strikes
    have occurred. Recently, negotiations have at times been marked by
    nonstrike work actions, such as sickouts and work slowdowns. These actions
    are designed to place economic pressure on an airline.

    Because of ongoing concerns about the scope and impact of airline labor
    negotiations, you asked us to examine a number of issues concerning
    airline negotiations, strikes, and nonstrike work actions. As agreed with
    your staff, we examined the following three questions:

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    Page 2 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

     What have been the major trends of labor negotiations in the airline
    industry since the industry was deregulated in 1978, including the number
    and length of negotiations and the number of strikes, presidential
    interventions to avoid or end strikes, and nonstrike work actions?

     What has been the impact of airline strikes on communities?  What have
    been the impacts of the length of negotiations and the

    occurrence of nonstrike work actions on passengers? In addition to these
    questions, you also requested information on states using binding and last
    offer arbitration 1 for essential employees and the number of times
    Congress has intervened in railroad labor negotiations in the last 25
    years. See appendix I for data on states using binding

    arbitration and congressional interventions in railroad negotiations. To
    determine the trends of labor negotiations, we analyzed data on
    negotiations, strikes, and nonstrike work actions from airlines, labor
    unions, the National Mediation Board (NMB), industry groups, and academic
    experts. We also interviewed officials with major U. S. airlines, labor
    unions, the NMB, industry groups, and academic experts. To determine the
    impact of strikes on communities, we reviewed available published studies
    from academics and other experts, and we analyzed data on airline
    schedules. To determine the impact of nonstrike work actions,

    we defined such actions as those in which airlines obtained either
    temporary restraining orders or injunctions against unions to prevent
    various actions. We then analyzed data from the U. S. Department of
    Transportation (DOT) on airline operational performance and passenger
    service. Except where noted, all data collected were current as of
    December 2002. Because of various data limitations, our analyses are
    restricted to major U. S. passenger airlines. 2 We did not evaluate the
    efficacy or effectiveness of the Railway Labor Act or the impact of any 1
    Last offer arbitration is a form of arbitration in which the dispute
    resolution procedure

    limits an arbitrator to choosing the final offer made by one of the
    parties. 2 DOT defines a *major* airline as one with annual total
    operating revenues in excess of $1 billion. For purposes of this report,
    we include only those major carriers that were in business as of 2001 for
    which we could obtain data (Alaska, America West, American, Continental,
    Delta, Northwest, Southwest, TWA, United, and US Airways). We excluded
    American Eagle, American Trans Air, cargo, and regional airlines,
    including American Eagle, some of which fit the $1 billion criteria,
    because data for these airlines were not available.

    Page 3 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    possible changes to the act. Appendix II contains a more complete
    description of our scope and methodology.

    Since the airline industry was deregulated in 1978, labor negotiations
    have taken increasing amounts of time and have been marked less by strikes
    and more by nonstrike work actions. For the contracts we reviewed that had
    been negotiated between major carriers and labor unions since
    deregulation, the overall median length for contracts negotiated between
    1978 and 1989 was 9 months, while the median negotiation time from 1990 to
    2002 increased to 15 months. (See fig. 1.) However, some carriers such as
    Continental Airlines, Southwest Airlines, Alaska Airlines, and United
    Airlines have been more successful than others at reaching agreement with
    their labor unions in much less time. Of the 16 strikes that occurred, 12
    took place from 1978 to 1989, and 4 took place since 1990. Various
    presidential interventions that have prevented or halted 6 strikes have
    all occurred since 1990, and all 10 court- recognized, nonstrike work
    actions have also taken place since 1990. Although the complete number of
    nonstrike work actions is not known because they are difficult to
    document, our evidence suggests that their use has increased in the past
    12 years.

    Figure 1: Summary of Negotiation Trends Since Deregulation

    Results in Brief

    Page 4 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    While strikes cause obvious negative impacts on affected communities, we
    could identify no published studies that comprehensively analyzed the full
    impacts of a past strike. Negative impacts of strikes include the lost

    income of striking and laid off workers, disrupted travel plans due to
    cancelled flights, decreased spending by the struck airline, and less
    spending by travelers. However, the overall economic impact of any past
    strike, including direct and indirect effects (and the offsetting effect
    of various mitigating factors such as the presence of service from
    competing airlines) has not been quantified. Our analysis of past strikes
    and other information indicates, however, that a strike*s potential
    impacts could vary greatly from community to community. For example, a
    community with substantial amounts of service provided by competing
    airlines is less likely to be affected than a community that is heavily or
    entirely dependent on the service provided by the striking airline,
    because passengers have continued access to air service. As a result, a
    thorough assessment of a strike*s impact on one community would be
    difficult to generalize to other locations.

    Our analysis indicates that passenger service has been affected more
    adversely by nonstrike work actions than by an increase in the length of
    negotiations. Generally, but not always, as negotiation periods increased,
    there has been a decline in on- time flights. 3 However, the impact of
    these negotiations has been unclear, because the decline may also have
    been affected by other factors such as poor weather, aircraft maintenance,
    runway closures, air traffic control system decisions, or equipment
    failures. By comparison, the 10 court- recognized, nonstrike work actions
    more clearly resulted in negative impacts on passengers, as shown through
    such measures as a decrease in the number of on- time flights, an increase
    in the number of flight problem complaints, and a decrease in passenger
    traffic. For example, during an American pilot slowdown in 1999, the
    percentage of flights that arrived or departed on time declined by 11.6

    percentage points. Also, customer flight complaints with DOT about
    American nearly quadrupled during the period of the nonstrike work action,
    rising from 53 to 203 complaints, while passenger traffic fell by 15
    percent as compared to the year before.

    3 DOT defines an on- time flight as one that is less than 15 minutes after
    the scheduled gate arrival or gate departure time.

    Page 5 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    All the major airlines have some union representation of at least part of
    their labor force. The various crafts or classes 4 that unions typically
    represent include pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, and dispatchers.
    Sometimes unions also represent customer service agents and clerical
    workers, aircraft and baggage handling personnel, and flight instructors.

    The extent of unionization among the major carriers varies significantly.
    At Delta, unions represent the pilots and two small employee groups; at
    Southwest, on the other hand, unions represent 10 different employee
    groups. Different unions may represent a given employee craft or class at
    different airlines. For example, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
    represents pilots at United, but the Allied Pilots Association represents
    American pilots. Table 1 summarizes the representation of different crafts
    or classes at the major airlines.

    Table 1: Unions Representing Selected Crafts or Classes at Major Passenger
    Airlines as of February 1, 2003

    Airline Pilots Flight attendants Mechanics

    and related Dispatchers Fleet service/ ramp

    Alaska ALPA AFA AMFA TWU IAM America West ALPA AFA IBT TWU TWU American
    APA APFA TWU TWU TWU Continental ALPA IAM IBT TWU (none) Delta ALPA (none)
    (none) PAFCA (none) Northwest ALPA IBT AMFA TWU IAM Southwest SWAPA TWU
    AMFA SAEA TWU United ALPA AFA IAM PAFCA IAM US Airways ALPA AFA IAM TWU
    IAM Legend AFA = Association of Flight Attendants ALPA = Air Line Pilots
    Association AMFA = Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association APA = Allied
    Pilots Association APFA = Association of Professional Flight Attendants

    4 NMB defines a craft or class as a group of employees seeking
    representation grouped around factors such as their functions, duties,
    responsibilities, and the general nature of the work performed. Background

    Page 6 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    IAM = International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers IBT =
    International Brotherhood of Teamsters PAFCA = Professional Airline Flight
    Control Association SAEA = Southwest Airlines Employee Association SWAPA =
    Southwest Airlines Pilot Association

    TWU = Transport Workers Unions Source: International Association of
    Machinists and Aerospace Workers. Note: American completed its purchase of
    Trans World Airlines (TWA) in April 2001, and this table lists union
    representation as of February 1, 2003; hence TWA is not included in this
    table.

    In general, airline labor contracts include three major elements: wages,
    benefits, and work rules. Work rules generally refer to those sections of
    a contract that define issues such as hours to be worked and what work is
    to be done by what employees.

    Negotiations between airlines and their labor unions on these contracts
    are conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Railway Labor Act
    (RLA). This act was passed in 1926 after the railroads and their unions
    agreed to set in place a legal framework that would avoid disruptions in
    rail service. The act was amended in 1936, after discussions with airline
    labor and management, to include the airline industry and its labor
    unions. See appendix III for a summary of the history and key provisions
    of the RLA.

    Airline labor contracts do not expire; rather, they reach an amendable
    date* the first day that the parties can be required to negotiate the
    terms of a new contract. Labor negotiations may begin before or after the
    amendable date, however. While a new contract is being negotiated, the
    terms of the existing contract remain in effect.

    Under the RLA, labor negotiations undergo a specific process that must be
    followed before a union can engage in any kind of work action, including a
    strike, or before a carrier can change work rules, wages, and benefits. 5
    After exchanging proposed changes to contract provisions, the airline and

    the union engage in direct bargaining. If they cannot come to an
    agreement, the parties must request mediation assistance from the NMB. By
    statute, if the NMB receives a properly completed application for

    5 This limitation on a union*s legal authority to engage in work actions
    or a carrier*s legal authority to change work rules is known as
    *maintaining the status quo.*

    Page 7 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    mediation, it must make its best effort to mediate an amicable settlement.
    If negotiations are deadlocked after mediation, the NMB must then offer
    arbitration to both parties. If either party declines arbitration, the NMB
    releases the parties into a 30- day cooling- off period. While this
    process is set by law, the decision about when the negotiations are
    deadlocked is left to the NMB. If the NMB concludes that a labor dispute
    threatens to

    interrupt essential transportation service to any part of the country, the
    act directs the NMB to notify the President of this possibility. The
    President then can, at his discretion, convene a Presidential Emergency
    Board

    (PEB), which issues a nonbinding, fact- finding report. 6 If the President
    does not call a PEB, after the 30- day cooling- off period ends the union
    is allowed to strike, and the airline is allowed to alter working
    conditions unilaterally. These actions are known as self- help. If the
    President does convene a PEB, it is given 30 days to hold hearings and
    recommend contract terms for a settlement to the parties. The union and
    the airline then have an additional 30- day cooling- off period, after the
    PEB makes its recommendations to the President, before either can engage
    in self- help. After a PEB, Congress may also intervene in the contract
    dispute by legislating terms of a contract between a carrier and a union.
    Congress, however, has never intervened in airline negotiations since
    deregulation. Figure 2 summarizes the key steps in the negotiation process
    under the RLA.

    6 The NMB notifies the President that a potential strike would result in a
    *possible substantial interference with interstate commerce.* At the
    President*s discretion, a board can be established to investigate the
    dispute between the union and the company and make recommendations for
    settlement. The recommendations are not binding on management or labor.
    These boards are known as PEBs.

    Page 8 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Figure 2: Collective Bargaining Process under the Railway Labor Act

    Besides negotiations on contracts that are nearing or have passed the
    amendable dates, airline management and labor may also engage in other
    negotiations. For example, if an airline introduces a new type of aircraft
    into its fleet, management and labor will negotiate *side agreements* to

    Page 9 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    the contract that set pay rates and work rules governing the operation of
    that aircraft. An example of this situation was when Delta and its pilots
    settled on pay rates for flying Delta*s newly introduced Boeing 777s in
    1999. This agreement was an amendment to a contract that was ratified in
    1996. Conversely, during financially difficult times, an airline*s
    management and labor may negotiate concessionary agreements before
    contracts reach the amendable date. For example, since 2001, several
    airlines have requested pay cuts from their unions due to the precarious
    financial condition of the airlines. In April 2003, American employees
    agreed to $1.8 billion in wage, benefit, and work rules concessions to
    help the airline avoid bankruptcy. In April, United employees represented
    by ALPA, Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), the International
    Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), the Transport
    Workers Union (TWU), and the Professional Airline Flight Control
    Association (PAFCA) agreed to $2.2 billion in average yearly savings to
    avoid liquidation or having all labor contracts abrogated by the
    bankruptcy court. Through January 2003, US Airways employees, including
    unionized, nonunionized, and management personnel, agreed to over $1
    billion in cuts to avoid liquidation.

    In the 25 years since deregulation, airline contract negotiation lengths
    have increased while the frequency of strikes has declined, but the number
    of nonstrike work actions have increased. For the 236 contracts that the
    major passenger airlines negotiated since 1978, available data suggest
    that the median time taken to negotiate contracts has risen substantially
    since

    1990, although this varies among the different carriers. In addition, 75
    percent of strikes occurred prior to 1990. By comparison, all presidential
    interventions and all identified nonstrike work actions (such as sickouts
    or refusals to work overtime) occurred after 1990. Length of

    Negotiations and Number of Nonstrike Work Actions Have Increased, While
    Number of Strikes Has Declined

    Page 10 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    The length of time to negotiate airline contracts has increased since
    deregulation. From 1978 to 1989, the median contract negotiation was 9
    months while the median negotiation length from 1990 to 2002 increased to
    15 months. 7 In other words, from 1978 to 1989, half of the contracts

    were negotiated in more than 9 months while from 1990 to 2002, half of the
    contracts took more than 15 months to reach an agreement. However, in
    1978* 1989, 6 contracts were ratified or settled by the amendable date
    where as from 1990* 2002, 9 contracts were ratified or settled by the
    amendable date. 8 (In all, during the two time periods from 1978* 1989 and
    1990* 2002, the number of negotiations that began before the amendable

    date were 65 and 51, respectively.) Conversely, the number of contracts
    that required more than 24 months to negotiate more than doubled between
    the two periods. Figure 3 summarizes changes in the length of time taken
    for airline labor negotiations from 1978 to 2002. 9 7 While we measured
    negotiation length from the date the carriers reported as the start of

    negotiations through the ratification/ settlement date, the NMB measures
    negotiation lengths from when it first receives a request for mediation
    services. While NMB*s measure accurately reflects the period of time they
    are involved in negotiations, our measure was designed to portray the
    total period involved in negotiations.

    8 See appendix IV for a list of contracts ratified by their amendable
    date. 9 We were not able to calculate negotiation lengths for all 236
    contracts because key dates were unavailable for 89 contracts: 83 had
    unknown start dates or ratification/ settlement dates, and 6 were listed
    as first- time contracts. Airline Contract

    Negotiation Lengths Have Increased Since 1978

    Page 11 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Figure 3: Length of Time Taken to Negotiate Contracts, 1978 to 2002
    Carriers differed in the degree to which their median negotiation lengths
    increased* if they increased at all. Negotiation lengths increased at six
    carriers that were measured, in some cases more than doubling. On the
    other hand, negotiation lengths decreased or remained constant at three:
    Continental, United, and Trans World Airlines (TWA). Figure 4 shows the

    change in median negotiation lengths at the major U. S. passenger airlines
    before and after 1990.

    1978- 89

    71 contracts Median: 9 months

    1990- 2002

    75 contracts Median: 15 months

    Negotiated before amendable date Less than 1 year

    1- 2 years More than 2 years 8% 54%

    24% 14%

    28% 12%

    29% 31%

    Page 12 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Figure 4: Median Negotiation Lengths by Carrier

    Note: America West Airlines was excluded from the measurement because
    negotiations for this airline were not listed prior to 1990. a Continental
    had only one contract pre- 1990 that had both a known negotiation start
    date and ratification/ settlement date.

    Contract complexity may play a role in lengthening negotiations. In the
    1980s, for example, scope clauses (provisions in labor contracts of the
    major airlines and their unions that limit the number of routes that can
    be transferred to smaller, regional jets) could be very short* sometimes
    only

    one paragraph. Now, however, such scope clauses can be 60 or more pages.
    Also, contracts negotiated during the 1980s tended to consist mainly of
    wages and benefits, while those negotiated in the 1990s included

    Page 13 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    corporate governance issues such as code sharing, 10 regionals, 11 and
    furloughs.

    Another factor in the length of negotiations is the relationship between
    labor and management. According to industry experts who examined labor
    relations in the industry, the quality of labor relationships is defined
    by the parties* level of trust, their level of communication, and their
    ability to problem solve. 12 Those carriers that industry officials and
    labormanagement experts 13 regard as having positive labor relations
    tended to have shorter negotiation periods than carriers with acrimonious
    relationships. Industry officials noted increased tension within
    labormanagement relationships during the 1990s, when the industry
    recovered from economic hardship to enjoy the biggest boom in its history.
    An industry official explained that during the recessionary economic
    period of the early 1990s, unions tended to stall negotiations to avoid
    making concessions. Conversely, during the peak economic period in the mid
    to late 1990s, some airlines* management tried to further improve their
    profits by prolonging negotiations.

    Carriers described by industry officials and labor- management experts as
    having had positive labor relationships include Continental (following
    1993) and Southwest. In the 1990s, their median negotiation periods were 7
    and 13 months, respectively. Labor- management experts credit
    Continental*s current CEO for creating relationships of trust, and
    reestablishing Continental as a profitable carrier after its bankruptcy in
    the early 1990s. Industry officials also credit Southwest*s labor
    relationships to

    10 The Regional Airline Association defines code sharing as when one
    airline uses the twoletter designator code of another airline to designate
    its flights, for example, Comair using Delta*s designator code (DL) to
    designate one of its flights. 11 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
    Aerospace Forecasts defines regional airlines

    as those carriers that provide regularly scheduled passenger service and
    whose fleets are composed primarily of aircraft having 60 seats or less.

    12 Jody Gittell, Andrew von Nordenflycht, and Thomas Kochan, *Mutual Gains
    or Zero Sum? Labor Relations and Firm Performance in the Airline
    Industry,* Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (forthcoming), and James
    Schultz and Marian Schultz, *Northwest Airlines Strike and Labor
    Negotiations,* American Association of Behavior Social Sciences Journal 2
    (1999) 254- . 13 Industry officials represent airline management, airline
    interest groups and/ or industry sponsored research organizations. Labor-
    management experts include academics who study airline labor relations,
    authors of studies regarding labor relations in the airline industry and
    lawyers practicing airline industry labor and employment law.

    Page 14 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    30 years of profitability while maintaining its original leadership. Both
    companies have been recognized for extended periods of low conflict in
    labor negotiations, underpinned by high- trust workplace cultures. 14
    Carriers that have been described by labor- management experts as having

    had contentious relations with their unions include American, Northwest
    Airlines, TWA, and US Airways. Also, all have a history of strikes and/ or
    court- recognized, nonstrike work actions. Furthermore, in the 1990s, many
    of these airlines had negotiations that tended to take much longer than
    Continental*s and Southwest*s. For example, the median length of time to
    negotiate contracts at US Airways in the 1990s was 34 months. By contrast,
    the length of time to negotiate contracts at Southwest was 13 months.

    The incidence of strikes in the airline industry has decreased over time.
    Of the 16 strikes that occurred since 1978, 12 occurred prior to 1990, and
    4 occurred subsequently. 15 These strikes ranged from as short as 24
    minutes

    to more than 2 years. Figure 5 summarizes the incidence of strikes,
    presidential interventions, and court- recognized, nonstrike work actions
    16 between 1978 and 2002.

    14 Jody Gittel, Andrew von Nordenflycht, and Thomas Kochan, *Mutual Gains
    or Zero Sum? Labor Relations and Firm Performance in the Airline
    Industry,* Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (forthcoming). 15 See
    appendix V for a description of airline strikes that have occurred since
    deregulation. 16 For purposes of this report, we define court- recognized,
    nonstrike work actions as any labor actions, other than a strike,
    performed outside of the self- help period and judged necessary by a court
    of law to warrant a temporary restraining order (TRO) or an injunction.
    See appendix VI for details on each of these nonstrike work actions.
    Strikes Have Decreased

    and Nonstrike Work Actions Have Increased during the 1990s

    Page 15 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Figure 5: Frequency of Strikes, Presidential Interventions, and Court-
    recognized, Nonstrike Work Actions by Year

    Note: There was one presidential intervention and one court- recognized,
    nonstrike work action in 2002.

    Six presidential interventions have been used to prevent strikes since
    deregulation. All six occurred since 1990. 17 Not all presidential
    interventions were PEBs. In 1993, the President recommended binding

    interest arbitration for American*s flight attendant negotiation. In 1998,
    and again in 2001, two PEB warnings occurred; one occurred during

    17 In the most recent airline strike* the 89- day strike at Delta
    Connection carrier Comair in 2001* NMB regarded the impact as not
    significant enough to warrant a presidential intervention, as they did not
    believe the strike would substantially threaten to interrupt interstate
    commerce to such a degree as to deprive any section of the country
    essential

    transportation service. (The Comair strike was not included in the list of
    strikes as it is not a major carrier. See appendix II for additional
    limitations to the scope of this report.)

    Page 16 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Northwest*s pilot strike and the second for American flight attendants. 18
    Still, PEBs have been used three times in the airline industry since 1978:
    during a 1994 American pilot negotiation, a 1996 Northwest mechanic
    negotiation, and a 2000 United mechanic negotiation.

    Compared to strikes, the pattern for nonstrike work actions has been the
    opposite: their incidence has increased over time. In all, 10
    courtrecognized, nonstrike work actions have occurred, each since 1998.
    Such actions included various forms of slowdowns such as sickouts, work-
    torule, and refusals to work overtime. 19 According to a labor- management
    expert, carriers believe there have been many more nonstrike work actions
    than the 10 recognized by the courts,

    but their existence is difficult to prove. Airline management has been
    unable to produce the evidence needed to prove the actions are taking
    place. 20 Those nonstrike work actions that were not identified by the
    court

    18 The President can take various measures short of a PEB to put pressure
    on the parties to settle. Such measures include sending a presidential
    representative to meet with the parties. For example, in the ALPA pilots*
    negotiation with Northwest in 1998, the President sent his Senior Counsel
    and Transportation Secretary to meet with the federal mediator to help the
    parties resolve their differences. The President can also publicly
    announce his

    readiness to empanel a PEB. For example, during the 2001 APFA negotiations
    with American, the Transportation Secretary announced publicly that the
    President would use all tools necessary to ensure there was no disruption
    in service. See appendix VII for a list of presidential interventions.

    19 Slowdowns are an organized effort by workers to decrease production in
    order to pressure the employer to take some desired action. Slowdowns can
    include refusing to work overtime, sickouts, and work- to- rule. A union
    official shared that, typically, minor FAA rules that do not concern
    safety may be overlooked in order to maintain flight schedules. According
    to two labor- management experts, during a work- to- rule action, airline
    labor strictly follows such minor rules in order to slow the flight
    schedule. For example, pilots may refuse to fly a plane if a tray table
    does not stay in the upright position.

    20 According to an International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) union
    official, unions do not participate in nonstrike work actions, although
    some might admit to performing workto- rule actions to put pressure on the
    carriers. The union official also stated that individual employees have
    taken actions into their own hands. For example, IBT reported that
    individual employees promoted a Northwest flight attendant sickout in 2000
    by using the Internet. After IBT leadership accessed the Web site, they
    told their members and the airlines that the union was not in favor of the
    members* actions. In separate actions, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit
    Courts of Appeal, ruling on behalf of United and Delta, respectively,
    declared that unions are responsible for controlling labor actions.
    Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that, when
    Delta*s pilots engaged in concerted

    activity in violation of the RLA, *ALPA* ha[ d] a duty to end* unlawful
    action* by its members. According to the court, that duty is not met by
    mere statements of policy and exhortations to refrain from unlawful
    activity, but must be backed with action, including union- imposed
    sanctions (Airline Management Publication).

    Page 17 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    include a number of highly publicized labor disruptions. For example, the
    reported, but unconfirmed, nonstrike work action taken by United*s pilots
    in the summer of 2000 was widely publicized by the media, 21 yet the
    airline

    never brought the issue before a court of law. Additionally, it has been
    reported that the reason why these actions are difficult to detect is
    because a concern for safety often masks the source of such actions.

    Airline labor strikes have exerted adverse impacts on communities, but we
    identified no published studies that systematically and comprehensively
    analyzed a strike*s net impact at the community level. For some strikes,
    we were able to identify evidence of individual impacts, such as reduced
    air service to and from the community, lost salaries or wages by striking
    or laid- off airline workers, or lower airport revenues. However, no
    studies have yet synthesized such information for a thorough picture of a
    strike*s impact on a community. Our analysis indicates that a strike*s
    potential impacts would likely vary greatly from community to community,
    because of differences in factors such as the amount of service available
    from other airlines. Thus, even if the impact of a strike were to be
    thoroughly studied at a particular community, it would be difficult to
    generalize these results to other locations.

    With the reduction of air service stemming from an airline strike,
    communities have experienced economic disruptions from a number of
    sources. Lost income of airline employees, fewer travelers and less
    spending in travel related businesses, and less spending by the airline
    are just some of the ways that local economies have been affected by a
    strike. For example, canceled flights have lead to the layoff of
    nonstriking employees, fewer travelers in the airport spending money in
    concessions, and reduced landing fees for airports. Because passenger
    traffic dropped, spending at hotels suffered.

    Local reports illustrated some of a strike*s economic impacts on a
    community during the 2001 Comair pilot strike. Comair, a regional carrier
    for Delta, has its main hub at the Cincinnati/ Northern Kentucky 21 See,
    for example, *United Pilots* Slow Taxiing Causes Delays at O*Hare,*
    Chicago O*Hare Air Traffic Control, TheTracon. com, July 26, 2000,

    http:// www. thetracon. com/ news/ times072600. htm, or *United Airlines
    Scraps Nearly 2, 000 Flights,* CNN. com, August 8, 2000, http:// www. cnn.
    com/ 2000/ TRAVEL/ NEWS/ 08/ 08/ united. cancellations. ap. Airline
    Strikes Adversely Affect

    Communities, but Impacts Have Not Been Fully Analyzed and Vary from Place
    to Place

    Airline Strikes Have Had Negative Economic Impacts on Communities

    Page 18 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    International Airport. Over the course of the strike, which lasted 89
    days, Comair did not operate its 815 daily flights, causing the 25, 000
    passengers who would normally have been on those flights in an average day
    to curtail

    their travel or make arrangements on other airlines. The airline*s 1,350
    striking pilots, many of whom are based in the area, lost an estimated $14
    million in salaries, and the airline reported laying off an additional
    1,600

    nonstriking employees in the greater Cincinnati area as well. A concourse
    at the Cincinnati/ Northern Kentucky International Airport closed during
    the strike. Reports stated that the concourse*s 16 stores and restaurants
    lost more than $3 million in sales, and that 152 of 193 workers were laid
    off. The airport also lost $1.2 million in landing fees from Comair during
    the strike.

    Impacts can be felt not only at hub communities like Cincinnati, but also
    at smaller spoke communities that may be served only by the striking
    airline. When Northwest Airlines pilots struck in 1998, for example,
    Mesaba Airlines, a regional affiliate, suspended operations as well. At
    least 12 of the communities served by Mesaba during the Northwest strike
    had no other air service. One of these locations was Houghton, Michigan.
    According to local reports, travelers to and from Houghton had to drive as
    far as Green Bay (213 miles from Hancock, Michigan, location of

    Houghton*s airport) or Wausau, Wisconsin, (192 miles away) to find
    alternative flights. DOT also recognized the possible impacts of halting
    all airline service. The department ordered Mesaba to return service to 12

    communities served from Minneapolis under the terms of Mesaba*s Essential
    Air Service contract. However, before the order was implemented, the
    strike ended, and service was restored to these communities.

    While the available information indicates that airline strikes can and do
    have adverse impacts on communities, we identified no published studies
    that attempt to comprehensively measure these impacts at the community
    level. The kinds of impacts cited above, for example, may have mitigating
    factors that need to be taken into account. In the Comair strike, for
    example, union strike funds replaced some of the lost income of strikers.
    ALPA approved payments of $1,400 per month to striking Comair pilots
    during the strike period, allowing them to spend at a reduced rate in the
    community. A study that reliably estimated the impact of a strike at the
    community level would need to take factors such as these into account. No
    such study has been done. Full Impacts at the

    Community Level Are Largely Unknown

    Page 19 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Another reason for uncertainty about the full impacts of a strike on a
    community is that the impact of a strike on passengers* travel decisions
    is often unknown. For example, while more than 100 communities lost Comair
    service to and from Cincinnati during the strike, all of these communities
    had service to Cincinnati from another airline. Thus, although hotel
    occupancy reportedly fell by more than 18 percent in Northern Kentucky in
    the strike*s first month, the degree to which this drop was attributable
    solely to the strike is unknown.

    Apart from community- level analysis of strikes, some studies have
    examined the overall economic impacts of aviation on regions or states.
    For example, the Campbell- Hill Aviation Group, on behalf of an industry
    interest group, published a report examining the state- level impact of a
    potential loss of aviation service, but this study did not evaluate the
    impact of any particular strikes on local or regional economies. 22 For
    example, the study stated that, in the year ending in March 2002, Delta
    had 10 percent of the passenger traffic in Texas and projected that a 10
    percent reduction in

    aviation benefits would cause a daily reduction of $17.7 million in one
    measure of the Texas economy, its gross domestic product (GDP). 23 DOT
    also has on occasion produced wide- ranging assessments of the

    impacts of potential airline strikes, but these studies have never
    addressed the impacts of strikes that actually occurred. These studies are
    conducted at the request of the NMB, which uses them in evaluating whether
    the

    labor dispute threatens to interrupt essential transportation services in
    any part of the country. Once the NMB makes this assessment, it notifies
    the President, who may, at his discretion, empanel a PEB. If the NMB
    believes an airline strike is probable, it may request the department to
    examine the possible economic consequences of that strike. The department
    reports the extent of potentially lost air service to hub and spoke cities
    of the affected carrier, the number of passengers that would have no
    service if a

    22 We found studies published by Wilbur Smith Associates, Wisconsin
    Department of Transportation, and the University of Cincinnati that
    reported on the total economic impact of aviation on the United States,
    the state of Wisconsin, and the greater Cincinnati/ Northern Kentucky
    region. None examined any strike impacts. 23 In the above example, one
    should not equate a strike against Delta with a 10 percent reduction in
    Texas* aviation benefits. Aviation benefits stem from other aviation
    related activity such as general and military aviation as well as
    scheduled airline service. Also, one

    would have to assume that all airline flights in Texas were completely
    filled with paying passengers so none of Delta*s 10 percent of Texas
    fliers could be accommodated by other airlines.

    Page 20 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    strike were to occur, possible financial impacts on the carrier, indirect
    impacts on the national economy, and the mitigating and aggravating
    factors on the impacts of a strike. While DOT*s reviews may examine many
    areas that could be affected by a strike, they examine only potential
    strikes and are not conducted after actual strikes.

    While comprehensive studies of community- level impacts of past strikes
    are not available, one thing that emerges from our analysis is that any
    future strike*s impact on a given community is likely to be affected by
    the level of service available from other airlines. If alternative service
    is greatly limited, travelers may have to take alternative* and less
    direct* routes offered by other airlines, or, in extreme cases, travel
    great distances to other airports in order to fly at all. Those impacts on
    travelers and businesses will vary depending on whether the community is a
    hub or spoke destination and even among an airline*s hubs and spoke
    destinations.

    The impact of a future strike at an airline*s hub locations would depend
    in part on which airline is involved in the strike and its market share at
    the hub. Some airlines dominate air traffic at their hubs to a much
    greater extent than other airlines do, and a strike involving an airline
    with a dominant position at most of its hubs would likely have more impact
    than a strike involving an airline that is hubbing out of locations where

    competition is greater. In 2001, the airlines with the most and least
    dominated hubs (based on the percentage of total available seats
    controlled by the hubbing airline) were US Airways and America West. (See
    fig. 6.) US Airways averaged 81 percent of the seats offered at its hubs,
    while America West averaged 32 percent. Thus, based on the loss of seating
    capacity at its hubs, a strike at US Airways that halted service would
    likely have substantially more impact on its hub communities than a strike
    at America West that halted service. Community- Level Impact

    of Any Future Strike Would Depend Partly on Service Available from Other
    Airlines

    Page 21 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Figure 6: 2001 Market Shares for Major Airlines at Their Hubs

    Among a single airline*s hub cities, the impact of a strike would also
    likely vary depending on service available from alternate carriers at
    those cities. Again, the impact of a strike at the hubbing carrier or its
    regional partners would be more substantial at more highly dominated hubs.
    For example, in 2001, Delta and its regional partners accounted for 91
    percent of the seats available in Cincinnati, but only 19 percent of
    available seats at the Dallas/ Fort Worth International Airport, which has
    the lowest market share among Delta*s hubs. Consequently, a strike against
    Delta would likely have caused much greater disruption in Cincinnati than
    in Dallas. In contrast to the differences among Delta*s hubs, the impact
    of a strike at

    Northwest would likely be felt equally at its Minneapolis/ St. Paul,
    Detroit, and Memphis hubs. At each of its hubs, Northwest offered between
    77 and 80 percent of available seats.

    As at hubs, the impacts of strikes on available air service at spoke
    cities would also depend on the amount and type of available alternative
    service. Those communities with air service from other carriers have a
    greater opportunity to mitigate the potential impact of a strike by
    enabling travelers to access the national air system using competing
    airlines. For

    Page 22 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    example, figure 7 shows available air service, as of April 2003, at spoke
    communities served by Delta*s regional partner, Comair, from Cincinnati,
    and by Northwest*s regional carrier, Mesaba, from Minneapolis- St. Paul.
    Comair provided nonstop service to a total of 101 U. S. communities from
    Cincinnati. All but one of these communities had alternative service to
    Cincinnati from another airline* 64 with nonstop service, 36 with one-
    stop

    service. 24 Thus, if Comair*s operations were to be disrupted by a strike,
    passengers at these communities would still have the opportunity for
    service to and from Cincinnati. The picture at Minneapolis- St. Paul is
    somewhat different. There, 10 of the 47 spoke cities served by Mesaba
    would have no alternative service to Minneapolis- St. Paul.

    24 The one exception (Melbourne, Florida) also had one- stop service to
    Cincinnati, but not from a competing airline. Melbourne passengers could
    still have one- stop service to Cincinnati from a combination of another
    Delta regional carrier (to Atlanta) and then a Delta mainline flight to
    Cincinnati.

    Page 23 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Figure 7: Spoke Communities Served from Cincinnati and Minneapolis- St.
    Paul Retain Service from Competing Airlines

    Note: Data are from airline schedules for the week of April 21- 25, 2003.

    Several other factors could also influence the impact of a future strike
    on a community. The length of the strike is one such factor; longer
    strikes are more likely to have an adverse impact. Since deregulation,
    strikes have varied from 24 minutes for an American pilot strike in 1997
    to almost 2 years for a Continental mechanics strike (1983* 1985). Another
    likely factor is financial preparation; as already mentioned, the local
    impact of the

    Comair strike was likely mitigated somewhat by the union*s payments to
    striking pilots. Similarly, the ability of airlines to operate through a
    strike* whether by hiring replacement workers or having union members
    cross picket lines* could also influence a strike*s impact. For example,
    during a strike by Continental mechanics lasting almost 2 years, some
    Continental workers crossed the picket line and continued working. This
    Other Factors Also

    Influence the Total Impact of Airline Strikes

    Page 24 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    allowed Continental to continue operation after a shutdown of only 3 days.
    Tactics used by the striking union can also reduce the overall impact.
    Alaska flight attendants used a technique called *CHAOS* (Creating Havoc
    Around Our System) that involved intermittent walkouts of certain crews on
    certain days. 25 This tactic kept certain flights from operating, but did
    not shut down the entire airline.

    Our analysis indicates that passenger service has been affected more
    adversely by nonstrike work actions than by an increase in the length of
    negotiations. Generally, but not always, as negotiation periods increased,
    there has been a slight decline in on- time flights. 26 However, the
    impact of these negotiations has been unclear, because the decline may
    also have been affected by other factors such as poor weather, aircraft
    maintenance,

    runway closures, air traffic control system decisions, or equipment
    failures. By comparison, the 10 court- recognized, nonstrike work actions
    more clearly resulted in negative impacts on passengers, as shown through
    such measures as a decrease in the number of on- time flights, an increase
    in the number of flight problem complaints, 27 and a decrease in passenger
    traffic.

    Our analyses found a slight correlation between the length of negotiations
    and adverse impacts on passengers. 28 We analyzed 23 negotiations between
    airlines and pilot unions from 1987 to 2002. 29 As negotiations
    lengthened, the frequency of on- time arrivals declined slightly. However,
    it is not clear

    25 CHAOS, as practiced by the Alaska flight attendants, was found by the
    federal courts to be a legal form of self- help and not an illegal work
    action. The Alaska flight attendants did not engage in this activity until
    after release by the NMB and the 30- day cooling- off period. 26 DOT
    defines an on- time flight as one that is less than 15 minutes after the
    scheduled gate arrival or gate departure time. 27 Flight problem
    complaints include complaints regarding cancellations, delays, or any
    other deviations from the schedule, whether planned or unplanned. 28 As a
    measure of adverse impact on passengers, we analyzed the number of on-
    time

    arrivals in relationship to the length of contract negotiations. The
    correlation between these two items was -. 25.

    29 These 23 pilot contracts were chosen because they had the most complete
    information, including amendable dates and ratification dates.
    Concessionary agreements ratified before the amendable date, first time
    pilot contracts, or pilot contracts with missing information were not used
    in this analysis. Nonstrike Work

    Actions Have Greater Impacts on Passengers than Lengthy Negotiations

    Impact of Negotiation Lengths on Passengers Is Unclear

    Page 25 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    if the change in on- time flights is attributable solely to negotiation
    lengths, or if other factors may also have contributed to the on- time
    performance. DOT*s data on flight arrival and departure timeliness
    indicate whether a flight is delayed, but not what caused the delay.
    Common factors for delays include severe weather, aircraft maintenance,
    runway closures, customer service issues (e. g., baggage and accommodating
    passengers with special needs, such as those in wheelchairs or youths
    requiring escorts), air traffic control system decisions, and equipment
    failures. Thus, despite the apparent relation between lengthening
    negotiations and a deterioration of service quality, other exogenous
    factors may explain the change in flight delays.

    Available data indicates that nonstrike work actions have had adverse
    impacts on passengers. While DOT data do not specifically identify these
    actions as the causes for the delays or the reasons for the complaints,
    increases in the number of late flights, passenger complaints, and
    decreases in passenger traffic during the period of the actions suggest a
    clearer relationship than is apparent with these same measures and lengthy
    negotiations. The periods in which nonstrike work actions occur show
    decreases in on- time flights, increases in passenger complaints, and
    decreases in passenger traffic. Two examples of such actions, the American
    pilot sickout and the Delta pilot slowdown, are described in the next two
    sections.

    American experienced decreases in on- time flights, increases in customer
    complaints, and drops in passenger traffic during a pilot sickout. (Under
    FAA regulations, any airline pilot can take himself out of the cockpit if
    he is sick, overly stressed, or does not feel *fit to fly.* During a
    sickout, pilots utilize these regulations to excuse themselves from work
    in order to put economic pressure on the airline during the negotiation.)
    In December 1998, AMR Corp, the parent company of American, purchased Reno
    Air, whose pilots were then to be integrated into a single workforce. In
    early 1999, American pilots began a sickout over a dispute involving a
    side agreement that would integrate Reno Air operations. On February 10,
    1999, a federal judge ordered the pilots to return to work. Subsequently,
    the number of flights cancelled increased. On February 13, 1999, the judge
    found the pilots* union in contempt of court. 30 By February 16, the
    airline

    30 The judge fined the American pilots* union, the Allied Pilots
    Association, $45.5 million for contempt. Nonstrike Work Actions

    Have Clearer Adverse Impacts on Passengers

    American Pilot Sickout

    Page 26 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    reported a return to its normal schedule but, reportedly, pilots were
    still refusing to work overtime and were adhering to work- to- rule
    practices, meaning that they would follow every regulation stipulated by
    the FAA in order to slow the airline.

    Figure 8 illustrates on- time arrival and departure rates at Dallas/ Fort
    Worth International Airport for the period of August 1998 through December
    1999 for American and Delta, which also operates a hub at that airport.
    The on- time flight statistics for the two airlines are relatively equal
    prior to the sickout period. During the next several months, American*s

    on- time record fell below that of Delta. Both carrier*s on- time rates
    declined somewhat, suggesting that other factors such as weather might
    also influence flight operations. However, the difference between the two
    airlines during this period is greater than in other periods. In August
    1999, when Reno Air*s operations were officially integrated* even though
    no

    agreement was made* the two airlines* records resumed a more closely
    parallel path.

    Figure 8: On- Time Flight Statistics for American and Delta at Dallas/
    Fort Worth International Airport, August 1998 to December 1999

    Page 27 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    The American sickout also caused increases in passenger flight problem
    complaints. Figure 9 compares the change in complaints against American
    and Delta. The complaints began to rise in February of 1999 and,
    generally, continued to increase into the summer, when American reached an
    agreement with its pilots.

    Figure 9: Flight Problem Complaints for American and Delta from August
    1998 to December 1999

    A comparison of passenger traffic between American and Delta at Dallas/
    Fort Worth International Airport indicates that passenger traffic declined
    either to avoid the carrier experiencing the nonstrike work action or due
    to grounded flights. (American grounded up to 2,250 flights per day during
    the sickout period.) (See fig. 10.) During the American pilot sickout in
    February 1999, there was a drop in American*s passenger traffic. Compared
    to the year before, American*s passenger traffic declined by 15 percent
    while Delta*s passenger traffic rose by 5 percent.

    Page 28 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Figure 10: Passengers Carried on American and Delta at Dallas/ Fort Worth
    International Airport, February 1998 and 1999

    Another example of the impact of nonstrike work actions on passengers is
    the Delta slowdown in 2000* 2001. In September 1999, Delta began
    negotiations with its pilots and submitted a contract proposal, which
    sought to tie future raises to the company*s financial performance. As a
    result, Delta pilots began refusing to fly overtime in the winter of 2000.
    When compared to Continental*s operations at Atlanta Hartsfield
    International Airport, 31 Delta experienced substantial declines in on-
    time flights and increases in flight problem complaints while also
    experiencing declines in passenger traffic. Delta first went to court on
    December 5,

    2000, and was denied an injunction. The airline then took the suit to the
    Eleventh Circuit on January 18, 2001, and the denial was overturned and
    remanded for injunction. 31 AirTran operates more flights than Continental
    at Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport.

    However, because DOT does not classify AirTran as a major airline, we
    compared Delta*s operations with Continental. Delta Pilot Slowdown

    Page 29 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Figure 11 shows the percent of on- time flights for both Delta and
    Continental at Atlanta*s Hartsfield International Airport for the period
    of August 2000 to August 2001. During the slowdown period from December to
    January, there is a decline in Delta*s on- time flights relative to
    Continental*s. Once the court issued an injunction against the union, the
    two airlines resumed a more similar pattern.

    Figure 11: On- Time Flight Statistics for Delta and Continental at Atlanta
    Hartsfield International Airport, August 2000 to August 2001

    Delta*s pilot slowdown also showed an increase in passenger complaints
    during this period. Figure 12 compares the change in passenger flight
    problem complaints about Delta and Continental during Delta*s slowdown.
    Flight complaints rose sharply in December and January, peaking at 185 in
    January 2001, and immediately declining after the union was enjoined on
    January 18, 2001.

    Page 30 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Figure 12: Flight Problem Complaints for Delta and Continental, August
    2000 to August 2001

    Finally, Delta*s passenger traffic at Atlanta Hartsfield International
    Airport also declined during the slowdown, but the pattern was less
    pronounced than for the American sickout discussed earlier. (See fig. 13.)
    In December 2000, when Delta first pursued an injunction in court, Delta*s
    and Continental*s passenger traffic dropped by 9 and 4 percent,
    respectively. Unlike the American sickout (when up to 2,250 flights were
    grounded per day), Delta pilots* refusal to fly overtime grounded far
    fewer flights* about

    100 to 125 per day* which means less passengers were affected by cancelled
    flights as compared to American.

    Page 31 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Figure 13: Change in Passenger Traffic on Delta and Continental at Atlanta
    Hartsfield International Airport in December 1999 and 1 Year Later during
    the Nonstrike Work Action in December 2000 We provided copies of a draft
    of this report to NMB for review and

    comment. NMB indicated it generally agreed with the accuracy of our
    report, and it provided technical clarifications, which were incorporated
    into the report as appropriate. The NMB also provided an additional
    statement, which is included in appendix VIII. We also provided selected
    portions of a draft of this report to the major airlines and unions to
    verify the presentation of factual material. We incorporated their
    technical clarifications as appropriate.

    As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
    this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
    the report date. At that time, we will provide copies to the Honorable
    Francis J. Duggan, Chairman of the National Mediation Board; the Honorable
    Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary of Transportation; and other interested
    parties. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In
    Agency Comments

    Page 32 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
    http:// www. gao. gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me
    at (202) 512- 2834, HeckerJ@ gao. gov or Steve Martin at (202) 512- 2834,
    MartinS@ gao. gov. Appendix VIII lists key contacts and key contributors
    to this report.

    Sincerely yours, JayEtta Z. Hecker Director, Physical Infrastructure
    Issues

    Appendix I: Additional Questions Page 33 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor
    Relations

    In addition to the three primary questions, you asked us how many states
    use a system of binding arbitration and last offer arbitration with their
    essential service personnel. You also asked how many times in the last 25
    years has Congress had to intervene in a dispute with railroads and what
    were the outcomes.

    As of November 2002, according to information from officials of Harvard
    University, 23 states* including the District of Columbia* use binding
    arbitration and/ or last offer arbitration as arbitration options. (See
    table 2.) Of those, none use last offer arbitration as their sole
    arbitration option. Table 2: States That Include Binding Arbitration or
    Last, Best Offer Arbitration as a

    Dispute Resolution Option State Type of arbitration included in resolution
    options

    1 California Binding arbitration 2 Maine Binding arbitration 3 Illinois
    Last offer arbitration 4 Michigan Last offer arbitration 5 Oklahoma Last
    offer arbitration 6 Tennessee Last offer arbitration 7 Colorado Binding
    arbitration and last offer arbitration 8 Conneticut Binding arbitration
    and last offer arbitration 9 Delaware Binding arbitration and last offer
    arbitration 10 District of Columbia Binding arbitration and last offer
    arbitration 11 Hawaii Binding arbitration and last offer arbitration 12
    Iowa Binding arbitration and last offer arbitration 13 Maryland Binding
    arbitration and last offer arbitration 14 Minnesota Binding arbitration
    and last offer arbitration 15 Montana Binding arbitration and last offer
    arbitration 16 Nevada Binding arbitration and last offer arbitration 17
    Ohio Binding arbitration and last offer arbitration 18 Oregon Binding
    arbitration and last offer arbitration 19 Pennsylvania Binding arbitration
    and last offer arbitration 20 Rhode Island Binding arbitration and last
    offer arbitration 21 Texas Binding arbitration and last offer arbitration
    22 Washington Binding arbitration and last offer arbitration 23 Wisconsin
    Binding arbitration and last offer arbitration Source: Harvard University.

    According to information from the National Mediation Board, in the last 25
    years Congress intervened in railroad negotiations eight times. These
    Appendix I: Additional Questions

    Appendix I: Additional Questions Page 34 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor
    Relations

    interventions occurred between 1982 and 1992. (See table 3.) Congressional
    interventions do not involve the airlines.

    Table 3: Congressional Interventions in Railroad Negotiations Date Remark

    1 6/ 26/ 92 Binding arbitration imposed by Congress 2 6/ 26/ 92 Binding
    arbitration imposed by Congress; parties reached

    voluntary agreement 3 6/ 26/ 92 Binding arbitration imposed by Congress in
    three cases; parties

    reached voluntary agreement in all others 4 4/ 18/ 91 Terms imposed by
    Congress 5 8/ 4/ 88 Status quo extended by Congress

    9/ 9/ 88 Terms imposed by Congress 6 1/ 28/ 87 Status quo extended by
    Congress; parties reached voluntary agreement 7 8/ 21/ 86 Status quo
    extended by Congress

    9/ 30/ 86 Terms imposed by Congress 8 9/ 22/ 82 Terms imposed by Congress
    Source: NMB.

    Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Page 35 GAO- 03- 652
    Airline Labor Relations

    This report examines the following three questions:  What have been the
    major trends of labor negotiations in the airline

    industry since the industry was deregulated in 1978, including the number
    and length of negotiations and the number of strikes, presidential
    interventions to avoid or end strikes, and nonstrike work actions?

     What has been the impact of airline strikes on communities?  What have
    been the impacts of the length of negotiations and the

    occurrence of nonstrike work actions on passengers? To determine the
    trends of airline labor negotiations, including the length of
    negotiations, the number of strikes, the number of presidential
    interventions, and the number of nonstrike work actions, we analyzed data
    from multiple sources. We obtained our data from major U. S. airlines and
    various labor organizations. The labor groups included the Air Line Pilots
    Association (ALPA), the Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA),
    the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), the International Association
    of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), and the International
    Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). We also received substantial negotiation
    and contract data from the U. S. National Mediation Board (NMB) and the
    Airline Industrial Relations Conference (AIRCon), a group funded by major
    U. S. airlines to facilitate the exchange of contract negotiation
    information and other labor relations matters among carriers. Because data
    were not available for commuter (regional) and all- cargo carriers, we
    originally limited our analysis to passenger airlines that are considered
    majors by the U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT) that were in
    operation during 2001. These airlines were Alaska, America West, American,
    American Eagle, American Trans Air (recently renamed as ATA Airlines),
    Continental, Delta, Northwest, Southwest, TWA 1 , United, and US Airways.
    We later were not able to include American Eagle or American

    Trans Air, which met the DOT criteria, in our analysis because we were not
    able to obtain information on these airlines.

    Dates listed as negotiation start dates differ between the airlines,
    AIRCon, and NMB, therefore, limiting the accuracy of the data collected. A
    negotiation*s *start date* can be when the carrier*s management or union 1
    American completed its purchase of TWA in April 2001, and TWA no longer
    exists as a

    separate entity. Analysis of activity from deregulation through April 2001
    is included in this report. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and
    Methodology

    Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Page 36 GAO- 03- 652
    Airline Labor Relations

    exchange a written notice stating that one of the parties desires a change
    in rates of pay, work rules, or working conditions or when face- to- face
    negotiations actually begin (i. e., when the two parties sit at a table
    and verbally negotiate the contract). By contrast, the NMB defines a
    *start date* only when it is called for mediation. For the purposes of our
    data collection, we first used dates provided by the airlines to AIRCon at
    the time the contract was being negotiated. If those were not available,
    we turned to the dates provided directly to us by the airlines from their
    files when available. We were supplied different dates, including
    ratification dates and settlement dates, for the end point of
    negotiations. We know of at least one union that did not have its members
    vote to ratify contract

    changes until after 1982. Again, we first used AIRCon provided
    ratification or settlement dates, if possible, and, in cases where these
    were not available, we used airline provided dates, or dates provided by
    NMB. We were unable to calculate a negotiation length for 83 of the 236
    contracts because we could not identify either a start date or a
    ratification or settlement date for them. In addition, we did not
    calculate negotiation lengths for 6 initial contracts, the first contract
    a union signs after a craft or class becomes recognized at an airline.

    To obtain information on nonstrike work actions, we also examined media
    sources and also reviewed federal court records. Based on the information
    we were able to review, we defined court- recognized, nonstrike work
    actions as those work actions for which airlines obtained either temporary
    restraining orders or injunctions against unions. Officials from the
    airlines we spoke with stated that there have been many more nonstrike
    work

    actions than the 10 judged by the courts. Even some union officials stated
    that union members have taken actions that they considered legal under
    their contract or Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. These
    same actions, on other occasions, have been found to be violations of the
    status quo by the courts. Additional cases of nonstrike work actions,

    however, have been difficult to prove. Airline management has either been
    unable to produce the needed evidence in court or airlines never took
    unions to court. Union officials also strenuously deny illegal activity on
    the part of their unions.

    We interviewed officials from airlines, labor unions, the NMB, and
    industry groups. The airlines we spoke with included American, American
    Trans Air, Continental, Delta, Northwest, Southwest, Comair, Atlantic
    Coast Airlines, Federal Express, United Parcel Service, and Airborne
    Express. We only analyzed data from airlines where we could obtain full
    data. The labor groups we interviewed included ALPA, CAPA, AFA, IAM, and
    IBT. We also held discussions with officials from NMB, the Air Transport

    Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Page 37 GAO- 03- 652
    Airline Labor Relations

    Association (ATA), Communities for Economic Strength Through Aviation
    (CESTA), and AIRCon. To determine the impact of airline strikes on
    communities, we searched for studies of these impacts from airlines,
    industry groups, and academic institutions. Specifically, we talked with
    United, Delta, Comair, ATA, and CESTA. Based on suggestions from airlines,
    unions, interest groups, and our own research we also talked with faculty
    at Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of
    Cincinnati, and

    the University of Kentucky. None of these sources knew of any published
    studies on specific impacts of past strikes on any community. In
    discussions with NMB, we learned that DOT produces studies, solely at the
    request of NMB, on the likely impacts of probable airline strikes on the
    airline and local and national economies. We obtained a copy of one of
    these studies from DOT. We also analyzed data on airline schedules and

    market share from Sabre, Inc.; BACK Aviation Solutions; and the Campbell-
    Hill Aviation Group. We also reviewed local media reports from communities
    affected by strikes. Due to the lack of published studies or generally
    accepted methodology to determine the impact of strikes, we cannot
    discount other possible causes for these impacts.

    To determine the impact of the length of negotiations and courtrecognized,
    nonstrike work actions on passengers, we analyzed data on airline
    operational performance from DOT*s Air Travel Consumer Report and
    passenger traffic information from BACK Aviation Solutions. To

    determine the impact of negotiation lengths, we compared on- time
    performance throughout the course of 23 negotiations between airlines and
    pilot unions. To determine the impact of nonstrike work actions, we
    compared airlines* on- time performance and flight complaints between
    airlines before, during, and after the 10 court- recognized, nonstrike
    work actions. We also analyzed changes in passenger traffic among airlines
    during these actions. Though our analysis included performing a
    correlation between on- time arrivals and the length of airline labor
    contract negotiations, we did not perform any multivariate analysis, and
    thus, cannot rule out possible alternative causes.

    We conducted our review between August 2002 and May 2003 in accordance
    with generally acceptable government accounting principles.

    Appendix III: Additional Background Information on the Railway Labor Act

    Page 38 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    The Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. S: 151, et. seq., (RLA) was passed by
    Congress in May 1926 to improve labor- management relations in the
    railroad industry. In January 1926, a committee of railway executives and
    union representatives jointly presented a draft bill to Congress that was

    universally supported by those in the industry. Congress did not make any
    changes of substance to the bill, and the RLA was signed by the President
    on May 20, 1926. 1 Congress has not altered the basic structure of the act
    that labor and management use to resolve what are known as *major
    disputes,* i. e., disputes over the creation of, or change of, agreements
    concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. After discussions
    with airline management and labor the act was applied to air carriers in
    1936. 2 As a method to keep labor disputes from interrupting commerce, the
    new

    law represented a significant departure from past labor practices by
    requiring both sides to preserve the status quo during collective
    bargaining and preventing either side from taking unilateral action. When
    labor and

    management representatives drafted the legislation, they agreed that both
    sides of a labor dispute should negotiate the dispute and not make any
    change in the working conditions in dispute until all issues were worked
    out under the deliberate process outlined in the act.

    The RLA is not a detailed statute. The main purposes of the act are
    threefold. First, Congress intended to establish a system that resolves
    labor disputes without interrupting commerce in the airline and railroad
    industries. The statute requires both labor and management *to exert every
    reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements ... and to settle all
    disputes ....* 3 The Supreme Court has described that duty as being the
    *heart* of the act. 4 Second, the act imposes on the parties an obligation
    to preserve and to maintain unchanged during the collective bargaining
    process *those

    actual, objective working conditions and practices, broadly conceived,
    which were in effect prior to the time the pending dispute arose and which

    1 P. L. No. 257, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 44 Stat. 577 (1926). 2 45 U. S. C.
    S: 181. 3 45 U. S. C. S: 152. 4 Chicago & North Western Ry. v. UTU, 402 U.
    S. 570, 574 (1971). Appendix III: Additional Background

    Information on the Railway Labor Act Key Provisions of the RLA

    Appendix III: Additional Background Information on the Railway Labor Act

    Page 39 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    are involved in or related to that dispute.* 5 This is generally known as
    *maintaining the status quo.*

    Finally, the act requires that: *Representatives, for the purposes of this
    Act, shall be designated by the respective parties ... without
    interference, influence, or coercion exercised by either party over the
    self- organization or designation of representatives by the other.* 6 That
    obligation was

    strengthened in 1934 so as to prohibit either party from interfering with,
    influencing, or coercing *the other in its choice of representatives.* 7
    The collective bargaining process established by the RLA is designed to

    preserve labor relations peace. The carrier is required to maintain the
    status quo before, during, and for some time after the period of formal
    negotiations. The union and the employees have the reciprocal obligation
    to refrain from engaging in actions that are designed to economically harm
    the company, such as strikes during the same period. These actions are

    termed economic self- help in the act. Airline labor and management
    periodically engage in negotiations to reach a comprehensive collective
    bargaining agreement that will remain in effect for a defined period,
    usually 2 or 3 years. The parties are required to submit written notices
    (* Section 6 notices*) of proposed changes in rates of pay, rules, and
    working conditions. In some cases, parties may agree that collective
    bargaining is required to proceed according to a particular time schedule.
    If those direct discussions do not result in an agreement resolving a
    dispute, either party or the National Mediation Board (NMB) can initiate
    mediation.

    The RLA requires both parties to maintain collectively bargained rates of
    pay, rules, and working conditions while they negotiate amendments to the
    agreement. This requirement extends the status quo after an existing
    agreement becomes amendable if no agreement is reached by that time. If
    mediation proves unsuccessful, the NMB appeals to the parties to submit
    the dispute to binding interest arbitration. If that is unsuccessful, the
    statute provides for a 30- day cooling- off period. There can be no lawful

    5 45 U. S. C. S:S: 155, 156, and 160. 6 45 U. S. C. S: 152. 7 45 U. S. C.
    S: 145. Collective Bargaining

    Process under the RLA

    Appendix III: Additional Background Information on the Railway Labor Act

    Page 40 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    self- help by either side during this period. Even after the termination
    of the 30- day period, the self- help option is contingent. If a dispute
    threatens *substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such
    as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation
    services,* the President, upon notification by the NMB, is empowered to
    create an emergency board to investigate the dispute and issue a report
    that is followed by an additional 30- day period for final negotiations.

    After this process, the parties are left to self- help and further
    negotiation to reach a settlement. The only alternative is congressional
    action, which has never been used in an airline labor dispute.

    Appendix IV: Contracts Negotiated and Ratified or Settled by the Amendable
    Date

    Page 41 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Carrier Union Craft Amendable date Ratification or settlement date

    1 Alaska ALPA Pilots 4/ 30/ 80 4/ 15/ 80 2 Alaska ALPA Pilots 4/ 30/ 83 3/
    2/ 83 3 Alaska ALPA Pilots 5/ 1/ 91 4/ 29/ 91 4 Alaska ALPA Pilots 4/ 30/
    93 2/ 16/ 93 5 Alaska ALPA Pilots 12/ 1/ 97 10/ 15/ 97 6 American TWU
    Mechanics 3/ 1/ 93 10/ 7/ 91

    7 Continental TWU Dispatchers 4/ 1/ 99 6/ 1/ 98 8 Delta PAFCA Flight
    control 1/ 1/ 82 1/ 22/ 81 9 Delta PAFCA Flight control 1/ 1/ 86 10/ 25/
    85 10 Northwest ALPA Pilots 7/ 1/ 80 6/ 28/ 80

    11 Northwest ALPA Pilots 3/ 1/ 94 7/ 6/ 93 12 Northwest IAM Mechanics 7/
    1/ 88 6/ 6/ 88 13 TWA ALPA Pilots 9/ 1/ 95 10/ 3/ 94 14 United ALPA Pilots
    11/ 30/ 94 7/ 12/ 94 15 United IAM Dispatchers 11/ 30/ 94 7/ 12/ 94 Legend
    ALPA = Air Line Pilots Association TWU = Transport Workers Union PAFCA =
    Professional Airline Flight Control Association IAM = International
    Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Sources: National
    Mediation Board, airlines, and labor unions. Note: At least one union
    notified us that they did not have their members ratify agreements before
    1982.

    Appendix IV: Contracts Negotiated and Ratified or Settled by the Amendable
    Date

    Appendix V: Airline Strikes That Have Occurred Since Deregulation

    Page 42 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Carrier Union Craft or class Duration of negotiations Dates of strike
    Duration of strike

    1 Alaska IAM Mechanics 2/ 17/ 84- 6/ 3/ 85 3/ 4/ 85 - 5/ 4/ 85 2 months 2
    American APA Pilots 6/ 30/ 94- 5/ 5/ 97 2/ 15/ 97 24 minutes 3 American
    APFA Flight attendants 11/ 18/ 92- 10/ 10/ 95 11/ 18/ 93 - 11/ 22/ 93 5
    days 4 American TWU Flight instructors Not available 11/ 4/ 79 1 day 5
    Continental ALPA Pilots Not available 10/ 1/ 83 - 10/ 31/ 85 2 years 6
    Continental IAM Mechanics 1981- 1985 8/ 13/ 83 - 4/ 16/ 85 1 1/ 2 years 7
    Continental IBT Flight engineers Not available 9/ 23/ 79 - 10/ 6/ 79 13
    days 8 Continental UFA Flight attendants Not available 12/ 5/ 80 - 12/ 21/
    80 16 days 9 Continental UFA Flight attendants Not available 10/ 1/ 83 -
    4/ 17/ 85 1 1/ 2 years 10 Continental IAM Flight attendants 1985- 1989 3/
    15/ 89 - 12/ 15/ 89 9 months 11 Northwest ALPA Pilots 8/ 27/ 96- 9/ 12/ 98
    8/ 29/ 98 - 9/ 12/ 98 15 days 12 Northwest IAM Mechanics 9/ 29/ 81- 6/ 16/
    82 5/ 22/ 82 - 6/ 25/ 82 1 month

    Flight kitchen 13 Southwest IAM Mechanics Not available 1/ 13/ 80 - 2/ 1/
    80 19 days 14 United ALPA Pilots 1/ 30/ 84- 6/ 17/ 85 5/ 17/ 85 - 6/ 14/
    85 29 days 15 United IAM Mechanics 10/ 1/ 78- 5/ 24/ 79 3/ 31/ 79 - 5/ 27/
    79 2 months

    Ramp and stores Food services Dispatchers Security officers 16 USAir IAM
    Mechanics 2/ 14/ 90- 10/ 13/ 92 10/ 5/ 92 - 10/ 8/ 92 3 days Legend IAM =
    International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers APA = Allied
    Pilots Association APFA = Association of Professional Flight Attendants
    TWU = Transport Workers Union of America * AFL- CIO IBT = International
    Brotherhood of Teamsters UFA = Union of Flight Attendants ALPA = Air Line
    Pilots Association Sources: NMB, airlines, and labor unions.

    Appendix V: Airline Strikes That Have Occurred Since Deregulation

    Appendix VI: Court- recognized, Nonstrike Work Actions Since Deregulation

    Page 43 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Carrier Union Craft Work action Plaintiff request Date of court decision
    Outcome

    1 American APA Pilots Sickout TRO sought 2/ 10/ 1999 Awarded 2 American
    TWU Mechanics Slowdown TRO sought 2001 Awarded 3 American TWU Mechanics
    Slowdown TRO sought 1998 Awarded 4 American TWU Mechanics Slowdown
    Injunction sought 1999 Granted 5 Delta ALPA Pilots Refuse overtime
    Injunction sought 2001 Granted 6 Northwest AMFA Mechanics Refuse overtime
    Injunction sought 5/ 11/ 2001 Granted 7 Northwest IAM Clerical Slowdown
    Injunction sought 2/ 25/ 1999 Granted

    Flight kitchen Stock 8 Northwest IBT Flight attendants Sickout Injunction
    sought 1/ 5/ 2000 Granted 9 TWA IAM Mechanics Sickout and work

    stoppage TRO sought 1998 Awarded 10 United IAM Mechanics Slowdown
    Injunction sought 7/ 1/ 2002 Granted

    Legend APA = Allied Pilots Association TWU = Transport Workers Union of
    America * AFL- CIO ALPA = Air Line Pilots Association AMFA = Aircraft
    Mechanics Fraternal Association IAM = International Association of
    Machinists and Aerospace Workers IBT = International Brotherhood of
    Teamsters Sources: NMB, airlines, and courts.

    Appendix VI: Court- recognized, Nonstrike Work Actions Since Deregulation

    Appendix VII: Number of Presidential Interventions Since Deregulation Page
    44 GAO- 03- 652 Airline Labor Relations

    Carrier Union Craft Amendable date Presidential intervention date Actions
    taken

    1 American APA Pilots 8/ 31/ 94 2/ 15/ 97 Presidential Emergency Board 2
    American APFA Flight attendants 11/ 1/ 98 2001 Presidential Emergency
    Board

    warning 3 American APFA Flight attendants 12/ 31/ 92 1993 President
    recommends binding

    interest arbitration 4 Northwest ALPA Pilots 11/ 2/ 96 September 1998
    Presidential Emergency Board

    warning 5 Northwest AMFA Mechanics 9/ 30/ 96 3/ 12/ 01 Presidential
    Emergency Board 6 United IAM Mechanics 7/ 12/ 00 1/ 19/ 02 Presidential
    Emergency Board

    Legend APA = Allied Pilots Association APFA = Association of Professional
    Flight Attendants ALPA = Air Line Pilots Association IAM = International
    Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers AMFA = Aircraft Mechanics
    Fraternal Association Sources: NMB and airlines.

    Appendix VII: Number of Presidential Interventions Since Deregulation

    Appendix VIII: Comments from the National Mediation Board Page 45 GAO- 03-
    652 Airline Labor Relations

    Appendix VIII: Comments from the National Mediation Board

    Appendix VIII: Comments from the National Mediation Board Page 46 GAO- 03-
    652 Airline Labor Relations

    Appendix VIII: Comments from the National Mediation Board Page 47 GAO- 03-
    652 Airline Labor Relations

    Appendix VIII: Comments from the National Mediation Board Page 48 GAO- 03-
    652 Airline Labor Relations

    Appendix VIII: Comments from the National Mediation Board Page 49 GAO- 03-
    652 Airline Labor Relations

    Appendix VIII: Comments from the National Mediation Board Page 50 GAO- 03-
    652 Airline Labor Relations

    Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments Page 51 GAO- 03- 652
    Airline Labor Relations

    JayEtta Z. Hecker (202) 512- 2834 Steven C. Martin (202) 512- 2834

    In addition to those individuals named above, Jonathan Bachman, Brandon
    Haller, David Hooper, Terence Lam, Dawn Locke, Sara Ann Moessbauer, Stan
    Stenersen, and Stacey Thompson made key contributions to this report.
    Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff

    Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Staff Acknowledgments

    (544050)

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