    Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance
    Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening
    (16-MAY-03, GAO-03-638).

    Sealed radioactive sources, radioactive material encapsulated in
    stainless steel or other metal, are used worldwide in medicine,
    industry, and research. These sealed sources pose a threat to
    national security because terrorists could use them to make
    "dirty bombs." GAO was asked to determine (1) the number of
    sealed sources worldwide and how many have been reported lost,
    stolen, or abandoned; (2) the controls, both legislative and
    regulatory, used by countries that possess sealed sources; and
    (3) the assistance provided by the Department of Energy (DOE) and
    other U.S. federal agencies to strengthen other countries'
    control over sealed sources and the extent to which these efforts
    are believed to be effectively implemented.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-638
        ACCNO:   A06913
      TITLE:     Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International
    Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need
    Strengthening
         DATE:   05/16/2003
      SUBJECT:   Facility management
    	     Federal aid to foreign countries
    	     Foreign governments
    	     Interagency relations
    	     National preparedness
    	     Internal controls
    	     International relations
    	     Nuclear facilities
    	     Nuclear proliferation
    	     Strategic planning

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    GAO-03-638

                                           A

    Letter

    May 16, 2003 The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka Ranking Minority Member
    Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International
    Security Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate Dear
    Senator Akaka: Since September 11, 2001, U. S. and international nuclear
    safety and security experts have raised concerns that terrorists could
    obtain radioactive material used in medicine, research, agriculture, and
    industry

    to construct a radiological dispersion device, or *dirty bomb.* This
    radioactive material is encapsulated, or sealed, in metal, such as
    stainless steel, titanium, or platinum, to prevent its dispersal and is
    commonly called a sealed radioactive source. These sealed sources are used
    throughout the United States and other countries in equipment designed to,
    among other

    things, diagnose and treat illnesses, preserve food, detect flaws and
    other failures in pipeline welds, and determine the moisture content of
    soil. Depending on their use, sealed sources contain different types of

    radioactive material, such as strontium- 90, cobalt- 60, cesium- 137,
    plutonium- 238, and plutonium- 239. If these sealed sources fell into the
    hands of terrorists, they could use them to produce a simple and crude,
    but potentially dangerous, weapon by packaging explosives, such as
    dynamite, with the radioactive material, which would be dispersed when the
    bomb went off. Depending on the type, amount, and form (powder or solid),
    the dispersed radioactive material could cause radiation sickness for
    people nearby and produce serious economic costs and psychological and
    social disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of
    the contaminated area.

    Given the concerns about the security of sealed sources worldwide, you
    asked us to determine, to the extent possible (1) the number of sealed
    sources worldwide and how many are reported lost, stolen, or abandoned;
    (2) the controls, both legislative and regulatory, used by countries that
    possess sealed sources; and (3) the assistance provided by the Department
    of Energy (DOE) and other U. S. federal agencies to strengthen other

    countries* control over sealed sources and the extent to which these
    efforts are believed to be effectively implemented. To address these
    objectives, we distributed a survey to 127 International Atomic Energy
    Agency (IAEA) 1 member states to determine, among other things, how
    countries control

    sealed sources. Appendix I presents our scope and methodology, appendix II
    presents the results of the survey, and appendix III contains a list of
    the countries we sent the survey to, including those that responded to it.
    We also met with or had discussions with officials from several countries
    to learn more about how they regulate and control sealed sources and met
    with officials from international organizations, such as IAEA and the
    European Commission, 2 to obtain their views on the problem of
    uncontrolled sealed sources. A forthcoming report will address controls
    over sealed sources in the United States. We conducted our review from May
    2002 through May 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards. Results in Brief The precise number of sealed sources
    that is in use today or that has been

    lost, stolen, or abandoned is unknown because many countries do not
    systematically account for them. Some estimates are available, however.
    For example, about 2 million licensed sealed sources are currently being
    used in the United States, according to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    (NRC), and the 49 countries that responded to our survey reported that 7.8
    million sealed sources are in use. Limited information exists about the

    number of sealed sources that has been lost, stolen, or abandoned*
    commonly referred to as *orphan sources** but it is estimated to be in the
    thousands worldwide. In the United States, about 250 sealed sources or 1
    Affiliated with the United Nations, IAEA*s aims are to promote the
    peaceful use of nuclear

    energy and to verify that nuclear material under its supervision or
    control is not used to further any military purpose.

    2 As the European Union*s executive body, the European Commission has
    three main tasks: to serve as the sole initiator of policy, to act as
    guardian of the European Union treaties by investigating treaty breaches,
    and to supervise the implementation of European Union law in the member
    states.

    devices containing sealed sources are reported lost or stolen annually,
    but the majority of these sources are recovered. The countries that
    responded to our survey said that a total of 612 sealed sources had been
    reported lost or stolen since 1995, 254 of which had not been recovered.
    U. S. and international nuclear safety and security experts told us that
    the largest

    number of lost, stolen, or abandoned sealed sources is located in the
    former Soviet Union. Of particular concern are as many as 12 electrical
    generators that were abandoned in the Republic of Georgia. These
    generators are powered by high activity levels (ranging from 40, 000 to
    150,000 curies) of strontium- 90* a destructive radioactive material.
    Recently, the United States and other countries* and IAEA* located and
    secured most of these generators believed to exist in Georgia. However,
    more than 1,000 additional generators that are not adequately protected

    and pose a significant security risk are spread throughout the former
    Soviet Union.

    All of the countries that responded to our survey reported that they have
    established legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources.
    However, nuclear safety and security experts from DOE, the Department of

    State, the Department of Defense (DOD), NRC, IAEA, and the European
    Commission told us that controls on radioactive sources vary greatly
    between countries and focus primarily on protecting public health and
    safety rather than on securing sealed sources from theft or destructive
    use. These experts also told us that controls over sealed sources are
    weakest

    among less developed countries. For example, representatives from several
    countries of the former Soviet Union told us that their national systems
    of control need improvement, particularly regarding inventorying,
    consolidating and securing, and transporting sealed sources. Because of

    concerns about many countries* inability to control radioactive materials*
    IAEA has estimated that as many as 110 countries worldwide do not have
    adequate controls over sealed sources* IAEA established a program to help
    88 countries enhance their regulatory infrastructures. Although the

    program has helped countries improve their regulatory controls, many
    participating countries continue to have numerous regulatory deficiencies.
    In the absence of regulatory controls, radioactive sources have been

    inadequately protected or secured; little or no attention has been paid to
    the export or import controls of sources; and basic record keeping has
    been lacking. Finally, officials from the Department of State, the
    European Commission, and IAEA told us that France has implemented a system
    for controlling sealed sources that could serve as a model for other
    countries. France*s system requires distributors of sealed sources to
    assume financial

    responsibility for recovering and disposing of them.

    DOE and other U. S. agencies have funded programs to strengthen controls
    over sealed sources in other countries. DOE, which has the largest
    program, received about $37 million since fiscal year 2002 to initiate a
    program to assist other countries in controlling their sealed sources.
    According to DOE officials, the program is expected to receive an
    additional $22 million in supplemental appropriations in fiscal year 2003,

    including $5 million for securing nuclear material in Iraq. DOE
    established a program focusing on improving the security of sites
    containing sealed sources in the former Soviet Union because that is where
    DOE believed the greatest threat exists. DOE has begun funding site
    assessments and security upgrades at several locations in Russia,
    Uzbekistan, the Republic of Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan. In Russia,
    for example, DOE has focused on securing sources at several large nuclear
    waste repositories scattered around the country. Furthermore, the
    Secretary of Energy

    recently announced that the program will expand to other regions of the
    world. Other U. S. federal agencies have begun efforts to help countries
    strengthen controls over sealed sources as well. Since fiscal year 2001,
    DOD has obligated about $1.7 million to inventory, secure, and dispose of
    sealed sources in Kazakhstan. In fiscal year 2002, the State Department
    received appropriations totaling about $1.2 million primarily to support
    IAEA projects on the safety and security of sealed sources. Finally, the
    NRC received about $250,000 from the U. S. Agency for International
    Development (USAID) to help Armenia develop a registry of sealed sources
    and improve Armenia*s legislative and regulatory framework for controlling
    sources.

    DOE*s initial efforts to secure sealed sources have lacked adequate
    planning and coordination, and the majority of the program funds were
    spent in the United States rather than in the countries of the former
    Soviet Union. DOE is in the process of developing a plan to guide its
    efforts. However, DOE officials told us that more detailed planning and
    analysis

    will be needed to, among other things, (1) determine which countries
    outside the former Soviet Union present the greatest security risk and
    most urgently require assistance, (2) identify future funding
    requirements, and (3) develop performance measures to gauge program
    success. In addition, Department of State and NRC officials told us that
    DOE has not fully coordinated its efforts with their agencies. In their
    view, DOE needs their input to ensure that a comprehensive governmentwide
    strategy is taken to, among other things, leverage program resources,
    maximize available

    expertise, avoid possible duplication of effort, and help ensure future
    program success. DOE has not systematically undertaken the kind of
    comprehensive planning that would foster better coordination with the

    other agencies and could also lead to better coordination with other
    countries* nuclear organizations. For example, officials from Russia*s
    nuclear regulatory organization, Gosatomnadzor, told us that DOE did not

    adequately consult them when it initially selected sites in Russia for
    security improvements. Regarding DOE*s effort to secure sealed sources in
    the former Soviet Union, as of January 31, 2003, DOE had spent about $8.9
    million, including $3 million transferred to IAEA. Of the remaining

    $5.9 million in expenditures, 93 percent was spent in the United States by
    DOE*s national laboratories. DOE officials told us that the program is
    still in its early stages and that the objective of the program is to
    place a significant percentage of funds in the recipient countries to
    improve security. This report makes recommendations designed to improve
    the management

    of DOE*s efforts to help improve controls over sealed sources.
    Specifically, it recommends that DOE (1) develop a comprehensive plan that
    identifies those countries that most urgently require assistance,
    establish realistic time frames and resources necessary to accomplish
    program goals, and establish meaningful performance measures; (2) take the
    lead in

    developing a governmentwide plan designed to, among other things, improve
    interagency coordination; and (3) strengthen its efforts to increase
    program expenditures in the countries requiring assistance.

    Background Sealed sources are used throughout the world for a variety of
    peaceful purposes. Until the 1950s, only naturally occurring radioactive
    materials, such as radium- 226, were available to be used in sealed
    sources. Since

    then, sealed sources containing radioactive material produced artificially
    in nuclear reactors and accelerators have become widely available,
    including cobalt- 60, strontium- 90, cesium- 137, and iridium- 192.
    Radioactive material

    can be found in various forms. For example, cobalt- 60 is a metal, while
    the cesium- 137 in many sealed sources is in a powdery form closely
    resembling talc. Radioactive materials are measured by their level of
    activity. The greater the activity level* measured in units called curies
    3 *the more

    radiation emitted, which increases the potential risk to public health and
    safety if improperly used or controlled. The intensity of radioactive

    3 The curie is a unit of measurement of radioactivity. In modern nuclear
    physics, it is precisely defined as the amount of substance in which 37
    billion atoms per second undergo radioactive disintegration. In the
    international system of units, the becquerel is the preferred unit of
    radioactivity. One curie equals 3. 7 x 10 10 becquerels.

    materials decays over time at various rates. The term *half- life* is used
    to indicate the period during which the radioactivity decreases by half as
    a result of decay. Usually, radioactive material with high radioactivity
    is placed in a sealed

    container to prevent leakage of the material itself. Because of the varied
    characteristics of the radioactive material* physical structure (metal,
    ceramic, or powder), activity level, half- life, and type of radiation
    emitted, 4 some materials pose a greater risk to people, property, and the

    environment than others. According to IAEA, the level of protection
    provided to users of the radioactive material should be commensurate with
    the safety and security risks that it presents if improperly used. For
    example, radioactive materials used for certain diagnostic purposes have
    low levels of activity and do not present a significant safety or security
    risk. However, powerful sealed sources, such as those used in radiotherapy

    (cancer treatment) that use cobalt- 60, cesium- 137, or iridium- 192,
    could pose a greater threat to the public and the environment and would
    also pose a potentially more significant security risk, particularly if
    acquired to produce a dirty bomb. The small size, portability, and
    potential value of sealed sources make them

    vulnerable to misuse, improper disposal, and theft. According to IAEA,
    illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear material, including sealed
    sources, has increased worldwide in recent years: IAEA reported 272 cases
    of illicit trafficking in these sources from 1993 to the end of 2002. (See
    app. IV for more information about illicit trafficking incidents.) While
    no dirty bombs have been detonated, in the mid- 1990s Chechen separatists

    placed a canister containing cesium- 137 in a Moscow park. Although the
    device was not detonated and no radioactive material was dispersed, the
    incident demonstrated that terrorists have the capability and willingness
    to use sealed sources as weapons of terror. U. S. and international
    experts have noted that some accidents involving

    sealed sources can provide a measure of understanding of what the 4
    Radioactive material emits alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, neutrons,
    or a combination thereof. For example, americium- 241 emits alpha
    particles and gamma rays; cobalt- 60 emits beta particles and gamma rays;
    and strontium- 90 emits only beta particles. Alpha particles are not a
    hazard outside of the body; beta particles can be more penetrating

    and cause radiation damage. Both, however, are generally most hazardous
    when ingested or inhaled. Gamma rays are an external hazard because they
    can easily pass through clothing and skin. Neutron particles are less
    common but can also cause damage.

    possible impacts of a dirty bomb might be. In 1987, an accident involving
    a cesium- 137 sealed source in Brazil killed four people, injured many
    more, and caused about $36 million in damages to the local economy. This
    accident had such an enormous psychological impact on the local population
    that the atomic symbol was added to the region*s flag as a lasting
    reminder of the accident*s consequences. Appendix V contains more
    information about worldwide accidents involving sealed sources.

    The Number of Sealed The precise number of sealed sources that is in use
    worldwide is unknown

    Sources in Use and because many countries do not systematically account
    for them. The lack

    of a full accounting of sealed sources makes it equally difficult to
    determine Lost, Stolen, or

    the number that has been lost, stolen, or abandoned* referred to as
    Abandoned Worldwide

    *orphan sources.* Orphan sources, which are estimated to number in the Is
    Unknown

    thousands worldwide, are considered by U. S. and international officials
    to pose significant health, safety, and security risks because they are
    outside of regulatory control. According to U. S. and international safety
    and security experts, one of the most urgent problems is locating and
    securing

    orphan sources in the former Soviet Union because they pose a significant
    security risk. The Number of Sealed

    The number of sealed sources in use worldwide is unknown, but some Sources
    in Use Worldwide Is

    estimates are available. According to IAEA, millions of sealed radioactive
    Unknown Because

    sources have been distributed worldwide over the past 50 years. Countries
    Do Not

    Approximately 2 million licensed sealed sources are in use in the United
    Systematically Account for

    States, according to the NRC. In addition, according to the European
    Commission, approximately 500,000 sealed sources have been supplied to
    Them

    operators in the 15 member states of the European Union, of which about
    110, 000 are currently in use. The European Commission also estimated in
    1999 that approximately 840,000 sealed sources exist in Russia, although
    Russian officials believe the total number is significantly higher.

    The 49 countries that responded to our survey reported a total of about
    7.8 million sealed sources that are in use within their countries. These
    sealed sources are used in various applications, such as industrial
    radiography and therapeutic medicine. Table 1 summarizes the responses
    received from the countries surveyed regarding the number of sealed
    sources in use and their major applications.

    Tabl e 1: Regional Distribution of Sealed Sources in Countries Responding
    to GAO*s Survey on the Security of Radioactive Sealed Sources Number of
    sealed Region sources in use Major applications

    Africa 834 Smoke detectors, academic/ research, and fixed gauges

    Asia 18, 420 Fixed gauges, analytical instruments, and academic/ research
    Europe 4,866, 024 Smoke detectors, fixed gauges, and academic/ research
    Former Soviet Union 20, 344 Smoke detectors, irradiation, and

    academic/ research Middle East 6,545 Medical- diagnostic, academic/
    research, and portable

    gauges North America a and

    2,887, 025 Smoke detectors, fixed gauges, and Central America academic/
    research South America 2,836 Smoke detectors, fixed gauges, and medical-
    diagnostic South Pacific 1,854 Industrial radiography, smoke

    detectors, and irradiation

    Tot al 7,803, 882

    Source: GAO. a The United States was not surveyed for this report.

    Several factors contribute to the lack of comprehensive information about
    the number of sealed sources worldwide. According to IAEA, many countries
    do not maintain accurate or complete inventories of sealed sources in use
    or registries of users of sources. In response to our survey, 28 of the 49
    countries said they had an inventory of sealed sources. In addition, 17
    countries said they were in the process of developing an inventory.
    However, several countries that reported they had inventories indicated
    that the number of sources was estimated rather than actual. A few
    countries, including a European nation, indicated that they did not have
    the resources necessary to develop a national registry of sources and
    users.

    An additional factor contributing to countries* limited or incomplete
    inventories is that sealed sources have been imported and exported by
    distributors and governments without consistent monitoring or tracking by
    the suppliers, the recipients of the sources, or the appropriate
    regulatory

    authority. Appendix VI provides information on the major producers of
    sealed sources worldwide. The Chairman of NRC noted in March 2003 that
    international commerce in

    these sources is extensive and that existing controls on imports and
    exports are minimal. For example, most U. S.- origin sealed sources are
    exported under a general license. 5 This means that in most instances,
    sealed sources are exported without NRC knowing the type, amount, or
    activity level of the sources, or their destination. (See app. VII for
    more

    information about NRC*s export regulations.) Sealed sources have also been
    distributed worldwide by a variety of means other than commercial trade
    without adequate monitoring and oversight. As a result, the sealed sources
    have not always been properly accounted for and accurately inventoried.
    For example, sealed sources have been (1) distributed by corporations
    working in developing countries without

    formal clearance from or approval by the recipient country*s regulatory
    authority, (2) donated by medical practitioners and nonprofit
    organizations, and (3) provided through international technical
    cooperation programs. IAEA has reported that international corporations*
    such as oil companies* have brought sealed sources used in oil exploration
    into developing countries. In some cases, there was no competent authority
    in the country to register or license the sealed sources, and existing
    national rules were regarded as too complicated or

    difficult for the corporations to follow. One African country reported in
    response to our survey that its inventory of sealed sources was incomplete
    because foreign construction companies had not notified the country*s
    regulatory authority when it imported sealed sources. According to IAEA,
    medical practitioners have brought sealed sources into

    developing countries for the purpose of establishing health clinics and
    hospitals and a number of sources were not properly accounted for. IAEA
    reported that hospitals in many developed countries donated large amounts
    of surplus radium- 226 to hospitals in developing countries in the 1960s.
    One African country responding to our survey noted that according to old
    records, radium had been imported into the country but could not be

    5 Under NRC regulations sealed sources may not be exported to certain
    countries and may only be exported to certain other countries in limited
    quantities. Sealed sources may not be exported to Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
    North Korea, and Sudan. 10 C. F. R. S: 110.28. Sealed sources may be
    exported only in limited quantities to Afghanistan, Andorra, Angola,
    Burma, Djibouti, India, Israel, Oman, Pakistan, and Syria. 10 C. F. R.S:
    110.29.

    located. Nonprofit organizations have also provided medical equipment
    using sealed sources to foreign countries. For example, the American
    International Health Alliance, operating under a series of cooperative
    agreements with USAID and DOE, has donated medical supplies,
    pharmaceuticals, and equipment, including those containing sealed sources,
    to countries in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern

    Europe since 1992. 6 According to an official from the American
    International Health Alliance, DOD also donated medical equipment
    containing sealed sources from field facilities to several countries in
    the former Soviet Union under the auspices of Operation Provide Hope.
    Since 1992, over 500 airlift deliveries by DOD to Armenia, Azerbaijan,
    Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan occurred, but the
    exact number of sealed source devices donated is unknown.

    IAEA has supplied sealed sources to many countries through its technical
    cooperation program. 7 In 1991, IAEA estimated that it had provided many
    developing countries with 565 sources since 1957. IAEA officials told us
    that IAEA had provided developing member states with over 1,000 devices
    containing sealed sources since 1996. Most of these sealed sources are not
    considered a security risk by IAEA because of their low radioactivity.
    However, officials did note that about 125 of the 1,000 devices contained

    sources that could pose security risks if acquired by terrorists. These
    include (1) teletherapy machines with cobalt- 60 sources of activity
    between 5,000 and 7,000 curies, (2) brachytherapy machines with cesium137
    sources of activity between 0. 5 and 1 curie and iridium- 192 sources of
    10 curies, (3) irradiators with cobalt- 60 sources with activity in the
    range of

    12,000 to 200,000 curies, and (4) calibrators with activity around 4,000
    curies. IAEA officials said that they were uncertain, however, the extent
    to which the sealed sources have been included in countries* inventories.

    While it is the responsibility of each country* and not IAEA* to maintain
    accurate inventories of the sources, IAEA has encouraged many of its
    member states to establish and/ or strengthen their radiation and waste

    6 The American International Health Alliance and its partners identify the
    health needs of local populations, develop strategies for meeting those
    needs, and implement programs and services to help local populations
    attain their goals. The equipment supplements voluntary and in- kind
    commitments of individual health care professionals, partner hospitals,
    and universities.

    7 IAEA*s technical cooperation program is designed to provide its member
    states with technical assistance by providing equipment, expert services,
    and training that support the upgrading and establishment of nuclear
    techniques and facilities.

    safety infrastructures via the model project program. In addition, IAEA
    policy does not allow for the approval of any technical cooperation
    projects involving the use of significant sealed sources unless the member
    state in question has, among other things, an effective regulatory
    framework that includes a system of notification, authorization, and

    control of sealed sources together with an inventory of sources. IAEA*s
    model project program is discussed on pages 22 and 23 of this report. DOE
    has provided countries with sealed sources under the Atoms for Peace
    Program. According to a March 2002 DOE Inspector General report,

    Accounting for Sealed Sources of Nuclear Material Provided to Foreign
    Countries, DOE could not fully account for sealed sources loaned to
    foreign countries and no longer maintained an accounting and tracking
    system for sealed sources. The report noted that DOE and its predecessor
    agencies provided 33 countries, including Iran, Pakistan, India, Malaysia,
    and Vietnam, with 536 sealed sources, which contained plutonium, from the
    1950s through the 1970s. Initially, these materials were loaned to foreign
    facilities, and the U. S. government maintained ownership.

    However, in the 1960s, the U. S. government began transferring ownership
    through direct sale or donation, but it still retained title to much of
    the sealed sources provided to foreign entities. The report concluded that
    (1) the oversight of sealed sources was inadequate and that inaccurate
    inventory records limit DOE*s ability to protect nuclear materials from
    loss,

    theft, or other diversion, and (2) DOE should work with IAEA to establish
    adequate regulatory oversight of sealed sources in foreign countries. In
    its response to the report, DOE stated that it is not the current policy
    of the U. S. government to track sealed sources once they are in the
    control of foreign entities and that to track loaned sealed sources would
    require a change in policy and international agreements.

    Limited Information Exists Because many countries cannot account for their
    sealed sources, there is

    about the Number of Lost, limited information on the number of sealed
    sources that are lost, stolen, or Stolen, or Abandoned

    abandoned* referred to as *orphan sources.* According to the Director
    Sealed Sources

    General of IAEA, orphan sources are a widespread phenomenon, and 34 of the
    49 countries responding to our survey indicated that orphan sources pose
    problems in their country. In the European Union, up to 70 sealed sources
    are lost among its member states annually. According to NRC, about 250
    sealed sources or devices are lost or stolen in the United States

    annually, but the majority of the sources have been recovered. NRC said
    that the European Union does not report sources as being lost unless they
    are at a certain activity level that exceeds the NRC threshold for
    tracking

    purposes. As a result, NRC typically reports a greater number of lost
    sealed sources than the European Union does. The problem of orphan sources
    is most significant in the countries of the

    former Soviet Union, where the collapse of the centralized Soviet
    government structure over a decade ago led to a loss of records and
    regulatory oversight over sealed sources. According to Russia*s nuclear
    regulatory agency, Gosatomnadzor, 51 sealed sources were reported lost in
    2002 and 245 were lost in 2000. No information was made available to us
    for 2001. In the Republic of Georgia, over 280 orphan sources have been

    recovered since the mid- 1990s. Survey respondents reported that 612
    sources had been lost or stolen since 1995. Of the 612 reported orphan
    sources, 254 had not yet been recovered. Table 2 summarizes the number of
    lost, stolen, and recovered sources reported.

    Tabl e 2: Reported Lost or Stolen and Recovered Sealed Sources Reported
    lost or stolen

    Recovered sealed Region sealed sources sources

    Africa 8 0 Asia 93 11 Europe 298 213 Former Soviet Union 35 14 Middle East
    41 24 North America a and Central America 72 65

    South America 21 10 South Pacific 44 21

    Tot al 612 358

    Source: GAO. a The United States was not included in this survey.

    Thirty- five of the 49 countries we surveyed indicated that they had an
    organized process to search for orphan sources, and several of these
    countries listed one or more organizations that are responsible for
    removing the sources once they have been found. However, the remaining 14
    countries, spread across different regions, reported that they did not
    have a similar process to search for orphaned sources. Four of the 14
    countries were located in Africa.

    Six countries indicated that there were disincentives to finding orphaned
    sources. In particular, they noted that an individual who reports finding
    a source might be held responsible for paying for its disposal. Russian
    officials told us that facilities possessing sealed sources that are no
    longer used are responsible for disposal costs. The disposal fees are very
    high and, as a result, the users are reluctant to notify authorities about
    them and frequently opt to dispose of them illegally.

    Certain Lost, Stolen, or According to U. S. and international safety and
    security experts, among the

    Abandoned Sealed Sources most urgent problems are the security risks posed
    by the approximately

    Pose a Significant Security 1,000 radioisotope thermoelectric generators
    located in the former Soviet

    Risk Union. These generators were designed to provide electric power and
    are

    ideally suited for remote locations to power navigational facilities, such
    as lighthouses, radio beacons, and meteorological stations. 8 Each has
    activity levels ranging from 40,000 to 150,000 curies of strontium- 90*
    similar to the

    amount of strontium- 90 released from the Chernobyl accident in 1986.
    These generators pose a security risk because they may not be adequately
    protected or secured. An international effort was initiated about 2 years
    ago to recover and secure these generators in remote locations in the
    Republic of Georgia. Although the exact number of generators in Georgia is
    unknown, IAEA and Georgian officials told us that at least six generators
    have been recovered. 8 The United States had also deployed a small number
    of radioistope thermoelectric

    generators in Alaska.

    Figure 1: Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators Manufactured in the
    Former Soviet Union

    We met with the Russian organization that developed the radioisotope
    thermoelectric generators* the Russian National Technical Physics and
    Automation Research Institute. Institute officials told us that the
    generators pose a serious security and safety threat and should all be
    taken out of service. They noted that the units have a design service life
    of 10 to 15 years and that no repair or maintenance has been done on any
    of these units since 1991. However, Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy
    (MINATOM) officials said that the generators are technically sound and
    should not be completely removed from service without adequate replacement
    power. MINATOM officials said they are considering extending the life of
    the generators in order to keep them in service significantly longer than

    originally planned. Table 3 shows the estimated number of radioisotope
    thermoelectric generators located in the countries of the former Soviet
    Union.

    Tabl e 3: Estimated Number of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators in
    the Former Soviet Union

    Radioisotope thermoelectric Country generators

    Armenia 1 Azerbaijan 1 Belarus 3 Georgia 12 a Kazakhstan 3 Russia 998 b
    Tajikistan 1 Ukraine 12

    Tot al 1,031

    Sources: NRC, MINATOM, and Russian National Technical Physics Automation
    Research Institute. a The estimated number of generators in Georgia ranges
    from 6 to 12.

    b Includes 829 that are operational and 169 that are in storage.

    There have been numerous attempts to steal the sealed sources from these
    generators. For example, in recent years there have been six attempts to
    disassemble the generators in Kazakhstan and a number of similar events in
    Georgia and Russia. Some of the strontium- 90 sealed sources from the
    generators have been found in residential areas. In a few instances,
    people who have stolen the sealed sources have used them for heating and
    cooking, and officials have speculated that the metal shielding might have
    been used to make bullets. In 2001, three woodsmen in Georgia who found
    the strontium- 90 sealed source from an abandoned and dismantled generator
    used it as a heat source and suffered severe radiation burns. IAEA and DOE
    officials told us that other devices containing sealed sources, such as
    seed irradiators that were used in the former Soviet Union, pose
    significant security risks. Seed irradiators were mounted on trucks and
    used to irradiate seeds in order to kill fungus and inhibit germination.
    According to IAEA and DOE, each irradiator has activity levels of over

    1, 000 curies of cesium- 137 in powdery form (cesium chloride).

    Figure 2: Abandoned Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator in Russia

    Figure 3: Seed Irradiators Used in the Former Soviet Union

    IAEA*s Director of the Division of Radiation and Waste Safety told us that
    no one knows the total number of orphan sources or their location in the
    former Soviet Union. IAEA is continuously obtaining new information about
    previously unknown devices using sealed sources. This makes it extremely
    difficult for the agency to develop strategies to locate and recover these
    sources in a systematic way. The Director also told us that the problem of
    orphan sources is not unique to the former Soviet Union and that similar
    problems exist in other parts of the world.

    Countries Have All of the countries responding to our survey said they
    have established

    Established Legislative legislative or regulatory controls over sealed
    sources. However, U. S. and

    international nuclear safety and security experts told us that controls
    and Regulatory placed on radioactive sources vary greatly between
    countries and focus

    Controls over Sealed primarily on protecting public health and safety and
    not on securing sealed

    Sources, but Adequacy sources from theft or destructive use. According to
    IAEA, as many as 110 countries worldwide do not have adequate controls
    over sealed sources

    of Controls Varies and the agency has established a program to help 88
    countries upgrade

    their regulatory infrastructures. Countries Responding to All of the
    countries that responded to our survey reported that they have Our Survey
    Reported That

    established legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources. The
    They Have Established countries that responded to our survey identified
    various controls over

    Controls over Sealed sealed sources, including (1) licensing and
    inspection; (2) tracking the

    import and export of sources; (3) maintaining national registries of
    Sources

    sources* users; (4) maintaining national inventories of sources; (5)
    searching for and recovering lost, stolen, or abandoned sources; (6)
    securing sources; and (7) regulating their safe transport. According to
    IAEA, controls over sealed sources are based on countries* development of
    a framework of laws and regulations. Twenty- five of the 49 countries
    reported that they had established a strong legislative framework to
    control sealed sources and most of these same countries indicated that
    they had a

    strong regulatory framework as well. Several countries characterized their
    legislative or regulatory framework as weak. The countries that reported
    having a strong legislative or regulatory framework were spread across
    many regions, including the former Soviet Union, Europe, Africa, and the
    South Pacific. Countries reporting that they had weak or nonexistent
    regulatory frameworks were located primarily in the former Soviet Union,
    the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and South America.

    Countries reported using various guidelines to develop their laws or
    regulations that serve as the basis for controls over sealed sources.
    Fortyfour of the 49 countries said they used either one or both IAEA
    guidelines* (1) the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection
    against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources and (2)
    the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. 9
    Twelve of the countries responding to our survey indicated that they base
    their regulatory

    controls, in part, on European Union regulations. European Commission
    officials told us that efforts are under way to strengthen controls over
    sealed sources, including harmonizing measures among member states for the
    recovery of orphan sources. These efforts began prior to September 11,
    2001, in response to accidents where orphan sources were melted with scrap
    metal, resulting in significant economic damages. In 2002, the commission
    adopted a proposed directive to improve controls over sealed sources that
    emit large amounts of radiation. The proposal urges that necessary
    measures be taken to protect public health from orphan source exposure.
    More recently, a commission committee proposed that users of radioactive
    sources in the European Union be charged a refundable deposit before
    acquiring sealed sources.

    All of the countries responding to our survey identified one or more
    organizations responsible for regulating sealed sources. Forty- five of
    the 49 countries reported that regulatory organizations inspect facilities
    where sealed sources are stored or in use. Regarding enforcement, three
    countries failed to list any actions that inspectors could take to ensure
    compliance with laws and regulations. Many of the countries identified
    more than one enforcement mechanism available, including levying fines,
    suspending or terminating licenses, and closing a facility. Enforcement
    mechanisms, however, are not always used. Representatives from one
    European country* that did not respond to our survey but discussed these
    matters with us* told us that imposed fines tend to be so low that many
    users of sealed sources may find it cheaper to pay the fines rather than
    comply with the regulations. 9 The International Basic Safety Standards
    are intended to ensure (1) the protection of

    individuals and the population against radiation exposure, (2) the safety
    of radiation sources in order to prevent accidents, and (3) the security
    of sources to prevent the relinquishing of control over their use. IAEA*s
    Code of Conduct is a nonbinding document that applies to all radioactive
    sources that may pose a significant risk to health and the environment. It
    does not cover fissile materials used to construct weapons of mass
    destruction and sources within military or defense programs. The code is
    currently being revised to reflect member states* increased concerns about
    the security risks posed by sealed sources.

    All of the countries responding to our survey reported that users of
    sealed sources are required to secure radioactive materials in their
    possession. In addition, 39 of the respondents reported that they had
    facilities to store disused sources. However, only 18 countries indicated
    that they have a facility to permanently dispose of the sealed sources.
    Those countries that did not have any storage facilities were primarily
    located in Africa. Representatives from four former Soviet Union countries
    told us that the absence of secure storage poses a serious security
    problem, and an official from the Republic of Georgia told us that a well-
    protected centralized storage facility was urgently needed.

    All but four of the countries responding to our survey said they had
    regulations covering the safe transport of sealed sources. The countries
    that did not have such regulations were located in Africa, South America,
    and the Middle East. Although Russia did not respond to our survey,
    Russian officials told us that they were concerned about moving sealed
    sources safely and securely. They said that sources that were no longer
    being used are moved great distances by trucks and are vulnerable to theft
    because the operators of the vehicles must stop to rest or lose
    communications owing to the remoteness of the locations where they are
    traveling.

    Countries* Controls over Nuclear safety and security experts from the
    Departments of Energy, State, Sealed Sources Vary and Are

    and Defense; NRC; IAEA; and the European Commission told us that Weakest
    among Developing

    controls placed on sealed sources vary greatly between countries and have
    Countries

    focused primarily on protecting public health and safety and not on
    securing the sources from potential terrorists threats. According to IAEA,
    as many as 110 countries worldwide lack the regulatory infrastructure to
    adequately protect or control sealed sources. Many of these countries are
    considered less developed and are confronted with social, political, and
    economic problems that divert attention from imposing controls on the many
    thousands of radioactive sources used in hospitals, research facilities,
    industries, or universities. In many cases, these countries* regulatory
    organizations have a limited number of trained personnel. In the absence
    of regulatory controls, radioactive sources have been inadequately
    protected or secured; little or no attention has been paid to export or
    import controls of sources; and there has been a lack of basic record
    keeping. IAEA*s Director of the Division of Radiation and Waste Safety
    told us that many countries also lack the commitment or political will to

    exercise controls over sealed sources.

    In March 2003 over 700 delegates from more than 120 countries met in
    Vienna, Austria, to participate in an international conference on the
    security of radioactive sources. The conference, sponsored by the
    governments of the United States and the Russian Federation, emphasized
    that all users of sealed sources share a responsibility for managing them
    in a safe and secure manner and that the manufacturers of sources and
    regulators have important roles to play. The conference also noted that

    high- risk radioactive sources that are not under secure and regulated
    control, including orphan sources, raise serious security and safety
    concerns. U. S. and international experts are in the process of developing
    a systematic approach to identifying the highest- risk sources. In 2000
    IAEA established a categorization of sealed sources to, among other
    things, determine the level of oversight that should be applied to the
    safety and security of a particular type of source. In response to growing
    concerns about sealed sources being used as a terror weapon, IAEA has
    revised the

    categorization. The categorization, which is still in draft, provides a
    relative numerical ranking of sealed sources and practices for which they
    are used. Appendix VIII provides more information about the conference,
    and appendix IX contains additional details about IAEA*s revised
    categorization of sources.

    IAEA Has Implemented a In 1994 IAEA established a model project program to
    enhance countries*

    Program to Help Many regulatory infrastructure. This program is available
    to any IAEA member

    Countries Improve state upon request. (See app. X for a list of countries
    participating in the

    Regulatory Controls program.) The program has expanded and includes 88
    countries. As of

    December 2002, IAEA had spent $27.7 million to help these countries. Each
    country*s progress is measured through five milestones, including the
    establishment of a regulatory framework. 10 This milestone is considered
    the most time- consuming and requires that the country draft and implement
    radiation protection laws and regulations; designate and empower a
    national regulatory authority; and establish a system for the
    notification, authorization, and control of radioactive sources, including
    the preparation of an inventory of sources and installations. According to
    IAEA, about 77 percent of the countries participating in the program as of
    September 2001 had promulgated the necessary laws and established
    regulatory authorities. In addition, about 42 percent of the countries had
    adopted the necessary regulations; about 50 percent had systems for the
    notification, authorization, and control of radioactive sources in place
    and operational; and about 80 percent had systems in place to inventory
    sources. Considering that the program had been under way since the
    mid1990s, the level of achievement was much lower than expected, and the
    time necessary to overcome some of the difficulties faced by the countries
    was underestimated. The reasons that many of the countries had not fully
    implemented this milestone included (1) time- consuming legislative and
    regulatory procedures; (2) institutional instability; (3) budgetary
    constraints, resulting in, among other things, a high turnover of
    qualified staff; (4) unfocused regulatory structures, resulting in
    overlapping

    responsibilities; (5) limited regulatory independence and empowerment; and
    (6) insufficient financial and technical resources, trained staff, and
    support services. Several countries responding to our survey indicated
    that additional assistance is needed to improve controls over sealed
    sources, including radiation detection equipment and training for
    regulatory staff.

    U. S. and international officials told us that there are about 50
    additional countries needing assistance that are not member states of IAEA
    and are not eligible for assistance under the model project program.
    According to IAEA, many of these countries have sealed sources that are
    being used

    10 The five milestones are (1) the establishment of a regulatory
    framework, (2) the establishment of occupational exposure control, (3) the
    establishment of medical exposure control, (4) the establishment of public
    exposure control, and (5) the establishment of emergency preparedness and
    response capabilities.

    without adequate controls. These officials are concerned that without
    appropriate regulatory oversight, sources in these countries pose a
    particularly serious threat because they are not adequately protected.

    Officials from the Department of State, IAEA, and the European Commission
    told us that France has implemented a system for controlling sealed
    sources that could serve as a model for other countries, including many
    developing nations. France*s system requires distributors of sealed
    sources to assume financial responsibility for recovering and disposing of
    these sources at the end of their 10- year life. According to French
    officials, this system has significantly reduced the number of orphan
    sources. France*s system for controlling sources is discussed in more
    detail in appendix XI.

    DOE Has a Program to DOE has the primary U. S. government responsibility
    for helping other

    Help Other Countries countries strengthen controls over sealed sources.
    Since fiscal year 2002,

    DOE has received $36.9 million to, among other things, secure sources at
    Secure Sealed Sources,

    several large nuclear waste repositories in Russia and other countries of
    but Strengthened

    the former Soviet Union. Other U. S. federal agencies, including the
    Coordination and

    Departments of Defense and State, and NRC have efforts under way to help
    countries strengthen controls over sealed sources as well. DOE*s initial
    Planning Are Needed

    efforts to secure sealed sources have lacked adequate planning and
    coordination, and the majority of program expenditures have been in the
    United States. According to DOE officials, efforts are under way to
    improve the management of the program, including the development of a plan
    and better coordination with other agencies. DOE Is Leading the U. S.

    DOE is leading U. S. government efforts to help other countries strengthen
    Effort to Help Other

    controls over sealed sources. DOE*s effort is part of the overall U. S.
    Countries Secure Sealed

    national strategy to reduce the risk that terrorist groups could use these
    Sources

    materials in a dirty bomb attack against the United States. A
    congressional report instructs DOE to use a portion of its fiscal year
    2002 supplemental appropriation to address the threat posed by dirty
    bombs. 11 In response to the congressional requirement, the National
    Nuclear Security

    Administration*s Office of International Material Protection and
    Cooperation established the Radiological Threat Reduction program in

    11 H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 107- 350, at 431 (2001).

    January 2002, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in fiscal year 2002,
    and received an additional $16.3 million appropriation in fiscal year
    2003. The program is expected to receive an additional $22 million in
    supplemental appropriations in fiscal year 2003, including $5 million to
    secure nuclear material in Iraq.

    Initially, DOE evaluated the threat to national security from radioactive
    materials and determined that sealed sources pose a greater threat than
    other radioactive materials, such as radioactive waste and nuclear fuel,
    because of their availability; radioactivity; and other physical
    characteristics, such as half- life. DOE did further studies of the dirty
    bomb threat, including (1) narrowing the list of sealed sources that are a
    high priority because of their characteristics and availability, (2)
    analyzing

    possible scenarios in which a radiological dispersion device could be
    used, and (3) determining what the economic consequences of a dirty bomb
    attack in the United States would be. The former assistant deputy
    administrator of the Office of International Material Protection and
    Cooperation told us that it would be impossible to secure all sealed
    sources but that by determining which sources pose the greatest risk, DOE
    could prioritize its efforts. DOE has focused on securing sealed sources
    in the countries of the former

    Soviet Union because DOE officials have determined that is where the
    greatest number of vulnerable sealed sources is located. In April 2002 the
    Radiological Threat Reduction program initiated its first security upgrade
    project at the Moscow Radon, a regional facility involved with collecting,
    transporting, processing, and disposing of sealed sources and low- and
    intermediate- level radioactive waste. There are 35 Radon facilities in
    the former Soviet Union, but the Moscow Radon is by far the largest and
    collects almost 80 percent of the institutional, industrial, and medical
    radioactive wastes in Russia from almost 2,000 enterprises in the city of
    Moscow, the Moscow region, and nine neighboring regions. During our visit
    to the Moscow Radon in October 2002, Radon officials showed us the
    building for which most of the DOE- funded upgrades are planned. (See fig.
    4.) Planned upgrades at the site include surveillance cameras, motion

    detectors, vehicles, building upgrades, and a security facility where
    guards can monitor the building where most high- activity sources are
    stored. Although there have been no known attempts at theft of materials
    at the

    site, Radon officials told us that upgrades are needed because existing
    security is inadequate.

    Figure 4: Moscow Radon Building Scheduled for DOE- Funded Security
    Upgrades

    The program has also secured sealed sources in Uzbekistan and the Republic
    of Georgia. In Uzbekistan, DOE has funded security upgrades at research
    and irradiation facilities and the construction of a national repository
    for sealed sources, and plans to fund increased physical security upgrades
    at a dozen regional cancer treatment facilities. In the Republic of
    Georgia, DOE funded security upgrades at a facility where radioisotope
    thermoelectric generators and other high- activity sealed sources are
    stored. Upgrades in both countries included bricking up windows;
    reinforcing doors; improving or replacing roofs; upgrading storage vaults;
    installing motion detectors and alarm systems; and other low- cost, *low-
    tech* measures. Figure 5 shows an example of the security upgrades funded
    by DOE.

    Figure 5: DOE- Funded Physical Security Upgrades in the Former Soviet
    Union (Top) before: Weak doors and windows; door locked with a simple
    padlock; and gaps/ holes in roof. (Bottom) after: Reinforced steel doors
    with double locks that cannot be cut; bricked- up windows; alarm system;
    patched, reinforced roof. In June 2002 DOE launched two additional
    efforts* a bilateral initiative

    with MINATOM to secure sealed sources at Russian facilities identified by

    MINATOM, and a Tripartite Initiative with MINATOM and IAEA. The objective
    of the Tripartite Initiative is to improve the security of sealed sources
    in former Soviet states by developing inventories of sealed sources,
    locating the sealed sources, recovering the sealed sources, storing
    recovered sealed sources in a secure manner, and disposing of the sources.

    Ultimately, DOE hopes that Russia will play a key role in recovering
    sealed sources in other former Soviet states because many of these sealed
    sources were manufactured in and distributed from Russia. In July 2002
    MINATOM provided DOE with a number of priority projects for funding in
    Russia. These projects included recovering and securing radioisotope

    thermoelectric generators, and recovering orphan sources at 45 sites in
    Russia. According to DOE, the sites will be prioritized according to the
    type and activity level of the radioactive material present. DOE has
    completed site assessments at four Radon sites in Russia. Upgrades at
    these facilities are expected to be completed by the end of

    fiscal year 2004. A key criterion for deciding if the site requires
    upgrades is an inventory of the sealed sources stored there* if the
    inventory includes sealed sources that DOE has determined to be high risk,
    security upgrades

    will be implemented. Under the Tripartite Initiative, 19 additional Radon
    sites in other former Soviet states will be assessed. These Radon sites
    are located in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 12 Estonia, Georgia,
    Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
    and Uzbekistan. DOE also plans to perform site assessments and security
    upgrades at medical, industrial, and research facilities throughout the
    former Soviet Union,

    similar to those done in Uzbekistan and Georgia. DOE, IAEA, and MINATOM
    officials visited Moldova in the fall of 2002 to conduct a physical
    security evaluation, implement the upgrades at the Moldova Radon, and
    identify other sites where further work is needed to improve security. DOE
    and IAEA officials conducted a similar trip to Tajikistan in December
    2002. Work in both countries is expected to be complete in the summer of
    2003, and DOE plans to initiate projects in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the
    Baltics, and possibly Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan in fiscal year
    2003.

    12 Current U. S. policy is to restrict assistance in Belarus to
    humanitarian assistance and exchange programs with state- run educational
    institutions; Russia and IAEA will likely carry out any work to secure
    sealed sources in Belarus under the Tripartite Initiative.

    In March 2003 the Secretary of Energy announced a new initiative to
    broaden the Tripartite Initiative to other countries needing assistance to
    secure high- risk vulnerable sources. The emphasis of the expanded
    initiative will be on developing countries outside of the former Soviet
    Union. As part of this expanded effort, DOE expects to initiate work in
    Serbia and Indonesia this year.

    Finally, DOE also has a program designed to strengthen other countries*
    controls over sealed sources managed by the Office of International
    Nuclear Safety within the National Nuclear Security Administration. The
    office is working with IAEA, other international organizations, NRC, and
    the State Department to develop a management program for sealed sources.
    The purpose of this program is to protect the health and safety of the
    public and people who work with sealed sources by developing literature
    and training programs. The program also contributed assistance

    for the international effort to recover orphan sources in the Republic of
    Georgia, including providing technical assistance, detection and personnel
    protection equipment, training, and software. In Armenia, this program is
    providing training, equipment, and other technical assistance to enhance
    the safety and security of sealed sources. As of September 30, 2002, DOE
    had spent about $330, 000 for these activities.

    DOD, State, and NRC Also DOD, through its Cooperative Threat Reduction
    program, 13 is helping

    Have Programs to Kazakhstan to inventory, secure, and dispose of about
    2,000 sealed sources,

    Strengthen Other Countries* primarily cesium- 137 and cobalt- 60, from an
    out- of- service industrial

    Controls over Sealed facility, and identify other facilities with sealed
    sources. The manager of

    the program told us that although sealed sources are not traditionally
    Sources

    considered to be weapons of mass destruction, DOD undertook this project
    because the Kazakhstan government asked for assistance and the quantity
    and types of sealed sources posed a security threat. The program began in
    fiscal year 2001, prior to the establishment of DOE*s program to secure
    sealed sources, and DOD does not expect to engage in any further projects
    to secure sources in the former Soviet Union countries. The $1.7 million
    project is expected to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2003. 13 The
    Cooperative Threat Reduction program is designed to help the countries of
    the former

    Soviet Union destroy and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
    and biological weapons of mass destruction.

    The State Department is also funding various projects to strengthen
    controls. For example, State provided IAEA with $1 million in fiscal year
    2002 to support the agency*s projects related to the safety and security
    of radioactive sources. Additionally, State allocated $120, 000 in fiscal
    year 2002 from the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 14 for a pilot
    project to develop and improve radiation safety programs in developing
    countries, including controls over sealed sources. The project was
    initially developed by the Health Physics Society 15 and proposed by
    State*s Office of the Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety. Health
    Physics Society members volunteer their time, and State Department funding
    is used for travel, per diem, the cost of shipping donated equipment to
    the host countries, and evaluation of the project* about $3,000 spent to
    date. Four countries* Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, and Panama* were
    chosen for the pilot; however, work has been initiated in only two
    countries. The project was recently reactivated after a suspension of
    several months because of State Department concerns about program
    management, security, and liability issues. The State Department has also
    contracted with Sandia National Laboratory

    for a $100, 000 study to assess the current laws and procedures governing
    intercountry transfers of sealed sources. Specifically, the study is
    looking at six countries that are either major exporters or importers of
    sealed sources and will provide information on, among other things, the
    number of sources that is imported and exported, and whether exporters are
    required to verify whether the countries they are exporting to have
    controls in place to ensure the safety and security of sealed sources. In
    addition, NRC has a program to strengthen controls that focuses on

    Armenia. NRC has spent $62,000 in Freedom Support Act funds transferred
    from USAID to assist Armenia. Initially, NRC will help Armenia develop a
    registry of sealed sources, including identifying the information
    required; develop the database; and help Armenia gather, assess, develop,
    and verify existing data on sources. Currently, Armenian regulations on
    sealed sources and other radioactive materials are spread across different
    ministries and departments, and many have not been changed since the fall
    14 The mission of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament fund is to
    undertake high- priority, rapid response projects to halt the
    proliferation of and destroy or neutralize weapons of

    mass destruction, and limit the spread of advanced conventional weapons.
    15 The Health Physics Society is a scientific and professional
    organization whose members specialize in occupational and environmental
    radiation safety.

    of the Soviet Union. NRC plans to assist Armenia with reviewing existing
    regulations and developing consolidated regulations on, among other
    things, licensing and inspections of radioactive sources, which will apply
    governmentwide and meet international standards. In addition, NRC provided
    Russia and Ukraine with guidance and training on the licensing and
    regulation of sealed sources in the mid- 1990s. NRC has also started
    working with Canada and Mexico to share information about controls over
    sealed sources in each country and improve cross- border controls and has
    provided cost- free experts to help IAEA update its Categorization of
    Radioactive Sources and Code of Conduct.

    Finally, DOE and State are providing funds to support IAEA efforts to
    strengthen controls over sealed sources. DOE and State have pledged a
    total of $8.2 million* 67 percent of the total $12.2 million pledged* to
    IAEA*s Nuclear Security Fund. 16 This fund was established after the
    terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in conjunction with IAEA*s action
    plan to improve nuclear security worldwide. The State Department has

    directed $1 million of its contribution specifically toward activities to
    improve the controls over sealed sources, and DOE*s $3 million
    contribution is entirely directed to these efforts. Planned activities to
    improve the security of sealed sources in member states include, among
    other things, enhancing ongoing activities to improve controls of sealed
    sources; developing standards, guidelines, and recommendations on the

    security of radioactive sources; establishing security standards for the
    transport of radioactive material; and locating and securing orphan
    sources.

    Table 4 summarizes the amounts that the Departments of Energy, State, and
    Defense, and NRC have received, obligated, and spent to help other
    countries strengthen their controls over sealed sources as of January 31,
    2003.

    16 Other countries that have pledged voluntary contributions to the
    Nuclear Security Fund include Australia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France,
    Greece, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
    Norway, Romania, Slovenia, South Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
    The Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nongovernmental organization, has also
    pledged to contribute to the fund.

    Table 4: Assistance to Improve Controls over Radioactive Sources through
    January 31, 2003 Program/ Activity Description Received Obligated Spent

    DOE Radiological Threat Assisting Russia and other former Soviet $36,900,
    000 $11,426,600 $8,934, 000 Reduction program Republics to secure sealed
    sources. Includes

    $3 million for IAEA activities. DOE International Emergency

    Training program for control and management 430, 000 430,000 330, 000
    Management program of radioactive materials. Also provides assistance to
    help locate, handle, and safely

    remove high- risk sources. DOD Cooperative Threat Securing, inventorying,
    and disposing of

    1,703, 884 1,699,214 975, 140 Reduction program a sources in Kazakhstan.
    State Department Radiation

    Assisting to build radiation safety 120, 020 120,020 3,094 Safety without
    Borders Pilot

    infrastructures in developing countries project

    participating in the IAEA model project. State Department study

    Studying protocols on international transfers of 100, 000 100,000 49, 300
    conducted by Sandia National

    sealed sources in several countries. Laboratory State Department Nuclear

    Funding to IAEA. 1,000, 000 1,000,000 1,000, 000 Safety Nuclear Regulatory

    Designing and developing a registry of sources, 250, 000 250,000 62, 000
    Commission and assistance to assess and develop

    regulations related to radioactive materials in Armenia.

    Total $40,503, 904 $15,025,834 $11,353, 534

    Sources: DOE, DOD, Department of State, and NRC. a DOD figures are through
    April 1, 2003.

    DOE Efforts Have Not Been DOE is in the process of developing a plan to
    guide its efforts to help other

    Well Planned and countries secure sealed sources. According to DOE
    officials, initial

    Coordinated with Those of attempts to develop a plan were stopped in May
    2002 because the former

    Other U. S. Agencies administrator of the Office of International Material
    Protection and

    Cooperation felt that the program needed to show tangible results quickly.
    In the absence of a plan, DOE officials told us that the program has
    modeled its work in Russia on previous DOE projects to secure fissile
    materials in Russia through its Material Protection, Control, and
    Accounting program. The director of the program told us that while the
    initial approach to securing sealed sources in Russia* focusing on
    improving physical security at Radon sites* was a good idea, it hindered

    DOE from setting priorities among other sites in Russia. He further noted
    that the program is now focusing on improving the security of the most
    vulnerable high- risk sources first.

    DOE officials told us that they recognize that the development of a plan
    is essential. DOE*s draft plan has established short- and long- term
    program elements, including consolidating and securing dangerous materials
    in vulnerable locations; leveraging critical partnerships, such as
    continuing to work with IAEA on key efforts such as the model projects
    program and the code of conduct; and continuing to help countries detect
    smuggled radioactive materials through its Second Line of Defense program.
    17 In addition to the plan, DOE officials said they are also developing a
    more detailed action plan; radioactivity thresholds for vulnerable high-
    risk radioactive materials; and guidelines for describing the actions that
    should be taken by DOE when sources are found to exceed those
    radioactivity thresholds. As part of its overall effort, DOE officials
    told us that more detailed planning and analysis will be needed to, among
    other things, (1) determine which countries present the greatest security
    risk and most

    urgently require assistance, (2) identify future funding requirements, and
    (3) develop performance measures to gauge program success. Despite these
    recent initiatives to improve program planning, officials from

    Gosatomnadzor, the Russian agency responsible for regulating sealed
    sources in use at almost 8,000 facilities in Russia, told us that beyond
    an initial meeting, DOE had not consulted with them in the selection or
    prioritization of sites for physical security upgrades. In particular,
    Gosatomnadzor officials were surprised that DOE was focusing so much
    attention on improving security at the Radon facilities in Russia where
    they believed the probability that sealed sources will be stolen is low.
    They said that it would be preferable to begin securing sealed sources
    from other vulnerable sites near Moscow, for example, out- of- service
    irradiation and research facilities. A systematic approach is required to
    assess needs, identify priorities, and develop a comprehensive approach to
    securing sealed sources. In their view, DOE*s initial approach had the
    potential to be superficial. DOE officials told us that they are now
    working more closely with

    Gosatomnadzor. In a March 31, 2003, letter from DOE*s Acting Deputy
    Assistant Secretary for International Material Protection and Cooperation
    to Gosatomnadzor*s First Deputy Chairman, the DOE official noted the need
    for regulatory oversight of the Russian radiological industry and

    17 See Nuclear Nonproliferation: U. S. Efforts to Help Other Countries
    Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning (GAO-
    02- 426, May 16, 2002).

    suggested that a proposal be formulated jointly with NRC to work
    cooperatively in this area. DOE is also seeking to improve planning and
    coordination of the Tripartite Initiative. According to an IAEA official,
    DOE coordinated its efforts with IAEA and Russia on the Moldova visit that
    contributed to a successful start of the Tripartite Initiative. The
    participants jointly developed and implemented a common approach for
    securing some vulnerable sealed sources, and arrangements were made to
    construct a facility to store these

    sources. However, the IAEA official told us that the Tajikistan assessment
    was not well coordinated. He noted that DOE was not flexible in scheduling
    the preliminary assessment visit and that Russia did not

    participate in the visit. Because of the timing of the visit, IAEA*s
    representative to the Tripartite Initiative was unable to participate in
    the visit, however, an official from IAEA*s Department of Technical
    Cooperation did accompany the DOE team.

    DOE officials told us that they were unable to make changes to their
    existing itinerary because they would have incurred significant delays if
    travel dates were changed due to country clearance restrictions for U. S.
    government travel in Tajikistan. Furthermore, they noted that because of
    the different roles that DOE, MINATOM, and IAEA play under the Tripartite

    Initiative, it is not necessary that representatives of each organization
    be present on each visit. As currently envisioned, the Russian and IAEA
    participants will act as an advance team, gathering information about
    which sealed sources exist in a given country and their current level of
    vulnerability. Subsequently, the U. S. team will visit the country and
    negotiate contracts to improve security at the vulnerable sites.

    IAEA*s official also told us that, overall, the Tripartite Initiative has
    not been well planned. Initial efforts have been ad- hoc, and a more
    systematic approach is needed as the program continues. He said that
    improved planning is essential particularly because the Tripartite
    Initiative will be used as a model to guide future efforts as the program
    expands worldwide. DOE officials agreed that improved coordination is
    needed. DOE, MINATOM, and IAEA are working to finalize a *Terms of
    Reference* document that defines the objectives, scope, roles, operational
    framework, and procedures to be followed for implementing projects under
    the

    Initiative. Furthermore, preliminary schedules for missions to several
    countries have been jointly developed through August 2003.

    Department of State and NRC officials told us that DOE has not fully
    coordinated its efforts with their agencies, although they noted that
    efforts were recently under way to improve coordination. These officials
    told us that DOE needs their input to ensure that a comprehensive

    governmentwide strategy is taken to, among other things, leverage program
    resources, maximize available expertise, avoid possible duplication of
    effort, and help ensure long- term success. DOE has not systematically
    undertaken the kind of comprehensive planning that would foster better
    coordination with the other agencies and could also lead to better
    coordination with other countries* nuclear organizations. For

    example, DOE did not adequately consult NRC or State when developing the
    Radiological Threat Reduction program or developing the Tripartite
    Initiative with MINATOM and IAEA. Officials from NRC and the State
    Department expressed interest in sharing information and working with DOE
    to plan and execute the Radiological Threat Reduction program, but told us
    that there had been limited information sharing between agencies.

    Both NRC and the State Department have extensive experience in nuclear
    regulatory and safety- related issues in the former Soviet Union. NRC has
    received approximately $50 million from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal
    year 2002 to support regulatory strengthening efforts in the countries of
    central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. These efforts have
    included training other countries* regulators in all aspects of licensing
    and inspection procedures, advising on how to establish a legal basis for
    nuclear regulations, and developing a control and accounting system for
    nuclear materials. The State Department*s Office of the Senior Coordinator
    for Nuclear Safety, which was established about 10 years ago, provides
    overall policy guidance for efforts to improve the safety of Soviet-
    designed nuclear power reactors. Since then, the office*s mandate has
    expanded to include the safety of other foreign civilian nuclear
    facilities, including

    research reactors and waste facilities. In addition, State Department
    officials said that more recently, State has been leading U. S.
    negotiations to revise IAEA*s Code of Conduct and leading consultations
    within the U. S. government with large exporters of sealed sources to
    strengthen export

    controls on international transfers of them. Several officials also told
    us that DOE was focusing too narrowly on rapid physical security upgrades
    and not taking into account long- term needs to develop better regulatory
    infrastructures in host countries. These officials also said that a
    coordinated, targeted effort to identify and secure the most vulnerable
    and high- risk sealed sources could eliminate the greatest risks, and that
    developing regulatory frameworks in host countries would

    significantly improve the safety and security of sealed sources. DOE noted
    that part of the program*s strategy is to support IAEA initiatives to
    leverage resources of member states to improve the security of sealed
    sources in their countries. They are hoping to build on the work IAEA has
    done in this area, particularly on the development of regulatory
    infrastructure.

    The Majority of DOE*s DOE budgeted $20.6 million for the Radiological
    Threat Reduction program

    Program Expenditures Have in fiscal year 2002 and received an additional
    $16.3 million in fiscal year

    Been in the United States 2003. DOE had spent about $8.9 million of the
    total $36.9 million received

    as of January 31, 2003, including $3 million transferred to IAEA*s Nuclear
    Security Fund. Of the remaining $5.9 million in expenditures, 93 percent
    was spent in the United States by DOE*s national laboratories for labor,
    travel, equipment, and overhead. Only $407,900 had been spent by the
    national laboratories in the countries receiving assistance. Table 5 shows
    expenditures by the laboratories by component of cost as of January 31,
    2003.

    Table 5: Radiological Threat Reduction Program Expenditures by DOE*s
    National Laboratories as of January 31, 2003

    Dollars in thousands

    Program activities in the Program activities in the United States former
    Soviet Union

    Services and Laboratory Labor a Travel b Equipment Overhead Travel c

    equipment Total

    Argonne National Laboratory $707 $82.7 $3.1 $0. 4 0 $3. 0 $796. 2 Los
    Alamos National Laboratory 1,263.9 114.4 103.2 0 29. 5 0 1,511. 0

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 65.3 8.4 0.6 -0.1 d 0 0 74. 2

    Nonproliferation and National Security Institute 142.9 3.5 0 0 0 0 146. 4

    Nevada Operations Office 65.4 6.0 0 9.1 15. 7 10. 0 106. 2

    Oak Ridge National Laboratory 208.5 0 1.3 0 0 0 209. 8

    Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 2,316.2 132.3 45.8 12. 5 0 327. 9
    2,834. 7

    Remote Sensing Laboratory 175.2 38.5 1.9 7.6 11. 8 10. 0 245. 0

    Sandia National Laboratory 10.5 0 0 0 0 0 10. 5 Total $4, 954.9 $385.8
    $155.9 $29. 5 $57.0 $350. 9 $5,934. 0 Source: DOE.

    a Includes salaries, wages, fringe benefits, and pensions that are
    directly chargeable to the Radiological Threat Reduction program. DOE*s
    headquarters employees* salaries are not charged directly to the program
    but are funded through DOE*s Office of International Material Protection
    and Cooperation. b Includes both travel and per diem costs* foreign and
    domestic* for laboratory officials

    and subcontractors. c Includes travel costs for officials from other
    countries. d The negative amount reflects funds from a prior fiscal year
    that were returned to the Radiological Threat Reduction program by the
    laboratory.

    DOE officials cited several reasons why only a small percentage of the
    funds allocated to the program since fiscal year 2002 had been spent as of
    January 31, 2003, including the following:

     The new program required significant start- up effort to assess the
    threat posed by sealed sources, determine the potential impacts from the
    detonation of a dirty bomb, and categorize and prioritize the types of
    sources that pose the greatest security risk.

     Difficulties and other unforeseen delays are frequently associated with
    doing work in the former Soviet Union. For example, the Russian Ministry
    of Construction, which maintains the Radon sites in Russia, raised
    concerns, after work had already started, that it had to authorize any
    work performed at those sites. Consequently, work was stopped at the Radon
    sites for several months. Initially, this Ministry had not been consulted
    by DOE and MINATOM in discussions about performing work at the Radon
    sites.

     It took DOE a significant amount of time to establish appropriate
    contacts in the countries of the former Soviet Union where DOE plans to
    provide assistance. While DOE has a long history of working with Russia to
    secure fissile materials through its Material Protection, Control, and
    Accounting program, DOE was required to identify and work with a different
    set of organizations responsible for regulating sealed sources.

    DOE officials told us that expenditures in countries of the former Soviet
    Union and other regions of the world are expected to increase as the
    program evolves. According to DOE, as the program matures security
    upgrades will be followed by comprehensive and costly consolidation and

    disposition activities, all of which will take place in foreign countries.
    DOE has requested an additional $36 million for the program in fiscal year
    2004.

    The director of the program said that the amount requested was an estimate
    based on anticipated future funding requirements. He expects that the
    funds will be allocated for, among other things, continued work in Russia,
    including securing large numbers of radioisotope thermoelectric
    generators, additional contributions to IAEA*s Nuclear Security Fund, and
    expanded efforts to secure sources in countries outside of the former

    Soviet Union. The director also noted that plans to secure sources in
    other parts of the world are still being developed and that DOE wants to
    ensure that it has a sound basis for determining which countries to select
    for assistance.

    Conclusions The attacks that occurred in September 2001 widened the array
    of potential scenarios and challenges that U. S. decision makers must
    confront concerning terrorist threats. Sealed sources containing
    radioactive material, which have many beneficial industrial, medical, and
    research applications, must now be considered possible terrorist weapons.
    These sealed sources are in virtually every country of the world and are
    often inadequately secured or accounted for. The central question is, What
    can the United States and the world community do to confront this problem,
    given the likely vast and unknown number of sources that exist and

    continue to be manufactured and distributed globally? DOE appears to be
    well suited to help countries secure sealed sources because of its long
    history in securing weapons grade material in the former Soviet Union.
    Further, DOE*s efforts to develop a plan to guide its efforts is a step in
    the right direction. However, additional planning and detailed analyses
    will be needed to, among other things, systematically identify and
    prioritize countries that require assistance, establish realistic time
    frames and resources necessary to accomplish these tasks, and develop
    meaningful performance measurements. The elements of such a plan assumed
    greater importance in light of the Secretary of Energy*s recent
    announcement that DOE*s program will expand beyond the

    countries of the former Soviet Union. For this reason alone, it is
    imperative that a comprehensive plan be established and implemented before
    significant amounts of appropriated funds are spent to improve
    international controls over sealed sources. Regarding program
    expenditures, we agree with DOE*s objective to maximize program resources
    in the recipient countries. To date, the national laboratories have spent
    the majority of the program funds in United States and we believe that
    this trend needs to be reversed as the program evolves. We would expect
    that in the future, a markedly smaller percentage of program funds

    will be directed toward the national laboratories and the greatest
    percentage will go to the countries that need the assistance to strengthen
    controls over sealed sources. We share the views of Department of State
    and NRC officials who

    expressed their concerns that DOE was not adequately coordinating its
    efforts with the other agencies. The Department of State and NRC have a
    long history of working on international nuclear safety issues, and their
    expertise and insights would be valuable, we believe, in crafting an
    overall governmentwide plan for strengthening controls over sealed
    sources. In particular, NRC has experience in working closely with many
    countries of

    the former Soviet Union to develop and strengthen national regulatory
    infrastructures. Clearly, any long- term plan requires that countries have
    a competent regulatory authority that can place appropriate levels of
    controls on sealed sources. Recommendations for

    We recommend that the Secretary of Energy (working with the Executive
    Action

    Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration):  Develop
    a comprehensive program plan for helping other countries

    secure sealed sources that includes (1) a unified set of program goals and
    priorities, including a well- defined plan for meeting these goals in the
    countries to be included; (2) program cost estimates; (3) time frames for
    effectively spending program funds; (4) performance measures; (5) ways to
    sustain upgrades to the facilities and equipment financed,

    including cost estimates; and (6) an exit strategy for each country,
    including a plan for transferring responsibilities to the host country for
    building and equipment maintenance. The plan should be flexible and
    updated periodically to ensure that long- term efforts are sustainable.

     Take the lead in developing a comprehensive governmentwide plan to
    strengthen controls over other countries* sealed sources. The plan should
    be developed in conjunction with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and
    Homeland Security, and the Chairman of NRC. In addition, this plan should
    be coordinated with the International Atomic Energy Agency to avoid
    overlap or duplication of effort.  Strengthen efforts to increase program
    expenditures in the countries

    requiring the assistance.

    Agency Comments and We provided the Departments of Energy, State, and
    Defense, and the

    Our Evaluation Nuclear Regulatory Commission with draft copies of this
    report for their

    review and comment. We also provided IAEA with pertinent sections of the
    report for review. DOD had no comments on the draft report. DOE*s,
    State*s, and NRC*s written comments are presented as appendixes XII, XIII,
    and XIV, respectively. The three agencies and IAEA also provided technical
    comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.

    DOE*s National Nuclear Security Administration agreed with our
    recommendations that the program needs strengthening and noted that the
    Secretary and the Administrator are actively involved with the
    international community to address the security of other countries* sealed
    sources. However, DOE disagreed with our finding that it had not
    coordinated its efforts with NRC and the Department of State to ensure
    that a governmentwide strategy is established. Further, DOE believes that
    it is important to place the report*s findings in context since the
    program is in its startup phase. Regarding DOE*s point about coordination,
    we had been

    told several times during the course of our review by NRC and State
    Department officials that DOE had not systematically included these
    agencies in the development of a comprehensive strategy to strengthen
    other countries* controls over sealed sources. In fact, we raised this
    issue

    with DOE program officials during our review and these officials
    acknowledged that DOE needed to do a better job in coordinating its
    program with other U. S. agencies. Although NRC and State Department
    officials told us that coordination has improved recently, they endorsed
    the need for the development of a governmentwide strategy to ensure that
    they fully participate in future U. S. efforts. Regarding DOE*s concern
    about

    putting the report*s findings in context, we noted in the draft report
    that the program required a significant start- up effort to, among other
    things, assess the threat posed by sealed sources, determine the potential
    impacts from the detonation of a dirty bomb, and prioritize the types of
    sources that pose the greatest threat.

    State agreed with the facts presented in our report and noted that a
    comprehensive approach to controlling sources will require a concerted
    diplomatic effort that should be combined with the technical expertise
    possessed by DOE in recovering and securing sealed sources in other
    countries. State said that it possesses a unique perspective that is
    crucial to the success of the program and hoped that we would clarify our
    recommendation to delineate between DOE*s technical programmatic
    responsibilities and State*s overall diplomatic role in guiding
    international

    strategies for securing radiation sources. Regarding State*s point, we
    acknowledge State*s responsibility to develop and implement international
    strategies on behalf of the U. S. government. However, we believe, as
    noted in the report, that DOE is well suited to help other countries
    secure sealed sources because of its long history in securing weapons
    grade material in the former Soviet Union and that it should take the lead
    in developing a comprehensive plan to strengthen controls of other
    countries* sealed sources.

    NRC made several points. First, NRC believed that our report should have
    focused more attention on high- risk radioactive sources rather than on
    radioactive sources of all types. NRC stated that the vast majority of
    radioactive sources in use in the United States and abroad are not useful
    to a terrorist and that it has been working with DOE and IAEA to finalize

    IAEA*s revised Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive
    Sources and the revised Categorization of Sources. In addition, NRC noted
    that only a few of the radioactive sources that are lost or stolen in the
    United States are high- risk and that a majority of the sources reported
    lost or stolen involve small or short- lived sources which are not useful
    as a radiological dispersion device. Second, NRC identified various
    efforts that it has undertaken to improve the security of high- risk
    sources in the United States. Third, NRC pointed out that we should
    consider including the Department of Homeland Security in our
    recommendation that calls for the development of a governmentwide plan to
    help other countries secure sealed sources.

    Regarding NRC*s comments, one of the objectives of our report was to
    specifically determine the number of sealed sources worldwide, and we
    believe that it is important to develop information, to the extent
    possible, regarding the number of all sealed radioactive sources that are
    in use. In fact, IAEA has placed great emphasis, particularly among
    developing countries, on the importance of developing and maintaining
    inventories of sources for safety and security purposes. As we noted in
    our report, current IAEA policy does not allow for the approval of any
    Technical Cooperation project involving the use of significant radiation
    sources, unless the member state in question, among other things, complies
    with the requirements to maintain an effective regulatory framework that
    includes an inventory of sources.

    While we agree with NRC that the highest- risk sources present the
    greatest concern as desirable material for a *dirty bomb,* other sealed
    radioactive sources could also be used as a terrorist weapon. No one can
    say with

    certainty what the psychological, social, or economic costs of a dirty
    bomb* regardless of the radioactive material used to construct it* would
    be. In addition, it is important to note that work by NRC, IAEA, and
    others to characterize sources is still ongoing.

    Regarding NRC*s comments about its activities to increase the security of
    the highest- risk sources, we will address these matters in our
    forthcoming report on U. S. efforts to strengthen controls over sealed
    sources in the United States. Finally, during the course of our review, no
    agency we met with was aware of or told us of a role being played by the
    Department of Homeland Security in securing sealed sources in other
    countries. However, we agree with NRC that it makes sense to coordinate
    the development of a governmentwide plan for this activity with the
    Department of Homeland Security and we have revised our recommendation to
    include the department.

    As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
    earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
    after the date of this letter. We will send copies of this report to the
    Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security
    Administration; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the
    Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; the Chairman, Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and
    interested congressional committees. We will make copies available to
    others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
    charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

    If you have any questions concerning this report, I can be reached at 202-
    512- 3841 or robinsonr@ gao. gov. Major contributors to this report are
    included in appendix XV. Sincerely yours,

    Robert A. Robinson Managing Director, Natural Resources and Environment

    Appendi Appendi xes x I

    Scope and Methodology To answer our objectives related to (1) number of
    sealed sources worldwide and how many sources are lost, stolen, or
    abandoned and (2) the legislative and regulatory controls that countries
    that possess sealed sources use, we distributed a questionnaire to 127
    member countries of the

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including 3 countries whose
    IAEA membership had been approved but had not yet taken effect at the time
    of our survey. We did not, however, survey all IAEA member states.
    Specifically, we did not distribute questionnaires to Afghanistan, Cuba,
    Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and the Holy See. The State
    Department recommended that we not correspond with the first eight
    countries listed. We determined from discussions with IAEA that the Holy
    See did not have any sealed sources. We did not include the United States
    because it is being treated separately in another GAO report.

    IAEA provided us with a list of the appropriate contacts for most of the
    countries we planned to survey. These officials were primarily from member
    countries* regulatory authorities. We pretested the survey with the

    U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and with representatives from
    Brazil, Poland, the United Kingdom, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. After revising
    the survey to reflect the comments of these officials, we distributed it
    in December 2002 via E- mail and fax, and through countries*

    embassies in Washington, D. C., and Vienna, Austria, where IAEA is
    located. As a follow- up for nonrespondents, we also distributed
    questionnaires directly to many countries* representatives who were
    attending an international conference in Vienna, Austria, on the security
    of radioactive sources. We also sent out periodic reminders to the
    countries from January through March 2003 requesting their assistance to
    complete the survey in a timely fashion. We received responses from 49
    IAEA member states (39

    percent), including countries from Asia, North and South America, the
    former Soviet Union, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. According to
    IAEA officials, the response rate was consistent with the rate it achieves
    when it sends out similar types of questionnaires to member states. In
    addition we were told by IAEA officials and others that there is an
    inherent difficulty associated with trying to obtain these types of data
    from countries owing to the sensitive nature of some of the questions and

    countries* concerns about ensuring the confidentiality of their responses.
    Our survey results were used without attempting to project the information
    to the universe of IAEA members. We did not assume that nonrespondent
    countries would have had similar answers to our survey. Regarding the
    matter of confidentiality, we notified the countries that the results from
    the survey would be reported in aggregate and that individual responses
    would not be disclosed.

    We supplemented the results obtained from the survey with interviews with
    officials from several countries, including Brazil, France, Kazakhstan,
    the Republic of Georgia, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan to
    learn more about how they regulate and control sealed sources. We also met
    with officials from IAEA and the European Commission to obtain their views
    on the security problems and challenges associated with sealed sources. In
    addition, we also interviewed and obtained pertinent

    documents from officials of several U. S. government agencies, including
    the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, and NRC. We attended two
    DOE- sponsored conferences related to the security of

    sealed sources. The first conference, held in London, United Kingdom,
    during September- October 2002, focused on international approaches to
    nuclear and radiological security. The second conference, which was held

    in Vienna, Austria, in March 2003, focused on the security of radioactive
    sources and was attended by representatives from more than 120 countries.

    To determine what assistance has been provided by the United States to
    other countries to strengthen their controls over sealed sources, we
    obtained budget, obligation, and expenditure data from the four agencies
    providing assistance* the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, and
    NRC. To assess how well the programs were being implemented, we
    interviewed program officials from each agency and reviewed pertinent
    documents, including agency plans as available. We also obtained
    information about these programs through interviews with representatives
    of IAEA and officials from some of the countries receiving U. S.
    assistance.

    Finally, we visited Russia to obtain a first- hand look at a waste
    facility that contains sealed sources. Specifically, we traveled to the
    Moscow Radon site at Sergiyev Posad, located about 90 kilometers from
    Moscow. While in Russia we also interviewed officials from the Ministry of
    Atomic Energy, the Ministry of Health, the Kurchatov Institute,
    Gosatomnadzor (Russia*s

    nuclear regulatory organization), the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the
    Russian National Technical Physics and Automation Research Institute.

    We performed our review from May 2002 through May 2003 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendi x II

    Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries This appendix presents a copy
    of the survey sent to 127 IAEA member countries and the results of that
    survey.

    List of Countries Surveyed by GAO and

    Appendi x III

    Responses Table 6 lists all of the countries that we sent surveys to and
    identifies whether or not they completed the survey when this report was
    being written.

    Tabl e 6: Countries Surveyed and Surveys Received Completed the Did not
    complete the Country survey survey

    Albania X Algeria X Angola X Argentina X Armenia X Australia X Austria X
    Azerbaijan X Bangladesh X Belarus X Belgium X Benin X Bolivia X Bosnia and
    Herzegovina X Botswana X Brazil X Bulgaria X Burkina Faso X Cambodia X
    Cameroon X Canada X Central African Republic X Chile X China X Colombia X
    Costa Rica X Croatia X Cyprus X Czech Republic X Democratic Republic of
    the Congo X

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Completed the Did not complete the Country survey survey

    Denmark X Dominican Republic X Ecuador X Egypt X El Salvador X Eritrea a X
    Estonia X Ethiopia X Finland X France X Gabon X Georgia X Germany X Ghana
    X Greece X Guatemala X Haiti X Honduras b X Hungary X Iceland X India X
    Indonesia X Ireland X Israel X Italy X Jamaica X Japan X Jordan X
    Kazakhstan X Kenya X Korea (Republic of) X Kuwait X Kyrgyzstan a X Latvia
    X Lebanon X Liberia X

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Completed the Did not complete the Country survey survey

    Liechtenstein X Lithuania X Luxembourg X Macedonia X Madagascar X Malaysia
    X Mali X Malta X Marshall Islands X Mauritius X Mexico X Moldova X Monaco
    X Mongolia X Morocco X Myanmar X Namibia X Netherlands X New Zealand X
    Nicaragua X Niger X Nigeria X Norway X Pakistan X Panama X Paraguay X Peru
    X Philippines X Poland X Portugal X Qatar X Romania X Russian Federation X
    Saudi Arabia X Senegal X Sierra Leone X

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Completed the Did not complete the Country survey survey

    Singapore X Slovakia X Slovenia X South Africa X Spain X Sri Lanka X
    Sweden X Switzerland X Tajikistan X Tanzania X Thailand X Tunisia X Tur
    key X Uganda X Ukraine X United Arab Emirates X United Kingdom X Uruguay X
    Uzbekistan X Venezuela X Vietnam X Ye me n X Yugoslavia X Zambia X
    Zimbabwe X Source: GAO. a IAEA membership has been approved by the IAEA
    General Conference and will take effect once the

    necessary legal instruments are deposited. b IAEA member state as of March
    17, 2003.

    Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving

    Appendi x IV

    Sealed Sources This appendix provides information about the illicit
    trafficking in, or smuggling of, radioactive material over the past decade
    and focuses primarily on 17 incidents involving sealed radioactive
    sources. There is sketchy* and sometimes contradictory* information about
    many of these cases for a number of reasons, including (1) many
    trafficking incidents are never detected by authorities; (2) some may be
    known but not reported because the country does not participate in IAEA*s
    Illicit Trafficking Database program; (3) details about these incidents
    may be considered sensitive by the countries where they occur; and (4)
    until recently, trafficking of radioactive materials was not considered by
    U. S. and

    international nonproliferation experts to be as great a concern as the
    trafficking of weapons- grade nuclear material. IAEA is encouraging
    countries to provide more details about all trafficking incidents
    involving radioactive materials so that better information can be
    developed and more accurate assessments and analysis can be performed.

    Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit
    trafficking in, or smuggling of, radioactive material worldwide, including
    sealed sources. According to IAEA, sealed sources, such as cesium- 137,

    cobalt- 60, strontium- 90, and iridium- 192 are considered to pose the
    greatest security risk. In 1993, IAEA established a database to record
    incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive
    materials. Seventy countries, or about one- half of IAEA*s member states,
    currently participate in the database. As of December 31, 2002, IAEA
    listed 272 confirmed incidents involving the illicit trafficking of
    radioactive materials, including sealed sources. 1 According to IAEA, a
    confirmed incident is one in which the information has been verified to
    IAEA through official points of contact from the reporting country. Of the
    272 confirmed illicit trafficking incidents reported by IAEA, there were
    179 incidents with potentially high risk sealed sources that pose the
    greatest security risks. More than twothirds of the 179 incidents
    involving these sources occurred after 1997. Figure 6 depicts the
    frequency of reported international trafficking

    incidents involving sealed sources since 1993. Figure 7 provides
    information on types of sealed sources and other radioactive materials
    involved in international trafficking incidents.

    1 The IAEA database includes incidents since January 1, 1993, that
    involved radioactive material other than nuclear material. In most cases,
    the radioactive material was in the form of sealed sources, but some
    incidents involving unsealed radioactive sources or

    radioactively contaminated materials, such as contaminated scrap metal,
    have also been reported to the illicit trafficking database and are
    included in the statistics.

    Figure 6: Reported International Trafficking Incidents Involving
    Radioactive Sources, 1993- 2002

    Figure 7: Illicit Trafficking Incidents by Type of Radioactive Source,
    1993- 2002

    Sources: IAEA (data); GAO (presentation). Trafficking Incidents Several
    observations can be made based on the incidents involving the Involving
    Sealed

    illicit trafficking of sealed sources. Sources

     The majority of the incidents involved deliberate intent to illegally
    acquire, smuggle, or sell radioactive material. Several other incidents
    reported, however, do not reflect criminal intent but have resulted from,
    among other things, the inadvertent transportation of contaminated scrap
    metal. The unregulated scrap metal industry throughout the former Soviet
    Union and Eastern Europe poses potential security and safety risks
    nonetheless because many radioactive sources are stolen for the metal
    shielding, leaving the source exposed and potentially very

    dangerous.

     Since the mid- 1990s, the trafficking of radioactive materials has
    generally increased. The increase in illicit trafficking cases may be due,
    in part, to the increased reporting of these incidents by countries and/
    or improved radiation detection systems placed at countries* border
    crossings.

     From 1993 through 1998, trafficking incidents involving radioactive
    material were primarily reported in Russia, Germany, and Estonia. In the
    past few years, there appears to have been an increase in trafficking
    through Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania.

     According to the illicit trafficking incidents reported by IAEA, high-
    risk sealed sources are more likely to be trafficked than weapons- grade
    fissile material, such as highly- enriched uranium. This is because such

    sources have numerous beneficial applications and are not as tightly
    controlled as fissile materials.

    IAEA and DOE officials told us that the actual number of trafficking cases
    involving sealed sources is larger than what is currently being reported
    because many trafficking incidents are never detected by authorities and

    many countries are not always willing to share sensitive trafficking
    information. Another factor that affects the number of confirmed cases
    reported is the credibility of the information. According to DOE, a
    significant amount of time and expertise is required to assess a
    particular incident before it can be deemed credible. Despite difficulties
    in drawing conclusions from illicit trafficking data, the threat posed by
    illicit trafficking is a real and growing problem. The Director of IAEA*s
    Office of Nuclear Security also told us that every reported case should be
    taken seriously. Furthermore, she noted that countries need to report
    their smuggling incidents more systematically so that better assessments
    can be performed. Table 7 provides information about 17 significant cases
    of illicit trafficking

    identified by IAEA and others since 1993. A brief discussion of each case
    follows the table.

    Tabl e 7: Significant Seizures of Illicitly Trafficked Sealed Sources
    Since 1993 Country where Date material was seized Material How material
    was found

    April 1993 Estonia Cesium- 137 Interdiction by police July 1993 Germany
    Strontium- 90 Discovered by police

    investigation September 1994 Bulgaria Multiple sources Discovered by
    police

    investigation October 1994 Romania Strontium- 90 Discovered by police

    investigation July 1995 Estonia Radium- 226 Discovered by police

    investigation November 1995 Russia Cesium- 137 Tip provided to news
    reporter October 1998 Ukraine Multiple sources Discovered by customs

    officials at airport July 1999 Russia Californium- 252 Discovered by
    police

    investigation August 1999 Tur key Cesium- 137 Discovered by police

    investigation September 1999 Ukraine Strontium- 90 Discovered by police

    investigation August 1999 Russia Cesium- 137 Discovered by police

    investigation February 2000 Ukraine Strontium- 90 Discovered by police

    investigation March 2000 Uzbekistan Radioactively contaminated material
    Interdiction at border by customs officials

    December 2000 Romania Multiple sources Discovered by police investigation

    January 2001 Greece Multiple sources Discovered by police investigation

    January 2002 Belarus Strontium- 90 Discovered by police investigation

    May 2002 Bulgaria Multiple sources Interdiction by police Sources: IAEA,
    Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation
    Studies, and Ridgway Center for International Security Studies.

    Khohtla- Jarve, Estonia, This incident involved two men who worked as
    assistants to an *engine*

    1993 driver at a mineral fertilizer plant, which is located in Khohtla-
    Jarve,

    Estonia. The two men stole a device containing 2.8 grams of cesium- 137
    and were arrested. According to available information, the suspects
    intended to sell the cesium to an unspecified buyer.

    Saarbrucken, Germany, In July 1993, German police recovered an
    unidentified amount of 1993

    strontium- 90 that had been transported from Ukraine. The material, which
    was packed in small containers, was found by police from information
    provided by Ukrainian security services. Reportedly, the containers were
    discovered in three plastic bags after Ukrainian police had told the
    German

    police where to find them. Police in Kiev, Ukraine, arrested 17 people in
    connection with the operation. Sofia, Bulgaria, 1994 In September 1994,
    following a 5- day undercover operation, Bulgarian authorities arrested
    six Bulgarians and confiscated 19 containers of radioactive substances,
    including plutonium, cesium- 137, strontium- 90,

    plutonium- beryllium sources, and thallium- 204 that had been stolen from
    the Izotop Enterprise near the capital, Sofia. According to available
    information, the theft was made possible by poor security at the
    laboratory.

    Urechesti, Romania, In October 1994, Romanian authorities arrested three
    Moldovans, two

    1994 Jordanians, and two Romanians for trying to sell 7 kilograms of
    strontium

    in a lead pipe. One suspect, a former military officer, had smuggled the
    strontium to Moldova. The material was then passed to intermediaries in
    the Romanian province of Transylvania, where it was offered to the
    Jordanians for $400,000.

    Tallinn, Estonia, 1995 In July 1995, Estonian security police arrested two
    Estonians who had radium- 226 in their car. According to available
    information, it was thought

    that the radium was smuggled into Estonia via middlemen in St. Petersburg,
    Russia, indicating that more people were probably involved. Moscow,
    Russia, 1995 In November 1995, acting on a tip, Russian television
    reporters discovered

    a 32- kilogram container, containing cesium- 137 and wrapped with
    explosives, in a Moscow park. According to available information, Chechen
    separatists were responsible for this incident and had reportedly obtained
    the radioactive material from either cancer- treatment equipment or an
    instrument calibration device used in flaw detection equipment. The
    Chechens threatened to detonate the device if Russia decided to resume

    combat operations in the region.

    Kiev, Ukraine, 1998 In October 1998, a radiation health specialist at a
    German company that consults on reactor safety was arrested by customs
    police at Kiev airport in

    possession of a container of radioactive material from Chernobyl.
    According to available information, a Russian scientist asked the health
    specialist to take a metal container holding a small amount of radioactive
    material out of the country for analysis. Russian officials were unsure of
    the exact type of material involved, but suspected it contained cesium,
    strontium, and zirconium. St. Petersburg, Russia,

    In July 1999 Russian law enforcement officials arrested two men who 1999

    attempted to sell 5 grams of californium- 252. One of those arrested, a
    technician from Murmansk, was approached by a criminal group who enlisted
    his help to procure californium- 252. The technician, who was responsible
    for removing spent nuclear components from a nuclearpowered icebreaker,
    smuggled the radioactive material off the icebreaker. Along with an
    accomplice, the technician packed the californium- 252 into a container
    filled with paraffin, which they placed within a canister of water. After
    the initial offer from the criminal group fell through, the technician

    and his accomplice traveled to St. Petersburg in search of another buyer,
    where they were arrested. Istanbul, Turkey, 1999 In a joint operation, the
    Istanbul Organized Crime and Arms Smuggling

    Office and the National Intelligence Organization arrested five people,
    one of whom was from the Republic of Georgia, as they tried to sell
    cesium- 137 to policemen acting as buyers in Istanbul in August 1999. The
    cesium, which was in two separate steel tubes and weighed 49 grams, was
    smuggled into Turkey from an unknown location.

    Uzhgorod, Ukraine, In September 1999, a Russian citizen was arrested after
    police officers

    1999 discovered that he was carrying two containers of strontium- 90. The

    material was discovered on the suspect during a document check by
    Ukrainian police. It is believed that the suspect was taking the
    radioactive materials from Russia to Western Europe. The suspect was in
    possession of a number of forged documents, including a forged diplomatic
    identification card.

    Volgograd, Russia, 1999 In August 1999, Russian security police recovered
    six containers of cesium137, which were stolen from a Volgograd oil
    refinery in May 1998. Earlier

    efforts to locate the stolen containers, including the establishment of
    checkpoints with radiation monitors on local roads, had proven fruitless.
    According to reports, the thieves had hidden the stolen cesium containers

    to avoid this police dragnet and hoped to sell the material after the
    search for it had finally been abandoned.

    Donetsk, Ukraine, 2000 In February 2000, A Ukrainian law enforcement unit
    confiscated 27 containers of strontium- 90. Five individuals were
    reportedly involved in the illegal trafficking of this material. The group
    allegedly tried to contact foreign buyers, who were in fact members of the
    law enforcement unit. The radioactive material was reportedly stolen from
    a military unit deployed in the region and was stored in an apartment.
    Reports stated that the individuals were attempting to sell the 27
    containers for $168, 000.

    Beshkoprik, In March 2000, Uzbekistan customs officers seized an Iranian-
    registered

    Uzbekistan, 2000 truck on the Kazakhstan- Uzbekistan border about 20
    kilometers from

    Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, after discovering it contained highly
    radioactive material. Kazakhstan customs officials had cleared the truck
    and issued a certificate indicating that it had passed radiation
    screening.

    Uzbekistan officials determined that the level of gamma radiation emitted
    by the cargo was 100 times over the acceptable level. Uzbekistan customs
    officials then returned the truck to their Kazakhstani counterparts. The
    destination listed on the truck*s manifest was Quetta, Pakistan, and some
    reports speculated that the incident involved efforts to smuggle
    radioactive material intended for use by terrorist groups to build a
    radiological weapon.

    Piatra Neamt City, In December 2000, five suspects were arrested while
    trying to sell Romania, 2000

    1 kilogram of radioactive material (strontium, plutonium, and cobalt), to
    undercover police officers posing as prospective buyers of radioactive
    material. The suspects included a former officer of an antiorganized crime
    police unit in Moldova and four Romanians who were bodyguards in charge of
    protecting the shipments and who were responsible for organizing the sale
    of the materials.

    Thessaloniki, Greece, In January 2001, Greek law enforcement officials
    uncovered several

    2001 hundred metal *wafers* of commercially available alpha- emitting
    ionization

    sources, containing a total of 3 grams of plutonium and americium. The
    cache was found buried in a forest 12 kilometers from Thessalonki. The
    sources were believed to be smuggled from Eastern Europe, and there was
    speculation about organized criminal involvement in the smuggling of these
    sources. An investigation was launched, but to date, there have been no
    publicly released results.

    Minsk, Belarus, 2002 In January 2002, police in Minsk, Belarus, arrested
    two persons in connection with an attempt to sell four sealed sources of
    strontium- 90 that

    one of the suspects had been storing in his apartment. One of the suspects
    had stolen the sources 4 years earlier during his military service, and
    the other was arrested while trying to sell them.

    Veliko Tarnova, In May 2002, Bulgarian authorities seized 101 plutonium
    sources and an

    Bulgaria, 2002 americium- beryllium source from a vehicle near Veliko
    Tarnova. The

    sources were detected when police officers stopped a taxi with four
    individuals during a routine inspection. Thirty- nine of the plutonium
    sources had certificates indicating that they had been manufactured in
    1990 by Izotop- Moscow and had been ordered for a ferryboat station in
    Varna.

    Because the 10- year guaranteed service life of the sources had expired,
    it is possible that the sources were diverted after they had been removed
    from service for disposal.

    Information About Accidents Involving Sealed

    Appendi x V

    Sources According to IAEA and the World Health Organization, there have
    been more than 100 accidents involving sealed sources over the past 50
    years. Many of these accidents have been small and resulted in few
    injuries. The actual number of accidents worldwide is unknown because many
    countries do not report or record such events. This appendix describes 10
    accidents that occurred since the early 1980s. Although these accidents
    were not the result of malevolent actions, they are useful in gaining a
    better understanding of the potential consequences following the loss of
    control of sealed sources.

    We have included, to the extent that it was available, information on the
    economic impacts of the accidents. The costs associated with lost
    equipment, damage to property, and the disposal of radioactive waste can
    be very significant. The cost components associated with radiological

    accidents include  medical treatment of exposed individuals;  radiation
    surveillance, including searching for lost sealed sources and

    contaminated areas;  decontamination and dismantling of contaminated
    buildings and

    property,  loss of production capacity;  radioactive waste management
    and disposal;  monetary compensation to individuals who received
    excessive doses of

    radiation;  rebuilding or possible relocation costs; and  effects on
    international trade. Nonmonetary impacts may include:  loss of public
    confidence and credibility in the government, and  public questions about
    all uses of ionizing radiation.

    Table 8 provides information about 10 significant cases of accidents
    identified by IAEA and the World Health Organization since 1983. A brief
    discussion of each case follows the table.

    Tabl e 8: Selected Accidents Involving Sealed Sources Since 1983 Number of
    Number of Type of sealed source significant

    related Year Location involved exposures

    deaths Associated costs

    1983 Juarez, Mexico Cobalt- 60 80 0 $34 million 1984 Morocco Iridium- 192
    11 8 Unknown 1987 Goiania, Brazil Cesium- 137 50 4 $36 million 1994
    Tammiku, Estonia Cesium- 137 3 1 Unknown 1996 Gilan, Iran Iridium- 192 1 0
    Unknown 1997 Lilo, Georgia Cesium- 137 11 0 Unknown 1998 Los Barrios,
    Spain Cesium- 137 6 0 $28 million 1999 Yanango, Peru Iridium- 192 1 0
    Unknown 2000 Samut Prakarn,

    Cobalt- 60 10 3 Unknown Thailand 2001 Lja, Georgia Cesium- 137 2 0 Unknown

    Sources: IAEA and the World Health Organization.

    Juarez, Mexico, 1983 A teletherapy unit containing a cobalt- 60 source was
    purchased and imported by a Mexican hospital without compliance with
    existing import

    requirements. After the unit was stored for 6 years in a warehouse, its
    scrap value attracted the attention of a maintenance technician. The
    technician dismantled the unit and removed the cylinder containing the
    sources and other metal parts. He then loaded them into a pickup truck,
    drove to a junkyard, and sold the parts as scrap. Before arriving at the
    junkyard, he ruptured the sealed cobalt source, dispersing about 6, 000
    tiny pellets of cobalt- 60 in the truck bed. When cranes moved the
    ruptured cylinder, the cobalt- 60 pellets were

    spread over the junkyard and mixed with other metal materials.
    Consequently, pellets and pellet fragments were transferred to vehicles
    used for transporting the scrap to various foundries. The technician*s
    pickup truck remained parked on the street for 40 days and was then moved
    to another street, where it remained for an additional 10 days. An

    unknown number of people passed by the truck each day and children used it
    as a play area. It was later discovered that contaminated scrap metal from
    the junkyard had been used to manufacture reinforcing rods and metal table
    bases. A truck transporting contaminated rods passed near a DOE national
    laboratory, where radiation detectors indicated the presence of
    radioactivity. Two days later, the authorities ascertained the origin of
    the contaminated rods.

    U. S. and Mexican officials spent an estimated $34 million to track,
    recover, and secure these radioactive products. An extensive investigation
    showed that 30,000 tables and 6,000 tons of reinforcing rods had been made
    from the contaminated material. In addition, 814 buildings were partly or
    completely demolished because the radioactivity in the reinforcing rods
    resulted in higher- than- acceptable levels of radiation. The accident
    exposed 4,000 people to radiation, and 80 people received significant

    doses. Table 9 provides a breakdown of the estimated costs associated with
    the accident.

    Tabl e 9: Estimated Costs Related to the Accident in Mexico

    Dollars in thousands

    Action taken Cost

    Transport and disposal of contaminated material $15, 640 Demolition and
    reconstruction to remove contaminated reinforcement bars in buildings
    8,500

    Loss of production capacity 3,740 Value of contaminated material 2,040
    Technical and operational personnel and equipment 680 Security and
    surveillance by police and army forces, and legal or political problems
    3,400

    Tot al $34, 000

    Source: IAEA.

    Morocco, 1984 In 1984, iridium- 192 sources were being used to radiograph
    welds in a fossil- fuel power plant under construction. One of these
    sources dropped

    to the ground from a radiography camera, where a passerby picked it up and
    took it home. The source was lost from March to June 1984 and, as a
    result, eight persons died from overexposure to radiation. In addition,
    three others suffered severe injuries from overexposure that required

    hospitalization. It was initially assumed that the deaths were from
    poisoning. Only after the last family member died was it suspected that
    the deaths might have been caused by radiation.

    Goiania, Brazil, 1987 A private radiography institute moved to new
    premises and left behind a cesium- 137 teletherapy unit without notifying
    the licensing authority. Because the building was partially demolished,
    the teletherapy unit was

    unsecured. Two people entered the building and removed the source
    assembly. They dismantled the source assembly at home and ruptured the
    sealed source. After the sealed source was ruptured, remnants of the
    source assembly were sold for scrap to a junkyard owner. He noticed that
    the material had a blue glow in the dark. Over a period of days, friends
    and relatives came to witness the phenomenon. Fragments of the source, the
    size of rice grains, were distributed to several families. Five days
    later, a number of persons started to show gastrointestinal distress.

    Because the sealed source contained cesium chloride, which is highly
    soluble and easily dispersed, there was considerable contamination of the
    environment, resulting in external irradiation and internal contamination
    of several persons. Some individuals suffered very high internal and
    external contamination because of the way they had handled the cesium
    chloride powder, such as rubbing it on their skin, eating with
    contaminated hands, and handling various objects. Consequently, four
    people died within 4 weeks of being hospitalized. In total, 249 people
    were contaminated, and 112,000 people were screened for contamination. The
    environment was also severely contaminated. Eighty- five houses were
    significantly contaminated, and 41 of these had to be evacuated. The

    decontamination process required the demolition of seven residences and
    various other buildings and generated 3,500 cubic meters of radioactive
    waste. The accident had a great psychological impact on the whole region.
    Many people feared contamination, irradiation, and incurable diseases.
    Over 8, 000 persons requested monitoring for contamination in order to
    obtain certificates stating that they were not contaminated. These were
    needed because operators of commercial airplanes and buses refused to
    allow

    people from the region to board and hotels refused to register them. The
    social and psychological impact of the accident was so great that an
    outlying region to Goiania, where the waste repository was established,
    has incorporated the trifoil symbol of radioactivity into the region*s
    flag.

    Economically, there was discrimination against products from Goiania,
    resulting in a 20 percent decrease in the sales of cattle, grains, and
    other agricultural products from the region. Tourism decreased virtually
    to zero and the gross domestic product for the region decreased by 15
    percent. It

    took 5 years for the gross domestic product to return to preaccident
    levels. In total, the direct and indirect costs for emergency response and
    remedial action are estimated to be $36 million.

    Figure 8: Contaminated Radioactive Debris from Demolished Residences in
    Goiania

    Tammiku, Estonia, In October 1994 a sealed source that was discovered in
    scrap metal was

    1994 recovered and transferred to a radioactive waste repository under the

    supervision of the national government. Three brothers entered the
    repository without authorization and removed a metal container enclosing a
    cesium- 137 source and the source fell out of the container. One of the
    men placed the source in his pocket and took it home. The source remained
    in the house for 27 days, resulting in the overexposure of five
    individuals, including one fatality. The sealed source was thought to be

    part of a gamma irradiator, but none had ever been used or registered in
    Estonia. According to available information, it is possible that the
    source was brought into Estonia from the Russian Federation with
    miscellaneous scrap metals for export to Western Europe.

    Gilan, Iran, 1996 At a combined cycle fossil fuel power plant in Iran,
    radiography equipment with an iridium- 192 sealed source was used to
    examine welds from a boiler. At the end of the radiographer*s shift, the
    source became detached from its

    drive cable and fell to the floor unnoticed. Later, a worker moving
    thermal insulation materials around the plant noticed a shiny, pencil-
    sized metal object in a trench and put it in his pocket. The source was in
    his chest pocket for approximately two hours, resulting in a high
    radiation dose. As a result of this exposure, the worker had abnormal
    redness of the skin, severe bone marrow depression, and an unusually
    extended radiation injury requiring plastic surgery.

    Lilo, Georgia, 1997 Eleven border frontier guards became ill owing to
    exposure from multiple radioactive sources, including 12 cesium- 137
    sources, one cobalt- 60 source,

    and 200 radium- 226 sources. These sources were abandoned when the
    military site was transferred from the Soviet Union to the Republic of
    Georgia. All individuals suffered from skin ulcerations and chronic
    radiation sickness. No deaths were associated with this accident.

    Figure 9: Location Where Sealed Sources Were Found, Lilo, Georgia

    Los Barrios, Spain, In May 1998, a cesium- 137 source was accidentally
    melted at a stainless

    1998 steel factory. As a result of the periodic maintenance and cleaning
    of the

    filter system at the factory, the dust was removed, and much of it was
    sent to two different factories several hundred kilometers from the
    factory. The dust was contaminated with cesium- 137, and about 400 people
    were monitored for contamination. Measurements of a large number of water,
    air, and soil samples were obtained from nearby towns and at locations

    several hundred kilometers away. Traces of cesium- 137 were found but
    considered negligible. In countries outside of Spain, the environmental
    impact was minimal. The economic consequences of the accident, including
    temporary suspension of factory operations, decontamination operations,
    and management of the resulting radioactive waste, were estimated to be
    over $25 million.

    Yanango, Peru, 1999 In February 1999 an iridium- 192 source fell out of a
    radiography camera being used at a hydroelectric power plant. Later that
    day, a welder picked

    up the iridium- 192 source and placed it in the right back pocket of his

    trousers. For the next several hours, the welder continued his work and
    later took a minibus home with 15 other people onboard. Once home, the
    welder*s wife fed their 18- month- old child while she was sitting on the
    welder*s trousers, and two other children were 2- 3 meters from the
    iridium source for approximately 2 hours. The welder received extensive
    radiation burns that required the amputation of his right leg. The wife
    suffered lesions on her lower back after her brief exposure to the sealed
    source. No radiation effects were reported for the children.

    Samut Prakarn, A company in Bangkok, Thailand, possessed several
    teletherapy devices

    Thailand, 2000 containing cobalt- 60 without authorization from the
    Thailand Office of

    Atomic Energy for Peace. The teletherapy device was originally installed
    at a hospital in Bangkok, Thailand, in 1969. In 1981, a new source was
    installed, and the hospital received no further maintenance from the
    manufacturer of the teletherapy unit and source. When the teletherapy unit
    was removed from service in 1994, the maintenance contractor had gone
    bankrupt and the manufacturer was no longer producing cobalt- 60 units. As
    a result, the hospital was left with the disused source to manage and
    control. Since the hospital did not have sufficient storage space, it sold
    the device and source to a new supplier without the authorization of the
    regulatory authority. In 1999 the new supplier was notified that its lease
    of the warehouse was to be terminated and relocated the device to a
    parking lot that was owned by its parent company. In the autumn of 1999,
    the company relocated the teletherapy devices to an unsecured storage
    location without the authorization of the national

    regulatory authority. In late January 2000, several individuals obtained
    access to the unsecured storage location and partially disassembled the
    teletherapy device. The individuals took the unit to a residence and
    attempted to disassemble it further. In early February 2000, two
    individuals took the disassembled device to a

    junkyard in Samut Prakarn, Thailand, to segregate component metals and
    sell them separately as scrap. While a junkyard worker was disassembling
    the device, the cobalt- 60 source fell out of its housing unobserved by
    the junkyard workers or the individuals. By the middle of February 2000,
    several of the people involved, including the finders of the source and
    junkyard workers, had begun to feel ill and sought medical assistance.
    Physicians at the hospital suspected the possibility of radiation exposure

    and reported their suspicions to the regulatory authority. Altogether, 10

    people received high doses of radiation from the source. Three of those
    people, all workers at the junkyard, died within 2 months of their
    exposure.

    Lja, Georgia, 2001 In December 2001 three woodsmen found two heat-
    emanating metallic containers near their campsite in a forest near the
    village of Lja in western

    Georgia. This village is in the Abkhazia region of the Caucasus. This
    region is subject to political unrest and has sought its independence from
    the Republic of Georgia. As a result, during the past decade, the region
    has been largely inaccessible to Georgian and international authorities.
    The woodsmen involved in the accident used the containers as a heat source
    and experienced nausea, vomiting, and dizziness within hours of exposure
    to the containers. At a local hospital in Tbilisi, Georgia, the woodsmen
    were diagnosed with radiation sickness and severe radiation burns, and at
    least two of the three were in serious condition. In February 2002, an
    IAEA- sponsored search and recovery team found the containers and
    discovered that each one was previously used in Soviet- era radioisotope
    thermoelectric generators.

    Information on Producers and Distributors of

    Appendi x VI

    Radioactive Material This appendix provides information about the major
    producers and distributors of radioactive material used to manufacture
    sealed sources. Six countries are the major suppliers of the radioactive
    material: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Russia, and South
    Africa. Canada is the largest exporter of radioactive material and has
    provided over half of all radioactive material used in medical
    applications worldwide. Table 10 lists the major producers and
    distributors of radioactive material used to manufacture sealed sources.

    Tabl e 10: Major Producers and Distributors of Radioactive Material Used
    to Manufacture Sealed Sources Country Major organizations producing and/
    or distributing sources

    Argentina National Atomic Energy Commission and INVAP S. E. Australia
    Australian Nuclear Science and

    Technology Organization Belgium National Institute for Radio Elements and
    Belgian Nuclear Research Centre Brazil Instituto de Pasquisas Energeticas
    Nucleares Bulgaria Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy
    Canada Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., and MDS Nordion China China Isotope
    Corporation and Nuclear Power Institute of China Czech Republic Nuclear
    Research Institute Denmark Risoe National Laboratory France CIS Bio
    International Commissariat A L*Energie Atomique Centre D*Etudes De Valduc

    Germany AEA Technology QSA, GmbH., Chemotrade, Isotope Products Europe
    Blaseg, GmbH., and STS* Steuerungstechnik & Strahlesnschutz GmbH

    Hungary Atomic Energy Research Institute and Institute of Isotopes Co.,
    Ltd. India Bhabha Atomic Research Centre Indonesia National Nuclear Energy
    Agency Japan Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and Institute for
    Atomic Energy Rikkyo University Malaysia Malaysian Institute for Nuclear
    Technology Research Netherlands I. D. B. Holland B. V. Russia
    Atomenergoexport, Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, Kurchatov
    Institute, Mayak

    Production Association, Scientific and Research Institute of Atomic
    Reactors, and St. Petersburg Institute of Nuclear Physics

    South Africa South African Nuclear Energy Corporation South Korea Korea
    Atomic Energy Research Institute Sweden Studsvik AB

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Country Major organizations producing and/ or distributing sources

    United Kingdom Ametek Advanced Measurement Technology, Nycomed Amersham,
    and Reviss Services Limited

    United States Department of Energy Uzbekistan Institute of Nuclear Physics
    Sources: IAEA and Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for
    Nonproliferation Studies .

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission*s Policy

    Appendi x VII

    on Exports of Sealed Sources In most cases, the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission grants a general license for the export of sealed sources to
    all countries containing byproduct material except certain proscribed
    countries: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan. Byproduct
    material is (1) any radioactive material (except special nuclear material)
    yielded in, or made radioactive by,

    exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or using
    special nuclear material (as in a reactor) and (2) the tailings, or wastes
    produced by the extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from

    ore. According to NRC, limited quantities of sealed sources can also be
    exported under a general license to *restricted* countries: Afghanistan,
    Andorra, Angola, Burma, Djibouti, India, Israel, Oman, Pakistan, and
    Syria. A general license, provided by regulation, grants authority to a
    person for

    certain activities, in this case, the export of sealed sources, and is
    effective without filing an application with NRC or the issuance of a
    licensing document to the person or organization exporting the sealed
    source. NRC has placed most sealed sources for export under a general
    license for several reasons, including the following: (1) subject to NRC
    or Agreement State 1 oversight, the United States is responsible only for
    ensuring the safe use and control of radioactive materials used to
    manufacture sealed

    sources within U. S. territory; (2) foreign countries have the sovereign
    responsibility for ensuring appropriate regulatory controls over
    radioactive material, including such material imported from other
    countries; and (3) control over radioactive material would not be enhanced
    by requiring

    specific licenses for material exported from the United States. A specific
    license would not ensure that the exported materials would be subject to
    controls and regulatory oversight in a foreign country because the license

    does not ensure that the recipient country has adequate regulatory
    controls over the material that is exported from the United States. Under
    a specific license, the export request must be reviewed and approved by
    NRC in consultation with other appropriate agencies, including the
    Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, and Energy.

    NRC officials told us that they are required only to maintain a database
    of exports of sealed sources that are issued under a specific license and
    certain other exports of concern, such as americium- 241 and neptunium1

    A U. S. state that has signed an agreement with NRC under which the state
    regulates the use of by- product and other materials within that state.
    Currently, there are 32 U. S. Agreement States.

    237. The United States, as a nuclear weapon state, has agreed to report
    all exports of americium and neptunium to IAEA. With regard to shipments
    of sealed sources, NRC officials told us that the Department of Homeland
    Security*s Bureau of Customs and Border Protection maintains a database of
    all transactions, identified by tariff number, including those including
    sealed sources that are exported under a general license. However, these

    officials also said that it would be very difficult for the Bureau of
    Customs and Border Protection to track these specific shipments of sealed
    sources because the information on manifests is general in nature.

    NRC officials told us that they were not aware of any sealed sources that
    were exported under a general license from the United States that have
    been used for malicious purposes. They noted that there have been

    thousands of such exports, most of which involve material in forms or
    quantities that pose minimal safety or health risks if properly used and
    controlled. However, there have been a few cases where lax local
    regulatory oversight over high- risk materials resulted in instances where
    sealed sources were eventually lost or improperly disposed of, resulting
    in

    harmful exposure to individuals. Specific licenses are required to export
    radioactive material in waste and tritium for recovery and recycling
    purposes. This is because a final NRC rule (59 F. R. 48994), effective
    November 10, 1994, revoked the general license for bulk tritium and alpha-
    emitting radionuclides having an alpha half- life of 10 days or greater
    but less than 200 years to conform NRC*s regulations to the export control
    guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers* Group 2 for nuclear- related, dual-
    use items. Tritium and reactor- produced alpha- emitting radionuclides are
    two commodities on the Nuclear Suppliers* Groups dual- use list whose
    exports are regulated by NRC. In addition, tritium and alpha- emitting
    radionucliedes are controlled by the

    Nuclear Suppliers* Group because of their potential application in the
    production of weapons of mass destruction. Another final rule on the
    import and export of radioactive material (60 F. R. 37556), effective
    August 21, 1995, established specific licensing

    requirements for the import and export of radioactive material in the form
    of waste coming into or leaving the United States to conform with NRC*s

    2 The Nuclear Suppliers* Group consists of 30 nuclear supplier countries
    and seeks to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and
    technology, both dual- use and specially designed and prepared.

    regulations to the guidelines of the IAEA Code of Practice on the
    International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste.

    In view of increased post- September 11 terrorism concerns, NRC is
    considering changes to its general license provisions to improve controls
    over exports. Possible changes include (1) ensuring that the exporter
    confirm that the customer in the foreign country is authorized by the
    recipient country to possess the material; (2) requiring prior
    notification to NRC for risk- significant shipments; and (3) as
    appropriate, providing

    national or international source registries with data for risk-
    significant shipments. Changes under consideration are expected to be
    implemented in fiscal year 2004 by orders with compensatory measures and
    in fiscal years 2004- 2005 by a rule change as part of a broader NRC plan
    to improve

    controls over the imports and exports of sealed sources. Other possible
    and more restrictive controls for exports include a requirement for a
    specific export license for high- risk material such as high- activity
    cobalt- 60 sources or imposing a specific prohibition on such exports to
    countries that do not have acceptable sealed source security, control, and
    accountability requirements. The United States is coordinating these
    efforts with other countries that export sealed sources to ensure
    consistent, adequate controls. In addition, in conjunction with the change
    of the national threat level to *orange* in March 2003, NRC issued a
    security advisory to licensees concerning certain quantities of certain
    highrisk

    sources, which included exports and imports.

    Results of the International Conference on the

    Appendi x VIII

    Security of Radioactive Sources This appendix provides information
    concerning several key findings and recommendations from the international
    conference on the security of radioactive sources held in Vienna, Austria,
    in March 2003. The conference was sponsored by the governments of the
    United States and the Russian

    Federation and hosted by the government of Austria. It was organized by
    IAEA in cooperation with the European Commission, the World Customs
    Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, and the
    European Police Office. Over 700 delegates from more than 120 countries
    attended the conference.

    The conference produced key findings in the following areas: (1)
    identifying, searching for, recovering, and securing high- risk
    radioactive sources; (2) strengthening long- term control over radioactive
    sources; (3) interdicting illicit trafficking; (4) planning the response
    to radiological emergencies arising from the malevolent use of radioactive
    sources; and (5) recognizing the role of the media/ public education,
    communication, and outreach.

    Regarding identifying and searching for sources, the conference encouraged
    countries to  develop and implement national action plans, on the basis
    of their own specific conditions, for locating, searching for, recovering,
    and securing high- risk radioactive sources;  accelerate the
    establishment of a coherent and transparent scheme for

    the categorization of radioactive sources in order to provide for the
    safety and security of sources; and

     assist other countries, as appropriate, in identifying, searching for,
    recovering, and securing high- risk sources. Concerning strengthening
    long- term control over radioactive sources, the conference encouraged
    countries to

     formulate and implement national plans for the management of sources
    throughout their life cycle;

     develop, to the extent practical, standards for the design of sealed
    sources and associated devices that are less suitable for malevolent use
    (e. g., alternative technologies and less- dispersible forms of high- risk
    sources); and

     establish arrangements for the safe and secure disposal of disused
    highrisk sources, including the development of disposal facilities.

    Regarding illicit trafficking, the conference recognized the need for
    greater international efforts to detect and interdict the illicit
    trafficking of high- risk sources and to take appropriate enforcement
    actions. In support of this objective, the conference encouraged countries
    to

     further develop and strengthen measures to detect, interdict, and
    respond to the illicit trafficking of high- risk radioactive sources;

     deploy and widely use technologies for detecting high- risk radioactive
    sources, with emphasis on ensuring the sustainability of monitoring and
    detection equipment;

     undertake further research on and development of detection technologies
    for use at borders and elsewhere;

     enhance cooperation between government agencies responsible for
    preventing, detecting, and responding to illicit trafficking incidents,
    especially in the fields of information sharing, communications, and
    training;

     pool resources through, for example, the sharing of monitoring and
    detection equipment on common borders; and

     continue support for and development of IAEA*s illicit trafficking
    database.

    The conference recommended that countries develop comprehensive plans to
    prepare for and respond to radiological emergencies involving radioactive
    sources. In support of this recommendation, the conference encouraged
    countries to, among other things,

     enhance current national and international response arrangements, taking
    into account the need to respond both proactively and reactively to the
    new scenarios presented by the possibility of the malevolent use of high-
    risk radioactive sources and

     consider establishing mechanisms to facilitate effective coordination in
    the event of a radiological emergency.

    Finally, the conference recognized that the public*s understanding of the
    nature and consequences of radiological emergencies will largely determine
    how the public reacts to such emergencies. As a result, the conference
    encouraged countries to

     conduct public outreach and awareness programs to foster a better
    understanding of radiological threats and the appropriate response in the
    event of a radiological emergency in order to minimize social and economic
    disruption;

     educate the public regarding the nature of radioactivity, the
    consequences of the malevolent uses of high- risk radioactive sources, and
    the procedures for mitigating those consequences in order to

    reduce the psychological impact of radiological terrorism;  strengthen
    their education and training programs as a means to promote

    confidence building within the public; and  assume greater responsibility
    for gaining the trust of the media and

    informing them about the potential threat of radiological terrorism to
    help ensure that the media will communicate information accurately in a
    nonsensational manner to avoid fueling public fear and panic.

    Information on IAEA*s Revised Categorization

    Appendi x IX

    of Radioactive Sources The purpose of IAEA*s Categorization of Radioactive
    Sources is to provide a fundamental and internationally harmonized basis
    for risk- informed decision making. The draft document provides a
    categorization for radioactive sources used in industry, medicine,
    agriculture, research, and education. The principles of the categorization
    can be equally applied to radioactive sources, such as radioisotope
    thermoelectric generators that may be under military control. The
    categorization does not apply to radiation- generating devices such as X-
    ray machines and particle accelerators, although it may be applied to
    radioactive sources produced

    by, or used as, target material in such devices. The revised
    categorization divides sources into five categories, according to their
    potential to cause harmful health effects, should the source not be
    managed safely and securely. The categories are defined as follows:

     Category 1 sources are considered extremely dangerous. If not safely
    managed safely, the radioactive material would likely cause permanent
    injury to a person who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it for
    more than a few minutes. It would probably be fatal to be close to this
    amount of unshielded material for a period of a few minutes to an hour.
    Furthermore, the amount of radioactive material, if dispersed by fire or
    explosion, could possibly* but would be unlikely to*

    permanently injure persons in the immediate vicinity or be life
    threatening to them. There would be little or no risk of immediate heath
    effects to persons beyond a few hundred meters. It would be highly
    unlikely for a category 1 source to contaminate a public water supply to
    dangerous levels, even if the radioactive material were highly soluble in
    water.

     Category 2 sources are also considered personally dangerous. If not
    safely managed or securely protected, the radioactive material could cause
    permanent injury to a person who handled it or were otherwise in contact
    with it for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to
    be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of
    hours to days. The amount of radioactive material, if dispersed by fire or
    explosion, could possibly* but would be very unlikely to* permanently
    injure or be life threatening to persons in the immediate vicinity. It
    would be virtually impossible for a category 2 source to contaminate a
    public water supply to dangerous levels, even if the radioactive material
    were highly soluble in water.

     Category 3 sources are also considered to be dangerous. If not safely
    managed or securely protected, the radioactive material could cause

    permanent injury to a person who handled it or were otherwise in contact
    with it, for some hours. It could possibly* although it is unlikely* be
    fatal to be in close contact to this amount of unshielded radioactive
    material for a period of days to weeks. The amount of radioactive
    material, if dispersed by fire or explosion, could possibly*

    but is extremely unlikely to* permanently injure or be life threatening to
    persons in the immediate vicinity. It would be virtually impossible for a
    category 3 source to contaminate a public water supply to dangerous
    levels, even if the radioactive material were highly soluble in water.

     Category 4 sources are unlikely to be dangerous. It is very unlikely
    that anyone would be permanently injured by this amount of radioactive
    material. This amount of radioactive material, if dispersed by fire or
    explosion, could not permanently injure persons.

     Category 5 sources are not considered dangerous. No one could be
    permanently injured by this amount of radioactive material. Furthermore,
    this amount of radioactive material, if dispersed by fire or explosion,
    could not permanently injure persons.

    IAEA has developed a list on the basis of practices (such as irradiators,
    industrial radiography, and teletherapy) as part of its relative ranking
    of sealed sources. Examples of the most dangerous (category 1) include
    radioisotope thermoelectric generators, sterilization and food
    preservation facilities containing cobalt- 60 or cesium- 137, and medical
    equipment containing cobalt- 60. The least dangerous (category 5) include
    low- doserate brachytherapy devices and lightning detectors containing
    americium241.

    Countries Participating in IAEA*s Model

    Appendi x X

    Project Program Table 11 provides a list of the countries participating in
    IAEA*s model project program and the year they joined the program.

    Tabl e 11: Countries Participating in IAEA*s Model Project Program Country
    Year joined the program

    Albania 1996 Algeria 2002 Angola a 2001 Armenia 1996 Azerbaijan 2003
    Bangladesh 1996 Belarus b 1996 Benin a 2003 Bolivia 1996 Bosnia and
    Herzegovina 1996 Bulgaria 2001 Burkina Faso a 2001 Cameroon a 1996 Central
    African Republic a 2003 China 2001 Columbia 1998 Costa Rica 1996 Croatia
    2001 Cyprus 1996 Democratic Republic of the Congo a 1996 Dominican
    Republic 1996 Ecuador 2000 Egypt 2001 El Salvador 1996 Ethiopia 1996
    Estonia 1996 Gabon a 1996 Georgia 1997 Ghana 1996 Guatemala 1996 Haiti
    1999 Hungary 2001

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Country Year joined the program

    Indonesia 2001 Iran 2001 Ivory Coast a 1996 Jamaica 1997 Jordan 1997
    Kazakhstan 1996 Kenya 2001 Kuwait 2001 Latvia 1996 Lebanon 1996 Libya 2001
    Lithuania 1996 Macedonia 1996 Madagascar 1996 Malaysia 2001 Mali a 1996
    Malta 2001 Mauritius a 1996 Moldova 1996 Mongolia 1996 Morocco 2001
    Myanmar 1996 Namibia a 1996 Nicaragua 1996 Niger a 1996 Nigeria a 1996
    Pakistan 2001 Panama 1996 Paraguay 1996 Philippines 2001 Portugal 2001
    Qatar 1996 Romania 2001 Saudi Arabia 1996 Senegal a 1996 Sierra Leone a
    1996 Singapore 2001

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Country Year joined the program

    Slovenia 2001 South Africa 2002 Sri Lanka 1996 Sudan 1996 Syria 1997
    Tajikistan 2002 Tanzania 2001 Thailand 2001 Tunisia 2001 Tur key 2001
    Uganda a 1996 United Arab Emirates 1996 Uruguay 2000 Uzbekistan 1996
    Venezuela 2002 Vietnam 1996 Ye me n 1996 Yugoslavia 2003 Zambia 2002
    Zimbabwe a 1996 Source: IAEA. a These countries are participating only in
    milestones 1 and 2 of the model project program.

    b Belarus completed the program in 2000.

    France*s System for Controlling Sealed

    Appendi x XI

    Sources French officials told us that their system for controlling sealed
    sources has several key components, including stringent controls on the
    licensing and tracking of the sources. Distributors of devices containing
    sealed sources must be authorized to market such devices and must send
    monthly accounts of the movement of sources to the French government
    agency responsible for regulating sealed sources. End users must have a
    license

    covering each site where the sources are used, and the maximum duration of
    a license is 5 years. For items such as smoke detectors, the end user is
    not required to have a license, but the distributor must be licensed.

    Approximately 30,000 sources in use in France are tracked by the
    government, and there are nearly 5, 000 licensees. This number does not
    include very small sources like iodine grains used for medical purposes
    (there are about 80, 000 such sources) and smoke detectors (for 400,000
    buildings), which are exempt from licensing requirements for end users.
    Sealed sources are subject to an annual inspection, and the end user pays

    for the inspections. The fee is a function of the number of sealed sources
    owned by the licensee. The inspection is designed to confirm that the
    sealed sources are properly accounted for, adequately secured, and safely
    used. In order to renew a license, the licensing agency must be provided
    with documentation of the annual inspections. If the end user is not
    inspected, it is subject to fines and may also be fined if the inspection
    shows that it is not adequately protecting devices containing sealed
    sources. Fines are based on health and safety infractions* not security
    violations* and the fines can be as high as about $15,000. France has also
    established a system to control orphan sources that has

    three main components.  End users are required to remove any source from
    service not more than

    10 years after it was purchased.  The company supplying the source to the
    end user is required to include

    disposal costs within the purchase price.  All other companies in the
    supply chain agree contractually to take back

    the source after 10 years. Under France*s system, the company supplying*
    or distributing* the sealed source is required to ensure, through a
    financial guarantee, that funds will be available to pay for the disposal
    of the source in case the distributor goes out of business or files for
    bankruptcy. The financial

    guarantee is made either through an annual fee paid to an association of
    source distributors or by providing France*s national waste management
    agency with a deposit. The association represents 99 percent of all
    distributors of devices containing sealed sources in France. About 50
    distributors are members of the association. Typically, the distributor
    makes an initial deposit of about $1,000 and then pays an annual fee on
    the

    basis of the total activity of sources it has distributed, the technology
    that the sealed sources are used for, and the value of the source. French
    officials responsible for administering the system told us that,
    initially,

    distributors did not like it because of the excessive amount of paper work
    involved. However, companies now see the value of the system. Distributors
    also have the option of contracting with France*s radioactive waste
    management agency for disposal of the sources if they do not want to join
    the association. Typically, the smaller distributors who choose this
    option do so because they may only supply one or two sources per year and
    do not want to share the risk of joining the larger association, where
    costs are spread among many distributors. Distributors who choose this
    option are required to deposit funds with the agency to guarantee that
    disposal costs will be covered. The deposit ranges from about $1,000 to
    several thousand dollars. When a source is returned, the agency returns
    the deposit (less an administrative fee) to the distributor. According to
    French officials, only 1 percent of the distributors of sources in France
    use this option because they believe it is more expensive than belonging
    to the association, which spreads the financial risk among all of its
    members. In addition, the cost determined by the waste management agency
    is based on the entire cost of disposal and takes into account inflation
    and other economic factors. To date, the waste management agency has not
    had to use the fund to dispose of any disused sealed sources. The agency
    has always been able to locate a source*s manufacturer to take back the
    source or find another manufacturer willing to accept it.

    According to French officials, when the system was first put into place,
    it posed a difficulty for distributors, who had to pass the cost of the
    financial guarantee to the end user. However, now that the system has been
    in place for many years, the additional costs are accepted, and users are
    pleased not to have to deal with disposing of the sources on their own. We
    were told that the process works well and has contributed to the reduction
    in the number of lost, stolen, or abandoned sealed sources. Currently,
    about one sealed source per year is orphaned in France.

    Appendi x XII Comments from the Department of Energy

    Appendi x XIII Comments from the Department of State

    Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory

    Appendi x XIV Commission

    Appendi x XV

    GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Gene Aloise (202) 512-
    3841 Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Kerry
    Dugan Hawranek, Preston

    S. Heard, Glen Levis, Judy K. Pagano, Terry L. Richardson, and Rebecca
    Shea also made key contributions to this report.

    (360199)

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    Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial
    Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee on
    Governmental Affairs, U. S. Senate

    May 2003 NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION U. S. and International Assistance
    Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening

    GAO- 03- 638

    Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 5 The Number of Sealed Sources in
    Use and Lost, Stolen, or

    Abandoned Worldwide Is Unknown 7 Countries Have Established Legislative
    and Regulatory Controls

    over Sealed Sources, but Adequacy of Controls Varies 18 DOE Has a Program
    to Help Other Countries Secure Sealed Sources,

    but Strengthened Coordination and Planning Are Needed 23 Conclusions 37
    Recommendations for Executive Action 38 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
    39

    Appendixes

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 42

    Appendix II: Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries 44

    Appendix III: List of Countries Surveyed by GAO and Responses 61

    Appendix IV: Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving Sealed Sources
    65

    Appendix V: Information About Accidents Involving Sealed Sources 74

    Appendix VI: Information on Producers and Distributors of Radioactive
    Material 83

    Appendix VII: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission*s Policy on Exports of
    Sealed Sources 85

    Appendix VIII: Results of the International Conference on the Security of
    Radioactive Sources 88

    Appendix IX: Information on IAEA*s Revised Categorization of Radioactive
    Sources 91

    Appendix X: Countries Participating in IAEA*s Model Project Program 93

    Appendix XI: France*s System for Controlling Sealed Sources 96

    Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Energy 98

    Appendix XIII: Comments from the Department of State 99

    Appendix XIV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 102

    Appendix XV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 104

    Tables Table 1: Regional Distribution of Sealed Sources in Countries
    Responding to GAO*s Survey on the Security of

    Radioactive Sealed Sources 8 Table 2: Reported Lost or Stolen and
    Recovered Sealed Sources 12 Table 3: Estimated Number of Radioisotope
    Thermoelectric

    Generators in the Former Soviet Union 15 Table 4: Assistance to Improve
    Controls over Radioactive Sources

    through January 31, 2003 31 Table 5: Radiological Threat Reduction Program
    Expenditures by

    DOE*s National Laboratories as of January 31, 2003 35 Table 6: Countries
    Surveyed and Surveys Received 61 Table 7: Significant Seizures of
    Illicitly Trafficked Sealed Sources

    Since 1993 69 Table 8: Selected Accidents Involving Sealed Sources Since
    1983 75 Table 9: Estimated Costs Related to the Accident in Mexico 76
    Table 10: Major Producers and Distributors of Radioactive Material

    Used to Manufacture Sealed Sources 83 Table 11: Countries Participating in
    IAEA*s Model Project Program 93

    Figures Figure 1: Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators Manufactured in
    the Former Soviet Union 14

    Figure 2: Abandoned Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator in Russia 16
    Figure 3: Seed Irradiators Used in the Former Soviet Union 17 Figure 4:
    Moscow Radon Building Scheduled for DOE- Funded

    Security Upgrades 25 Figure 5: DOE- Funded Physical Security Upgrades in
    the Former

    Soviet Union 26 Figure 6: Reported International Trafficking Incidents
    Involving

    Radioactive Sources, 1993- 2002 66 Figure 7: Illicit Trafficking Incidents
    by Type of Radioactive

    Source, 1993- 2002 67 Figure 8: Contaminated Radioactive Debris from
    Demolished

    Residences in Goiania 78 Figure 9: Location Where Sealed Sources Were
    Found, Lilo,

    Georgia 80

    Abbreviations

    DOD Department of Defense DOE Department of Energy GAO General Accounting
    Office IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency MINATOM Russian Ministry of
    Atomic Energy NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission USAID U. S. Agency for
    International Development

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    a

    GAO United States General Accounting Office

    The precise number of sealed sources in use is unknown because many
    countries do not systematically account for them. However, nearly 10
    million sealed sources exist in the United States and the 49 countries
    responding to a GAO survey. There is also limited information about the
    number of sealed sources that have been lost, stolen, or abandoned, but it
    is estimated to be in the thousands worldwide. Many of the most vulnerable
    sealed sources that could pose a security risk are located in the
    countries of the former Soviet Union. All of the 49 countries that
    responded to GAO*s survey reported that they

    have established legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources.
    However, nuclear safety and security experts from DOE, the Departments of
    State and Defense, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the
    International Atomic Energy Agency, and the European Commission told GAO
    that countries* controls over sealed sources vary greatly and are weakest
    among less developed countries. In fiscal year 2002, DOE established a
    program focusing on improving the

    security of sealed sources in the former Soviet Union and has started to
    fund security upgrades in Russia and other former Soviet countries. The
    Departments of Defense and State and NRC also have programs to help
    countries strengthen controls over sealed sources. DOE plans to expand its
    program to other countries and regions in 2003 and is developing a plan to
    guide its efforts. However, the department has not fully coordinated its
    efforts with NRC and the Department of State to ensure that a
    governmentwide strategy is established. In addition, as of January 2003,
    the majority of DOE*s program expenditures totaling $8.9 million were
    spent by DOE*s national laboratories in the United States.

    Abandoned Electrical Generators Containing Large Amounts of Radioactive
    Strontium- 90 in a Former Soviet Union Country Sealed radioactive sources,
    radioactive material encapsulated in stainless steel or other metal, are
    used worldwide in medicine,

    industry, and research. These sealed sources pose a threat to national
    security because terrorists

    could use them to make *dirty bombs.* GAO was asked to determine (1) the
    number of sealed sources worldwide and how many have been reported lost,
    stolen, or abandoned; (2) the controls, both legislative and regulatory,
    used by countries that possess sealed sources; and (3) the assistance
    provided by the Department of Energy (DOE) and other U. S.

    federal agencies to strengthen other countries* control over sealed
    sources and the extent to which these efforts are believed to be
    effectively implemented. GAO recommends that the

    Secretary of Energy (1) develop a comprehensive plan for DOE to guide its
    future efforts, (2) take the lead in developing a governmentwide plan to
    strengthen controls over other countries*

    sealed sources; and (3) strengthen efforts to increase program
    expenditures in the countries

    requiring assistance. DOE agreed with our recommendations to strengthen
    the program but believes it has fully coordinated with other federal
    agencies. DOE*s contention is contrary to other agencies* views. www. gao.
    gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 638. To view the full report, including
    the scope

    and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact
    Gene Aloise at (202) 512- 3841 or aloisee@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO-
    03- 638, a report to the

    Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget,
    and International Security, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U. S.
    Senate

    May 2003

    NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

    U. S. and International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive
    Sources Need Strengthening

    Page i GAO- 03- 638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Contents

    Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Contents

    Page iii GAO- 03- 638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 638 Nuclear Nonproliferation United States General
    Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548

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    Appendix I

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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    Appendix II

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 45 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 46 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 47 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 48 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 49 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 50 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 51 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 52 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 53 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 54 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 55 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 56 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 57 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 58 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 59 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries Page 60 GAO- 03-
    638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

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    Appendix III

    Appendix III List of Countries Surveyed by GAO and Responses

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    Appendix III List of Countries Surveyed by GAO and Responses

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    Appendix III List of Countries Surveyed by GAO and Responses

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    Appendix IV

    Appendix IV Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix IV Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix IV Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix IV Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix IV Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix IV Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix IV Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix IV Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix V

    Appendix V Information About Accidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix V Information About Accidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix V Information About Accidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix V Information About Accidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix V Information About Accidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix V Information About Accidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix V Information About Accidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix V Information About Accidents Involving Sealed Sources

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    Appendix VI

    Appendix VI Information on Producers and Distributors of Radioactive
    Material

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    Appendix VII

    Appendix VII The Nuclear Regulatory Commission*s Policy on Exports of
    Sealed Sources

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    Appendix VII The Nuclear Regulatory Commission*s Policy on Exports of
    Sealed Sources

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    Appendix VIII

    Appendix VIII Results of the International Conference on the Security of
    Radioactive Sources

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    Appendix VIII Results of the International Conference on the Security of
    Radioactive Sources

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    Appendix IX

    Appendix IX Information on IAEA*s Revised Categorization of Radioactive
    Sources

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    Appendix X

    Appendix X Countries Participating in IAEA*s Model Project Program

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    Appendix X Countries Participating in IAEA*s Model Project Program

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    Appendix XI

    Appendix XI France*s System for Controlling Sealed Sources

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    Appendix XII

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    Appendix XIII

    Appendix XIII Comments from the Department of State Page 100 GAO- 03- 638
    Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix XIII Comments from the Department of State Page 101 GAO- 03- 638
    Nuclear Nonproliferation

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    Appendix XIV

    Appendix XIV Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 103 GAO-
    03- 638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

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    Appendix XV

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001
    Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300 Address Service Requested

    Presorted Standard Postage & Fees Paid

    GAO Permit No. GI00
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