Defense Infrastructure: Basing Uncertainties Necessitate	 
Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans in South Korea		 
(15-JUL-03, GAO-03-643).					 
                                                                 
The U.S.-South Korean Land Partnership Plan (LPP), signed in	 
March 2002, was designed to consolidate U.S. installations,	 
improve combat readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen  
the U.S.-South Korean alliance by addressing some of the causes  
of periodic tension associated with the U.S. presence in South	 
Korea. The Senate report on military construction appropriations 
for fiscal year 2003 directed GAO to review the LPP. GAO adjusted
its review to also address the effect of ongoing reassessments of
U.S. overseas presence upon the LPP and other infrastructure	 
needs. In this report, GAO assessed (1) the scope of the LPP, (2)
the implications on the LPP and other construction projects of	 
proposals to change basing in South Korea, and (3) implementation
challenges associated with the LPP that could affect future U.S. 
military construction projects in South Korea.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-643 					        
    ACCNO:   A07512						        
  TITLE:     Defense Infrastructure: Basing Uncertainties Necessitate 
Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans in South Korea		 
     DATE:   07/15/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Construction (process)				 
	     Construction costs 				 
	     Land management					 
	     Military facility construction			 
	     International relations				 
	     South Korea					 
	     United States-South Korean Land			 
	     Partnership Plan					 
                                                                 

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GAO-03-643

Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

July 2003 DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

Basing Uncertainties Necessitate Reevaluation of U. S. Construction Plans
in South Korea

GAO- 03- 643

Although broad in scope, the LPP was not designed to resolve all U. S.
military infrastructure issues. Specifically, the plan was intended to
resolve 49 of the 89 separate land disputes that were pending in South
Korea. Of the land disputes the plan did not address, the most politically
significant, complex, and expensive dispute involves the potential
relocation of U. S. forces from Yongsan Army Garrison, located in the
Seoul metropolitan area. As a result, the LPP, as approved, covered about
37 percent of the $5.6 billion in construction costs planned at U. S.
military installations in South Korea over the next 10 years.

Ongoing reassessments of U. S. overseas presence and basing requirements
could diminish the need for and alter the locations of many construction
projects in South Korea, both those associated with the LPP and those
unrelated to it. For example, over $1 billion of ongoing and planned
construction associated with improving military infrastructure at Yongsan
Army Garrison and U. S. installations located north of Seoul* areas where
there is uncertainty about future U. S. presence* has recently been put on
hold, canceled, or redirected to an installation located south of Seoul.

GAO identified some key challenges that could adversely affect the
implementation of the LPP and future U. S. military construction projects
throughout South Korea. First, the plan relies on various funding sources,
including funding realized through land sales from property returned by
the United States. The extent to which these sources of funding would be
required and available for broader infrastructure changes is not yet
clear. Second, a master plan would be needed to guide future military
construction to reposition U. S. forces and basing in South Korea.

Ongoing and Planned Construction on U. S. Installations in South Korea, as
of March 2003

The U. S.- South Korean Land Partnership Plan (LPP), signed in March 2002,
was designed to consolidate U. S. installations, improve combat readiness,
enhance public safety, and

strengthen the U. S.- South Korean alliance by addressing some of the
causes of periodic tension

associated with the U. S. presence in South Korea. The Senate report on
military construction appropriations for fiscal year 2003 directed GAO to
review the LPP. GAO adjusted its review to also address the effect of
ongoing reassessments of U. S. overseas presence upon the LPP and other
infrastructure needs. In this report, GAO assessed

(1) the scope of the LPP, (2) the implications on the LPP and other
construction projects of proposals to change basing in South Korea, and
(3) implementation challenges associated with the LPP that could affect
future U. S. military construction projects in

South Korea. GAO recommends (1) a reassessment of construction projects
planned or under way in South Korea as ongoing studies of overseas
presence and basing are finalized and (2) the development of a detailed
South Korea- wide infrastructure master plan to guide future construction
planning. DOD agreed with GAO*s recommendations and indicated actions it
is taking to address them.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 643. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Barry W. Holman at (202) 512- 5581 or holmanb@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 643, a report to

congressional committees

July 2003

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

Basing Uncertainties Necessitate Reevaluation of U. S. Construction Plans
in South Korea

Page i GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
Background 5 Korea Land Partnership Plan 7 Land Partnership Plan as
Originally Approved Addressed a Portion

of Previously Existing U. S. Military Infrastructure Needs in South Korea
14 Ongoing Studies Are Expected to Alter Previously Planned LPP
Construction Projects 15 Challenges to Completing Land Partnership Plan
and Other

Planned Construction Projects throughout South Korea 17 Conclusions 21
Recommendations for Executive Action 21 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
22 Appendix I Scope and Methodology 24

Appendix II Summary of the Land Partnership Plan 26

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 34

Tables

Table 1: Exclusive Use Grants Retained by the United States 29 Table 2:
Temporary Grants 30 Table 3: Training Area Easements 30 Table 4: Total
Release of U. S. Training Areas 30 Table 5: Partial Release of Grants 31
Table 6: Joint Use of South Korean Military Training Facilities and Areas
31 Table 7: Upper Tier Easements 33 Table 8: Middle Tier Easements 33
Table 9: Lower Tier Easements 33 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure Figures

Figure 1: Quonset Hut Used for Barracks at Camp Greaves 6 Figure 2: U. S.
Installations Located in the Seoul Metropolitan Area 7 Figure 3: Execution
of the Land Partnership Plan 9 Figure 4: Sources of Funding for Planned
Infrastructure Construction Costs in South Korea, Fiscal Years 2002- 2011
10 Figure 5: Land Partnership Plan Funding Sources, Fiscal Years 2002-
2011 11 Figure 6: U. S. Troop Installations Located in South Korea Under
the Land Partnership Plan 16 Figure 7: Estimated Funding Requirements for
the Land Partnership Plan 19 Figure 8: Installation Grants and Returns
under the Land Partnership Plan, by Calendar Year 28 Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense LPP Land Partnership Plan

This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
materials separately from GAO*s product.

Page 1 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

July 15, 2003 Congressional Committees Military officials from the United
States and the Republic of Korea (hereafter referred to as South Korea)
signed an agreement known as the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) on March 29,
2002. The LPP was described by the parties to the agreement as a
cooperative U. S.- South Korean effort to consolidate U. S. installations
and training areas, improve combat readiness, enhance public safety, and
strengthen the U. S.- South Korean alliance by addressing some of the
causes of periodic tension and discontent among South Koreans regarding
the U. S. presence in South Korea. The LPP, as originally approved,
promised to reduce the number of U. S. military troop installations from
41 to 23 and to consolidate many U. S. facilities north of Seoul (the
capital of South Korea), along with other

facilities south of Seoul. Under the plan, financing of new construction
to support consolidations and relocations of U. S. forces in South Korea
was expected to rely on revenue generated from land sales following U. S.
return of selected facilities and training lands to South Korea, on host
nation funding, and on U. S. military construction funding. The LPP was
predicated on continuing to maintain U. S. bases and facilities north of
Seoul (near the demilitarized zone that separates North Korea from South
Korea). Since passage of the LPP by the South Korea National Assembly on
October 30, 2002, there have been various indications that the United
States is re- examining how and where it may want to station its forces
overseas in the future. Prominent among them have been statements by U. S.
officials that the United States is considering a range of options for its
troops in South Korea, including repositioning them away from Seoul and
from areas north of Seoul (near the demilitarized zone).

The Senate report on military construction appropriations for fiscal year
2003 1 directed us to review the LPP to provide the Congress with a better
understanding of the plan, associated costs, burden- sharing implications,
and other related factors that the plan may not address. In light of
ongoing reassessments of the U. S. presence overseas, which could affect
basing requirements, we adjusted our review to also address the effect of
potential basing changes upon the LPP and the U. S. military*s
infrastructure in South Korea. This report assesses (1) the scope and cost
of the LPP in relation to total infrastructure issues in South Korea, (2)
the

1 S. Rpt. No. 107- 202, at 26 (2002).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

implications on the LPP and other construction projects in South Korea of
recent proposals to reposition U. S. forces in South Korea, and (3) the
implementation challenges associated with the LPP that could affect future
U. S. military construction projects in South Korea. Briefings were
provided to various congressional defense committee staffs regarding our
preliminary findings during our review. This report updates that
information and provides our final analysis.

In conducting this review, we met with officials responsible for
developing and managing the LPP and military construction projects
throughout South Korea, and we analyzed projected costs and funding
streams. We visited 16 U. S. military installations and facilities in
South Korea that would be affected by the plan, including sites that will
be closed, partially closed, or expanded. We also visited land transfer
sites that remain unresolved and military construction projects that are
not addressed in the plan, and we met with officials from the Department
of Defense and the Department of State to identify challenges that could
also affect future military construction projects throughout South Korea.
In addition, we interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the
Department of Defense, which provided perspective on the department*s
studies concerning a potential change to the role, size, and basing of U.
S. forces in South Korea. More information on the scope and methodology of
our work

is presented in appendix I. Although broad in scope, the Land Partnership
Plan, as approved, was not designed to entirely resolve U. S. military
infrastructure issues, and it did not address some of the more challenging
land disputes, such as the relocation of U. S. forces from the Seoul
metropolitan area. However, the LPP represented a step forward in
addressing U. S. military infrastructure issues in South Korea related to
improving servicemembers* quality of life, combat readiness, and relations
between South Korea and U. S. forces. From a cost standpoint, the LPP
encompassed about $2 billion of the $5.6 billion that the U. S. military
and South Korea planned to spend to improve the U. S. military
infrastructure in South Korea from 2002 through 2011. The LPP was intended
to resolve 49 of the 89 separate land disputes (55 percent) that were
pending in South Korea in January 2003. Of the land disputes the plan did
not address, the most politically significant, complex, and expensive
dispute involving the potential relocation of U. S. forces Results in
Brief

Page 3 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

from Yongsan Army Garrison, located in the Seoul metropolitan area. 2 A
previous agreement between the United States and South Korea in 1991
called for the relocation of U. S. troops stationed there and the return
of garrison lands and facilities to South Korea. The South Korean
government had agreed to pay for the costs of the relocation; however, the
relocation did not occur due to its anticipated high cost. Ongoing
reassessments of U. S. overseas presence and basing requirements

are expected to change U. S. basing in South Korea significantly beyond
that envisioned under the LPP and would diminish the need for and alter
the locations of many construction projects, both those associated with
the plan and those unrelated to it; in addition, costs could increase. The
Department of Defense is conducting multiple studies related to future
overseas presence, and available information indicates that at least
tentative decisions have been made to reposition, over time, U. S. troops
away from facilities in Seoul and away from areas north of Seoul. The full
results of these studies and related negotiations may not be available for
several months; consequently, sufficient information is not currently

available to determine the full magnitude of modifications to existing
basing arrangements that will be required. However, we were told that the
United States would likely concentrate its forces in far fewer, though
larger, installations than were envisioned under the LPP. According to a
U. S. Forces Korea official, until recently there had been about $1.3
billion of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving
military

infrastructure at Yongsan Army Garrison and U. S. installations located
north of Seoul* areas where there is uncertainty about the future U. S.
presence. However, U. S. Forces Korea officials recently announced that
they were reviewing these projects and that over $1 billion of the ongoing

and planned construction had been put on hold. Further, the Department of
Defense recently submitted a budget amendment to the Congress to cancel
about $5 million of construction projects planned for the garrison and to
redirect $212.8 million of construction planned for the garrison and
northern installations to an installation located south of Seoul.

2 Yongsan Army Garrison is surrounded by residential and commercial high-
rises. Yongsan Army Garrison is the headquarters for the U. S. military
presence in South Korea, including headquarters facilities for the United
Nations Command, the United States- Republic of Korea Combined Forces
Command, United States Forces Korea, and the Eighth United States Army.
Yongsan employs 2,500 U. S. military personnel, 1,000 U. S. civilians,
6,000 Korean civilians, and more than 1, 000 South Korean military
personnel. In addition, 3,500 military and civilian employees reside on
the property or live in neighborhoods adjacent to the garrison.

Page 4 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

Our review of the LPP identified some key challenges that could have
adversely affected the implementation of the LPP, as originally approved,
and which also could affect future U. S. military construction projects
throughout South Korea with the larger- scale changes now likely. First,
the plan is dependent on substantial amounts of funding that South Korea
expects to realize through land sales from property returned by the United
States, host- nation- funded construction, and U. S. military construction
funds. The extent to which these sources of funding would be available to
support broader infrastructure changes is unclear, particularly the
relocation of forces from Yongsan Army Garrison. While the South Korean
government is expected to remain responsible for providing funding for
this relocation, the Yongsan Army Garrison property reportedly would be
used for municipal purposes and would not be subject to resale to provide
funding to support relocation of U. S. forces, as is the approach to
basing changes under the LPP. At this point, insufficient information is
available to determine precisely how many replacement facilities will be
required for U. S. troops moving out of Yongsan Army Garrison and
facilities north of Seoul and any difficulties that might be encountered
in obtaining the funding. The LPP also relied on using up to 50 percent of
South Korea*s host nation funding, 3 which would have limited the
availability of these funds for other uses. To what extent these funds
would be used for additional troop relocations is not yet clear. Second,
implementation of the LPP involves a closely knit series of tasks to phase
out some facilities and installations while phasing in new facilities and
expanding other facilities and installations. U. S. Forces Korea was
developing a master plan to manage this complex task and control future
changes to guide its implementation of the LPP, but in light of the
expected broader repositioning of forces in South Korea much greater
changes in the numbers of affected bases and locations are anticipated.
These changes, not yet finalized, suggest the need for a revised road map
to manage and guide future facilities requirements and changes in South
Korea.

We are making recommendations in this report to the Secretary of Defense
to (1) require a reassessment of planned construction projects in South
Korea as the results of ongoing studies associated with overseas presence
and basing are finalized and (2) prepare a detailed South Korea- wide
infrastructure master plan to manage the changing infrastructure plans

3 The host- nation- funded construction program is part of the South Korea
burden- sharing arrangement covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty between
South Korea and the United States and represents the largest single source
of major construction funds for U. S. Forces Korea.

Page 5 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

for South Korea. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department
of Defense agreed with our recommendations and pointed out that it is
taking actions to ensure that all planned construction projects support
decisions regarding global presence and basing strategy and that all
master plans are adjusted to support these decisions.

U. S. interests in South Korea involve a wide range of security, economic,
and political concerns. The United States has remained committed to
maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula since the 1950 to 1953 Korean
War. 4 Although most of the property that the United States once
controlled

has been returned to South Korea, the United States maintains about 37,000
troops in South Korea, which are currently scattered across 41 troop
installations and an additional 54 small camps and support sites.

According to U. S. Forces Korea officials, many of the facilities there
are obsolete, poorly maintained, and in disrepair to the extent that the
living and working conditions in South Korea are considered to be the
worst in the Department of Defense (DOD). 5 We observed many of these
conditions during our visits to U. S. facilities and installations in
South Korea. While improvements have been made in recent years, U. S.
military personnel still use, as shown in figure 1, some Korean War- era
Quonset huts for housing.

4 In 1954, the United States and South Korea agreed to the Mutual Defense
Treaty between South Korea and the United States. 5 Examples of poor
living and working conditions include daily electrical outages; air
conditioning failures during the summer; inadequate heating during the
winter, including unheated showers and latrines; and the presence of
asbestos in family housing units. Background

Page 6 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 1: Quonset Hut Used for Barracks at Camp Greaves

Improving overall facilities used by the United States in South Korea will
require an enormous investment. At the same time, rapid growth and
urbanization in South Korea during the last several decades have created a
greater demand for land and increased encroachments on areas used by U. S.
forces. Consequently, many of the smaller U. S. camps and training areas
that were originally located in isolated areas are now in the middle of
large urban centers, where their presence has caused friction with local

residents; urban locations also limit the ability of U. S. forces to train
effectively. Figure 2 shows the boundaries of Yongsan Army Garrison and
other U. S. installations that have become encircled by the city of Seoul.

Page 7 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 2: U. S. Installations Located in the Seoul Metropolitan Area

Historically, DOD reports difficulties filling its military personnel
assignments in South Korea, which are generally 1- year hardship tours in
which 90 percent of the assigned military personnel are unaccompanied by
their families. A DOD survey conducted in 2001 found that Army and Air
Force personnel considered South Korea as the least desirable assignment
and that many soldiers were avoiding service in South Korea by various
means, including retirement and declining to accept command assignments.
U. S. Forces Korea has wanted to make South Korea an assignment of choice
by improving living and working conditions, modifying assignment policies
to increase accompanied tours to 25 percent by 2010, and reducing the out-
of- pocket expenses for personnel to maintain a second household in South
Korea. To address these problems, military officials from the United
States and

South Korea signed the Land Partnership Plan on March 29, 2002. The LPP,
as originally approved, was described as a cooperative U. S.- South Korean
effort to consolidate U. S. installations and training areas, improve
combat readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U. S.- South
Korean

alliance. The United States views the plan as a binding agreement under
the Status of Forces Agreement, not as a separate treaty. However, U. S.
Forces Korea officials told us that South Korea views the plan as a Korea
Land

Partnership Plan

Page 8 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

treaty requiring approval by the South Korea National Assembly and that
approval occurred on October 30, 2002.

The three components of the plan are as follows:  Installations*
establishes a timeline for the grant of new land, the

construction of new facilities, and the closure of installations. The plan
calls for the number of U. S. military installations to drop from 41 to
23. To accomplish this, the military will close or partially close some
sites, while enlarging or creating other installations.  Training areas*
returns training areas in exchange for guaranteed time on South Korean
ranges and training areas. The plan calls for the

consolidation and protection of remaining U. S. training areas.  Safety
easements 6 *acknowledges that South Korean citizens are at risk of injury
or death in the event of an explosion of U. S. weapons, provides a
prioritized list of required safety easements, and establishes a procedure
and timeline for enforcing the easements.

The costs of the LPP must be shared between the United States and South
Korea. U. S. funding is provided from the military construction and
operations and maintenance accounts and from nonappropriated funds. The
South Korean government provides host nation funds and funding obtained
from sales of property returned to South Korea by the United States. As a
general rule, the United States funds the relocation of units from camps
that it wishes to close, and South Korea funds the relocation of units
from camps South Korea has asked to be closed. The execution of

the LPP is shown on figure 3. 6 The LPP defines a safety easement as the
distance from an explosive area that personnel and structures must be kept
and is directly related to the quantity and types of explosives and
ammunition present.

Page 9 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 3: Execution of the Land Partnership Plan The target date for the
completion of the LPP was December 31, 2011, although the timetable and
the scale could be adjusted by mutual agreement. More information on the
plan as originally envisioned is included in appendix II.

Page 10 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

U. S. military infrastructure funding in South Korea involves multiple
organizations and sources. It involves 10 organizations from the United
States (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations, Army and
Air Force Exchange Service, Defense Logistics Agency, Department

of Defense Dependents School, Medical Command, and Defense Commissary
Agency), as well as construction funded by South Korea. These
organizations provide funding for military construction using five
different sources of money* U. S. military construction funds, U. S.
operations and maintenance funds, U. S. nonappropriated funds, South
Korea- funded construction, and South Korea combined defense improvement
program funding. Figure 4 shows the sources of funding for $5.6 billion
that, until recently, was planned for infrastructure construction costs
for U. S. installations in South Korea during the 2002 through 2011 time
frame.

Figure 4: Sources of Funding for Planned Infrastructure Construction Costs
in South Korea, Fiscal Years 2002- 2011

Infrastructure Funding

Page 11 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

Most of the approximately $2 billion projected cost of implementing the
plan was expected to be paid for by the government of South Korea, with
much of it financed through land sales from property returned by the
United States. Figure 5 shows all planned funding sources and amounts for
the plan.

Figure 5: Land Partnership Plan Funding Sources, Fiscal Years 2002- 2011

More information on funding and sequencing actions associated with the
LPP, as originally approved, is included in appendix II.

A wide array of military operations- related facilities (command and
administrative offices, barracks, and maintenance facilities) and
dependent- related facilities and services (family housing units; schools;
base exchanges; morale, welfare, and recreation facilities; child care
programs; and youth services) have recently been constructed or are in the
process of being constructed in South Korea. Typically, as U. S.
installations overseas are vacated and turned over to host governments,
the status of forces agreements between the United States and host
governments address any residual value remaining, at the time of release,
of construction and improvements that were financed by the United

States. The agreement in South Korea differs from the agreements used in
some other overseas locations where the United States receives residual
value for returned property* such as currently in Germany* in that South

Page 12 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

Korea is not obliged to make any compensation to the United States for any
improvements made in facilities and areas or for the buildings and
structures left there.

In recent months, political dynamics in South Korea have been changing as
DOD has been reassessing future overseas basing requirements. According to
U. S. Forces Korea officials, there have always been groups in South Korea
that have criticized the U. S. presence and have claimed that

the U. S. presence hinders reconciliation between North and South Korea.
Demonstrations against American military presence increased sharply during
last year*s South Korean presidential election. South Koreans were angered
in November 2002 by a U. S. military court*s acquittal of two American
soldiers charged in association with a tragic training accident that
claimed the lives of two South Korean schoolgirls in June 2002. The South
Korean government wanted the two American soldiers who had been operating
the vehicle involved in the accident turned over to South Korean
authorities; however, they were tried in a U. S. military court. As a
result, South Koreans demonstrated against U. S. forces in Korea, carried
out isolated violence directed at U. S. soldiers, and practiced
discrimination against Americans (such as businesses refusing to serve
them). Subsequently, other groups demonstrated in support of the U. S.
government. At the same time, the United States and South Korea were
working to strengthen their alliance and to address

issues involving North Korea*s active nuclear weapons program and the
proliferation of its missile programs.

In December 2002, the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Minister of
South Korea agreed to conduct a Future of the Alliance study to assess the
roles, missions, capabilities, force structure, and stationing of U. S.
forces, including having South Korea assume the predominant role in its
defense and increasing both South Korean and U. S. involvement in regional
security cooperation. The results of the Future of the Alliance study are
not expected until later this year. In February 2003, the Secretary of
Defense testified before the Congress that the United States was
considering the relocation of U. S. troops now based within and north of
Seoul, including those near the demilitarized zone. Consideration of such
a move would be in keeping with a broader reassessment of U. S. presence
overseas that is now underway. In April 2003, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs and other U. S.
officials met with officials of the South Korean Ministry of National
Defense to discuss redeploying U. S. troops and relocating key military
bases in South Korea. Following these discussions, the U. S. and Korean
press reported Stationing of Troops

in South Korea May Be Changing

Page 13 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

that the United States would relocate from Yongsan Army Garrison in Seoul
to an area located south of Seoul. According to the U. S. Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, both South Korea and
the United States have decided that this is an issue that cannot wait any
longer for resolution. U. S. and South Korean officials are expected to
hold more discussions to finalize the realignment of U. S. troops by fall
2003. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense has recently directed
acceleration

on work that began during the development of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review, related to the global positioning of U. S. forces and their
supporting infrastructure outside the United States. In March 2003, the
Secretary of Defense requested that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop a comprehensive
and integrated presence and basing strategy for the next 10 years. An
Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will build upon multiple
DOD studies, including the Overseas Basing and Requirements Study, the
Overseas Presence Study, and the U. S. Global Posture Study. In addition,
the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will use information
from the combatant commanders to determine the appropriate location of the
infrastructure necessary to execute U. S. defense strategy. The Integrated
Global Presence and Basing Strategy is not expected to be completed until
the summer of 2003. However, we were recently told by DOD officials that
the United States will likely concentrate its forces in South Korea in far
fewer, though larger, installations than were initially envisioned under
the LPP, and that over time the forces now located north of Seoul will be
relocated south of Seoul.

Page 14 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

Although the Land Partnership Plan as approved was broad in scope, it was
designed to address only a portion of the U. S. military*s previously
existing infrastructure needs in South Korea, and it left unresolved a
number of significant land disputes. Specifically, the LPP covered about
37 percent of the construction costs planned at U. S. military
installations in South Korea over the next 10 years, encompassing about $2
billion of the $5.6 billion that the U. S. military and South Korea
planned to spend to improve the U. S. military infrastructure in South
Korea from 2002 through 2011. It was intended to resolve 55 percent, or
49, of the 89 separate land disputes that were pending in South Korea in
January 2003, 7 which was

considered a significant step forward. One example of a land dispute that
would be resolved under the LPP involves Camp Hialeah, located on the
southern tip of the Korean peninsula in the port city of Pusan, South
Korea*s second largest city. According to press reports, South Korea
wanted this base returned because of its proximity to the port and the
impediments it posed to urban redevelopment. However, no relocation
agreement could be reached until the LPP included an agreement to begin
relocating Camp Hialeah*s functions to a new site in Noksan, South Korea,
in 2008 and to close Camp Hialeah in 2011. According to press reports
attributed to an official from the South Korean Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, relocating in- city bases like Camp Hialeah would help
lessen the potential tension between U. S. forces and neighboring
communities.

Although the plan was considered a major step forward, it was not designed
to resolve a number of significant land disputes. As far back as far as
1982, negotiations over some land returns have been deadlocked and left
unresolved. For example, the relocation of Yongsan Army Garrison 8
remained unresolved because of its projected financial cost to South
Korea. The relocation of the garrison has been and continues to be a

politically sensitive, complex, and expensive issue for U. S. Forces Korea
and the South Korean government. In 1991, the governments of the United
States and South Korea signed an agreement to relocate the garrison by
1996. In 1993, the plan was suspended, largely because of the anticipated

7 Since 1969, U. S. Forces Korea has reportedly returned 87 percent of the
land it once controlled. During this time, additional land returns have
been attempted, but these were stalled when disputes arose involving
ownership and future use. 8 In addition to traditional military
facilities, Yongsan Army Garrison includes support facilities associated
with a small city, for example, a hospital, a fire station, a police
force, commissary and exchange facilities, schools, theaters, restaurants,
a hotel, sports and recreational facilities, and water and sewage
treatment plants. Land Partnership

Plan as Originally Approved Addressed a Portion of Previously Existing U.
S. Military Infrastructure Needs in South Korea

Page 15 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

high cost 9 and the lack of alternative locations for the garrison. More
than a decade later, the relocation of Yongsan is an ongoing, contentious
issue. Since the 1990s, U. S. military and South Korean officials have
held discussions on moving the military base out of the city, including
screening various suburb locations. In December 2002, the United States
and South Korea agreed on the need to find a mutually acceptable way to
relocate U. S. forces outside the city of Seoul as a result of the Future
of

the Alliance Study. DOD has had many construction projects underway in
South Korea, both within and outside of the LPP. However, DOD- sponsored
studies now underway examining future overseas presence requirements are
likely to significantly change the number and locations for U. S. military
bases in South Korea. As noted, we were recently told that the United
States will likely concentrate its forces in far fewer, though larger,
installations than were envisioned under the LPP and that, over time, the
forces would be relocated south of Seoul. 10 Therefore, a number of sites
and facilities retained under the LPP are likely to be affected. Figure 6
shows the locations of U. S. troop installations in South Korea under the
LPP, as originally approved.

9 There have been various indications that the cost of relocating Yongsan
Army Garrison could have been from $1. 7 billion to $9.5 billion (in 1993
dollars). According to DOD, there has never been a detailed or agreed upon
cost estimate for the relocation of Yongsan Army Garrison. 10 According to
press reports, the relocations would occur in two phases. During phase
one,

U. S. forces located north of Seoul would consolidate on a smaller number
of bases. During phase two, these forces and forces in the Seoul
metropolitan area would move to key hubs south of Seoul. Ongoing Studies
Are Expected to Alter

Previously Planned LPP Construction Projects

Page 16 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 6: U. S. Troop Installations Located in South Korea Under the Land
Partnership Plan

Except as otherwise provided by the LPP, South Korea is not obliged to
compensate the United States for any improvements made in facilities and
areas or for the buildings and structures left behind. This could be
particularly important because of military infrastructure projects planned
or underway in areas from which the United States is considering

relocating its troops, including Seoul*s Yongsan Army Garrison and U. S.
installations located north of Seoul, which, according to a U. S. Forces
Korea official, had recently represented $1.3 billion in ongoing or
planned

Page 17 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

construction projects. 11 For example, construction projects in Yongsan
included apartment high- rises for unaccompanied soldiers, a hospital, a
sports and recreation complex, a mini- mall, and an overpass between
Yongsan*s main and south posts. We discussed with U. S. Forces Korea
officials the need to reassess construction projects under way or planned
in South Korea and to delay the execution of some projects until better

decision- making information becomes available. Subsequently, U. S. Forces
Korea officials announced that they were reviewing all projects and that
over $1 billion in ongoing and planned construction had been put on hold.
Further, DOD recently submitted an amendment to the President*s fiscal
year 2004 budget to the Congress to cancel about $5 million of
construction projects planned for the garrison and to redirect

$212.8 million of construction planned for the garrison and northern
installations to an installation located south of Seoul.

During the initial phase of our review we identified funding and other
management challenges that could adversely affect the implementation of
the Land Partnership Plan. As we considered these issues in light of the
potential for even greater basing changes, we recognized that they could
also affect the associated U. S. military construction projects throughout
South Korea. First, the LPP is dependent on substantial amounts of funding
that South Korea expects to realize through land sales from property
returned by the United States, host- nation- funded construction, and U.
S. military construction funds. While U. S. Forces Korea officials expect
to build on this LPP framework for likely additional basing changes, the
details have not been finalized for the broader changes. As U. S. Forces
Korea revises its plans, competition for limited funding for other
priorities could become an issue. Second, U. S. Forces Korea does not have
a detailed road map to manage current and future facilities requirements
in South Korea.

The LPP, as originally approved, was dependent on substantial amounts of
South Korean funding to be realized through land sales, host- nationfunded
construction, and U. S. military construction funds. The extent to which
these sources of funding would be required and available for

broader infrastructure changes is not yet clear, particularly for the 11
According to a U. S. Forces Korea official, of the $1.3 billion in
construction projects, $491 million was for ongoing or planned for Yongsan
Army Garrison in Seoul. Challenges to

Completing Land Partnership Plan and Other Planned Construction Projects
throughout South Korea

Funding Sources and Competition for Funding Are Challenges

Page 18 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

relocation of Yongsan Army Garrison. While U. S. officials expect the
South Korean government to fund much of the cost of these additional
basing changes, details have not yet been finalized. The South Korean
government is also expected to remain responsible for providing funding

for the relocation of forces now based at the Yongsan Army Garrison
property, although those costs could be reduced by the fact that a
residual number of U. S. and United Nations personnel are expected to
remain at Yongsan. It should also be noted that the Yongsan Garrison
property is expected to be used for municipal purposes and is not subject
to resale to provide funding to support relocation of U. S. forces. At
this point,

insufficient information is available to determine precisely how many
replacement facilities will be required for U. S. troops moving out of
Yongsan Garrison and to anticipate any difficulties that might be
encountered in obtaining the funding. However, if South Korea encounters
problems or delays in acquiring needed lands and providing replacement
facilities, future projects could be delayed. Figure 7 presents the amount
of funding, as of May 2003, that the United States and South Korean
governments expected to pay for the LPP* as originally approved* by fiscal
year. The funding amounts for fiscal year 2004 and beyond are subject to
revision.

Page 19 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 7: Estimated Funding Requirements for the Land Partnership Plan

The LPP, as originally approved, was dependent on designating up to 50
percent of South Korea*s host nation funding for construction.
Historically, the stability of host nation funding from South Korea has
been subject to some uncertainty because international economic factors
have played a part in determining the level of funding. 12 South Korea
host nation payments are paid in both South Korean won and U. S. dollars;
consequently, a downturn in the South Korean economy or a sharp
fluctuation in the South Korean currency could affect the South Korean
government*s payments. For example, during South Korea*s economic downturn
in 1998, host nation payments were less than expected (the United States
received from South Korea $314.2 million of the $399 million that had been
agreed to).

12 The annual level of host- nation- funded construction is determined
between the U. S. Department of State and the South Korea Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade and is negotiated for a 3- year time frame.

Page 20 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

Designating up to 50 percent of host nation funding for the LPP would also
limit funding for readiness and other needs. Non- LPP readiness- related
infrastructure funding shortages previously identified in readiness
reports at the time of our visit to South Korea in November 2002 were
estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars and represented
competing requirements for limited funding. Such needs included Air Force
facilities at Osan and Kunsan ($ 338.2 million), Navy facilities at Pohang
and Chinhae ($ 10.3 million), and Army facilities at Humphreys, Carroll,
and Tango ($ 25.2 million). Recently, U. S. Forces Korea officials have
also expressed the desire to increase from 10 percent to 25 percent the
number of servicemembers in South Korea who are permitted to be
accompanied by their families. While these expressions have not been
finalized, such an increase could be expected to cause a significant
increase in the demand for housing, schools, and other support services
and could result in greater competition for U. S. and Korean funding. For
example, U. S. Forces Korea officials estimated that the increased demand
for housing alone would cost $900 million in traditional military
construction funding and, to reduce costs, officials were exploring a
build- to- lease program using Korean private- sector funding and host-
nation- funded construction, where possible.

In the past, funding from U. S. military construction accounts, which
represent 13 percent of funding for the LPP as originally approved, has
fluctuated. From 1990 through 1994, U. S. forces in South Korea did not
receive any military construction funds, resulting in a significant
backlog of construction projects. Implementation of the LPP was expected
to involve a closely knit series

of tasks to phase out some facilities and installations while phasing in
new facilities and expanding other facilities and installations. U. S.
Forces Korea was developing an implementation plan for each installation
encompassed by the LPP and, at the time of our visit there, was developing
a detailed, overarching implementation plan capable of integrating and
controlling the multiple, sometimes simultaneous, actions needed to

relocate U. S. forces and support their missions. According to U. S.
Forces Korea officials, such a master plan is needed to accomplish
training, maintain readiness, and control future changes.

During our visits to U. S. installations in South Korea, we found that, in
the absence of a completed master plan for implementation, installation
commanders had varying interpretations of what infrastructure changes were
to occur. U. S. Forces Korea officials told us that this was not Managing
Current

and Future Facilities Requirements Is Also a Challenge

Page 21 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

unusual, given that detailed implementation plans were still being
developed. At the same time, these officials emphasized the need for a
detailed plan to guide future projects and to help minimize the costly
changes that can occur when subsequent commanders have a different vision
of the installations* needs than their predecessors, which could lead to
new interpretations of the LPP and more changes. In light of the
potentially broader repositioning of forces in South Korea, the master
plan under development could be substantially changed; thus, a
significantly revised road map will be needed to manage future facilities
requirements and changes in South Korea.

As approved, the Land Partnership Plan represented an important step to
reduce the size of the U. S. footprint in South Korea by leveraging the
return of facilities and land to South Korea in order to obtain
replacement facilities in consolidated locations. However, subsequent
events suggest

the LPP, as originally outlined, will require significant modification.
Available data indicate that changes in the U. S. basing structure in
South Korea are likely; therefore, a significant portion of the $5.6
billion in construction projects planned over the next 10 years is being
reassessed

based on currently expected basing changes and may need to be further
reassessed when the results of ongoing overseas presence and basing
studies are completed.

The LPP was to require 10 years of intensive management to ensure
implementation progressed as planned. The master plan U. S. Forces Korea
officials are developing to guide its implementation will require
significant revision to accommodate the more comprehensive changes in
basing now anticipated and to identify funding requirements and division
of funding responsibilities between the United States and South Korea.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Commander, U. S.
Forces Korea, to (1) reassess planned construction projects in South Korea
as the results of ongoing studies associated with overseas presence and
basing are finalized and (2) prepare a detailed South Korea- wide
infrastructure master plan for the changing infrastructure for U. S.
military facilities in South Korea, updating it periodically as needed,
and identifying funding requirements and division of funding
responsibilities between the United States and South Korea. Conclusions

Recommendations for Executive Action

Page 22 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs
provided written comments to a draft of this report. DOD agreed with our
recommendations and pointed out that it is taking actions that address our
recommendations. In commenting on our recommendation to reassess planned
construction projects in South Korea, DOD stated that U. S. Forces Korea
is already reassessing all planned construction in South Korea and will
ensure that all planned construction projects support decisions regarding
global presence and basing strategy. In commenting on our recommendation
for a detailed South Korea- wide infrastructure master plan, DOD stated
that U. S. Forces Korea is already developing master plans for all
enduring installations and, once decisions have been reached on global
presence and basing strategy, they will ensure that all master plans are
adjusted to support these decisions. DOD*s comments are reprinted in
appendix IV. DOD also provided a separate technical comment, and we
revised the report to reflect it. We are sending copies of this report to
the appropriate congressional

committees, the Commander, U. S. Forces Korea, and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. The report is also available at no charge on GAO*s
Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this
report, please contact me at (202) 512- 5581. Key contributors to this
report were Ron Berteotti, Roger Tomlinson, Nelsie Alcoser, Susan
Woodward, and Ken Patton.

Barry W. Holman Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Agency
Comments

and Our Evaluation

Page 23 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

List of Congressional Committees The Honorable John W. Warner, Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed
Services United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens, Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United
States Senate

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison, Chairman The Honorable Diane Feinstein
Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Military Construction Committee on
Appropriations United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter, Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry Lewis, Chairman The Honorable John P. Murtha Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House
of Representatives

The Honorable Joe Knollenberg, Chairman The Honorable Chet Edwards Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Military Construction Committee on
Appropriations House of Representatives

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 24 GAO- 03- 643 Defense
Infrastructure

To determine the scope and cost of the plan in relation to total
infrastructure issues in South Korea, we analyzed provisions of the Land
Partnership Plan (LPP), identified the scope and cost of construction
projects outside of the LPP, compared the scope and cost of LPP
construction projects to the scope and cost of all construction projects
in South Korea, and analyzed some of the key unresolved infrastructure
issues not included in the plan, such as the relocation of U. S. troops
from Yongsan Army Garrison. We met with officials from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Logistics Directorate and Strategy Division); Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (Office of Asia- Pacific Affairs); Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment); U. S. Pacific
Command, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, U. S. Army Pacific, Marine
Forces Pacific, U. S. Pacific Fleet; U. S. Forces Korea, Eighth U. S. Army
and 7th Air Force;

U. S. Department of State; U. S. Embassy (South Korea); and South Korea*s
Defense Ministry to document their input to the plan. We visited 16 U. S.
military installations and facilities in South Korea that are affected by
the

plan. We selected these installations and facilities because they provided
a cross- section of the activities that are covered by the plan (i. e.,
some that will be closed, some that will be scaled back, some that will be
expanded, some where new construction will take place, and some possible
new installation locations). We also visited land transfer sites that
remain unresolved and military construction projects that are not
addressed in the plan to gain an understanding and perspective on the wide
range of infrastructure issues affecting U. S. troops stationed in South
Korea.

To determine the implications of potential basing changes on the plan and
other construction projects in South Korea, we obtained the views of
officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Logistics Directorate and
Strategy

Division); Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Office of Asia- Pacific
Affairs); and U. S. Forces Korea on the potential impact of changing
defense policies. We conducted a literature review of U. S. and South
Korean publications to collect information on the LPP and possible basing
changes in South Korea. We also attended various congressional hearings,
which discussed funding for U. S. Forces Korea construction projects and
potential basing changes. We used this information to identify the costs

of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving military
infrastructure in areas where there is uncertainty about future U. S.
presence* such as Yongsan Army Garrison and U. S. installations located
north of Seoul. We did not verify the accuracy and completeness of this
information.

To identify implementation challenges associated with the plan that could
affect future U. S. military construction projects in South Korea, we met
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 25 GAO- 03- 643 Defense
Infrastructure

with officials from the above organizations and reviewed the Status of
Forces Agreement, an agreement under Article IV of the Mutual Defense
Treaty between South Korea and the United States, and other related
agreements and defense guidance. We discussed challenges that must be
addressed during implementation of the LPP and implementation issues
associated with the plan that could affect future construction projects
throughout South Korea.

We performed our review from September 2002 through May 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 26 GAO- 03- 643
Defense Infrastructure

The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) provides a comprehensive plan for more
efficient and effective stationing of U. S. Forces in South Korea. The LPP
is intended to strengthen the South Korea- U. S. alliance, improve the
readiness posture of combined forces, reduce the overall amount of land
granted for U. S. Forces Korea use, and enhance public support for both
the South Korean government and U. S. Forces Korea, while positioning U.
S. forces to meet alliance security requirements well into the future.

According to U. S. Forces Korea officials, LPP imperatives are as follows:
 The agreement should be based on readiness and security, not the amount

of land involved.  The agreement should be comprehensive, allowing for
land issues that

cannot be resolved independently to be resolved as part of a package and
ensuring stationing decisions that fit into a comprehensive vision for the
disposition of U. S. forces.  When new land and facilities are ready for
use, U. S. Forces Korea can release old land and facilities. U. S. Forces
Korea needs all existing

facilities and areas and can only return them when replacement facilities
are available or the requirement is met in another manner.  The agreement
should be binding under the Status of Forces Agreement.

The LPP is not just an *agreement in principle* but also a commitment to
take action, and it operates within the Status of Forces Agreement* which
means there are no new rules.  The agreement should be self- financing*
the costs of the LPP must be

shared between the United States and South Korea. U. S. funding is
provided from the military construction account. The South Korean
government provides host nation funds and funding obtained from sales of
property returned to South Korea by the United States.

As a general rule, the United States funds the relocation of units from
camps the United States wishes to close, and South Korea funds the
relocation of units from camps that South Korea has asked the United
States to close. The execution of the LPP is shown in figure 1. The LPP
has been negotiated under the authority of the Joint Committee

under the Status of Forces Agreement. The Status of Forces Agreement gives
the Joint Committee the authority and responsibility to determine the
facilities and areas required for U. S. use in support of the United
States/ South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. The Joint Committee established
the Ad- hoc Subcommittee for LPP to develop and manage the LPP. The LPP
components address installations, training areas, and safety easements.
Appendix II: Summary of the Land

Partnership Plan

Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 27 GAO- 03- 643
Defense Infrastructure

Installations: The LPP reduces the number of U. S. installations from 41
to 23 and consolidates U. S. forces onto enduring installations. The LPP
establishes a timeline for the grant of new land, the construction of new
facilities, and the closure of installations. Figure 8 illustrates the
sequence in which new lands are to be granted to the United States and
their relationship to facilities that will be returned to South Korea from
calendar years 2002 through 2011.

Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 28 GAO- 03- 643
Defense Infrastructure

Figure 8: Installation Grants and Returns under the Land Partnership Plan,
by Calendar Year

Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 29 GAO- 03- 643
Defense Infrastructure

Training Areas: The LPP returns U. S. training areas in exchange for
guaranteed time on South Korean ranges and training areas. To ensure the
continued readiness of U. S. Forces Korea, the United States agrees to
return certain granted facilities and areas and to accept the grant of
joint use of certain South Korea military facilities and areas on a
limited time- share basis as determined by the Status of Forces Agreement
Joint Committee. The United States is expected to return approximately
32,186 acres, or 39,396,618 pyong, 1 of granted training areas. Table 1
shows the exclusive use of existing grants retained by U. S. Forces Korea.
Table 1: Exclusive Use Grants Retained by the United States

Facility Acres

Rodriquez Local Training Area #1 1.0 Story Range 1,756.0 New Mexico Range
116.0 Warrior Training Base 19.0 Warrior Training Base Ammunition Holding
Area 1.2 Dagmar North 1,391.0 Mike* November 3,008.0 Papa* Oscar* Romeo
3,353.4 North Star 30.2 Chaparral Local Training Area 115.1 Local Training
Area 130 63.7 Local Training Area 140 6.4 Rodriquez Gun Local Training
Area #1 17.5 Rodriquez Gun Local Training Area #2 8.3 Rodriguez Gun Local
Training Area #3 7.6 Humphreys Range 6.0 Training Areas 79.0 Bayonne
Signal Training Area 19.8 Rodriguez Watkins Local Training Area 45.1
Rodriquez Live Fire Complex 3,343.0 Masan Range 372.0 Koon- ni 438.3
Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

1 Korean unit of measure, 1 pyong = 3. 3 square meters or 35 square feet.

Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 30 GAO- 03- 643
Defense Infrastructure

Table 2 shows training areas that will be provided on a temporary basis to
U. S. Forces Korea.

Table 2: Temporary Grants Facility Acres

Local Training Area 320 247.0 Drop Zone Cory 186.0 Non Commissioned
Officer Academy Training Area 364.0 Drop Zone Rigger Pilsung Strafing
Range 619.8

0 Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

Table 3 shows new safety easements to be designated for training areas.
Table 3: Training Area Easements Facility Acres

New Mexico Restrictive Easement 128 Warrior Training Ammunition Holding
Area Easement 2619.3 Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

Table 4 shows training areas that will be returned to South Korea under
the LPP.

Table 4: Total Release of U. S. Training Areas Facility Acres

Rodriquez Local Training Area #3 3.0 Rodriquez Local Training Area #2
100.0 Rodriquez Local Training Area #4 10.0 Kansas Range 71.0 Oklahoma
Range 15.0 North Carolina, Air Mobile, Edwards Local Training Area, TA-
504/ 520 1,302.0 Dagmar & S, Squads, Palmers, and Oklahoma 16,747.0 River
Crossing 16.0 Camp Page Local Training Area 302.0 Tango 2,952.0 KCT- 43,
Yankee, Whiskey N.( actual) (written record) 8,920.0

2,761.0 Stanton Local Training Area 15.0 Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 31 GAO- 03- 643
Defense Infrastructure

Table 5 shows training areas where parts of the land will be returned to
South Korea.

Table 5: Partial Release of Grants Facility Acres

Texas Local Training Area and Zulu LA 1,133.0 Mike- A 480.0 Romeo 120.0
Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

Table 6 shows training facilities and areas that the South Korean
government is expected to grant to the U. S. for joint use for the time
specified.

Table 6: Joint Use of South Korean Military Training Facilities and Areas
Facility Weeks Days

Typhoon Range 1 week per quarter 24 Chungyong Range 2 weeks per year 12
Bisung Range 1.5 weeks per year 9 St. Barbara Range* MLRS Live Fire 4
weeks per year 24 St. Barbara Range* Paladin Live Fire 4 weeks per year 24
Korea Training Area/ Twin Bridges Training Area 13 weeks per year 91
Seung- Jin Nightmare Range 8 weeks per year 48 Capital Defense Command
Bangpae Range 2 weeks per quarter 48 Jungpyung M16 8 weeks per year 48
Jungpyung 40MM Grenade Launcher Range 4 weeks per year 24 Jungpyung Hand
Grenade 2 weeks per year 12 Chochiwon Range 1 week per quarter 24 Sokung
(Seogok) Range 5 weeks per year 30 Angang Range 1 week per quarter 24 Kumi
Range 4 weeks per year 24 Susan- ri Range 6 weeks per year 36 R- 222 1
week per quarter 24 R- 227 4 weeks per quarter 96 R- 233 6 weeks per
quarter 144 R- 228 6 weeks per quarter 144 Han River Cross Site 2 weeks
per quarter 48 Training Area Jerry 2 weeks per quarter 48 Training Area
Nightmare 2 weeks per quarter 48 Training Area Tom 2 weeks per quarter 48
Saetue Field Training Area 2 weeks per quarter 48 TAA No Name (Munmak) 2
weeks per quarter 48

Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 32 GAO- 03- 643
Defense Infrastructure

Facility Weeks Days

Kaup Mountain Training Area (H- 710) 1 week per quarter 24 Kumdan Mountain
Training Area 1 week per quarter 24 Puksung Mountain Training Area 1 week
per quarter 24 Sung Mountain Training Area (H- 471) 1 week per quarter 24
Taeki Mountain Training Area 1 week per quarter 24 Yongmun Mountain
Training Area 1 week per quarter 24 Hwangyong Park Tactical Training Area
1 week per quarter 24 Hampyong Tactical Training Area 1 week per quarter
24 Jinwon Tank Tactical Training Area 2 weeks per quarter 48 Mu Juk
Training Area 26 weeks per year 182 Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

Safety Easements: According to U. S. Forces Korea officials, a safety
easement is a defined distance from an explosive area that personnel and
structures must be kept away from and is directly related to the quantity
and types of explosives and ammunition present. The presence of Korean
citizens in areas requiring explosive safety easements has placed them at

risk of injury or death in the event of an explosion. Tables 7, 8, and 9
show the various tiers of easements established under the LPP at U. S.
military installations. Upper tier easements are those required at
enduring installations; middle tier easements are required during
armistice, but will not be required after a change in the armistice
condition; and lower tier

easements are those required at closing installations. U. S. Forces Korea
shall enforce safety easements inside U. S. installations, while South
Korea will enforce safety easements outside U. S. installations.

Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 33 GAO- 03- 643
Defense Infrastructure

Table 7: Upper Tier Easements Installation Explosive site

Osan Air Force Base Munitions storage area (Delta site) Patriot Batteries
on Chin Wi River Hot cargo pad easement extension Kunsan Air Force Base 2
Munitions storage areas

Hot cargo pad and patriot battery Camp Humphreys Rearm point Camp Casey
Ammunition storage area 21 Ammunition storage area 25 Camp Stanley
Ammunition storage area 18 (tunnel)

Ammunition storage area 9 Camp Walker Ammunition storage area Camp Hovey
Ammunition storage area Yongsan Ammunition storage area Source: U. S.
Forces Korea.

Table 8: Middle Tier Easements Installation Explosive site

Camp Bonifas Ammunition storage area (main post) Ammunition storage area
(east) Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

Table 9: Lower Tier Easements Installation Explosive site

Camp LaGuardia Ammunition storage area Camp Howze Ammunition storage area
Camp Edwards Ammunition storage area Camp Essayons Ammunition storage area
Camp Colbern Ammunition storage area Camp Stanton Ammunition storage area
Camp Greaves Ammunition storage area Camp Garry Owen Ammunition storage
area Camp Eagle Ammunition storage area Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 34 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 35 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure (350267)

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U. S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.
C. 20548 GAO*s Mission Obtaining Copies of

GAO Reports and Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal
Programs Public Affairs
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