Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to	 
Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability		 
(30-JUN-03, GAO-03-607).					 
                                                                 
After the events of September 11, 2001 led to the defeat of the  
Taliban, the United States and the international community	 
developed an assistance program to support Afghanistan's new	 
government and its people. Key components of this effort include 
food and agricultural assistance. GAO was asked to assess (1) the
impact, management, and support of food assistance to Afghanistan
and (2) the impact and management of agricultural assistance to  
Afghanistan, as well as obstacles to achieving food security and 
political stability.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-607 					        
    ACCNO:   A07420						        
  TITLE:     Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles
to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability	 
     DATE:   06/30/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Food relief programs				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Agricultural assistance				 
	     International food programs			 
	     International organizations			 
	     International relations				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Afghanistan					 

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GAO-03-607

                                       A

June 30, 2003 Let er t The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia

Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf Chairman Subcommittee Commerce, Justice,
State, and the Judiciary Committee on Appropriations House of
Representatives

Afghanistan is a country devastated by 23 years of war and destructive
domestic policies and more than 4 years of drought. The livelihood of 85
percent of Afghanistan*s approximately 26 million inhabitants depends on
agriculture, yet the food and agricultural sector has been severely
damaged. 1 Since 1978, the country has required international food aid to
help meet the shortfall between food supply and demand. Since 1999, the
United States has been the largest donor of food and agricultural
assistance to Afghanistan. The U. S. policy goal in Afghanistan is to
create a stable Afghan society that is not a threat to itself or others
and is not a base for terrorism; U. S. food and agricultural assistance to
Afghanistan is intended not only to provide emergency relief but also to
help achieve this long- term goal. The United States has provided short-
term, emergency food

assistance to feed Afghanistan*s vulnerable populations, as well as
longerterm agricultural development assistance to help Afghanistan improve
its food security 2 and political stability. The majority of U. S.
assistance has been given through the U. S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the
United Nations (UN) World Food Program (WFP) and the UN Food and

Agriculture Organization (FAO), as well as nongovernmental organizations.
1 Estimates on total population vary between 24 and 28 million. 2 FAO
defines food security as ensuring that sufficient food is available, that
supplies are relatively stable, and that those in need of food can obtain
it. The World Bank defines food security as the condition whereby
everyone, at all times, has access to and control over

high- quality food sufficient for an active and healthy life.

Nongovernmental organizations and contractors distribute most of the
assistance provided through the UN organizations in Afghanistan.

Because of concerns about the United States* and UN*s ability to deliver
assistance in such a complex environment, and recognizing the
interrelationship of short- term emergency food assistance and longer-
term

agricultural assistance, you asked that we examine the food and
agricultural assistance provided to date. We assessed, for 1999* 2002, (1)
the impact, management, and U. S. and international support of short-
term, emergency food assistance to Afghanistan and (2) the impact and
management of long- term, agricultural development assistance to
Afghanistan, as well as obstacles to achieving food security and political
stability.

To address these issues, we collected and analyzed information from the U.
S. Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and State; the U. S. Agency for
International Development; the UN World Food Program, Food and Agriculture
Organization, and Development Program; the World Bank; the Asian
Development Bank; and the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture and Animal
Husbandry and Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources. This effort
included an analysis of the cost data for U. S. food assistance provided
through these agencies and organizations. In addition, we contacted 14
nongovernmental organizations, responsible for delivering WFP and FAO
assistance in Afghanistan, to obtain their views on a range of issues
including the management of donated commodities and coordination. Finally,
we traveled to Afghanistan to examine the WFP*s

operations in country. Our presence in Afghanistan was limited due to
security precautions imposed by the Department of State. While in
Afghanistan, we spoke with officials from U. S., UN, and nongovernmental
organizations and the Afghan government. (For further details of the scope
and methodology of our study, see app. I.)

Results in Brief The emergency food assistance provided by the United
States and the international community from January 1999 through December
2002 helped avert famine by providing approximately 1.6 million tons of
food. 3 The WFP managed the assistance efforts effectively, overcoming
significant

obstacles and employing monitoring mechanisms such as a real- time 3 In
this report, *international community* is defined as the collective
grouping of bilateral, multilateral, and international assistance agencies
and nongovernmental organizations.

automated tracking system and periodic site visits. We observed organized
and efficient food distribution operations at WFP sites, and available
program data showed that less than 1 percent of the assistance was lost.
However, the inadequacy of the international community*s financial and
inkind support of the WFP*s appeal for assistance disrupted the provision
of food assistance throughout 2002. For example, because of lack of
resources, the WFP reduced the amount of food rations provided to
returning refugees from 150 kilograms to 50 kilograms. Meanwhile, as a
result of the statutory requirement that U. S. agencies providing food
assistance purchase U. S.- origin commodities and ship 75 percent of them

on U. S.- flagged vessels, assistance costs and delivery times were higher
by $35 million and 120 days, respectively, than if the United States had
provided cash or regionally produced commodities to international
assistance agencies.

The agricultural assistance provided by the international community had a
limited impact, from 1999 to 2002, because of continued conflict and
drought. During this period, FAO, nongovernmental organizations, and
others provided primarily short- term agricultural assistance such as
distributing tools and seed and, as a result, the assistance did not

significantly contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan*s
agricultural sector. In addition, in 2002, international agricultural
assistance was not adequately coordinated with the Afghan government,
contrary to established guidelines. A new coordination mechanism was
established in December 2002, but it is too early to determine its
effectiveness. Because of the lack of coordination, the Afghan government
and the international community have not developed a joint strategy to
integrate the numerous disparate assistance projects and manage the
overall agricultural rehabilitation effort. Finally, obstacles to future
rehabilitation efforts include inadequate funding to meet the U. S. and
international community*s goal of rehabilitating the agricultural sector.
The international community plans to spend approximately $230 million on
agricultural assistance in 2003. However, FAO officials said that the
agricultural rehabilitation effort will cost billions of dollars and take
at least a decade to complete. Meanwhile, the unstable security situation,
the control by warlords of much of the country, and the growth of opium
production create additional

obstacles to achieving food security and political stability in
Afghanistan. To increase the United States* flexibility in responding to
complex emergencies where U. S. national security interests are involved,
such as that in Afghanistan, Congress may wish to consider amending
existing food aid legislation to allow, in the event of such emergencies,
the provision of

non- U. S.- produced commodities and the provision of cash to
international assistance agencies to purchase non- U. S.- produced
commodities and amending cargo shipping legislation to allow waiver of the
requirement to ship food assistance on U. S. flag vessels. In addition, we
are recommending that the Department of State (State) and USAID take an
active role in a joint international* Afghan government effort to develop
an operational agricultural sector rehabilitation strategy that contains
measurable goals, defines resource levels, delineates responsibilities,
identifies external factors that affect the achievement of goals, and
requires program evaluations.

We presented a draft of this report to WFP, State, USDA, USAID, and the
Department of Defense. WFP agreed with our recommendation that the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 be amended, but
State, USDA, and USAID did not. State thought that more cost- benefit
studies were needed, and USAID and USDA stated that other existing

legislation allows USAID and State the resources and flexibility necessary
to respond to humanitarian crises. USDA also observed that changes in
cargo preference regulations would help reduce overall U. S. assistance

costs while not negatively affecting the provision of U. S. commodities.
In addition, USDA asserted that if the United States had provided greater
levels of commodities as a result of purchasing regionally produced
commodities, WFP*s logistical system would have been overstrained and
savings in cost and time would have been marginal. We maintain that
amending the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954
would provide greater flexibility than the provisions contained in other
existing legislation. The act is the principal authority for providing
food assistance in emergency and nonemergency situations. In both 2002 and

2003 over $2 billion in food assistance, the preponderant amount of this
type of assistance, was dispersed under this authority. Amending the act
will provide a permanent provision in the principal authority for
providing U. S. food assistance, allowing the United States to respond
rapidly and in a cost effective manner to events that affect U. S.
national security. Further, in the event that U. S. commodities are not
available, amending the act will provide the United States with the
flexibility to respond in a timely and cost effective manner. However, we
agree with USDA that the cargo preference requirement adds additional cost
to food assistance and should be waived in specific situations, and we
have adjusted the matter for congressional

consideration to reflect this point. We disagree with USDA*s claim that
additional commodities would have overburdened WFP and that the savings
from purchasing regional commodities would have been insignificant. WFP
moved record- levels of commodities through its

extensive logistics system in Afghanistan. Further, purchasing commodities
regionally could have reduced delivery time by 120 days and increased the
amount of commodities purchased by 103,000 metric tons. WFP, State, USDA,
and USAID all agreed with our recommendation that a joint Afghan*
international donor strategy for the rehabilitation of Afghanistan*s
agriculture sector is needed. However, USAID stated that FAO, not USAID,
should lead such an effort. We maintain that USAID should lead the effort
because the United States is the largest donor to Afghanistan,
agricultural rehabilitation is the cornerstone of USAID*s efforts in
Afghanistan, and the success of U. S. policy goals in Afghanistan is
tightly linked to the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector.

The Department of Defense limited its comments to issues pertaining to its
humanitarian daily ration program. The Department of Defense stated that
(1) we incorrectly characterized the ration program as strictly a food aid
program, (2) its informal evaluations of the program indicated that it
alleviated hunger and generated goodwill among the Afghan people, and (3)
although the funds used to purchase rations could have been used to
purchase bulk food, the bulk food could not have been delivered to remote

areas. The report discusses the food assistance and nonfood assistance
aspects of the rations program, and we have added information about the
goodwill generated by the rations to the report. As described in the
report, WFP*s well established logistics system was capable of delivering
food to all parts of Afghanistan throughout 2001, including the months of
October

through December when the rations were being delivered. Background
Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, land- locked Central Asian country
with

limited natural resources. At 647,500 square kilometers, it is slightly
smaller than the state of Texas. Afghanistan is bordered by Pakistan to
the east and south; Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China to the
north; and Iran to the west (see fig. 1). Its population, currently
estimated at 26

million, is ethnically diverse, largely rural, and mostly uneducated. Life
expectancy in Afghanistan is among the lowest in the world, with some of
the highest rates of infant and child mortality. 4

4 According to the 2002 UN World Development Indicators, as of 2000 (the
latest year for which figures are available), the infant mortality rate in
Afghanistan was 165 per 1,000 live births, and the mortality rate for
children younger than 5 years was 257 per 1,000 live births. Approximately
10 percent of children younger than 5 suffer from acute malnutrition, and
50 percent suffer from chronic malnutrition. This condition renders
children particularly vulnerable to disease, especially pneumonia,
tuberculosis, and diarrheal diseases. In addition, malnutrition is
believed to affect about 10 percent of Afghan women of

childbearing age.

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan, Including Provinces and Major Roads

Political conflicts have ravaged Afghanistan for years, limiting
development within the country. Conflict broke out in 1978 when a
communist- backed coup led to a change in government. One year later, the
Soviet Union began its occupation of Afghanistan, initiating more than two
decades of conflict. Over the course of the 10- year occupation, various

countries, including the United States, backed Afghan resistance efforts.
The protracted conflict led to the flight of a large number of refugees
into Pakistan and Iran. In 1989, the Soviet forces withdrew, and in 1992,
the communist regime fell to the Afghan resistance. Unrest continued,
however, fueled by factions and warlords fighting for control.

The Taliban movement emerged in the mid 1990s, and by 1998 it controlled
approximately 90 percent of the country. Although it provided some
political stability, the Taliban regime did not make significant
improvements to the country*s food security. Furthermore, the Taliban*s
continuing war with the Northern Alliance and the Taliban*s destructive

policies, highlighted in its treatment of women, further impeded aid and
development. Coalition forces removed the regime in late 2001, responding
to its protection of al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States.
In December 2001, an international summit in Bonn, Germany, established a

framework for the new Afghan government, known as the Bonn Agreement. 5
Agriculture is essential to Afghanistan. Despite the fact that only 11. 5
percent (7.5 million hectares) of Afghanistan*s total area is cultivable,
6 85 percent of the population depends on agriculture for its livelihood,
and 80

percent of export earnings and more than 50 percent of the gross domestic
product have historically come from agriculture. 7 However, Afghanistan*s
agricultural sector continues to suffer from the effects of prolonged
drought, war, and neglect. It lacks high- quality seed, draft animals, and

fertilizer, as well as adequate veterinary services, modern technology,
advanced farming methods, and a credit system for farmers. Further,
Afghanistan*s Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry and its

5 The Bonn Agreement, signed by numerous stakeholders on December 5, 2001,
in Bonn, Germany, established provisional arrangements concerning the
governing of Afghanistan pending the reestablishment of permanent
government institutions within the country. The UN Security Council
endorsed the Bonn Agreement on December 6, 2001, through UN Resolution
1383.

6 One hectare is equivalent to 10,000 square meters, 2.471 acres, or 11,
959.64 square yards. 7 Historical percentage based on UN data from the
1970s and early 1990s.

Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources lack the infrastructure and
resources to assist farmers. 8

Because Afghanistan experiences limited rainfall, its agricultural sector
is highly dependent on irrigation* 85 percent of its agricultural products
derives from irrigated areas. Thus, the conservation and efficient use of
water is the foundation of the agricultural sector. The severe drought
that has gripped the country since 1998 has resulted in drastic decreases
in domestic production of livestock and agricultural supplies including
seed,

fertilizer, and feed (see fig. 2). Several earthquakes and the worst
locust infestation in 30 years exacerbated this crisis in 2002. Without
adequate supplies and repairs to irrigation systems, even if the drought
breaks, farmers will be unable to produce the food that the country needs
to feed itself.

8 These ministries are referred to as the Ministries of Agriculture and
Irrigation throughout the remainder of this report.

Figure 2: Drought- Affected Areas in Afghanistan as of October 2001

Since 1965, the WFP 9 has been the major provider of food assistance to
Afghanistan. Partnering with nongovernmental organizations, 10 it delivers
assistance through emergency operations that provide short- term relief to
populations affected by a specific crisis such as war or drought. It also
conducts protracted relief and recovery operations designed to shift
assistance toward longer- term reconstruction efforts. Because of its
policy

to target assistance at specific populations, WFP does not attempt to
provide food for all of the vulnerable people within a country or affected
area. Instead, it focuses on specific vulnerable populations such as
internally displaced people or widows (see fig. 3). Further, it does not
try to meet all of the daily requirements of the targeted populations.
WFP*s 2002 emergency operation in Afghanistan targeted internally
displaced people, people affected by drought, and children, among others.
The assistance programs designed to assist these populations provide
between 46 and 79 percent, or 970 to 1671 kilocalories, of the recommended
minimum daily requirement of 2100 kilocalories. WFP assumes that
beneficiaries will obtain the remainder of their food through subsistence
farming or the market.

9 WFP was established in 1963. Since its inception, it has provided food
for development projects, and it has also provided increasingly greater
shares of assistance to emergency operations around the world. WFP devoted
28 percent of its resources to development in 1997, 18 percent in 1999, 13
percent in 2000, and 10 percent in 2001. The program obtains all of its
resources through voluntary contributions from donor nations.

10 In Afghanistan, WFP partners with UN organizations like the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees and local and international nongovernmental
organizations, including CARE, Oxfam, and World Vision.

Figure 3: WFP Distribution of U. S. -Provided Food in Afghanistan

FAO has provided much of the agricultural assistance 11 to Afghanistan.
FAO has been involved in agricultural development and natural resource
management in Afghanistan for more than 50 years. FAO was founded in 1945
with a mandate to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, to
improve agricultural productivity, and to better the condition of rural

populations. Today, FAO is one of the largest specialized agencies in the
UN system and the lead agency for agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and
rural

11 Agricultural assistance includes distribution of inputs (seed, planting
materials, fertilizer, tools, livestock); irrigation repair; water
resource management; hydrologic and climate monitoring/ watershed
management; agriculture product market, supply, and distribution systems
development; rehabilitation and development of agriculture infrastructure,

including fertilizer plants, seed farms, nurseries, product production and
processing facilities, and government facilities (offices, labs);
veterinary services/ artificial insemination (supplies, training); pest
control and capacity building/ training in related subjects (horticulture,
irrigation, animal husbandry); and development of agriculture policies,
regulations, and laws.

development. An intergovernmental organization, FAO has 183 member
countries plus one member organization, the European Community. FAO has
traditionally carried out reconstruction efforts in relatively stable
environments. Although FAO is increasingly implementing its programs in
unstable postconflict situations such as Afghanistan, the agency and its

staff are still adjusting to operating in such environments. FAO's regular
program budget provides funding for the organization's normative work and,
to a limited extent, for advice to member states on policy and planning in
the agricultural sector. FAO's regular budget can also fund limited
technical assistance projects through its Technical Cooperation Program.
Apart from this, extrabudgetary resources, through trust funds provided by
donors or other funding arrangements, fund all emergency and development
assistance provided by FAO. Thus, extrabudgetary resources

fund FAO*s field program, the major part of its assistance to member
countries.

U. S. and International The emergency food assistance provided to
Afghanistan by the United

Food Assistance Had States and the international community from January
1999 through

December 2002 benefited millions and was well managed, but donor
Significant Impact and

support was inadequate. WFP delivered food to millions of people in each
Was Well Managed, but

of the 4 years, helping avert widespread famine. In addition, WFP managed
Donor Support Was

the distribution of U. S. and international food assistance effectively,
overcoming significant obstacles and using its logistics system and a
Problematic

variety of monitoring mechanisms to ensure that food reached the intended
beneficiaries. However, inadequate and untimely donor support in 2002
disrupted some WFP assistance efforts and could cause further disruptions
in 2003. Further, WFP could have provided assistance to an additional

685,000 people and reduced its delivery times if the United States had
donated cash or regionally purchased commodities instead of shipping U.
S.- produced commodities. Additionally, if the United States had donated
the $50.9 million that it spent on approximately 2.5 million daily rations
airdropped by the Department of Defense, WFP could have purchased enough
regionally produced commodities to provide food assistance for an
estimated 1.0 million people for a year.

Food Assistance Had The emergency food assistance that the United States
and other bilateral

Important Impact donors provided in Afghanistan through WFP from 1999
through 2002 met a

portion of the food needs of millions of vulnerable Afghans. Over the 4-
year period, WFP delivered approximately 1.6 million metric tons of food
that helped avert famine and stabilize the Afghan people, both in
Afghanistan and in refugee camps in neighboring countries. 12 The food
assistance also furthered the country*s reconstruction through projects,
among others, that exchanged food for work. WFP delivered the assistance
as part of seven protracted relief* recovery and emergency operations (see
table 1). 13 The types of operations and their duration and objectives
varied in response to changing conditions within Afghanistan. These
objectives included, but

were not limited to, providing relief to the most severely affected
populations in Afghanistan and Afghan refugees in neighboring countries
and preventing mass movements of populations.

12 During the period 1999* 2001, WFP and other agencies believed that
without food assistance to Afghanistan, a famine could occur. In remote
areas, prefamine conditions, including severe malnutrition, were observed.

13 WFP has provided assistance to Afghanistan for most of the 36 years
prior to 2002; consequently, it had significant experience in the country,
and its logistics infrastructure was well established. The assistance
delivered from 1999 through 2001 was not tightly coordinated with the
Taliban owing to the UN*s policy of not working with this particular
government. The assistance delivered in 2002 was coordinated with the new
Afghan government through memorandums of understanding.

Table 1: WFP Operations: Cash Donations, Food Donations, Number of
Beneficiaries, and Percentage of U. S. Contribution, 1999* 2002

Total cash donations

Percentage of Target ed

(millions of cash contributed

Food donations Percentage of food

beneficiaries Duration

dollars) by U. S. (metric tons) contributed by U. S.

(millions)

1/ 99* 12/ 99 a $49.5 87. 3 111, 502 89.7 1. 2 1/ 00* 12/ 01 b 54. 3 61. 0
121,989 61.5 1. 0 8/ 00* 3/ 01 c 47. 9 78. 4 114,694 78.5 1. 6 4/ 01* 10/
01 d 82. 2 86. 7 184,462 82.8 3. 8 11/ 01* 10/ 02 e 43. 8 100. 0 100,000
100.0 5. 6 10/ 01* 3/ 02 f 225.4 61. 2 500, 624 58.8 7. 5 4/ 02* 6/ 03 g
242.3 64.5 h 516,394 60. 0 h 9.9

Total $745.4 N/ A 1,649,665 N/ A N/ A I

Average percentage of N/ A 68. 0 N/ A 67.0 N/ A

contributions from U. S. Legend N/ A = not applicable Source: WFP.

a Protracted relief and recovery operation 6064. b Protracted relief and
recovery operation 6064.01. Operation suspended, activities integrated
into emergency operation 10046.0. c Emergency operation 6259.0.

d Emergency operation 10046.0. Operation terminated and replaced with
emergency operation 10126.0. e Emergency operation 10098. Operation
terminated and replaced with emergency operation 10126.0.

f Emergency operation 10126.0. Covered beneficiaries in Afghanistan, Iran,
Pakistan, and Tajikistan. g Emergency operation 10155.0. h As of March 31,
2003. I The cumulative total of beneficiaries cannot be calculated since
the same beneficiaries may have been served multiple times during the 4-
year period.

WFP implemented a number of different types of food assistance projects,
including free food distribution; institutional feeding programs;
bakeries; food- for- work, -seed, -education, -training, and -asset-
creation projects; and

projects targeted at refugees, internally displaced people, and civil
servants. (See app. II for a list and description of WFP*s projects.)
Food- forwork and food- for- asset- creation projects provided essential
food assistance to the most vulnerable members of Afghanistan*s population

while enabling the beneficiaries to help rehabilitate local infrastructure
and rebuild productive assets such as roads and schools. Between July and
September 2002, these projects employed 1 million laborers per month,
paying them in food commodities. 14 U. S. food assistance to Afghanistan,
provided by USAID and USDA,

accounted for approximately 68 percent of the cash contributions and 67
percent of the commodities delivered by WFP from 1999 through 2002 (see
table 1). The U. S. provides cash to WFP to cover transportation and

administrative costs associated with its in- kind contributions of
commodities. 15 USAID*s authority to donate to WFP operations derives from
Title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954
(P. L. 480). Title II authorizes the agency to donate agricultural
commodities to meet international emergency relief requirements and carry
out nonemergency feeding programs overseas. USDA also provides surplus
commodities to WFP under section 416( b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949.
U. S. contributions consisted of in- kind donations of commodities such as
white wheat and cash donations to cover the cost of transporting the
commodities from the United States to Afghanistan.

Food Assistance WFP managed the distribution of U. S. and international
food assistance to

Distribution Was Well Afghanistan effectively despite significant
obstacles, including harsh

Managed weather and a lack of infrastructure to deliver food to
beneficiaries. To accomplish this, WFP appointed a special envoy to direct
operations and

employed a dedicated staff of local nationals. It also used various
monitoring and reporting mechanisms to track the delivery of food.

14 For example, food- for- work participants earn 7 kilograms of wheat per
day, valued at $1.00. Wage rates across Afghanistan range from $1.50 to
$3.40 per day. 15 WFP requires donors to provide funding to cover
transportation and administrative costs for in- kind contributions of
commodities. The cash that the U. S. contributes for this purpose

cannot be used by WFP to purchase commodities.

WFP*s Management Overcame In distributing the food assistance, WFP faced
significant obstacles related

Many Obstacles to political and security disturbances in Afghanistan as
well as physical and

environmental conditions. These obstacles included limited mobility due to
continued fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance and
coalition forces; religious edicts issued by the Taliban limiting the
employment of women by international organizations; difficult transport
routes created by geography, climate, and lack of infrastructure (see fig.
4); and attempts by Afghan trucking cartels to dramatically increase
trucking fees. To overcome these obstacles, WFP negotiated with the
Taliban to allow the movement of food to areas occupied by the Northern
Alliance; it also threatened to cancel certain projects unless women were
allowed to continue to work for WFP. Further, WFP found ways to deliver
food to remote areas, including airlifting food and hiring donkeys (see
fig. 5). In addition, it purchased trucks to supplement a fleet of
contracted trucks. Using these trucks as leverage against the Afghan
trucking cartel, WFP forced the cartel to negotiate when the cartel
attempted to dramatically increase transport fees.

Figure 4: Road Conditions Faced by WFP Truckers in Afghanistan

Figure 5: Use of Donkeys to Deliver Food to Remote Areas

Special Envoy and Staff Ensured WFP created the position of Special Envoy
of the Executive Director for

Effective Delivery the Afghan Region to lead and direct all WFP operations
in Afghanistan and neighboring countries during the winter of 2001* 2002,
when it was believed

that the combination of winter weather and conflict would increase the
need for food assistance. WFP was thus able to consolidate the control of
all resources in the region, streamline its operations, and accelerate the

movement of assistance. 16 WFP points to the creation of the position as
one of the main reasons it was able to move record amounts of food into
Afghanistan from November 2001 through January 2002. In December 2001
alone, WFP delivered 116,000 metric tons of food, the single largest

monthly food delivery within a complex emergency operation in WFP*s
history. WFP also credits its quick response to its national staff and the
Afghan truck drivers it contracted. WFP employed approximately 400 full-
time

national staff during 1999* 2002. These staff established and operated an
extensive logistics system and continued operations throughout
Afghanistan, including areas that international staff could not reach
owing to security concerns, and during periods when international staff
were evacuated from the country. The truckers who moved the food around
the country continued working even during the harshest weather and in
areas that were unsafe because of ongoing fighting and banditry.

WFP Monitoring Shows Effective WFP uses a number of real- time monitoring
mechanisms to track the

Distribution and Negligible distribution of commodities in Afghanistan,
and the data we reviewed

Losses suggested that food distributions have been effective and losses
minimal.

(For a description of WFP*s monitoring procedures, see app. III.) During
our visits to project and warehouse sites in Afghanistan, we observed
orderly and efficient storage, handling, and distribution of food
assistance. 17 WFP*s internal auditor reviewed WFP Afghanistan*s
monitoring operations in August of 2002 and found no material weaknesses.
USAID has also conducted periodic monitoring of WFP activities without
finding any major flaws in WFP*s operations. In addition, most of the
implementing partners we contacted were familiar with WFP reporting
requirements. However, 10 of the 14 implementing partners we

contacted commented unfavorably on WFP*s project monitoring efforts,
stating that monitoring visits were too infrequent. Finally, WFP*s loss
reporting data indicated that only 0.4 percent of the commodities was lost
owing to theft, spoilage, mishandling, or other causes.

16 The special envoy*s term ran from November 2001 to May 2002. A second
envoy was not appointed. 17 Owing to security restrictions, we were able
to conduct only limited site visits in Afghanistan.

Inadequate International Inadequate and untimely donor support disrupted
WFP*s food assistance

Support Disrupted Food efforts in 2002 and could disrupt efforts in 2003;
in addition, U. S. assistance

Assistance; U. S. to Afghanistan, both through WFP and the Department of
Defense, was

Contributions Costly and costly. In 2002, interruptions in support forced
WFP to delay payments of

food, curtail the implementation of new projects, and reduce the level of
Slow rations provided to repatriating refugees. WFP expressed concern that
donor support in 2003 may be similarly affected, as a growing number of

international emergencies and budgetary constraints could reduce the total
funding available for food assistance to Afghanistan. 18 In addition, WFP
could have delivered more food and reduced delivery times if the United
States had provided either cash or regionally purchased commodities
instead of shipping U. S.- produced commodities and airdropping
humanitarian daily rations.

Limited International Donor Obtaining donor support for the emergency food
assistance operation for

Support Disrupted Food the April 2002 through December 2002 period was
difficult owing to the

Assistance in 2002, Could donor community*s inadequate response to WFP*s
appeal for contributions. Disrupt Efforts in 2003

WFP made its initial appeal in February 2002 for the operation and it made
subsequent appeals for donor support throughout the operation. The
operation was designed to benefit 9,885,000 Afghans over a 9- month
period, through the provision of 543,837 metric tons of food at a cost of
over $295 million. 19 It was also intended to allow WFP to begin to shift
from emergency to recovery operations with particular emphasis on
education, health, and the agricultural sector. When the operation began
in April 2002,

WFP*s Kabul office warned that it might have to stop or slow projects if
donors did not provide more support. At that time, WFP had received only
$63.9 million, or 22 percent of the required resources. The United States
provided most of this funding. (See app. IV for a list of donors and their
contributions for the operation.) From April through June* the preharvest
period when Afghan food supplies are traditionally at their lowest point*
WFP was able to meet only 51 percent of the planned requirement for

18 According to WFP, approximately 44.6 million people needed food
assistance in Africa and North Korea in 2002. Meanwhile, declining global
food production and donor food assistance contributions are expected to
reduce aid levels worldwide in 2003. As of May 2003, based on donor
pledges received, WFP estimates that donor contributions to Afghanistan
will be adequate to meet projected requirements.

19 Emergency Operation 10155. 0 *Emergency Assistance to Afghanistan.* The
period of the operation was originally 9 months but was extended to 15
months to ensure a continued pipeline of food and a smooth transition
between this operation and the subsequent operation.

assistance. WFP*s actual deliveries were, on average, 33 percent below
actual requirements for the 10- month period April 2002* January 2003.
Figure 6 illustrates the gaps in the operation*s resources for the 10-
month period.

Figure 6: Resource Requirements vs. Actual Deliveries for WFP Emergency
Food Assistance Operation in Afghanistan, April 2002* January 2003

Note: The large drop in requirements from July through August resulted
from the suspension of free food distribution during the harvest period.
WFP suspended this program in an effort to prevent its assistance from
negatively affecting the price of domestically produced wheat in
Afghanistan. The increase in requirements from October through December
resulted from the need to stockpile food for vulnerable populations during
the winter.

Lack of timely donor contributions and an increase in the number of
returning refugees forced WFP and its implementing partner, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, to reduce from 150 to 50 kilograms the rations
provided to help returning refugees and internally displaced persons
reestablish themselves in their places of origin. The rations are intended
to enable these groups to sustain themselves long enough to reestablish
their lives; reducing the rations may have compromised efforts to
stabilize population movements within Afghanistan. The lack of donor
support also forced WFP and its implementing partners to delay for up to
10 weeks, in

some cases, the compensation promised to Afghans who participated in the
food- for- work and food- for- asset- creation projects, resulting in a
loss of credibility in the eyes of the Afghans and nongovernmental
organizations.

Similarly, because of resource shortages, WFP had to delay for up to 8
weeks in- kind payments of food in its civil service support program,
intended to help the new government establish itself, and it never
received

enough contributions to provide civil servants with the allocation of tea
they were to be given as part of their support package. In addition, WFP
was forced to reduce the number of new projects it initiated, thus
limiting the level of reconstruction efforts it completed.

In January 2003, WFP expressed concern that the problems it encountered
with donor support in 2002 could recur in 2003. Despite the expansion of
agricultural production in 2002 because of increased rainfall, 6 million

Afghans will require food assistance in 2003. Although the United States
was the largest donor of food assistance to Afghanistan in 2002, the U. S.
contribution may be smaller in 2003 than in previous years owing to

reduced surpluses of commodities, higher commodity prices, and competing
crises in Africa, North Korea, and Iraq. 20 The UN forecasts Afghan cereal
production for July 2002 through June 2003 at 3.59 million metric tons, a
cereal import requirement of 1.38 million metric tons, and Afghan
commercial food imports at 911,000 metric tons. Thus, an estimated total
deficit of 469,000 metric tons remains to be covered in the 12- month
period by international food assistance. 20 Section 416( b) of the
Agricultural Act of 1949 provides a permanent authority for USDA to

donate surplus commodities in Commodity Credit Corporation inventories to
carry out programs of assistance in developing and other foreign
countries. The administration has decided to sharply reduce reliance on
this program. The administration expects to use only $50 million in 416(
b) commodities worldwide in 2003, compared with $360 million in 2002

and $634 million in 2001. It has increased P. L. 480 Title II funding by
approximately $800 million in fiscal year 2003 in part to offset the
decrease.

U. S. Food Assistance The U. S.- produced commodities and humanitarian
daily rations provided

Contributions Were Costly and by the United States to Afghanistan resulted
in lower volumes of food than

Inefficient if the United States had provided regionally purchased
commodities or

cash donations. If it had provided WFP with cash or commodities from
countries in the Central Asia region, the United States could have
eliminated ocean freight costs. We estimated that the savings in freight
costs would have enabled WFP to provide food assistance to approximately
685,000 additional people for 1 year. In addition, we estimated that if
the United States had donated cash or regionally purchased commodities
instead of air- dropping rations, WFP could have provided food assistance
for another 1.0 million people for a year.

U. S.- Produced Commodities Raised Costs and Slowed Delivery

Most of the food assistance that the United States donated to Afghanistan
in 1999* 2002 was provided through WFP as in- kind donations of U. S.
agricultural products as well as cash to cover shipping and freight costs.
Since the commodities were purchased in the United States, much of the
cost of the assistance represented shipping and freight costs rather than
the price of the commodities. Figure 7 provides a breakdown of the costs
associated with U. S. food assistance to Afghanistan from 1999 through
2002. (See app. V for additional cost data.)

Figure 7: Costs for U. S. Food Assistance to Afghanistan, Fiscal Years
1999* 2002

Legend Admin. and misc. = administrative and miscellaneous. Includes
administrative costs associated with the delivery of assistance

ITSH= internal transport, storage, and handling within Afghanistan Inland
freight = freight costs from port of arrival to Afghan border Ocean
freight = freight costs from U. S. port to port of arrival

We estimated that if the United States had provided cash or regionally
purchased commodities instead of U. S.- produced commodities in 2002, WFP
could have purchased approximately 103,000 additional metric tons

of commodities and saved 120 days in delivery time. WFP officials in Rome
and Cairo 21 stated that cash was greatly preferable to in- kind donations
because it allows for flexibility and for local and regional purchases.
Other contributors to WFP efforts in Afghanistan have provided cash,
allowing WFP to make the purchases it deemed most expedient, including
purchases from Central Asian countries that produced large surpluses in

2002. 22 Ninety- three percent of the commodities WFP purchased for the
emergency operation that began in April 2002 (157, 128 metric tons) were
from Kazakhstan and Pakistan. 23 WFP also stated that it could have saved
approximately 120 days in delivery time if it had received U. S.
contributions in cash that it could have used for regional purchases.

21 WFP*s Regional Bureau for the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Central
Asia is located in Cairo, Egypt, and is responsible for operations in
Afghanistan. 22 In March 2002 testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, the Administrator of USAID stated, *The countries
surrounding Afghanistan had plenty of surplus food available, thus
ensuring price stability, to meet the needs of the Afghan people.

However, the tools did not exist for the U. S. government to respond more
effectively and, possibly, at lower cost to the taxpayer.* In 2002,
Kazakhstan exported 6 million metric tons of wheat and Pakistan exported
1.6 metric tons.

23 In 2002, WFP purchased approximately 33 percent of all commodities it
distributed in Afghanistan and received the other 67 percent from donor
nations.

Although the commodity costs and some of the freight costs for regional
purchases are lower, the largest portion of the savings from regional
purchases comes from eliminating ocean freight costs. In 2002, USDA spent

$5.6 million on ocean freight, or 31 percent of the value of the aid it
provided to Afghanistan. USAID spent $29.4 million on ocean freight, or
18.3 percent of the value of the aid it provided to Afghanistan. Overall,
USDA and USAID spent approximately $35.0 million on ocean freight and
commissions, or 19.6 percent of the total value ($ 178,068,786) of the
food aid they provided through WFP to Afghanistan. Had this money been
spent on regional purchases instead of on ocean freight, it could have
paid for 103,000 additional metric tons of commodities, or enough to
provide food assistance for approximately 685,000 people for 1 year. 24
However, the laws governing the main food assistance programs under which
most of the U. S. assistance was provided to Afghanistan through WFP do
not provide for USAID and USDA to purchase food assistance commodities
regionally or provide cash to WFP to make regional purchases. All of the
assistance must be provided in the form of U. S. commodities, and 75
percent of the commodities by weight must be shipped on U. S.- flag
vessels. 25 According to USDA, this requirement referred to as *cargo
preference* accounts for 9 percent of the cost of U. S. food assistance
shipments worldwide. In this case, it accounted for approximately $16
million of the $35 million in ocean freight. In prior reports we reported
that the most significant impact of the cargo preference requirement on U.
S. food assistance programs is the

additional costs incurred. 26 Using U. S.- flag vessels reduces funds
available for purchasing commodities, thus the amount of food delivered to
vulnerable populations is decreased. In its 2002 annual assessment of

management performance, the Office of Management and Budget concluded that
U. S. food assistance programs would be more cost effective

24 Estimate based on the ration provided to refugees in Afghanistan: 12. 5
kilograms (27.5 pounds) of wheat per person per month and regional
commodity and transportation costs of $340 per metric ton.

25 The Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (P. L. 74- 835), as amended by the Cargo
Preference Act of 1954 (P. L. 83- 664), generally requires that at least
50 percent of any U. S. governmentcontrolled cargo shipped by sea be
carried on privately owned U. S.- flag vessels. In 1985, the Merchant
Marine Act, 1936 was amended to require that 75 percent of certain foreign
food aid be shipped on privately owned U. S. flag vessels.

26 For further information on impact of shipping U. S. commodities on U.
S. flagged cargo vessels see Cargo Preference Requirements: Objectives Not
Significantly Advanced When Used in U. S. Food Aid Programs, GAO/ GGD- 94-
215 (Washington, D. C.: September 1994).

Cargo Preference Requirements: Their Impact on U. S. Food Aid Programs and
the U. S. Merchant Marine, GAO/ NSIAD- 90- 174 (Washington, D. C.: June
1990).

and flexible if the requirement to ship U. S. food assistance on U. S.-
flag vessels was eliminated. In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA
stated that consideration should be given to waiving cargo preference
requirements in specific food aid situations.

In February 2003, the President announced a new humanitarian $200 million
Famine Fund. Use of the fund will be subject to presidential decision and
will draw upon the broad disaster assistance authorities in the Foreign
Assistance Act. According to USAID, these authorities allow the U. S.
government to purchase commodities overseas to meet emergency food
assistance needs. However, this authority does not extend to the United
States* fiscal year 2003 $2.6 billion food assistance programs under
existing food assistance legislation.

Humanitarian Daily Rations Were Expensive and Inefficient

The U. S. Department of Defense*s humanitarian daily ration program was a
largely ineffective and expensive component of the U. S. food assistance
effort. The program was initiated to alleviate suffering and convey that
the United States was waging war against the Taliban, not the Afghan
people. However, the program*s public relations and military impact have
not been

formally evaluated. Airdrops of the humanitarian daily rations were
intended to disperse the packets over a wide area, avoiding the dangers of
heavy pallet drops or having concentrations of food fall into the hands of
a few. On October 8, 2001, U. S. Air Force C- 17s began dropping rations
on various areas within Afghanistan. Drops averaged 35,000 packets per
night (two planeloads) and ended on December 21, 2001. In 198 missions
over 74 days, the Air Force dropped 2,489, 880 rations (see fig. 8). 27

27 In addition to dropping the rations, the Air Force dropped 21,000 55-
pound sacks of wheat and 42,000 blankets.

Figure 8: Humanitarian Daily Rations

Note: A ration packet measures 8.5 by 12.5 inches, weighs about 2.2
pounds, and contains a complete set of meals for 1 day for one person,
totaling approximately 2,200 calories. The contents are chosen to meet
strict dietary considerations and as such are completely vegetarian.

According to WFP, one of the major problems with the ration program was
the lack of any assessment to identify the needs of the target populations
or their locations. WFP representatives were part of the coordination team
located at Central Command in late 2001 when the airdrops were made. These
representatives provided the Defense Department with general information
on drought- affected areas but were not asked to provide information on
specific areas to target. According to Department of Defense officials,
the drop areas were selected based on consultations with USAID staff
familiar with the situation in Afghanistan.

Defense officials told us that the rations are an expensive and
inefficient means of delivering food assistance and were designed to
relieve temporary food shortages resulting from manmade or natural
disasters* not, as in Afghanistan, to feed a large number of people
affected by a longterm food shortage. Defense officials responsible for
the ration program stated that the humanitarian, public relations, and
military impact of the

effort in Afghanistan had not been evaluated. According to these
officials, anecdotal reports from Special Forces soldiers indicated that
vulnerable populations did receive the food and that the rations helped to
generate goodwill among the Afghan people. However, reports from
nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan indicated that often the
rations went to the healthiest, since they were able to access the drop
zone most quickly, and were hoarded by a few rather than distributed among
the population.

The cost of the rations was $4.25 per unit, or $10,581,990 for the
approximately 2.5 million dropped. The total cost of the program was
$50,897,769, or $20.44 per daily ration. Delivery cost is estimated at
$16.19 per unit, based on the difference in the ration cost and the
department*s total expenditure. The rations accounted for only 2,835
metric tons out of

the total of 365,170 metric tons, or .78 percent of the total weight of
food aid delivered in fiscal year 2002. However, the cost of the rations
equals 28. 6 percent of the $178, 068, 786 that USAID and USDA spent on
emergency assistance to Afghanistan from October 2001 through September
2002. If

the United States had bought traditional food assistance commodities
regionally instead of dropping the 2,835 metric tons of rations, it could
have purchased approximately 118,000 metric tons of food, enough to
provide food assistance to 1.0 million people for 1 year.

Agricultural Assistance The U. S. and international community*s
agricultural reconstruction efforts

Has Had Limited in Afghanistan have had limited impact, coordination of
the assistance has

been fragmented, and significant obstacles jeopardize Afghanistan*s
longterm Impact and Lacks

food security and political stability. Because of drought and adverse
Coordination, and

political conditions, agricultural assistance provided by the
international Major Obstacles

community has not measurably improved Afghanistan*s long- term food
security. In 2002, collective efforts to coordinate reconstruction
assistance,

Jeopardize Food especially with the Afghan government, were ineffectual
and, as a result, no

Security and Political single operational strategy has been developed to
manage and integrate

international agricultural assistance projects. Finally, the inadequacy of
Stability proposed agricultural assistance, and the increase in domestic
terrorism, warlords* control of much of the country, and opium production
all present obstacles to the international community*s goal of achieving
food security and political stability in Afghanistan.

Impact of Agricultural For most of the period 1999* 2002, because of war
and drought, FAO, Assistance Limited by

bilateral donors, and more than 50 nongovernmental organizations in
Drought and Political

Afghanistan focused resources primarily on short- term, humanitarian
Factors

relief; consequently, the impact of this effort on the agricultural
sector*s long- term rehabilitation was limited. The assistance was
provided in an effort to increase short- term food security and decrease
Afghanistan*s dependence on emergency food assistance. During most of the
4- year period, FAO provided $28 million in assistance to Afghanistan
partly under the UN Development Program*s (UNDP) Poverty Eradication and
Community Empowerment program and partly as donor- funded response to the
drought. 28 The poverty eradication program ended in 2002, but FAO
continues its projects in Afghanistan. FAO*s short- term activities focus
on efforts to enable war- and drought- affected populations to resume food

production activities. These activities include providing agricultural
inputs such as tools, seed, and fertilizer; controlling locusts; and
making repairs to small- scale irrigation systems (see fig. 9). Its
longer- term activities include, among other things, the establishment of
veterinary clinics, assistance in the production of high- quality seed
through 5,000 contracted Afghan farmers, and horticulture development.
From 1999 to 2002, bilateral efforts focused on the distribution of
agricultural inputs and the repair of irrigation systems. USAID activities
currently include developing a market- based

distribution system for agricultural inputs as well as distributing
highquality seed. 29 As of March 2002, at least 50 of the approximately
400 national and international nongovernmental organizations working in
Afghanistan were involved in agriculture- related assistance, including
providing agricultural inputs, farmer training, microcredit, and the
construction of wells.

28 During the 1990s, FAO*s emergency and longer- term development efforts
were conducted under strategies and programs managed by UNDP. 29 USAID
spent approximately $23 million on agriculture assistance in Afghanistan
in 2002.

Figure 9: FAO Irrigation Rehabilitation Project

For most of the 4- year period, the rise of the Taliban, the continuing
conflict with the Northern Alliance, and the ongoing drought prevented the
international community from shifting from short- term relief projects to
longer- term agricultural rehabilitation projects and reversed earlier
advancements in agricultural production. For example, by 1997, agriculture
in some areas had returned to prewar levels, and Afghanistan as a whole
had reached 70 percent self- sufficiency in the production of cereals. At
the time, assistance agencies were planning to implement longer- term
assistance activities but were unable to do so owing to drought and
conflict. These same factors resulted in decreases in cereal production
and livestock herds of 48 percent and 60 percent, respectively, from 1998
through 2001. In 2002, a number of longer- term agricultural
rehabilitation

efforts were started, including efforts by USAID to reestablish
agricultural input and product markets. However, these efforts have not
been evaluated, and it is too early to determine their sustainability
after donor assistance ends or their long- term impact.

Weak Assistance International assistance, including agricultural
assistance, was not well

Coordination in 2002 coordinated in 2002, and, as a result, the Afghan
government was not

Hindered Afghan substantively integrated into the agricultural recovery
effort and lacks an Government*s Involvement

effective operational strategy. In December 2002, the Afghan government
and the international community instituted a new mechanism, the and
Development of

Consultative Group, to improve coordination. However, the Consultative
Operational Strategy

Group is similar in purpose and structure to a mechanism used earlier in
2002, the Implementation Group, and does not surmount the obstacles that
prevented the Implementation Group*s success. Because of the lack of
coordination, the Afghan government and the international community have
not developed a single operational strategy to direct the agricultural
rehabilitation effort; instead, all of the major assistance organizations
have independent strategies. Although documents prepared by the Afghan
government and others to manage assistance efforts contain some of the
components of an effective operational strategy, these components have not
been combined in a coherent strategy. The lack of an operational strategy
hinders efforts to integrate projects, focus resources, empower Afghan
government ministries, and make the international community more
accountable.

Assistance Coordination Despite efforts to synchronize multiple donors*
initiatives in a complex and

Was Weak in 2002 changing environment, coordination of international
assistance in general, and agricultural assistance in particular, was weak
in 2002. According to

the UN, assistance coordination refers to a recipient government*s
integration of donor assistance into national development goals and
strategies. From the beginning of the assistance effort in 2002, donors
were urged to defer responsibility for assistance coordination to the
Afghan government as stipulated in the Bonn Agreement. 30 According to the
UN, coordination rests with the Afghan government, efforts by the aid
community should reinforce national authorities, and the international
community should operate, and relate to the Afghan government, in a
coherent manner rather than through a series of disparate relationships.
31 30 Annex III of the Bonn Agreement states that the participants in the
UN Talks on

Afghanistan hereby urge the UN, the international community, particularly
donor countries and multilateral institutions, to reaffirm, strengthen and
implement their commitment to assist with rehabilitation, recovery, and
reconstruction of Afghanistan, in coordination with the Afghan government.

31 Immediate and Transitional Assistance Program for the Afghan People,
January 17, 2002.

The Security Council resolution that established the UN Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan goes further; it states that reconstruction assistance
should be provided through the Afghan government and urges the
international community to coordinate closely with the government. 32 In
April 2002, the Afghan government attempted to exert leadership over the
highly fragmented reconstruction process. To accomplish this task, the

government published its National Development Framework. The framework
provides a vision for a reconstructed Afghanistan and broadly establishes
national goals and policy directions. 33 The framework is not intended to
serve as a detailed operational plan with specific objectives and tasks
that must be pursued to accomplish national goals. Also, in 2002, the
Afghan government established a government- led coordination mechanism,
the Implementation Group (see app. VI for detailed descriptions and a
comparison of the coordinating mechanisms). The intent of the
Implementation Group was to bring coherence to the international
community*s independent efforts and broad political objectives, such as
ensuring Afghanistan does not become a harbor for terrorists. The
mechanism*s structure was based on the National Development Framework.
Individual coordination groups, led by Afghan ministers and composed of
assistance organizations, were established for each of the 12 programs
contained in the framework.

The Implementation Group mechanism proved to be largely ineffective.
Officials from the Afghan government, the UN, the Department of State, and
USAID, as well as a number of nongovernmental bodies, expressed

concern over the lack of meaningful and effective coordination of
assistance in Afghanistan in 2002. For example, a high- ranking WFP
official in Afghanistan said that coordination efforts since September 11,
2002, paid only *lip- service* to collaboration, integration, and
consensus. In August 2002, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Rural
Reconstruction and Development, Irrigation, and Agriculture stated that
the donor community*s effort to coordinate with the government was poor to
nonexistent. A

USAID official characterized the coordination of reconstruction in 2002 as
32 Security Council Resolution 1401 (2002), S/ RES/ 1401, March 28, 2002.
33 The framework is organized around three *pillars*: (1) humanitarian
assistance and human social capital, (2) physical reconstruction and
natural resources, and (3) private sector development. Under the three
pillars there are 12 programs supported by a number of

subprograms. Subprograms for agriculture and irrigation fall under *Pillar
2, Physical Reconstruction and Natural Resources, program for Natural
Resources Management.*

an *ugly evolution* and *the most complex post- conflict management
system* he had ever seen.

The ineffectiveness of the Implementation Group mechanism resulted from
its inability to overcome several impediments. First, each bilateral,
multilateral, and nongovernmental assistance agency has its own mandate,
established by implementing legislation or charter, and sources of
funding, and each agency pursues development efforts in Afghanistan
independently. Second, the international community asserts that the Afghan
government lacks the capacity and resources to effectively assume the role
of coordinator and, hence, these responsibilities cannot be

delegated to the government. Third, no single entity within the
international community has the authority and mandate to direct the
efforts of the myriad bilateral, multilateral, and nongovernmental
organizations providing agricultural assistance to Afghanistan. 34
Finally, efforts to coordinate agricultural assistance were further
complicated because the Ministries of Agriculture, Irrigation, and
Rehabilitation and

Rural Development share responsibility for agriculture development.
Efforts to Improve Coordination

In December 2002, the Afghan government instituted a new coordination Have
Been Implemented

system, the Consultative Group mechanism. 35 The overall objective of the
Consultative Group in Afghanistan is to increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of assistance coordination in support of goals and objectives
contained in the National Development Framework. 36 According to the
Afghan government, the program- level consultative groups established

34 Donor nations have taken the lead in other sectors. Specifically, the
United States leads in training the national army, Germany in training the
police, Italy in rebuilding the judicial system, and the United Kingdom in
drug control. These donor nations, in consultation with

the Afghan government and the international community, have developed
strategies for reconstructing their respective sectors.

35 Consultative group is a World Bank term used to describe a process of
consultations between the government of a recipient developing nation and
the international assistance community. Typically, the process involves
monthly group meetings in country on sectoral or thematic issues. Such
working groups bring together interested parties, including ministry
representatives, donors, nongovernmental organizations, and UN agencies,
to discuss strategic planning and improve coordination.

36 There are 12 program area* based consultative groups that correspond to
the 12 program areas contained in the Afghan government*s National
Development Framework. Two additional consultative groups deal with
national security issues (national army and national police). The groups
report to a consultative group standing committee during an annual
national consultative group meeting.

under this mechanism provide a means by which the government can engage
donors, UN agencies, and nongovernmental organizations to promote specific
national programs and objectives presented in the government*s National
Development Framework and the projects articulated in the Afghan National
Development Budget. 37 According to advisors to the Afghan government, the
Consultative Group mechanism provides a real opportunity for donors to
provide focused support for policy development, project preparation,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.

The Consultative Group mechanism in Afghanistan evolved out of the
Implementation Group and is similar in its National Development Framework*
based hierarchal structure, the role of the Afghan government, the
membership and leadership of sector specific groups, and stated goals (see
app. VI). One difference between the Implementation and Consultative Group
mechanisms is that, since the establishment of the latter, the Afghan
government has asked donor government and assistance organizations to
categorize their assistance projects under the subprograms in the National

Development Framework and to direct funding toward the projects in the
Afghan National Development Budget.

Despite the effort to develop a more effective coordination mechanism, the
Consultative Group mechanism has not surmounted the conditions that
prevented the Implementation Group from effectively coordinating
assistance. For example, in 2003, donor governments and assistance
agencies have continued to develop their own strategies, as well as fund
and implement projects outside the Afghan government*s national budget. In
addition, agricultural assistance is divided up among several

consultative groups including the groups for natural resources management
and livelihoods. Further, unlike food assistance where donors primarily
use one agency, WFP, for channeling resources, donors continue to use a
variety of channels for their agriculture assistance. Although the Afghan
government asserts that it is assuming a greater level of leadership over
the coordination effort, as of May 2003, we could not determine whether
the new coordination mechanism would be more successful than earlier
efforts.

37 The budget contains three types of prioritized projects: (1) projects
designed primarily by the Afghan government and funded through the
national budget, (2) projects primarily designed by donors and funded and
implemented by donors, and (3) conceptual projects for which funding and
implementation arrangements have not been determined.

Lack of Coordination Prevented Because of the inadequate coordination of
agricultural assistance, the

Development of Operational Afghan government and the international
community have not developed

Strategy an operational agricultural sector strategy. Each assistance
agency has

published its own development strategy that addresses agriculture and
numerous other sectors. The Consultative Group mechanism and the National
Development Framework, as well as other documents prepared by the Afghan
government and others to manage assistance efforts, contain some of the
components of an effective operational strategy, such as measurable goals
and impediments to their achievement. However, these components have not
been incorporated in a single strategy. Without an integrated operational
strategy, jointly developed by the Afghan

government and the international community, the Afghan government lacks a
mechanism to manage the agricultural rehabilitation effort, focus limited
resources, assert its leadership, and hold the international donor
community accountable. 38 Assistance Agencies Have Developed Separate
Strategies

No donor has taken the lead in the agricultural sector; consequently,
multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental organizations, including the
UN, FAO, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, USAID, and others,
have prepared individual strategies that address, to varying degrees,
agricultural reconstruction and food security. 39 However, these
strategies lack measurable national goals for the sector and have not been
developed jointly with the Afghan government. For example, in August 2002,
the Minister of Agriculture stated, *The ministry does not know the
priorities of

the international community for the agricultural sector, how much money
will be spent, and where the projects will be implemented.* FAO claimed
that the Ministry of Agriculture had endorsed FAO*s agricultural
rehabilitation strategy. However, no letter of agreement or memorandum of
understanding between the FAO and the ministry documents the acceptance of
the strategy. The Minister of Agriculture told us, in December 2002, that
the ministry had not endorsed FAO*s latest strategy.

Further, the Ministry of Agriculture presented a list of more than 100
prioritized rehabilitation projects to the international community. As of
late

38 According to the UN, *assistance management* refers to the effective
implementation of donor- funded development programs. 39 Assistance
proposed in these strategies includes technical assistance, inputs such as
seeds and fertilizer, capacity building for government staff, irrigation
repair, water resource management, livestock rehabilitation, and credit to
small farmers, among other things.

December 2002, the international community had not responded regarding the
ministry*s proposed projects.

Components of an Operational Strategy Have Not Been Integrated into a
Single Document

Although Consultative Group mechanism* related documents, the Afghan
National Development Framework, and other documents prepared by the Afghan
government and others to manage assistance efforts contain some of the
components of an effective operational strategy, these components have not
been incorporated in a single strategy. For an operational agricultural
strategy to be effective, all relevant stakeholders must participate in
its formulation. In this case, stakeholders include the Afghan Ministries
of Agriculture and Irrigation and key nongovernmental, multilateral, and
bilateral development organizations. Further, such strategies must
establish measurable goals, set specific time frames, determine resource
levels, and delineate responsibilities. For example, in Afghanistan, one
such goal might be to increase the percentage of irrigated

land by 25 percent by 2004 through the implementation of $100 million in
FAO- led irrigation projects in specific provinces. In addition, an
operational strategy should identify external factors that could
significantly affect the achievement of goals and include a schedule for
future program evaluations. 40 Stakeholders should implement the strategy
through projects that support the measurable goals of the strategy and
broader policy objectives, such as those contained in the Afghan
Government*s National Development Framework (see fig. 10). 40 Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 P. L. 103- 62. U. S. General
Accounting

Office Congressional Review of Agency Strategic Plans, GAO/ GGD- 10. 1. 16
(Washington, D. C.: January 1995). Office of Management and Budget,
Circular A- 11, Part 6* Preparation and Submission of Strategic Plans,
Annual Performance Plans, and Annual Program Performance Results
(Washington, D. C.: June 2002).

Figure 10: Hierarchy of Strategies for Agricultural Sector Reconstruction

The Implementation Group and its successor, the Consultative Group, as
well as the National Development Framework and other documents, contain
some of the essential elements of an operational strategy. These elements
include the involvement of key stakeholders, the development of some
measurable objectives, and the identification of external factors that
could affect the achievement of goals. However, since the National
Development Framework is a general national strategy and not a detailed
operational strategy, it is sufficiently broad that any assistance to the

agricultural sector could be considered supportive of the framework, even
if the assistance were not well targeted or made no significant impact. In
addition, the various elements of an effective operational strategy that
are contained in the National Development Framework and other documents
have not been effectively applied, nor has a single agricultural sector
strategy incorporating all of these elements been developed. The UN
Assistance Mission for Afghanistan*s management plan endorses

the formulation of joint strategies for reconstruction. In late December
2002, Afghanistan*s Minister of Agriculture told us that he would welcome
the development of a joint Afghan* international agricultural sector
strategy containing clear objectives, measurable goals, concrete funding
levels, and

clearly delineated responsibilities. In January 2003, FAO*s Assistant
Director- General of Technical Cooperation stated that FAO would welcome

the opportunity to assist the Ministry of Agriculture in preparing a
strategy. The Consultative Group mechanism could serve as a vehicle to
support the development of such a strategy. In March 2003, Afghan
government advisors told us that consultative groups could develop
strategies based on the subprograms contained in the National Development
Framework and National Development Budget. Proposals for the development
of strategies pertaining to natural resources management, including
agriculture, have been drafted, and support for these proposals is being
sought from the international community.

Lack of Operational Agricultural Sector Strategy Limits Integration and
Oversight

The lack of an operational agricultural sector strategy hinders efforts to
integrate disparate projects, focus limited assistance resources, place
Afghan government ministries in a leadership role, and make the
international community more accountable to the Afghan government. In its
October 2002 National Development Budget, the Afghan government

cited the lack of a strategic framework for the natural resources
management sector, including agriculture, as an impediment to
rehabilitation. Absent an operational strategy, the Afghan government
lacks

a mechanism to  integrate disparate projects into an effective
agricultural rehabilitation

program,  manage finite resources so as to ensure the greatest return on

agricultural investment, and  guide the efforts of the international
community and assert the Afghan government*s leadership in agricultural
reconstruction. Finally, an operational agricultural sector strategy that
includes measurable goals and the means to assess progress against those
goals could increase accountability. 41 Because no comprehensive
integrated strategy exists, the Afghan government lacks the means to hold
the international assistance community accountable for implementing the
agricultural sector reconstruction effort and achieving measurable
results.

41 Government Performance and Results Act.

Limited Funding and Major obstacles to the goal of a food- secure and
politically stable Afghan

Security Problems Present state include inadequate assistance funding, as
well as a volatile security

Obstacles to Food Security situation, long- standing power struggles among
warlords, and the rapid

and Political Stability increase in opium production. Donor support has
not met Afghanistan*s

recovery and reconstruction needs, and future funding levels for
agricultural assistance may be inadequate to achieve the goal of food
security and political stability, primarily because assistance levels are

based on what the international community is willing to provide rather
than on Afghanistan*s needs. Meanwhile, the continued deterioration of the
security situation, exacerbated by a rising incidence of terrorism, the
resurgence of warlords, and near- record levels of opium production, are
impeding reconstruction and threaten to destabilize the nascent Afghan
government.

International Assistance May Be Total assistance levels, including those
for agricultural reconstruction,

Insufficient to Meet Needs proposed at the Tokyo donors* conference in
January 2002 do not provide

Afghanistan with enough assistance to meet its estimated needs. 42 The
preliminary needs assessment prepared for the January 2002 donor*s
conference in Tokyo estimated that, in addition to humanitarian assistance

such as food and shelter assistance, between $11.4 and $18.1 billion over
10 years would be needed to reconstruct Afghanistan (see table 2). Others
have estimated that much more is required. For example, the Afghan
government estimated that it would need $15 billion for reconstruction
from 2003 through 2007.

42 UNDP, Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank, Preliminary Needs
Assessment for Recovery and Reconstruction (Tokyo: 2002). The assessment
was prepared by UNDP, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank to
help determine the requirement of external assistance to support
Afghanistan*s economic and social recovery and reconstruction over the
short and medium terms. During the January 2002 conference, the Afghan
government identified agricultural and rural development, including food
security, water management, and revitalizing irrigation, as one of six
areas essential for reconstruction.

Table 2: Projected Cumulative Funding Requirements for the Reconstruction
of Afghanistan

(Billions of dollars)

Level 1 year 2.5 years 5 years 10 years

Low case $1. 4 $4. 2 $8.3 $11.4 Base case 1.7 4. 9 10.2 14.6 High case $2.
1 $5. 5 $12.2 $18.1 Sources: Asian Development Bank, UNDP, and the World
Bank. Note: Afghanistan Preliminary Needs Assessment for Recovery and
Reconstruction (Tokyo: January 2002).

In January 2002, donors pledged $5.2 billion for the reconstruction of
Afghanistan for 2002* 2006, or slightly more than half of the base- case
estimate for 5 years. 43 For the period January 2002* March 2003, the
donors pledged $2.1 billion (see app. VII for donor pledges and
donations). 44 As of March 2003, approximately 88 percent of the 2002
grant funding had been disbursed. However, only 27 percent, or $499
million, was spent on major reconstruction projects such as roads and
bridges, which are essential for the export of Afghan agricultural
commodities and the import of foreign agricultural supplies. Despite the
importance that the United States and the international community attach
to the Afghan reconstruction effort, Afghanistan is receiving less
assistance than was provided for other recent postconflict, complex
emergencies. For example, per capita assistance levels have ranged from
$193 in Rwanda to $326 in Bosnia, compared with

$57 for Afghanistan. Given that the livelihood of 22 million Afghans
depends on agriculture, we estimated that if all of the assistance had
been provided only to people engaged in agriculture, each person would
have received $67 annually or about 18 cents per day for their daily
subsistence and agriculture production efforts in 2002. If Afghanistan
were to receive per capita aid consistent with the average amounts
provided for other recent postconflict reconstruction efforts, in 2002 it
would have received

43 This figure was revised from $4.5 billion because of increases in
pledges. This total included $3. 8 billion in grants and $1. 4 billion in
loans. The initial pledge of $1.8 billion for 2002 was revised to $2.1
billion.

44 Overall U. S. assistance to Afghanistan in 2002 totaled $717 million,
or 6.2 percent of worldwide U. S. bilateral assistance obligations in that
year. Most of this amount was not for reconstruction but for humanitarian
assistance, including food aid.

$6 billion in international assistance, and from 2002 to 2006 it would
receive $30 billion, or nearly three times the base- case estimate.
Funding May Be Inadequate to

The funding proposed by donors for food security* related issues is
limited Rehabilitate Agricultural Sector and may be insufficient to
achieve the long- term goals of the Afghan government and the
international community. Despite the Afghan

government*s estimated annual need of $500 million for agricultural
rehabilitation, agricultural assistance for Afghanistan in 2003 may total
approximately $230 million. 45 Afghanistan*s President has emphasized that
the goal of food security and political stability is the Afghan
government*s overarching priority, and the United States and other donor
governments

recognize the strong link between stability and food security. According
to the U. S. Department of State, reconstruction is an integral part of
the campaign against terrorism: the U. S. policy goal in Afghanistan is to
create a stable Afghan society that is not a threat to itself or others
and is not a base for terrorism. Because the agricultural sector forms the
core of the Afghan economy, the pace of the sector*s recovery will largely
determine the rate of overall economic recovery. Sustained investment in
the agricultural sector, particularly the rehabilitation, upgrading, and
maintenance of the nation*s irrigation infrastructure, is essential for
the recovery of the Afghan economy and the country*s long- term food
security. 46 Despite improvements in agricultural production in 2002,
owing

primarily to increased precipitation, the fundamental weakness of
Afghanistan*s agricultural infrastructure continues to threaten overall
recovery efforts. 45 The international community has not published a
figure for total agricultural assistance to

Afghanistan. This estimate is derived from available Asian Development
Bank, European Union, European Commission, UN, U. S., and World Bank data.

46 FAO estimates that it will take at least 10 years to rebuild the
agricultural sector.

The Ministry of Agriculture estimates that it needs $5 billion over 10
years to complete 117 key projects and other efforts important for the
recovery of the sector. Despite these costs, the 2003 Afghan development
budget for natural resource management, including agriculture, is only
$155 million. Since the budget is funded almost entirely by the donor
community, the budget reflects what the government expects to receive from
the international community, not the Afghan government*s actual need.
Afghan government budget estimates indicate that the natural resources

management budget will increase to $298 million in 2004 and $432 million
in 2005. International donors have budgeted approximately $230 million for
agriculture- related assistance in 2003. USAID considers adequate funding
a prerequisite for the success of the assistance effort and plans to spend
approximately $50 million on agriculture in 2003 and similar amounts in
2004 and 2005. USAID funding covers 32 percent of the Afghan government*s
2003 natural resources management program budget of $155 million but only
10 percent of the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture*s estimated annual needs
of $500 million. 47 Increased Terrorism, Warlords,

The goal of a stable Afghan state is threatened by the rise in domestic
and Opium Production Are Major terrorism, long- standing rivalries among
warlords, and the rapid increase in Obstacles to Food Security and

opium production. In March 2002, in a report to the UN Security Council,
Political Stability the UN Secretary General stated that security will
remain the essential requirement for the protection of the peace process
in Afghanistan. One year later, in a report to the council, he stated that
*security remains the most serious challenge facing the peace process in
Afghanistan.* Others in the international community, including USAID,
consider security as a prerequisite for the implementation of
reconstruction efforts. In 2002 and early 2003, the deteriorating security
situation was marked by terrorist attacks against the Afghan government,
the Afghan people, and the international community. 48 These incidents
have forced the international community to periodically suspend
agricultural assistance activities, disrupting the agricultural recovery
effort.

47 The level of USAID*s agricultural assistance will remain the same in
2004 and 2005, accounting for about 16 percent of the Afghan government*s
natural resources and management budget in 2004 and 11 percent in 2005.

48 Incidents included the attempted assassinations of the Minister of
Defense and the President; the murder of an International Committee of the
Red Cross staff member; rocket attacks on U. S. and international military
installations; and bombings in the center of Kabul,

at the International Security Assistance Force headquarters, and at UN
compounds. There are approximately 4,900 International Security Assistance
Force troops located in Kabul. These troops provide security only for the
city of Kabul and the immediate vicinity.

Meanwhile, clashes between the warlords* private armies continue to
destabilize the country and reduce the Afghan government*s ability to fund
agricultural reconstruction. The warlords foster an illegitimate economy
fueled by smuggling of arms, drugs, and other goods. They also illegally
withhold hundreds of millions of dollars in customs duties collected at
border points in the regions they control, depriving the central
government of revenues needed to fund the country*s agricultural
reconstruction. The warlords control private armies of tens of thousands
of armed men. Across Afghanistan, approximately 700,000 Afghan men are
armed, and half of these are combat trained. USAID considers the
demobilization and integration of these armed men a prerequisite for the
success of the international recovery effort. 49 Currently, the
unemployment rate in Afghanistan is estimated at 50 percent. Without a
revitalization of the agricultural sector* the engine of the Afghan
economy and the main source of employment* it is likely that these men
will remain in the employ of the warlords.

Another destabilizing force that affects agriculture is the illicit
international trade in Afghan opiates. The drug trade was the primary
income source of the Taliban and continues to provide income for
terrorists and warlords. 50 On January 17, 2002, the President of
Afghanistan issued a decree stating that the existence of an opium- based
economy was a matter of national

security and should be fought by all means. During the 1990s, Afghanistan
became the world*s leading opium producer accounting for approximately 70
percent of opium production worldwide. Despite being a central focus of a
number of international donors engaged in Afghanistan, opium poppy
eradication efforts implemented by the Afghan government and the
international community in 2002 failed. In July 2002, one of Afghanistan*s
vice presidents and leader of the Afghan government*s poppy eradication
campaign, Haji Qadir, was assassinated. In October 2002, the UN Office for
Drug Control and Crime Prevention estimated that, in 2002, Afghan farmers
produced 3,400 metric tons of opium. 51 This level of production equals or
exceeds levels achieved in 9 of the last 10 years. Total 2002 revenue from
opium production totaled $1.2 billion, an amount equivalent to 70 percent

49 USAID plans to spend $30 million in 2003 on demobilization efforts. 50
In 2001, the United States estimated that the Taliban collected at least
$40 million in taxes on opium. 51 UN Office for Drug Control and Crime
Prevention, Geneva, October 2002.

of total assistance to Afghanistan pledged for 2002, or nearly 220 percent
more than the Afghan government*s 2003 operating budget. 52 The UN Drug
Control Program also estimated that the average poppy

farmer earned $4,000 dollars from growing poppies in 2002. Owing to
continuing drought, a poor agricultural marketing structure, and
widespread poverty, farmers have turned to poppy cultivation to avoid
destitution. 53 Since the fall of the Taliban, irrigated acreage dedicated
to wheat production has fallen by 10 percent, supplanted by opium poppies.

In addition, it is estimated that 30 to 50 percent of Afghans are involved
in opium cultivation. Many of the farmers continue to grow opium poppies
because they lack the seed and fertilizer needed to grow alternative crops
that generate revenues comparable to those from opium. 54 Conclusions The
establishment of a new government in Afghanistan has provided the

Afghan people, the international community, and the United States an
opportunity to rebuild Afghanistan and create a stable country that is
neither a threat to itself or its neighbors nor a harbor for terrorists.
In 2002, U. S. and international food assistance averted famine, assisted
the return of refugees, and helped to implement reconstruction efforts.
However, U. S. food assistance and cargo shipping legislation limited the
United States*

flexibility in responding quickly to the emergency and providing support
to WFP; the legislation does not provide for purchasing commodities
regionally or donating cash to the UN for procuring commodities and
requires that U. S. commodities be shipped on U. S. flag vessels.
Consequently, the costs of food assistance were higher and delivery times

were greater, fewer commodities were purchased, and a smaller number of
people received food assistance. In addition, a lack of timely and
adequate overall donor support disrupted WFP*s food assistance efforts.
Meanwhile, in 2003, six million people will require food assistance in
Afghanistan.

52 The value of Afghanistan*s 2002 opium crops was equivalent to 17
percent of its gross domestic product. 53 Although some poppy farmers are
wealthy, many are poor farmers with just enough land and water for poppies
but not enough resources to plant traditional or alternative crops. For

many of these poor farmers, the decision to cultivate poppies causes moral
anguish, as they regard its cultivation to be highly un- Islamic.

54 Prices paid to farmers range from $350 to $400 per kilogram. One
kilogram equals 2.2 pounds.

Because the economy remains overwhelmingly agricultural, the pace of
recovery in the agricultural sector will largely determine the rate of
Afghanistan*s overall recovery. Food assistance alone cannot provide food
security; Afghanistan*s agricultural sector must be rehabilitated.
Environmental and political problems have limited the impact of the
international community*s agricultural assistance efforts. In addition, in
2002, the assistance efforts were not coordinated with each other or with
the Afghan government. A new coordination mechanism established in
December 2002 is largely similar to earlier mechanisms, and it is too
recent

for us to determine its effectiveness. Further, whereas U. S. and UN
agencies, bilateral donors, and nongovernmental organizations have drafted
numerous overlapping recovery strategies, no single Afghan government*
supported strategy is directed toward the effort to rehabilitate the
sector. Meanwhile, funding for the agricultural assistance effort is
insufficient and the nascent Afghan government is plagued with problems
stemming from domestic terrorism, the resurgence of warlords, and
nearrecord levels of opium production. These obstacles threaten the
recovery of the agricultural sector and the U. S. goals of achieving food
security and political stability in Afghanistan.

Matter for To increase the United States* ability to respond quickly to
complex

Congressional emergencies involving U. S. national security interests,
such as that in

Afghanistan, Congress may wish to consider amending the Agricultural
Consideration

Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P. L. 83- 480), as amended,
to provide the flexibility, in such emergencies, to purchase commodities
outside the United States when necessary and provide cash to assistance
agencies for the procurement of non- U. S.- produced commodities. In

addition, Congress may wish to amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as
amended, to allow waiver of cargo preference requirements in emergencies
involving national security. These amendments would enable the United
States to reduce assistance costs and speed the delivery of assistance,
thus better supporting U. S. foreign policy and national security
objectives.

Recommendations for To increase the effectiveness of the agricultural
assistance effort in

Executive Action Afghanistan, we recommend that the Secretary of State and
the

Administrator of the U. S. Agency for International Development work
through the Consultative Group mechanism to develop a comprehensive
international* Afghan operational strategy for the rehabilitation of the
agricultural sector. The strategy should (1) contain measurable goals and

specific time frames and resource levels, (2) delineate responsibilities,
(3) identify external factors that could significantly affect the
achievement of goals, and (4) include a schedule for program evaluations
that assess progress against the strategy*s goals. Agency Comments and

We provided a draft of this report to WFP, Department of State, USDA, Our
Evaluation

USAID, and Department of Defense and received written comments from each
agency (see app. VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII respectively). We also received
technical comments from USDA, the Departments of Defense and State, USAID,
FAO, and the World Bank, and incorporated information as appropriate.

Department of State, USDA, and USAID all commented on our matter for
congressional consideration related to amending food assistance
legislation. WFP supported our suggestion that Congress consider amending
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 to allow the
provision of non- U. S. commodities when such action supports U. S.
national security. However, State, USDA, and USAID did not support the
recommendation. Specifically, although State accepted our evidence that
purchasing commodities from the United States is not the most
costeffective method of providing assistance, it believes that further
study of potential variables, such as regional customs fees, taxes, and
trucking costs, that may negate cost- benefit savings is needed before the
act is amended. USAID stated that an amendment is not necessary because
other authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act allow the provision of
cash, and the proposed $200 million Famine Fund announced by the President
in February 2003 would also increase the flexibility of U. S. assistance
programs. USDA stated that the flexibility to quickly respond to
humanitarian crises can be achieved through means, such as amending cargo
shipping legislation, that would not adversely affect the provision of U.
S. commodities. Specifically, USDA suggested adding a national security
waiver to the U. S. regulations that govern how U. S. assistance is
transported to eliminate the requirement to use U. S. flag vessels in
certain circumstances. We do not disagree that under broad disaster
assistance legislation U. S.

agencies may provide cash or purchase food aid commodities outside the
United States. However, we maintain that amending the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954 to allow the provision of cash or
food commodities outside the United States will greatly improve U. S.
flexibility in responding to crises that affect U. S. national security
and

foreign policy interests. The act is the principal authority for providing
food assistance in emergency situations. In both 2002 and 2003 over $2
billion in food assistance, the preponderant amount of this type of
assistance, was dispersed under this authority. Amending the act will
provide the United States with more flexibility to respond rapidly and at
lower cost to events that affect U. S. national security; this is
particularly important given the number and magnitude of crises requiring
food assistance and decreasing surpluses of U. S. commodities. We also
agree with USDA that the cargo preference requirement adds additional cost
to food assistance and should be waived in specific situations, and we
have adjusted the matter for congressional consideration contained in the
report on this issue.

In its comments, USDA stated that the report did not provide enough
evidence about the existence of surpluses in 2002 in the Central Asia
region. It also stated that if the U. S. had procured greater levels of

commodities with the savings accrued by purchasing regional versus U. S.
origin commodities, the additional commodities would have over burdened
WFP*s logistics system while generating only *marginal savings in time and

money.* We have added additional information on the 7.6 million metric ton
2002 grain surplus in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. We disagree with USDA*s
assertions that additional regionally procured commodities would have

taxed WFP*s logistics system and brought only marginal gains. In December
2002, while fighting between coalition forces, the Northern Alliance, and
the Taliban was still occurring, and winter weather was

complicating food deliveries, WFP delivered 116,000 metric tons of food to
Afghan beneficiaries, in the single largest movement of food by WFP in a
1- month period. According to WFP, its Afghanistan logistics system was
capable of routinely moving more than 50,000 metric tons of food per
month. Further, we disagree with USDA*s statement that the potential
savings in cost and time by purchasing commodities regionally are
marginal. Savings from the elimination of ocean freight costs could have
fed 685,000 people for 1 year, and commodities purchased regionally are
delivered to beneficiaries within weeks of being purchased, compared with

the 4 months that it can take for commodities purchased in the United
States.

WFP, the Department of State, USDA, and USAID all agreed with the report*s
conclusion and recommendation pertaining to assistance coordination and
the need to develop a joint international- Afghan agricultural
rehabilitation strategy. WFP pointed out that although the

international assistance effort may have been aided by better coordination
in 2002, the overall level of assistance might have been too small in 2002
to have any long- term impact on the agricultural sector. Although USAID
agreed with our recommendation, it stated it did not want to lead the
strategy development effort. We believe that USAID should take an active
and aggressive role in the development of a joint international* Afghan
government strategy, because the United States is the largest donor to
Afghanistan, agriculture rehabilitation is the focus of USAID*s assistance
effort in Afghanistan, and the achievement of U. S. goals in Afghanistan
is

tightly linked to the rehabilitation of the country*s agricultural sector.
According to USAID*s assistance strategy for Afghanistan, restoring food
security is USAID*s highest priority.

Finally, the Department of Defense focused its comments on the report*s
discussion of the humanitarian daily ration program. Specifically, the
Department of Defense stated that (1) the report incorrectly characterized
the ration program as a food assistance program, (2) informal evaluations
of the program indicated that the program alleviated hunger and generated
goodwill from the Afghan people toward U. S. soldiers, and (3) although
the funds used to purchase rations could have been used to purchase bulk
food, the bulk food could not have been delivered to remote areas. The
report discusses both the food assistance and nonfood assistance aspects
of the rations program, and we have added information on page 30 about the
goodwill generated by the rations to the report. Finally, as discussed on
page 20 of the report, bulk food could have been delivered to remote areas
during the period of time (October- December 2001) when the ration program
was implemented. During the month of December 2001, WFP

delivered 116,000 metric tons of food to Afghanistan, a level of food
assistance that exceeds any 1- month total for any emergency operation in
WFP*s history.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Richard J. Durbin,
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee
on Governmental Affairs, and to the Honorable Frank R. Wolf, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives. We also will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512- 4347. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are
listed in appendix XIII.

Loren Yager, Director International Affairs and Trade

Appendi Appendi xes I x Scope and Methodology To examine the management,
cost, and sufficiency of U. S. and international food assistance since
1999, we reviewed documents obtained from the World Food Program (WFP) and
the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Specifically, we
reviewed program documentation for recent emergency and special
operations; WFP Afghanistan Country Office quarterly and annual reports;
WFP*s Emergency Field Operations Manual and Food Aid in Emergencies
Redbook; country office monitoring guidelines; Afghanistan area office
strategies; memorandums of understanding and letters of agreement signed
by WFP and United Nations (UN) agencies, nongovernmental organizations,
and the Afghan government; and monitoring reports prepared by USAID staff.

In addition, we analyzed project monitoring and loss data to determine the
frequency of monitoring visits, the experience and education level of
monitors, and the level of commodities lost versus those delivered. We did

not verify the statistical data provided by WFP. We also reviewed donor
resource contribution data for recent emergency and special operations. We
contacted by e- mail, or spoke with, 14 Afghan and international

nongovernmental organizations 1 to obtain their views on the delivery of
assistance, WFP monitoring and reporting, and overall assistance
coordination issues. We interviewed WFP management and staff at WFP
headquarters in Rome, Italy; at the Regional Bureau for the Mediterranean,
Middle East, and Central Asia, in Cairo, Egypt; at the Country Office in
Kabul, Afghanistan; and at the Area Office in Hirat, Afghanistan. We also
interviewed USAID, U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U. S.
Department of State staff in Washington, D. C., and Kabul; U. S.
Department

of Defense Staff in Washington; the International Security Afghanistan
Force, UN Development Program (UNDP), and UN Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA) staff in Kabul; and UN High Commissioner for Refugees
staff in Kabul and Hirat. Finally, we visited WFP project sites and
warehouses in Kabul and Hirat. The number of sites visited was limited
because of constraints placed on our movement within Afghanistan by the

U. S. Embassy because of security considerations. We also examined cost
data provided by USDA and USAID. The data included commodity costs; total
ocean freight charges; inland freight;

1 We contacted the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
(ACTED), Action Contre la Faim, Afghanaid, Canadian Relief Foundation,
CARE International, Focus, Goal, International Rescue Committee, Islamic
Relief, Madera, Norwegian Assistance Committee, Save the Children,
Solidarte, and World Vision.

internal transport, storage, and handling charges; and administrative
support costs. We used the data to calculate two additional expenses, per
USDA statements about the composition of costs and additional costs that
are not stated on the data sheets. First, the "freight forwarder" fees
represent 2.5 percent of the total cost of ocean freight. Thus, ocean
freight charges were divided between freight forwarder fees (total freight
minus total freight divided by 1.025) and actual freight costs (total
freight minus freight forwarder fees). This was true for both USDA and
USAID assistance. In the final analysis, the freight forwarder fee was
included in the ocean freight cost because it is an expense that would not
have been incurred if ocean shipping had not been used. Second, with each
donation to WFP, USDA provides an administrative support grant at the rate
of 7.5

percent of the total value of the donated commodities. We calculated these
data accordingly.

We checked all USAID and USDA data for validity, where possible to the
level of individual shipment. We cross- checked USAID data with USDA data.
(USAID typically provided only estimated costs for commodities for the
period 1999* 2002. Because USDA conducts almost all commodity purchases
for USAID, USAID estimates the commodity costs at the time it places its
order with USDA, based on the current market cost. However, because USDA
provided actual costs for USAID purchases in 1999, 2000,

and 2001, the USAID commodity costs we cited for 2002 are based on USAID's
estimate.) We then compared the cost of the U. S.- purchased commodities
with the cost of commodities purchased in the Central Asia region to
determine whether any savings could have been realized by purchasing
commodities regionally versus buying U. S. commodities.

Finally, using the level of rations that WFP provides to returning
refugees, 12.5 kilograms per month, we calculated the amount of food
assistance that the United States could have purchased and the number of
people that could have received food assistance if it had purchased
commodities in the Central Asia region.

Further, we examined the costs associated with the Department of Defense*s
Afghan humanitarian daily ration program, implemented from October 2001
through December 2001. Using the level of rations that WFP provides to
returning refugees, 12. 5 kilograms per month, we calculated the amount of
food assistance that the United States could have purchased and the number
of people that could have received food assistance if it had purchased
commodities in the Central Asia region.

In addition, we reviewed relevant food assistance legislation including
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P. L. 83-
480) to determine whether provisions in the law allowed the U. S.
government to purchase commodities outside the United States or provide
cash transfers to assistance agencies for the provision of commodities
from sources other than U. S. suppliers.

To assess U. S. and international agricultural assistance, coordination,
strategies, and funding intended to help Afghanistan maintain stability
and achieve long- term food security, we reviewed documentation provided
by FAO, UNDP, and UNAMA; the World Bank; the Asian Development Bank;

USAID; and the Afghan Ministries of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, and
Irrigation and Water Resources. We reviewed information pertaining to past
and current coordination mechanisms in the Afghan government*s National
Development Framework and National Development Budget. We examined the
structure and content of the assistance strategies published

by FAO, UNDP, UNAMA, the European Commission, the World Bank, Asian
Development Bank, and USAID, and we examined the proposed funding levels
contained in each strategy. Using the criteria contained in the U. S.
Government Performance and Results Act, we examined the strategies to
determine whether each contained the basic elements of an operational
strategy articulated in the act. Further, we examined the overall
assistance funding requirements contained in the January 2002 UNDP, World
Bank,

and Asian Development Bank Comprehensive Needs Assessment, which served as
a guideline for international donor contributions for Afghanistan. We
interpolated the funding projection data to construct annual aid flows,

so that the cumulative totals were equal to those contained in the
assessment. Assuming that the first year of data referred to 2002, we
applied the U. S. gross domestic product deflator to convert the assumed
current dollar figures into constant 2003 dollars.

Further, we examined security reports produced by the Department of
Defense and the UN, as well as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime report on
opium production in Afghanistan, to determine the impact of warlords and
opium production on food security and political stability. In addition, we
discussed U. S. and international agricultural assistance efforts and food
security issues with officials from USAID in Washington and Kabul; FAO in

Rome and Kabul; UNDP and the Afghan Ministries of Communication, Foreign
Affairs, Interior, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and Irrigation
and Water Resources in Kabul; and the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture in
Kabul and Washington.

We conducted our review from April 2002 through May 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

World Food Program Projects in Afghanistan,

Appendi I I x 2002 Type of project Description

Free food distribution Free food is delivered to the most vulnerable
populations. Supplementary feeding Malnourished children, pregnant and
nursing mothers, and people undergoing treatment for tuberculosis and
leprosy are provided with a blended mix of either milled

corn and soy or wheat and soy, in addition to sugar and oil, through
feeding centers, hospitals, clinics, and orphanages. Food for work
Returning refugees, internally displaced persons, and people involved in
the poppy

industry, among others, reconstruct and rehabilitate irrigation canals,
roads, and other infrastructure. The program provides wages in the form of
food and tools.

Food for asset creation Men and women of the community decide which
families should receive food. Ablebodied households contribute their labor
to construct or rehabilitate an asset, such as an irrigation canal, that
benefits the entire community. Those who cannot contribute labor also
receive food, and they benefit from the community asset.

Food for education and support to teachers Food is distributed to students
in school to encourage families to send their children to school. To
encourage families to support the education of females, additional food is
provided to female students. Food is also provided to teachers to
supplement their low salaries. Food for training Food is provided to women
who participate in informal education activities including technical
skills and literacy training. Food for seed Food is exchanged for improved
seed grown by contract farmers. The seed is then sold to other farmers.
Urban and women*s bakeries Daily rations of bread are provided to more
than 250,000 people. Women operate 41 of

the 100 bakeries. Civil servant support Approximately 270,000 civil
servants were provided with pulses and oil to supplement

their salaries and help the Afghan government reestablish itself. Refugee
and Food assistance is provided as part of a resettlement package to help
people internally displaced person support reestablish themselves in their
home areas or chosen community. Source: WFP.

Description of WFP Food Assistance

Appendi I I I x Monitoring Mechanisms The World Food Program uses a number
of mechanisms to minimize losses and ensure that its commodities are well
managed. The mechanisms include real- time automated tracking, periodic
monitoring visits to project sites, required periodic reports from
implementing partners, and end- ofproject evaluations. The program*s
global automated tracking system, the Commodity Movement and Progress
Analysis System, is intended to record and report all commodity movement,
loss, and damage. Each WFP suboffice in Afghanistan has access to the
system and employs a clerk dedicated to managing it. The system produces a
number of reports,

including stock, damage, and loss reports. WFP guidelines state that
monitoring and reporting are essential parts of effective project
management in the field, and it is WFP*s policy not to support any project
that cannot be monitored. Monitoring activities are intended to assess the
status of projects by comparing the actual implementation of activities to
the project*s work plan. The responsibility for monitoring projects rests
with the program*s country office in Kabul and five Afghan suboffices
located in other cities. Each office employs between 6 and 24 local Afghan
project monitors, 1 and WFP has 22 program staff in Afghanistan who also
monitor projects, in addition to their other duties. WFP*s Afghan country
office has developed monitoring guidelines for its monitors and monitoring
checklists for each type of activity (e. g., food- for- work, food- for-
seed, food- for- asset- creation, food- for- education).

According to WFP, monitoring visits include an examination of project
inputs, current operations, outputs, and immediate effects. Specific
monitoring activities include an examination of food stocks held by
implementing partners. The monitors spot- check the weight of randomly
selected bags in storage and compare the total stock held with WFP stock
balance reports. The monitors also survey local markets to determine
whether any WFP food is being resold rather than used by beneficiaries.
Projects are monitored on a periodic basis. WFP tries to visit each
project when it starts, during its implementation, and when it is
completed. The WFP data that we examined indicated that, on average, 2.4
monitoring visits were conducted on all projects implemented between April
2002 and November 2002 in Afghanistan.

1 WFP employs a total of 78 local monitors with an average of 3 years of
WFP experience. Approximately 90 percent of these monitors have a college
degree. In addition to the monitors, implementing partners make monitoring
visits in areas where WFP staff cannot travel owing to security concerns.

In addition to requiring the project monitoring visits, WFP requires its
implementing partners to report on the status of projects on a monthly
basis. WFP project proposals and the letters of agreement signed by WFP
and its implementing partners stipulate that monthly and end- of- project
reports must be submitted to WFP. The end- of- project reports include an
assessment of the achievement of project objectives and a breakdown of
budget expenditures.

Donor Contributions to World Food Program Emergency Operation 10155 as of
May 12,

Appendi V I x 2003 Percentage Percentage Donor U. S. dollars of total Tons
of total

Total (appeal) 287,943, 598 100.00% 550, 171 100. 00%

Australia 4,087, 975 1.42% 9, 567 1. 74% Belgium 985, 222 0.34% 2, 847 0.
52% Canada 1,610, 097 0.56% 4, 662 0. 85% Denmark 3, 199, 194 1.11% 6, 648
1. 21% EC* EuropeAid 21,897, 321 7.60% 63,834 11. 60% Faroe Islands 329,
412 0.11% 897 0. 16% Finland 437, 445 0.15% 1, 303 0. 24% Germany 1, 985,
560 0.69% 6, 497 1. 18% India 7, 444, 108 2.59% 9, 526 1. 73% Ireland 469,
484 0.16% 1, 512 0. 27% Italy 8, 127, 321 2.82% 16,091 2. 92% Japan*
private 442, 881 0.15% 1, 320 0. 24% Japan 17,818, 002 6.19% 45,436 8. 26%
Korea, Republic of 40, 000 0.01% 109 0. 02% Luxembourg 490, 678 0.17% 1,
466 0. 27% Netherlands 4, 374, 453 1.52% 13,288 2. 42% Norway 1,262, 626
0.44% 3, 809 0. 69% Private 37,582 0. 01% 61 0.01% Switzerland 4, 039, 157
1.40% 8, 918 1. 62% United Kingdom 5, 633, 701 1.96% 12,547 2. 28% United
Nations 185, 000 0.06% TBD United States 156,385, 885 54.31% 309, 770 56.
30% U. S. friends of WFP 172, 020 0.06% 195 0. 04% Multilateral funds 832,
005 0.29% 1, 035 0. 19%

Total (received) 242,287, 129 84.14% 521, 338 94. 76%

Shortfall 45,656, 469 15.86% 28,833 5. 24% Legend EC = European Community
WFP = World Food Program TBD = to be determined Source: WFP.

Cost Data for U. S. Food Assistance to Afghanistan Provided to the UN
World Food

Appendi V x Program, Fiscal Years 1999* 2002 Administrative Commodity

and cost Ocean freight Inland freight ITSH freight

miscellaneous Total cost

1999 $15, 069,555 $10,521,204 $815, 200 $756, 800 $1, 016,705 $28,179, 464

53.48% 37.34% 2.89% 2. 69% 3.61% 2000 $18, 282,825 $12,234,100 $2,905, 600
$3,874, 400 $1, 131,903 $38,428, 828

47.58% 31.84% 7.56% 10. 08% 2. 95% 2001 $46, 866,434 $20,639,750 $3,313,
900 $8,738, 300 $3, 294,616 $82,853, 000

56.57% 24.91% 4.00% 10. 55% 3. 98% 2002 $75, 770,144 $34,920,586 $25,987,
600 $39,896, 400 $1, 494,056 $178,068, 786

42.55% 19.61% 14. 59% 22. 40% 0.84%

Total $155,988,958 $78,315,640 $33,022, 300 $53,265, 900 $6, 937,280
$327,530, 078

Annual average 50.04% 28.43% 7.26% 11. 43% 2. 85% 100%

percentage Percentage of total 47.63% 23.91% 10. 08% 16. 26% 2.12% 100%

Legend ITSH = Internal Transport, Storage, and Handling Sources: GAO
analysis of U. S. Department of Agriculture and U. S. Agency for
International Development data.

International Donor Assistance Coordination

Appendi VI x Mechanisms in Afghanistan Between 1998 and 2003, as
circumstances in Afghanistan changed, the coordination processes utilized
by the international community and the Afghan government evolved (see
table 3 and figure 11). Beginning in 1998, the international community
employed a strategy of Principled Common Programming among United Nations
agency, nongovernmental, and bilateral donor programs. The international
community*s aim was to establish priorities and projects based on agreed
upon goals and principles

that would form the UN*s annual consolidated appeal for assistance. To
implement Principled Common Programming, a number of coordination
mechanisms were established, including the Afghan Programming Body. The
programming body consisted of the Afghan Support Group, 15 UN
Representatives, and 15 nongovernmental organizations and was responsible
for making policy recommendations on issues of common concern, supporting
the UN*s annual consolidated appeal for donor

assistance, and promoting coordination of assistance efforts. 1 The
Taliban government had no role in the programming body. The programming
body was supported by a secretariat; working level operations were
conducted by a standing committee and thematic groups responsible for
analyzing needs, developing strategies and policies, and setting
assistance priorities within their thematic areas (e. g., the provision of
basic social services). The Afghan Programming Body and its standing
committee were incorporated into the Implementation Group/ Program Group
process established in

2002. Table 3 describes the Afghan assistance coordination mechanisms in
place in 2002.

1 In 1988 the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghanistan Relief was
established to coordinate the efforts of national and international
nongovernmental organizations conducting work in Afghanistan. The agency*s
membership included 68 Afghan and international nongovernmental
organizations. The Afghan Support Group formed in 1997 was a donor
coordination group composed of 16 donor nations.

Table 3: Major Assistance Coordination Mechanisms in Afghanistan in 2002
Organization/

Date of formation/

suborganization Responsibility Members comment

Afghanistan Coordinate and mobilize international More than 60 countries,
the November 2001 Reconstruction Steering reconstruction funds. European
Union, the members of Group

the G- 8, a the United Nations (UN), Replaced by the Consultative and the
World Bank. Cochaired by Group (December 2002) and

the United States, the European Afghanistan High- level Union, Japan, and
Saudi Arabia. Strategic Forum (March 2003).

Implementation Group Implement the strategy and policy of The Afghan
government, World

January 2002 the Afghan Reconstruction Steering Bank, UN Development
Program, Group by facilitating coordination

Asian Development Bank, Islamic Transformed into Consultative among the
Afghan government,

Development Bank, and the Group (December 2002).

bilateral, multilateral, and Afghan Support Group b nongovernmental
organizations

implementing projects in Afghanistan.

Implementation Standing Local working level coordination Afghan Assistance
Coordinating April 2002

Committee Authority, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, donor
Transformed into the governments, international

Consultative Group Standing financial institutions, Committee (December
2002) nongovernmental organizations

Program Groups/ Further develop the 12 programs

Afghan government and UN, April 2002

Program Secretariats outlined in the Afghan government*s bilateral,
multilateral, and National Development Framework. A nongovernmental
organizations

The Consultative Groups lead ministry guides each program

replaced the existing Program group. Technical support is provided by
Groups, and the Program a program secretariat led by a UN, Secretariats
were replaced by multilateral, or nongovernmental the Consultative Groups*
Focal

organization. Points in December 2002.

Afghan Assistance Coordinate the flow of international Afghan government
February 2002

Coordination Authority assistance in Afghanistan. (Afghan government

agency) UN Assistance Mission in

Coordinate all UN programs in All UN agencies working in March 2002

Afghanistan Afghanistan. Afghanistan Regional/ UN aid coordination
organizations in

All UN agencies working in Late 1990s/ May 2002

Provincial major regions of Afghanistan/ UN aid Afghanistan Coordination
Bodies

coordination organizations at the In 2002, the Afghan

provincial level in Afghanistan government asked that the bodies realign
along provincial lines.

Sources: UN and Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. a The G- 8 is
comprised of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the

United States. b The Afghan Support Group was founded in 1997 by the 16
largest donor nations providing assistance

to Afghanistan and the European Union. In January 2003, the group was
dissolved and the Afghan government assumed responsibility for assistance
coordination.

Figure 11: Organizations Responsible for Coordinating International
Assistance in Afghanistan, 1998* 2003

In December 2002, the Afghan government instituted the Consultative Group
coordination process in Afghanistan. The process evolved out of the
previous Implementation/ Program group processes. (Table 4 compares the
two processes.) The Consultative Group process retains the same basic
hierarchical structure that was established under the Implementation Group
process. 2 For example, the new process includes 12 groups, each

2 Terms of reference prepared by the lead ministry and presented to the
group members for further discussion and agreement will outline both
specific and general responsibilities of group members as well as set
clear benchmarks for preparing and implementing national programs. The
terms of reference will also specify clear submission deadlines for the
national budget and programs and address reporting, including monthly
updates of indicators of progress in the program area and monitoring of
benchmarks.

lead by an Afghan government minister, organized around the 12 programs
contained in the Afghan government*s National Development Framework. In
addition to the 12 groups, 2 consultative groups covering national

security programs (i. e., the national army and police); and 3 national
working groups on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration;
counternarcotics; and demining were established. Further, 5 advisory
groups were also established to ensure that cross- cutting issues, such as
human rights, are mainstreamed effectively in the work of the 12
consultative groups and reflected in the policy framework and budget.

Each consultative group will assist in policy management, as well as
monitoring the implementation of activities envisaged under the Afghan
government*s national budget. The groups will assist in preparing the

budget, provide a forum for general policy dialogue, monitor the
implementation of the budget, report on indicators of progress for each
development program, and elaborate detailed national programs. The groups,
with assistance from the standing committee, will also focus on monitoring
performance against benchmarks established by each group. Each lead
ministry will select a focal point, or secretariat, organization

from among donors and UN agencies. Each year, in March, the Afghanistan
Development Forum, or national consultative group meeting, will be held to
discuss the budget for the next fiscal year, review national priorities,
and assess progress. At that time, the consultative groups will report to
the Consultative Group Standing Committee.

Table 4: Comparison of Implementation Group and Consultative Group
Processes Implementation Group Consultative Group Structure

Based on Afghan National Ye s Ye s

Development Framework Hierarchy  Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering
Group  Afghanistan high- level Strategic Forum  Implementation Group

 National Consultative Group/ Afghanistan  Implementation Group Standing
Committee Development forum  12 Program groups

 Consultative Group Standing committees  Additional subgroups

 12 Program Consultative Groups  1 Lead ministry per program group

 1 Lead ministry per program group  12 Program group secretariats led by
a donor

 12 Program group secretariats led by a donor agency

agency  2 National Security Consultative Groups  3 working groups  5
advisory groups

Leadership Afghan ministry leads each group. Afghan ministry leads each
group. Membership Ministries, UN agencies, development banks, donor

Ministries, UN agencies, development banks, agencies/ governments, and
NGOs donor agencies/ governments, and NGOs

Stated goals

Assist in budget preparation Yes Yes Monitor performance of

Ye s Ye s programs and subprograms Promote better coordination

Ye s Ye s between all parties Formulate policy Not stated Yes

Develop projects/ programs Yes Yes Prepare annual development

Yes Not stated plan Set program

Ye s Ye s benchmarks/ targets Sources: GAO analysis of UN and Afghan
government data.

Major Donors* Pledges and Contributions as of December 31, 2002 (as
reported by the

Appendi VI x I

U. S. Department of State) Dollars in millions

Tokyo conference Total disbursed Country pledge a Additional pledges for
2002 Time frame

Canada 62. 8 31.3 15 months France 24 32 Unspecified Germany 285 43 112 4
years Italy 43 43.9 1 year Japan 500 282 2. 5 years United Kingdom 288 55
77.5 5 years United States 297 600 Unspecified Russia b 30 Unspecified
Austria 11.6 2. 4 10.7 1 year Belgium 30.7 11.5 Unspecified Denmark 59
16.5 31.9 Unspecified Finland 28 10 12.1 4 years Greece 4.5 1 1.7 Ireland
12. 3 9. 8 4 years Luxembourg 4.5 .1 3. 6 2.5 years Netherlands 63 5 78.9
2. 5 years Norway 46. 6 10 47 2.5 years Portugal .8 Unspecified Spain 104
6.4 77 Unspecified Sweden 90 31 4 years Switzerland 20 6. 7 Unspecified
European

864 78.4 133 5 years Commission Bahrain

Kuwait 30 5 Unspecified Oman Qatar .1 Unspecified Saudi Arabia 220 72.5 4
years United Arab Emirates 36 80 69.8 Unspecified Iran 560 32.7 6 years
Australia 8.8 14.6 19 1 year South Korea 45 5 2.5 years Republic of China

29 3 years (Taiwan)

(Continued From Previous Page)

Dollars in millions

Tokyo conference Total disbursed Country pledge a Additional pledges for
2002 Time frame

Turkey 5 1. 8 2.9 5 years China 1 150 30 Unspecified India 100 31.7 One
year Pakistan 100 17.7 Unspecified

Total 3, 972.8 475 1, 949.95

Source: Department of State. a Pledges and disbursements do not include
those of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and

other international nongovernmental organizations. b Russia did not pledge
at Tokyo * Russian assistance has been primarily in- kind donations.

Appendi VI x I I Comments from the World Food Program Note: GAO comments
supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

The following are GAO*s comments on the letter from the United Nations
World Food Program dated June 2, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. Although changes in the coordination mechanism utilized in
Afghanistan were introduced in 2003, the Afghan government and the

international community still lack a common, jointly developed strategy
for rehabilitating the agricultural sector. We believe that such a
strategy, including measurable goals and a means to evaluate progress
toward achieving the goals, is needed to focus limited resources and hold
the international community accountable for the assistance it delivers.

Appendi X I x Comments from the Department of State Note: GAO comments
supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

The following are GAO*s comments on the letter from the Department of
State dated June 3, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. The U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
currently purchases limited amounts of regional food commodities in an
effort to respond quickly to humanitarian emergencies. Commodities
purchased in the United States by U. S. agencies must travel the same
logistics networks as commodities purchased regionally. For example, U. S.
commodities destined for Afghanistan in 2002 were shipped from the

United States to the Pakistani port at Karachi and moved to their final
destination via roads in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Commodities purchased
in Pakistan followed the same transit routes. Hence, the overland shipping
costs, such as for trucking, were the same for U. S.

origin commodities and Pakistani commodities. Further, regional cash
purchases of food would be made by U. S. government officials or World
Food Program (WFP) officials, the same officials that currently handle
hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance funds and millions of metric
tons of commodities; we are not suggesting that cash be

provided to local governments. Any purchases would be subject to U. S. and
UN accountability procedures, as such purchases are currently; increasing
the amount of commodities purchased locally would not by itself create an
opportunity for corruption.

Comments from the United States Agency for

Appendi X x International Development Note: GAO comments supplementing
those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

See comment 1. See comment 2.

See comment 3. See comment 4.

The following are GAO*s comments on the letter from the United States
Agency for International Development dated June 6, 2003. GAO Comments 1.
We believe that the U. S. Agency for International Development

(USAID) should take an active and aggressive role in the cooperative
development of a joint international* Afghan government strategy because
the United States is the largest donor to Afghanistan, agricultural
rehabilitation is the cornerstone of USAID*s efforts in Afghanistan, and
the success of U. S. policy goals in Afghanistan is tightly linked to the
rehabilitation of the agricultural sector. According to USAID*s assistance
strategy for Afghanistan, restoring food security is USAID*s highest
priority. Consequently, agriculture assistance is one of USAID*s main
strategic objectives in Afghanistan. Further, according to USAID*s Afghan
assistance strategy documents, USAID*s overall assistance program is based
on several critical assumptions about

conditions in Afghanistan, one condition being that agricultural
conditions do not deteriorate further. The document states that if these
conditions do not prevail, USAID may not achieve its goals. We also
recognize the importance of the Food and Agriculture Organization*s
(FAO*s) involvement in the cooperative strategy development effort.

However, donor support for FAO*s Afghanistan program has been limited.

2. We agree that developing a broad- based agricultural rehabilitation
strategy would have been difficult in early 2002, given the nascent nature
of the Afghan government and the assistance coordination mechanism then in
use. However, the government has been in place since June 2002, and the
Consultative Group coordination mechanism was introduced in December 2002.
Hence, we believe that the conditions now exist for the development of
such a strategy. In

addition, we have discussed the development of a joint Afghan*
international community agriculture rehabilitation strategy with the
Afghan Minister of Agriculture and FAO. Both support the idea and welcome
the opportunity to develop such a strategy.

3. No change to the title of the report is necessary. As stated in the
report, agriculture is of central importance to Afghanistan*s economy and
the livelihood of 85 percent of its citizens. Further, the link between
food security and political stability is recognized by the international
community not only in Afghanistan but also in other areas such as southern
Africa. In addition, as stated above, USAID*s assistance

strategy recognizes the importance of agriculture sector rehabilitation to
the achievement of the U. S. policy goals in Afghanistan, including a
politically stable state that is not a harbor for terrorists.

4. We agree that other authorities allow USAID to provide cash or purchase
assistance commodities outside the United States. However, we believe that
amending the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 to
allow the provision of cash or food commodities outside the United States
will greatly improve U. S. flexibility in responding to crises affecting
U. S. national security and foreign policy interests. The act is the
principal authority for providing food assistance in emergency and
nonemergency situations. Amending the act will provide a permanent
provision in this authority allowing the United States to respond rapidly
and in a cost- effective manner to events that affect U. S. national
security.

USAID cites the recently proposed $200 million Famine Fund as providing
the flexibility that the United States needs to address humanitarian
crises. However, the fund proposal indicates that the fund will target
dire unforeseen circumstances related to famine; thus, the

fund does not appear to be designed to respond to nonfamine crises
involving large amounts of food aid or national security. The fund amounts
to less than 10 percent of the $2.2 billion and $2.6 billion appropriated
for U. S. food aid in 2002 and 2003, respectively, a period marked by an
increasing number of humanitarian food crises* for

example, in Afghanistan, southern Africa, and North Korea* that did not
entail famine but that did, in some cases, affect U. S. national security.
The Famine Fund is inadequate to respond to the increasing number and size
of such crises. Meanwhile, the availability of commodities in the United
States for food assistance has declined in 2003. Therefore, the need to
procure commodities overseas in close proximity to affected countries has
become more critical while also being more cost effective.

Comments from the Department of

Appendi XI x Agriculture Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the
report text appear at the end of this appendix.

See comment 1. See comment 2.

See comment 3. See comment 4. See comment 5. See comment 6.

See comment 1. See comment 7. See comment 8.

The following are GAO*s comments on the letter from the Department of
Agriculture dated June 10, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. Although other legislation allows for the provision of
cash or assistance commodities from non- U. S. sources, we believe that
amending the

Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 to allow the
provision of cash or food commodities outside the United States will
greatly improve U. S. flexibility in responding to crises that affect U.
S. national security interests. The act is the principal authority for
providing food assistance in emergency and nonemergency situations.
Amending the act will provide a permanent provision in this authority

allowing the United States to respond rapidly and in a cost effective
manner to events that affect U. S. national security. In addition,
although the proposed $200 million Famine Fund may

provide some additional flexibility for responding to humanitarian crises,
the fund proposal indicates that the fund will target dire unforeseen
circumstances related to famine. Thus, the fund does not appear to be
designed to respond to nonfamine crises involving large amounts of food
aid or national security. The fund amounts to less than 10 percent of the
$2.2 billion and $2.6 billion appropriated for U. S. food aid in 2002 and
2003, respectively, a period marked by an increasing

number of humanitarian food crises* for example, in Afghanistan, southern
Africa, and North Korea* that did not entail famine but that did, in some
cases, affect U. S. national security. 2. We agree with the U. S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) that the

cargo preference requirement adds additional cost to food assistance and
should be waived in specific situations, and we have adjusted the matter
for congressional consideration to reflect this. As stated in the report,
19.6 percent of total food assistance costs in fiscal year 2002 were for
ocean freight. These costs were incurred because of the requirement that
assistance commodities must be purchased in the United States, and 75
percent of the purchased commodities by weight

must be shipped on U. S.- flagged carriers. In previous reports, we
analyzed the costs of cargo preference requirements on food assistance and
demonstrated the negative impact of these costs on U. S. food aid

programs.

3. Additional information has been added to the report describing the
commodity surpluses available in the region in 2002. For example, in 2002,
Kazakhstan harvested 16 million metric tons of wheat, a record

harvest for that nation. Approximately 6 million metric tons of the 2002
harvest was available for export. Similarly, Pakistan exported
approximately 1.6 million metric tons of wheat in 2002. Consequently,
these countries had nearly 7.6 million metric tons available for export,
20 times the requirement for World Food Program*s (WFP*s) 2002

emergency operation or 68 times the amount that WFP purchased from these
two countries in 2002.

4. All of the obstacles cited by USDA, including road closures due to
snow, were concerns for WFP in 2002. We describe many of these obstacles
in the report and also demonstrate that WFP was able to overcome the
obstacles. The same transportation routes were used to move both
regionally procured commodities and U. S. origin commodities. As noted in
the report, in December 2002, while fighting between coalition forces, the
Northern Alliance, and the Taliban was

still occurring and winter weather was complicating food deliveries, WFP
delivered 116,000 metric tons of food to Afghan beneficiaries, in the
single largest movement of food by WFP anywhere in a 1- month period.
Further, according to WFP, its Afghanistan logistics system was capable of
routinely moving over 50,000 metric tons of food per month. Consequently,
adding 103,000 metric tons or 8,600 metric tons per month to the total
food moved over the course of 2002 would not have overburdened WFP*s
logistics system. Further, the cost and time saved by purchasing
commodities regionally are not marginal. As indicated in the report,
purchasing commodities regionally could have substantially reduced the
delivery time and the increased level of purchased commodities could have
fed 685,000 people for 1 year. 5. Although all commodities may not be
available regionally in all cases, in

2002, Afghanistan*s greatest need was wheat, which constituted the bulk of
the commodities delivered to Afghanistan that year. As stated in the
report, if the United States had purchased wheat regionally, or provided
WFP with cash to make regional purchases, the United States could have
saved approximately $35 million in 2002. While our analysis describes how
much wheat could have been purchased regionally with the savings, higher-
value, consumer- ready commodities such as cornsoy blend from U. S.
companies could have been purchased instead of additional regionally
produced wheat. In either case, the United States

could have provided a greater volume of commodities to Afghanistan if

it had used the savings realized through the purchase of regional
commodities versus U. S. commodities to procure additional commodities.
Further, WFP has commodity quality control standards and would not
purchase commodities with donor funds that were objectionable to the donor
providing the funds. Finally, much of the wheat that was purchased in the
United States was shipped in bulk to ports in Pakistan where it was bagged
for final distribution in bags

clearly marked *USA.* Wheat purchased regionally with U. S. funds was
packaged in Pakistan in the same type of bags. Thus, any regional
purchases could be packaged in appropriately marked bags in the country of
origin or at a bagging facility in a transit country. WFP uses this
practice in other regions, such as southern Africa.

6. WFP made regional purchases during late 2001, but it also made regional
purchases during 2002. As stated in the report, the amount of food
available for food assistance in 2003 is less than in 2002, while the need
for food aid continues to grow around the world, most notably in southern
Africa. In addition, even if the U. S. grain infrastructure system is able
to respond to ongoing demands for food aid, purchasing U. S. origin
commodities and shipping the commodities via expensive ocean

freight is not the most cost effective or quickest means either of
supplying food to hungry people or of achieving U. S. national security
and foreign policy objectives, such as stability in Afghanistan.

7. We agree that the donor community faced challenges in engaging the
Afghan government in 2002. We believe that the mechanisms currently in
place, including the Consultative Group coordination mechanism,

provide an environment where the international community and the Afghan
government can engage in a joint strategy development effort.

8. The report*s description of Afghanistan*s agriculture sector is based
on discussions with and documents obtained from FAO, Asian Development
Bank, USAID, and Afghan government officials. We have adjusted the
language in the report in response to USDA*s comments.

Appendi XI x I

Comments from the Department of Defense Note: GAO comments supplementing
those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

See comment 1. See comment 2.

See comment 3.

The following are GAO*s comments on the letter from the Department of
Defense dated June 10, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. The report discusses both food assistance and nonfood
assistance aspects of the Humanitarian Daily Ration program. On page 30 of
the

report, we state that the HDR program was initiated to alleviate suffering
and convey that the United States waged war against the Taliban, not the
Afghan people. Also, the HDR program is included with the U. S. Agency for
International Development*s humanitarian programs in U. S. government
tallies of total humanitarian assistance provided to Afghanistan.

2. Department of Defense officials responsible for the administration of
the HDR program stated that no formal evaluation of the HDR program in
Afghanistan has been conducted. In the report, we cite the informal
reporting that provided the Department of Defense with some information
about how the program was received by the Afghan people. We have added
information about the goodwill that the HDRs generated according to the
informal reports cited by the Department of Defense in its comments on the
draft report.

3. The report describes how HDRs are designed to be used* to relieve
temporary food shortages resulting from manmade or natural disasters* not,
as in Afghanistan, to feed a large number of people affected by a long-
term food shortage. Further, as discussed in the report, the World Food
Program (WFP) has worked in Afghanistan for many years, and during that
period it developed an extensive logistics system for delivering food
throughout the country. Even during the rule of the Taliban, WFP was able
to deliver food to remote areas including those controlled by the Northern
Alliance. During the month of December 2001, while Department of Defense
was delivering HDRs, WFP delivered 116,000 metric tons of food to
Afghanistan, a level of food assistance that exceeds any 1- month total
for any emergency operation in WFP*s history. As stated in the report,
WFP*s logistics system was capable of delivering commodities to remote
populations both by air or by donkey if necessary.

Appendi XI x I I GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Phil
Thomas (202) 512- 9892 David M. Bruno (202) 512- 7280 Staff

In addition to the individuals named above, Jeffery T. Goebel, Paul
Hodges, Acknowledgments and Reid L. Lowe made key contributions to this
report.

(320108)

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Report to Congressional Requesters

June 2003 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to
Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan*s Stability

GAO- 03- 607

Contents Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Background 5 U. S. and International Food Assistance
Had Significant Impact and Was Well Managed, but Donor Support Was
Problematic 13

Agricultural Assistance Has Had Limited Impact and Lacks Coordination, and
Major Obstacles Jeopardize Food Security and Political Stability 30
Conclusions 46 Matter for Congressional Consideration 47 Recommendations
for Executive Action 47 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 48

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 52

Appendix II: World Food Program Projects in Afghanistan, 2002 56

Appendix III: Description of WFP Food Assistance Monitoring Mechanisms 57

Appendix IV: Donor Contributions to World Food Program Emergency Operation
10155 as of May 12, 2003 59

Appendix V: Cost Data for U. S. Food Assistance to Afghanistan Provided to
the UN World Food Program, Fiscal Years 1999* 2002 60

Appendix VI: International Donor Assistance Coordination Mechanisms in
Afghanistan 61

Appendix VII: Major Donors* Pledges and Contributions as of December 31,
2002 (as reported by the U. S. Department of State) 66

Appendix VIII: Comments from the World Food Program 68 GAO Comments 70

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of State 71 GAO Comments 73

Appendix X: Comments from the United States Agency for International
Development 74 GAO Comments 77

Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Agriculture 79 GAO Comments
82

Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Defense 85 GAO Comments 86

Appendix XIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 87 GAO Contacts 87
Staff Acknowledgments 87

Tables Table 1: WFP Operations: Cash Donations, Food Donations, Number of
Beneficiaries, and Percentage of U. S. Contribution, 1999* 2002 15 Table
2: Projected Cumulative Funding Requirements for the

Reconstruction of Afghanistan 42 Table 3: Major Assistance Coordination
Mechanisms in

Afghanistan in 2002 62 Table 4: Comparison of Implementation Group and
Consultative

Group Processes 65 Figures Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan, Including
Provinces and Major

Roads 7 Figure 2: Drought- Affected Areas in Afghanistan as of October

2001 10 Figure 3: WFP Distribution of U. S. -Provided Food in Afghanistan
12

Figure 4: Road Conditions Faced by WFP Truckers in Afghanistan 18 Figure
5: Use of Donkeys to Deliver Food to Remote Areas 19 Figure 6: Resource
Requirements vs. Actual Deliveries for WFP

Emergency Food Assistance Operation in Afghanistan, April 2002* January
2003 22 Figure 7: Costs for U. S. Food Assistance to Afghanistan, Fiscal

Years 1999* 2002 25 Figure 8: Humanitarian Daily Rations 29 Figure 9: FAO
Irrigation Rehabilitation Project 32 Figure 10: Hierarchy of Strategies
for Agricultural Sector

Reconstruction 39 Figure 11: Organizations Responsible for Coordinating
International

Assistance in Afghanistan, 1998* 2003 63

Abbreviations

ACTED Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development FAO Food and
Agriculture Organization HDR humanitarian daily ration ITSH Internal
Transport, Storage, and Handling NDF National Development Framework UN
United Nations UNAMA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNDP United
Nations Development Program USAID United States Agency for International
Development USDA United States Department of Agriculture WFP World Food
Program

This is a work of the U. S. government and is not subject to copyright
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a

GAO United States General Accounting Office

The emergency food assistance that the United States and the international
community provided from January 1999 through December 2002 helped avert
famine by supplying millions of beneficiaries with about 1.6 million tons
of food. However, the inadequacy of the international community*s
financial and in- kind support of the World Food Program*s (WFP) appeal
for assistance disrupted the provision of food assistance throughout 2002.
Because of a lack of resources, WFP reduced the amount of food rations
provided to returning refugees from 150 kilograms to 50 kilograms.
Meanwhile, as a result of the statutory

requirement that U. S. agencies providing food assistance purchase U. S.-
origin commodities and ship them on U. S.- flag vessels, assistance costs
and delivery times were higher by $35 million and 120 days, respectively,
than if the United States had provided WFP with cash or regionally
produced commodities. Had the U. S. assistance been purchased regionally,
an additional 685,000 people could have been fed for 1 year.

U. S.- provided vegetable oil distributed by WFP in Hirat, Afghanistan

The livelihood of 85 percent of Afghanistan*s approximately 26 million
people depends on agriculture. Over 50 percent of the gross domestic
product and 80 percent of export earnings have historically come from
agriculture. Over the 4- year period, because of continued conflict and
drought, the international community provided primarily short- term
agricultural assistance such as tools and seed. As a result, the
assistance did not significantly contribute to the reconstruction of the
agricultural sector. In 2002, agricultural assistance was not adequately
coordinated with the Afghan government; a new coordination

mechanism was established in December 2002, but it is too early to
determine its effectiveness. As a result of the weak coordination, the
Afghan government and the international community have not developed a
joint strategy to direct the overall agricultural rehabilitation effort.
Meanwhile, inadequate assistance funding, continuing terrorist attacks,
warlords* control of much of the country, and the growth of opium
production threaten the recovery of the agricultural sector and the U. S.
goals of food security and political stability in Afghanistan. After the
events of September 11, 2001 led to the defeat of the Taliban, the United
States and the

international community developed an assistance program to support
Afghanistan*s new government and its people. Key components of this effort
include food and agricultural assistance. GAO was asked to

assess (1) the impact, management, and support of food assistance to
Afghanistan and (2) the impact and management of agricultural assistance
to Afghanistan, as well as obstacles to achieving food

security and political stability. GAO recommends that the Secretary of
State and the Administrator of USAID take an active role in an
international* Afghan effort to develop an agricultural rehabilitation
strategy.

GAO suggests that Congress consider amending the Agriculture Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, and the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, as amended, to allow the purchase of commodities
overseas and waive

the U. S.- flag vessel requirement under certain circumstances.

The agencies agree with the need to develop a strategy, but USAID does not
think it should lead the effort. In terms of providing flexibility, WFP
agrees, but U. S. agencies disagree with the need to amend legislation.
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 607. To view the full product,
including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact
Loren Yager (202) 512- 4347 or yagerl@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03-
607, a report to

congressional requesters

June 2003

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery Threaten
Afghanistan's Stability

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Contents

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Appendix I

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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Appendix II

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Appendix III

Appendix III Description of WFP Food Assistance Monitoring Mechanisms

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Appendix IV

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Appendix V

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Appendix VI

Appendix VI International Donor Assistance Coordination Mechanisms in
Afghanistan

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Appendix VII

Appendix VII Major Donors* Pledges and Contributions as of December 31,
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Appendix VIII

Appendix VIII Comments from the World Food Program

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Appendix VIII Comments from the World Food Program

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Appendix IX

Appendix IX Comments from the Department of State

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Appendix IX Comments from the Department of State

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Appendix X

Appendix X Comments from the United States Agency for International
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Appendix XI

Appendix XI Comments from the Department of Agriculture

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Appendix XI Comments from the Department of Agriculture

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Appendix XII

Appendix XII Comments from the Department of Defense

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Appendix XIII

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