    Defense Infrastructure: Basing Uncertainties Necessitate
    Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans in South Korea
    (15-JUL-03, GAO-03-643).

    The U.S.-South Korean Land Partnership Plan (LPP), signed in
    March 2002, was designed to consolidate U.S. installations,
    improve combat readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen
    the U.S.-South Korean alliance by addressing some of the causes
    of periodic tension associated with the U.S. presence in South
    Korea. The Senate report on military construction appropriations
    for fiscal year 2003 directed GAO to review the LPP. GAO adjusted
    its review to also address the effect of ongoing reassessments of
    U.S. overseas presence upon the LPP and other infrastructure
    needs. In this report, GAO assessed (1) the scope of the LPP, (2)
    the implications on the LPP and other construction projects of
    proposals to change basing in South Korea, and (3) implementation
    challenges associated with the LPP that could affect future U.S.
    military construction projects in South Korea.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-643
        ACCNO:   A07512
      TITLE:     Defense Infrastructure: Basing Uncertainties Necessitate
    Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans in South Korea
         DATE:   07/15/2003
      SUBJECT:   Construction (process)
    	     Construction costs
    	     Land management
    	     Military facility construction
    	     International relations
    	     South Korea
    	     United States-South Korean Land
    	     Partnership Plan

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    GAO-03-643

    Report to Congressional Committees

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

    July 2003 DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

    Basing Uncertainties Necessitate Reevaluation of U. S. Construction Plans
    in South Korea

    GAO- 03- 643

    Although broad in scope, the LPP was not designed to resolve all U. S.
    military infrastructure issues. Specifically, the plan was intended to
    resolve 49 of the 89 separate land disputes that were pending in South
    Korea. Of the land disputes the plan did not address, the most politically
    significant, complex, and expensive dispute involves the potential
    relocation of U. S. forces from Yongsan Army Garrison, located in the
    Seoul metropolitan area. As a result, the LPP, as approved, covered about
    37 percent of the $5.6 billion in construction costs planned at U. S.
    military installations in South Korea over the next 10 years.

    Ongoing reassessments of U. S. overseas presence and basing requirements
    could diminish the need for and alter the locations of many construction
    projects in South Korea, both those associated with the LPP and those
    unrelated to it. For example, over $1 billion of ongoing and planned
    construction associated with improving military infrastructure at Yongsan
    Army Garrison and U. S. installations located north of Seoul* areas where
    there is uncertainty about future U. S. presence* has recently been put on
    hold, canceled, or redirected to an installation located south of Seoul.

    GAO identified some key challenges that could adversely affect the
    implementation of the LPP and future U. S. military construction projects
    throughout South Korea. First, the plan relies on various funding sources,
    including funding realized through land sales from property returned by
    the United States. The extent to which these sources of funding would be
    required and available for broader infrastructure changes is not yet
    clear. Second, a master plan would be needed to guide future military
    construction to reposition U. S. forces and basing in South Korea.

    Ongoing and Planned Construction on U. S. Installations in South Korea, as
    of March 2003

    The U. S.- South Korean Land Partnership Plan (LPP), signed in March 2002,
    was designed to consolidate U. S. installations, improve combat readiness,
    enhance public safety, and

    strengthen the U. S.- South Korean alliance by addressing some of the
    causes of periodic tension

    associated with the U. S. presence in South Korea. The Senate report on
    military construction appropriations for fiscal year 2003 directed GAO to
    review the LPP. GAO adjusted its review to also address the effect of
    ongoing reassessments of U. S. overseas presence upon the LPP and other
    infrastructure needs. In this report, GAO assessed

    (1) the scope of the LPP, (2) the implications on the LPP and other
    construction projects of proposals to change basing in South Korea, and
    (3) implementation challenges associated with the LPP that could affect
    future U. S. military construction projects in

    South Korea. GAO recommends (1) a reassessment of construction projects
    planned or under way in South Korea as ongoing studies of overseas
    presence and basing are finalized and (2) the development of a detailed
    South Korea- wide infrastructure master plan to guide future construction
    planning. DOD agreed with GAO*s recommendations and indicated actions it
    is taking to address them.

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 643. To view the full product,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact Barry W. Holman at (202) 512- 5581 or holmanb@ gao.
    gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 643, a report to

    congressional committees

    July 2003

    DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

    Basing Uncertainties Necessitate Reevaluation of U. S. Construction Plans
    in South Korea

    Page i GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
    Background 5 Korea Land Partnership Plan 7 Land Partnership Plan as
    Originally Approved Addressed a Portion

    of Previously Existing U. S. Military Infrastructure Needs in South Korea
    14 Ongoing Studies Are Expected to Alter Previously Planned LPP
    Construction Projects 15 Challenges to Completing Land Partnership Plan
    and Other

    Planned Construction Projects throughout South Korea 17 Conclusions 21
    Recommendations for Executive Action 21 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
    22 Appendix I Scope and Methodology 24

    Appendix II Summary of the Land Partnership Plan 26

    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 34

    Tables

    Table 1: Exclusive Use Grants Retained by the United States 29 Table 2:
    Temporary Grants 30 Table 3: Training Area Easements 30 Table 4: Total
    Release of U. S. Training Areas 30 Table 5: Partial Release of Grants 31
    Table 6: Joint Use of South Korean Military Training Facilities and Areas
    31 Table 7: Upper Tier Easements 33 Table 8: Middle Tier Easements 33
    Table 9: Lower Tier Easements 33 Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure Figures

    Figure 1: Quonset Hut Used for Barracks at Camp Greaves 6 Figure 2: U. S.
    Installations Located in the Seoul Metropolitan Area 7 Figure 3: Execution
    of the Land Partnership Plan 9 Figure 4: Sources of Funding for Planned
    Infrastructure Construction Costs in South Korea, Fiscal Years 2002- 2011
    10 Figure 5: Land Partnership Plan Funding Sources, Fiscal Years 2002-
    2011 11 Figure 6: U. S. Troop Installations Located in South Korea Under
    the Land Partnership Plan 16 Figure 7: Estimated Funding Requirements for
    the Land Partnership Plan 19 Figure 8: Installation Grants and Returns
    under the Land Partnership Plan, by Calendar Year 28 Abbreviations

    DOD Department of Defense LPP Land Partnership Plan

    This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
    copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
    materials separately from GAO*s product.

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    July 15, 2003 Congressional Committees Military officials from the United
    States and the Republic of Korea (hereafter referred to as South Korea)
    signed an agreement known as the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) on March 29,
    2002. The LPP was described by the parties to the agreement as a
    cooperative U. S.- South Korean effort to consolidate U. S. installations
    and training areas, improve combat readiness, enhance public safety, and
    strengthen the U. S.- South Korean alliance by addressing some of the
    causes of periodic tension and discontent among South Koreans regarding
    the U. S. presence in South Korea. The LPP, as originally approved,
    promised to reduce the number of U. S. military troop installations from
    41 to 23 and to consolidate many U. S. facilities north of Seoul (the
    capital of South Korea), along with other

    facilities south of Seoul. Under the plan, financing of new construction
    to support consolidations and relocations of U. S. forces in South Korea
    was expected to rely on revenue generated from land sales following U. S.
    return of selected facilities and training lands to South Korea, on host
    nation funding, and on U. S. military construction funding. The LPP was
    predicated on continuing to maintain U. S. bases and facilities north of
    Seoul (near the demilitarized zone that separates North Korea from South
    Korea). Since passage of the LPP by the South Korea National Assembly on
    October 30, 2002, there have been various indications that the United
    States is re- examining how and where it may want to station its forces
    overseas in the future. Prominent among them have been statements by U. S.
    officials that the United States is considering a range of options for its
    troops in South Korea, including repositioning them away from Seoul and
    from areas north of Seoul (near the demilitarized zone).

    The Senate report on military construction appropriations for fiscal year
    2003 1 directed us to review the LPP to provide the Congress with a better
    understanding of the plan, associated costs, burden- sharing implications,
    and other related factors that the plan may not address. In light of
    ongoing reassessments of the U. S. presence overseas, which could affect
    basing requirements, we adjusted our review to also address the effect of
    potential basing changes upon the LPP and the U. S. military*s
    infrastructure in South Korea. This report assesses (1) the scope and cost
    of the LPP in relation to total infrastructure issues in South Korea, (2)
    the

    1 S. Rpt. No. 107- 202, at 26 (2002).

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    Page 2 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    implications on the LPP and other construction projects in South Korea of
    recent proposals to reposition U. S. forces in South Korea, and (3) the
    implementation challenges associated with the LPP that could affect future
    U. S. military construction projects in South Korea. Briefings were
    provided to various congressional defense committee staffs regarding our
    preliminary findings during our review. This report updates that
    information and provides our final analysis.

    In conducting this review, we met with officials responsible for
    developing and managing the LPP and military construction projects
    throughout South Korea, and we analyzed projected costs and funding
    streams. We visited 16 U. S. military installations and facilities in
    South Korea that would be affected by the plan, including sites that will
    be closed, partially closed, or expanded. We also visited land transfer
    sites that remain unresolved and military construction projects that are
    not addressed in the plan, and we met with officials from the Department
    of Defense and the Department of State to identify challenges that could
    also affect future military construction projects throughout South Korea.
    In addition, we interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the
    Department of Defense, which provided perspective on the department*s
    studies concerning a potential change to the role, size, and basing of U.
    S. forces in South Korea. More information on the scope and methodology of
    our work

    is presented in appendix I. Although broad in scope, the Land Partnership
    Plan, as approved, was not designed to entirely resolve U. S. military
    infrastructure issues, and it did not address some of the more challenging
    land disputes, such as the relocation of U. S. forces from the Seoul
    metropolitan area. However, the LPP represented a step forward in
    addressing U. S. military infrastructure issues in South Korea related to
    improving servicemembers* quality of life, combat readiness, and relations
    between South Korea and U. S. forces. From a cost standpoint, the LPP
    encompassed about $2 billion of the $5.6 billion that the U. S. military
    and South Korea planned to spend to improve the U. S. military
    infrastructure in South Korea from 2002 through 2011. The LPP was intended
    to resolve 49 of the 89 separate land disputes (55 percent) that were
    pending in South Korea in January 2003. Of the land disputes the plan did
    not address, the most politically significant, complex, and expensive
    dispute involving the potential relocation of U. S. forces Results in
    Brief

    Page 3 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    from Yongsan Army Garrison, located in the Seoul metropolitan area. 2 A
    previous agreement between the United States and South Korea in 1991
    called for the relocation of U. S. troops stationed there and the return
    of garrison lands and facilities to South Korea. The South Korean
    government had agreed to pay for the costs of the relocation; however, the
    relocation did not occur due to its anticipated high cost. Ongoing
    reassessments of U. S. overseas presence and basing requirements

    are expected to change U. S. basing in South Korea significantly beyond
    that envisioned under the LPP and would diminish the need for and alter
    the locations of many construction projects, both those associated with
    the plan and those unrelated to it; in addition, costs could increase. The
    Department of Defense is conducting multiple studies related to future
    overseas presence, and available information indicates that at least
    tentative decisions have been made to reposition, over time, U. S. troops
    away from facilities in Seoul and away from areas north of Seoul. The full
    results of these studies and related negotiations may not be available for
    several months; consequently, sufficient information is not currently

    available to determine the full magnitude of modifications to existing
    basing arrangements that will be required. However, we were told that the
    United States would likely concentrate its forces in far fewer, though
    larger, installations than were envisioned under the LPP. According to a
    U. S. Forces Korea official, until recently there had been about $1.3
    billion of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving
    military

    infrastructure at Yongsan Army Garrison and U. S. installations located
    north of Seoul* areas where there is uncertainty about the future U. S.
    presence. However, U. S. Forces Korea officials recently announced that
    they were reviewing these projects and that over $1 billion of the ongoing

    and planned construction had been put on hold. Further, the Department of
    Defense recently submitted a budget amendment to the Congress to cancel
    about $5 million of construction projects planned for the garrison and to
    redirect $212.8 million of construction planned for the garrison and
    northern installations to an installation located south of Seoul.

    2 Yongsan Army Garrison is surrounded by residential and commercial high-
    rises. Yongsan Army Garrison is the headquarters for the U. S. military
    presence in South Korea, including headquarters facilities for the United
    Nations Command, the United States- Republic of Korea Combined Forces
    Command, United States Forces Korea, and the Eighth United States Army.
    Yongsan employs 2,500 U. S. military personnel, 1,000 U. S. civilians,
    6,000 Korean civilians, and more than 1, 000 South Korean military
    personnel. In addition, 3,500 military and civilian employees reside on
    the property or live in neighborhoods adjacent to the garrison.

    Page 4 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    Our review of the LPP identified some key challenges that could have
    adversely affected the implementation of the LPP, as originally approved,
    and which also could affect future U. S. military construction projects
    throughout South Korea with the larger- scale changes now likely. First,
    the plan is dependent on substantial amounts of funding that South Korea
    expects to realize through land sales from property returned by the United
    States, host- nation- funded construction, and U. S. military construction
    funds. The extent to which these sources of funding would be available to
    support broader infrastructure changes is unclear, particularly the
    relocation of forces from Yongsan Army Garrison. While the South Korean
    government is expected to remain responsible for providing funding for
    this relocation, the Yongsan Army Garrison property reportedly would be
    used for municipal purposes and would not be subject to resale to provide
    funding to support relocation of U. S. forces, as is the approach to
    basing changes under the LPP. At this point, insufficient information is
    available to determine precisely how many replacement facilities will be
    required for U. S. troops moving out of Yongsan Army Garrison and
    facilities north of Seoul and any difficulties that might be encountered
    in obtaining the funding. The LPP also relied on using up to 50 percent of
    South Korea*s host nation funding, 3 which would have limited the
    availability of these funds for other uses. To what extent these funds
    would be used for additional troop relocations is not yet clear. Second,
    implementation of the LPP involves a closely knit series of tasks to phase
    out some facilities and installations while phasing in new facilities and
    expanding other facilities and installations. U. S. Forces Korea was
    developing a master plan to manage this complex task and control future
    changes to guide its implementation of the LPP, but in light of the
    expected broader repositioning of forces in South Korea much greater
    changes in the numbers of affected bases and locations are anticipated.
    These changes, not yet finalized, suggest the need for a revised road map
    to manage and guide future facilities requirements and changes in South
    Korea.

    We are making recommendations in this report to the Secretary of Defense
    to (1) require a reassessment of planned construction projects in South
    Korea as the results of ongoing studies associated with overseas presence
    and basing are finalized and (2) prepare a detailed South Korea- wide
    infrastructure master plan to manage the changing infrastructure plans

    3 The host- nation- funded construction program is part of the South Korea
    burden- sharing arrangement covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty between
    South Korea and the United States and represents the largest single source
    of major construction funds for U. S. Forces Korea.

    Page 5 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    for South Korea. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department
    of Defense agreed with our recommendations and pointed out that it is
    taking actions to ensure that all planned construction projects support
    decisions regarding global presence and basing strategy and that all
    master plans are adjusted to support these decisions.

    U. S. interests in South Korea involve a wide range of security, economic,
    and political concerns. The United States has remained committed to
    maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula since the 1950 to 1953 Korean
    War. 4 Although most of the property that the United States once
    controlled

    has been returned to South Korea, the United States maintains about 37,000
    troops in South Korea, which are currently scattered across 41 troop
    installations and an additional 54 small camps and support sites.

    According to U. S. Forces Korea officials, many of the facilities there
    are obsolete, poorly maintained, and in disrepair to the extent that the
    living and working conditions in South Korea are considered to be the
    worst in the Department of Defense (DOD). 5 We observed many of these
    conditions during our visits to U. S. facilities and installations in
    South Korea. While improvements have been made in recent years, U. S.
    military personnel still use, as shown in figure 1, some Korean War- era
    Quonset huts for housing.

    4 In 1954, the United States and South Korea agreed to the Mutual Defense
    Treaty between South Korea and the United States. 5 Examples of poor
    living and working conditions include daily electrical outages; air
    conditioning failures during the summer; inadequate heating during the
    winter, including unheated showers and latrines; and the presence of
    asbestos in family housing units. Background

    Page 6 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    Figure 1: Quonset Hut Used for Barracks at Camp Greaves

    Improving overall facilities used by the United States in South Korea will
    require an enormous investment. At the same time, rapid growth and
    urbanization in South Korea during the last several decades have created a
    greater demand for land and increased encroachments on areas used by U. S.
    forces. Consequently, many of the smaller U. S. camps and training areas
    that were originally located in isolated areas are now in the middle of
    large urban centers, where their presence has caused friction with local

    residents; urban locations also limit the ability of U. S. forces to train
    effectively. Figure 2 shows the boundaries of Yongsan Army Garrison and
    other U. S. installations that have become encircled by the city of Seoul.

    Page 7 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    Figure 2: U. S. Installations Located in the Seoul Metropolitan Area

    Historically, DOD reports difficulties filling its military personnel
    assignments in South Korea, which are generally 1- year hardship tours in
    which 90 percent of the assigned military personnel are unaccompanied by
    their families. A DOD survey conducted in 2001 found that Army and Air
    Force personnel considered South Korea as the least desirable assignment
    and that many soldiers were avoiding service in South Korea by various
    means, including retirement and declining to accept command assignments.
    U. S. Forces Korea has wanted to make South Korea an assignment of choice
    by improving living and working conditions, modifying assignment policies
    to increase accompanied tours to 25 percent by 2010, and reducing the out-
    of- pocket expenses for personnel to maintain a second household in South
    Korea. To address these problems, military officials from the United
    States and

    South Korea signed the Land Partnership Plan on March 29, 2002. The LPP,
    as originally approved, was described as a cooperative U. S.- South Korean
    effort to consolidate U. S. installations and training areas, improve
    combat readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U. S.- South
    Korean

    alliance. The United States views the plan as a binding agreement under
    the Status of Forces Agreement, not as a separate treaty. However, U. S.
    Forces Korea officials told us that South Korea views the plan as a Korea
    Land

    Partnership Plan

    Page 8 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    treaty requiring approval by the South Korea National Assembly and that
    approval occurred on October 30, 2002.

    The three components of the plan are as follows:  Installations*
    establishes a timeline for the grant of new land, the

    construction of new facilities, and the closure of installations. The plan
    calls for the number of U. S. military installations to drop from 41 to
    23. To accomplish this, the military will close or partially close some
    sites, while enlarging or creating other installations.  Training areas*
    returns training areas in exchange for guaranteed time on South Korean
    ranges and training areas. The plan calls for the

    consolidation and protection of remaining U. S. training areas.  Safety
    easements 6 *acknowledges that South Korean citizens are at risk of injury
    or death in the event of an explosion of U. S. weapons, provides a
    prioritized list of required safety easements, and establishes a procedure
    and timeline for enforcing the easements.

    The costs of the LPP must be shared between the United States and South
    Korea. U. S. funding is provided from the military construction and
    operations and maintenance accounts and from nonappropriated funds. The
    South Korean government provides host nation funds and funding obtained
    from sales of property returned to South Korea by the United States. As a
    general rule, the United States funds the relocation of units from camps
    that it wishes to close, and South Korea funds the relocation of units
    from camps South Korea has asked to be closed. The execution of

    the LPP is shown on figure 3. 6 The LPP defines a safety easement as the
    distance from an explosive area that personnel and structures must be kept
    and is directly related to the quantity and types of explosives and
    ammunition present.

    Page 9 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    Figure 3: Execution of the Land Partnership Plan The target date for the
    completion of the LPP was December 31, 2011, although the timetable and
    the scale could be adjusted by mutual agreement. More information on the
    plan as originally envisioned is included in appendix II.

    Page 10 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    U. S. military infrastructure funding in South Korea involves multiple
    organizations and sources. It involves 10 organizations from the United
    States (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations, Army and
    Air Force Exchange Service, Defense Logistics Agency, Department

    of Defense Dependents School, Medical Command, and Defense Commissary
    Agency), as well as construction funded by South Korea. These
    organizations provide funding for military construction using five
    different sources of money* U. S. military construction funds, U. S.
    operations and maintenance funds, U. S. nonappropriated funds, South
    Korea- funded construction, and South Korea combined defense improvement
    program funding. Figure 4 shows the sources of funding for $5.6 billion
    that, until recently, was planned for infrastructure construction costs
    for U. S. installations in South Korea during the 2002 through 2011 time
    frame.

    Figure 4: Sources of Funding for Planned Infrastructure Construction Costs
    in South Korea, Fiscal Years 2002- 2011

    Infrastructure Funding

    Page 11 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    Most of the approximately $2 billion projected cost of implementing the
    plan was expected to be paid for by the government of South Korea, with
    much of it financed through land sales from property returned by the
    United States. Figure 5 shows all planned funding sources and amounts for
    the plan.

    Figure 5: Land Partnership Plan Funding Sources, Fiscal Years 2002- 2011

    More information on funding and sequencing actions associated with the
    LPP, as originally approved, is included in appendix II.

    A wide array of military operations- related facilities (command and
    administrative offices, barracks, and maintenance facilities) and
    dependent- related facilities and services (family housing units; schools;
    base exchanges; morale, welfare, and recreation facilities; child care
    programs; and youth services) have recently been constructed or are in the
    process of being constructed in South Korea. Typically, as U. S.
    installations overseas are vacated and turned over to host governments,
    the status of forces agreements between the United States and host
    governments address any residual value remaining, at the time of release,
    of construction and improvements that were financed by the United

    States. The agreement in South Korea differs from the agreements used in
    some other overseas locations where the United States receives residual
    value for returned property* such as currently in Germany* in that South

    Page 12 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    Korea is not obliged to make any compensation to the United States for any
    improvements made in facilities and areas or for the buildings and
    structures left there.

    In recent months, political dynamics in South Korea have been changing as
    DOD has been reassessing future overseas basing requirements. According to
    U. S. Forces Korea officials, there have always been groups in South Korea
    that have criticized the U. S. presence and have claimed that

    the U. S. presence hinders reconciliation between North and South Korea.
    Demonstrations against American military presence increased sharply during
    last year*s South Korean presidential election. South Koreans were angered
    in November 2002 by a U. S. military court*s acquittal of two American
    soldiers charged in association with a tragic training accident that
    claimed the lives of two South Korean schoolgirls in June 2002. The South
    Korean government wanted the two American soldiers who had been operating
    the vehicle involved in the accident turned over to South Korean
    authorities; however, they were tried in a U. S. military court. As a
    result, South Koreans demonstrated against U. S. forces in Korea, carried
    out isolated violence directed at U. S. soldiers, and practiced
    discrimination against Americans (such as businesses refusing to serve
    them). Subsequently, other groups demonstrated in support of the U. S.
    government. At the same time, the United States and South Korea were
    working to strengthen their alliance and to address

    issues involving North Korea*s active nuclear weapons program and the
    proliferation of its missile programs.

    In December 2002, the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Minister of
    South Korea agreed to conduct a Future of the Alliance study to assess the
    roles, missions, capabilities, force structure, and stationing of U. S.
    forces, including having South Korea assume the predominant role in its
    defense and increasing both South Korean and U. S. involvement in regional
    security cooperation. The results of the Future of the Alliance study are
    not expected until later this year. In February 2003, the Secretary of
    Defense testified before the Congress that the United States was
    considering the relocation of U. S. troops now based within and north of
    Seoul, including those near the demilitarized zone. Consideration of such
    a move would be in keeping with a broader reassessment of U. S. presence
    overseas that is now underway. In April 2003, the Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs and other U. S.
    officials met with officials of the South Korean Ministry of National
    Defense to discuss redeploying U. S. troops and relocating key military
    bases in South Korea. Following these discussions, the U. S. and Korean
    press reported Stationing of Troops

    in South Korea May Be Changing

    Page 13 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    that the United States would relocate from Yongsan Army Garrison in Seoul
    to an area located south of Seoul. According to the U. S. Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, both South Korea and
    the United States have decided that this is an issue that cannot wait any
    longer for resolution. U. S. and South Korean officials are expected to
    hold more discussions to finalize the realignment of U. S. troops by fall
    2003. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense has recently directed
    acceleration

    on work that began during the development of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
    Review, related to the global positioning of U. S. forces and their
    supporting infrastructure outside the United States. In March 2003, the
    Secretary of Defense requested that the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop a comprehensive
    and integrated presence and basing strategy for the next 10 years. An
    Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will build upon multiple
    DOD studies, including the Overseas Basing and Requirements Study, the
    Overseas Presence Study, and the U. S. Global Posture Study. In addition,
    the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will use information
    from the combatant commanders to determine the appropriate location of the
    infrastructure necessary to execute U. S. defense strategy. The Integrated
    Global Presence and Basing Strategy is not expected to be completed until
    the summer of 2003. However, we were recently told by DOD officials that
    the United States will likely concentrate its forces in South Korea in far
    fewer, though larger, installations than were initially envisioned under
    the LPP, and that over time the forces now located north of Seoul will be
    relocated south of Seoul.

    Page 14 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    Although the Land Partnership Plan as approved was broad in scope, it was
    designed to address only a portion of the U. S. military*s previously
    existing infrastructure needs in South Korea, and it left unresolved a
    number of significant land disputes. Specifically, the LPP covered about
    37 percent of the construction costs planned at U. S. military
    installations in South Korea over the next 10 years, encompassing about $2
    billion of the $5.6 billion that the U. S. military and South Korea
    planned to spend to improve the U. S. military infrastructure in South
    Korea from 2002 through 2011. It was intended to resolve 55 percent, or
    49, of the 89 separate land disputes that were pending in South Korea in
    January 2003, 7 which was

    considered a significant step forward. One example of a land dispute that
    would be resolved under the LPP involves Camp Hialeah, located on the
    southern tip of the Korean peninsula in the port city of Pusan, South
    Korea*s second largest city. According to press reports, South Korea
    wanted this base returned because of its proximity to the port and the
    impediments it posed to urban redevelopment. However, no relocation
    agreement could be reached until the LPP included an agreement to begin
    relocating Camp Hialeah*s functions to a new site in Noksan, South Korea,
    in 2008 and to close Camp Hialeah in 2011. According to press reports
    attributed to an official from the South Korean Ministry of Foreign
    Affairs and Trade, relocating in- city bases like Camp Hialeah would help
    lessen the potential tension between U. S. forces and neighboring
    communities.

    Although the plan was considered a major step forward, it was not designed
    to resolve a number of significant land disputes. As far back as far as
    1982, negotiations over some land returns have been deadlocked and left
    unresolved. For example, the relocation of Yongsan Army Garrison 8
    remained unresolved because of its projected financial cost to South
    Korea. The relocation of the garrison has been and continues to be a

    politically sensitive, complex, and expensive issue for U. S. Forces Korea
    and the South Korean government. In 1991, the governments of the United
    States and South Korea signed an agreement to relocate the garrison by
    1996. In 1993, the plan was suspended, largely because of the anticipated

    7 Since 1969, U. S. Forces Korea has reportedly returned 87 percent of the
    land it once controlled. During this time, additional land returns have
    been attempted, but these were stalled when disputes arose involving
    ownership and future use. 8 In addition to traditional military
    facilities, Yongsan Army Garrison includes support facilities associated
    with a small city, for example, a hospital, a fire station, a police
    force, commissary and exchange facilities, schools, theaters, restaurants,
    a hotel, sports and recreational facilities, and water and sewage
    treatment plants. Land Partnership

    Plan as Originally Approved Addressed a Portion of Previously Existing U.
    S. Military Infrastructure Needs in South Korea

    Page 15 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    high cost 9 and the lack of alternative locations for the garrison. More
    than a decade later, the relocation of Yongsan is an ongoing, contentious
    issue. Since the 1990s, U. S. military and South Korean officials have
    held discussions on moving the military base out of the city, including
    screening various suburb locations. In December 2002, the United States
    and South Korea agreed on the need to find a mutually acceptable way to
    relocate U. S. forces outside the city of Seoul as a result of the Future
    of

    the Alliance Study. DOD has had many construction projects underway in
    South Korea, both within and outside of the LPP. However, DOD- sponsored
    studies now underway examining future overseas presence requirements are
    likely to significantly change the number and locations for U. S. military
    bases in South Korea. As noted, we were recently told that the United
    States will likely concentrate its forces in far fewer, though larger,
    installations than were envisioned under the LPP and that, over time, the
    forces would be relocated south of Seoul. 10 Therefore, a number of sites
    and facilities retained under the LPP are likely to be affected. Figure 6
    shows the locations of U. S. troop installations in South Korea under the
    LPP, as originally approved.

    9 There have been various indications that the cost of relocating Yongsan
    Army Garrison could have been from $1. 7 billion to $9.5 billion (in 1993
    dollars). According to DOD, there has never been a detailed or agreed upon
    cost estimate for the relocation of Yongsan Army Garrison. 10 According to
    press reports, the relocations would occur in two phases. During phase
    one,

    U. S. forces located north of Seoul would consolidate on a smaller number
    of bases. During phase two, these forces and forces in the Seoul
    metropolitan area would move to key hubs south of Seoul. Ongoing Studies
    Are Expected to Alter

    Previously Planned LPP Construction Projects

    Page 16 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    Figure 6: U. S. Troop Installations Located in South Korea Under the Land
    Partnership Plan

    Except as otherwise provided by the LPP, South Korea is not obliged to
    compensate the United States for any improvements made in facilities and
    areas or for the buildings and structures left behind. This could be
    particularly important because of military infrastructure projects planned
    or underway in areas from which the United States is considering

    relocating its troops, including Seoul*s Yongsan Army Garrison and U. S.
    installations located north of Seoul, which, according to a U. S. Forces
    Korea official, had recently represented $1.3 billion in ongoing or
    planned

    Page 17 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    construction projects. 11 For example, construction projects in Yongsan
    included apartment high- rises for unaccompanied soldiers, a hospital, a
    sports and recreation complex, a mini- mall, and an overpass between
    Yongsan*s main and south posts. We discussed with U. S. Forces Korea
    officials the need to reassess construction projects under way or planned
    in South Korea and to delay the execution of some projects until better

    decision- making information becomes available. Subsequently, U. S. Forces
    Korea officials announced that they were reviewing all projects and that
    over $1 billion in ongoing and planned construction had been put on hold.
    Further, DOD recently submitted an amendment to the President*s fiscal
    year 2004 budget to the Congress to cancel about $5 million of
    construction projects planned for the garrison and to redirect

    $212.8 million of construction planned for the garrison and northern
    installations to an installation located south of Seoul.

    During the initial phase of our review we identified funding and other
    management challenges that could adversely affect the implementation of
    the Land Partnership Plan. As we considered these issues in light of the
    potential for even greater basing changes, we recognized that they could
    also affect the associated U. S. military construction projects throughout
    South Korea. First, the LPP is dependent on substantial amounts of funding
    that South Korea expects to realize through land sales from property
    returned by the United States, host- nation- funded construction, and U.
    S. military construction funds. While U. S. Forces Korea officials expect
    to build on this LPP framework for likely additional basing changes, the
    details have not been finalized for the broader changes. As U. S. Forces
    Korea revises its plans, competition for limited funding for other
    priorities could become an issue. Second, U. S. Forces Korea does not have
    a detailed road map to manage current and future facilities requirements
    in South Korea.

    The LPP, as originally approved, was dependent on substantial amounts of
    South Korean funding to be realized through land sales, host- nationfunded
    construction, and U. S. military construction funds. The extent to which
    these sources of funding would be required and available for

    broader infrastructure changes is not yet clear, particularly for the 11
    According to a U. S. Forces Korea official, of the $1.3 billion in
    construction projects, $491 million was for ongoing or planned for Yongsan
    Army Garrison in Seoul. Challenges to

    Completing Land Partnership Plan and Other Planned Construction Projects
    throughout South Korea

    Funding Sources and Competition for Funding Are Challenges

    Page 18 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    relocation of Yongsan Army Garrison. While U. S. officials expect the
    South Korean government to fund much of the cost of these additional
    basing changes, details have not yet been finalized. The South Korean
    government is also expected to remain responsible for providing funding

    for the relocation of forces now based at the Yongsan Army Garrison
    property, although those costs could be reduced by the fact that a
    residual number of U. S. and United Nations personnel are expected to
    remain at Yongsan. It should also be noted that the Yongsan Garrison
    property is expected to be used for municipal purposes and is not subject
    to resale to provide funding to support relocation of U. S. forces. At
    this point,

    insufficient information is available to determine precisely how many
    replacement facilities will be required for U. S. troops moving out of
    Yongsan Garrison and to anticipate any difficulties that might be
    encountered in obtaining the funding. However, if South Korea encounters
    problems or delays in acquiring needed lands and providing replacement
    facilities, future projects could be delayed. Figure 7 presents the amount
    of funding, as of May 2003, that the United States and South Korean
    governments expected to pay for the LPP* as originally approved* by fiscal
    year. The funding amounts for fiscal year 2004 and beyond are subject to
    revision.

    Page 19 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    Figure 7: Estimated Funding Requirements for the Land Partnership Plan

    The LPP, as originally approved, was dependent on designating up to 50
    percent of South Korea*s host nation funding for construction.
    Historically, the stability of host nation funding from South Korea has
    been subject to some uncertainty because international economic factors
    have played a part in determining the level of funding. 12 South Korea
    host nation payments are paid in both South Korean won and U. S. dollars;
    consequently, a downturn in the South Korean economy or a sharp
    fluctuation in the South Korean currency could affect the South Korean
    government*s payments. For example, during South Korea*s economic downturn
    in 1998, host nation payments were less than expected (the United States
    received from South Korea $314.2 million of the $399 million that had been
    agreed to).

    12 The annual level of host- nation- funded construction is determined
    between the U. S. Department of State and the South Korea Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs and Trade and is negotiated for a 3- year time frame.

    Page 20 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    Designating up to 50 percent of host nation funding for the LPP would also
    limit funding for readiness and other needs. Non- LPP readiness- related
    infrastructure funding shortages previously identified in readiness
    reports at the time of our visit to South Korea in November 2002 were
    estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars and represented
    competing requirements for limited funding. Such needs included Air Force
    facilities at Osan and Kunsan ($ 338.2 million), Navy facilities at Pohang
    and Chinhae ($ 10.3 million), and Army facilities at Humphreys, Carroll,
    and Tango ($ 25.2 million). Recently, U. S. Forces Korea officials have
    also expressed the desire to increase from 10 percent to 25 percent the
    number of servicemembers in South Korea who are permitted to be
    accompanied by their families. While these expressions have not been
    finalized, such an increase could be expected to cause a significant
    increase in the demand for housing, schools, and other support services
    and could result in greater competition for U. S. and Korean funding. For
    example, U. S. Forces Korea officials estimated that the increased demand
    for housing alone would cost $900 million in traditional military
    construction funding and, to reduce costs, officials were exploring a
    build- to- lease program using Korean private- sector funding and host-
    nation- funded construction, where possible.

    In the past, funding from U. S. military construction accounts, which
    represent 13 percent of funding for the LPP as originally approved, has
    fluctuated. From 1990 through 1994, U. S. forces in South Korea did not
    receive any military construction funds, resulting in a significant
    backlog of construction projects. Implementation of the LPP was expected
    to involve a closely knit series

    of tasks to phase out some facilities and installations while phasing in
    new facilities and expanding other facilities and installations. U. S.
    Forces Korea was developing an implementation plan for each installation
    encompassed by the LPP and, at the time of our visit there, was developing
    a detailed, overarching implementation plan capable of integrating and
    controlling the multiple, sometimes simultaneous, actions needed to

    relocate U. S. forces and support their missions. According to U. S.
    Forces Korea officials, such a master plan is needed to accomplish
    training, maintain readiness, and control future changes.

    During our visits to U. S. installations in South Korea, we found that, in
    the absence of a completed master plan for implementation, installation
    commanders had varying interpretations of what infrastructure changes were
    to occur. U. S. Forces Korea officials told us that this was not Managing
    Current

    and Future Facilities Requirements Is Also a Challenge

    Page 21 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    unusual, given that detailed implementation plans were still being
    developed. At the same time, these officials emphasized the need for a
    detailed plan to guide future projects and to help minimize the costly
    changes that can occur when subsequent commanders have a different vision
    of the installations* needs than their predecessors, which could lead to
    new interpretations of the LPP and more changes. In light of the
    potentially broader repositioning of forces in South Korea, the master
    plan under development could be substantially changed; thus, a
    significantly revised road map will be needed to manage future facilities
    requirements and changes in South Korea.

    As approved, the Land Partnership Plan represented an important step to
    reduce the size of the U. S. footprint in South Korea by leveraging the
    return of facilities and land to South Korea in order to obtain
    replacement facilities in consolidated locations. However, subsequent
    events suggest

    the LPP, as originally outlined, will require significant modification.
    Available data indicate that changes in the U. S. basing structure in
    South Korea are likely; therefore, a significant portion of the $5.6
    billion in construction projects planned over the next 10 years is being
    reassessed

    based on currently expected basing changes and may need to be further
    reassessed when the results of ongoing overseas presence and basing
    studies are completed.

    The LPP was to require 10 years of intensive management to ensure
    implementation progressed as planned. The master plan U. S. Forces Korea
    officials are developing to guide its implementation will require
    significant revision to accommodate the more comprehensive changes in
    basing now anticipated and to identify funding requirements and division
    of funding responsibilities between the United States and South Korea.

    We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Commander, U. S.
    Forces Korea, to (1) reassess planned construction projects in South Korea
    as the results of ongoing studies associated with overseas presence and
    basing are finalized and (2) prepare a detailed South Korea- wide
    infrastructure master plan for the changing infrastructure for U. S.
    military facilities in South Korea, updating it periodically as needed,
    and identifying funding requirements and division of funding
    responsibilities between the United States and South Korea. Conclusions

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    Page 22 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs
    provided written comments to a draft of this report. DOD agreed with our
    recommendations and pointed out that it is taking actions that address our
    recommendations. In commenting on our recommendation to reassess planned
    construction projects in South Korea, DOD stated that U. S. Forces Korea
    is already reassessing all planned construction in South Korea and will
    ensure that all planned construction projects support decisions regarding
    global presence and basing strategy. In commenting on our recommendation
    for a detailed South Korea- wide infrastructure master plan, DOD stated
    that U. S. Forces Korea is already developing master plans for all
    enduring installations and, once decisions have been reached on global
    presence and basing strategy, they will ensure that all master plans are
    adjusted to support these decisions. DOD*s comments are reprinted in
    appendix IV. DOD also provided a separate technical comment, and we
    revised the report to reflect it. We are sending copies of this report to
    the appropriate congressional

    committees, the Commander, U. S. Forces Korea, and the Director, Office of
    Management and Budget. The report is also available at no charge on GAO*s
    Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this
    report, please contact me at (202) 512- 5581. Key contributors to this
    report were Ron Berteotti, Roger Tomlinson, Nelsie Alcoser, Susan
    Woodward, and Ken Patton.

    Barry W. Holman Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Agency
    Comments

    and Our Evaluation

    Page 23 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    List of Congressional Committees The Honorable John W. Warner, Chairman
    The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed
    Services United States Senate

    The Honorable Ted Stevens, Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United
    States Senate

    The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison, Chairman The Honorable Diane Feinstein
    Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Military Construction Committee on
    Appropriations United States Senate

    The Honorable Duncan Hunter, Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
    Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

    The Honorable Jerry Lewis, Chairman The Honorable John P. Murtha Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House
    of Representatives

    The Honorable Joe Knollenberg, Chairman The Honorable Chet Edwards Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Military Construction Committee on
    Appropriations House of Representatives

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 24 GAO- 03- 643 Defense
    Infrastructure

    To determine the scope and cost of the plan in relation to total
    infrastructure issues in South Korea, we analyzed provisions of the Land
    Partnership Plan (LPP), identified the scope and cost of construction
    projects outside of the LPP, compared the scope and cost of LPP
    construction projects to the scope and cost of all construction projects
    in South Korea, and analyzed some of the key unresolved infrastructure
    issues not included in the plan, such as the relocation of U. S. troops
    from Yongsan Army Garrison. We met with officials from the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff (Logistics Directorate and Strategy Division); Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy (Office of Asia- Pacific Affairs); Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment); U. S. Pacific
    Command, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, U. S. Army Pacific, Marine
    Forces Pacific, U. S. Pacific Fleet; U. S. Forces Korea, Eighth U. S. Army
    and 7th Air Force;

    U. S. Department of State; U. S. Embassy (South Korea); and South Korea*s
    Defense Ministry to document their input to the plan. We visited 16 U. S.
    military installations and facilities in South Korea that are affected by
    the

    plan. We selected these installations and facilities because they provided
    a cross- section of the activities that are covered by the plan (i. e.,
    some that will be closed, some that will be scaled back, some that will be
    expanded, some where new construction will take place, and some possible
    new installation locations). We also visited land transfer sites that
    remain unresolved and military construction projects that are not
    addressed in the plan to gain an understanding and perspective on the wide
    range of infrastructure issues affecting U. S. troops stationed in South
    Korea.

    To determine the implications of potential basing changes on the plan and
    other construction projects in South Korea, we obtained the views of
    officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Logistics Directorate and
    Strategy

    Division); Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Office of Asia- Pacific
    Affairs); and U. S. Forces Korea on the potential impact of changing
    defense policies. We conducted a literature review of U. S. and South
    Korean publications to collect information on the LPP and possible basing
    changes in South Korea. We also attended various congressional hearings,
    which discussed funding for U. S. Forces Korea construction projects and
    potential basing changes. We used this information to identify the costs

    of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving military
    infrastructure in areas where there is uncertainty about future U. S.
    presence* such as Yongsan Army Garrison and U. S. installations located
    north of Seoul. We did not verify the accuracy and completeness of this
    information.

    To identify implementation challenges associated with the plan that could
    affect future U. S. military construction projects in South Korea, we met
    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 25 GAO- 03- 643 Defense
    Infrastructure

    with officials from the above organizations and reviewed the Status of
    Forces Agreement, an agreement under Article IV of the Mutual Defense
    Treaty between South Korea and the United States, and other related
    agreements and defense guidance. We discussed challenges that must be
    addressed during implementation of the LPP and implementation issues
    associated with the plan that could affect future construction projects
    throughout South Korea.

    We performed our review from September 2002 through May 2003 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 26 GAO- 03- 643
    Defense Infrastructure

    The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) provides a comprehensive plan for more
    efficient and effective stationing of U. S. Forces in South Korea. The LPP
    is intended to strengthen the South Korea- U. S. alliance, improve the
    readiness posture of combined forces, reduce the overall amount of land
    granted for U. S. Forces Korea use, and enhance public support for both
    the South Korean government and U. S. Forces Korea, while positioning U.
    S. forces to meet alliance security requirements well into the future.

    According to U. S. Forces Korea officials, LPP imperatives are as follows:
     The agreement should be based on readiness and security, not the amount

    of land involved.  The agreement should be comprehensive, allowing for
    land issues that

    cannot be resolved independently to be resolved as part of a package and
    ensuring stationing decisions that fit into a comprehensive vision for the
    disposition of U. S. forces.  When new land and facilities are ready for
    use, U. S. Forces Korea can release old land and facilities. U. S. Forces
    Korea needs all existing

    facilities and areas and can only return them when replacement facilities
    are available or the requirement is met in another manner.  The agreement
    should be binding under the Status of Forces Agreement.

    The LPP is not just an *agreement in principle* but also a commitment to
    take action, and it operates within the Status of Forces Agreement* which
    means there are no new rules.  The agreement should be self- financing*
    the costs of the LPP must be

    shared between the United States and South Korea. U. S. funding is
    provided from the military construction account. The South Korean
    government provides host nation funds and funding obtained from sales of
    property returned to South Korea by the United States.

    As a general rule, the United States funds the relocation of units from
    camps the United States wishes to close, and South Korea funds the
    relocation of units from camps that South Korea has asked the United
    States to close. The execution of the LPP is shown in figure 1. The LPP
    has been negotiated under the authority of the Joint Committee

    under the Status of Forces Agreement. The Status of Forces Agreement gives
    the Joint Committee the authority and responsibility to determine the
    facilities and areas required for U. S. use in support of the United
    States/ South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. The Joint Committee established
    the Ad- hoc Subcommittee for LPP to develop and manage the LPP. The LPP
    components address installations, training areas, and safety easements.
    Appendix II: Summary of the Land

    Partnership Plan

    Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 27 GAO- 03- 643
    Defense Infrastructure

    Installations: The LPP reduces the number of U. S. installations from 41
    to 23 and consolidates U. S. forces onto enduring installations. The LPP
    establishes a timeline for the grant of new land, the construction of new
    facilities, and the closure of installations. Figure 8 illustrates the
    sequence in which new lands are to be granted to the United States and
    their relationship to facilities that will be returned to South Korea from
    calendar years 2002 through 2011.

    Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 28 GAO- 03- 643
    Defense Infrastructure

    Figure 8: Installation Grants and Returns under the Land Partnership Plan,
    by Calendar Year

    Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 29 GAO- 03- 643
    Defense Infrastructure

    Training Areas: The LPP returns U. S. training areas in exchange for
    guaranteed time on South Korean ranges and training areas. To ensure the
    continued readiness of U. S. Forces Korea, the United States agrees to
    return certain granted facilities and areas and to accept the grant of
    joint use of certain South Korea military facilities and areas on a
    limited time- share basis as determined by the Status of Forces Agreement
    Joint Committee. The United States is expected to return approximately
    32,186 acres, or 39,396,618 pyong, 1 of granted training areas. Table 1
    shows the exclusive use of existing grants retained by U. S. Forces Korea.
    Table 1: Exclusive Use Grants Retained by the United States

    Facility Acres

    Rodriquez Local Training Area #1 1.0 Story Range 1,756.0 New Mexico Range
    116.0 Warrior Training Base 19.0 Warrior Training Base Ammunition Holding
    Area 1.2 Dagmar North 1,391.0 Mike* November 3,008.0 Papa* Oscar* Romeo
    3,353.4 North Star 30.2 Chaparral Local Training Area 115.1 Local Training
    Area 130 63.7 Local Training Area 140 6.4 Rodriquez Gun Local Training
    Area #1 17.5 Rodriquez Gun Local Training Area #2 8.3 Rodriguez Gun Local
    Training Area #3 7.6 Humphreys Range 6.0 Training Areas 79.0 Bayonne
    Signal Training Area 19.8 Rodriguez Watkins Local Training Area 45.1
    Rodriquez Live Fire Complex 3,343.0 Masan Range 372.0 Koon- ni 438.3
    Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

    1 Korean unit of measure, 1 pyong = 3. 3 square meters or 35 square feet.

    Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 30 GAO- 03- 643
    Defense Infrastructure

    Table 2 shows training areas that will be provided on a temporary basis to
    U. S. Forces Korea.

    Table 2: Temporary Grants Facility Acres

    Local Training Area 320 247.0 Drop Zone Cory 186.0 Non Commissioned
    Officer Academy Training Area 364.0 Drop Zone Rigger Pilsung Strafing
    Range 619.8

    0 Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

    Table 3 shows new safety easements to be designated for training areas.
    Table 3: Training Area Easements Facility Acres

    New Mexico Restrictive Easement 128 Warrior Training Ammunition Holding
    Area Easement 2619.3 Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

    Table 4 shows training areas that will be returned to South Korea under
    the LPP.

    Table 4: Total Release of U. S. Training Areas Facility Acres

    Rodriquez Local Training Area #3 3.0 Rodriquez Local Training Area #2
    100.0 Rodriquez Local Training Area #4 10.0 Kansas Range 71.0 Oklahoma
    Range 15.0 North Carolina, Air Mobile, Edwards Local Training Area, TA-
    504/ 520 1,302.0 Dagmar & S, Squads, Palmers, and Oklahoma 16,747.0 River
    Crossing 16.0 Camp Page Local Training Area 302.0 Tango 2,952.0 KCT- 43,
    Yankee, Whiskey N.( actual) (written record) 8,920.0

    2,761.0 Stanton Local Training Area 15.0 Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

    Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 31 GAO- 03- 643
    Defense Infrastructure

    Table 5 shows training areas where parts of the land will be returned to
    South Korea.

    Table 5: Partial Release of Grants Facility Acres

    Texas Local Training Area and Zulu LA 1,133.0 Mike- A 480.0 Romeo 120.0
    Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

    Table 6 shows training facilities and areas that the South Korean
    government is expected to grant to the U. S. for joint use for the time
    specified.

    Table 6: Joint Use of South Korean Military Training Facilities and Areas
    Facility Weeks Days

    Typhoon Range 1 week per quarter 24 Chungyong Range 2 weeks per year 12
    Bisung Range 1.5 weeks per year 9 St. Barbara Range* MLRS Live Fire 4
    weeks per year 24 St. Barbara Range* Paladin Live Fire 4 weeks per year 24
    Korea Training Area/ Twin Bridges Training Area 13 weeks per year 91
    Seung- Jin Nightmare Range 8 weeks per year 48 Capital Defense Command
    Bangpae Range 2 weeks per quarter 48 Jungpyung M16 8 weeks per year 48
    Jungpyung 40MM Grenade Launcher Range 4 weeks per year 24 Jungpyung Hand
    Grenade 2 weeks per year 12 Chochiwon Range 1 week per quarter 24 Sokung
    (Seogok) Range 5 weeks per year 30 Angang Range 1 week per quarter 24 Kumi
    Range 4 weeks per year 24 Susan- ri Range 6 weeks per year 36 R- 222 1
    week per quarter 24 R- 227 4 weeks per quarter 96 R- 233 6 weeks per
    quarter 144 R- 228 6 weeks per quarter 144 Han River Cross Site 2 weeks
    per quarter 48 Training Area Jerry 2 weeks per quarter 48 Training Area
    Nightmare 2 weeks per quarter 48 Training Area Tom 2 weeks per quarter 48
    Saetue Field Training Area 2 weeks per quarter 48 TAA No Name (Munmak) 2
    weeks per quarter 48

    Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 32 GAO- 03- 643
    Defense Infrastructure

    Facility Weeks Days

    Kaup Mountain Training Area (H- 710) 1 week per quarter 24 Kumdan Mountain
    Training Area 1 week per quarter 24 Puksung Mountain Training Area 1 week
    per quarter 24 Sung Mountain Training Area (H- 471) 1 week per quarter 24
    Taeki Mountain Training Area 1 week per quarter 24 Yongmun Mountain
    Training Area 1 week per quarter 24 Hwangyong Park Tactical Training Area
    1 week per quarter 24 Hampyong Tactical Training Area 1 week per quarter
    24 Jinwon Tank Tactical Training Area 2 weeks per quarter 48 Mu Juk
    Training Area 26 weeks per year 182 Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

    Safety Easements: According to U. S. Forces Korea officials, a safety
    easement is a defined distance from an explosive area that personnel and
    structures must be kept away from and is directly related to the quantity
    and types of explosives and ammunition present. The presence of Korean
    citizens in areas requiring explosive safety easements has placed them at

    risk of injury or death in the event of an explosion. Tables 7, 8, and 9
    show the various tiers of easements established under the LPP at U. S.
    military installations. Upper tier easements are those required at
    enduring installations; middle tier easements are required during
    armistice, but will not be required after a change in the armistice
    condition; and lower tier

    easements are those required at closing installations. U. S. Forces Korea
    shall enforce safety easements inside U. S. installations, while South
    Korea will enforce safety easements outside U. S. installations.

    Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan Page 33 GAO- 03- 643
    Defense Infrastructure

    Table 7: Upper Tier Easements Installation Explosive site

    Osan Air Force Base Munitions storage area (Delta site) Patriot Batteries
    on Chin Wi River Hot cargo pad easement extension Kunsan Air Force Base 2
    Munitions storage areas

    Hot cargo pad and patriot battery Camp Humphreys Rearm point Camp Casey
    Ammunition storage area 21 Ammunition storage area 25 Camp Stanley
    Ammunition storage area 18 (tunnel)

    Ammunition storage area 9 Camp Walker Ammunition storage area Camp Hovey
    Ammunition storage area Yongsan Ammunition storage area Source: U. S.
    Forces Korea.

    Table 8: Middle Tier Easements Installation Explosive site

    Camp Bonifas Ammunition storage area (main post) Ammunition storage area
    (east) Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

    Table 9: Lower Tier Easements Installation Explosive site

    Camp LaGuardia Ammunition storage area Camp Howze Ammunition storage area
    Camp Edwards Ammunition storage area Camp Essayons Ammunition storage area
    Camp Colbern Ammunition storage area Camp Stanton Ammunition storage area
    Camp Greaves Ammunition storage area Camp Garry Owen Ammunition storage
    area Camp Eagle Ammunition storage area Source: U. S. Forces Korea.

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Page 34 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Page 35 GAO- 03- 643 Defense Infrastructure (350267)

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