Foreign Assistance: Sustained Efforts Needed to Help Southern	 
Africa Recover from Food Crisis (25-JUN-03, GAO-03-644).	 
                                                                 
The southern Africa food crisis threatened 15.3 million people in
six countries (Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia,	 
and Zimbabwe) with famine. GAO was asked to look at (1) factors  
that contributed to the crisis, (2) how well the populations'	 
needs were met, (3) obstacles to the food aid effort, and (4)	 
challenges to emerging from crisis.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-644 					        
    ACCNO:   A07214						        
  TITLE:     Foreign Assistance: Sustained Efforts Needed to Help     
Southern Africa Recover from Food Crisis			 
     DATE:   06/25/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Food relief programs				 
	     Foreign aid programs				 
	     Foreign economic assistance			 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     HIV/AIDS						 
	     Lesotho						 
	     Malawi						 
	     Mozambique 					 
	     Swaziland						 
	     Zimbabwe						 
	     Zambia						 
	     UN World Food Program				 
	     International Monetary Fund			 

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GAO-03-644

                                       A

June 25, 2003 Let er t The Honorable Russell D. Feingold

Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on African Affairs Committee on
Foreign Relations United States Senate

Dear Senator Feingold: The southern Africa region has been facing its
worst food crisis in more than a decade. Approximately 15. 3 million
people (26 percent of the total population) in 6 countries* Lesotho,
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe* have experienced
severe food shortages and the threat of famine. Avoiding famine has
required substantial supplies of food from commercial imports 1 and a
large international food aid effort. The United Nations began establishing
emergency food aid operations in

individual countries as early as November 2001. In July 2002, the United
Nations appealed to international donors for $507 million to provide 1.2
million metric tons of emergency food aid as part of a consolidated
regional program for the April 2002- March 2003 crop year. However, food
shortages continue and emergency operations have been extended through
June 2003.

Because of concerns over the nature and severity of this food crisis, you
asked us to determine: (1) what factors contributed to the current crisis
in southern Africa, (2) how well were the populations* overall food needs
met during the crisis period, (3) what were the major obstacles to the
food aid effort, and (4) what are the challenges to emerging from the
crisis into sustained recovery.

To address these objectives, we met with and analyzed information from U.
S. government officials at the U. S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the Departments of State and Agriculture in Washington, D. C.,
and at U. S. missions in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe,
and South Africa. We also met with officials and reviewed information from
the World Food Program (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
and the International Fund for

1 Depending on a country*s policies, commercial imports represent the
private sector, the government, or both. In some cases governments
subsidize private sector imports.

Agricultural Development (IFAD) at their headquarters in Rome and in the
southern African countries we visited. In addition, we gathered
information from and met with representatives of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), other U. N. agencies, nongovernmental
organizations (NGO), other donor governments, and host government
ministries in Washington and at the country level in southern Africa. As
part of our fieldwork, we observed WFP and NGO food aid distributions in
Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. (App. I provides detailed
information on our scope and methodology.)

Results in Brief The primary factors that contributed to the food crisis
were: (1) erratic weather, (2) a poorly functioning agricultural sector,
(3) questionable

government actions, (4) widespread poverty, and (5) the HIV/ AIDS
epidemic. Erratic weather patterns contributed to a reduction in southern
Africa*s cereal 2 production by 29 percent on average. 3 But this decline
alone

would not have caused a food crisis absent other conditions. Food stocks
were depleted from previous poor harvests and farmers lacked access to
agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizer. Government actions such
as

the sale of grain reserves in Malawi and disruptive land reform policies
in Zimbabwe* which spurred a 75 percent drop in that country*s commercial
maize (corn) production over the past 2 years* further reduced food

supply. Widespread poverty contributed to food insecurity in the region.
HIV/ AIDS, which has infected 13 percent to 33 percent of the population
in the six countries, exacerbated the crisis by reducing both productivity
and agricultural output and severely limiting the populations* ability to
cope

with a bad harvest and high food prices. By the end of the April 2002-
March 2003 crisis period, approximately 93 percent of the regional cereal
gap 4 was met. Commercial cereal imports were reported as 1.72 million
metric tons (MT), while the food aid effort achieved at least 0.73 million
MT (60 percent of the planned amount). Provision of this food prevented
large- scale famine and death. However, 2 As used in this report, cereal
refers to plants that yield grain suitable for food and includes

maize, millet, sorghum, rice, and wheat. 3 This figure reflects total
production for these six countries in the 2001/ 02 season compared with
average production over the previous 5 years.

4 Total cereal gap is calculated by estimating annual domestic cereal
needs and subtracting the estimated harvest during the year plus cereal
stocks at the beginning of the year.

food did not reach the region early enough to avert widespread hunger, and
many people resorted to rationing food, reducing expenditures on nonfood
items, and selling household assets (such as tools and livestock). Success
in filling the total cereal gap varied widely across the six affected
countries. For example, Malawi more than eliminated its cereal gap,
whereas Mozambique cut its gap by about 50 percent. According to currently
available data, rates of acute malnutrition in the region have not

deteriorated significantly. The major obstacles to the food aid effort
were (1) the lack of sufficient, timely food donations; (2) poor
infrastructure in recipient countries; and (3) concerns associated with
biotech food. 5 Although the United States made substantial, early
donations, in aggregate, donor country commitments of food were 18 percent
below WFP*s operational needs through the end of December. Moreover, given
the lag in time between when food commitments were made and when food
arrived in country, the shortfall in the first 6 months of the crisis
period was much higher. Poor infrastructure* ports, rail, roads, and
storage facilities* in recipient

countries hampered efficient delivery of food aid, limited how quickly
food could reach recipients, and ultimately prevented food from reaching
some beneficiaries. Concerns about the health and environmental safety of
food aid that might contain bioengineered products led Zambia to reject U.
S. donated maize and most of the other countries to impose costly and
timeconsuming processing requirements* which further reduced or delayed
the food aid effort, increased costs, and complicated emergency
operations. The major challenges to emerging from the current food crisis
into

sustained recovery include (1) declining investment in the region*s
agricultural sector, (2) the limited scope of existing programs related to
food security, 6 and (3) the negative impact of HIV/ AIDS. Recognizing
that little progress has been made to address impediments to the
transition from crisis to recovery, the U. N. Secretary- General and
several other key

5 Modern agricultural biotechnology employs scientific techniques, such as
genetic engineering, to modify plants, animals, or microorganisms by
introducing desired traits in them, including characteristics from
unrelated species. For example, traits may be introduced to facilitate
pest management and improve yield or nutritional value. In this report, we
refer to foods derived from genetically modified plants as biotech foods.
(See

app. VII and our evaluation of agency comments.) 6 Food security is
commonly defined as physical and economic access by all people at all
times to enough food to meet their dietary needs for an active and healthy
life.

stakeholders have called for a more comprehensive, integrated approach to
break the pattern of recurrent food crises in Africa. While the food
outlook for the next crop year* April 2003 through March 2004* is better,
food security conditions are still tenuous; and without sustained
progress, recurring food crises may be difficult to avoid in the future.
This report makes recommendations to the Secretaries of State and
Agriculture and the Administrator of USAID, to (1) undertake a
comprehensive review of the issues pertaining to biotech foods in
emergency food aid in anticipation of future food crises, and (2) work
with

international organizations, donors, national governments, and key
stakeholders to develop a recovery strategy that integrates agricultural
development, HIV/ AIDS, and natural disaster management, among other
things.

We received written comments on a draft of our report from the Departments
of State and Agriculture, USAID, and WFP, which we have reprinted in
appendixes VIII, IX, X, and XI, respectively. These agencies generally
agreed with our overall conclusions and recommendations while expressing
technical concerns on specific points, primarily issues related to biotech
food. Their technical comments, along with those received from FAO, IMF,
and the World Bank, have been incorporated into the report as

appropriate. Background In 1991/ 92, drought caused massive crop failure,
threatening 18 million

people in 10 southern African countries with famine. Because of a similar
reduced maize crop after the 2001/ 02 crop cycle, 7 several early warning
systems predicted an impending food crisis that would run through the
beginning of the following harvest in April 2003. (App. II provides a
timeline of the crisis period, and app. III provides information on early
warning systems.)

7 The maize crop cycle in southern Africa runs roughly from mid- November
(when crops are planted) through mid- April (when crops are harvested).

Regional and national assessments of the crisis conducted by WFP, FAO, and
others estimated that 15.3 million people 8 in the region were at risk of
starvation. (Fig. 1 shows the population at risk of famine in each of the
six

affected countries.) 8 Three assessments of the southern Africa food
crisis were conducted between April 2002 and March 2003. The first round
was a series of national Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM)
reports published in May 2002, which estimated that 12.8 million
individuals would be at risk of starvation at the peak of the crisis. The
second round, published in September 2002 as Emergency Food Security
Assessment Reports, increased the at- risk estimate to 14.4 million people
at the peak of the crisis. The third round of assessments, published in
January 2003, increased the estimate to 15.3 million people.

Figure 1: Population at Risk of Famine in the Affected Southern African
Countries DRC

Tanzania 31%

Angola Zambia

Malawi 2.8 million

3.6 million Mozambique

650,000 3%

Zimbabwe 7.2 million

28% Namibia

Botswana Madagascar

52% 28% South Africa

Swaziland 300,000 34%

(Number): Number of people affected by the food crisis

Percent of country's population

Lesotho

affected by the food crisis

760,000

Source: GAO and MapArt.

In July 2002, WFP initiated the Southern Africa Crisis Response Emergency
Operation (EMOP) for providing food aid to the six countries on a regional
basis. Prior to this consolidation, WFP had been delivering food to the
individual country emergency operating programs. WFP*s objectives in the
southern Africa food crisis were to prevent severe food shortages,
safeguard the nutritional well- being of vulnerable segments of the

population, preserve human assets, and prevent migration out of affected
areas.

As the major food aid donor in the southern Africa crisis, the U. S.
government has a significant role in the relief effort. Through USAID*s
Food for Peace Office and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and
USDA, the U. S. government has worked to support the EMOP and address the
crisis. In February 2002, in an effort to avert famine, the United States
began authorizing food aid shipments to the region. As of March 18, 2003,
the U. S. government had provided approximately $275 million in food aid

and $13 million for bilateral nonfood- related assistance such as
agriculture, health, shelter, and sanitation. (See app. IV for additional
information on the U. S. contributions.) WFP, the United States, and other
countries partner with nongovernmental

organizations to distribute food aid at the regional and village level. In
addition, many of these organizations also provide nonfood emergency
assistance and long- term development aid. 9

Much of the population in each of the affected countries works in the
agricultural sector. The percentage of labor force engaged in agriculture
ranges from 66 percent in Zimbabwe to 86 percent in Lesotho and Malawi.

Many of these farmers rely on maize (corn) as the primary staple crop.
Unlike root crops such as cassava and sweet potatoes* which are common but
less popular staples in the region* maize is relatively fragile, requiring
more fertilizer and differing amounts of water during the growing season.

Multiple Factors The immediate factor contributing to the food crisis was
the erratic

Contributed to the weather patterns that disrupted the normal growing
cycle, causing maize

production in southern Africa to drop from a 5- year average of about 7.3
Food Crisis

million MT to about 5.2 million MT in 2002. The dramatic reduction in
available maize can also be linked to a weak agricultural sector and
government actions, such as Malawi*s decision to sell off its strategic
grain reserve and Zimbabwe*s fast- tracked land reform. In addition, much
of the

region*s population had limited access to food because of widespread
poverty. The HIV/ AIDS epidemic further exacerbated the population*s
access to basic commodities by decreasing household food production and
income and increasing consumption requirements. 9 Nongovernmental
organizations are nonprofit, private entities funded by private,
governmental, and international organizations. NGOs are WFP's principal
implementing

partners in providing emergency food assistance.

Erratic Weather Patterns Erratic weather patterns between December 2001
and May 2002 reduced

Played a Key Role in the harvests in five of the six affected countries,
except Mozambique, when

Reducing Maize Production compared with 5- year averages. Drought- like
conditions gripped parts of

Malawi, southern Mozambique, Swaziland, southern Zambia, and Zimbabwe in
the middle of the growing season (see app. II for timeline). This water
deficit at a crucial point in the growing season severely stressed crops
and caused many hectares 10 to wilt. In addition, parts of Zambia suffered
high rainfall mid- season, flooding the still- growing crops. Similarly,
in Malawi, after the mid- season dry spells wilted some crops, the

country received heavy rains that hampered the harvesting and drying of
what crops remained, and in some cases, caused them to rot. Lesotho also
experienced prolonged rains late in the season as well as an additional
lateseason

frost that damaged crops across large parts of the country and drastically
reduced production. Regional Cereal Production

Regional food supplies have been limited due to poor cereal harvests in
five Dropped by 29 Percent

out of the six affected countries. (See table 1.) Mozambique was the one
exception: Its 2001/ 02 cereal harvest was actually above average.
However, due to transportation constraints, Mozambique*s production
surpluses

could not be supplied to the southern part of the country where cereal
harvests were lower.

10 One hectare equals 2. 47 acres.

Table 1: Cereal Production by Country In metric tons

Percentage 2001/ 02 season 5- year average a change

Lesotho 121,500 171, 000 b -29% Malawi 1,772, 000 2,081, 000 -15%
Mozambique 1, 767,000 1,678, 000 5% Swaziland 70,000 90, 000 -22% Zambia
738,000 1,095, 000 -33% Zimbabwe 705,840 2,164, 000 -67%

Total 5, 174,340 7,279, 000 -29%

Source: Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) Vulnerability
Assessment Committee (VAC) Reports, September 2002 through January 2003. a
Represents average production for the harvests in 1997 through 2001. b
Estimated.

Poorly Functioning In addition to poor weather conditions, weaknesses in
the agricultural

Agricultural Sector sector contributed to a poor harvest. According to
IFAD, these weaknesses

Negatively Affected Food included the following:

Supply  Declining soil fertility reduced crop yields. In Lesotho, average

maize and sorghum yields have declined by more than 60 percent since the
mid- 1970s. According to FAO, declining soil fertility is a primary cause
of this trend and is leading to a crop production catastrophe in that
country.

 Restricted access to agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizer
limited harvests. In Zambia, important inputs such as seeds and fertilizer
were not available until December 2001 or January 2002, resulting in late
plantings. These crops were at a crucial stage of development when the
rains ceased in early 2002, causing crop failure.

 Incomplete market development impaired farmers* ability to sell crops.
In Malawi, market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s eliminated price controls
and removed government food grain monopolies. While these liberalizing
reforms increased the availability of seeds and fertilizer, small farmers
still lack access to credit.

Recent Government Actions The food supply has been constrained further by
certain government

Further Reduced the Food actions, the most damaging of which were the sale
of grain reserves in

Supply Malawi and fast- tracked land reform in Zimbabwe.

Sale of Malawi*s Grain Reserve Between July 2000 and August 2001, the
National Food Reserve Agency of Hindered Stable Food Supplies

Malawi sold the 167,000 MT of maize it had purchased and stored as food
reserves for the country. Despite several audits, it is still uncertain
where the proceeds of the sale went. While the sold reserves did not cause
the Malawi food crisis, their absence jeopardized the population*s food
security. Had the government retained 60,000 MT of maize in accordance

with its own policy to ensure adequate food supplies or an equivalent
amount of currency to purchase new stocks, it could have been used to help
ease food shortages in the early stage of the crisis, when a considerable
number of people are reported to have died, 11 and to fill almost one-
quarter of the country*s cereal gap while emergency response operations
were ramping up.

An investigation by Malawi*s National Audit Office in May 2002 concluded
that the National Food Reserve Agency lost money in every area of handling
maize because of poor financial management. Another investigation,
conducted by Malawi*s Anti- Corruption Bureau in mid- 2002, found that
poor management of the grain reserve allowed companies and individuals to
take advantage of the maize shortage to increase prices beyond the reach
of a large sector of the community. The mismanagement cost the Malawian
government more than K 2.9 billion (about $40 million). 12

Zimbabwe*s Land Reform After years of trying to redistribute the country*s
arable land, the

Decimated Production and government of Zimbabwe fast- tracked its land
reform and resettlement

Strained Region*s Supply policy in 2000 with the aim of acquiring all
commercial farms no later than

August 8, 2002. The campaign was characterized by the forced expulsion of
landowners and farm laborers. To date, there remain more than a million

11 According to a study by the international NGO ActionAid between January
and April 2002, at least 500 to 1,000 people died of hunger and hunger-
related diseases in southern and central Malawi. WFP reported that more
than 70 people died in the village of Gwengwe during that time* all
victims of the district*s severe food crisis. The Commissioner of Malawi*s
Department of Disaster Preparedness for Relief and Rehabilitation told us
that his agency estimated 1,200 people died from hunger- related causes
between December 2001 and June 2002.

12 Based on 2001 year- end exchange rate: US$ 1= Malawi K 72.2.

internally displaced farm laborers. While the government did acquire these
farms, it did not maintain them to ensure continued productivity. As a
result, the land seizure destabilized the country*s economy, leading to a
75 percent drop in commercial maize production over the past 2 years and
turning Zimbabwe from a net exporter of grain to a net importer. Because
Zimbabwe now cannot grow enough food to feed its own population, it has
strained the cereal supply for the entire region. According to the State
Department, the country*s gross domestic product

fell by more than 20 percent and inflation soared to more than 269 percent
between 1998 and 2002, coinciding with fast- tracked land reform. At the
same time, unemployment rose by more than 25 percent as dismantling of

commercial farms left many rural farm workers without a source of income
and, therefore, a way to purchase food when their subsistence crops
failed. In addition, government- imposed price controls on basic
commodities have caused shortages of everything from bread, milk, sugar,
and wheat flour to fuel and electricity.

Widespread Poverty The six nations affected by the food crisis are
generally low- income

Contributed to Food countries. The percentage of population subsisting on
less than $1 per day

Insecurity range from 36 percent in Zimbabwe to 64 percent in Zambia. This

widespread poverty and lack of productive assets (e. g., livestock and
farm machinery) contribute to food insecurity in the region. In addition,
the region is currently facing serious economic problems that further
increase the population*s food insecurity. For example, in recent years,
the dramatic collapse in the economy of Zimbabwe and a decline in the
mining industry

in South Africa and Zambia have removed sources of employment for many
individuals in the region. The region*s food insecurity is associated with
high rates of chronic malnutrition in the under- 5 population* ranging
from

30 percent in Swaziland to 59 percent in Zambia. HIV/ AIDS Epidemic

The HIV/ AIDS epidemic has strained already- diminished food supplies by
Exacerbated Food

decreasing affected households* food production and increasing nutritional
Shortages

requirements. In addition, the epidemic limits households* access to food
by decreasing income and increasing household expenses. According to the
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/ AIDS (UNAIDS), adult HIV/ AIDS
infection rates in 2001 were approximately 31 percent for Lesotho, 15

percent for Malawi, 13 percent for Mozambique, 33 percent for Swaziland,
22 percent for Zambia, and 34 percent for Zimbabwe. Infection rates are

higher among women, who generally account for 70 percent of the
agricultural labor force and 80 percent of food production in Africa.

HIV/ AIDS Reduces Food HIV/ AIDS has decreased household food production
by attacking people in

Supplies their most productive working years, thus reducing the labor
force. Around

three- fourths of HIV/ AIDS cases in southern Africa are among adults
between the ages of 20 and 40. The percentage of agricultural labor force
lost due to HIV/ AIDS deaths by 2000 was nearly 6 percent for Malawi and
10 percent for Zimbabwe. Recent studies on specific rural areas show, for
example, that each adult death in Zambia was associated with a 16 percent
reduction in the amount of land planted by the household, and 72 percent
of households affected by chronic illness in selected rural areas of
Malawi experienced an agricultural production decrease. 13 In addition, a
person infected with HIV/ AIDS requires up to 50 percent more protein and
15

percent more calories than a noninfected person. These extra needs put a
further strain on the already limited food supplies. HIV/ AIDS Decreases
Access to

HIV/ AIDS has lowered household incomes, making it more difficult to Food

access what food is available. Recent studies estimate that GDP growth in
southern Africa is currently around 1 percent to 2 percent lower due to
HIV/ AIDS. 14 For the six affected countries, 1 percent of GDP in 2001
amounted to around $200 million. Recent studies in the region also show
large monetary impacts at the household level. For example, in Zambia,
HIV/ AIDS- affected households reported annual income levels of 30 percent
to 35 percent less due to the disease. In Zimbabwe, households with
orphans had 42 percent less income per capita than households without
orphans. In addition, medical care and funeral expenses are significant:
In Zambia, 42 percent of households with chronically ill members reported
unusually high health care expenses compared with 14 percent of households
without chronically ill members, while in Zimbabwe, funeral costs can be
as much as twice the annual per capita poverty line.

13 A 1992 study in Malawi found that a person infected with HIV/ AIDS was
estimated to work only 9.7 years out of a potential 25.3 years. 14 To
estimate this reduction, most studies rely on simulations of projected
income growth in a case with HIV/ AIDS and in a (hypothetical) case
without HIV/ AIDS. The results of these

studies vary, primarily due to assumptions about how HIV/ AIDS affects
savings and investment rates and the skill composition of the labor force.

Food Needs Not Fully By the end of the April 2002- March 2003 crisis
period, approximately 93 percent of the regional cereal gap appeared to
have been met. 15 Met, but Famine Was

Commercial cereal imports were reported as 1.72 million MT, while the
Averted

food aid effort achieved at least 0.73 million MT (60 percent of the
planned food aid amount). The commercial cereal imports and food aid
prevented large- scale famine and death but did not reach parts of the
region early enough throughout most of the crisis period to avert
widespread hunger. Many people resorted to coping mechanisms, such as
rationing their food intake, reducing their expenditures on nonfood items,
and selling household assets to obtain food. The limited data available on
nutritional status generally do not show a significant impact on acute
malnutrition in the countries of the region. In addition to problems with
timely delivery of food, U. N. agencies were only able to fund about 25
percent of urgent, nonfood emergency humanitarian needs.

Approximately 93 Percent The May/ June 2002 FAO/ WFP crop and food supply
assessments (CFSAM)

of the Cereal Gap Met for each of the six countries estimated the cereal
gap for the region at 4.1

during the Crisis Period million MT or 43 percent of domestic requirements
for the April 1, 2002,

through March 31, 2003, period. However, by the end of March 2003, the
cereal gap had been revised downward substantially*- to 2.6 million MT or
31 percent of domestic requirements. 16 Based on the plan that evolved
from the CFSAMs, the cereal deficit was to be offset by a combination of

commercial imports and emergency food aid. The assessments identified an
emergency cereals need of 1.2 million MT for the crop year, and this
amount was adopted as a goal in the United Nations* July 2002 emergency
appeal for food aid for the region. Although later analyses projected more
people at risk of famine, the goal for emergency cereals needs was not

15 The Vulnerability Assessment Committees, WFP, and others collected,
analyzed, and reported considerable information on the cereal gap.
However, complete data were unavailable because the VACs found it
difficult to gather information on food aid provided

by nongovernmental organizations. 16 The May/ June 2002 FAO/ WFP CFSAM
initially determined the annual cereal deficit for each country based on
estimates of domestic cereal consumption and stock requirements and
production. Subsequent VAC and other assessments revised these estimates,
resulting in changes to cereal deficit estimates. A requirement to
replenish 473,000 MT of cereal stocks by the end of the crop year was
dropped, estimates of cereal production and opening stocks were revised
upward by 539,000 MT, and estimates of domestic consumption needs were
lowered by 425,000 MT; the latter revision was partly due to reduced
population figures for Zambia and Zimbabwe.

increased. As shown in figure 2, if the emergency goal of 1.2 million MT
were fully met, the estimated need for commercial cereal imports would be
1.4 million MT. 17 Figure 2: Revised Estimate of the Cereal Gap in the Six
Countries and Plan for Addressing the Deficit (March 2003)

Figure 3 indicates the extent to which food aid and commercial imports
helped offset the cereal gap in each country and the region over the April
1, 2002, to March 31, 2003, period. As the figure shows, the region as a
whole

met at least 93 percent of its need. In two countries* Malawi and Zambia*
food aid and commercial imports combined considerably exceeded the cereal
gap, while the other four had unmet gaps ranging from between 9 percent to
50 percent. However, the numbers reported by the Vulnerability

17 Given that the U. N. regional emergency food aid appeal used the
original CFSAM emergency food aid targets, we derived the annual
commercial import requirement by subtracting planned emergency food aid
from the March 2003 revised cereal deficit, as provided to us by WFP.

Assessment Committees (VAC), WFP, and others do not allow us to precisely
define total food aid and commercial import levels. The figures are
estimates and should be interpreted with caution. Food aid figures
probably underestimate actual values because it was difficult for the VACs
and WFP to collect comprehensive food aid data from NGOs. Thus, total NGO
contributions could be considerably higher. Regarding commercial imports,
some countries had experienced a considerable amount of informal trade in
cereals, but the VACs and WFP did not always have access to reliable
figures on informal trade. In the case of Zimbabwe, commercial imports may
be exaggerated, since the VAC expressed skepticism about the data that
were reported. According to some observers, Zimbabwe*s price controls may
have encouraged a substantial outflow of cereals to neighboring countries
where controls did not exist. Thus, the gap in Zimbabwe may have been much
greater than shown in the figure.

Figure 3: Extent to Which Cereal Food Aid and Commercial Imports Met the
Cereal Gap (April 1, 2002, through March 31, 2003)

Percentage 160

140 120 100

80 60 40 20

0 Malawi

Zambia Zimbabwe

Lesotho Swaziland

Mozambique Regiontotal

Percentage of gap filled by commercial imports Percentage of gap filled by
food aid

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by WFP and USAID.

The data in figure 3 do not address the extent to which different parts of
a country were served. Although Zambia appears to have offset its cereal
gap by a large amount, the January VAC assessment reported serious cereal
supply problems at local markets in rural areas. 18 In addition, Malawi,
which offset its cereal gap to an even greater extent, reported maize to
be available in most markets, but vulnerable households had limited
ability to

pay for the food. (See app. V for additional information on commercial
imports.)

18 According to WFP, private traders operate primarily in urban markets.
Sales are limited in rural markets due to low purchasing power among rural
populations.

Food Aid Did Not Reach the The overall commercial cereal imports and food
aid averted widespread

Region Early Enough to famine, according to WFP, USAID, and other
observers in the region.

Avert Widespread Hunger However, because food supplies to the region were
less than planned

during the July through December period, far fewer people received food
aid than expected. Many people in vulnerable areas went without meals and
resorted to other coping mechanisms as well. Limited data available on
nutritional status generally do not show a significant impact on acute
malnutrition.

Food Supplies from World Food Between July and December 2002, WFP
distributed only 48 percent of the

Program cereal it planned to provide to beneficiaries during that period.
While

Malawi and Swaziland received 87 percent and 76 percent, respectively, of
their planned deliveries, the other four countries fell below the 40
percent mark. In addition to cereal, WFP planned to provide several other
foods (principally pulses, vegetable oil, and corn/ soya blend) for added
nutrition as well as to meet the special needs of some of its recipients.
WFP realized only 17 percent of its planned distribution of these foods
for July through

December 2002. WFP deliveries in three countries* Mozambique, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe* each represented less than 10 percent of its plans (1 percent in
the case of Zambia). In Malawi, which had the best performance, WFP
achieved 40 percent of its planned distribution.

Figure 4 shows WFP*s monthly performance in achieving its plans for
delivery of cereals and noncereal commodities in the region. In general,
WFP*s performance gradually improved between July and December. It

improved substantially in January, achieving 97 percent for cereals and 74
percent for noncereals. Deliveries declined during the next 2 months, to a
low in March of 81 percent for cereal and 53 percent for noncereals.

Figure 4: Extent to Which WFP Monthly Food Delivery Targets Were Met (July
2002 through March 2003)

Food Supplies from Independent of WFP*s program, NGOs were to provide
about 402,000 MT of

Nongovernmental Organizations cereals, or one- third of the emergency
cereal need for the region. NGOs

obtained or financed food for their efforts from donor countries as well
as other voluntary contributions. The United States funded a World Vision
program that provided 19,710 MT of cereal food aid to Zimbabwe. In
addition, the United States contracted with an NGO consortium, called
CSAFE (Consortium for the Southern Africa Food Security Emergency), to
deliver food into the region. According to U. S. officials, the program
was part of a longer- term strategy that targeted the most vulnerable
populations that the WFP program might miss. USAID, which began
discussions withCSAFE members (CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and World
Vision) in July 2002, did not approve a program for the consortium until
January 15,

2003. 19 However, under a November pre- authorization agreement, C- SAFE
began delivering food into the region in late December 2002. As of the end
of March 2003, the consortium had delivered about 57,000 MT of cereal food
aid to Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. (See app. IV for additional
information on C- SAFE.) Data provided to us by WFP indicate NGOs provided
at least another 16,200 MT of cereals food aid into the region.

Beneficiaries Fewer than Between July and December 2002, WFP averaged only
3.9 million

Intended beneficiaries per month, compared with a planned average of 10.4
million

people per month (for both cereal and noncereal food aid). 20 Figure 5
shows how the shortfall in food aid during the July through December 2002
period affected WFP beneficiary levels in each country. In four of the six
countries, fewer than 45 percent of planned beneficiaries were served.

19 The USAID- approved program authorized 160,000 MT of food aid to be
provided during fiscal year 2003 to three of the six countries. The
program did not establish a target amount of food aid to be distributed by
the end of March 2003.

20 On average for the 6- month period, WFP planned to assist 8 million
people through largescale general food and food- for- work distributions.
This aid would go to families living in rural areas affected by adverse
weather and whose coping strategies were depleted because of stress
factors, including the increased burden of caring for family members
affected by HIV/ AIDs. WFP also planned to provide supplementary support
to another 2.4 million people during the period, such as malnourished
children, school- age children, and

expectant and/ or nursing women who had needs above and beyond the levels
needed to qualify for general food and food- for- work assistance.

Figure 5: Percent of WFP Total Planned Beneficiaries Who Received at Least
Some Food Aid (July through December 2002)

Note: According to USAID officials, Malawi and Swaziland did better than
the other countries, at least in part because they placed fewer or no
restrictions on biotech food aid.

In addition, many people who did receive food aid did not receive a full
ration. 21 For example, WFP officials in Malawi told us that during
November they were only able to provide cereal to many of their
beneficiaries. Beans and vegetable oil were unavailable to provide a
balanced diet.

Reduced Food Intake, Other Studies show that people in vulnerable
communities reduced food intake

Coping Strategies as their major coping strategy, and this approach has
increased since the

crisis began. For example, as of December 2002, more than 60 percent of
the population in all regions of Malawi reduced the amount of food and
number of meals they ate, according to the VAC.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) identified other coping
strategies including reducing expenditures on nonfood items, selling or
trading household assets to get food (e. g., sale of livestock),
increasing consumption of wild foods, migrating to find work or food,

21 According to WFP, the food baskets were incomplete largely because of
when pledged resources arrived as well as donor preferences for in- kind
contributions of certain commodities. Beans, oils, and corn/ soya blend
are often under- resourced.

stealing, and resorting to prostitution. Table 2 shows the extent to which
surveyed households in Zambia relied on reduced food consumption and other
coping strategies from between August and December 2002.

Table 2: Frequency of Household Coping Strategies in Zambia (August
through December 2002) Percent of households Coping Strategy engaged in
each

Reduced number of meals 78 Reduced amount at meal times 72 Skipped food
for an entire day 58 Reduced expenditures on alcohol and tobacco 57
Increased consumption of wild foods 38 Reduced expenditures on non- food
items 34 Above- normal livestock sales 32 Borrowed from friends and
relatives 30 Borrowed from nonfamily members 27 Borrowed from money
lenders 5 Source: Zambia National Vulnerability Assessment Committee,
Zambia Emergency Food Security Assessment (Lusaka, Zambia: January 2003).

Nutritional Impacts Mixed Between 1999 and 2001, acute malnutrition rates
in countries of the region for children under 5 years of age were between
1.2 percent and 6.4 percent. Some assessments conducted between May and
October 2002 found an increase in acute malnutrition rates compared with
earlier studies but did

not find rates consistent with a severe food crisis, which would be 10
percent to 15 percent. However, these studies did not exclude possible
pockets of severe malnutrition or hunger- related deaths in the region.
Also, adult malnutrition and malnutrition in urban areas were not
surveyed. 22 More recent assessments (December 2002 through January 2003)
of acute

malnutrition for children under age 5 in select districts of Malawi,
Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zambia found rates generally ranging between 2
percent and 8 percent. However, the rate was 11.2 percent in one province
of Mozambique.

22 The Malawian VAC*s July- August household survey found that adults were
eating less than children and thus might experience a more rapid decline
in nutritional status.

According to a recent internal U. S. government report, anecdotal evidence
from the field in late 2002 indicates that in certain districts in
Zimbabwe, children were being admitted to some health care facilities in
increasing numbers for malnutrition. At one facility, three to five
children were reported to have died of malnutrition during each month of
2002. More formal nutrition surveys within the country have demonstrated
acute malnutrition rates of 6.4 percent and 7.3 percent in May and August
2002, respectively. Results from a nutrition survey conducted in early
2003 are still pending.

Nonfood Emergency Needs In addition to requesting $507 million for
emergency food aid for July 2002

Severely Underfunded through March 2003, U. N. agencies also requested
$143.7 million 23 to address urgent and related humanitarian needs that
increased people*s

vulnerability to famine for the July 2002 through June 2003 period. As of
April 9, 2003, less than 25 percent of the total identified requirements
had been funded, according to an April 22 U. N. southern Africa
humanitarian crisis update. Principal objectives of the request were to:

 prevent, contain, and address the outbreak of disease through enhanced
health and nutritional surveillance;  address the needs of people living
with HIV/ AIDS and seek to prevent

new infections;  ensure an adequate and timely provision of agricultural
inputs for the

next planting season as well as emergency veterinary inputs;  maintain
the capacity for planning recovery efforts in food selfsufficiency,
education, and health services; and

 prevent marginal populations from falling into a downward spiral that
could lead to prolonged dependency in the future.

A longer- term objective was to phase out emergency humanitarian
assistance and move toward a development agenda focused on poverty
reduction, HIV/ AIDS prevention and control, and support for food security

23 The initial request for nonfood needs was for $104 million. However,
specific requests for some countries and sectors were revised upward or
downward during the year. As of early April 2003, the overall request was
for $143.7 million.

by increasing food production and strengthening foreign exchange earnings.
(For additional information on nonfood emergency needs, see app. VI.)

Slow Donations, Poor Major obstacles to the food aid effort*s success were
the lack of sufficient,

Infrastructure, timely food donations; poor infrastructure in recipient
countries; and

concerns associated with biotech food. Although the United States made
Concerns Associated

substantial, early donations, aggregate commitments from donor countries
with Biotech Food

were 18 percent below what WFP needed for the July through December Were
Major Obstacles

period. The shortfall was actually higher given the lag in time between
when food is committed and when it arrives in- country. Poor
infrastructure

to an Effective in recipient countries and related logistical constraints
impeded efficient

Response delivery of food aid and in some cases prevented food from
reaching

beneficiaries. Concerns over biotech food led Zambia to reject U. S.
donated maize and other countries to impose costly processing
requirements. These actions reduced or delayed food aid, increased costs,
and complicated the logistics of the emergency operation. Lack of
Sufficient, Timely

By the end of June 2002, the United States had delivered more than 41,000
Donations Contributed to

MT of food aid to ocean ports in the southern African region. U. S.
deliveries Food Aid Shortfalls

to these ports between July and December 2002 represented approximately 50
percent of the food WFP needed to arrive in- country during that period.
(See app. IV for additional information on U. S. food aid donations.)
Nonetheless, in aggregate, donors did not make sufficient, timely
donations

to WFP. WFP needed about 855,000 tons of food (cereals and noncereals) to
arrive in the six countries from July through December 2002 to support its
planned food distributions. During that period, donors advised WFP that
they would contribute about 701,000 tons* a shortfall of 18 percent.
However, the shortfall was actually greater because of the considerable
lag

time between when WFP was advised in writing that a contribution would be
made and when food arrived in a beneficiary country. WFP officials
estimate that in- kind contributions take 3 to 5 months from the time
donors confirm the contribution to the arrival of food aid at its final
distribution

sites. 24 However, according to WFP officials, when contributions are made
in cash and procurement is done within the region, the process can be
reduced to 1 to 3 months.

Table 3 shows the countries that gave the most to WFP*s regional emergency
food aid operation and when they advised WFP of their intended donations.
Some of the major donors, including the United States and the United
Kingdom, gave large amounts early to the crisis. Others, including the
European Union, South Africa, and Japan, waited several months or longer
before confirming what they would contribute.

24 According to USAID officials, depending on the availability of
commodities and shipping, as well as need in an affected country, USAID
in- kind contributions can be provided in as short a time as 6 weeks.

Table 3: Contributions to WFP and Their Timing

Food in metric tons

Cumulative Confirmed Donations a to WFP*s Southern Africa Regional EMOP by
End of March 2003 Jul 2002 Aug 2002 Sep 2002 Oct 2002 Nov 2002 Dec 2002
Mar 2003

United States 194,350 197,550 248,403 248,403 326, 553 326, 553 326, 553
European Union 139, 854 139, 854 139, 854 179, 531 South Africa 100, 000
United Kingdom 62, 515 65, 385 65, 385 65, 231 65, 231 65, 231 70, 231
Japan 35, 295 35, 450 54, 386 56, 662 Algeria 31, 000 Germany 6,113 14,
539 15, 344 15, 344 24, 256 22, 775 Australia 6,185 14, 335 14, 597 14,
597 18, 098 18, 248 Finland 4,075 6,149 8,377 8, 377 14, 575 14, 934
Canada 1,661 1,661 6,779 6,697 6, 697 12, 573 12, 573 OPEC 12, 411
Netherlands 1,097 10, 797 10, 797 10, 797 10, 797 10, 797 10, 625 All
others b 7,133 12, 961 12, 789 14, 471 14, 471 35, 097 36, 549

Total 266, 756 304,727 379,176 559,066 637, 371 701, 420 892, 092

Source: GAO analysis based on WFP data. a A confirmed donation (in kind or
in cash) is when a donor has notified WFP in writing of what it will

donate. b There were 29 other donors, some of which were private or
multilateral entities. Together, they accounted for 4.1 percent of all
donations, with an individual range from 0. 001 percent to 0.7 percent.

WFP acknowledged that the early months of the regional EMOP would indeed
have benefited from more rapid mobilization of resources. At the same
time, WFP said, as of mid- May 2003, the operation had been 93 percent
resourced, by 41 institutional donors-- which represented an

unusually supportive response. Poor Infrastructure

The flow chart shown in figure 6 illustrates WFP*s logistics process of
Hampered Efficient Food

delivering food, from the time it is shipped by suppliers to the time food
is actually distributed to the recipients at the village level. 25 Food
aid Delivery

25 In addition, NGOs that were directly funded by the U. S. government
carried out a similar operation.

commodities are either purchased by WFP regionally or shipped to the
region through one of five ports of entry: Beira, Nacala, and Maputo in
Mozambique; Durban in South Africa; or Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. (See
fig. 7 for a map of the transportation network.) From these points of
entry, food is transported by truck or rail to intermediate storage
facilities, or

transshipment points, which are strategically located in various districts
within the country to streamline the flow of deliveries. From these
strategic locations, food is then transported to extended delivery points*
storage facilities generally located at the district level* from which the
food aid allocations for each final distribution site are dispatched. WFP
manages this process, including transporting the food to the extended
delivery points. Wherever possible, nongovernmental organizations that are
designated as the implementing partners are responsible for the secondary
transport of food from the extended delivery points to the final
distribution points.

Figure 6: Steps in the Logistics Process Extended delivery points

Secondary transport 5

4 Points of entry (ports of Beira, Final distribution Suppliers

Maputo, Nacala, Dar es points

of food Salaam, Durban)

commodities 1

3 Primary transport

6 2

Village (beneficiaries)

Transshipment point

Sources: GAO and MapArt, based on World Food Program information; all
photos GAO, except primary transport, WFP. Note: The flow chart does not
reflect the additional step of milling. In addition, the chart does not
show monitoring of the flow of food deliveries throughout the process to
ensure proper receipt and dispatches of food.

Figure 7: The Transportation Network for Moving Food in the Region

Derailment showing problems

Nacala railway with the Nacala

tracks with new railway tracks in

locomotives in Mozambique

operation

CONGO

Dar es

Mbeya

Salaam

Luanda

TANZANIA ANGOLA

Lake Malawi

MOZAMBIQUE ZAMBIA

Lilongwe

Nacala

Lusaka MALAWI

Blantyre Harare

Mozambique Victoria

ZambeziRiver Channel Falls

ZIMBABWE

Basin

Poor roads

Beira

BOTSWANA

Walvis

Windhoek

Bay

NAMIBIA

Gaborone Pretoria

Mbabane

Maputo

Luderitz

SWAZILAND Maseru

De Aar

LESOTHO

Durban

From the port,

SOUTH

food is moved

AFRICA

overland by rail or

East London

road Limited trucking

Cape Town 0

500 miles Port Elizabeth

capacity Parallel scale at 0 o 0 o

Road routes in use

Ports in use

Countries in food crisis Rail routes in use

Ports not in use

Countries with transport routes to countries in food crisis Road routes
not in use

Other ports

Adjacent countries Rail routes not in use

Capitals Intermediate cities

Source: Map: GAO and MapArt, based on World Food Program information;
Photos: GAO, except Nacala railway, WFP.

Long- standing weaknesses in transportation infrastructure across the
region hampered timely delivery of food aid where it was needed. Much of
the transportation infrastructure (including ports, railways, and roads)
had deteriorated since the 1991/ 92 drought. For example, the port of
Maputo, which is ideally situated for moving food commodities to
landlocked countries, such as Swaziland and Zimbabwe, cannot be used
optimally

because of the lack of adequate port warehouse and storage facilities.
However, even when ports are full, there is a limit to the amount of food
that can be transported over land to landlocked countries, like Zambia,
due to rail and trucking capacity and other logistical considerations.

According to WFP officials, the port of Nacala was in better condition
than the port of Maputo. But its rail system* the sole transport link
between Malawi and the nearest port in Mozambique and the shortest,
cheapest route into Malawi and eastern Zambia* was in such poor condition
it had to be fixed during the crisis. In late 2002, the United Kingdom and
Canada

gave WFP $6.4 million and $256,000, respectively, to rehabilitate a 48-
milelong track on the Nacala railway and to lease locomotives and wagons.
While these locomotives and ongoing repairs to the rail corridor
represented a major breakthrough, unexpected setbacks continued to mire
operations. For example, in Malawi, heavy rains in January 2003 completely
destroyed one bridge on the Nacala rail line, thus impeding the

movement of commodities for at least 10 days. In late summer 2002, a
donation of 200 trucks from the government of Norway and the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies helped ease access to
places that are particularly hard to reach. However, many village roads in
these countries routinely become impassable when the rainy season
(September to March) begins, thus isolating beneficiaries from food
deliveries.

Recipient Country Concerns In the middle of 2002, Zambia and Zimbabwe
debated whether to accept

about Biotech Food U. S.- donated maize 26 based on concerns that it might
contain biotech

Compromised Food products that could adversely affect (1) the health of
food aid recipients, (2) the countries* agricultural biodiversity, 27 and
(3) their ability to export

Pipeline agricultural commodities. 28 Despite some earlier concerns over
U. S. biotech food aid and Zimbabwe*s objections to biotech whole kernel
maize

dating back to the middle of 2001, 29 the United States and international
agencies did not have a ready alternative to biotech food aid in the
southern Africa crisis. 30 The United States was only partly successful in
its efforts to persuade southern African country governments to allow

26 Crop varieties developed through the application of biotechnology to
agriculture were first marketed in the United States in 1994. Because the
U. S. grain handling system typically combines biotech and conventional
maize varieties (for efficiency purposes), all U. S. food aid corn
shipments possibly contained biotech maize. In 2002, roughly 35 percent of
U. S. food aid could be considered as having varying degrees of biotech
content. See appendix VII for further discussion.

27 Whole kernel maize, unlike its processed counterpart, has the
possibility, if planted, of introducing engineered genes into conventional
maize plants. 28 There is no worldwide, harmonized approach to assessing
the safety of biotech foods and regulating their trade. Given the novelty
of agricultural biotech products, many countries especially developing
countries have no approval process for these products at all. The

Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, an international environmental treaty,
will regulate transboundary movements of living genetically modified
organisms after it is ratified by 50 countries, which may occur in late
2003. Countries that ratify the protocol may establish their own national
systems for assessing and regulating biotech foods.

29 In 1999, media in Orissa, India, claimed the United States had dumped
biotech food aid commodities on developing countries because European and
Japanese markets would not buy them. In 2000, Sudanese politicians accused
the NGO community of distributing biotech food aid and poisoning the
Sudanese people. In 2001, the Ugandan government raised concerns about a
program to distribute corn/ soya blend rations to 60,000 people living
with HIV/ AIDS. In 2001, the Bolivian government seized biotech food aid
following a decree forbidding imports of products derived from biotech
crops. According to USDA, in each of these instances, USDA and/ or USAID
addressed the recipient country government*s concerns and ensured that
food aid reached those in need. In December 2001 and May 2002, Zimbabwe
rejected U. S. offers to provide shipments of corn that could not be
certified as 100 percent biotech free. According to ACDI/ VOCA, an NGO
specializing in development

and food aid issues, through early 2002 most problems relating to biotech
food aid had been resolved relatively quickly and amicably. See ACDI/
VOCA, Genetically Modified Food: Implications for U. S. Food Aid Programs
(Washington, D. C.: Revised February 2002).

30 According to USAID officials, the United States did not anticipate the
biotech issue, since Mozambique and Zambia had accepted U. S. corn food
aid for years. USDA officials said that it was difficult to determine with
certainty those food aid recipient countries in southern Africa that would
accept or reject food aid containing biotech commodities because of
nontransparent, evolving decision- making processes.

unrestricted import and distribution of food aid, including biotech
products, on an emergency basis for the duration of the crisis. Efforts
included providing information about agricultural biotechnology and the
safety of biotech food aid to Zambia and the other countries.
Nevertheless, Zambia rejected all food aid that could have included
biotech

commodities. 31 Zimbabwe implemented stringent grain handling procedures,
including milling of whole grain maize, that significantly slowed
distribution of food aid. Malawi, Mozambique, and Lesotho also debated
what to do and eventually imposed milling requirements on whole grain
maize that were enforced with varying degrees of rigor. 32 Toward the end
of August 2002, FAO, WHO, and WFP issued a common statement on biotech
food aid, as did the European Union. Both statements

indicated that biotech food aid was unlikely to present a risk to human
health and suggested milling the maize as a way to overcome environmental
and trade concerns. However, U. S. officials from State, USAID, and USDA
believe that, given the severity of the crisis and existing scientific
evidence, U. N. agencies and the European Union did not speak out early or
forcefully enough on the issue.

The United States rejected the option of donating only milled maize,
citing increased costs and limited U. S. milling capacity that would cause
delays in getting food aid to needy people. U. S. officials estimate that
U. S.- based milling would double the costs of its food aid, thus reducing
the amount of aid it could provide. Additionally, according to U. S.
officials, agreeing to mill all of the maize could have promoted the idea
that unprocessed maize was unsafe. (App. VII provides further discussion
of issues related to biotech food.)

Despite the United States* early and large donations, the impasse over
biotech food significantly compromised the food pipeline in several ways:
31 The United States provided about 280,000 MT of whole kernel maize;
about 77,000 MT of

corn meal; about 43,000 MT of corn soy blend and corn soy milk; and about
21,000 MT of vegetable oil made from either corn or soybeans. Altogether,
about 84 percent of the donated U. S. tonnage could have contained biotech
commodities.

32 According to USAID, in practice Malawi has preferred that whole kernel
maize be milled prior to distribution but has not allowed its requirement
to slow deliveries of food aid in any way and has only milled
comparatively small quantities.

 Food aid was reduced and delayed. On September 3, 2002, Zambia*s
Agriculture Minister, in a statement to the press, demanded that 19,000 MT
of biotech maize that had been delivered to storage facilities inside the
country be sent to a country that was willing to accept it. (WFP was
officially notified on October 29, 2002.) According to U. S. officials, by
early November, Zambia had rejected an additional 57,000 MT of biotech
maize intended for its food aid beneficiaries. The combined 76,000 MT of
maize considerably exceeded WFP*s cereal shortfall for Zambia for the July
through December period and would have fed 1.5 million Zambians for 3
months. 33 In the case of Zimbabwe, there were delays while the government
debated whether to accept whole grain maize and then negotiated,
developed, and put in place restrictions it deemed suitable. According to
a U. S. official, at one point, more than 80,000 MT of U. S. whole kernel
maize imports destined for Zimbabwe were delayed in South Africa and
Mozambique port warehouses awaiting permits* while the food aid pipeline
lacked cereal.

 Costs of food aid operations increased. WFP, national governments, and
other donors have borne the additional costs associated with requirements
to mill some or all of the U. S.- donated maize. These costs include the
milling itself, added charges for transporting whole grain maize to mills
and for shipping milled product, added storage costs because of limited
milling capacity, and grain losses associated with the milling process. 34
WFP estimates that when it has to mill the product in South Africa,
regional distribution costs could total up to $80 per metric ton more than
for unmilled U. S. maize. 35

 Logistics of the food aid effort were complicated. Logistics became more
complex because of (1) U. S. whole kernel maize piling up in ports as
governments debated whether to accept biotech maize and, if so, under what
conditions, (2) limited milling capacity, (3) added transportation and
storage requirements, and (4) the short shelf life of maize milled
regionally (3 months compared with 12 months for whole

33 According to WFP, 1 MT of cereal feeds approximately 60 people per
month. 34 Milling reduces the volume of the product. As a result, more
whole grain maize must be supplied to meet the food needs of the
beneficiaries. 35 WFP*s estimate of $80 per MT represents the rule of
thumb for maximum costs, which include extraction rates during milling,
additional transport, bagging, fumigation, and drying, as well as
additional oversight. Actual total costs for milling, however, could not
be calculated because milling is integrated into the overall procurement
and logistics network.

maize). Because food is distributed to households on a monthly basis, WFP
had to ensure that milled maize would not take more than 2 months to
arrive at final distribution sites.

U. S. officials said that recipient countries in southern Africa did not
make timely, informed decisions about whether to accept or reject biotech
food aid. These officials also said the U. S. government does not have
comprehensive data on which recipient countries are likely to accept or
reject biotech food aid, nor does the U. S. government have a strategy for
providing alternatives to biotech food to countries that may reject it.
According to officials from State, USAID, and USDA, these problems are not
confined to the southern Africa region but also have a global reach.
Declining Support for

The major challenges to emerging from the current food crisis into
Agricultural Sector and

sustained recovery include (1) a decline in agriculture sector
investments; (2) limited scope of existing programs in agricultural
development; and (3) the HIV/ AIDS Epidemic

the negative impact of the HIV/ AIDS epidemic. Recognizing the need to
Pose Challenges to

address numerous challenges to move out of this crisis into recovery, the
Emerging from Crisis

U. N. Secretary- General and several other key stakeholders have called
for a comprehensive and targeted approach to break the pattern of
recurrent

into Sustained food crises in Africa. The food outlook for the next crop
year has improved,

Recovery but without continuing efforts to respond to the region*s
problems,

recurring food crises may be difficult to avoid.

Agriculture Sector Since agriculture accounts for 70 percent of the labor
force in Africa,

Investments by Donors and investments that improve productivity in the
agricultural sector have

Governments Have significant implications for food security and overall
rural development.

Declined According to the International Food Policy Research Institute, a
1 percent

increase in agricultural productivity would help 6 million more Africans
raise their incomes above $1 per day. However, data show declining
investments in the agricultural sector as agricultural lending by the
World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the International Fund for
Agricultural Development has fallen. Similarly, agricultural spending by
national governments and U. S. bilateral assistance for agricultural
programs in the affected countries have declined. 36 Agricultural Lending
by Selected

Total lending to the agriculture sector by selected international
financing International Financing

organizations declined during the 1990s. For example, measured in 2003
Organizations

dollars, the African Development Bank approved about $873 million in loans
for agriculture in 1990 compared with $236 million in 2000, as shown in
figure 8. Similarly, the World Bank approved $4.7 billion in loans for
agriculture in 1990 compared with $1.4 billion in 2000. Bank officials
noted that the World Bank now approaches the agricultural sector in the
context of the Bank*s overall rural development strategy that includes,
among other things, lending for rural infrastructure, rural health, and
environment and natural resource management. For this reason, starting in
2001, the World Bank began to include agricultural investments as part of
its rural development lending. However, this does not negate the overall
declining trend in agricultural lending between 1990 and 2000.

36 The private sector is also a source of agricultural investment in terms
of capital (farm machinery and equipment) and technology (seed,
irrigation, and soil conservation). However, little or no data are
available to determine the size, growth, and impact of private sector
investments on agricultural production in these countries.

Figure 8: Agricultural Lending by the World Bank, the African Development
Bank, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development* 1990
through 2000

Note: IFAD provides strictly agricultural development loans.

Our review of World Bank agricultural loans to the six affected countries
since 1990 found that 15 had been made* with 9 of them approved between
1990 and 1993. There were no loans recorded for Swaziland. As shown in
figure 9, in 2002, the downward trend in World Bank agricultural lending
to

the affected region reversed with two $50 million emergency drought
recovery loans for Zambia and Malawi. These loans included an agricultural
component but also comprised health, social services, and

other emergency programs.

Figure 9: World Bank Agricultural Sector Loans Approved for the Affected
Countries* 1990 to 2002

Agricultural Spending by In general, national governments have been
spending a declining share of

National Governments their budgets on agriculture, as shown in figure 10.
Real spending on agriculture has declined for two countries* Lesotho and
Zambia* whereas

total government spending has increased for all six affected countries.
For the remaining countries, national government spending on agriculture
has been stagnant or has grown at a slower rate than total government
spending.

Figure 10: Agricultural Spending as a Percentage of Total Government
Spending* 1996/ 97 through 2001/ 02 (in 2003 dollars)

Note: 2001/ 2002 data for Lesotho, Malawi, and Zimbabwe were not
available. We did not calculate the percentage of government spending for
agriculture for Mozambique. The IMF provided us with the percentage data.

U. S. Bilateral Assistance for Although the levels of U. S. bilateral
assistance for agriculture by country

Agricultural Sector have been mixed, overall assistance to the region*s
agricultural sector has

declined from $27 million in 1998 to $20.6 million in 2003. The largest
reductions were for Malawi, which went from $10.3 million in 1998 to $3.2
million in 2003, while assistance to Mozambique went from $14.5 million in
1998 to $12. 8 million in 2003 (see fig. 11).

Figure 11: USAID Bilateral Assistance in the Agricultural Sector to Four
Countries a * 1998 to 2003

a USAID does not have bilateral programs in Lesotho and Swaziland.
However, these two countries do benefit from some regional assistance and
limited funding support through other U. S. government agencies. b The
combined figure includes Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It does
not include Regional Center funding.

Existing Programs Are To promote agricultural development and work toward
achieving food

Helpful but Limited in Scope security, FAO, IFAD, and WFP advocate an
approach that helps support

small farmers, enhances the ability of the poor to access food, and aids

recovery efforts (fig. 12 describes examples of some of the current
programs). Several U. N. and USAID officials told us that while many of
the programs they have funded have demonstrated promising results, the
programs are limited in scope due to resource constraints and would need
to be implemented on a much wider scale for greater impact and
effectiveness.

Figure 12: Examples of Existing Programs Related to Food Security
Improving crop diversification

Agricultural experts have promoted programs to diversify crops that are
good alternatives to maize, particularly in areas with erratic rainfall
and adverse conditions. For example, in Malawi, FAO and USAID are
supporting programs, such as the Southern Africa Root Crops Research
Network, designed to multiply and distribute improved varieties of sweet
potatoes and cassava. In addition, USAID- supported farmer associations
throughout the country are promoting

higher- value crops such as groundnuts and aromatic rice.

Cassava multiplication program (Malawi). Rebuilding assets

Many farmers depleted their livestock and other assets during the crisis
and have limited access to credit. During the crisis, several countries
experienced shortages in agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, seed, and
tools. Nonetheless, some governments and major donors did have programs to
deliver basic agricultural inputs to small farmers to help boost
agricultural production for the next growing season. For example, in
Malawi, the government targeted 2 million farmers for free "starter packs"
(primarily seeds). In addition, the United Nations reported distributing
more than 177,000 packs of seed and tools but noted that funding
constraints limited the amount of seeds distributed. Representatives of
nongovernmental organizations, which focus their activities at the village
level,

Seed input fair (Mozambique).

stressed the effectiveness of such mitigation measures. Developing better
water management schemes

Because the region lacks irrigation schemes, drought- affected areas
included many villages that were close to significant water sources, such
as Lake Malawi and the Zambezi river basin. FAO officials believe that,
with better water management schemes, such villages should be able to
collect and save water to mitigate drought. As part of its program of
assistance, FAO helps farmers identify water management techniques and
implement suitable low- cost solutions to increase agricultural
production. FAO also promotes water users associations and appropriate
irrigation support services to make water management sustainable.

FAO- sponsored joint irrigation schemes (Mozambique). Rehabilitating rural
infrastructure

The lack of a functioning rural infrastructure often prevents farmers from
marketing their crops. Donor and government officials in the region stress
the need to rehabilitate the rural infrastructure. In Mozambique, USAID
has programmed resources to rehabilitate farm- to- market roads and to
construct the long- delayed final segment of the north- south trunk road.
As a result, farmers and other residents along the road have found better
access to markets. In 2001, according to a USAID

Food for work programs help build rural

report, sales of beans, maize, and cotton in some areas along the road
alignment increased 20

infrastructure such as schools (Zambia).

percent over the previous year. Improving emergency preparedness and
disaster management

In light of erratic weather conditions in the region, numerous officials
cited the need to prepare for emergencies and manage disasters more
effectively. According to many USAID, U. N., and host government
officials, Mozambique has been better able to respond to the current food
crisis than it was to the disastrous 2000- 2001 floods because it
developed a national plan that was put into effect at the national,
provincial and district, and local community levels at the onset of the
crisis. Among

High water mark of the 2000- 2001 flood on food

other things, the plan coordinated efforts in various sectors;
prepositioned food stocks in strategic

warehouse wall (Mozambique).

locations; and provided information to people in vulnerable areas.
Sources: GAO; photos, GAO (top and bottom 2 photos), all other photos,
FAO.

Negative Impact of In addition to being a significant factor that
contributed to the food crisis,

HIV/ AIDS on Food Security HIV/ AIDS will continue to affect food security
in the region by decreasing

Will Grow food production, lowering household income, and increasing
household

expenses, according to numerous experts. These effects will increase as
the HIV/ AIDS epidemic worsens. For example, by lowering the productivity
of agricultural labor in its food supply model, USDA estimated that HIV/
AIDS will cause a 3. 3 percent reduction in grain output in sub- Saharan
Africa over the next decade relative to the region's baseline projections.
As a result, the projected food deficit will grow by 13 percent. 37
According to an IMF study, HIV/ AIDS will also lower gross domestic

product (GDP). Figure 13 shows the projected decrease in growth rates of
GDP per capita attributable to HIV/ AIDS in 10 to 15 years: Estimates
range from minus 4 percent in Mozambique to about minus 7 percent in
Zimbabwe. Projected average per capita GDP growth rates without HIV/ AIDS
range from 1.5 percent for Lesotho to 3.9 percent for Mozambique,
indicating that the HIV/ AIDS effect will significantly reduce national
income. 38 In fact, for a typical sub- Saharan African country with HIV/
AIDS prevalence of 20 percent, national income is estimated to be 67
percent lower at the end of a 20- year period than without the disease.

37 The projected food deficit is defined as the gap between projected
domestically produced food supplies and projected food needs based on a
basic nutritional requirement and projected population. 38 GDP projections
are from Global Insight*s 2000 forecast and indicate annual growth rates
from 2006 to 2020.

Figure 13: Projected Impact on GDP Due to HIV/ AIDS

Note: Estimates are for an economy open to trade and are for a 10- to 15-
year period with 2000 as the base year.

U. N. Secretary- General and Although the international response was
sufficient to avoid famine in past

Others Cite Need for food crises in the region* as well as the current
one* food security

Integrated Response continues to be a significant development challenge.
U. N. and U. S. officials

acknowledge that food aid and humanitarian assistance alone will not
prevent future crises without a comprehensive recovery strategy that
addresses the underlying causes of food insecurity. In our review, we
found no evidence of such a strategy.

In March 2003, the U. N. Secretary- General noted that the devastating
impact of HIV/ AIDS requires an integrated response that may include
longterm measures even when addressing short- term emergencies and called
for a more systematic, targeted approach to break the pattern of recurrent
food crises in Africa. Many other authoritative experts and key
stakeholders have echoed the U. N. Secretary- General*s call for an
integrated response. For example, in December 2002, SADC* the principal
organization for regional cooperation in food and agriculture and related

economic and social issues* acknowledged the need for political commitment
at all levels within the region and for coordinated support from SADC,
national governments, donors, nongovernmental organizations, and civil
society to ensure food security in the future. Among those calling for a
comprehensive response to address food security* one that integrates
agricultural development, HIV/ AIDS, natural disaster management, and
other appropriate interventions* are the U. N. Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Food Policy Research Institute,
and the Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa.

In recent years, international donors have announced major initiatives
related to food security. These include plans not only to enhance food
availability by increasing agricultural production but strategies to
increase food accessibility by reducing poverty. For example, the United
Nations*

2001 Millennium Development Goals pledged to help cut hunger in Africa in
half by 2015. 39 The World Bank and IMF have worked with countries
eligible for debt relief* Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia* to ensure that
food security and agriculture are central themes in these countries*
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. 40 Among other measures, these strategy
papers emphasize promoting small- scale irrigation, reducing land
degradation, and improving access to credit and agricultural inputs. In
early 2002, USAID

introduced its Agricultural Initiative to Cut Hunger in Africa, which is
designed to accelerate agricultural growth and reduce vulnerability to
hunger and poverty. However, as of April 2003, of the six affected
countries, only Mozambique was proposed for funding ($ 3.9 million in
2003) under the initiative.

39 One of the key Millennium Development Goals is the eradication of
extreme poverty and hunger and cutting in half between 1990 and 2015 the
proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day and the proportion
of people who suffer from hunger.

40 These countries are required to develop Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSP) as the basis for assistance from the World Bank and IMF
under the Initiative for Highly Indebted Poor Countries, where official
creditors agree to help the most indebted countries obtain debt relief. In
addition to these three countries, Lesotho has prepared an Interim PRSP
and should issue a full PRSP this year.

Regional Food Outlook Despite improved weather conditions and a better
harvest beginning in

Remains Tenuous; April 2003, food security conditions in the region are
still tenuous. As of the

Sustained Efforts Seen as end of March 2003, early warning systems were
forecasting that some parts

Necessary of the region may have better harvests than last year; however,
they also

note that food insecurity and the need for emergency aid persist* and may
worsen* in some areas, particularly in Zimbabwe and parts of southern
Mozambique. In February 2003, the U. N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs stated that, because the response to improve

agricultural inputs has been inadequate, recovery by the next agricultural
season is unlikely and the need for food aid prolonged. In fact, the
current emergency operations, which were for the crop year that concluded
March 2003, have been extended through June 2003. Beyond that, according
to

WFP and USAID officials, the need for food aid will likely continue,
particularly for many of the poorest and most vulnerable households.

Conclusions The current food crisis is complicated by disruptive
agricultural and governance policies in the affected countries and the
HIV/ AIDS epidemic.

While the WFP, the United States, some donor governments, and NGOs
provided enough food to prevent a famine, overall donor response was
insufficient in terms of food quantities and timeliness to prevent
widespread hunger. In addition, other obstacles* including poor

infrastructure in the affected countries and concerns associated with
biotech food* hampered an effective response. The controversy about
biotech food aid, in particular, significantly complicated logistics,
increased costs, and delayed food aid reaching beneficiaries. Concerns
about agricultural biotechnology may be an obstacle to addressing future
emergency food aid needs around the world, partly because the United
States accounts for about half of global food aid and because several U.
S.

food aid commodities are genetically modified. Action is needed to reduce
the likelihood of biotech food aid becoming a serious problem in future
crises. Furthermore, in a region where agricultural production is critical
to national economies and food security, there is a need for viable
agricultural policies and funding by national governments, as well as
adequate agricultural assistance and related strategies from multilateral
organizations and donors, including the United States. Without a concerted

strategy that integrates, among other things, agricultural development,
the impact of HIV/ AIDS, and natural disaster management, destabilizing
food crises are likely to recur.

Recommendations for To maximize the effectiveness of the U. S. response to
future food crises in

Executive Action the southern Africa region as well as in other parts of
the world, we

recommend that the Secretaries of State and Agriculture and the
Administrator of USAID initiate a comprehensive review of the issues
pertaining to biotech foods in emergency food aid. In anticipation of
future food crises, this review could consider measures such as (1)
encouraging recipient countries to enhance their capacity to make informed
decisions regarding agricultural biotechnology and offering technical
assistance in this endeavor; (2) identifying which countries are likely to
accept, restrict, or reject biotech food aid; and (3) determining ways
that the United States can contribute to emergency food aid needs in
countries that decide to restrict or reject biotech food aid.

To further food security in the region, we recommend that the Secretaries
of State and Agriculture and the Administrator of USAID work with
international organizations, donors, and national governments to develop a
comprehensive, targeted strategy to ensure sustained recovery that (1)
integrates agricultural development, HIV/ AIDS awareness and action,
natural disaster management, and other appropriate interventions; (2)
estimates costs and resource requirements; and (3) establishes a plan for
mobilizing resources, a timetable for achieving results, and indicators
for measuring performance.

Agency Comments and The Department of State, USDA, USAID, and WFP provided
written

Our Evaluation comments on a draft of our report. These comments are
reprinted in appendixes VIII, IX, X, and XI, along with our responses to
specific points.

In general, the Departments of State and Agriculture, USAID, and WFP
agreed with our overall conclusions and recommendations. However, they
expressed technical concerns, primarily related to our discussion of
biotech food, which we have addressed in the text as appropriate.

USDA objected to our use of the term *biotech food,* saying it prefers
*foods which may contain the products of agricultural biotechnology.* USDA
also said that it opposes the use of the term *genetically modified
organisms* and the acronym *GMO* because these terms carry negative
connotations. According to the department, modern agricultural

biotechnology is simply the next step in plant breeding technology.
Notwithstanding USDA*s comments, FAO, WHO, and WFP use the terms
genetically modified food, GM food, and biotech food. In fact, after

receiving USDA*s comments, we found that USDA was still using the terms
*biotech plants* and *biotech crops* in some of its publicly available
informational materials. USAID objected to our use of the term *biotech
food aid,* noting that the United States provides food aid from the
general

U. S. food supply, which may contain biotech crops. In certain places, we
now refer to U. S. food aid as aid that may contain biotech crops.

In commenting on our recommendation to initiate a comprehensive review of
the issues associated with biotech foods in emergency food aid, USDA said
that it agrees that all relevant parts of the U. S. government must
continue to review and engage other countries regarding their biotech
policies, including those related to food aid. USDA said it will continue
to

support developing countries* efforts to enhance their capacity for making
science- based and transparent decisions regarding products of modern
agricultural biotechnology. At the same time, USDA said it is difficult to
accurately identify countries that might accept or reject products of
modern agricultural biotechnology because many developing countries*
policies depend upon the specific political, economic, and social
circumstances at the time.

The Department of State said that an interagency review on how to manage
the presence of bioengineered foods in food aid might be useful for
developing a strategy. However, the department said that such a review
should be narrowly focused to ensure better coordination among food aid,
development, trade policy and regulatory agencies. USAID said it supports

further interagency discussion and coordination on the dimensions of
biotechnology in food aid. USAID noted that it is actively engaged in
supporting the development of capacity in a number of food aid recipient
countries to make informed decisions, but said in practical terms this is
a long- term strategy and unlikely to assist in emergency situations such
as we saw in southern Africa. USAID said it believes that the most
practical

solution will be to work with recipient governments and partners involved
in the delivery of food aid to build confidence in the existing safety
evaluations of these products, including evaluations done in the United

States and by other countries, scientists, and international organizations
such as FAO and WHO.

Regarding our recommendation to develop an integrated recovery strategy,
the Department of State, USAID, and WFP fully support the need for a
comprehensive, coordinated approach to help address the underlying causes
of food insecurity. State cited U. S. efforts to work with major donor
countries to create a multilateral framework for improving long- term food

security throughout the world. USAID said that, along with an interagency
working group formed by the sub- policy planning committee to coordinate
the U. S. government response to the food crisis, it is in the process of
drafting a recovery strategy and action plan, which will guide the
development and review of new USAID country strategies in the region. WFP
emphasized the need for the international community to remain

engaged within the region and to help national governments address medium-
to longer- term issues related to food insecurity. We agree that such
efforts must be sustained if destabilizing food crises are to be avoided.

In addition, we provided FAO, IMF, and the World Bank an opportunity to
review parts of a draft of this report for technical accuracy, and we
incorporated their comments as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretaries of State and Agriculture, and the USAID
Administrator. Copies will be made available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at http:// www. gao. gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me on (202) 512- 3149. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are
listed in appendix XII. Sincerely yours,

David Gootnick Director, International Affairs and Trade

Appendi Appendi xes I x Scope and Methodology To determine what factors
contributed to the current crisis in southern Africa, we met with and
analyzed information from government officials at the U. S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the Departments of Agriculture
(USDA) and State in Washington, D. C., and U. S. missions in Botswana,
Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South

Africa. We also met with officials and reviewed information from the World
Food Program (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) at their
headquarters in Rome and in the southern African countries we visited. In
addition, we gathered information from and met with representatives of the

World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), other U. N.
agencies, other donor governments, and host government ministries. We also
gathered information and met with representatives of early warning systems
and interagency food security assessment teams. In addition, we gathered
information and met with representatives of nongovernmental organizations
(NGO), including Africare, Bread for the World, the Coalition for Food
Aid, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the Coalition for Food Aid, Save the
Children, World Vision, and ACDI/ VOCA. We also reviewed studies from
public and private research institutions on the causes of the current and
past food crises in southern Africa.

To determine how well the populations* overall food needs were met during
the crisis period, we met with officials and reviewed information from
WFP, FAO, host governments, the private sector, donor governments, NGOs,
and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). We also met with
and gathered information from representatives of interagency famine early
warning and vulnerability assessment teams. In addition, we analyzed
country- specific and regional WFP food aid data tracking food aid flows
from donors (through WFP and NGOs) to the country level and, for WFP food
aid, to the beneficiary level. Because of southern Africa*s infrastructure
and technology problems, our collection and analysis of agricultural
supply and demand information had inherent limitations. We observed food
aid distribution at various stages including at

the points of entry and storage facilities at the extended delivery points
and final distribution points. We met with WFP, NGO, donor, national
government, and local government officials responsible for managing and
monitoring the food aid distribution process. We reviewed WFP*s real time
logistics information system including its monitoring and loss reports. We
also reviewed U. S. and other donor financial contributions to determine

similar information on nonfood aid- related assistance. We verified the
accuracy of data and reports, to the extent possible, by tracing the flow
of

information and obtaining comparable data from multiple government,
international organization, NGO, and private sector sources. To determine
the major obstacles to the food aid effort, we met with key officials and
gathered and examined data from governments and the private sector in
recipient countries, WFP, donor governments, NGOs, and

SADC on the rate and amount of donor contributions, infrastructure, and
biotech food aid and its impact on food aid distribution in the current
crisis. We examined U. S. and other donor funding of WFP*s EMOP, reviewing
actual country donations against pledges to determine the sufficiency and
timeliness of donations. We reviewed and examined data on the
transportation network for moving food in the region and identified and
confirmed transportation and infrastructure obstacles during our fieldwork
in country. We verified and confirmed the general accuracy of these data
through multiple private sector and governmental organizations. With the
assistance of the National Academy of Sciences, we had seven U. S.
scientists provide an independent perspective on the Zambian

Scientists* biotech report. To determine the challenges to emerging from
the crisis into sustained recovery, we met with numerous NGOs, the World
Bank, the IMF, USAID, and the Departments of Agriculture and State and
analyzed information on the decline in agricultural sector investment, the
limited scope of existing programs in agricultural development, and the
negative impact of the HIV/ AIDS epidemic. In addition, we reviewed
studies from private and public research institutions, such as the
International Food Policy Research Institute, on the challenges to moving
from crisis into recovery. We also analyzed agricultural funding data of
the six southern African

national governments. To analyze World Bank agricultural lending, we
reviewed World Bank annual reports and its Web site from 1990 to 2002 to
determine the amount and nature of loans made to the six affected southern
African countries. After identifying the loans, we calculated an average
deflator for each fiscal year (July to June) and calculated the 2003 value
of each of these loans. To analyze the percentage of government budgets
expended for agriculture, we gathered fiscal data for each of the

six countries from the IMF country statistical appendices for 1997 through
2002. We then calculated the current and capital expenditures from
agriculture as a share of the total current and capital expenditures in
the government budget. We also calculated the real growth rate using least
square regression methodology for agricultural and total spending.
Finally, to determine the impact of HIV/ AIDS on food security among the
six

affected countries, we reviewed USDA and IMF studies that quantified the
food security situation and its economic implications.

The information on foreign laws in this report does not reflect our
independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary
sources.

We conducted our review from August 2002 through May 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendi I I x Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis Figure 14 is a
chronology of key events (political actions, alerts, and emergencies) that
occurred in the region and in some of the affected countries during the 2-
year period from July 2001 through April 2003.

Figure 14: Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis 2001

2002 2003 U. S. government

C- SAFE consortium C- SAFE consortium

begins donating formed among World

approved by food aid to region

Vision, CRS, and CARE USAID

U. N. consolidated appeal mid- term review

Drought- like Excessive rains

weather in in Lesotho,

U. N. Regional

southern northern

consolidated EMOP

Mozambique, Zambia, and

appeal extended

southern Zambia, Malawi

launched through

Swaziland, Frost in

and Zimbabwe Lesotho

(regional June

EMOP) 2003

Save the GIEWS warns that

First Crop First

Second Children- UK

four million people and Food

Emergency Emergency

warns of in southern Africa

Supply Food Security

Food Security impending

face severe food Assessments

Assessment Assessment

crisis shortages

conducted Report released

Report released Expected weather

Rainy Dry Rainy patterns Normal crop

Fallow Growing Harvest Fallow Growing Harvest year

Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Jan Feb Mar Apr Hungry Hungry Season Season Hungry Hungry Season

Season Zimbabwe Zambia Malawi Mozambique Lesotho, Swaziland Swazi

Last of Malawi AntiCorruption

government Zambia

Malawi declares

suspends Strategic

Bureau receives urgent need

biotech food Grain

complaint about for food aid

distribution Zambian

Reserves possible grain

scientists sold

hording Zimbabwe

trip Nacala Railroad

declares abroad

Bridge destroyed a food

by heavy rain emergency

Deadline for Zambia

commercial reaffirms

farmers to decision to

Lesotho vacate land in

reject biotech Malawi declares

Early warnings and assessments

declares a Zimbabwe

food a flood emergency

food

Political actions or NGO events

emergency

Severe or abnormal weather

Malawi Zambia

Riots over

Emergencies

declares declares

food food

national availability in

emergency disaster on

Balawayo,

WFP launches emergency operation

food security Zimbabwe

Source: GAO.

Early Warning Systems and Vulnerability

Appendi I I I x Assessment Methods Two types of data collection systems
tracked the food crisis in southern Africa: (1) early warning systems,
which monitor factors that affect food supply to provide decision makers
with notice of potential crises; and (2) assessment systems, which monitor
the nutritional needs of vulnerable populations in order to design or
assess interventions. Early Warning Systems Famine early warning systems
are designed to provide decision makers

with information of an impending food crisis or famine. These systems
compile various indicators of food security at a regional, national, or
subnational scale, including information on weather and household
purchasing power. While early warning systems are useful, preventing food
crises depends on timely responses to the information they disseminate.

For this report, we reviewed two early warning systems:  FEWS NET: The
Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) is a specialized

Information Network (NET) based in 17 African countries contending with
chronic food insecurity. 1 FEWS NET is a partnership- based program
initiated and funded by USAID. The goal of FEWS NET is to strengthen the
ability of African countries and regional organizations to manage risk of
food insecurity by providing timely and analytical early warning and
vulnerability information. FEWS NET monitors information from multiple
technologies, such as satellites and field observations, and seeks to
facilitate timely access to that information; identifies specific, acute
food security threats; and provides regular information assessments to
decision makers that reflect the best judgment of the food security
community.

 GIEWS: FAO*s Global Information Early Warning System on Food and
Agriculture (GIEWS) is an information system based in Rome that includes
116 governments, 3 regional organizations, and 61 nongovernmental
organizations. The goal of GIEWS is to provide the international community
with warning of imminent food crises to ensure timely interventions in
countries or regions affected by natural or man- made disasters. The
system seeks to monitor all aspects of food supply and demand in all
countries on a continuous basis at the global, regional/ subregional,
national, and subnational levels. It reports to the

1 Burkina Faso, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Southern Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

international community through its system of regular and ad hoc reports.

FEWS NET and GIEWS often contribute to the WFP/ FAO Crop and Food Supply
Assessment Missions. Additionally, FEWS NET supplies GIEWS with the major
proportion of its remote- sensing data for monitoring agricultural
production. However, according to USAID, these two early warning systems
differ in three main areas:

 Geographic scope: FEWS NET has a 17- country scope in Africa, whereas
GIEWS has a global mandate.  Level of detail: FEWS NET reports on the
subnational level based on information gathered by field staff located
throughout their scope,

whereas GIEWS reports on the national and global levels from their
headquarters in Rome with few field staff.

 Technical focus on food security: FEWS NET focuses on food availability,
access, and utilization, while GIEWS focuses on food production and
availability.

Early Warning Systems in The famine early warning systems produced
relevant information regarding the Southern Africa Food

the southern Africa food crisis. FEWS NET and GIEWS reported on such
Crisis

food security indicators as adverse weather events, current food
shortages, the status of cereal imports, the status of strategic grain
reserves, the status of grain prices, and forecasts for the 2001/ 02
harvest.

In particular, in late 2001 and early 2002 the early warning systems
reported questionable food security in parts of the six countries,
accounting for the poor 2000/ 01 harvest and anticipating future cereal
gaps based on a poor outlook for the 2001/ 02 harvest. In November 2001,
FEWS NET reported that the 2000/ 01 cereal harvest from earlier that year
would likely be insufficient to fill food needs in each country except
Mozambique. After

FEWS NET highlighted these potential maize shortages, the U. S. government
began carefully monitoring the situation in southern Africa, according to
a Department of State cable. By mid- February 2002, GIEWS warned that
impending severe food shortages threatened some 4 million people in the
southern African countries, including parts of each of the six countries.
That same month, however, FEWS NET reported that although

there were localized areas of concern at the national and subnational
levels, there was no reason for serious concern over production prospects

from a regional perspective at that point in the growing season. In April
2002, closer to the harvest period, GIEWS warned of a looming food crisis
in southern Africa, with conditions in several countries set to worsen. By
May 2002, FEWS NET also warned of the potential for a food security crisis
of regional magnitude if appropriate and timely action were not taken.

Nevertheless, the early warning systems did not anticipate the severity of
the situation in Malawi. Although the systems did report serious maize
(corn) production shortfalls in Malawi during the 2000/ 01 harvest caused
by mid- season floods and late- season drought, flawed agricultural
statistics provided by the government of Malawi 2 indicated that the
production shortfall would be covered by other food crops, especially
cassava.

According to the IMF, the data error only became apparent in February 2002
when Malawi began experiencing severe food shortages.

Assessment Systems For this report, we reviewed the following assessments:
 VAM: The Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Unit (VAM) analyzes,

maps, and reports on populations and geographic areas experiencing food
insecurity to inform WFP food aid operations in 43 countries. VAM uses
state- of- the- art mapping techniques to pinpoint the people most
vulnerable to hunger and target their needs. VAM and FEWS NET work in
close collaboration in the African countries where they are both present.
VAM relies on FEWS NET for early warning analyses in most African
countries. VAM also has a global mandate in supporting internal WFP
operations, whereas FEWS NET attempts to build assessment capacity within
the countries.

 CFSAM: Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) is a rapid
assessment of information generated in an affected country used to fill in
information gaps and to provide an early forecast of production and

the emerging food supply situation of that country. This is done only at
the request of the host country government. A mission may also collect
information on household food security, vulnerability, coping mechanisms,
and social welfare programs. GIEWS/ FAO coordinates such missions in
conjunction with WFP and other stakeholders such as host country
ministerial staff, FEWS NET staff, and the Southern 2 Early warning
systems often rely on data supplied by the governments of the countries in

question.

African Development Community*s (SADC) Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU).
CFSAM targets a wider audience than WFP*s internally focused VAM unit. The
international community uses the CFSAM information to calculate how much
food aid and other relief assistance is needed to assist the most
vulnerable people.

 VAC: SADC and some of its member states established vulnerability
assessment committees (VAC) to better assess and address food security
issues. 3 The purpose of VAC assessments is to (1) provide additional
information to help adjust response programs to better meet the needs of
vulnerable populations; (2) rapidly investigate and characterize or verify
suspected crises in local areas; and (3) better understand the causes of
the emergency and their implications for a return to food security. The
committees use a coordinated, collaborative process that integrates the
most influential assessment and crisis

response players into the effort to help gain privileged access to
national data sets and expert technicians and increase the likelihood of
reaching consensus among national governments, implementing partners, and
major donors. Key players include the SADC Regional Early Warning Unit and
national VACs, VAM, FEWS NET, GIEWS, and several NGOs. The assessment
methodology included sample surveys at the district, community, and
household levels and incorporated household food economy and nutritional
surveys.

Use of Assessments in the Several of the above assessments have been used
to prepare for and

Southern Africa Food Crisis monitor the southern Africa food crisis (see
app. II for timeline). FAO

conducted a series of CFSAMs starting in May 2002. The missions estimated
cereal requirements and cereal production for each of the six countries
and the extent to which the gap could be offset by commercial imports.
(See app. V for more on commercial sector imports and their role in the
crisis.) The remaining deficit was identified as requiring emergency food
aid. The regional and national VACs built assessment capacity in the

region and increased the breadth and depth of food security monitoring 3
The SADC Vulnerability Assessment Committee, established in early 1999, is
a committee of national professionals working at the regional level to
enhance food security and livelihood conditions within the SADC member
states. In August 2001, SADC Ministers of Agriculture encouraged member
states to establish cross- sectoral and interagency vulnerability
assessment groups to better understand food security and livelihood
conditions of vulnerable communities and better target emergency and
development interventions. The SADC VAC coordinates and backstops the
national committees.

during the crisis. To this end, the committees conducted assessments and
prepared reports on their results in September 2002 and January 2003. A
third assessment occurred in May 2003.

Appendi V I x U. S. Donations By early 2002, the United States had
recognized the seriousness of the developing food crisis in southern
Africa and initiated actions to donate substantial quantities of food aid
to the region. For example, in midFebruary 2002, USAID arranged a loan of
8,470 metric tons (MT) of maize to southern Africa from stocks held in
Tanzania; the commodity began arriving in the region in mid- March. On
March 15, 2002, USAID authorized

World Vision to provide 14,310 MT of food aid to Zimbabwe (the amount was
later increased to 19,710 MT). On March 21, USAID authorized the purchase
of 35,330 MT of commodities* from existing stocks in New Orleans* to be
shipped to southern African ports; these stocks arrived by the end of June
2002.

Overall, between late April 2002 and March 31, 2003, the United States
donated and delivered nearly 500, 000 MT of food aid to the region valued
at about $275 million. The food represented approximately 68 percent of
the total food aid delivered into the region between April 1, 2002, and
March 31, 2003. 1 U. S. deliveries included:

 81,950 MT for precursor WFP emergency programs in each of the six
countries* Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe,
valued at $43 million; 2  19,710 MT for the World Vision program in
Zimbabwe, valued at $12.8

million;  326,553 MT for the WFP regional operation, valued at $165.4
million; and  71, 600 MT for the C- SAFE operation, valued at $53.5
million. Table 4 provides a breakout of the U. S. food aid by country and
commodity. As the table shows, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia received the
largest amounts of aid. Maize (corn) and maize meal accounted for more
than 70 percent of the donated commodities. About 84 percent of all the
donated

food represented biotech commodities (i. e., maize, maize meal, oil, and
corn soya blend (CSB)/ corn soya milk( CSM)).

1 The U. S. contribution to the southern African region was consistent
with its global food aid performance in recent years. For example,
from1992 through 2001, the United States accounted for an average 58
percent of global food aid deliveries, ranging between 45.9 percent in
1995 and 68.8 percent in 1999.

2 Together, the six operations were designed to assist 4.8 million people.

Table 4: U. S. Government Food Aid Response to the Southern Africa Crisis
Corn soy Corn

blend/ corn Country Corn meal Beans Oil

soy milk Sorghum Bulgur Total

Lesotho 23,500 2,510 800 950 27, 760

Malawi 114,650 8,500 8.720 4, 720 14,905 151, 495

Mozambique 13,000 2,680 2, 860 1,250 19, 790

Swaziland 11,500 700 725 2,617 15, 542

Zambia 26,500 9,600 7,900 100 400 15,000 15,000 74, 500

Zimbabwe 90,800 56, 510 17, 120 11, 946 24,030 10,000 215, 406 Total
279,950 77, 120 37, 920 21, 301 43,202 15,000 25,000 499, 493

Source: USAID.

Appendi V x Commercial Imports The extent and availability of commercial
cereal food supplies during the food crisis 1 are difficult to assess for
a number of reasons. Early concerns about the progress of commercial
imports stemmed from the large amounts of cereal imports needed, the high
regional prices for maize, 2 and the lack of sufficient foreign exchange
resources for governments and private sector entities to purchase the
required imports. 3 Nonetheless, data available in mid- May 2003 indicated
that 1.72 million MT of commercial cereal imports had been received in the
six countries between April 1, 2002, and March 31, 2003. 4 However, the
regional Vulnerability Assessment Committee September 2002, December 2002,
and January 2003 reports

indicated some serious problems with food availability during the year.
(See app. III for a detailed description of the VACs.) Factors
contributing to the uncertainty over commercial cereal food supplies
included the lack of time frames indicating when imports needed to be
purchased, data

reliability issues, problems between urban and rural distribution of food
supplies, and government policies that provided disincentives to the
private sector to import food or that, once imports were received in
country, discouraged the efficient supply of those goods to the local
market.

In contrast to WFP*s food aid effort, the CFSAMs did not identify the
monthly rate at which imports needed to occur, making it difficult to
judge

1 One factor that reportedly affected the availability of commercial
imports was the drop in maize production in South Africa, a primary
supplier of maize to regional markets. South Africa's average maize
production in 2001 and 2002 was 9 percent lower than the previous 5year
average (from 1996 to 2000).

2 Maize prices fluctuated throughout the season and region. In Malawi,
maize prices reached unprecedented levels during the pre- harvest period.
In Zimbabwe, the price of maize on the black market rose by 167 percent
from August to December. In Mozambique, November 2002 prices were
generally higher than 2001 prices in four of seven provinces surveyed, but
the same or lower in the other three provinces.

3 The January 2003 VAC regional report concluded that Zimbabwe faced the
greatest challenge of the six countries for purchasing required imports.
Zimbabwe has been experiencing an economic crisis as its annual inflation
rate has reached 180 percent and its gross domestic product has declined
by 12 percent in 2002.

4 The May 2002 FAO/ WFP CFSAM initially estimated the annual cereal
deficit for each country and how much of that could be met by commercial
imports, with the remainder to be offset by emergency food aid. Subsequent
VAC reports updated estimates of the cereal

deficit as well as domestic cereal and stock requirements and production.
Given that the U. N. regional emergency food aid appeal used the original
CFSAM emergency food aid targets, we derived the annual commercial import
requirement by subtracting planned emergency food aid from the March 2003
revised cereal deficit.

the timeliness of commercial imports. The September VAC report for Zambia
indicated concern that it could be difficult for importers to find maize
in regional markets (as several countries in the region had large deficits
and would be competing to buy from the same suppliers), which in turn
could delay purchases. According to the December VAC report for Lesotho,
maize, wheat, and sorghum were generally not available for purchase at the
end of the year in communities across that country. In Swaziland, maize
was reported to be readily available in retail outlets nationwide even
though there had been no commercial imports between July and November.
However, there were fears that a shortfall in maize imports would occur
between December and March, causing another round of price hikes.

Once data on commercial cereal imports began to be available, data
reliability became an issue in some cases. For example, according to the
December Zimbabwe VAC report, figures on the combination of commercial
imports, food aid imports, and available national production should have
resulted in a surplus of 200,000 MT at the national level. However, the
report indicated there was something seriously wrong with the numbers,
since 41 percent of communities surveyed reported that cereal grains were
not or were rarely available from the government*s grain

marketing board and the other 59 percent reported that the grains were
only occasionally available. U. S. government officials noted that there
have been numerous anecdotal reports of the government*s politicizing food
aid, which may partly explain some of the discrepancy.

While commercial cereal imports may have been provided to urban markets,
shortages were reported in many rural areas, indicating problems with the
distribution of commercial cereal supplies. The December VAC report for
Lesotho indicated that maize meal maize that has undergone the milling
process was said to be available, though very expensive, in the various
urban centers but generally not available in the rural areas, which were
characterized as experiencing a serious food crisis. The January VAC
report for Zambia said there was no commercial shortfall in urban areas
and millers did not expect one through February and beyond. However, most
of the maize that had been imported (officially or via cross- border

trade) was reportedly only servicing the urban markets, leaving the rural
areas with a severe commercial grain shortfall that drastically pushed up
prices. Of 48 villages surveyed, fewer than 10 percent said maize was
readily available and fewer than 30 percent said maize was occasionally
available.

Finally, some national governments implemented subsidies and price
controls that raised concern about private sector imports and whether
imports received would be supplied to local markets efficiently. For
example, in response to the crisis, Malawi implemented a countrywide
subsidy on the consumer price of maize to make it more affordable to the
public. However, this policy, combined with high interest rates that
inhibited the private sector from borrowing to cover its purchases, meant
that the private sector could not profit from importing maize and selling
it at the subsidized price. In Zambia, the government encouraged a program
whereby a private sector group, the Millers Association, would import

300,000 MT of maize without having to pay import duties and the government
would import 155, 000 MT of maize to begin a strategic reserve. However,
the Zambian government reportedly provided conflicting information about
the amount of food it was to import for relief versus strategic reserves,
thus causing confusion about planned imports,

uncertainty over market prices, and conditions favorable for market
speculation. In Zimbabwe, the government banned all private sector imports
and implemented price controls on maize. This policy reportedly encouraged
traders with food supplies to stockpile them or sell them at a much higher
price on black markets in country or across borders.

Appendi VI x Nonfood Emergency Needs U. N. agencies requested $143.7
million to address urgent, nonfood humanitarian needs that increased
people*s vulnerability to famine for the July 2002 through June 2003
period. As of April 9, 2003, less than 25 percent of the total identified
requirements had been funded. Figure 15 compares the sectors and dollar
amounts for which the U. N. agencies requested funding to actual
contributions. As the figure shows, the largest amounts were requested for
health, agriculture, and economic recovery. Only five of the nine sectors
received any funding and four of these were only partially funded. The
four sectors with the highest rates of funding were: multisector, 583
percent of the requested amount; coordination and support services, 49
percent of the requested amount; agriculture, 35 percent; and health, 21
percent. Figure 15: U. N. Nonfood Emergency Appeals and Contributions by
Sector

Funding requests were tied to specific projects. For example, the World
Health Organization (WHO) asked for $2.9 million for projects in Malawi to
enable earlier detection of epidemics, improve response to disease
outbreaks in emergency situations, and strengthen emergency health
coordination. FAO requested funding for an $8.5 million project in
Zimbabwe to (1) increase agricultural production among 400,000 vulnerable
households by providing inputs such as seeds and fertilizer, (2)
facilitate tillage, (3) rehabilitate local water sources, and (4) develop
opportunities to market agricultural products.

Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food

Appendi VI x I

Crisis This appendix provides additional information on crops and foods
produced with modern agricultural biotechnology, how concerns about
agricultural biotechnology developed in southern Africa, and how issues
surrounding agricultural biotechnology affected delivery of U. S. food aid
during the southern Africa food crisis.

Modern Agricultural Modern agricultural biotechnology refers to various
scientific techniques

Biotechnology used to modify plants, animals, or microorganisms by
introducing in their

genetic makeup genes for specific desired traits, including genes from
unrelated species. Genetic engineering techniques allow development of new
crop or livestock varieties, since the genes for a given trait can be
introduced into a plant or animal species to produce a new variety

incorporating that specific trait. Additionally, genetic engineering
increases the range of traits that can be introduced in new varieties by
allowing genes from totally unrelated species to be incorporated into a
particular plant or animal variety. 1

Crops and foods containing or derived from genetically modified (GM)
plants have been characterized by various users as biotech, GM,
genetically modified organisms (GMO), and bioengineered crops and foods.
Biotech crops currently on the market are mainly aimed at increasing crop

protection by introducing resistance against plant diseases caused by
insects or viruses or by increasing tolerance to herbicides. Biotech crops
have lowered pest management costs and enhanced yields. By the end of
2000, such crops had been planted on nearly 100 million acres worldwide.
As of 2000, the United States had 76.7 million acres of biotech crop
varieties: 26 percent of all maize planted, 68 percent of cotton, and 69
percent of soybeans.

The United States and a number of other countries have established
regulatory processes for assessing whether foods derived from agricultural
biotechnology are as safe for humans, animals, other plants, and the
environment as their traditional counterparts. Safety assessments of GM
foods investigate direct health effects (toxicity), tendencies to provoke
allergic reaction, nutritional effects, and any unintended effects that
could

1 U. S. General Accounting Office, International Trade: Concerns Over
Biotechnology Challenge U. S. Agricultural Exports, GAO- 01- 727
(Washington, D. C.: June 15, 2001).

result from gene insertion. 2 Environmental assessments consider the
ability of the GMO to escape and potentially introduce the engineered
genes into wild populations; susceptibility of nontarget organisms (e. g.,
insects that are not pests) to the gene product; loss of biodiversity; and
increased use of chemicals in agriculture. The environmental aspects vary
considerably according to local conditions.

GM food such as whole kernel maize seed contains living modified organisms
(LMO) that are capable of transferring or replicating genetic material. If
maize is milled, this is no longer the case. Whole kernel maize seed can
be eaten as a food or planted to grow a new crop.

Challenges to U. S. U. S. agricultural biotech exports have faced several
significant challenges

Agricultural Exports in international markets. First, as the single, major
producer of biotech

Containing Biotech products, the United States has been relatively
isolated in its efforts to

maintain access for these products. 3 Second, in many parts of the world,
Commodities

consumer concerns about the safety of biotech foods have increased,
leading key market countries to implement or consider regulations that may
restrict U. S. biotech exports. Third, in the United States, biotech and
conventional varieties are typically combined in the grain handling system

for more efficient use of crops from multiple sources. 4 Thus, foreign
regulations on biotech could affect all U. S. exports of these commodities
as well as food products containing or derived from biotech crops.
Specifically, regulations limiting or banning the importation of foods
containing biotech products present serious challenges to U. S. exporters
of corn and soy products, according to Department of State and USDA
officials.

2 In May 2002, GAO reported on biotechnology experts* views on the
adequacy of tests used to evaluate potential health risks associated with
genetically modified foods. Experts we contacted agreed that the regimen
of tests used is adequate in assessing the safety of such foods. See U. S.
General Accounting Office, Genetically Modified Foods: Experts View
Regimen of Safety Tests as Adequate but FDA*s Evaluation Process Could Be
Enhanced, GAO- 02- 566 (Washington, D. C.: May 23, 2002).

3 According to USDA officials, more than 17 countries currently produce
biotech agricultural commodities. According to a USAID official, an
estimated 20 percent of the Brazilian soy crop and 20 percent of South
Africa*s yellow maize are bioengineered.

4 Once a product of modern agricultural biotechnology is determined to be
as safe as its conventional counterpart, it is allowed to circulate freely
in the U. S. market.

Several international organizations are involved in developing guidance on
biotech food and its regulation. The Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex)
a joint FAO/ WHO body responsible for an international food code* has been
developing principles for the human health risk analysis of biotech foods.
These principles are based on a premarket assessment, performed on a case-
by- case basis, that evaluates both direct effects (from the inserted
gene) and unintended effects that may arise from inserting the new gene.
The principles are in the final stage of an eight- step international
agreement process. Draft language under consideration includes an option

for mandatory labeling based on the method of production, even if there is
no detectable presence of DNA or protein in the end product resulting from
genetic modification. The United States and several other countries have
opposed mandatory processed- based labeling for foods, which may contain
the products of agricultural biotechnology. They favor mandatory labeling
only with regards to allergic reactions, changes in nutritional content,
and changes in handling requirements. Codex has been deadlocked on the
labeling issue for several years.

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, an international environmental
treaty, regulates transboundary movements of LMOs. Biotech foods are
within the scope of the protocol only if they contain LMOs. The protocol
requires exporters to get consent from importing countries before the
first shipment of LMOs intended for release into the environment. This
requirement does not apply to LMOs intended for direct use as food, feed,
or for processing. 5 The protocol will enter into force 90 days after the
50 th country has ratified it, which may be in late 2003, according to a
USAID

official. The United States is not a signatory to the agreement. However,
according to U. S. officials, as a practical matter U. S. exporters will
need to observe and comply with local regulations implementing the
protocol.

U. S. Versus EU Approval The United States and the European Union (EU)
have very different Process

regulatory frameworks for approving new agricultural biotech products. 5
For these products, the protocol establishes procedures for countries to
exchange information. According to the protocol, the initial documentation
should clearly identify that the shipment *may contain* LMOs that are not
intended for intentional introduction into the environment and contain a
point of contact for further information. Subsequent

information that will be placed on an international data base should
contain information such as the characteristics of LMOs; any national
laws, regulation, or guidelines on LMOs; and other related information.

The United States generally applies existing food safety and environmental
protection laws and regulations 6 to biotech products and approves them
based on their characteristics rather than on whether they are derived
from biotechnology. To evaluate new products, U. S. regulators require
sufficient evidence to determine their safety or risk. Under this
approach, the United States has approved most new biotech varieties.

The EU follows the *precautionary principle,* under which the EU maintains
that approval of new biotechnology products should not proceed if there is
*insufficient, inconclusive, or uncertain* scientific data regarding
potential risks. The EU has not approved any new biotech foods for
marketing since 1998. 7 This stance has affected the viability of biotech
trade in other parts of the world. For example, given the importance of
the EU market, U. S. soybean producers have been reluctant to introduce
new biotech varieties not approved for marketing in the EU. Similarly,
maize growers in Argentina, who export to the EU, are deferring planting a
biotech variety known as *Round- up Ready* corn because the EU has not
approved it. They are only planting biotech varieties approved by the EU.

Biotech Issues in Zimbabwe According to U S. officials, Zimbabwe raised
concerns about the potential adverse environmental and commercial/ trade
impacts of unmilled biotech

products as early as the summer of 2001, a year before the U. N. *s
southern Africa appeal. It did not want planting of whole kernel biotech
seeds or feeding of livestock on biotech products. In December 2001, the
United States offered to provide 14,300 MT of maize to Zimbabwe, but the
government refused, since it could not be certified as GMO- free. In
January 2002, the United States agreed to provide 8,500 MT of fortified
corn meal to Zimbabwe as an initial contribution to a WFP program launched
in November 2001. Since this was a milled product that did not contain any
living GMOs, the government accepted it.

In May 2002, the United States offered an additional shipment of 10,000 MT
of whole kernel maize for the WFP program. The government again said it
would only accept contributions that included assurances that the food

6 The U. S. system involves coordination among USDA, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Food and Drug Administration. 7 According to a
U. S. official, the EU has had a moratorium on new approvals, which goes a
step beyond merely applying precaution to each regulatory decision.

was not derived from GMOs. As a result, the maize was reallocated to
Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique. Near the end of July 2002, Zimbabwe
proposed to accept a U. S. offer of 17, 500 MT of maize that might contain
biotech commodity. However, the maize would be temporarily stored in silos
to be milled and subsequently distributed. In the meantime, the government
would use its own maize for distribution, which would be packed into USAID
food bags and distributed. This proposal became known as *the swap.* Near
the end of August, the United States approved the swap arrangement.
However, on September 1,

the Agriculture Minister of Zimbabwe was quoted as emphatically rejecting
biotech food assistance. 8 Four days later, though, the President approved
accepting biotech maize, subject to special shipping, milling, and
distribution requirements. 9 Biotech Issues in Zambia In February and
March 2002, WFP and U. S. officials notified Zambia that

U. S. donations to that country would likely include maize containing
biotech varieties. In June 2002, Zambia*s Vice President said the country
would gladly accept the U. S. maize Zimbabwe refused. However, during

June and July a public debate on biotech food began and appeared to be
backed strongly by the opposition political party. In August, a 6- hour
town meeting on the issue was held, and on August 16, the government
decided to suspend all biotech imports and distributions.

After this announcement, the USAID Administrator invited seven Zambian
scientists to visit the United States on a fact- finding mission regarding
the biotech issue. The scientists came to the United States in September
and subsequently visited South Africa and several European countries as
well. Their report concluded that:

 distributing biotech maize carries a high risk of eroding local maize
varieties; 8 The swap never took place because the Zimbabwe government did
not fulfill its part of the

agreement, according to USAID officials. 9 According to U. S. officials,
as of late February 2003, WFP had milled more than 41,000 MT of U. S.
maize in Zimbabwe and some U. S. maize destined for Zimbabwe in South
Africa.

WFP was expecting that all U. S. corn stored in the region would be milled
and transported to end sites by the end of March or early April.

 the safety aspects of biotech foods are not conclusive; 10 and  there
is a potential risk of biotech maize, if planted, affecting the export

of baby corn and honey in particular and organic foods in general to the
EU.

They recommended that the government continue its policy of not accepting
biotech foods. On October 29, the Zambian government agreed.

Seven experts in the field of modern agricultural biotechnology reviewed
the Zambian scientists* report for us. With regard to human health and
safety issues, two experts found the report to be fair, accurate, and
factbased; two experts disagreed with this assessment; and three did not
respond. Concerning environmental issues, three experts said the report
was fair, accurate, and fact- based; two experts disagreed; one expert was
not certain; and one did not respond. The experts generally agreed that
cross- pollination, or gene flow, would occur between biotech and
conventional maize plants, but disagreed about whether this warrants a ban
on biotech maize. Four experts suggested that milling of biotech maize was
a viable option for maintaining safety while simultaneously feeding the
hungry; the other three did not comment on this issue. Overall, the
experts supported the need for Zambia and other southern African countries
to be able to assess GMOs in their environments.

U. S. Views and Approach During June 2002, the United States planned how
it would respond to the biotech issue. It recognized that (1) Zimbabwe*s
rejection of whole kernel

maize was a problem that had to be addressed, (2) other affected
countries* positions on the import and transport of biotech food needed to
be determined, and (3) it was important to provide information about
biotech food. By early July, the United States was planning to use private
and, if

necessary, public diplomacy to get the affected countries to accept the
biotech food aid. It would work with and through SADC and its members to
remove barriers to biotech food aid and would support WFP in asking for
humanitarian exceptions to current and proposed biotech regulations. When
feasible, the United States would attempt to provide alternative food aid
to countries that had bans on agricultural biotechnology in place.
However, if recipient countries placed special regulations on biotech

10 Issues include concerns related to toxicity, allergenicity, and
antibiotic resistance.

products for example, milling or labeling requirements they themselves
would have to pay to implement these requirements. The U. S. government
opposed agreeing to provide only milled biotech food aid because the
process added costs and delayed shipments.

On July 25, 2002, the State Department directed its embassies in the six
affected states and Botswana to stress to host governments the importance
of addressing the region*s immediate needs rather than engaging in
protracted debate on the merits or supposed dangers of biotech food. State
warned that recent decisions by some recipient and transit countries not
to accept whole kernel biotech maize risked endangering the lives of
millions of people. State advised U. S. missions to urge SADC member
states to immediately adopt an agreement allowing unrestricted import and
distribution of food aid, including biotech produce, on an emergency basis
for the duration of the crisis. State*s background and guidance to its
overseas posts on biotech food aid included the following:  Food that is
exported from the United States, whether commercially or

through food aid, is the same food eaten by Americans in terms of its GMO
content.

 To date, there is no scientific evidence to suggest that commercially
available biotech commodities and processed foods are any less safe than
their conventional counterparts.  Commercially produced bioengineered
plant varieties in the United

States have been reviewed under the U. S. regulatory process, which sets
rigorous standards for human, animal, and plant health and for
environmental safety. These varieties have received safety approval in a
number of countries.

 Developing countries are concerned that genetically engineered genes may
contaminate other farmers* fields or wild plants in the centers of origin,
but this occurrence would not necessarily be negative or damaging. Genes
naturally flow (through cross- pollination) between

traditionally developed varieties and modern hybrids.  Some African
countries are concerned that if farmers plant whole grain

U. S. food aid, their trade with the EU may be affected. At this point in
time, the only whole grain in food aid that might contain biotech
varieties is maize. If whole maize is planted, it is possible biotech
varieties co- mingled in food aid could cross- pollinate with local

varieties. However, it is unlikely that the biotech grain will grow well
as it is made from hybrid seed and not well- adapted to conditions in
southern Africa.

U. N. Response In May 2002, WFP*s Executive Director raised the issue of
biotech food aid with the U. N. Secretary General and in June briefed him
on why biotech food aid was an impediment for operations in southern
Africa. By early July 2002, the U. N. Under Secretary- General for
Humanitarian Affairs had sought guidance from FAO, WHO, and WFP regarding
food aid with biotech components. The FAO Director- General responded with
a letter incorrectly

citing the Cartagena Protocol as recommending that all food aid that might
contain biotech products be subject to an *advanced informed agreement*
and be milled before distribution to avoid the possibility of germination.
However, the Cartagena Protocol expressly states that advanced informed
agreement does not apply when the shipment is for direct use as food or

feed, or for processing, nor does it suggest that grain shipments
containing living biotech components be milled. After the United States
raised concerns about this misinformation, the Director- General issued a
correction letter. 11 Nonetheless, the FAO representative in Malawi
repeated the same erroneous recommendations to Malawi*s Ministry of
Agriculture. The United States again cited the error, but in August, the
FAO

representative in Zimbabwe gave similar inaccurate advice. This time, when
the United States alerted FAO, the problem was quickly corrected,
according to FAO.

On August 23, 2002, FAO, WHO, and WFP issued a joint U. N. statement on
the use of biotech foods as food aid in southern Africa. 12 Its key points
included the following:

 Although there are no existing international agreements in force
regarding trade in biotech food or food aid, WFP policy is that all
donated food must meet the safety standards of both the donor and

11 The Director- General advised U. S. officials that it was still
possible that material imported for food, feed, or processing purposes
could be used as seed or that spillage could occur, which might lead to
propagation of the GMO in the country of import or transit. Processes

such as milling, he noted, make germination impossible. 12 According to
WFP officials, WFP*s Executive Director was tasked to negotiate drafting
of the statement.

recipient countries and all applicable international standards,
guidelines, and recommendations.

 FAO and WHO are confident that the principal country of origin (i. e.,
the United States) has applied its national food safety risk assessment
procedures to its food aid and has fully certified that these foods are
safe for human consumption. Based on national information from a variety
of sources and current scientific knowledge, FAO, WHO, and WFP believe the
consumption of biotech food now being provided as food aid in southern
Africa is unlikely to present human health risk.

 Any potential risks to biological diversity and sustainable agriculture
from inadvertent introduction of GMOs have to be judged and managed by
countries on a case- by- case basis. In the case of maize, processing
techniques such as milling or heat treatment may be considered to avoid
inadvertent introduction of biotech seed. However, U. N. policy does not
require that biotech grain used for food, feed, or processing be treated
this way.  Governments must carefully consider the severe and immediate

consequences of limiting the food aid available for millions so
desperately in need.

European Union Statement Several of the southern African countries were
concerned that if whole kernel biotech maize were planted and used as feed
for their cattle, their ability to export grain and cattle to the EU would
be hampered. On August 28, 8 days after Zambia announced it would not
accept biotech foods, the delegation of the European Commission in Zambia
issued a press release to clarify its position, which stated the
following:

 The United States, the EU, and others have evaluated several biotech
maize varieties, and some have been authorized for use, including
planting. Given the serious food shortages in the region, governments may
want to use these evaluations rather than wait for them to be repeated
locally.

 The fact that a country grows biotech maize has no impact on its ability
to export other agricultural products to the EU.

 The importation and use of biotech maize in a form other than grain
should eliminate concerns about negative biodiversity effects and trade
consequences. 13  EU scientists have found no evidence that the biotech
maize varieties

they have assessed are harmful to human health. 13 Although the EU
statement indicated Zambia*s acceptance of biotech maize would not legally
undermine its ability to export biotech maize to the EU, private entities
could add restrictions that might affect such exports..

Appendi VI x I I

Comments from the Department of State Note: GAO comments supplementing
those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

See comment 1. See comment 2.

See comment 3. See comment 4. See comment 5.

See comment 6.

See comment 7. See comment 8.

See comment 9.

See comment 10. See comment 11.

The following are GAO*s comments on the State Department*s letter dated
June 3, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. We recognize that the United States is taking steps to
help improve long- term food security in the region that include, among
others, the

Agricultural Initiative to Cut Hunger in Africa, which was introduced
early last year. However, as noted in figure 11, overall assistance to the
region's agricultural sector has declined between 1998 and 2003; and as

of April 2003, only one out of the six countries (Mozambique) was proposed
to receive funding under the new initiative. We also recognize that U. S.
bilateral assistance in several of the affected countries has funded a
number of programs related to food security over the years, including
ongoing programs on agricultural development, HIV/ AIDS, and disaster
management. While all these programs do help to promote food security, U.
N. and U. S. officials told us that to have broad impact, these programs
need to be implemented on a much larger scale. Our recommendation that U.
S. agencies work with international organizations, donors, and national
governments to develop a comprehensive, targeted strategy for sustained
recovery would, if implemented, help coordinate efforts, integrate
approaches, and leverage limited resources as necessary to achieve greater
effectiveness.

2. We modified the text on pages 3 and 23 to note that the United States
anticipated the crisis at the outset. Although the United States acted
early so that food would arrive in a timely way, USAID officials advised
us that no food was prepositioned in any of the countries. We modified the
text on page 18 to reflect the point on the C- SAFE program.

3. We modified the text on pages 10- 11 to reflect this information. 4.
According to USAID officials, available quantities of sorghum and

bulgur were limited. 5. We noted this view on page 46. 6. We modified our
discussion of Malawi*s policy on page 31. 7. We modified the text on pages
31 to reflect this point.

8. We replaced the definition, cited from a World Health Organization
publication, with an alternative. See pages 3 and 65. We modified the
discussion of safety issues on pages 64- 65.

9. We modified the text on these several issues on page 67. 10. We
clarified this footnote, on page 67, to indicate what information

would be required in the initial documentation and what information would
be required in subsequent exchanges of information.

11. On page 68, we changed our reference to the precautionary principle to
clarify that the statements represent the EU*s arguments under the
principle.

Appendi X I x Comments from Department of Agriculture Note: GAO comments
supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

See comment 1. See comment 2.

The following are GAO*s comments on USDA*s letter dated June 3, 2003. GAO
Comments 1. We modified the text on page 30 to reflect this point.

2. We modified the text on page 66 to reflect the first point. Our draft
report noted that the biotech and conventional varieties are typically
combined in the U. S. grain handling system. Regarding the use of the term
biotech, see pages 45- 46.

Comments from the U. S. Agency for

Appendi X x International Development Note: GAO comments supplementing
those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

The following are GAO*s comments on USAID*s letter dated June 9, 2003. GAO
Comments 1. Currently in draft form, the recovery strategy/ action plan
USAID

outlines in its comments represents a beginning. USAID notes that its
draft strategy has already been useful as a planning tool in developing
USAID*s country strategies for the region. As such, the recovery strategy/
action plan will help target U. S. efforts. However, our recommendation
goes beyond U. S. efforts. To ensure sustained recovery in an environment
of constrained resources, we believe there is a need for a comprehensive
strategy that pulls together the efforts of international organizations,
donors, and national governments; integrates approaches; and leverages
limited resources.

Appendi XI x Comment from the World Food Program Note: GAO comments
supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

See comment 1. See comment 2.

See comment 3. See comment 4. See comment 4.

The following are GAO*s comments on the WFP*s letter dated June 2, 2003.
GAO Comments 1. We agree with WFP*s support for further collaboration with
the U. S. government and other partners in defining and implementing a

sustainable recovery strategy. 2. We further highlighted the problems of
extreme poverty and regional

economic decline on page 11. 3. We further highlighted Zimbabwe*s economic
problems on page 11. 4. We reflected these points on page 25.

Appendi XI x I

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Phillip J. Thomas
(202) 512- 9892 Wayne Ferris (202) 512- 5169 Acknowledgments In addition
to the persons named above, Joy Labez, Miriam Carroll, Kendall

Schaefer, and Janey Cohen made key contributions to this report. Nathan
Anderson, Nima Edwards, Etana Finkler, Chase Huntley, Bruce Kutnick,
Jeremy Latimer, Barbara Shields, and Eve Weisberg provided technical
support.

(320145)

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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate

June 2003 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE Sustained Efforts Needed to Help Southern
Africa Recover from Food Crisis

GAO- 03- 644

Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Multiple Factors Contributed to
the Food Crisis 7 Food Needs Not Fully Met, but Famine Was Averted 13 Slow
Donations, Poor Infrastructure, Concerns Associated with Biotech Food Were
Major Obstacles to an Effective Response 23

Declining Support for Agricultural Sector and the HIV/ AIDS Epidemic Pose
Challenges to Emerging from Crisis into Sustained Recovery 33 Conclusions
44 Recommendations for Executive Action 45 Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation 45

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 48

Appendix II: Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis 51

Appendix III: Early Warning Systems and Vulnerability Assessment Methods
53 Early Warning Systems 53 Assessment Systems 55

Appendix IV: U. S. Donations 58

Appendix V: Commercial Imports 60

Appendix VI: Nonfood Emergency Needs 63

Appendix VII: Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food Crisis 65 Modern
Agricultural Biotechnology 65

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of State 75 GAO Comments 80

Appendix IX: Comments from Department of Agriculture 82 GAO Comments 85

Appendix X: Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
86 GAO Comments 88

Appendix XI: Comment from the World Food Program 89 GAO Comments 92

Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 93

GAO Contacts 93 Acknowledgments 93

Tables Table 1: Cereal Production by Country 9 Table 2: Frequency of
Household Coping Strategies in Zambia

(August through December 2002) 21 Table 3: Contributions to WFP and Their
Timing 25 Table 4: U. S. Government Food Aid Response to the Southern
Africa Crisis 59

Figures Figure 1: Population at Risk of Famine in the Affected Southern
African Countries 6

Figure 2: Revised Estimate of the Cereal Gap in the Six Countries and Plan
for Addressing the Deficit (March 2003) 14 Figure 3: Extent to Which
Cereal Food Aid and Commercial

Imports Met the Cereal Gap (April 1, 2002, through March 31, 2003) 16
Figure 4: Extent to Which WFP Monthly Food Delivery Targets

Were Met (July 2002 through March 2003) 18 Figure 5: Percent of WFP Total
Planned Beneficiaries Who

Received at Least Some Food Aid (July through December 2002) 20 Figure 6:
Steps in the Logistics Process 27 Figure 7: The Transportation Network for
Moving Food in the

Region 28 Figure 8: Agricultural Lending by the World Bank, the African

Development Bank, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development*
1990 through 2000 35 Figure 9: World Bank Agricultural Sector Loans
Approved for the

Affected Countries* 1990 to 2002 36 Figure 10: Agricultural Spending as a
Percentage of Total

Government Spending* 1996/ 97 through 2001/ 02 (in 2003 dollars) 37 Figure
11: USAID Bilateral Assistance in the Agricultural Sector to

Four Countries* 1998 to 2003 38 Figure 12: Examples of Existing Programs
Related to Food

Security 40 Figure 13: Projected Impact on GDP Due to HIV/ AIDS 42 Figure
14: Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis 52

Figure 15: U. N. Nonfood Emergency Appeals and Contributions by Sector 63

Abbreviations

CFSAM Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission C- SAFE Consortium for the
Southern Africa Food Security Emergency EMOP Emergency Operations EWS
early warning systems FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FEWS NET
Famine Early Warning Systems Network GIEWS Global Information Early
Warning System IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFPRI
International Food Policy Research Institute IMF International Monetary
Fund NGO nongovernmental organization OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance SADC Southern African Development Community UNAIDS Joint United
Nations Program on HIV/ AIDS UNICEF United Nations Children*s Fund USAID
United States Agency for International Development USDA United States
Department of Agriculture VAC vulnerability assessment committee VAM
vulnerability assessment mapping WFP World Food Program WHO World Health
Organization

This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
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a

GAO United States General Accounting Office

Multiple factors contributed to the food crisis. Erratic weather reduced
maize (corn) production. A poorly functioning agricultural sector caused
food supply shortages. Government actions including the sale of Malawi*s
grain reserve and Zimbabwe*s land reform further cut available food.
Widespread poverty contributed to food

insecurity and the HIV/ AIDS epidemic exacerbated food shortages by
reducing the labor force. Food aid averted famine, but the overall
response did not

prevent widespread hunger. About 93 percent of the total cereal gap the
difference between domestic needs and production was met by the end of the
April 2002- March 2003 crisis period. However, food aid deliveries fell
short in several countries, and vulnerable households had limited ability
to purchase commercial maize. Plan for Addressing Cereal Needs in the Six
Countries 67%

33% 14%

22% 48% Zimbabwe

Malawi, 5%

Mozambique Zambia, 3%

Nongovernmental organizations

World Food Program Swaziland, 8% Lesotho

Commercial imports Food aid

Total Cereal a Requirements 8.5 Million Metric Tons

Commercial Import Needs by Country

Plan for Cereal Food Aid

Production and opening stock levels

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by WFP.

69% 14% 17%

Cereal gap 31% Cereal gap 31%

a Cereal includes maize and other grains suitable for food.

Slow donations, poor infrastructure, and concerns about biotech food were
major obstacles to an effective response.

Excluding the United States, most donors did not make sufficient, timely
donations to the World Food Program. Poor transportation systems and
storage facilities hampered efficient food delivery. Zambia rejected food
aid because of concerns regarding biotech food; other countries required
milling maize for the same reason. This compromised the food aid pipeline
given the United States was the region*s key donor and its aid may contain
biotech food.

Declining investments in agriculture and the HIV/ AIDS epidemic pose
challenges to emerging from crisis into sustained recovery. U. N. and U.
S. officials cite the need to reverse declining trends in agricultural
investments by international financing organizations, national
governments, and donors. Without a strategy that integrates, among other
things, agricultural development, the impact of HIV/ AIDS, and natural
disaster management, food crises will recur. The southern Africa food
crisis threatened 15.3 million people in

six countries (Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe) with famine. GAO

was asked to look at (1) factors that contributed to the crisis, (2) how
well the populations* needs were met, (3) obstacles to the food aid
effort, and (4) challenges to emerging from crisis. GAO recommends that
the

Secretaries of State and Agriculture and Administrator of the U. S. Agency
for International Development review issues related to biotech

foods in emergency food aid* such as health, trade and environment
concerns* in anticipation of future crises; and

work with international donors and national governments on a recovery
strategy integrating, among others, agricultural development, HIV/ AIDS,
and

natural disaster management. The Departments of State and Agriculture,
USAID, and WFP generally agreed with our recommendations. Their technical
comments were incorporated as

appropriate.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 644. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact David Gootnick (202) 512- 3149 (gootnickd@ gao. gov).
Highlights of GAO- 03- 644, a report to the

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate

June 2003

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Sustained Efforts Needed to Help Southern Africa Recover from Food Crisis

Page i GAO- 03- 644 Foreign Assistance

Contents

Contents

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Appendix I

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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Appendix II Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis

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Appendix III

Appendix III Early Warning Systems and Vulnerability Assessment Methods

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Appendix IV

Appendix IV U. S. Donations

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Appendix V

Appendix V Commercial Imports

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Appendix V Commercial Imports

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Appendix VI Nonfood Emergency Needs

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Appendix VII

Appendix VII Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food Crisis

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Appendix VIII

Appendix VIII Comments from the Department of State

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Appendix VIII Comments from the Department of State

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Appendix VIII Comments from the Department of State

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Appendix IX

Appendix IX Comments from Department of Agriculture

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Appendix IX Comments from Department of Agriculture

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Appendix IX Comments from Department of Agriculture

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Appendix X Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development

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Appendix XI Comment from the World Food Program

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Appendix XII

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