Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance
Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening
(16-MAY-03, GAO-03-638).
Sealed radioactive sources, radioactive material encapsulated in
stainless steel or other metal, are used worldwide in medicine,
industry, and research. These sealed sources pose a threat to
national security because terrorists could use them to make
"dirty bombs." GAO was asked to determine (1) the number of
sealed sources worldwide and how many have been reported lost,
stolen, or abandoned; (2) the controls, both legislative and
regulatory, used by countries that possess sealed sources; and
(3) the assistance provided by the Department of Energy (DOE) and
other U.S. federal agencies to strengthen other countries'
control over sealed sources and the extent to which these efforts
are believed to be effectively implemented.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-638
ACCNO: A06913
TITLE: Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International
Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need
Strengthening
DATE: 05/16/2003
SUBJECT: Facility management
Federal aid to foreign countries
Foreign governments
Interagency relations
National preparedness
Internal controls
International relations
Nuclear facilities
Nuclear proliferation
Strategic planning
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GAO-03-638
A
Letter
May 16, 2003 The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International
Security Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate Dear
Senator Akaka: Since September 11, 2001, U. S. and international nuclear
safety and security experts have raised concerns that terrorists could
obtain radioactive material used in medicine, research, agriculture, and
industry
to construct a radiological dispersion device, or *dirty bomb.* This
radioactive material is encapsulated, or sealed, in metal, such as
stainless steel, titanium, or platinum, to prevent its dispersal and is
commonly called a sealed radioactive source. These sealed sources are used
throughout the United States and other countries in equipment designed to,
among other
things, diagnose and treat illnesses, preserve food, detect flaws and
other failures in pipeline welds, and determine the moisture content of
soil. Depending on their use, sealed sources contain different types of
radioactive material, such as strontium- 90, cobalt- 60, cesium- 137,
plutonium- 238, and plutonium- 239. If these sealed sources fell into the
hands of terrorists, they could use them to produce a simple and crude,
but potentially dangerous, weapon by packaging explosives, such as
dynamite, with the radioactive material, which would be dispersed when the
bomb went off. Depending on the type, amount, and form (powder or solid),
the dispersed radioactive material could cause radiation sickness for
people nearby and produce serious economic costs and psychological and
social disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of
the contaminated area.
Given the concerns about the security of sealed sources worldwide, you
asked us to determine, to the extent possible (1) the number of sealed
sources worldwide and how many are reported lost, stolen, or abandoned;
(2) the controls, both legislative and regulatory, used by countries that
possess sealed sources; and (3) the assistance provided by the Department
of Energy (DOE) and other U. S. federal agencies to strengthen other
countries* control over sealed sources and the extent to which these
efforts are believed to be effectively implemented. To address these
objectives, we distributed a survey to 127 International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) 1 member states to determine, among other things, how
countries control
sealed sources. Appendix I presents our scope and methodology, appendix II
presents the results of the survey, and appendix III contains a list of
the countries we sent the survey to, including those that responded to it.
We also met with or had discussions with officials from several countries
to learn more about how they regulate and control sealed sources and met
with officials from international organizations, such as IAEA and the
European Commission, 2 to obtain their views on the problem of
uncontrolled sealed sources. A forthcoming report will address controls
over sealed sources in the United States. We conducted our review from May
2002 through May 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Results in Brief The precise number of sealed sources
that is in use today or that has been
lost, stolen, or abandoned is unknown because many countries do not
systematically account for them. Some estimates are available, however.
For example, about 2 million licensed sealed sources are currently being
used in the United States, according to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), and the 49 countries that responded to our survey reported that 7.8
million sealed sources are in use. Limited information exists about the
number of sealed sources that has been lost, stolen, or abandoned*
commonly referred to as *orphan sources** but it is estimated to be in the
thousands worldwide. In the United States, about 250 sealed sources or 1
Affiliated with the United Nations, IAEA*s aims are to promote the
peaceful use of nuclear
energy and to verify that nuclear material under its supervision or
control is not used to further any military purpose.
2 As the European Union*s executive body, the European Commission has
three main tasks: to serve as the sole initiator of policy, to act as
guardian of the European Union treaties by investigating treaty breaches,
and to supervise the implementation of European Union law in the member
states.
devices containing sealed sources are reported lost or stolen annually,
but the majority of these sources are recovered. The countries that
responded to our survey said that a total of 612 sealed sources had been
reported lost or stolen since 1995, 254 of which had not been recovered.
U. S. and international nuclear safety and security experts told us that
the largest
number of lost, stolen, or abandoned sealed sources is located in the
former Soviet Union. Of particular concern are as many as 12 electrical
generators that were abandoned in the Republic of Georgia. These
generators are powered by high activity levels (ranging from 40, 000 to
150,000 curies) of strontium- 90* a destructive radioactive material.
Recently, the United States and other countries* and IAEA* located and
secured most of these generators believed to exist in Georgia. However,
more than 1,000 additional generators that are not adequately protected
and pose a significant security risk are spread throughout the former
Soviet Union.
All of the countries that responded to our survey reported that they have
established legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources.
However, nuclear safety and security experts from DOE, the Department of
State, the Department of Defense (DOD), NRC, IAEA, and the European
Commission told us that controls on radioactive sources vary greatly
between countries and focus primarily on protecting public health and
safety rather than on securing sealed sources from theft or destructive
use. These experts also told us that controls over sealed sources are
weakest
among less developed countries. For example, representatives from several
countries of the former Soviet Union told us that their national systems
of control need improvement, particularly regarding inventorying,
consolidating and securing, and transporting sealed sources. Because of
concerns about many countries* inability to control radioactive materials*
IAEA has estimated that as many as 110 countries worldwide do not have
adequate controls over sealed sources* IAEA established a program to help
88 countries enhance their regulatory infrastructures. Although the
program has helped countries improve their regulatory controls, many
participating countries continue to have numerous regulatory deficiencies.
In the absence of regulatory controls, radioactive sources have been
inadequately protected or secured; little or no attention has been paid to
the export or import controls of sources; and basic record keeping has
been lacking. Finally, officials from the Department of State, the
European Commission, and IAEA told us that France has implemented a system
for controlling sealed sources that could serve as a model for other
countries. France*s system requires distributors of sealed sources to
assume financial
responsibility for recovering and disposing of them.
DOE and other U. S. agencies have funded programs to strengthen controls
over sealed sources in other countries. DOE, which has the largest
program, received about $37 million since fiscal year 2002 to initiate a
program to assist other countries in controlling their sealed sources.
According to DOE officials, the program is expected to receive an
additional $22 million in supplemental appropriations in fiscal year 2003,
including $5 million for securing nuclear material in Iraq. DOE
established a program focusing on improving the security of sites
containing sealed sources in the former Soviet Union because that is where
DOE believed the greatest threat exists. DOE has begun funding site
assessments and security upgrades at several locations in Russia,
Uzbekistan, the Republic of Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan. In Russia,
for example, DOE has focused on securing sources at several large nuclear
waste repositories scattered around the country. Furthermore, the
Secretary of Energy
recently announced that the program will expand to other regions of the
world. Other U. S. federal agencies have begun efforts to help countries
strengthen controls over sealed sources as well. Since fiscal year 2001,
DOD has obligated about $1.7 million to inventory, secure, and dispose of
sealed sources in Kazakhstan. In fiscal year 2002, the State Department
received appropriations totaling about $1.2 million primarily to support
IAEA projects on the safety and security of sealed sources. Finally, the
NRC received about $250,000 from the U. S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) to help Armenia develop a registry of sealed sources
and improve Armenia*s legislative and regulatory framework for controlling
sources.
DOE*s initial efforts to secure sealed sources have lacked adequate
planning and coordination, and the majority of the program funds were
spent in the United States rather than in the countries of the former
Soviet Union. DOE is in the process of developing a plan to guide its
efforts. However, DOE officials told us that more detailed planning and
analysis
will be needed to, among other things, (1) determine which countries
outside the former Soviet Union present the greatest security risk and
most urgently require assistance, (2) identify future funding
requirements, and (3) develop performance measures to gauge program
success. In addition, Department of State and NRC officials told us that
DOE has not fully coordinated its efforts with their agencies. In their
view, DOE needs their input to ensure that a comprehensive governmentwide
strategy is taken to, among other things, leverage program resources,
maximize available
expertise, avoid possible duplication of effort, and help ensure future
program success. DOE has not systematically undertaken the kind of
comprehensive planning that would foster better coordination with the
other agencies and could also lead to better coordination with other
countries* nuclear organizations. For example, officials from Russia*s
nuclear regulatory organization, Gosatomnadzor, told us that DOE did not
adequately consult them when it initially selected sites in Russia for
security improvements. Regarding DOE*s effort to secure sealed sources in
the former Soviet Union, as of January 31, 2003, DOE had spent about $8.9
million, including $3 million transferred to IAEA. Of the remaining
$5.9 million in expenditures, 93 percent was spent in the United States by
DOE*s national laboratories. DOE officials told us that the program is
still in its early stages and that the objective of the program is to
place a significant percentage of funds in the recipient countries to
improve security. This report makes recommendations designed to improve
the management
of DOE*s efforts to help improve controls over sealed sources.
Specifically, it recommends that DOE (1) develop a comprehensive plan that
identifies those countries that most urgently require assistance,
establish realistic time frames and resources necessary to accomplish
program goals, and establish meaningful performance measures; (2) take the
lead in
developing a governmentwide plan designed to, among other things, improve
interagency coordination; and (3) strengthen its efforts to increase
program expenditures in the countries requiring assistance.
Background Sealed sources are used throughout the world for a variety of
peaceful purposes. Until the 1950s, only naturally occurring radioactive
materials, such as radium- 226, were available to be used in sealed
sources. Since
then, sealed sources containing radioactive material produced artificially
in nuclear reactors and accelerators have become widely available,
including cobalt- 60, strontium- 90, cesium- 137, and iridium- 192.
Radioactive material
can be found in various forms. For example, cobalt- 60 is a metal, while
the cesium- 137 in many sealed sources is in a powdery form closely
resembling talc. Radioactive materials are measured by their level of
activity. The greater the activity level* measured in units called curies
3 *the more
radiation emitted, which increases the potential risk to public health and
safety if improperly used or controlled. The intensity of radioactive
3 The curie is a unit of measurement of radioactivity. In modern nuclear
physics, it is precisely defined as the amount of substance in which 37
billion atoms per second undergo radioactive disintegration. In the
international system of units, the becquerel is the preferred unit of
radioactivity. One curie equals 3. 7 x 10 10 becquerels.
materials decays over time at various rates. The term *half- life* is used
to indicate the period during which the radioactivity decreases by half as
a result of decay. Usually, radioactive material with high radioactivity
is placed in a sealed
container to prevent leakage of the material itself. Because of the varied
characteristics of the radioactive material* physical structure (metal,
ceramic, or powder), activity level, half- life, and type of radiation
emitted, 4 some materials pose a greater risk to people, property, and the
environment than others. According to IAEA, the level of protection
provided to users of the radioactive material should be commensurate with
the safety and security risks that it presents if improperly used. For
example, radioactive materials used for certain diagnostic purposes have
low levels of activity and do not present a significant safety or security
risk. However, powerful sealed sources, such as those used in radiotherapy
(cancer treatment) that use cobalt- 60, cesium- 137, or iridium- 192,
could pose a greater threat to the public and the environment and would
also pose a potentially more significant security risk, particularly if
acquired to produce a dirty bomb. The small size, portability, and
potential value of sealed sources make them
vulnerable to misuse, improper disposal, and theft. According to IAEA,
illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear material, including sealed
sources, has increased worldwide in recent years: IAEA reported 272 cases
of illicit trafficking in these sources from 1993 to the end of 2002. (See
app. IV for more information about illicit trafficking incidents.) While
no dirty bombs have been detonated, in the mid- 1990s Chechen separatists
placed a canister containing cesium- 137 in a Moscow park. Although the
device was not detonated and no radioactive material was dispersed, the
incident demonstrated that terrorists have the capability and willingness
to use sealed sources as weapons of terror. U. S. and international
experts have noted that some accidents involving
sealed sources can provide a measure of understanding of what the 4
Radioactive material emits alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, neutrons,
or a combination thereof. For example, americium- 241 emits alpha
particles and gamma rays; cobalt- 60 emits beta particles and gamma rays;
and strontium- 90 emits only beta particles. Alpha particles are not a
hazard outside of the body; beta particles can be more penetrating
and cause radiation damage. Both, however, are generally most hazardous
when ingested or inhaled. Gamma rays are an external hazard because they
can easily pass through clothing and skin. Neutron particles are less
common but can also cause damage.
possible impacts of a dirty bomb might be. In 1987, an accident involving
a cesium- 137 sealed source in Brazil killed four people, injured many
more, and caused about $36 million in damages to the local economy. This
accident had such an enormous psychological impact on the local population
that the atomic symbol was added to the region*s flag as a lasting
reminder of the accident*s consequences. Appendix V contains more
information about worldwide accidents involving sealed sources.
The Number of Sealed The precise number of sealed sources that is in use
worldwide is unknown
Sources in Use and because many countries do not systematically account
for them. The lack
of a full accounting of sealed sources makes it equally difficult to
determine Lost, Stolen, or
the number that has been lost, stolen, or abandoned* referred to as
Abandoned Worldwide
*orphan sources.* Orphan sources, which are estimated to number in the Is
Unknown
thousands worldwide, are considered by U. S. and international officials
to pose significant health, safety, and security risks because they are
outside of regulatory control. According to U. S. and international safety
and security experts, one of the most urgent problems is locating and
securing
orphan sources in the former Soviet Union because they pose a significant
security risk. The Number of Sealed
The number of sealed sources in use worldwide is unknown, but some Sources
in Use Worldwide Is
estimates are available. According to IAEA, millions of sealed radioactive
Unknown Because
sources have been distributed worldwide over the past 50 years. Countries
Do Not
Approximately 2 million licensed sealed sources are in use in the United
Systematically Account for
States, according to the NRC. In addition, according to the European
Commission, approximately 500,000 sealed sources have been supplied to
Them
operators in the 15 member states of the European Union, of which about
110, 000 are currently in use. The European Commission also estimated in
1999 that approximately 840,000 sealed sources exist in Russia, although
Russian officials believe the total number is significantly higher.
The 49 countries that responded to our survey reported a total of about
7.8 million sealed sources that are in use within their countries. These
sealed sources are used in various applications, such as industrial
radiography and therapeutic medicine. Table 1 summarizes the responses
received from the countries surveyed regarding the number of sealed
sources in use and their major applications.
Tabl e 1: Regional Distribution of Sealed Sources in Countries Responding
to GAO*s Survey on the Security of Radioactive Sealed Sources Number of
sealed Region sources in use Major applications
Africa 834 Smoke detectors, academic/ research, and fixed gauges
Asia 18, 420 Fixed gauges, analytical instruments, and academic/ research
Europe 4,866, 024 Smoke detectors, fixed gauges, and academic/ research
Former Soviet Union 20, 344 Smoke detectors, irradiation, and
academic/ research Middle East 6,545 Medical- diagnostic, academic/
research, and portable
gauges North America a and
2,887, 025 Smoke detectors, fixed gauges, and Central America academic/
research South America 2,836 Smoke detectors, fixed gauges, and medical-
diagnostic South Pacific 1,854 Industrial radiography, smoke
detectors, and irradiation
Tot al 7,803, 882
Source: GAO. a The United States was not surveyed for this report.
Several factors contribute to the lack of comprehensive information about
the number of sealed sources worldwide. According to IAEA, many countries
do not maintain accurate or complete inventories of sealed sources in use
or registries of users of sources. In response to our survey, 28 of the 49
countries said they had an inventory of sealed sources. In addition, 17
countries said they were in the process of developing an inventory.
However, several countries that reported they had inventories indicated
that the number of sources was estimated rather than actual. A few
countries, including a European nation, indicated that they did not have
the resources necessary to develop a national registry of sources and
users.
An additional factor contributing to countries* limited or incomplete
inventories is that sealed sources have been imported and exported by
distributors and governments without consistent monitoring or tracking by
the suppliers, the recipients of the sources, or the appropriate
regulatory
authority. Appendix VI provides information on the major producers of
sealed sources worldwide. The Chairman of NRC noted in March 2003 that
international commerce in
these sources is extensive and that existing controls on imports and
exports are minimal. For example, most U. S.- origin sealed sources are
exported under a general license. 5 This means that in most instances,
sealed sources are exported without NRC knowing the type, amount, or
activity level of the sources, or their destination. (See app. VII for
more
information about NRC*s export regulations.) Sealed sources have also been
distributed worldwide by a variety of means other than commercial trade
without adequate monitoring and oversight. As a result, the sealed sources
have not always been properly accounted for and accurately inventoried.
For example, sealed sources have been (1) distributed by corporations
working in developing countries without
formal clearance from or approval by the recipient country*s regulatory
authority, (2) donated by medical practitioners and nonprofit
organizations, and (3) provided through international technical
cooperation programs. IAEA has reported that international corporations*
such as oil companies* have brought sealed sources used in oil exploration
into developing countries. In some cases, there was no competent authority
in the country to register or license the sealed sources, and existing
national rules were regarded as too complicated or
difficult for the corporations to follow. One African country reported in
response to our survey that its inventory of sealed sources was incomplete
because foreign construction companies had not notified the country*s
regulatory authority when it imported sealed sources. According to IAEA,
medical practitioners have brought sealed sources into
developing countries for the purpose of establishing health clinics and
hospitals and a number of sources were not properly accounted for. IAEA
reported that hospitals in many developed countries donated large amounts
of surplus radium- 226 to hospitals in developing countries in the 1960s.
One African country responding to our survey noted that according to old
records, radium had been imported into the country but could not be
5 Under NRC regulations sealed sources may not be exported to certain
countries and may only be exported to certain other countries in limited
quantities. Sealed sources may not be exported to Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, and Sudan. 10 C. F. R. S: 110.28. Sealed sources may be
exported only in limited quantities to Afghanistan, Andorra, Angola,
Burma, Djibouti, India, Israel, Oman, Pakistan, and Syria. 10 C. F. R.S:
110.29.
located. Nonprofit organizations have also provided medical equipment
using sealed sources to foreign countries. For example, the American
International Health Alliance, operating under a series of cooperative
agreements with USAID and DOE, has donated medical supplies,
pharmaceuticals, and equipment, including those containing sealed sources,
to countries in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
Europe since 1992. 6 According to an official from the American
International Health Alliance, DOD also donated medical equipment
containing sealed sources from field facilities to several countries in
the former Soviet Union under the auspices of Operation Provide Hope.
Since 1992, over 500 airlift deliveries by DOD to Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan occurred, but the
exact number of sealed source devices donated is unknown.
IAEA has supplied sealed sources to many countries through its technical
cooperation program. 7 In 1991, IAEA estimated that it had provided many
developing countries with 565 sources since 1957. IAEA officials told us
that IAEA had provided developing member states with over 1,000 devices
containing sealed sources since 1996. Most of these sealed sources are not
considered a security risk by IAEA because of their low radioactivity.
However, officials did note that about 125 of the 1,000 devices contained
sources that could pose security risks if acquired by terrorists. These
include (1) teletherapy machines with cobalt- 60 sources of activity
between 5,000 and 7,000 curies, (2) brachytherapy machines with cesium137
sources of activity between 0. 5 and 1 curie and iridium- 192 sources of
10 curies, (3) irradiators with cobalt- 60 sources with activity in the
range of
12,000 to 200,000 curies, and (4) calibrators with activity around 4,000
curies. IAEA officials said that they were uncertain, however, the extent
to which the sealed sources have been included in countries* inventories.
While it is the responsibility of each country* and not IAEA* to maintain
accurate inventories of the sources, IAEA has encouraged many of its
member states to establish and/ or strengthen their radiation and waste
6 The American International Health Alliance and its partners identify the
health needs of local populations, develop strategies for meeting those
needs, and implement programs and services to help local populations
attain their goals. The equipment supplements voluntary and in- kind
commitments of individual health care professionals, partner hospitals,
and universities.
7 IAEA*s technical cooperation program is designed to provide its member
states with technical assistance by providing equipment, expert services,
and training that support the upgrading and establishment of nuclear
techniques and facilities.
safety infrastructures via the model project program. In addition, IAEA
policy does not allow for the approval of any technical cooperation
projects involving the use of significant sealed sources unless the member
state in question has, among other things, an effective regulatory
framework that includes a system of notification, authorization, and
control of sealed sources together with an inventory of sources. IAEA*s
model project program is discussed on pages 22 and 23 of this report. DOE
has provided countries with sealed sources under the Atoms for Peace
Program. According to a March 2002 DOE Inspector General report,
Accounting for Sealed Sources of Nuclear Material Provided to Foreign
Countries, DOE could not fully account for sealed sources loaned to
foreign countries and no longer maintained an accounting and tracking
system for sealed sources. The report noted that DOE and its predecessor
agencies provided 33 countries, including Iran, Pakistan, India, Malaysia,
and Vietnam, with 536 sealed sources, which contained plutonium, from the
1950s through the 1970s. Initially, these materials were loaned to foreign
facilities, and the U. S. government maintained ownership.
However, in the 1960s, the U. S. government began transferring ownership
through direct sale or donation, but it still retained title to much of
the sealed sources provided to foreign entities. The report concluded that
(1) the oversight of sealed sources was inadequate and that inaccurate
inventory records limit DOE*s ability to protect nuclear materials from
loss,
theft, or other diversion, and (2) DOE should work with IAEA to establish
adequate regulatory oversight of sealed sources in foreign countries. In
its response to the report, DOE stated that it is not the current policy
of the U. S. government to track sealed sources once they are in the
control of foreign entities and that to track loaned sealed sources would
require a change in policy and international agreements.
Limited Information Exists Because many countries cannot account for their
sealed sources, there is
about the Number of Lost, limited information on the number of sealed
sources that are lost, stolen, or Stolen, or Abandoned
abandoned* referred to as *orphan sources.* According to the Director
Sealed Sources
General of IAEA, orphan sources are a widespread phenomenon, and 34 of the
49 countries responding to our survey indicated that orphan sources pose
problems in their country. In the European Union, up to 70 sealed sources
are lost among its member states annually. According to NRC, about 250
sealed sources or devices are lost or stolen in the United States
annually, but the majority of the sources have been recovered. NRC said
that the European Union does not report sources as being lost unless they
are at a certain activity level that exceeds the NRC threshold for
tracking
purposes. As a result, NRC typically reports a greater number of lost
sealed sources than the European Union does. The problem of orphan sources
is most significant in the countries of the
former Soviet Union, where the collapse of the centralized Soviet
government structure over a decade ago led to a loss of records and
regulatory oversight over sealed sources. According to Russia*s nuclear
regulatory agency, Gosatomnadzor, 51 sealed sources were reported lost in
2002 and 245 were lost in 2000. No information was made available to us
for 2001. In the Republic of Georgia, over 280 orphan sources have been
recovered since the mid- 1990s. Survey respondents reported that 612
sources had been lost or stolen since 1995. Of the 612 reported orphan
sources, 254 had not yet been recovered. Table 2 summarizes the number of
lost, stolen, and recovered sources reported.
Tabl e 2: Reported Lost or Stolen and Recovered Sealed Sources Reported
lost or stolen
Recovered sealed Region sealed sources sources
Africa 8 0 Asia 93 11 Europe 298 213 Former Soviet Union 35 14 Middle East
41 24 North America a and Central America 72 65
South America 21 10 South Pacific 44 21
Tot al 612 358
Source: GAO. a The United States was not included in this survey.
Thirty- five of the 49 countries we surveyed indicated that they had an
organized process to search for orphan sources, and several of these
countries listed one or more organizations that are responsible for
removing the sources once they have been found. However, the remaining 14
countries, spread across different regions, reported that they did not
have a similar process to search for orphaned sources. Four of the 14
countries were located in Africa.
Six countries indicated that there were disincentives to finding orphaned
sources. In particular, they noted that an individual who reports finding
a source might be held responsible for paying for its disposal. Russian
officials told us that facilities possessing sealed sources that are no
longer used are responsible for disposal costs. The disposal fees are very
high and, as a result, the users are reluctant to notify authorities about
them and frequently opt to dispose of them illegally.
Certain Lost, Stolen, or According to U. S. and international safety and
security experts, among the
Abandoned Sealed Sources most urgent problems are the security risks posed
by the approximately
Pose a Significant Security 1,000 radioisotope thermoelectric generators
located in the former Soviet
Risk Union. These generators were designed to provide electric power and
are
ideally suited for remote locations to power navigational facilities, such
as lighthouses, radio beacons, and meteorological stations. 8 Each has
activity levels ranging from 40,000 to 150,000 curies of strontium- 90*
similar to the
amount of strontium- 90 released from the Chernobyl accident in 1986.
These generators pose a security risk because they may not be adequately
protected or secured. An international effort was initiated about 2 years
ago to recover and secure these generators in remote locations in the
Republic of Georgia. Although the exact number of generators in Georgia is
unknown, IAEA and Georgian officials told us that at least six generators
have been recovered. 8 The United States had also deployed a small number
of radioistope thermoelectric
generators in Alaska.
Figure 1: Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators Manufactured in the
Former Soviet Union
We met with the Russian organization that developed the radioisotope
thermoelectric generators* the Russian National Technical Physics and
Automation Research Institute. Institute officials told us that the
generators pose a serious security and safety threat and should all be
taken out of service. They noted that the units have a design service life
of 10 to 15 years and that no repair or maintenance has been done on any
of these units since 1991. However, Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy
(MINATOM) officials said that the generators are technically sound and
should not be completely removed from service without adequate replacement
power. MINATOM officials said they are considering extending the life of
the generators in order to keep them in service significantly longer than
originally planned. Table 3 shows the estimated number of radioisotope
thermoelectric generators located in the countries of the former Soviet
Union.
Tabl e 3: Estimated Number of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators in
the Former Soviet Union
Radioisotope thermoelectric Country generators
Armenia 1 Azerbaijan 1 Belarus 3 Georgia 12 a Kazakhstan 3 Russia 998 b
Tajikistan 1 Ukraine 12
Tot al 1,031
Sources: NRC, MINATOM, and Russian National Technical Physics Automation
Research Institute. a The estimated number of generators in Georgia ranges
from 6 to 12.
b Includes 829 that are operational and 169 that are in storage.
There have been numerous attempts to steal the sealed sources from these
generators. For example, in recent years there have been six attempts to
disassemble the generators in Kazakhstan and a number of similar events in
Georgia and Russia. Some of the strontium- 90 sealed sources from the
generators have been found in residential areas. In a few instances,
people who have stolen the sealed sources have used them for heating and
cooking, and officials have speculated that the metal shielding might have
been used to make bullets. In 2001, three woodsmen in Georgia who found
the strontium- 90 sealed source from an abandoned and dismantled generator
used it as a heat source and suffered severe radiation burns. IAEA and DOE
officials told us that other devices containing sealed sources, such as
seed irradiators that were used in the former Soviet Union, pose
significant security risks. Seed irradiators were mounted on trucks and
used to irradiate seeds in order to kill fungus and inhibit germination.
According to IAEA and DOE, each irradiator has activity levels of over
1, 000 curies of cesium- 137 in powdery form (cesium chloride).
Figure 2: Abandoned Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator in Russia
Figure 3: Seed Irradiators Used in the Former Soviet Union
IAEA*s Director of the Division of Radiation and Waste Safety told us that
no one knows the total number of orphan sources or their location in the
former Soviet Union. IAEA is continuously obtaining new information about
previously unknown devices using sealed sources. This makes it extremely
difficult for the agency to develop strategies to locate and recover these
sources in a systematic way. The Director also told us that the problem of
orphan sources is not unique to the former Soviet Union and that similar
problems exist in other parts of the world.
Countries Have All of the countries responding to our survey said they
have established
Established Legislative legislative or regulatory controls over sealed
sources. However, U. S. and
international nuclear safety and security experts told us that controls
and Regulatory placed on radioactive sources vary greatly between
countries and focus
Controls over Sealed primarily on protecting public health and safety and
not on securing sealed
Sources, but Adequacy sources from theft or destructive use. According to
IAEA, as many as 110 countries worldwide do not have adequate controls
over sealed sources
of Controls Varies and the agency has established a program to help 88
countries upgrade
their regulatory infrastructures. Countries Responding to All of the
countries that responded to our survey reported that they have Our Survey
Reported That
established legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources. The
They Have Established countries that responded to our survey identified
various controls over
Controls over Sealed sealed sources, including (1) licensing and
inspection; (2) tracking the
import and export of sources; (3) maintaining national registries of
Sources
sources* users; (4) maintaining national inventories of sources; (5)
searching for and recovering lost, stolen, or abandoned sources; (6)
securing sources; and (7) regulating their safe transport. According to
IAEA, controls over sealed sources are based on countries* development of
a framework of laws and regulations. Twenty- five of the 49 countries
reported that they had established a strong legislative framework to
control sealed sources and most of these same countries indicated that
they had a
strong regulatory framework as well. Several countries characterized their
legislative or regulatory framework as weak. The countries that reported
having a strong legislative or regulatory framework were spread across
many regions, including the former Soviet Union, Europe, Africa, and the
South Pacific. Countries reporting that they had weak or nonexistent
regulatory frameworks were located primarily in the former Soviet Union,
the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and South America.
Countries reported using various guidelines to develop their laws or
regulations that serve as the basis for controls over sealed sources.
Fortyfour of the 49 countries said they used either one or both IAEA
guidelines* (1) the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection
against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources and (2)
the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. 9
Twelve of the countries responding to our survey indicated that they base
their regulatory
controls, in part, on European Union regulations. European Commission
officials told us that efforts are under way to strengthen controls over
sealed sources, including harmonizing measures among member states for the
recovery of orphan sources. These efforts began prior to September 11,
2001, in response to accidents where orphan sources were melted with scrap
metal, resulting in significant economic damages. In 2002, the commission
adopted a proposed directive to improve controls over sealed sources that
emit large amounts of radiation. The proposal urges that necessary
measures be taken to protect public health from orphan source exposure.
More recently, a commission committee proposed that users of radioactive
sources in the European Union be charged a refundable deposit before
acquiring sealed sources.
All of the countries responding to our survey identified one or more
organizations responsible for regulating sealed sources. Forty- five of
the 49 countries reported that regulatory organizations inspect facilities
where sealed sources are stored or in use. Regarding enforcement, three
countries failed to list any actions that inspectors could take to ensure
compliance with laws and regulations. Many of the countries identified
more than one enforcement mechanism available, including levying fines,
suspending or terminating licenses, and closing a facility. Enforcement
mechanisms, however, are not always used. Representatives from one
European country* that did not respond to our survey but discussed these
matters with us* told us that imposed fines tend to be so low that many
users of sealed sources may find it cheaper to pay the fines rather than
comply with the regulations. 9 The International Basic Safety Standards
are intended to ensure (1) the protection of
individuals and the population against radiation exposure, (2) the safety
of radiation sources in order to prevent accidents, and (3) the security
of sources to prevent the relinquishing of control over their use. IAEA*s
Code of Conduct is a nonbinding document that applies to all radioactive
sources that may pose a significant risk to health and the environment. It
does not cover fissile materials used to construct weapons of mass
destruction and sources within military or defense programs. The code is
currently being revised to reflect member states* increased concerns about
the security risks posed by sealed sources.
All of the countries responding to our survey reported that users of
sealed sources are required to secure radioactive materials in their
possession. In addition, 39 of the respondents reported that they had
facilities to store disused sources. However, only 18 countries indicated
that they have a facility to permanently dispose of the sealed sources.
Those countries that did not have any storage facilities were primarily
located in Africa. Representatives from four former Soviet Union countries
told us that the absence of secure storage poses a serious security
problem, and an official from the Republic of Georgia told us that a well-
protected centralized storage facility was urgently needed.
All but four of the countries responding to our survey said they had
regulations covering the safe transport of sealed sources. The countries
that did not have such regulations were located in Africa, South America,
and the Middle East. Although Russia did not respond to our survey,
Russian officials told us that they were concerned about moving sealed
sources safely and securely. They said that sources that were no longer
being used are moved great distances by trucks and are vulnerable to theft
because the operators of the vehicles must stop to rest or lose
communications owing to the remoteness of the locations where they are
traveling.
Countries* Controls over Nuclear safety and security experts from the
Departments of Energy, State, Sealed Sources Vary and Are
and Defense; NRC; IAEA; and the European Commission told us that Weakest
among Developing
controls placed on sealed sources vary greatly between countries and have
Countries
focused primarily on protecting public health and safety and not on
securing the sources from potential terrorists threats. According to IAEA,
as many as 110 countries worldwide lack the regulatory infrastructure to
adequately protect or control sealed sources. Many of these countries are
considered less developed and are confronted with social, political, and
economic problems that divert attention from imposing controls on the many
thousands of radioactive sources used in hospitals, research facilities,
industries, or universities. In many cases, these countries* regulatory
organizations have a limited number of trained personnel. In the absence
of regulatory controls, radioactive sources have been inadequately
protected or secured; little or no attention has been paid to export or
import controls of sources; and there has been a lack of basic record
keeping. IAEA*s Director of the Division of Radiation and Waste Safety
told us that many countries also lack the commitment or political will to
exercise controls over sealed sources.
In March 2003 over 700 delegates from more than 120 countries met in
Vienna, Austria, to participate in an international conference on the
security of radioactive sources. The conference, sponsored by the
governments of the United States and the Russian Federation, emphasized
that all users of sealed sources share a responsibility for managing them
in a safe and secure manner and that the manufacturers of sources and
regulators have important roles to play. The conference also noted that
high- risk radioactive sources that are not under secure and regulated
control, including orphan sources, raise serious security and safety
concerns. U. S. and international experts are in the process of developing
a systematic approach to identifying the highest- risk sources. In 2000
IAEA established a categorization of sealed sources to, among other
things, determine the level of oversight that should be applied to the
safety and security of a particular type of source. In response to growing
concerns about sealed sources being used as a terror weapon, IAEA has
revised the
categorization. The categorization, which is still in draft, provides a
relative numerical ranking of sealed sources and practices for which they
are used. Appendix VIII provides more information about the conference,
and appendix IX contains additional details about IAEA*s revised
categorization of sources.
IAEA Has Implemented a In 1994 IAEA established a model project program to
enhance countries*
Program to Help Many regulatory infrastructure. This program is available
to any IAEA member
Countries Improve state upon request. (See app. X for a list of countries
participating in the
Regulatory Controls program.) The program has expanded and includes 88
countries. As of
December 2002, IAEA had spent $27.7 million to help these countries. Each
country*s progress is measured through five milestones, including the
establishment of a regulatory framework. 10 This milestone is considered
the most time- consuming and requires that the country draft and implement
radiation protection laws and regulations; designate and empower a
national regulatory authority; and establish a system for the
notification, authorization, and control of radioactive sources, including
the preparation of an inventory of sources and installations. According to
IAEA, about 77 percent of the countries participating in the program as of
September 2001 had promulgated the necessary laws and established
regulatory authorities. In addition, about 42 percent of the countries had
adopted the necessary regulations; about 50 percent had systems for the
notification, authorization, and control of radioactive sources in place
and operational; and about 80 percent had systems in place to inventory
sources. Considering that the program had been under way since the
mid1990s, the level of achievement was much lower than expected, and the
time necessary to overcome some of the difficulties faced by the countries
was underestimated. The reasons that many of the countries had not fully
implemented this milestone included (1) time- consuming legislative and
regulatory procedures; (2) institutional instability; (3) budgetary
constraints, resulting in, among other things, a high turnover of
qualified staff; (4) unfocused regulatory structures, resulting in
overlapping
responsibilities; (5) limited regulatory independence and empowerment; and
(6) insufficient financial and technical resources, trained staff, and
support services. Several countries responding to our survey indicated
that additional assistance is needed to improve controls over sealed
sources, including radiation detection equipment and training for
regulatory staff.
U. S. and international officials told us that there are about 50
additional countries needing assistance that are not member states of IAEA
and are not eligible for assistance under the model project program.
According to IAEA, many of these countries have sealed sources that are
being used
10 The five milestones are (1) the establishment of a regulatory
framework, (2) the establishment of occupational exposure control, (3) the
establishment of medical exposure control, (4) the establishment of public
exposure control, and (5) the establishment of emergency preparedness and
response capabilities.
without adequate controls. These officials are concerned that without
appropriate regulatory oversight, sources in these countries pose a
particularly serious threat because they are not adequately protected.
Officials from the Department of State, IAEA, and the European Commission
told us that France has implemented a system for controlling sealed
sources that could serve as a model for other countries, including many
developing nations. France*s system requires distributors of sealed
sources to assume financial responsibility for recovering and disposing of
these sources at the end of their 10- year life. According to French
officials, this system has significantly reduced the number of orphan
sources. France*s system for controlling sources is discussed in more
detail in appendix XI.
DOE Has a Program to DOE has the primary U. S. government responsibility
for helping other
Help Other Countries countries strengthen controls over sealed sources.
Since fiscal year 2002,
DOE has received $36.9 million to, among other things, secure sources at
Secure Sealed Sources,
several large nuclear waste repositories in Russia and other countries of
but Strengthened
the former Soviet Union. Other U. S. federal agencies, including the
Coordination and
Departments of Defense and State, and NRC have efforts under way to help
countries strengthen controls over sealed sources as well. DOE*s initial
Planning Are Needed
efforts to secure sealed sources have lacked adequate planning and
coordination, and the majority of program expenditures have been in the
United States. According to DOE officials, efforts are under way to
improve the management of the program, including the development of a plan
and better coordination with other agencies. DOE Is Leading the U. S.
DOE is leading U. S. government efforts to help other countries strengthen
Effort to Help Other
controls over sealed sources. DOE*s effort is part of the overall U. S.
Countries Secure Sealed
national strategy to reduce the risk that terrorist groups could use these
Sources
materials in a dirty bomb attack against the United States. A
congressional report instructs DOE to use a portion of its fiscal year
2002 supplemental appropriation to address the threat posed by dirty
bombs. 11 In response to the congressional requirement, the National
Nuclear Security
Administration*s Office of International Material Protection and
Cooperation established the Radiological Threat Reduction program in
11 H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 107- 350, at 431 (2001).
January 2002, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in fiscal year 2002,
and received an additional $16.3 million appropriation in fiscal year
2003. The program is expected to receive an additional $22 million in
supplemental appropriations in fiscal year 2003, including $5 million to
secure nuclear material in Iraq.
Initially, DOE evaluated the threat to national security from radioactive
materials and determined that sealed sources pose a greater threat than
other radioactive materials, such as radioactive waste and nuclear fuel,
because of their availability; radioactivity; and other physical
characteristics, such as half- life. DOE did further studies of the dirty
bomb threat, including (1) narrowing the list of sealed sources that are a
high priority because of their characteristics and availability, (2)
analyzing
possible scenarios in which a radiological dispersion device could be
used, and (3) determining what the economic consequences of a dirty bomb
attack in the United States would be. The former assistant deputy
administrator of the Office of International Material Protection and
Cooperation told us that it would be impossible to secure all sealed
sources but that by determining which sources pose the greatest risk, DOE
could prioritize its efforts. DOE has focused on securing sealed sources
in the countries of the former
Soviet Union because DOE officials have determined that is where the
greatest number of vulnerable sealed sources is located. In April 2002 the
Radiological Threat Reduction program initiated its first security upgrade
project at the Moscow Radon, a regional facility involved with collecting,
transporting, processing, and disposing of sealed sources and low- and
intermediate- level radioactive waste. There are 35 Radon facilities in
the former Soviet Union, but the Moscow Radon is by far the largest and
collects almost 80 percent of the institutional, industrial, and medical
radioactive wastes in Russia from almost 2,000 enterprises in the city of
Moscow, the Moscow region, and nine neighboring regions. During our visit
to the Moscow Radon in October 2002, Radon officials showed us the
building for which most of the DOE- funded upgrades are planned. (See fig.
4.) Planned upgrades at the site include surveillance cameras, motion
detectors, vehicles, building upgrades, and a security facility where
guards can monitor the building where most high- activity sources are
stored. Although there have been no known attempts at theft of materials
at the
site, Radon officials told us that upgrades are needed because existing
security is inadequate.
Figure 4: Moscow Radon Building Scheduled for DOE- Funded Security
Upgrades
The program has also secured sealed sources in Uzbekistan and the Republic
of Georgia. In Uzbekistan, DOE has funded security upgrades at research
and irradiation facilities and the construction of a national repository
for sealed sources, and plans to fund increased physical security upgrades
at a dozen regional cancer treatment facilities. In the Republic of
Georgia, DOE funded security upgrades at a facility where radioisotope
thermoelectric generators and other high- activity sealed sources are
stored. Upgrades in both countries included bricking up windows;
reinforcing doors; improving or replacing roofs; upgrading storage vaults;
installing motion detectors and alarm systems; and other low- cost, *low-
tech* measures. Figure 5 shows an example of the security upgrades funded
by DOE.
Figure 5: DOE- Funded Physical Security Upgrades in the Former Soviet
Union (Top) before: Weak doors and windows; door locked with a simple
padlock; and gaps/ holes in roof. (Bottom) after: Reinforced steel doors
with double locks that cannot be cut; bricked- up windows; alarm system;
patched, reinforced roof. In June 2002 DOE launched two additional
efforts* a bilateral initiative
with MINATOM to secure sealed sources at Russian facilities identified by
MINATOM, and a Tripartite Initiative with MINATOM and IAEA. The objective
of the Tripartite Initiative is to improve the security of sealed sources
in former Soviet states by developing inventories of sealed sources,
locating the sealed sources, recovering the sealed sources, storing
recovered sealed sources in a secure manner, and disposing of the sources.
Ultimately, DOE hopes that Russia will play a key role in recovering
sealed sources in other former Soviet states because many of these sealed
sources were manufactured in and distributed from Russia. In July 2002
MINATOM provided DOE with a number of priority projects for funding in
Russia. These projects included recovering and securing radioisotope
thermoelectric generators, and recovering orphan sources at 45 sites in
Russia. According to DOE, the sites will be prioritized according to the
type and activity level of the radioactive material present. DOE has
completed site assessments at four Radon sites in Russia. Upgrades at
these facilities are expected to be completed by the end of
fiscal year 2004. A key criterion for deciding if the site requires
upgrades is an inventory of the sealed sources stored there* if the
inventory includes sealed sources that DOE has determined to be high risk,
security upgrades
will be implemented. Under the Tripartite Initiative, 19 additional Radon
sites in other former Soviet states will be assessed. These Radon sites
are located in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 12 Estonia, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan. DOE also plans to perform site assessments and security
upgrades at medical, industrial, and research facilities throughout the
former Soviet Union,
similar to those done in Uzbekistan and Georgia. DOE, IAEA, and MINATOM
officials visited Moldova in the fall of 2002 to conduct a physical
security evaluation, implement the upgrades at the Moldova Radon, and
identify other sites where further work is needed to improve security. DOE
and IAEA officials conducted a similar trip to Tajikistan in December
2002. Work in both countries is expected to be complete in the summer of
2003, and DOE plans to initiate projects in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the
Baltics, and possibly Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan in fiscal year
2003.
12 Current U. S. policy is to restrict assistance in Belarus to
humanitarian assistance and exchange programs with state- run educational
institutions; Russia and IAEA will likely carry out any work to secure
sealed sources in Belarus under the Tripartite Initiative.
In March 2003 the Secretary of Energy announced a new initiative to
broaden the Tripartite Initiative to other countries needing assistance to
secure high- risk vulnerable sources. The emphasis of the expanded
initiative will be on developing countries outside of the former Soviet
Union. As part of this expanded effort, DOE expects to initiate work in
Serbia and Indonesia this year.
Finally, DOE also has a program designed to strengthen other countries*
controls over sealed sources managed by the Office of International
Nuclear Safety within the National Nuclear Security Administration. The
office is working with IAEA, other international organizations, NRC, and
the State Department to develop a management program for sealed sources.
The purpose of this program is to protect the health and safety of the
public and people who work with sealed sources by developing literature
and training programs. The program also contributed assistance
for the international effort to recover orphan sources in the Republic of
Georgia, including providing technical assistance, detection and personnel
protection equipment, training, and software. In Armenia, this program is
providing training, equipment, and other technical assistance to enhance
the safety and security of sealed sources. As of September 30, 2002, DOE
had spent about $330, 000 for these activities.
DOD, State, and NRC Also DOD, through its Cooperative Threat Reduction
program, 13 is helping
Have Programs to Kazakhstan to inventory, secure, and dispose of about
2,000 sealed sources,
Strengthen Other Countries* primarily cesium- 137 and cobalt- 60, from an
out- of- service industrial
Controls over Sealed facility, and identify other facilities with sealed
sources. The manager of
the program told us that although sealed sources are not traditionally
Sources
considered to be weapons of mass destruction, DOD undertook this project
because the Kazakhstan government asked for assistance and the quantity
and types of sealed sources posed a security threat. The program began in
fiscal year 2001, prior to the establishment of DOE*s program to secure
sealed sources, and DOD does not expect to engage in any further projects
to secure sources in the former Soviet Union countries. The $1.7 million
project is expected to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2003. 13 The
Cooperative Threat Reduction program is designed to help the countries of
the former
Soviet Union destroy and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons of mass destruction.
The State Department is also funding various projects to strengthen
controls. For example, State provided IAEA with $1 million in fiscal year
2002 to support the agency*s projects related to the safety and security
of radioactive sources. Additionally, State allocated $120, 000 in fiscal
year 2002 from the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 14 for a pilot
project to develop and improve radiation safety programs in developing
countries, including controls over sealed sources. The project was
initially developed by the Health Physics Society 15 and proposed by
State*s Office of the Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety. Health
Physics Society members volunteer their time, and State Department funding
is used for travel, per diem, the cost of shipping donated equipment to
the host countries, and evaluation of the project* about $3,000 spent to
date. Four countries* Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, and Panama* were
chosen for the pilot; however, work has been initiated in only two
countries. The project was recently reactivated after a suspension of
several months because of State Department concerns about program
management, security, and liability issues. The State Department has also
contracted with Sandia National Laboratory
for a $100, 000 study to assess the current laws and procedures governing
intercountry transfers of sealed sources. Specifically, the study is
looking at six countries that are either major exporters or importers of
sealed sources and will provide information on, among other things, the
number of sources that is imported and exported, and whether exporters are
required to verify whether the countries they are exporting to have
controls in place to ensure the safety and security of sealed sources. In
addition, NRC has a program to strengthen controls that focuses on
Armenia. NRC has spent $62,000 in Freedom Support Act funds transferred
from USAID to assist Armenia. Initially, NRC will help Armenia develop a
registry of sealed sources, including identifying the information
required; develop the database; and help Armenia gather, assess, develop,
and verify existing data on sources. Currently, Armenian regulations on
sealed sources and other radioactive materials are spread across different
ministries and departments, and many have not been changed since the fall
14 The mission of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament fund is to
undertake high- priority, rapid response projects to halt the
proliferation of and destroy or neutralize weapons of
mass destruction, and limit the spread of advanced conventional weapons.
15 The Health Physics Society is a scientific and professional
organization whose members specialize in occupational and environmental
radiation safety.
of the Soviet Union. NRC plans to assist Armenia with reviewing existing
regulations and developing consolidated regulations on, among other
things, licensing and inspections of radioactive sources, which will apply
governmentwide and meet international standards. In addition, NRC provided
Russia and Ukraine with guidance and training on the licensing and
regulation of sealed sources in the mid- 1990s. NRC has also started
working with Canada and Mexico to share information about controls over
sealed sources in each country and improve cross- border controls and has
provided cost- free experts to help IAEA update its Categorization of
Radioactive Sources and Code of Conduct.
Finally, DOE and State are providing funds to support IAEA efforts to
strengthen controls over sealed sources. DOE and State have pledged a
total of $8.2 million* 67 percent of the total $12.2 million pledged* to
IAEA*s Nuclear Security Fund. 16 This fund was established after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in conjunction with IAEA*s action
plan to improve nuclear security worldwide. The State Department has
directed $1 million of its contribution specifically toward activities to
improve the controls over sealed sources, and DOE*s $3 million
contribution is entirely directed to these efforts. Planned activities to
improve the security of sealed sources in member states include, among
other things, enhancing ongoing activities to improve controls of sealed
sources; developing standards, guidelines, and recommendations on the
security of radioactive sources; establishing security standards for the
transport of radioactive material; and locating and securing orphan
sources.
Table 4 summarizes the amounts that the Departments of Energy, State, and
Defense, and NRC have received, obligated, and spent to help other
countries strengthen their controls over sealed sources as of January 31,
2003.
16 Other countries that have pledged voluntary contributions to the
Nuclear Security Fund include Australia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France,
Greece, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Romania, Slovenia, South Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nongovernmental organization, has also
pledged to contribute to the fund.
Table 4: Assistance to Improve Controls over Radioactive Sources through
January 31, 2003 Program/ Activity Description Received Obligated Spent
DOE Radiological Threat Assisting Russia and other former Soviet $36,900,
000 $11,426,600 $8,934, 000 Reduction program Republics to secure sealed
sources. Includes
$3 million for IAEA activities. DOE International Emergency
Training program for control and management 430, 000 430,000 330, 000
Management program of radioactive materials. Also provides assistance to
help locate, handle, and safely
remove high- risk sources. DOD Cooperative Threat Securing, inventorying,
and disposing of
1,703, 884 1,699,214 975, 140 Reduction program a sources in Kazakhstan.
State Department Radiation
Assisting to build radiation safety 120, 020 120,020 3,094 Safety without
Borders Pilot
infrastructures in developing countries project
participating in the IAEA model project. State Department study
Studying protocols on international transfers of 100, 000 100,000 49, 300
conducted by Sandia National
sealed sources in several countries. Laboratory State Department Nuclear
Funding to IAEA. 1,000, 000 1,000,000 1,000, 000 Safety Nuclear Regulatory
Designing and developing a registry of sources, 250, 000 250,000 62, 000
Commission and assistance to assess and develop
regulations related to radioactive materials in Armenia.
Total $40,503, 904 $15,025,834 $11,353, 534
Sources: DOE, DOD, Department of State, and NRC. a DOD figures are through
April 1, 2003.
DOE Efforts Have Not Been DOE is in the process of developing a plan to
guide its efforts to help other
Well Planned and countries secure sealed sources. According to DOE
officials, initial
Coordinated with Those of attempts to develop a plan were stopped in May
2002 because the former
Other U. S. Agencies administrator of the Office of International Material
Protection and
Cooperation felt that the program needed to show tangible results quickly.
In the absence of a plan, DOE officials told us that the program has
modeled its work in Russia on previous DOE projects to secure fissile
materials in Russia through its Material Protection, Control, and
Accounting program. The director of the program told us that while the
initial approach to securing sealed sources in Russia* focusing on
improving physical security at Radon sites* was a good idea, it hindered
DOE from setting priorities among other sites in Russia. He further noted
that the program is now focusing on improving the security of the most
vulnerable high- risk sources first.
DOE officials told us that they recognize that the development of a plan
is essential. DOE*s draft plan has established short- and long- term
program elements, including consolidating and securing dangerous materials
in vulnerable locations; leveraging critical partnerships, such as
continuing to work with IAEA on key efforts such as the model projects
program and the code of conduct; and continuing to help countries detect
smuggled radioactive materials through its Second Line of Defense program.
17 In addition to the plan, DOE officials said they are also developing a
more detailed action plan; radioactivity thresholds for vulnerable high-
risk radioactive materials; and guidelines for describing the actions that
should be taken by DOE when sources are found to exceed those
radioactivity thresholds. As part of its overall effort, DOE officials
told us that more detailed planning and analysis will be needed to, among
other things, (1) determine which countries present the greatest security
risk and most
urgently require assistance, (2) identify future funding requirements, and
(3) develop performance measures to gauge program success. Despite these
recent initiatives to improve program planning, officials from
Gosatomnadzor, the Russian agency responsible for regulating sealed
sources in use at almost 8,000 facilities in Russia, told us that beyond
an initial meeting, DOE had not consulted with them in the selection or
prioritization of sites for physical security upgrades. In particular,
Gosatomnadzor officials were surprised that DOE was focusing so much
attention on improving security at the Radon facilities in Russia where
they believed the probability that sealed sources will be stolen is low.
They said that it would be preferable to begin securing sealed sources
from other vulnerable sites near Moscow, for example, out- of- service
irradiation and research facilities. A systematic approach is required to
assess needs, identify priorities, and develop a comprehensive approach to
securing sealed sources. In their view, DOE*s initial approach had the
potential to be superficial. DOE officials told us that they are now
working more closely with
Gosatomnadzor. In a March 31, 2003, letter from DOE*s Acting Deputy
Assistant Secretary for International Material Protection and Cooperation
to Gosatomnadzor*s First Deputy Chairman, the DOE official noted the need
for regulatory oversight of the Russian radiological industry and
17 See Nuclear Nonproliferation: U. S. Efforts to Help Other Countries
Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning (GAO-
02- 426, May 16, 2002).
suggested that a proposal be formulated jointly with NRC to work
cooperatively in this area. DOE is also seeking to improve planning and
coordination of the Tripartite Initiative. According to an IAEA official,
DOE coordinated its efforts with IAEA and Russia on the Moldova visit that
contributed to a successful start of the Tripartite Initiative. The
participants jointly developed and implemented a common approach for
securing some vulnerable sealed sources, and arrangements were made to
construct a facility to store these
sources. However, the IAEA official told us that the Tajikistan assessment
was not well coordinated. He noted that DOE was not flexible in scheduling
the preliminary assessment visit and that Russia did not
participate in the visit. Because of the timing of the visit, IAEA*s
representative to the Tripartite Initiative was unable to participate in
the visit, however, an official from IAEA*s Department of Technical
Cooperation did accompany the DOE team.
DOE officials told us that they were unable to make changes to their
existing itinerary because they would have incurred significant delays if
travel dates were changed due to country clearance restrictions for U. S.
government travel in Tajikistan. Furthermore, they noted that because of
the different roles that DOE, MINATOM, and IAEA play under the Tripartite
Initiative, it is not necessary that representatives of each organization
be present on each visit. As currently envisioned, the Russian and IAEA
participants will act as an advance team, gathering information about
which sealed sources exist in a given country and their current level of
vulnerability. Subsequently, the U. S. team will visit the country and
negotiate contracts to improve security at the vulnerable sites.
IAEA*s official also told us that, overall, the Tripartite Initiative has
not been well planned. Initial efforts have been ad- hoc, and a more
systematic approach is needed as the program continues. He said that
improved planning is essential particularly because the Tripartite
Initiative will be used as a model to guide future efforts as the program
expands worldwide. DOE officials agreed that improved coordination is
needed. DOE, MINATOM, and IAEA are working to finalize a *Terms of
Reference* document that defines the objectives, scope, roles, operational
framework, and procedures to be followed for implementing projects under
the
Initiative. Furthermore, preliminary schedules for missions to several
countries have been jointly developed through August 2003.
Department of State and NRC officials told us that DOE has not fully
coordinated its efforts with their agencies, although they noted that
efforts were recently under way to improve coordination. These officials
told us that DOE needs their input to ensure that a comprehensive
governmentwide strategy is taken to, among other things, leverage program
resources, maximize available expertise, avoid possible duplication of
effort, and help ensure long- term success. DOE has not systematically
undertaken the kind of comprehensive planning that would foster better
coordination with the other agencies and could also lead to better
coordination with other countries* nuclear organizations. For
example, DOE did not adequately consult NRC or State when developing the
Radiological Threat Reduction program or developing the Tripartite
Initiative with MINATOM and IAEA. Officials from NRC and the State
Department expressed interest in sharing information and working with DOE
to plan and execute the Radiological Threat Reduction program, but told us
that there had been limited information sharing between agencies.
Both NRC and the State Department have extensive experience in nuclear
regulatory and safety- related issues in the former Soviet Union. NRC has
received approximately $50 million from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal
year 2002 to support regulatory strengthening efforts in the countries of
central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. These efforts have
included training other countries* regulators in all aspects of licensing
and inspection procedures, advising on how to establish a legal basis for
nuclear regulations, and developing a control and accounting system for
nuclear materials. The State Department*s Office of the Senior Coordinator
for Nuclear Safety, which was established about 10 years ago, provides
overall policy guidance for efforts to improve the safety of Soviet-
designed nuclear power reactors. Since then, the office*s mandate has
expanded to include the safety of other foreign civilian nuclear
facilities, including
research reactors and waste facilities. In addition, State Department
officials said that more recently, State has been leading U. S.
negotiations to revise IAEA*s Code of Conduct and leading consultations
within the U. S. government with large exporters of sealed sources to
strengthen export
controls on international transfers of them. Several officials also told
us that DOE was focusing too narrowly on rapid physical security upgrades
and not taking into account long- term needs to develop better regulatory
infrastructures in host countries. These officials also said that a
coordinated, targeted effort to identify and secure the most vulnerable
and high- risk sealed sources could eliminate the greatest risks, and that
developing regulatory frameworks in host countries would
significantly improve the safety and security of sealed sources. DOE noted
that part of the program*s strategy is to support IAEA initiatives to
leverage resources of member states to improve the security of sealed
sources in their countries. They are hoping to build on the work IAEA has
done in this area, particularly on the development of regulatory
infrastructure.
The Majority of DOE*s DOE budgeted $20.6 million for the Radiological
Threat Reduction program
Program Expenditures Have in fiscal year 2002 and received an additional
$16.3 million in fiscal year
Been in the United States 2003. DOE had spent about $8.9 million of the
total $36.9 million received
as of January 31, 2003, including $3 million transferred to IAEA*s Nuclear
Security Fund. Of the remaining $5.9 million in expenditures, 93 percent
was spent in the United States by DOE*s national laboratories for labor,
travel, equipment, and overhead. Only $407,900 had been spent by the
national laboratories in the countries receiving assistance. Table 5 shows
expenditures by the laboratories by component of cost as of January 31,
2003.
Table 5: Radiological Threat Reduction Program Expenditures by DOE*s
National Laboratories as of January 31, 2003
Dollars in thousands
Program activities in the Program activities in the United States former
Soviet Union
Services and Laboratory Labor a Travel b Equipment Overhead Travel c
equipment Total
Argonne National Laboratory $707 $82.7 $3.1 $0. 4 0 $3. 0 $796. 2 Los
Alamos National Laboratory 1,263.9 114.4 103.2 0 29. 5 0 1,511. 0
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 65.3 8.4 0.6 -0.1 d 0 0 74. 2
Nonproliferation and National Security Institute 142.9 3.5 0 0 0 0 146. 4
Nevada Operations Office 65.4 6.0 0 9.1 15. 7 10. 0 106. 2
Oak Ridge National Laboratory 208.5 0 1.3 0 0 0 209. 8
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 2,316.2 132.3 45.8 12. 5 0 327. 9
2,834. 7
Remote Sensing Laboratory 175.2 38.5 1.9 7.6 11. 8 10. 0 245. 0
Sandia National Laboratory 10.5 0 0 0 0 0 10. 5 Total $4, 954.9 $385.8
$155.9 $29. 5 $57.0 $350. 9 $5,934. 0 Source: DOE.
a Includes salaries, wages, fringe benefits, and pensions that are
directly chargeable to the Radiological Threat Reduction program. DOE*s
headquarters employees* salaries are not charged directly to the program
but are funded through DOE*s Office of International Material Protection
and Cooperation. b Includes both travel and per diem costs* foreign and
domestic* for laboratory officials
and subcontractors. c Includes travel costs for officials from other
countries. d The negative amount reflects funds from a prior fiscal year
that were returned to the Radiological Threat Reduction program by the
laboratory.
DOE officials cited several reasons why only a small percentage of the
funds allocated to the program since fiscal year 2002 had been spent as of
January 31, 2003, including the following:
The new program required significant start- up effort to assess the
threat posed by sealed sources, determine the potential impacts from the
detonation of a dirty bomb, and categorize and prioritize the types of
sources that pose the greatest security risk.
Difficulties and other unforeseen delays are frequently associated with
doing work in the former Soviet Union. For example, the Russian Ministry
of Construction, which maintains the Radon sites in Russia, raised
concerns, after work had already started, that it had to authorize any
work performed at those sites. Consequently, work was stopped at the Radon
sites for several months. Initially, this Ministry had not been consulted
by DOE and MINATOM in discussions about performing work at the Radon
sites.
It took DOE a significant amount of time to establish appropriate
contacts in the countries of the former Soviet Union where DOE plans to
provide assistance. While DOE has a long history of working with Russia to
secure fissile materials through its Material Protection, Control, and
Accounting program, DOE was required to identify and work with a different
set of organizations responsible for regulating sealed sources.
DOE officials told us that expenditures in countries of the former Soviet
Union and other regions of the world are expected to increase as the
program evolves. According to DOE, as the program matures security
upgrades will be followed by comprehensive and costly consolidation and
disposition activities, all of which will take place in foreign countries.
DOE has requested an additional $36 million for the program in fiscal year
2004.
The director of the program said that the amount requested was an estimate
based on anticipated future funding requirements. He expects that the
funds will be allocated for, among other things, continued work in Russia,
including securing large numbers of radioisotope thermoelectric
generators, additional contributions to IAEA*s Nuclear Security Fund, and
expanded efforts to secure sources in countries outside of the former
Soviet Union. The director also noted that plans to secure sources in
other parts of the world are still being developed and that DOE wants to
ensure that it has a sound basis for determining which countries to select
for assistance.
Conclusions The attacks that occurred in September 2001 widened the array
of potential scenarios and challenges that U. S. decision makers must
confront concerning terrorist threats. Sealed sources containing
radioactive material, which have many beneficial industrial, medical, and
research applications, must now be considered possible terrorist weapons.
These sealed sources are in virtually every country of the world and are
often inadequately secured or accounted for. The central question is, What
can the United States and the world community do to confront this problem,
given the likely vast and unknown number of sources that exist and
continue to be manufactured and distributed globally? DOE appears to be
well suited to help countries secure sealed sources because of its long
history in securing weapons grade material in the former Soviet Union.
Further, DOE*s efforts to develop a plan to guide its efforts is a step in
the right direction. However, additional planning and detailed analyses
will be needed to, among other things, systematically identify and
prioritize countries that require assistance, establish realistic time
frames and resources necessary to accomplish these tasks, and develop
meaningful performance measurements. The elements of such a plan assumed
greater importance in light of the Secretary of Energy*s recent
announcement that DOE*s program will expand beyond the
countries of the former Soviet Union. For this reason alone, it is
imperative that a comprehensive plan be established and implemented before
significant amounts of appropriated funds are spent to improve
international controls over sealed sources. Regarding program
expenditures, we agree with DOE*s objective to maximize program resources
in the recipient countries. To date, the national laboratories have spent
the majority of the program funds in United States and we believe that
this trend needs to be reversed as the program evolves. We would expect
that in the future, a markedly smaller percentage of program funds
will be directed toward the national laboratories and the greatest
percentage will go to the countries that need the assistance to strengthen
controls over sealed sources. We share the views of Department of State
and NRC officials who
expressed their concerns that DOE was not adequately coordinating its
efforts with the other agencies. The Department of State and NRC have a
long history of working on international nuclear safety issues, and their
expertise and insights would be valuable, we believe, in crafting an
overall governmentwide plan for strengthening controls over sealed
sources. In particular, NRC has experience in working closely with many
countries of
the former Soviet Union to develop and strengthen national regulatory
infrastructures. Clearly, any long- term plan requires that countries have
a competent regulatory authority that can place appropriate levels of
controls on sealed sources. Recommendations for
We recommend that the Secretary of Energy (working with the Executive
Action
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration): Develop
a comprehensive program plan for helping other countries
secure sealed sources that includes (1) a unified set of program goals and
priorities, including a well- defined plan for meeting these goals in the
countries to be included; (2) program cost estimates; (3) time frames for
effectively spending program funds; (4) performance measures; (5) ways to
sustain upgrades to the facilities and equipment financed,
including cost estimates; and (6) an exit strategy for each country,
including a plan for transferring responsibilities to the host country for
building and equipment maintenance. The plan should be flexible and
updated periodically to ensure that long- term efforts are sustainable.
Take the lead in developing a comprehensive governmentwide plan to
strengthen controls over other countries* sealed sources. The plan should
be developed in conjunction with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and
Homeland Security, and the Chairman of NRC. In addition, this plan should
be coordinated with the International Atomic Energy Agency to avoid
overlap or duplication of effort. Strengthen efforts to increase program
expenditures in the countries
requiring the assistance.
Agency Comments and We provided the Departments of Energy, State, and
Defense, and the
Our Evaluation Nuclear Regulatory Commission with draft copies of this
report for their
review and comment. We also provided IAEA with pertinent sections of the
report for review. DOD had no comments on the draft report. DOE*s,
State*s, and NRC*s written comments are presented as appendixes XII, XIII,
and XIV, respectively. The three agencies and IAEA also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.
DOE*s National Nuclear Security Administration agreed with our
recommendations that the program needs strengthening and noted that the
Secretary and the Administrator are actively involved with the
international community to address the security of other countries* sealed
sources. However, DOE disagreed with our finding that it had not
coordinated its efforts with NRC and the Department of State to ensure
that a governmentwide strategy is established. Further, DOE believes that
it is important to place the report*s findings in context since the
program is in its startup phase. Regarding DOE*s point about coordination,
we had been
told several times during the course of our review by NRC and State
Department officials that DOE had not systematically included these
agencies in the development of a comprehensive strategy to strengthen
other countries* controls over sealed sources. In fact, we raised this
issue
with DOE program officials during our review and these officials
acknowledged that DOE needed to do a better job in coordinating its
program with other U. S. agencies. Although NRC and State Department
officials told us that coordination has improved recently, they endorsed
the need for the development of a governmentwide strategy to ensure that
they fully participate in future U. S. efforts. Regarding DOE*s concern
about
putting the report*s findings in context, we noted in the draft report
that the program required a significant start- up effort to, among other
things, assess the threat posed by sealed sources, determine the potential
impacts from the detonation of a dirty bomb, and prioritize the types of
sources that pose the greatest threat.
State agreed with the facts presented in our report and noted that a
comprehensive approach to controlling sources will require a concerted
diplomatic effort that should be combined with the technical expertise
possessed by DOE in recovering and securing sealed sources in other
countries. State said that it possesses a unique perspective that is
crucial to the success of the program and hoped that we would clarify our
recommendation to delineate between DOE*s technical programmatic
responsibilities and State*s overall diplomatic role in guiding
international
strategies for securing radiation sources. Regarding State*s point, we
acknowledge State*s responsibility to develop and implement international
strategies on behalf of the U. S. government. However, we believe, as
noted in the report, that DOE is well suited to help other countries
secure sealed sources because of its long history in securing weapons
grade material in the former Soviet Union and that it should take the lead
in developing a comprehensive plan to strengthen controls of other
countries* sealed sources.
NRC made several points. First, NRC believed that our report should have
focused more attention on high- risk radioactive sources rather than on
radioactive sources of all types. NRC stated that the vast majority of
radioactive sources in use in the United States and abroad are not useful
to a terrorist and that it has been working with DOE and IAEA to finalize
IAEA*s revised Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive
Sources and the revised Categorization of Sources. In addition, NRC noted
that only a few of the radioactive sources that are lost or stolen in the
United States are high- risk and that a majority of the sources reported
lost or stolen involve small or short- lived sources which are not useful
as a radiological dispersion device. Second, NRC identified various
efforts that it has undertaken to improve the security of high- risk
sources in the United States. Third, NRC pointed out that we should
consider including the Department of Homeland Security in our
recommendation that calls for the development of a governmentwide plan to
help other countries secure sealed sources.
Regarding NRC*s comments, one of the objectives of our report was to
specifically determine the number of sealed sources worldwide, and we
believe that it is important to develop information, to the extent
possible, regarding the number of all sealed radioactive sources that are
in use. In fact, IAEA has placed great emphasis, particularly among
developing countries, on the importance of developing and maintaining
inventories of sources for safety and security purposes. As we noted in
our report, current IAEA policy does not allow for the approval of any
Technical Cooperation project involving the use of significant radiation
sources, unless the member state in question, among other things, complies
with the requirements to maintain an effective regulatory framework that
includes an inventory of sources.
While we agree with NRC that the highest- risk sources present the
greatest concern as desirable material for a *dirty bomb,* other sealed
radioactive sources could also be used as a terrorist weapon. No one can
say with
certainty what the psychological, social, or economic costs of a dirty
bomb* regardless of the radioactive material used to construct it* would
be. In addition, it is important to note that work by NRC, IAEA, and
others to characterize sources is still ongoing.
Regarding NRC*s comments about its activities to increase the security of
the highest- risk sources, we will address these matters in our
forthcoming report on U. S. efforts to strengthen controls over sealed
sources in the United States. Finally, during the course of our review, no
agency we met with was aware of or told us of a role being played by the
Department of Homeland Security in securing sealed sources in other
countries. However, we agree with NRC that it makes sense to coordinate
the development of a governmentwide plan for this activity with the
Department of Homeland Security and we have revised our recommendation to
include the department.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after the date of this letter. We will send copies of this report to the
Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; the Chairman, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and
interested congressional committees. We will make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.
If you have any questions concerning this report, I can be reached at 202-
512- 3841 or robinsonr@ gao. gov. Major contributors to this report are
included in appendix XV. Sincerely yours,
Robert A. Robinson Managing Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendi Appendi xes x I
Scope and Methodology To answer our objectives related to (1) number of
sealed sources worldwide and how many sources are lost, stolen, or
abandoned and (2) the legislative and regulatory controls that countries
that possess sealed sources use, we distributed a questionnaire to 127
member countries of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including 3 countries whose
IAEA membership had been approved but had not yet taken effect at the time
of our survey. We did not, however, survey all IAEA member states.
Specifically, we did not distribute questionnaires to Afghanistan, Cuba,
Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and the Holy See. The State
Department recommended that we not correspond with the first eight
countries listed. We determined from discussions with IAEA that the Holy
See did not have any sealed sources. We did not include the United States
because it is being treated separately in another GAO report.
IAEA provided us with a list of the appropriate contacts for most of the
countries we planned to survey. These officials were primarily from member
countries* regulatory authorities. We pretested the survey with the
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and with representatives from
Brazil, Poland, the United Kingdom, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. After revising
the survey to reflect the comments of these officials, we distributed it
in December 2002 via E- mail and fax, and through countries*
embassies in Washington, D. C., and Vienna, Austria, where IAEA is
located. As a follow- up for nonrespondents, we also distributed
questionnaires directly to many countries* representatives who were
attending an international conference in Vienna, Austria, on the security
of radioactive sources. We also sent out periodic reminders to the
countries from January through March 2003 requesting their assistance to
complete the survey in a timely fashion. We received responses from 49
IAEA member states (39
percent), including countries from Asia, North and South America, the
former Soviet Union, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. According to
IAEA officials, the response rate was consistent with the rate it achieves
when it sends out similar types of questionnaires to member states. In
addition we were told by IAEA officials and others that there is an
inherent difficulty associated with trying to obtain these types of data
from countries owing to the sensitive nature of some of the questions and
countries* concerns about ensuring the confidentiality of their responses.
Our survey results were used without attempting to project the information
to the universe of IAEA members. We did not assume that nonrespondent
countries would have had similar answers to our survey. Regarding the
matter of confidentiality, we notified the countries that the results from
the survey would be reported in aggregate and that individual responses
would not be disclosed.
We supplemented the results obtained from the survey with interviews with
officials from several countries, including Brazil, France, Kazakhstan,
the Republic of Georgia, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan to
learn more about how they regulate and control sealed sources. We also met
with officials from IAEA and the European Commission to obtain their views
on the security problems and challenges associated with sealed sources. In
addition, we also interviewed and obtained pertinent
documents from officials of several U. S. government agencies, including
the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, and NRC. We attended two
DOE- sponsored conferences related to the security of
sealed sources. The first conference, held in London, United Kingdom,
during September- October 2002, focused on international approaches to
nuclear and radiological security. The second conference, which was held
in Vienna, Austria, in March 2003, focused on the security of radioactive
sources and was attended by representatives from more than 120 countries.
To determine what assistance has been provided by the United States to
other countries to strengthen their controls over sealed sources, we
obtained budget, obligation, and expenditure data from the four agencies
providing assistance* the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, and
NRC. To assess how well the programs were being implemented, we
interviewed program officials from each agency and reviewed pertinent
documents, including agency plans as available. We also obtained
information about these programs through interviews with representatives
of IAEA and officials from some of the countries receiving U. S.
assistance.
Finally, we visited Russia to obtain a first- hand look at a waste
facility that contains sealed sources. Specifically, we traveled to the
Moscow Radon site at Sergiyev Posad, located about 90 kilometers from
Moscow. While in Russia we also interviewed officials from the Ministry of
Atomic Energy, the Ministry of Health, the Kurchatov Institute,
Gosatomnadzor (Russia*s
nuclear regulatory organization), the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the
Russian National Technical Physics and Automation Research Institute.
We performed our review from May 2002 through May 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendi x II
Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries This appendix presents a copy
of the survey sent to 127 IAEA member countries and the results of that
survey.
List of Countries Surveyed by GAO and
Appendi x III
Responses Table 6 lists all of the countries that we sent surveys to and
identifies whether or not they completed the survey when this report was
being written.
Tabl e 6: Countries Surveyed and Surveys Received Completed the Did not
complete the Country survey survey
Albania X Algeria X Angola X Argentina X Armenia X Australia X Austria X
Azerbaijan X Bangladesh X Belarus X Belgium X Benin X Bolivia X Bosnia and
Herzegovina X Botswana X Brazil X Bulgaria X Burkina Faso X Cambodia X
Cameroon X Canada X Central African Republic X Chile X China X Colombia X
Costa Rica X Croatia X Cyprus X Czech Republic X Democratic Republic of
the Congo X
(Continued From Previous Page)
Completed the Did not complete the Country survey survey
Denmark X Dominican Republic X Ecuador X Egypt X El Salvador X Eritrea a X
Estonia X Ethiopia X Finland X France X Gabon X Georgia X Germany X Ghana
X Greece X Guatemala X Haiti X Honduras b X Hungary X Iceland X India X
Indonesia X Ireland X Israel X Italy X Jamaica X Japan X Jordan X
Kazakhstan X Kenya X Korea (Republic of) X Kuwait X Kyrgyzstan a X Latvia
X Lebanon X Liberia X
(Continued From Previous Page)
Completed the Did not complete the Country survey survey
Liechtenstein X Lithuania X Luxembourg X Macedonia X Madagascar X Malaysia
X Mali X Malta X Marshall Islands X Mauritius X Mexico X Moldova X Monaco
X Mongolia X Morocco X Myanmar X Namibia X Netherlands X New Zealand X
Nicaragua X Niger X Nigeria X Norway X Pakistan X Panama X Paraguay X Peru
X Philippines X Poland X Portugal X Qatar X Romania X Russian Federation X
Saudi Arabia X Senegal X Sierra Leone X
(Continued From Previous Page)
Completed the Did not complete the Country survey survey
Singapore X Slovakia X Slovenia X South Africa X Spain X Sri Lanka X
Sweden X Switzerland X Tajikistan X Tanzania X Thailand X Tunisia X Tur
key X Uganda X Ukraine X United Arab Emirates X United Kingdom X Uruguay X
Uzbekistan X Venezuela X Vietnam X Ye me n X Yugoslavia X Zambia X
Zimbabwe X Source: GAO. a IAEA membership has been approved by the IAEA
General Conference and will take effect once the
necessary legal instruments are deposited. b IAEA member state as of March
17, 2003.
Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving
Appendi x IV
Sealed Sources This appendix provides information about the illicit
trafficking in, or smuggling of, radioactive material over the past decade
and focuses primarily on 17 incidents involving sealed radioactive
sources. There is sketchy* and sometimes contradictory* information about
many of these cases for a number of reasons, including (1) many
trafficking incidents are never detected by authorities; (2) some may be
known but not reported because the country does not participate in IAEA*s
Illicit Trafficking Database program; (3) details about these incidents
may be considered sensitive by the countries where they occur; and (4)
until recently, trafficking of radioactive materials was not considered by
U. S. and
international nonproliferation experts to be as great a concern as the
trafficking of weapons- grade nuclear material. IAEA is encouraging
countries to provide more details about all trafficking incidents
involving radioactive materials so that better information can be
developed and more accurate assessments and analysis can be performed.
Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit
trafficking in, or smuggling of, radioactive material worldwide, including
sealed sources. According to IAEA, sealed sources, such as cesium- 137,
cobalt- 60, strontium- 90, and iridium- 192 are considered to pose the
greatest security risk. In 1993, IAEA established a database to record
incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive
materials. Seventy countries, or about one- half of IAEA*s member states,
currently participate in the database. As of December 31, 2002, IAEA
listed 272 confirmed incidents involving the illicit trafficking of
radioactive materials, including sealed sources. 1 According to IAEA, a
confirmed incident is one in which the information has been verified to
IAEA through official points of contact from the reporting country. Of the
272 confirmed illicit trafficking incidents reported by IAEA, there were
179 incidents with potentially high risk sealed sources that pose the
greatest security risks. More than twothirds of the 179 incidents
involving these sources occurred after 1997. Figure 6 depicts the
frequency of reported international trafficking
incidents involving sealed sources since 1993. Figure 7 provides
information on types of sealed sources and other radioactive materials
involved in international trafficking incidents.
1 The IAEA database includes incidents since January 1, 1993, that
involved radioactive material other than nuclear material. In most cases,
the radioactive material was in the form of sealed sources, but some
incidents involving unsealed radioactive sources or
radioactively contaminated materials, such as contaminated scrap metal,
have also been reported to the illicit trafficking database and are
included in the statistics.
Figure 6: Reported International Trafficking Incidents Involving
Radioactive Sources, 1993- 2002
Figure 7: Illicit Trafficking Incidents by Type of Radioactive Source,
1993- 2002
Sources: IAEA (data); GAO (presentation). Trafficking Incidents Several
observations can be made based on the incidents involving the Involving
Sealed
illicit trafficking of sealed sources. Sources
The majority of the incidents involved deliberate intent to illegally
acquire, smuggle, or sell radioactive material. Several other incidents
reported, however, do not reflect criminal intent but have resulted from,
among other things, the inadvertent transportation of contaminated scrap
metal. The unregulated scrap metal industry throughout the former Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe poses potential security and safety risks
nonetheless because many radioactive sources are stolen for the metal
shielding, leaving the source exposed and potentially very
dangerous.
Since the mid- 1990s, the trafficking of radioactive materials has
generally increased. The increase in illicit trafficking cases may be due,
in part, to the increased reporting of these incidents by countries and/
or improved radiation detection systems placed at countries* border
crossings.
From 1993 through 1998, trafficking incidents involving radioactive
material were primarily reported in Russia, Germany, and Estonia. In the
past few years, there appears to have been an increase in trafficking
through Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania.
According to the illicit trafficking incidents reported by IAEA, high-
risk sealed sources are more likely to be trafficked than weapons- grade
fissile material, such as highly- enriched uranium. This is because such
sources have numerous beneficial applications and are not as tightly
controlled as fissile materials.
IAEA and DOE officials told us that the actual number of trafficking cases
involving sealed sources is larger than what is currently being reported
because many trafficking incidents are never detected by authorities and
many countries are not always willing to share sensitive trafficking
information. Another factor that affects the number of confirmed cases
reported is the credibility of the information. According to DOE, a
significant amount of time and expertise is required to assess a
particular incident before it can be deemed credible. Despite difficulties
in drawing conclusions from illicit trafficking data, the threat posed by
illicit trafficking is a real and growing problem. The Director of IAEA*s
Office of Nuclear Security also told us that every reported case should be
taken seriously. Furthermore, she noted that countries need to report
their smuggling incidents more systematically so that better assessments
can be performed. Table 7 provides information about 17 significant cases
of illicit trafficking
identified by IAEA and others since 1993. A brief discussion of each case
follows the table.
Tabl e 7: Significant Seizures of Illicitly Trafficked Sealed Sources
Since 1993 Country where Date material was seized Material How material
was found
April 1993 Estonia Cesium- 137 Interdiction by police July 1993 Germany
Strontium- 90 Discovered by police
investigation September 1994 Bulgaria Multiple sources Discovered by
police
investigation October 1994 Romania Strontium- 90 Discovered by police
investigation July 1995 Estonia Radium- 226 Discovered by police
investigation November 1995 Russia Cesium- 137 Tip provided to news
reporter October 1998 Ukraine Multiple sources Discovered by customs
officials at airport July 1999 Russia Californium- 252 Discovered by
police
investigation August 1999 Tur key Cesium- 137 Discovered by police
investigation September 1999 Ukraine Strontium- 90 Discovered by police
investigation August 1999 Russia Cesium- 137 Discovered by police
investigation February 2000 Ukraine Strontium- 90 Discovered by police
investigation March 2000 Uzbekistan Radioactively contaminated material
Interdiction at border by customs officials
December 2000 Romania Multiple sources Discovered by police investigation
January 2001 Greece Multiple sources Discovered by police investigation
January 2002 Belarus Strontium- 90 Discovered by police investigation
May 2002 Bulgaria Multiple sources Interdiction by police Sources: IAEA,
Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, and Ridgway Center for International Security Studies.
Khohtla- Jarve, Estonia, This incident involved two men who worked as
assistants to an *engine*
1993 driver at a mineral fertilizer plant, which is located in Khohtla-
Jarve,
Estonia. The two men stole a device containing 2.8 grams of cesium- 137
and were arrested. According to available information, the suspects
intended to sell the cesium to an unspecified buyer.
Saarbrucken, Germany, In July 1993, German police recovered an
unidentified amount of 1993
strontium- 90 that had been transported from Ukraine. The material, which
was packed in small containers, was found by police from information
provided by Ukrainian security services. Reportedly, the containers were
discovered in three plastic bags after Ukrainian police had told the
German
police where to find them. Police in Kiev, Ukraine, arrested 17 people in
connection with the operation. Sofia, Bulgaria, 1994 In September 1994,
following a 5- day undercover operation, Bulgarian authorities arrested
six Bulgarians and confiscated 19 containers of radioactive substances,
including plutonium, cesium- 137, strontium- 90,
plutonium- beryllium sources, and thallium- 204 that had been stolen from
the Izotop Enterprise near the capital, Sofia. According to available
information, the theft was made possible by poor security at the
laboratory.
Urechesti, Romania, In October 1994, Romanian authorities arrested three
Moldovans, two
1994 Jordanians, and two Romanians for trying to sell 7 kilograms of
strontium
in a lead pipe. One suspect, a former military officer, had smuggled the
strontium to Moldova. The material was then passed to intermediaries in
the Romanian province of Transylvania, where it was offered to the
Jordanians for $400,000.
Tallinn, Estonia, 1995 In July 1995, Estonian security police arrested two
Estonians who had radium- 226 in their car. According to available
information, it was thought
that the radium was smuggled into Estonia via middlemen in St. Petersburg,
Russia, indicating that more people were probably involved. Moscow,
Russia, 1995 In November 1995, acting on a tip, Russian television
reporters discovered
a 32- kilogram container, containing cesium- 137 and wrapped with
explosives, in a Moscow park. According to available information, Chechen
separatists were responsible for this incident and had reportedly obtained
the radioactive material from either cancer- treatment equipment or an
instrument calibration device used in flaw detection equipment. The
Chechens threatened to detonate the device if Russia decided to resume
combat operations in the region.
Kiev, Ukraine, 1998 In October 1998, a radiation health specialist at a
German company that consults on reactor safety was arrested by customs
police at Kiev airport in
possession of a container of radioactive material from Chernobyl.
According to available information, a Russian scientist asked the health
specialist to take a metal container holding a small amount of radioactive
material out of the country for analysis. Russian officials were unsure of
the exact type of material involved, but suspected it contained cesium,
strontium, and zirconium. St. Petersburg, Russia,
In July 1999 Russian law enforcement officials arrested two men who 1999
attempted to sell 5 grams of californium- 252. One of those arrested, a
technician from Murmansk, was approached by a criminal group who enlisted
his help to procure californium- 252. The technician, who was responsible
for removing spent nuclear components from a nuclearpowered icebreaker,
smuggled the radioactive material off the icebreaker. Along with an
accomplice, the technician packed the californium- 252 into a container
filled with paraffin, which they placed within a canister of water. After
the initial offer from the criminal group fell through, the technician
and his accomplice traveled to St. Petersburg in search of another buyer,
where they were arrested. Istanbul, Turkey, 1999 In a joint operation, the
Istanbul Organized Crime and Arms Smuggling
Office and the National Intelligence Organization arrested five people,
one of whom was from the Republic of Georgia, as they tried to sell
cesium- 137 to policemen acting as buyers in Istanbul in August 1999. The
cesium, which was in two separate steel tubes and weighed 49 grams, was
smuggled into Turkey from an unknown location.
Uzhgorod, Ukraine, In September 1999, a Russian citizen was arrested after
police officers
1999 discovered that he was carrying two containers of strontium- 90. The
material was discovered on the suspect during a document check by
Ukrainian police. It is believed that the suspect was taking the
radioactive materials from Russia to Western Europe. The suspect was in
possession of a number of forged documents, including a forged diplomatic
identification card.
Volgograd, Russia, 1999 In August 1999, Russian security police recovered
six containers of cesium137, which were stolen from a Volgograd oil
refinery in May 1998. Earlier
efforts to locate the stolen containers, including the establishment of
checkpoints with radiation monitors on local roads, had proven fruitless.
According to reports, the thieves had hidden the stolen cesium containers
to avoid this police dragnet and hoped to sell the material after the
search for it had finally been abandoned.
Donetsk, Ukraine, 2000 In February 2000, A Ukrainian law enforcement unit
confiscated 27 containers of strontium- 90. Five individuals were
reportedly involved in the illegal trafficking of this material. The group
allegedly tried to contact foreign buyers, who were in fact members of the
law enforcement unit. The radioactive material was reportedly stolen from
a military unit deployed in the region and was stored in an apartment.
Reports stated that the individuals were attempting to sell the 27
containers for $168, 000.
Beshkoprik, In March 2000, Uzbekistan customs officers seized an Iranian-
registered
Uzbekistan, 2000 truck on the Kazakhstan- Uzbekistan border about 20
kilometers from
Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, after discovering it contained highly
radioactive material. Kazakhstan customs officials had cleared the truck
and issued a certificate indicating that it had passed radiation
screening.
Uzbekistan officials determined that the level of gamma radiation emitted
by the cargo was 100 times over the acceptable level. Uzbekistan customs
officials then returned the truck to their Kazakhstani counterparts. The
destination listed on the truck*s manifest was Quetta, Pakistan, and some
reports speculated that the incident involved efforts to smuggle
radioactive material intended for use by terrorist groups to build a
radiological weapon.
Piatra Neamt City, In December 2000, five suspects were arrested while
trying to sell Romania, 2000
1 kilogram of radioactive material (strontium, plutonium, and cobalt), to
undercover police officers posing as prospective buyers of radioactive
material. The suspects included a former officer of an antiorganized crime
police unit in Moldova and four Romanians who were bodyguards in charge of
protecting the shipments and who were responsible for organizing the sale
of the materials.
Thessaloniki, Greece, In January 2001, Greek law enforcement officials
uncovered several
2001 hundred metal *wafers* of commercially available alpha- emitting
ionization
sources, containing a total of 3 grams of plutonium and americium. The
cache was found buried in a forest 12 kilometers from Thessalonki. The
sources were believed to be smuggled from Eastern Europe, and there was
speculation about organized criminal involvement in the smuggling of these
sources. An investigation was launched, but to date, there have been no
publicly released results.
Minsk, Belarus, 2002 In January 2002, police in Minsk, Belarus, arrested
two persons in connection with an attempt to sell four sealed sources of
strontium- 90 that
one of the suspects had been storing in his apartment. One of the suspects
had stolen the sources 4 years earlier during his military service, and
the other was arrested while trying to sell them.
Veliko Tarnova, In May 2002, Bulgarian authorities seized 101 plutonium
sources and an
Bulgaria, 2002 americium- beryllium source from a vehicle near Veliko
Tarnova. The
sources were detected when police officers stopped a taxi with four
individuals during a routine inspection. Thirty- nine of the plutonium
sources had certificates indicating that they had been manufactured in
1990 by Izotop- Moscow and had been ordered for a ferryboat station in
Varna.
Because the 10- year guaranteed service life of the sources had expired,
it is possible that the sources were diverted after they had been removed
from service for disposal.
Information About Accidents Involving Sealed
Appendi x V
Sources According to IAEA and the World Health Organization, there have
been more than 100 accidents involving sealed sources over the past 50
years. Many of these accidents have been small and resulted in few
injuries. The actual number of accidents worldwide is unknown because many
countries do not report or record such events. This appendix describes 10
accidents that occurred since the early 1980s. Although these accidents
were not the result of malevolent actions, they are useful in gaining a
better understanding of the potential consequences following the loss of
control of sealed sources.
We have included, to the extent that it was available, information on the
economic impacts of the accidents. The costs associated with lost
equipment, damage to property, and the disposal of radioactive waste can
be very significant. The cost components associated with radiological
accidents include medical treatment of exposed individuals; radiation
surveillance, including searching for lost sealed sources and
contaminated areas; decontamination and dismantling of contaminated
buildings and
property, loss of production capacity; radioactive waste management
and disposal; monetary compensation to individuals who received
excessive doses of
radiation; rebuilding or possible relocation costs; and effects on
international trade. Nonmonetary impacts may include: loss of public
confidence and credibility in the government, and public questions about
all uses of ionizing radiation.
Table 8 provides information about 10 significant cases of accidents
identified by IAEA and the World Health Organization since 1983. A brief
discussion of each case follows the table.
Tabl e 8: Selected Accidents Involving Sealed Sources Since 1983 Number of
Number of Type of sealed source significant
related Year Location involved exposures
deaths Associated costs
1983 Juarez, Mexico Cobalt- 60 80 0 $34 million 1984 Morocco Iridium- 192
11 8 Unknown 1987 Goiania, Brazil Cesium- 137 50 4 $36 million 1994
Tammiku, Estonia Cesium- 137 3 1 Unknown 1996 Gilan, Iran Iridium- 192 1 0
Unknown 1997 Lilo, Georgia Cesium- 137 11 0 Unknown 1998 Los Barrios,
Spain Cesium- 137 6 0 $28 million 1999 Yanango, Peru Iridium- 192 1 0
Unknown 2000 Samut Prakarn,
Cobalt- 60 10 3 Unknown Thailand 2001 Lja, Georgia Cesium- 137 2 0 Unknown
Sources: IAEA and the World Health Organization.
Juarez, Mexico, 1983 A teletherapy unit containing a cobalt- 60 source was
purchased and imported by a Mexican hospital without compliance with
existing import
requirements. After the unit was stored for 6 years in a warehouse, its
scrap value attracted the attention of a maintenance technician. The
technician dismantled the unit and removed the cylinder containing the
sources and other metal parts. He then loaded them into a pickup truck,
drove to a junkyard, and sold the parts as scrap. Before arriving at the
junkyard, he ruptured the sealed cobalt source, dispersing about 6, 000
tiny pellets of cobalt- 60 in the truck bed. When cranes moved the
ruptured cylinder, the cobalt- 60 pellets were
spread over the junkyard and mixed with other metal materials.
Consequently, pellets and pellet fragments were transferred to vehicles
used for transporting the scrap to various foundries. The technician*s
pickup truck remained parked on the street for 40 days and was then moved
to another street, where it remained for an additional 10 days. An
unknown number of people passed by the truck each day and children used it
as a play area. It was later discovered that contaminated scrap metal from
the junkyard had been used to manufacture reinforcing rods and metal table
bases. A truck transporting contaminated rods passed near a DOE national
laboratory, where radiation detectors indicated the presence of
radioactivity. Two days later, the authorities ascertained the origin of
the contaminated rods.
U. S. and Mexican officials spent an estimated $34 million to track,
recover, and secure these radioactive products. An extensive investigation
showed that 30,000 tables and 6,000 tons of reinforcing rods had been made
from the contaminated material. In addition, 814 buildings were partly or
completely demolished because the radioactivity in the reinforcing rods
resulted in higher- than- acceptable levels of radiation. The accident
exposed 4,000 people to radiation, and 80 people received significant
doses. Table 9 provides a breakdown of the estimated costs associated with
the accident.
Tabl e 9: Estimated Costs Related to the Accident in Mexico
Dollars in thousands
Action taken Cost
Transport and disposal of contaminated material $15, 640 Demolition and
reconstruction to remove contaminated reinforcement bars in buildings
8,500
Loss of production capacity 3,740 Value of contaminated material 2,040
Technical and operational personnel and equipment 680 Security and
surveillance by police and army forces, and legal or political problems
3,400
Tot al $34, 000
Source: IAEA.
Morocco, 1984 In 1984, iridium- 192 sources were being used to radiograph
welds in a fossil- fuel power plant under construction. One of these
sources dropped
to the ground from a radiography camera, where a passerby picked it up and
took it home. The source was lost from March to June 1984 and, as a
result, eight persons died from overexposure to radiation. In addition,
three others suffered severe injuries from overexposure that required
hospitalization. It was initially assumed that the deaths were from
poisoning. Only after the last family member died was it suspected that
the deaths might have been caused by radiation.
Goiania, Brazil, 1987 A private radiography institute moved to new
premises and left behind a cesium- 137 teletherapy unit without notifying
the licensing authority. Because the building was partially demolished,
the teletherapy unit was
unsecured. Two people entered the building and removed the source
assembly. They dismantled the source assembly at home and ruptured the
sealed source. After the sealed source was ruptured, remnants of the
source assembly were sold for scrap to a junkyard owner. He noticed that
the material had a blue glow in the dark. Over a period of days, friends
and relatives came to witness the phenomenon. Fragments of the source, the
size of rice grains, were distributed to several families. Five days
later, a number of persons started to show gastrointestinal distress.
Because the sealed source contained cesium chloride, which is highly
soluble and easily dispersed, there was considerable contamination of the
environment, resulting in external irradiation and internal contamination
of several persons. Some individuals suffered very high internal and
external contamination because of the way they had handled the cesium
chloride powder, such as rubbing it on their skin, eating with
contaminated hands, and handling various objects. Consequently, four
people died within 4 weeks of being hospitalized. In total, 249 people
were contaminated, and 112,000 people were screened for contamination. The
environment was also severely contaminated. Eighty- five houses were
significantly contaminated, and 41 of these had to be evacuated. The
decontamination process required the demolition of seven residences and
various other buildings and generated 3,500 cubic meters of radioactive
waste. The accident had a great psychological impact on the whole region.
Many people feared contamination, irradiation, and incurable diseases.
Over 8, 000 persons requested monitoring for contamination in order to
obtain certificates stating that they were not contaminated. These were
needed because operators of commercial airplanes and buses refused to
allow
people from the region to board and hotels refused to register them. The
social and psychological impact of the accident was so great that an
outlying region to Goiania, where the waste repository was established,
has incorporated the trifoil symbol of radioactivity into the region*s
flag.
Economically, there was discrimination against products from Goiania,
resulting in a 20 percent decrease in the sales of cattle, grains, and
other agricultural products from the region. Tourism decreased virtually
to zero and the gross domestic product for the region decreased by 15
percent. It
took 5 years for the gross domestic product to return to preaccident
levels. In total, the direct and indirect costs for emergency response and
remedial action are estimated to be $36 million.
Figure 8: Contaminated Radioactive Debris from Demolished Residences in
Goiania
Tammiku, Estonia, In October 1994 a sealed source that was discovered in
scrap metal was
1994 recovered and transferred to a radioactive waste repository under the
supervision of the national government. Three brothers entered the
repository without authorization and removed a metal container enclosing a
cesium- 137 source and the source fell out of the container. One of the
men placed the source in his pocket and took it home. The source remained
in the house for 27 days, resulting in the overexposure of five
individuals, including one fatality. The sealed source was thought to be
part of a gamma irradiator, but none had ever been used or registered in
Estonia. According to available information, it is possible that the
source was brought into Estonia from the Russian Federation with
miscellaneous scrap metals for export to Western Europe.
Gilan, Iran, 1996 At a combined cycle fossil fuel power plant in Iran,
radiography equipment with an iridium- 192 sealed source was used to
examine welds from a boiler. At the end of the radiographer*s shift, the
source became detached from its
drive cable and fell to the floor unnoticed. Later, a worker moving
thermal insulation materials around the plant noticed a shiny, pencil-
sized metal object in a trench and put it in his pocket. The source was in
his chest pocket for approximately two hours, resulting in a high
radiation dose. As a result of this exposure, the worker had abnormal
redness of the skin, severe bone marrow depression, and an unusually
extended radiation injury requiring plastic surgery.
Lilo, Georgia, 1997 Eleven border frontier guards became ill owing to
exposure from multiple radioactive sources, including 12 cesium- 137
sources, one cobalt- 60 source,
and 200 radium- 226 sources. These sources were abandoned when the
military site was transferred from the Soviet Union to the Republic of
Georgia. All individuals suffered from skin ulcerations and chronic
radiation sickness. No deaths were associated with this accident.
Figure 9: Location Where Sealed Sources Were Found, Lilo, Georgia
Los Barrios, Spain, In May 1998, a cesium- 137 source was accidentally
melted at a stainless
1998 steel factory. As a result of the periodic maintenance and cleaning
of the
filter system at the factory, the dust was removed, and much of it was
sent to two different factories several hundred kilometers from the
factory. The dust was contaminated with cesium- 137, and about 400 people
were monitored for contamination. Measurements of a large number of water,
air, and soil samples were obtained from nearby towns and at locations
several hundred kilometers away. Traces of cesium- 137 were found but
considered negligible. In countries outside of Spain, the environmental
impact was minimal. The economic consequences of the accident, including
temporary suspension of factory operations, decontamination operations,
and management of the resulting radioactive waste, were estimated to be
over $25 million.
Yanango, Peru, 1999 In February 1999 an iridium- 192 source fell out of a
radiography camera being used at a hydroelectric power plant. Later that
day, a welder picked
up the iridium- 192 source and placed it in the right back pocket of his
trousers. For the next several hours, the welder continued his work and
later took a minibus home with 15 other people onboard. Once home, the
welder*s wife fed their 18- month- old child while she was sitting on the
welder*s trousers, and two other children were 2- 3 meters from the
iridium source for approximately 2 hours. The welder received extensive
radiation burns that required the amputation of his right leg. The wife
suffered lesions on her lower back after her brief exposure to the sealed
source. No radiation effects were reported for the children.
Samut Prakarn, A company in Bangkok, Thailand, possessed several
teletherapy devices
Thailand, 2000 containing cobalt- 60 without authorization from the
Thailand Office of
Atomic Energy for Peace. The teletherapy device was originally installed
at a hospital in Bangkok, Thailand, in 1969. In 1981, a new source was
installed, and the hospital received no further maintenance from the
manufacturer of the teletherapy unit and source. When the teletherapy unit
was removed from service in 1994, the maintenance contractor had gone
bankrupt and the manufacturer was no longer producing cobalt- 60 units. As
a result, the hospital was left with the disused source to manage and
control. Since the hospital did not have sufficient storage space, it sold
the device and source to a new supplier without the authorization of the
regulatory authority. In 1999 the new supplier was notified that its lease
of the warehouse was to be terminated and relocated the device to a
parking lot that was owned by its parent company. In the autumn of 1999,
the company relocated the teletherapy devices to an unsecured storage
location without the authorization of the national
regulatory authority. In late January 2000, several individuals obtained
access to the unsecured storage location and partially disassembled the
teletherapy device. The individuals took the unit to a residence and
attempted to disassemble it further. In early February 2000, two
individuals took the disassembled device to a
junkyard in Samut Prakarn, Thailand, to segregate component metals and
sell them separately as scrap. While a junkyard worker was disassembling
the device, the cobalt- 60 source fell out of its housing unobserved by
the junkyard workers or the individuals. By the middle of February 2000,
several of the people involved, including the finders of the source and
junkyard workers, had begun to feel ill and sought medical assistance.
Physicians at the hospital suspected the possibility of radiation exposure
and reported their suspicions to the regulatory authority. Altogether, 10
people received high doses of radiation from the source. Three of those
people, all workers at the junkyard, died within 2 months of their
exposure.
Lja, Georgia, 2001 In December 2001 three woodsmen found two heat-
emanating metallic containers near their campsite in a forest near the
village of Lja in western
Georgia. This village is in the Abkhazia region of the Caucasus. This
region is subject to political unrest and has sought its independence from
the Republic of Georgia. As a result, during the past decade, the region
has been largely inaccessible to Georgian and international authorities.
The woodsmen involved in the accident used the containers as a heat source
and experienced nausea, vomiting, and dizziness within hours of exposure
to the containers. At a local hospital in Tbilisi, Georgia, the woodsmen
were diagnosed with radiation sickness and severe radiation burns, and at
least two of the three were in serious condition. In February 2002, an
IAEA- sponsored search and recovery team found the containers and
discovered that each one was previously used in Soviet- era radioisotope
thermoelectric generators.
Information on Producers and Distributors of
Appendi x VI
Radioactive Material This appendix provides information about the major
producers and distributors of radioactive material used to manufacture
sealed sources. Six countries are the major suppliers of the radioactive
material: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Russia, and South
Africa. Canada is the largest exporter of radioactive material and has
provided over half of all radioactive material used in medical
applications worldwide. Table 10 lists the major producers and
distributors of radioactive material used to manufacture sealed sources.
Tabl e 10: Major Producers and Distributors of Radioactive Material Used
to Manufacture Sealed Sources Country Major organizations producing and/
or distributing sources
Argentina National Atomic Energy Commission and INVAP S. E. Australia
Australian Nuclear Science and
Technology Organization Belgium National Institute for Radio Elements and
Belgian Nuclear Research Centre Brazil Instituto de Pasquisas Energeticas
Nucleares Bulgaria Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy
Canada Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., and MDS Nordion China China Isotope
Corporation and Nuclear Power Institute of China Czech Republic Nuclear
Research Institute Denmark Risoe National Laboratory France CIS Bio
International Commissariat A L*Energie Atomique Centre D*Etudes De Valduc
Germany AEA Technology QSA, GmbH., Chemotrade, Isotope Products Europe
Blaseg, GmbH., and STS* Steuerungstechnik & Strahlesnschutz GmbH
Hungary Atomic Energy Research Institute and Institute of Isotopes Co.,
Ltd. India Bhabha Atomic Research Centre Indonesia National Nuclear Energy
Agency Japan Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and Institute for
Atomic Energy Rikkyo University Malaysia Malaysian Institute for Nuclear
Technology Research Netherlands I. D. B. Holland B. V. Russia
Atomenergoexport, Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, Kurchatov
Institute, Mayak
Production Association, Scientific and Research Institute of Atomic
Reactors, and St. Petersburg Institute of Nuclear Physics
South Africa South African Nuclear Energy Corporation South Korea Korea
Atomic Energy Research Institute Sweden Studsvik AB
(Continued From Previous Page)
Country Major organizations producing and/ or distributing sources
United Kingdom Ametek Advanced Measurement Technology, Nycomed Amersham,
and Reviss Services Limited
United States Department of Energy Uzbekistan Institute of Nuclear Physics
Sources: IAEA and Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for
Nonproliferation Studies .
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission*s Policy
Appendi x VII
on Exports of Sealed Sources In most cases, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission grants a general license for the export of sealed sources to
all countries containing byproduct material except certain proscribed
countries: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan. Byproduct
material is (1) any radioactive material (except special nuclear material)
yielded in, or made radioactive by,
exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or using
special nuclear material (as in a reactor) and (2) the tailings, or wastes
produced by the extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from
ore. According to NRC, limited quantities of sealed sources can also be
exported under a general license to *restricted* countries: Afghanistan,
Andorra, Angola, Burma, Djibouti, India, Israel, Oman, Pakistan, and
Syria. A general license, provided by regulation, grants authority to a
person for
certain activities, in this case, the export of sealed sources, and is
effective without filing an application with NRC or the issuance of a
licensing document to the person or organization exporting the sealed
source. NRC has placed most sealed sources for export under a general
license for several reasons, including the following: (1) subject to NRC
or Agreement State 1 oversight, the United States is responsible only for
ensuring the safe use and control of radioactive materials used to
manufacture sealed
sources within U. S. territory; (2) foreign countries have the sovereign
responsibility for ensuring appropriate regulatory controls over
radioactive material, including such material imported from other
countries; and (3) control over radioactive material would not be enhanced
by requiring
specific licenses for material exported from the United States. A specific
license would not ensure that the exported materials would be subject to
controls and regulatory oversight in a foreign country because the license
does not ensure that the recipient country has adequate regulatory
controls over the material that is exported from the United States. Under
a specific license, the export request must be reviewed and approved by
NRC in consultation with other appropriate agencies, including the
Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, and Energy.
NRC officials told us that they are required only to maintain a database
of exports of sealed sources that are issued under a specific license and
certain other exports of concern, such as americium- 241 and neptunium1
A U. S. state that has signed an agreement with NRC under which the state
regulates the use of by- product and other materials within that state.
Currently, there are 32 U. S. Agreement States.
237. The United States, as a nuclear weapon state, has agreed to report
all exports of americium and neptunium to IAEA. With regard to shipments
of sealed sources, NRC officials told us that the Department of Homeland
Security*s Bureau of Customs and Border Protection maintains a database of
all transactions, identified by tariff number, including those including
sealed sources that are exported under a general license. However, these
officials also said that it would be very difficult for the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection to track these specific shipments of sealed
sources because the information on manifests is general in nature.
NRC officials told us that they were not aware of any sealed sources that
were exported under a general license from the United States that have
been used for malicious purposes. They noted that there have been
thousands of such exports, most of which involve material in forms or
quantities that pose minimal safety or health risks if properly used and
controlled. However, there have been a few cases where lax local
regulatory oversight over high- risk materials resulted in instances where
sealed sources were eventually lost or improperly disposed of, resulting
in
harmful exposure to individuals. Specific licenses are required to export
radioactive material in waste and tritium for recovery and recycling
purposes. This is because a final NRC rule (59 F. R. 48994), effective
November 10, 1994, revoked the general license for bulk tritium and alpha-
emitting radionuclides having an alpha half- life of 10 days or greater
but less than 200 years to conform NRC*s regulations to the export control
guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers* Group 2 for nuclear- related, dual-
use items. Tritium and reactor- produced alpha- emitting radionuclides are
two commodities on the Nuclear Suppliers* Groups dual- use list whose
exports are regulated by NRC. In addition, tritium and alpha- emitting
radionucliedes are controlled by the
Nuclear Suppliers* Group because of their potential application in the
production of weapons of mass destruction. Another final rule on the
import and export of radioactive material (60 F. R. 37556), effective
August 21, 1995, established specific licensing
requirements for the import and export of radioactive material in the form
of waste coming into or leaving the United States to conform with NRC*s
2 The Nuclear Suppliers* Group consists of 30 nuclear supplier countries
and seeks to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and
technology, both dual- use and specially designed and prepared.
regulations to the guidelines of the IAEA Code of Practice on the
International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste.
In view of increased post- September 11 terrorism concerns, NRC is
considering changes to its general license provisions to improve controls
over exports. Possible changes include (1) ensuring that the exporter
confirm that the customer in the foreign country is authorized by the
recipient country to possess the material; (2) requiring prior
notification to NRC for risk- significant shipments; and (3) as
appropriate, providing
national or international source registries with data for risk-
significant shipments. Changes under consideration are expected to be
implemented in fiscal year 2004 by orders with compensatory measures and
in fiscal years 2004- 2005 by a rule change as part of a broader NRC plan
to improve
controls over the imports and exports of sealed sources. Other possible
and more restrictive controls for exports include a requirement for a
specific export license for high- risk material such as high- activity
cobalt- 60 sources or imposing a specific prohibition on such exports to
countries that do not have acceptable sealed source security, control, and
accountability requirements. The United States is coordinating these
efforts with other countries that export sealed sources to ensure
consistent, adequate controls. In addition, in conjunction with the change
of the national threat level to *orange* in March 2003, NRC issued a
security advisory to licensees concerning certain quantities of certain
highrisk
sources, which included exports and imports.
Results of the International Conference on the
Appendi x VIII
Security of Radioactive Sources This appendix provides information
concerning several key findings and recommendations from the international
conference on the security of radioactive sources held in Vienna, Austria,
in March 2003. The conference was sponsored by the governments of the
United States and the Russian
Federation and hosted by the government of Austria. It was organized by
IAEA in cooperation with the European Commission, the World Customs
Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, and the
European Police Office. Over 700 delegates from more than 120 countries
attended the conference.
The conference produced key findings in the following areas: (1)
identifying, searching for, recovering, and securing high- risk
radioactive sources; (2) strengthening long- term control over radioactive
sources; (3) interdicting illicit trafficking; (4) planning the response
to radiological emergencies arising from the malevolent use of radioactive
sources; and (5) recognizing the role of the media/ public education,
communication, and outreach.
Regarding identifying and searching for sources, the conference encouraged
countries to develop and implement national action plans, on the basis
of their own specific conditions, for locating, searching for, recovering,
and securing high- risk radioactive sources; accelerate the
establishment of a coherent and transparent scheme for
the categorization of radioactive sources in order to provide for the
safety and security of sources; and
assist other countries, as appropriate, in identifying, searching for,
recovering, and securing high- risk sources. Concerning strengthening
long- term control over radioactive sources, the conference encouraged
countries to
formulate and implement national plans for the management of sources
throughout their life cycle;
develop, to the extent practical, standards for the design of sealed
sources and associated devices that are less suitable for malevolent use
(e. g., alternative technologies and less- dispersible forms of high- risk
sources); and
establish arrangements for the safe and secure disposal of disused
highrisk sources, including the development of disposal facilities.
Regarding illicit trafficking, the conference recognized the need for
greater international efforts to detect and interdict the illicit
trafficking of high- risk sources and to take appropriate enforcement
actions. In support of this objective, the conference encouraged countries
to
further develop and strengthen measures to detect, interdict, and
respond to the illicit trafficking of high- risk radioactive sources;
deploy and widely use technologies for detecting high- risk radioactive
sources, with emphasis on ensuring the sustainability of monitoring and
detection equipment;
undertake further research on and development of detection technologies
for use at borders and elsewhere;
enhance cooperation between government agencies responsible for
preventing, detecting, and responding to illicit trafficking incidents,
especially in the fields of information sharing, communications, and
training;
pool resources through, for example, the sharing of monitoring and
detection equipment on common borders; and
continue support for and development of IAEA*s illicit trafficking
database.
The conference recommended that countries develop comprehensive plans to
prepare for and respond to radiological emergencies involving radioactive
sources. In support of this recommendation, the conference encouraged
countries to, among other things,
enhance current national and international response arrangements, taking
into account the need to respond both proactively and reactively to the
new scenarios presented by the possibility of the malevolent use of high-
risk radioactive sources and
consider establishing mechanisms to facilitate effective coordination in
the event of a radiological emergency.
Finally, the conference recognized that the public*s understanding of the
nature and consequences of radiological emergencies will largely determine
how the public reacts to such emergencies. As a result, the conference
encouraged countries to
conduct public outreach and awareness programs to foster a better
understanding of radiological threats and the appropriate response in the
event of a radiological emergency in order to minimize social and economic
disruption;
educate the public regarding the nature of radioactivity, the
consequences of the malevolent uses of high- risk radioactive sources, and
the procedures for mitigating those consequences in order to
reduce the psychological impact of radiological terrorism; strengthen
their education and training programs as a means to promote
confidence building within the public; and assume greater responsibility
for gaining the trust of the media and
informing them about the potential threat of radiological terrorism to
help ensure that the media will communicate information accurately in a
nonsensational manner to avoid fueling public fear and panic.
Information on IAEA*s Revised Categorization
Appendi x IX
of Radioactive Sources The purpose of IAEA*s Categorization of Radioactive
Sources is to provide a fundamental and internationally harmonized basis
for risk- informed decision making. The draft document provides a
categorization for radioactive sources used in industry, medicine,
agriculture, research, and education. The principles of the categorization
can be equally applied to radioactive sources, such as radioisotope
thermoelectric generators that may be under military control. The
categorization does not apply to radiation- generating devices such as X-
ray machines and particle accelerators, although it may be applied to
radioactive sources produced
by, or used as, target material in such devices. The revised
categorization divides sources into five categories, according to their
potential to cause harmful health effects, should the source not be
managed safely and securely. The categories are defined as follows:
Category 1 sources are considered extremely dangerous. If not safely
managed safely, the radioactive material would likely cause permanent
injury to a person who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it for
more than a few minutes. It would probably be fatal to be close to this
amount of unshielded material for a period of a few minutes to an hour.
Furthermore, the amount of radioactive material, if dispersed by fire or
explosion, could possibly* but would be unlikely to*
permanently injure persons in the immediate vicinity or be life
threatening to them. There would be little or no risk of immediate heath
effects to persons beyond a few hundred meters. It would be highly
unlikely for a category 1 source to contaminate a public water supply to
dangerous levels, even if the radioactive material were highly soluble in
water.
Category 2 sources are also considered personally dangerous. If not
safely managed or securely protected, the radioactive material could cause
permanent injury to a person who handled it or were otherwise in contact
with it for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to
be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of
hours to days. The amount of radioactive material, if dispersed by fire or
explosion, could possibly* but would be very unlikely to* permanently
injure or be life threatening to persons in the immediate vicinity. It
would be virtually impossible for a category 2 source to contaminate a
public water supply to dangerous levels, even if the radioactive material
were highly soluble in water.
Category 3 sources are also considered to be dangerous. If not safely
managed or securely protected, the radioactive material could cause
permanent injury to a person who handled it or were otherwise in contact
with it, for some hours. It could possibly* although it is unlikely* be
fatal to be in close contact to this amount of unshielded radioactive
material for a period of days to weeks. The amount of radioactive
material, if dispersed by fire or explosion, could possibly*
but is extremely unlikely to* permanently injure or be life threatening to
persons in the immediate vicinity. It would be virtually impossible for a
category 3 source to contaminate a public water supply to dangerous
levels, even if the radioactive material were highly soluble in water.
Category 4 sources are unlikely to be dangerous. It is very unlikely
that anyone would be permanently injured by this amount of radioactive
material. This amount of radioactive material, if dispersed by fire or
explosion, could not permanently injure persons.
Category 5 sources are not considered dangerous. No one could be
permanently injured by this amount of radioactive material. Furthermore,
this amount of radioactive material, if dispersed by fire or explosion,
could not permanently injure persons.
IAEA has developed a list on the basis of practices (such as irradiators,
industrial radiography, and teletherapy) as part of its relative ranking
of sealed sources. Examples of the most dangerous (category 1) include
radioisotope thermoelectric generators, sterilization and food
preservation facilities containing cobalt- 60 or cesium- 137, and medical
equipment containing cobalt- 60. The least dangerous (category 5) include
low- doserate brachytherapy devices and lightning detectors containing
americium241.
Countries Participating in IAEA*s Model
Appendi x X
Project Program Table 11 provides a list of the countries participating in
IAEA*s model project program and the year they joined the program.
Tabl e 11: Countries Participating in IAEA*s Model Project Program Country
Year joined the program
Albania 1996 Algeria 2002 Angola a 2001 Armenia 1996 Azerbaijan 2003
Bangladesh 1996 Belarus b 1996 Benin a 2003 Bolivia 1996 Bosnia and
Herzegovina 1996 Bulgaria 2001 Burkina Faso a 2001 Cameroon a 1996 Central
African Republic a 2003 China 2001 Columbia 1998 Costa Rica 1996 Croatia
2001 Cyprus 1996 Democratic Republic of the Congo a 1996 Dominican
Republic 1996 Ecuador 2000 Egypt 2001 El Salvador 1996 Ethiopia 1996
Estonia 1996 Gabon a 1996 Georgia 1997 Ghana 1996 Guatemala 1996 Haiti
1999 Hungary 2001
(Continued From Previous Page)
Country Year joined the program
Indonesia 2001 Iran 2001 Ivory Coast a 1996 Jamaica 1997 Jordan 1997
Kazakhstan 1996 Kenya 2001 Kuwait 2001 Latvia 1996 Lebanon 1996 Libya 2001
Lithuania 1996 Macedonia 1996 Madagascar 1996 Malaysia 2001 Mali a 1996
Malta 2001 Mauritius a 1996 Moldova 1996 Mongolia 1996 Morocco 2001
Myanmar 1996 Namibia a 1996 Nicaragua 1996 Niger a 1996 Nigeria a 1996
Pakistan 2001 Panama 1996 Paraguay 1996 Philippines 2001 Portugal 2001
Qatar 1996 Romania 2001 Saudi Arabia 1996 Senegal a 1996 Sierra Leone a
1996 Singapore 2001
(Continued From Previous Page)
Country Year joined the program
Slovenia 2001 South Africa 2002 Sri Lanka 1996 Sudan 1996 Syria 1997
Tajikistan 2002 Tanzania 2001 Thailand 2001 Tunisia 2001 Tur key 2001
Uganda a 1996 United Arab Emirates 1996 Uruguay 2000 Uzbekistan 1996
Venezuela 2002 Vietnam 1996 Ye me n 1996 Yugoslavia 2003 Zambia 2002
Zimbabwe a 1996 Source: IAEA. a These countries are participating only in
milestones 1 and 2 of the model project program.
b Belarus completed the program in 2000.
France*s System for Controlling Sealed
Appendi x XI
Sources French officials told us that their system for controlling sealed
sources has several key components, including stringent controls on the
licensing and tracking of the sources. Distributors of devices containing
sealed sources must be authorized to market such devices and must send
monthly accounts of the movement of sources to the French government
agency responsible for regulating sealed sources. End users must have a
license
covering each site where the sources are used, and the maximum duration of
a license is 5 years. For items such as smoke detectors, the end user is
not required to have a license, but the distributor must be licensed.
Approximately 30,000 sources in use in France are tracked by the
government, and there are nearly 5, 000 licensees. This number does not
include very small sources like iodine grains used for medical purposes
(there are about 80, 000 such sources) and smoke detectors (for 400,000
buildings), which are exempt from licensing requirements for end users.
Sealed sources are subject to an annual inspection, and the end user pays
for the inspections. The fee is a function of the number of sealed sources
owned by the licensee. The inspection is designed to confirm that the
sealed sources are properly accounted for, adequately secured, and safely
used. In order to renew a license, the licensing agency must be provided
with documentation of the annual inspections. If the end user is not
inspected, it is subject to fines and may also be fined if the inspection
shows that it is not adequately protecting devices containing sealed
sources. Fines are based on health and safety infractions* not security
violations* and the fines can be as high as about $15,000. France has also
established a system to control orphan sources that has
three main components. End users are required to remove any source from
service not more than
10 years after it was purchased. The company supplying the source to the
end user is required to include
disposal costs within the purchase price. All other companies in the
supply chain agree contractually to take back
the source after 10 years. Under France*s system, the company supplying*
or distributing* the sealed source is required to ensure, through a
financial guarantee, that funds will be available to pay for the disposal
of the source in case the distributor goes out of business or files for
bankruptcy. The financial
guarantee is made either through an annual fee paid to an association of
source distributors or by providing France*s national waste management
agency with a deposit. The association represents 99 percent of all
distributors of devices containing sealed sources in France. About 50
distributors are members of the association. Typically, the distributor
makes an initial deposit of about $1,000 and then pays an annual fee on
the
basis of the total activity of sources it has distributed, the technology
that the sealed sources are used for, and the value of the source. French
officials responsible for administering the system told us that,
initially,
distributors did not like it because of the excessive amount of paper work
involved. However, companies now see the value of the system. Distributors
also have the option of contracting with France*s radioactive waste
management agency for disposal of the sources if they do not want to join
the association. Typically, the smaller distributors who choose this
option do so because they may only supply one or two sources per year and
do not want to share the risk of joining the larger association, where
costs are spread among many distributors. Distributors who choose this
option are required to deposit funds with the agency to guarantee that
disposal costs will be covered. The deposit ranges from about $1,000 to
several thousand dollars. When a source is returned, the agency returns
the deposit (less an administrative fee) to the distributor. According to
French officials, only 1 percent of the distributors of sources in France
use this option because they believe it is more expensive than belonging
to the association, which spreads the financial risk among all of its
members. In addition, the cost determined by the waste management agency
is based on the entire cost of disposal and takes into account inflation
and other economic factors. To date, the waste management agency has not
had to use the fund to dispose of any disused sealed sources. The agency
has always been able to locate a source*s manufacturer to take back the
source or find another manufacturer willing to accept it.
According to French officials, when the system was first put into place,
it posed a difficulty for distributors, who had to pass the cost of the
financial guarantee to the end user. However, now that the system has been
in place for many years, the additional costs are accepted, and users are
pleased not to have to deal with disposing of the sources on their own. We
were told that the process works well and has contributed to the reduction
in the number of lost, stolen, or abandoned sealed sources. Currently,
about one sealed source per year is orphaned in France.
Appendi x XII Comments from the Department of Energy
Appendi x XIII Comments from the Department of State
Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory
Appendi x XIV Commission
Appendi x XV
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Gene Aloise (202) 512-
3841 Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Kerry
Dugan Hawranek, Preston
S. Heard, Glen Levis, Judy K. Pagano, Terry L. Richardson, and Rebecca
Shea also made key contributions to this report.
(360199)
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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial
Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee on
Governmental Affairs, U. S. Senate
May 2003 NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION U. S. and International Assistance
Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening
GAO- 03- 638
Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 5 The Number of Sealed Sources in
Use and Lost, Stolen, or
Abandoned Worldwide Is Unknown 7 Countries Have Established Legislative
and Regulatory Controls
over Sealed Sources, but Adequacy of Controls Varies 18 DOE Has a Program
to Help Other Countries Secure Sealed Sources,
but Strengthened Coordination and Planning Are Needed 23 Conclusions 37
Recommendations for Executive Action 38 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
39
Appendixes
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 42
Appendix II: Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries 44
Appendix III: List of Countries Surveyed by GAO and Responses 61
Appendix IV: Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving Sealed Sources
65
Appendix V: Information About Accidents Involving Sealed Sources 74
Appendix VI: Information on Producers and Distributors of Radioactive
Material 83
Appendix VII: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission*s Policy on Exports of
Sealed Sources 85
Appendix VIII: Results of the International Conference on the Security of
Radioactive Sources 88
Appendix IX: Information on IAEA*s Revised Categorization of Radioactive
Sources 91
Appendix X: Countries Participating in IAEA*s Model Project Program 93
Appendix XI: France*s System for Controlling Sealed Sources 96
Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Energy 98
Appendix XIII: Comments from the Department of State 99
Appendix XIV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 102
Appendix XV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 104
Tables Table 1: Regional Distribution of Sealed Sources in Countries
Responding to GAO*s Survey on the Security of
Radioactive Sealed Sources 8 Table 2: Reported Lost or Stolen and
Recovered Sealed Sources 12 Table 3: Estimated Number of Radioisotope
Thermoelectric
Generators in the Former Soviet Union 15 Table 4: Assistance to Improve
Controls over Radioactive Sources
through January 31, 2003 31 Table 5: Radiological Threat Reduction Program
Expenditures by
DOE*s National Laboratories as of January 31, 2003 35 Table 6: Countries
Surveyed and Surveys Received 61 Table 7: Significant Seizures of
Illicitly Trafficked Sealed Sources
Since 1993 69 Table 8: Selected Accidents Involving Sealed Sources Since
1983 75 Table 9: Estimated Costs Related to the Accident in Mexico 76
Table 10: Major Producers and Distributors of Radioactive Material
Used to Manufacture Sealed Sources 83 Table 11: Countries Participating in
IAEA*s Model Project Program 93
Figures Figure 1: Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators Manufactured in
the Former Soviet Union 14
Figure 2: Abandoned Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator in Russia 16
Figure 3: Seed Irradiators Used in the Former Soviet Union 17 Figure 4:
Moscow Radon Building Scheduled for DOE- Funded
Security Upgrades 25 Figure 5: DOE- Funded Physical Security Upgrades in
the Former
Soviet Union 26 Figure 6: Reported International Trafficking Incidents
Involving
Radioactive Sources, 1993- 2002 66 Figure 7: Illicit Trafficking Incidents
by Type of Radioactive
Source, 1993- 2002 67 Figure 8: Contaminated Radioactive Debris from
Demolished
Residences in Goiania 78 Figure 9: Location Where Sealed Sources Were
Found, Lilo,
Georgia 80
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense DOE Department of Energy GAO General Accounting
Office IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency MINATOM Russian Ministry of
Atomic Energy NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission USAID U. S. Agency for
International Development
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a
GAO United States General Accounting Office
The precise number of sealed sources in use is unknown because many
countries do not systematically account for them. However, nearly 10
million sealed sources exist in the United States and the 49 countries
responding to a GAO survey. There is also limited information about the
number of sealed sources that have been lost, stolen, or abandoned, but it
is estimated to be in the thousands worldwide. Many of the most vulnerable
sealed sources that could pose a security risk are located in the
countries of the former Soviet Union. All of the 49 countries that
responded to GAO*s survey reported that they
have established legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources.
However, nuclear safety and security experts from DOE, the Departments of
State and Defense, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and the European Commission told GAO
that countries* controls over sealed sources vary greatly and are weakest
among less developed countries. In fiscal year 2002, DOE established a
program focusing on improving the
security of sealed sources in the former Soviet Union and has started to
fund security upgrades in Russia and other former Soviet countries. The
Departments of Defense and State and NRC also have programs to help
countries strengthen controls over sealed sources. DOE plans to expand its
program to other countries and regions in 2003 and is developing a plan to
guide its efforts. However, the department has not fully coordinated its
efforts with NRC and the Department of State to ensure that a
governmentwide strategy is established. In addition, as of January 2003,
the majority of DOE*s program expenditures totaling $8.9 million were
spent by DOE*s national laboratories in the United States.
Abandoned Electrical Generators Containing Large Amounts of Radioactive
Strontium- 90 in a Former Soviet Union Country Sealed radioactive sources,
radioactive material encapsulated in stainless steel or other metal, are
used worldwide in medicine,
industry, and research. These sealed sources pose a threat to national
security because terrorists
could use them to make *dirty bombs.* GAO was asked to determine (1) the
number of sealed sources worldwide and how many have been reported lost,
stolen, or abandoned; (2) the controls, both legislative and regulatory,
used by countries that possess sealed sources; and (3) the assistance
provided by the Department of Energy (DOE) and other U. S.
federal agencies to strengthen other countries* control over sealed
sources and the extent to which these efforts are believed to be
effectively implemented. GAO recommends that the
Secretary of Energy (1) develop a comprehensive plan for DOE to guide its
future efforts, (2) take the lead in developing a governmentwide plan to
strengthen controls over other countries*
sealed sources; and (3) strengthen efforts to increase program
expenditures in the countries
requiring assistance. DOE agreed with our recommendations to strengthen
the program but believes it has fully coordinated with other federal
agencies. DOE*s contention is contrary to other agencies* views. www. gao.
gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 638. To view the full report, including
the scope
and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact
Gene Aloise at (202) 512- 3841 or aloisee@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO-
03- 638, a report to the
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget,
and International Security, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U. S.
Senate
May 2003
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
U. S. and International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive
Sources Need Strengthening
Page i GAO- 03- 638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Contents
Contents
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Appendix I
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
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Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 45 GAO- 03-
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Appendix III List of Countries Surveyed by GAO and Responses
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Appendix IV Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving Sealed Sources
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Appendix V Information About Accidents Involving Sealed Sources
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Appendix VI
Appendix VI Information on Producers and Distributors of Radioactive
Material
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Appendix VII
Appendix VII The Nuclear Regulatory Commission*s Policy on Exports of
Sealed Sources
Page 86 GAO- 03- 638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix VII The Nuclear Regulatory Commission*s Policy on Exports of
Sealed Sources
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Page 88 GAO- 03- 638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix VIII
Appendix VIII Results of the International Conference on the Security of
Radioactive Sources
Page 89 GAO- 03- 638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix VIII Results of the International Conference on the Security of
Radioactive Sources
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Appendix IX
Appendix IX Information on IAEA*s Revised Categorization of Radioactive
Sources
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Appendix X
Appendix X Countries Participating in IAEA*s Model Project Program
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Appendix X Countries Participating in IAEA*s Model Project Program
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Appendix XI
Appendix XI France*s System for Controlling Sealed Sources
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Appendix XII
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Appendix XIII
Appendix XIII Comments from the Department of State Page 100 GAO- 03- 638
Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix XIII Comments from the Department of State Page 101 GAO- 03- 638
Nuclear Nonproliferation
Page 102 GAO- 03- 638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix XIV
Appendix XIV Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 103 GAO-
03- 638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
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Appendix XV
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