    Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key
    to the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's Success (30-JUN-03,
    GAO-03-598).

    The Department of Defense (DOD) is developing a new unmanned
    combat air vehicle (UCAV) that can suppress enemy air defenses
    and conduct other air-to-ground attacks, particularly against
    heavily defended targets. Because it may perform these missions
    at a relatively low cost, the UCAV could be used to replace some
    of DOD's aging tactical aircraft fleet. A key to UCAV's success
    will lie in DOD's ability to match users' needs, or requirements,
    with the developer's resources (technology and design knowledge,
    money, and time) when product development begins. Our work shows
    that doing so can prevent rework and save both time and money.
    Therefore, we assessed DOD's ability to make this match. GAO
    conducted its work on the basis of the Comptroller General's
    authority and addresses the report to the Subcommittee on
    Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Committee on Armed Services
    because of its interest and jurisdiction in the program.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-598
        ACCNO:   A07441
      TITLE:     Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with
    Requirements Is Key to the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's
    Success
         DATE:   06/30/2003
      SUBJECT:   Air warfare
    	     Aircraft
    	     Combat readiness
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Defense cost control
    	     DOD Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
    	     X-45A Aircraft
    	     X-45B Aircraft
    	     X-45C Aircraft
    	     X-47B Aircraft

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    GAO-03-598

    Report to the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on
    Armed Services, House of Representatives

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

    June 2003 DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

    Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to the Unmanned Combat Air
    Vehicle Program*s Success

    GAO- 03- 598

    The UCAV program*s original performance objectives posed manageable
    challenges to build an affordable, highly survivable, and lethal weapon
    system. The Air Force, however, added requirements for electronic attack
    and increased flying range after DOD accelerated the program*s product
    development schedule by 3 years. These changes widened the gap between the
    customer*s requirements and the developer*s resources, specifically time,
    reducing the probability that the program would deliver production
    aircraft on cost, on schedule, and with anticipated performance
    capabilities.

    DOD has recently decided to adopt a new joint service approach to UCAV
    development that provides more time to close the requirements* resource
    gap before product development starts. It appears DOD may add new content
    because it is proposing to build a new prototype that would be a larger
    air vehicle, capable of flying and carrying out combat missions for longer
    periods of time. To reduce technical risk, DOD anticipates delaying the
    start of product development for several years in order to address new
    requirements.

    As a gap between resources and requirements widened in 2002, risks
    projected for the start of product development with UCAV*s 15
    technologies, processes and system attributes increased significantly. The
    new joint plan brings the risks back down. This action also allows
    competition back into the UCAV development effort.

    DOD will still face challenges in controlling joint, multimission
    requirements and ensuring that both services continue to provide funds for
    the program while also funding other large aircraft investments. If these
    challenges are not met, the gap between requirements and resources could
    resurface. DOD*s role will continue to be instrumental in helping to
    negotiate requirements, assure resources are in place, and make difficult
    program trade- offs.

    Risk Levels Projected at Start of Product Development under Different UCAV
    Plans

    The Department of Defense (DOD) is developing a new unmanned combat air
    vehicle (UCAV) that can

    suppress enemy air defenses and conduct other air- to- ground attacks,
    particularly against heavily defended targets. Because it may perform
    these missions at a relatively low cost, the UCAV could be used to replace
    some of DOD*s aging tactical aircraft fleet. A key to

    UCAV*s success will lie in DOD*s ability to match users* needs, or
    requirements, with the developer*s resources (technology and design
    knowledge, money, and time) when product development begins. Our work
    shows that doing so can prevent rework and save both time and money.
    Therefore, we assessed DOD*s ability to make this match.

    GAO conducted its work on the basis of the Comptroller General*s authority
    and addresses the report to the Subcommittee because of its interest and
    jurisdiction in the program.

    We recommend that DOD develop a joint UCAV acquisition approach that
    balances requirements and resources at the start of product development.
    We also recommend that the Secretary formalize the UCAV management role
    performed by his office, ensure that the services are fully involved in
    the process, and work to develop an efficient approach to transition the
    UCAV to the product development phase so the needs of the war fighter can
    be met more quickly. www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 598. To
    view the full product, including the scope

    and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact
    Paul Francis at (202) 512- 2811 or francisp@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO-
    03- 598, a report to the

    Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services,
    House of Representatives June 2003

    DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

    Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to the Unmanned Combat Air
    Vehicle Program*s Success

    Page i GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
    Background 3 Importance of Matching Resources with Requirements before

    Product Development 5 Gap between UCAV Resources and Requirements Was
    Increased in 2002 7 Recent DOD Decision to Restructure Program Can Reduce
    Risks 14 Conclusion 19 Recommendations for Executive Action 19 Agency
    Comments and Our Evaluation 20 Scope and Methodology 20 Appendix I
    Comments from the Department of Defense 22

    Tables

    Table 1: Current Risk Level of UCAV Technologies, Processes, and System
    Attributes 9 Table 2: Chronology of Changes to the Air Force UCAV
    Acquisition

    Program Schedule Since 2000 11 Table 3: Comparisons of UCAV Variants 14
    Figures

    Figure 1: Boeing X- 45A Demonstrator in Flight 4 Figure 2: Computer
    Rendition of the Boeing X- 45B Prototype 5 Figure 3: Timing of the Match
    between Customer Requirements and Resources 7 Figure 4: Effect of
    Accelerated Product Development Start on Program Risk 13 Figure 5:
    Computer Rendition of the Boeing X- 45C 15 Figure 6: Computer Rendition of
    the Northrop Grumman X- 47B 16 Figure 7: Effect of Delayed Product
    Development Start on

    Program Risk 17 Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success Abbreviations

    DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency SEAD suppression of enemy
    air defenses UCAV Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle

    This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
    copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
    materials separately from GAO*s product.

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    June 30, 2003 The Honorable Curt Weldon Chairman The Honorable Neil
    Abercrombie Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land
    Forces Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

    The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the initial stages of developing a
    new unmanned air vehicle capable of suppressing enemy air defenses and
    carrying out other types of air- to- ground attacks, particularly against
    heavily defended targets. Because of its potential to perform these
    missions at a relatively low cost, this new air vehicle could foster
    efforts to replace DOD*s aging tactical aircraft fleet.

    The air vehicle is being developed under the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
    (UCAV) program. This is an advanced technology demonstration program,
    still in a pre- acquisition phase, with two demonstrator UCAVs

    being flown to assess technologies and capabilities. Launch of a formal
    product development program was expected to occur next fiscal year but has
    since been delayed. We conducted our work on the basis of the Comptroller
    General*s authority and have addressed the report to you because your
    expressed interest in the program as a committee of jurisdiction.

    The start of product development* signified by a Milestone B decision*
    represents the point at which program managers make a commitment to DOD
    and the Congress that the UCAV will perform as required and be delivered
    on time and within estimated costs. Our work has shown that programs are
    more likely to succeed if program managers are able to achieve a match
    between user needs, which eventually become requirements, and resources
    (technology, design and production

    knowledge, money, and time) at the start of product development.
    Conversely, if they do not match requirements with resources, cost
    overruns and schedule delays are likely to occur, reducing DOD*s buying
    power in other areas.

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    Page 2 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    Consequently, this report analyzes requirements 1 and schedule changes
    made during pre- acquisition and their effects on DOD*s ability to achieve
    this match. The report also assesses a recent decision to expand the
    program* both in terms of the military services that will be involved with
    it and in terms of the design and capability of the air vehicle* and that

    decision*s effect on DOD*s ability to match requirements to resources. Our
    report focuses on the UCAV program managed by the Air Force and the
    Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). DARPA has also been
    working with the Navy on a UCAV, but until recently its transition to the
    product development phase was further off in the future. We did not assess
    the Navy*s effort except to the extent that it was included in the
    recently established joint program. From 2000 through 2002, decisions to
    get more capability in less time

    widened the gap between UCAV resources and requirements. The UCAV
    program*s original requirements posed significant, but manageable
    challenges to build an air vehicle that is affordable throughout its life
    cycle, highly survivable, and lethal. Subsequently, however, the Air Force
    added requirements for an electronic attack mission and increased flying
    range. Also, DOD accelerated the program*s product development schedule by
    3 years. Those actions widened the gap between requirements and resources
    and increased the challenge for the development program.

    DOD has recently decided to adopt a new joint Air Force and Navy approach
    to UCAV development that provides more time to close the requirements-
    resource gap before product development starts. Details concerning the new
    acquisition strategy behind this approach have not yet been worked out.
    However, the program could increase requirements

    since DOD is proposing to develop a new prototype that would essentially
    be a larger air vehicle, capable of carrying out combat missions for
    longer periods of time. DOD currently anticipates delaying product
    development by several years in order to address new requirements. This
    delay would help to reduce technical risks, but initial fielding of the
    new air vehicle would be delayed as well. Having the Air Force and the
    Navy work jointly on a UCAV program is more efficient than two separate
    programs. At the

    1 Formal requirements for the UCAV program have not yet been established.
    However, program objectives based on customer expectations have been
    established for specific missions the UCAV is expected to perform. We
    refer to these as requirements in this report. Results in Brief

    Page 3 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    same time, the participation of two services will increase the challenges
    of sustaining funding and managing requirements.

    GAO is making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on maintaining
    flexibility to make the tradeoffs necessary to bring and keep the UCAV*s
    requirements and resources in balance and to ensure his office maintains
    the constructive role it has played in the program so far.

    DOD has been successfully using unmanned air vehicles such as the Global
    Hawk and Predator to gather intelligence and perform surveillance and
    reconnaissance missions for military purposes. Beginning in the mid-
    1990s, DOD began to conceive of a different type of unmanned air vehicle*
    the unmanned combat air vehicle or UCAV* which would be capable of
    performing dangerous, lethal combat missions, including suppression of
    enemy air defenses (SEAD). 2 Unlike other unmanned air vehicles, UCAVs
    would carry weapons as well as electronic jammers to confuse enemy radars.
    DOD also envisioned that the air vehicle would operate more autonomously
    than other unmanned air vehicles, requiring little or no human input from
    ground stations to complete their missions or change flight paths. In
    addition, UCAVs would be stealthy and capable of flying in groups or with
    manned aircraft.

    The potential of these weapons has garnered high interest from both
    Congress and DOD. In the fiscal year 2001 Defense Authorization Act,
    Congress set a goal that by 2010, one- third of DOD*s deep strike force be
    unmanned in order to perform this dangerous mission. 3 In addition to the
    potential for saving lives on risky missions, the UCAV could provide
    mission capability at less cost than manned aircraft. Program officials
    initially aimed for the UCAV*s acquisition cost to be one- third of the
    joint strike fighter and operations and support costs to be at least 75
    percent lower. Because of the promise of unmanned air vehicles, the Office
    of Secretary of Defense has established a joint- service unmanned air
    vehicles task force to help promote the development and fielding of these
    systems, including making sure that there is multiservice cooperation.
    This task

    2 Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) missions are those directed at
    destroying or interrupting the ability of ground- based missiles, either
    fixed or mobile, to locate, target, and/ or destroy U. S. aircraft.

    3 Pub. L. No. 106- 398, Sec. 220 (2000). Background

    Page 4 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    force is responsible for outlining the future of DOD*s unmanned air
    vehicles. In the late 1990s, DARPA and the Air Force began pre-
    acquisition efforts

    to conduct advanced technology demonstrations to show the technical
    feasibility of using UCAVs to penetrate deeply into enemy territory to
    attack enemy targets. Boeing Corporation was selected in 1999 to develop
    and demonstrate two demonstrator UCAVs* designated X- 45A. (See fig. 1.)

    Figure 1: Boeing X- 45A Demonstrator in Flight

    The DARPA- Air Force UCAV original plan also called for building and
    demonstrating two prototypes during the pre- acquisition phase, called X-
    45B, that are larger and incorporate low observable technology. (See fig.
    2.) These air vehicles were expected to be more representative of the
    operational air vehicle that the Air Force planned to field. Initially,
    the Air Combat Command, which establishes mission and performance

    requirements, determined that the X- 45B should be focused on performing
    SEAD missions within the air superiority mission area. This decision was
    made to address the limited inventory of current assets in the air
    superiority mission area and to counter the challenges and deficiencies
    associated with conducting SEAD missions.

    Page 5 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    Figure 2: Computer Rendition of the Boeing X- 45B Prototype

    As of February 2003, 55 of 160 planned demonstrations have been completed.
    Most of the demonstrations designed to validate the basic flight
    characteristics of the air vehicle have been completed. Only a small
    number of the demonstrations needed to validate the ability of a single
    air vehicle to perform a preemptive destruction mission have been
    completed. The more demanding demonstrations* those designed to
    demonstrate

    technologies and software for highly autonomous, multivehicle operations
    (with both manned aircraft and unmanned air vehicles), and the more
    difficult aspects of the SEAD mission against mobile targets* have not
    begun.

    The product development decision that DOD is approaching for its UCAV
    program represents a commitment by the product developer to deliver a
    product at established cost, schedule, and performance targets and
    identifies the amount of resources that will be necessary to do so. Our
    studies of leading companies have shown that when requirements and
    resources were matched before product development was started, the more
    likely the development was able to meet performance, cost, and schedule
    objectives. 4 When this took place later, programs encountered

    4 U. S. General Accounting Office, BEST PRACTICES: Better Matching of
    Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GA0- 01-
    288 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 8, 2001). Importance of

    Matching Resources with Requirements before Product Development

    Page 6 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    problems such as increased cost, schedule delays, and performance
    shortfalls.

    A key to achieving this match is to ensure that the developer has the
    resources* technology, design and production knowledge, money, and time*
    needed to design, test, manufacture, and deliver the product. It is not
    unusual for a customer to initially want a high- performing product that
    does not cost much or take too long to develop. But such an expectation

    may exceed the developer*s technology or engineering expertise, or it may
    be more costly and time- consuming to create than the customer is willing
    to accept. Therefore, a process of negotiations and trade- offs is usually
    necessary to match customer requirements and developer resources before
    firming requirements and committing to product development. Our work has
    shown that successful programs will not commit to product development
    until needed technologies are ready to satisfy product requirements. In
    other words, technology development is separated from product development.
    If technology is not sufficiently mature at the beginning of a product
    development program, the program may need to spend more time and money
    than anticipated to bring the technology to the point to which it can meet
    the intended product*s performance requirements. 5 Testing is perhaps the
    main instrument used to gauge technology maturity.

    Testing new technologies before they enter into a product development
    program, as DOD is doing now by demonstrating the two X- 45A
    demonstrators, enables organizations to discover and correct problems
    before a considerable investment is made in the program. By contrast,
    problems found late in development may require more time, money, and
    effort to fix because they may require more extensive retrofitting and
    redesign as well as retesting. These problems are further exacerbated when
    the product development schedule requires a number of activities to

    be done concurrently. The need to address one problem can slow down other
    work on the weapon system.

    Figure 3 illustrates the timing of the match between a customer*s
    requirements and a product developer*s resources for successful and
    problematic programs we have reviewed.

    5 U. S. General Accounting Office, BEST PRACTICES: Better Management of
    Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/ NSIAD- 99-
    162 (Washington, D. C.: July 30, 1999).

    Page 7 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    Figure 3: Timing of the Match between Customer Requirements and Resources

    During 2002, significant requirements were added to the UCAV program after
    the schedule was accelerated by 3 years. This step put the program at
    considerable risk because it increased the gap between requirements and
    resources. The program added two new requirements* one for electronic
    attack capability and one for increased flying range* while reducing a
    critical resource, time, to mature key UCAV technologies. As a result, the
    Air Force and DARPA anticipated that most of the 15 key technologies,
    system attributes, or processes supporting the aircraft*s basic
    capabilities would move from all low risk to mostly medium risk of
    achieving desired functionality by the time a product development decision
    was reached; one would be at high risk.

    The UCAV program*s original requirements were difficult to meet because
    they posed significant but manageable technical challenges to building an
    air vehicle that is, at once, affordable throughout its life cycle, highly
    survivable, and lethal. In the last year, both air vehicle and mission Gap
    between UCAV Resources and

    Requirements Was Increased in 2002

    UCAV Requirements Increased During 2002

    Page 8 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    equipment requirements were increased. The original requirements called
    for a UCAV that would have  a low life- cycle cost, survivable design;
    a mission control station that can fly single or multiple UCAVs at

    one time;  a secure command, control, and communications network;
    completely autonomous vehicle operation from takeoff to landing;  off-
    board and on- board sensors with which to locate targets; and  human
    involvement in targeting, weapons delivery, and target damage assessment.

    Once these requirements were established, the UCAV contractor identified
    15 technologies, processes, and system attributes the UCAV would have to
    possess to meet those requirements. These elements became a way to gauge
    the level of knowledge (in terms of risk) that the contractors had. Right
    now, technologies that support some of these capabilities, such as
    autonomous operation, are not yet mature. We used their risk assessments
    and criteria for the 15 technologies, processes, and system attributes to
    determine current system integration risk as well as technology risk. We
    believe technology readiness levels would have provided a more precise
    gauge of technology maturity, but program officials did not provide them.
    6 Currently, 10 technologies, processes, and system attributes are

    considered to be medium risk by the Air Force and DARPA. Medium risk means
    that there is a 30 to 70 percent probability of achieving the desired
    functionality for the initial operational UCAV. Moreover, 5 are currently
    considered to be high risk, that is, there is less than 30 percent
    probability of achieving their functionality. Table 1 provides the current
    risk level of the 15 UCAV technologies, processes, and system attributes
    for original UCAV objectives.

    6 A good indicator of technology risk is technology readiness level, which
    is used by NASA and some Air Force programs to define the level of risk
    from a technology given its level of demonstration.

    Page 9 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    Table 1: Current Risk Level of UCAV Technologies, Processes, and System
    Attributes

    Characteristics currently at medium risk Characteristics currently

    at high risk

     Affordable air vehicle unit/ recurring flyaway cost

     Survivable air vehicle integration

     Weapons suspension and release  Advanced targeting and engagement
    process

     Dynamic distributed mission/ vehicle control

     Low observable maintainability

     Advanced cognitive aids integration, mission planning  Adaptive,
    autonomous operations

     Force integration, interoperability, and information assurance

     Affordable large- scale software

     Secure, robust communication capability  Coordinated multivehicle
    flight/ motion

     Affordable operating and support cost, and integrated vehicle health
    management  Mobility, rapid deployment, and

    footprint

     Sortie rate, turn time, and ground Operations

    Source: DOD.

    Originally, the UCAV program was tasked with providing an air vehicle that
    would perform both preemptive and reactive SEAD missions against fixed and
    mobile targets that are extremely demanding from both a mission and
    capability perspective. The reactive mission is more demanding than the
    preemptive mission because the UCAV will have less time to find and engage
    mobile targets. When DOD decided to accelerate delivery of the initial
    UCAVs, the program was relieved of meeting the requirement for reactive
    SEAD, making for a better balance between requirements and available
    resources. However, requirements were subsequently added that increased
    the challenge of matching requirements with resources. These requirements
    include an electronic attack mission and increased combat range and
    endurance.

     Electronic attack: DOD*s electronic attack mission is currently
    performed by the Navy*s aging EA- 6B Prowler aircraft. Electronic attack
    confuses enemy radars with electronic jammers. In 2001, the Navy conducted
    an analysis of alternatives for replacing the Prowler.

    Page 10 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    Air Combat Command planners determined that the UCAV could fill portions
    of this role quickly and added the requirement to the program. As
    currently structured, the program does not plan to demonstrate electronic
    attack technologies on UCAV demonstrator or prototype vehicles before
    product development begins. According to program officials, the biggest
    additional challenge associated with this change is the integration of
    existing electronic attack technologies into a

    low observable air vehicle. Program officials are also concerned that
    downsizing and repackaging current electronic warfare technology to fit
    into a smaller space, with sufficient cooling and power, and incorporating
    antennas and other apertures into the low observable signature of the UCAV
    may pose additional challenges. Program officials also stated that the
    addition of electronic attack adds

    uncertainty to overall program costs. It may reduce the number of initial
    UCAVs planned for initial production because additional work will be
    required to integrate this capability into air vehicles, given the current
    schedule and funding.

     Longer range and endurance: According to program officials, Air Force
    leadership would like to have a larger UCAV with longer range and greater
    endurance than that currently being designed in the X- 45B to perform
    strategic lethal strike and nonlethal intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance missions. However, increasing UCAV*s range forced the
    program to abandon a key design concept expected to lower operating and
    support costs significantly over that of a manned aircraft* one of the
    program*s original critical requirements. The initial UCAV concept was a
    design that allowed the wings to be detached from the air vehicle and
    stored in a crate for up to 10 years, a concept which was expected to
    contribute to a greater than 75 percent reduction in operation and support
    costs. When needed, the UCAV

    could be shipped to the theater of operations, assembled, and readied for
    use. Adding range and endurance required redesigning the air vehicle with
    fixed or permanently attached wings, in order that the inside of the wings
    could be used as fuel tanks. This would allow the UCAV to carry more fuel
    and give it the ability to fly farther. Since the wings would no longer be
    detachable, the long- term storage approach had to be abandoned.

    The schedule for the UCAV program has changed several times during the
    pre- acquisition phase. In 2000, the Air Force anticipated that product
    development would start in 2007 and initial deliveries would begin in
    2011. After several schedule changes, the Air Force set product
    development in

    2004 and initial delivery of aircraft in 2007. (See table 2.) The net
    effect of Schedule Compression

    Created Greater Technical and Cost Risks

    Page 11 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    the changes was a 3- year reduction in time to mature technologies before
    product development. This reduction created the potential for costly and
    time- consuming rework in product development since the Air Force would
    still be in the process of maturing technologies as it undertook other
    product development activities. Moreover, the concurrency that comes with
    the schedule changes would have left little room for error.

    Table 2: Chronology of Changes to the Air Force UCAV Acquisition Program
    Schedule Since 2000 Program strategy as of

    End of technology and military utility demonstrations (FY) Start product

    development (FY) Initial deliveries (FY) UCAV capabilities

    2000 2007 2007 2011 Preemptive SEAD; reactive SEAD

    2001 2006 2005 2010 Preemptive SEAD; reactive SEAD

    Explanation of change: To meet Air Force expectations for delivering
    capabilities to the war fighter earlier than 2011, the product launch date
    was moved up by 2 years to 2005 and initial delivery up 1 year to 2010.

    2002 2006 2003 2007 Preemptive SEAD

    Explanation of change: The schedule was changed by direction of the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense to further accelerate delivery of initial
    operational UCAVs to the customer. The program attempted to balance this
    decision by deferring the most challenging requirements for conducting
    reactive SEAD against mobile targets to a future version of UCAV.

    Late 2002 2006 2004 2007 Preemptive SEAD;

    Electronic attack; Extended range Explanation of change: The timeline was
    changed to address added requirements for electronic attack and extended
    range. While 1 year was added to the start of product development, the
    date for initial deliveries did not change.

    Source: GAO presentation of program data.

    Under the original schedule, the UCAV program would essentially have 3
    more years prior to the beginning of product development to test and
    mature technologies. As a result, all 15 of the technologies, processes,
    and system attributes would be at low risk by the launch of product
    development indicating a match between requirements and resources. By
    contrast, under the late 2002 schedule, the program would not have enough
    time to mature technologies to a low risk prior to the launch of product
    development in 2004. In fact, most technologies, processes, and system
    attributes would still be either medium or high risk by the time product
    development was launched indicating that requirements exceeded resources.

    The overlap of technology development and product development, introduced
    by the acceleration of product development, also raised risks for the UCAV
    program. The late 2002 schedule allowed less time for discovering and
    correcting problems that may have arisen during

    Page 12 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    technology demonstrations prior to product development launch.
    Importantly, all of the air vehicle military utility demonstrations would
    have been completed after the beginning of product development. Under the
    original schedule most of these demonstrations would have been completed
    prior to the start of product development.

    Increasing the overlap of technology development and product development
    added risk to the program. Problems found during those demonstrations
    might have to be fixed during product development* problems made more
    likely given the lower maturity level of the key technologies. Figure 4
    shows that the concurrency between technology development and product
    development increased by approximately 18 months under the late 2002
    schedule* from a 6- month approximate overlap to a 24- month approximate
    overlap. Also, this acceleration increased the program risk for the start
    of product development from all low to mostly medium risk for the 15
    technologies, processes, and system attributes being tracked.

    Page 13 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    Figure 4: Effect of Accelerated Product Development Start on Program Risk

    As figure 4 indicates, the UCAV technology and product development phases
    had been shortened from a plan with little concurrency between technology
    and product development to a plan with significant concurrency between the
    two. The push to deliver the product sooner compressed the time in which
    technologies will be matured and integrated into the UCAV weapon system.
    The resulting approximate 24- month overlap between technology and product
    development caused by accelerating the beginning of UCAV*s product
    development program had the potential to create *late cycle churn,* or the
    scramble to fix significant problems discovered late. We have found that
    when problems are

    Page 14 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    uncovered late in product development, more time and money is required to
    rework what is already finished. 7 The Office of the Secretary of Defense
    recently restructured the UCAV

    program to a joint program structure to meet the needs of the Navy as well
    as the Air Force. The Office of the Secretary of Defense cancelled plans
    to build the X- 45B prototypes and now anticipates that the joint UCAV
    program will focus on a family of vehicles derived from the larger Boeing
    X- 45C and Northrop Grumman X- 47B prototypes designs. The details of the
    program are still being decided, but it appears likely that while content
    will increase, the start of product development will be delayed. This
    approach represents a substantial improvement over the late 2002 plan in
    that it lowers risks significantly. However, keeping requirements and
    resources in balance and funding intact until product development starts
    will be a challenge.

    The proposed prototypes will be larger than the X- 45A or X- 45B and thus
    more capable of supporting requirements for greater combat range and
    endurance. Also, both the proposed X- 45C and X- 47B prototypes will have
    a larger wing area, allowing them to carry increased payload and internal
    fuel. Just as the X- 45B would have been more capable than the X- 45A, the
    X- 45C is projected to be more capable than the X- 45B as shown in Table 3

    below. We did not obtain specific data on the X- 47B prototype.

    Table 3: Comparisons of UCAV Variants X- 45A X- 45B X- 45C

    Weight 12,000 lb. 21,000 lb. (approx.) 35,000 lb. Length 26.3 ft. 32 ft.
    36 ft. Wingspan 33.8 ft. 47 ft. 48 ft. Payload 1,500 lb. 2,000 lb. 4,500
    lb. Ceiling 35,000 ft. 40,000 ft. 40,000 ft. Speed 0.75 Mach 0.85 Mach
    0.85 Mach Endurance/ combat radius 450 NM w/ 30 minutes loiter 850 NM w/
    30 minute

    loiter (w/ added internal fuel)

    1100* 1300 NM w/ 30 minute loiter Source: DOD.

    7 U. S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: A More Constructive
    Test Approach Is Key to Better Weapon Systems Outcomes, GAO/ NSIAD- 00-
    199 (Washington, D. C.: July 31, 2000). Recent DOD Decision

    to Restructure Program Can Reduce Risks

    Page 15 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    Further, by adopting a design that increases internal space on the air
    vehicle, DOD could more readily incorporate electronic attack equipment
    and other sensors and avionics. In addition, the plan would reintroduce
    competition into the UCAV program by assessing two different designs. This
    competition would increase DOD*s ability to pursue the best technical
    solution. On the other hand, acquisition cost for the larger air vehicles
    are expected to increase as will operating and support costs due to the
    abandonment of the storage- in- the- box concept. Also, meeting the Navy*s
    need for carrier- based operations could place additional demands on the
    air vehicle design. Figures 5 and 6 show illustrations of Boeing and
    Northrop Grumman proposed joint UCAV designs.

    Figure 5: Computer Rendition of the Boeing X- 45C

    Page 16 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    Figure 6: Computer Rendition of the Northrop Grumman X- 47B

    In addition, more time will be added under the joint program to conduct
    demonstrations by delaying the start of product development by several
    years. Some of this added time* up to a year* will be needed to develop
    and deliver the new prototypes. As shown in figure 7, delaying the

    beginning of product development could reduce technical risks since DOD
    would have more time to test prototypes.

    Page 17 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    Figure 7: Effect of Delayed Product Development Start on Program Risk

    However, these delays may postpone initial operational capability beyond
    what DOD and the Congress originally anticipated, which was at the end of
    the decade. But recognizing this upfront to put the program on a sounder
    footing may be preferable to proposing a higher risk approach* like the
    2002 plan* that is more susceptible to unplanned delays.

    Drawing on the experience of the UCAV to date as well as other programs,
    DOD will face challenges in keeping the requirements for the new joint
    design balanced with available resources. One challenge relates to
    requirements. As mentioned above, more demands could be made of the air
    vehicle to meet the needs of both the Air Force and the Navy. Prior to the
    new joint approach, the Navy*s top mission for the UCAV has been
    conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. When
    considering the Air Force*s missions of reactive and preemptive SEAD and
    electronic attack, it is foreseeable that the program will face pressures
    to

    Page 18 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    meet multiple missions. One approach to meeting this challenge is to delay
    the start of product development until resources* such as technology
    maturity* are available to meet all requirements. This would delay the
    program significantly and could raise funding issues. Alternatively,
    adhering to an evolutionary acquisition approach and developing the
    different mission capabilities in sequence could meet the challenge, so
    that the initial capability can be fielded sooner.

    Another challenge relates to funding. Past and present programs have been
    susceptible to such funding issues. Moreover, other programs that dwarf
    the UCAV program* such as the F- 22 and the Joint Strike Fighter* will be
    competing for investment funds at the same time.

    We have found in earlier work 8 that although the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense provides some funding for advanced technology development
    efforts, the military services and defense agencies are ultimately
    responsible for financing the acquisition and support of equipment or
    items that result from the efforts. At times, however, the military
    services have not wanted to fund the transition process. This action
    either slowed down the acquisition process or resulted in no additional
    procurements. Specifically, military services have not wanted to fund
    technologies focusing on meeting joint requirements because those
    technologies do not directly affect their individual missions, and there
    are specific projects that they would prefer to fund. At the same time,
    Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that they lack a
    mechanism for ensuring that decisions on whether to acquire items with
    proven military utility are made at the joint level, and not merely by the
    gaining organizations, and that these acquisitions receive the proper
    priority.

    The UCAV has already experienced some funding challenges. Recently, during
    preparations for the fiscal year 2004 budget cycle, the Air Force budget
    proposal eliminated all UCAV funding beyond that needed to finish work on
    two prototypes already on contract. The Air Force based this

    action on its belief that the X- 45B UCAV was too small for the role the
    Air Force believed was most needed.

    8 U. S. General Accounting Office, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Factors Affecting
    Outcomes of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations, GAO- 03- 52
    (Washington, D. C.: Dec. 2, 2002

    Page 19 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    To keep the UCAV program on track, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    stepped in to resolve requirements and funding challenges and maintained a
    strong oversight over it. While the Office of the Secretary

    of Defense increased the challenge by accelerating the delivery date for
    the first UCAVs, it allowed the Air Force to defer the reactive SEAD
    requirement and fended off more radical changes to the UCAV*s missions. In
    addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has taken the lead in
    brokering the agreement on the joint program proposal, adding development
    time to the proposal and working out a joint effort that could

    result in a single design for the Air Force and Navy. Sustaining the role
    played by the Office of the Secretary of Defense is likely to be important
    to meeting future challenges the UCAV may face.

    UCAVs offer a potential for DOD to carry out dangerous missions without
    putting lives at stake and to find cost- effective ways of replacing DOD*s
    aging tactical aircraft fleet. However, up until recently, pre-
    acquisition decisions had collectively increased requirements and reduced
    resources, putting the program in a riskier position to succeed. The
    decision to create a joint program could make for a better program if the
    gap between resources and requirements can be closed. The joint program
    faces a challenge in managing the demands of multimission requirements
    with the desire to field an initial capability in a reasonable time.
    Accepting increased requirements and accelerating fielding at the same
    time, as was previously done, will hinder the ability of the joint UCAV
    program to succeed. The program also faces the challenge of sustaining
    funding support from both services at a time when it is competing against
    other large aircraft investments. Regardless of which direction the new
    program takes, the role played by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    will

    continue to be instrumental in helping to negotiate requirements, to
    assure the right resources are provided, and to make further difficult
    tradeoff decisions throughout the program.

    We recommend the Secretary of Defense develop an acquisition approach for
    the joint UCAV program that enables requirements and resources to be
    balanced at the start of product development. This approach should provide
    mechanisms for brokering the demands of multiple missions, for ensuring
    that the product developer maintains a voice in assessing the resource
    implications of requirements, and for preserving the integrity of
    evolutionary acquisition. Reinstating the use of technology readiness
    levels may be very valuable in facilitating necessary tradeoffs.
    Conclusion

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    Page 20 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    We also recommend that the Secretary formalize the management role
    performed by his office and the attendant authority to perform that role;
    ensure that the services are fully involved in the process; and work to
    develop an efficient approach to transitioning the UCAV from DOD*s
    technology development environment to the services* acquisition
    environment so the needs of the war fighter can be met more quickly.

    DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The
    comments appear in appendix I. DOD provided separate technical comments,
    which we have incorporated as appropriate.

    DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
    develop an acquisition approach for the joint UCAV program that enables
    requirements and resources to be balanced at the start of product
    development. It has directed the formation of a Joint Systems Management
    Office to define near- term requirements and to conduct robust operational
    assessments. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the
    Secretary

    formalize a management role performed by his office and the attendant
    authority to perform that role; ensure that the services are fully
    involved in the process; and work to develop an efficient services*
    acquisition environment so the needs of the war fighter can be met more
    quickly. DOD noted that the Secretary is organizing the management
    function as he deems suitable. DOD did state that the department*s UAV
    Planning Task

    Force would continue to provide oversight over all DOD UCAV program
    activities. We believe this is important because it was this organization
    that was instrumental in refocusing the DOD UCAV effort into a joint
    program that we believe will significantly improve the probability of
    successfully fielding UCAVs.

    To achieve our objectives we examined Air Force UCAV program solicitations
    and agreements, the demonstration master plan, trade studies, technology
    demonstration plans and results, status of critical technologies, plans to
    further enhance maturity of critical technologies, and plans to move UCAV
    to the Air Force for product development. We interviewed DARPA and Air
    Force program managers and technical support officials at DARPA program
    offices in Arlington, Virginia, and the Air Force*s Research Lab and
    Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton,
    Ohio, to document current development efforts and the maturity status of
    critical technologies and other attributes. Agency Comments

    and Our Evaluation Scope and Methodology

    Page 21 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    To determine options that may be available to UCAV program managers in
    making changes to requirements or resources, we examined the program*s
    risk assessments of its 15 technologies, processes, and system attributes
    to identify risk associated with beginning product development at
    different points in time. We interviewed Air Force Air Combat Command
    officials at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, concerning UCAV
    requirements, and air staff officials in Arlington, Virginia, concerning
    program objectives and resources. We also interviewed a number of
    officials from the Office of Secretary of Defense having responsibility
    for UCAV oversight and funding. We conducted our work from February 2002
    through May 2003 in

    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are
    sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries
    of the Air Force and Navy, the Director of the Office of Management and
    Budget and other congressional defense committees. We will also provide
    copies to others on request. In addition, the report will be available at
    no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

    Please contact me at (202) 512- 2811 if you or your staff has any
    questions concerning this report. Key contributors to this report were
    Mike Sullivan, Jerry Clark, Matt Lea, Kris Keener, Travis Masters,
    Cristina Chaplain, Lily Chin, Bob Swierczek, and Maria- Alaina Rambus.

    Paul Francis Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management

    Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Page 22 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success

    Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Page 23 GAO- 03- 598 UCAV Program's Success (120125)

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