Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and
Surveillance System Need to Be Considered (23-MAY-03,
GAO-03-597).
The Department of Defense's Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is
developing a ballistic missile defense system designed to counter
a wide spectrum of ballistic missile threats. A future element of
this system is the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS).
STSS will eventually be composed of a constellation of satellites
that will work together to detect and track missiles throughout
all phases of their flight. GAO was asked to analyze MDA's
approach to demonstrate capabilities for STSS.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-597
ACCNO: A06984
TITLE: Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking
and Surveillance System Need to Be Considered
DATE: 05/23/2003
SUBJECT: Ballistic missiles
Electronic surveillance
Military research and development
Military satellites
DOD Space Tracking and Surveillance
System
DOD Space-Based Infrared System-low
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-03-597
Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, U. S. Senate
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
May 2003 MISSILE DEFENSE Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and
Surveillance System Need to Be Considered
GAO- 03- 597
MDA purposely adopted a strategy that would evolve STSS over time rather
than trying to make a big leap in its capability, deferring some
requirements, and calling for competition in the development of the
sensors aboard the satellite. Recent decisions, however, will limit MDA*s
ability to achieve its original goals
as well as the knowledge that could be gained from its satellite
demonstrations. Specifically:
MDA recently reduced its efforts to sustain competition by eliminating
funds set aside to procure an alternative satellite sensor from a
competing contractor. It now plans to fund only efforts to design an
alternative sensor. If it chooses to pursue STSS as part of the missile
defense system, STSS may end up being more expensive in the future because
MDA could be locked
into a single contractor for the design and production of the large
constellation of satellites. MDA decided to delay development and launch
of new demonstrators in
order to focus on completing development of two legacy satellites. MDA
already knows that it would like to pursue different designs and different
technologies for its target system given that the legacy satellites do not
support a producible design. As a result, delaying work on the next
generation of satellites will delay work that could offer a better basis
from which MDA could build an operational capability.
MDA*s decision to launch in 2007 lacks important knowledge. MDA has
established a launch date before it has completed its assessment of the
working condition of the equipment it needs to assemble in order to finish
building the two satellites it would like to launch. As a result, it does
not know the extent of work that must be done or how much it will cost
because
the number components found to be in working or non- working order have
not yet been identified. MDA has considered pursuing alternate approaches,
but all are constrained by the need to participate in 2006- 2007 missile
defense tests. These approaches include (1) launching the legacy
satellites in 2008 instead of 2007 and (2)
stopping work on the legacy satellites and focusing instead on developing
new demonstrators. Both of these approaches would enable MDA to inject
more competition into the STSS program, reduce scheduling risks, and
demonstrate more capabilities. However, they also have drawbacks;
primarily, they would
delay MDA*s ability to make informed trade- offs on missile defense
sensors. The Department of Defense*s
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is developing a ballistic missile defense
system designed to counter a wide spectrum of ballistic missile threats. A
future element of this
system is the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS). STSS will
eventually be composed of a
constellation of satellites that will work together to detect and track
missiles throughout all phases of their flight. GAO was asked to analyze
MDA*s approach to demonstrate capabilities for STSS.
To optimize MDA*s approach to demonstrating space- based missile tracking
capabilities, GAO recommends that MDA focus spending to assessing what
needs to be done to complete work on existing satellite components so that
it has a reasonable basis for its
cost and scheduling estimates. GAO also recommends that MDA assess
alternatives to its current strategy that may offer opportunities to
reduce risks and gain more knowledge. In commenting on a draft of this
report, DOD partially concurred
with two of our recommendations and concurred with two others. In its
comments, DOD stated that it would not be prudent to delay launching
satellites given the need to make overall ballistic missile defense system
sensor
assessments.
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 597. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Katherine Schinasi at (202) 512- 4841 or SchinasiK@
gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 597, a report to
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Committee on Armed Services May
2003
MISSILE DEFENSE
Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and Surveillance System Need to Be
Considered
Page i GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background
4 Capabilities Remain to Be Proven through Testing in Space 8 MDA*s
Approach to Demonstrate STSS Capabilities 10 MDA May Not Be Able to
Achieve Original Goals With Its Revised
Strategy 16 Alternate Approaches May Garner More Knowledge 23 Conclusions
26 Recommendations for Executive Actions 26 Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation 27 Scope and Methodology 29 Appendix Comments from the
Department of Defense 31
Tables
Table 1: DOD*s Attempts to Demonstrate or Field Space- Based Missile
Tracking Capabilities and Their Outcomes 7 Table 2: TRL Assessment for
Critical Technologies for Legacy
Satellites 15 Table 3: Work That Must Be Done on Legacy Satellites 15
Table 4: Potential Risks for the Current STSS Strategy 19 Table 5:
Comparison of MDA*s Strategy and Alternatives Not Being Considered 24
Figure
Figure 1: Notional Configuration of STSS and the Ballistic Missile Defense
System 5 Contents
Page ii GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense Abbreviations
AEHF Advanced Extremely High Frequency DOD Department of Defense MDA
Missile Defense Agency MSX Midcourse Space Experiment SBIRS Space- Based
Infrared System STSS Space Tracking and Surveillance System
TRL Technology readiness level
This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
materials separately from GAO*s product.
Page 1 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
May 23, 2003 The Honorable Wayne Allard Chairman The Honorable Bill Nelson
Ranking Minority Member Strategic Forces Subcommittee Committee on Armed
Services United States Senate
The Department of Defense*s (DOD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is
developing a ballistic missile defense system designed to counter a wide
spectrum of ballistic missile threats. A future element of this system is
the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), formerly known as
Space- Based Infrared System- low (SBIRS- low). STSS will eventually be
composed of a constellation of an as yet undefined number of satellites
that will work together to detect and track missiles throughout all phases
of their flight* from launch through midcourse and finally into reentry
phase* and pass that information to other missile defense elements. The
satellites will orbit earth at a low altitude, and they will carry
infrared sensors and supporting subsystems based on sophisticated
technologies. DOD currently expects to spend about $3.1 billion on STSS
through 2009.
DOD has initiated several programs and spent several billion dollars over
the past 2 decades trying to develop a system to track missiles from
space, but has not yet demonstrated certain critical capabilities. While
some capabilities have been demonstrated through computer modeling and
simulations, DOD believes all of the capabilities need to be proven in
space before a large number of satellites can be acquired. Given the
challenges associated with the program, you requested that we determine
which capabilities still need to be demonstrated for STSS, analyze MDA*s
approach for doing so, and identify alternative approaches for
demonstrating the capabilities that may offer better outcomes.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
To be able to track missiles from space, MDA still needs to demonstrate
that:
tracking information can be passed between sensors within a satellite;
tracking information can be passed between satellites; missiles can be
tracked in the midcourse phase of their flight; data from two satellites
at different locations and angles can be
successfully integrated, processed, and analyzed; data from the
satellites can be successfully passed to other space-, air-,
land-, and sea- based platforms; satellites can operate and make some
decisions autonomously; and satellites can discriminate warheads from
decoys.
Achieving these capabilities is technically challenging given the
difficulties associated with tracking cool objects against the cold
background of space as well as the harsh space environment and the short
time frames required to successfully identify, track, and intercept an
incoming warhead. Yet MDA believes most of these capabilities are needed
to have a system that can play a useful role in the overall missile
defense system. Two capabilities* autonomous operation and discrimination*
do not need to be demonstrated as quickly, but they would significantly
enhance a space- based missile tracking system.
MDA purposely adopted a strategy that would evolve STSS over time rather
than trying to make a big leap in capability, as had been the strategy in
the past. It deferred requirements that were too technically challenging
or beyond its immediate missile defense mission. MDA also called for
competition in the development and production of the sensors aboard the
satellite that would detect a missile launch (acquisition sensor) and
track a missile flight (tracking sensor) so that costs could be contained
in the future and the best technical solution could be pursued. In
addition, MDA opted to launch *demonstration* satellites before developing
and producing them in large numbers. This strategy helps to reduce risks
because it ensures technology is sufficiently mature and capabilities have
been demonstrated before a greater investment is made.
Recent decisions, however, will limit MDA*s ability to achieve its
original goals as well as the knowledge that could be gained from its
satellite demonstrations. In order to take part in broader missile
defense tests scheduled for
2006 and 2007, MDA decided to retrieve satellites and ground components
that were partially built in a previous effort and put into Results in
Brief
Page 3 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
storage 4 years ago, complete the assembly of this equipment, and launch
two satellites in 2007. Using these satellites in the 2007 test will help
MDA to make trade- off decisions among missile defense systems. To be able
to launch both satellites in 2007, however, MDA eliminated its plans to
have two contractors compete in the production of satellite acquisition
sensors. Instead, the program office now plans to fund the separate
development of an alternative sensor design, but if the funds available do
not allow for a meaningful design effort, it will be canceled. By choosing
this approach, overall program costs could be higher because MDA could be
locked in to using a single contractor for the production of a larger
constellation of satellites.
In order to complete the development of the legacy satellites for launch
in 2007, MDA also decided to delay the development and launching of new
demonstrators. While MDA could learn a great deal about missile tracking
capabilities from the legacy satellites, MDA already knows that it would
like to pursue different designs and different technologies for its target
system given that the legacy satellites do not support a producible
design. As a result, delaying work on the next generation of satellites
will delay work that could offer a better basis from which MDA could build
operational capability.
MDA*s decision to launch in 2007 was based on limited knowledge. MDA
established a launch date before it had completed its assessment of the
working condition of the equipment it needs to assemble in order to finish
building the two satellites it would like to launch. As a result, it does
not know the extent of work that must be done or how much it will cost.
More specifically, while MDA may know the cost to test the satellite
component hardware, it does not know how many components will be found in
nonworking order, nor the costs to fix these components. Moreover, MDA has
identified a number of activities that will pose scheduling risks, such as
(1) completing development of software for the ground segment and the
infrared sensor software and (2) integrating the payload hardware and
software. Though MDA has set aside funds to cover the risks, it will not
have the knowledge it needs to really know if it can meet its target date
until early 2004* when its assessment of the working condition of the
existing equipment will be complete.
MDA has considered alternative approaches, but has not pursued any that
would not allow STSS to participate in 2006- 2007 testing. Alternative
approaches not considered include (1) launching the legacy satellites in
2008 instead of 2007, which would allow another year to complete
development of the legacy satellites and procure a sensor of different
Page 4 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
design, and (2) stopping work on the legacy satellites and focusing
instead on developing new technology, which would enable MDA to
demonstrate and eventually field an operational capability sooner than its
current approach. Both of these approaches would enable MDA to inject more
competition into the STSS program, reduce scheduling risks, and
demonstrate more capabilities. However, they also have drawbacks;
primarily, they would delay MDA*s ability to make informed trade- offs
among missile defense systems.
We are making recommendations in this report that are intended to guide
MDA in selecting the best approach for demonstrating missile tracking
capabilities from space. DOD partially concurred with two of our
recommendations and concurred with two others. In its comments, DOD stated
that it would not be prudent to delay launching satellites given the need
to make overall ballistic missile defense system sensor assessments. DOD
is developing a ballistic missile defense system designed, over time,
to counter a wide spectrum of ballistic missile threats. It will rely on
space and ground- based systems to detect and track missiles; ground-,
sea-, and air- based systems to intercept missiles in all stages of flight
(which includes boost, midcourse, and reentry); and an overarching command
and control system to plan and execute actions to counter enemy attacks.
STSS will serve as the satellite network that will detect and track
missiles
throughout their flight and relay necessary cuing data to other elements
in the missile defense system. The satellites will orbit the earth at low
altitudes in order to allow for better missile viewing angles and high
resolution. 1 Each satellite will contain two infrared sensors* one to
watch for bright missile plumes during the boost phase (acquisition
sensor) and one to follow the missile through midcourse and reentry
(tracking sensor). To provide for worldwide coverage, STSS would consist
of a large constellation of satellites (between 21 and 28) as well as a
supporting ground infrastructure. MDA has decided that significantly fewer
satellites could be used to provide a meaningful capability based on the
contributions and configurations of the other elements in MDA*s ballistic
missile defense system. However, at this time MDA has not decided on the
number of satellites that it plans to acquire.
1 The satellites will operate about 1, 350 kilometers above the earth. By
comparison, satellites in geo- synchronous orbit operate at about 36,000
kilometers. Background
Page 5 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
Figure 1: Notional Configuration of STSS and the Ballistic Missile Defense
System
DOD has had considerable difficulty for almost 20 years in developing a
space- based missile tracking capability. Though it has spent several
billion dollars through a series of development and acquisition programs
since
1984, it has not launched a single satellite or demonstrated any
spacebased missile tracking capabilities from space using technologies
similar to those to be used by STSS. This is partly due to the technical
challenges associated with building a system like STSS. For example, the
satellites* sensors need to be able to track missiles in the midcourse
phase of their flight, when missiles can no longer be easily detected by
their bright
plume. To do this, detection sensors must be cooled to very low
temperatures for very long periods of time to detect and track a cool
warhead against the cold background of space. In addition, systems aboard
the satellite and on the ground must send that data to other missile
History of Problems in Developing a Missile
Tracking System
Page 6 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
defense systems quickly enough to allow them to target and destroy
incoming missiles and they must work under harsh environmental conditions
of space. This requires fast data processing and communication links as
well as materials that can withstand radiation and cold temperatures.
Within this environment of significant technical challenges, DOD has not
yet established a program that it could execute. As we have reported 2
over the years, DOD and the Air Force did not relax rigid requirements to
more closely match technical capabilities that were achievable. Program
baselines were set based on artificial time and/ or money constraints.
Over time, it became apparent that the lack of knowledge of program
challenges had led to overly optimistic schedules and budgets that were
funded at less than what was needed. Attempts to stay on schedule by
approving critical milestones without meeting program criteria resulted in
higher costs and more slips in technology development efforts. For
example, our 1997 and 2001 reviews of DOD*s $1.7 billion SBIRS- low
program, STSS* immediate predecessor, showed that the program would enter
the product development phase with critical technologies that were
immature and with optimistic deployment schedules. In order to reduce
costs, schedule, performance, and technical risks, we recommended that DOD
restructure the program and analyze alternatives to satisfy critical
ballistic missile defense requirements in case SBIRS- low could not be
deployed according to the original acquisition strategy. DOD eventually
restructured the SBIRS- low program because of the cost and scheduling
problems, and it put the equipment it had partially built into storage.
Table 1 further highlights problems affecting space- based missile
tracking programs since 1990.
2 U. S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Space- Based
Infrared System- low at Risk of Missing Initial Deployment Date, GAO- 01-
6 (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 28, 2001) and National Missile Defense: Risk
and Funding Implications for the Space- Based Infrared Low Component GAO/
NSIAD- 97- 16 (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 25, 1997).
Page 7 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
Table 1: DOD*s Attempts to Demonstrate or Field Space- Based Missile
Tracking Capabilities and Their Outcomes Program start Program title
Purpose/ mission Problems Outcome
1990 Brilliant Eyes Development program. Acquire and track missiles during
late boost and midcourse phases and discriminate warheads from decoys.
Program funding was sharply reduced for Brilliant Eyes and other space-
based systems. The lack of funding hindered the program from meeting its
objectives. No demonstration satellites
launched. The Congress transferred the program from the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization (now MDA) to the Air Force in 1993. 1993 Space and
Missile
Tracking System Development program. Acquire and track missiles and
discriminate warheads from decoys during post- boost phases.
Technical, funding, and management problems delayed the scheduled launch
of two demonstration
satellites. No demonstration satellites
were launched. In 1994, DOD consolidated its infrared space requirements
and selected the Space- Based Infrared System as a *system of systems*
approach. Program was terminated. 1996 Space- Based
Infrared Systemlow Acquisition program. Support
national and theater missile defense by tracking missiles over their
entire flights and discriminating warheads from decoys in supporting the
missile
defense mission. Negative trends in cost,
schedule, and performance estimates for the SBIRS- low program resulted in
DOD taking it off an acquisition track, and returning it to a
sustained and deliberate technology development track.
Satellite demonstration effort canceled and the program development risk
reduction phase restructured. Program
subsequently transferred from the Air Force to MDA.
2002 Space Tracking and Surveillance System
Development program. Acquire, detect, and track ballistic missiles through
a series of increasingly capable and interoperable satellites and ground
infrastructure.
Not applicable. Program has just begun. Not applicable. Program has
just begun. Source: GAO. In October 2000, the Congress directed the Air
Force to transfer the
program to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (now MDA). The
Senate Committee on Armed Services directed a study of alternatives to
SBIRS- low as part of the fiscal year 2002 budget authorization process.
These alternatives were to include ground-, sea-, and air- based sensors
such as radar systems. MDA is currently expected to complete this study in
2003. The Committee directed that the report contain (1) an analysis of
essential national missile defense requirements that SBIRS- low would
fulfill and what alternative systems could also fulfill such requirements;
(2) a quantitative assessment of national missile defense system
performance without SBIRS- low or any alternative system; (3) a
quantitative assessment of the national missile defense system performance
with SBIRS- low and with each alternative system; (4) yearly cost
estimates for SBIRS- low and of each alternative system beginning with
fiscal year 2002, including all Congressional Actions
Page 8 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
previous fiscal years and all fiscal years through deployment of a fully
operational system; (5) a risk assessment of SBIRS- low and of each
alternative system; and (6) a qualitative assessment of the strengths and
weaknesses of SBIRS- low and each alternative system.
In addition, the Congress denied the $385 million DOD requested for the
program for fiscal year 2002, but it provided $250 million for a satellite
sensor technology effort, of which STSS would be a part. MDA was also
directed by the House Appropriations Committee to take STSS out of the
acquisition process and manage it as a sustained and deliberate technology
development effort.
DOD believes the following capabilities are needed to have a space- based
missile tracking system that can play a useful role in the overall missile
defense system. These capabilities have not yet been demonstrated in
space, although DOD has had successes in demonstrating some related
onorbit capabilities through experimental satellites.
Acquisition- to- track hand over:
The ability of one satellite to detect or *acquire* a missile launch and
to transmit this data to its internal tracking sensor. The tracking sensor
would then continue tracking the missile after the acquisition sensor has
completed its detection function. Satellite- to- satellite hand over:
The ability of two or more low- earth orbiting satellites to pass along
missile tracking data through two- way cross- links. This is a challenging
capability to demonstrate given the low orbits and flight path geometry of
the satellites. DOD has no military flight experience linking two or more
low- earth orbiting satellites through two- way cross- links. The Iridium
System, a private network of low orbiting satellites, can establish cross-
links, but it does not have the timeliness and low bit error rate
requirement of STSS. Further, only voice data (versus analytical data) is
transmitted from one fixed user to another (in comparison with a moving
satellite*s speed), there are ground stations to assist in the process,
and dropped links are not mission- critical as they would be for STSS.
DOD*s Milstar communication satellites use cross- links, but they operate
in a much higher orbit in fixed positions Capabilities Remain
to Be Proven through Testing in Space
Page 9 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
relative to one another, so this experience also does not translate
directly to STSS. 3 Midcourse tracking:
The ability to (1) accurately track cool objects from thousands of
kilometers away, which depends on sensitive sensors and accurate pointing
capabilities, and (2) stereo tracking, which requires the capability to
transfer and fuse data from multiple sensors in space while viewing the
target missile from differing ranges and angles. Midcourse stereo tracking
(two satellites reporting tracking information on one missile*s flight) is
more desirable because it results in more precise information on the
missile*s location. Some missile tracking capabilities were demonstrated
during DOD*s 1996 Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX), which launched a
satellite that collected data on a missile launch using optical sensors.
However, this satellite did not conduct the same kind of functions that
STSS would be required to perform, nor did it demonstrate all of the same
technologies. 4 Dual mission data processing:
The ability to process and analyze data from two satellites that view one
event from two different angles and locations.
Missile defense system integration:
The ability to transmit and fuse STSS data with data provided by other
space-, air, land-, and sea- based sensors* including legacy and emerging
systems belonging to DOD and U. S. allies* and to use the results
effectively in missile defense operations.
3 The Milstar satellite communications system provides secure, jam
resistant, worldwide communications to meet essential wartime requirements
for high- priority military users. 4 The MSX spacecraft had 5 primary
sensors with a total of 11 optical sensors, precisely
aligned so that activity of various targets can be viewed simultaneously
with multiple sensors. Four months after its launch, MSX successfully
observed and tracked a 20- minute ballistic missile test flight. MSX
collected more than 800 seconds of high- quality data on this missile
test. MSX tracked missiles by relying on a sensor that was cooled using a
passive technique whereas the sensor on- board STSS is to rely on an
active and mechanical
approach.
Page 10 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
There are two capabilities that DOD believes do not need to be
demonstrated as quickly, but they would significantly enhance a spacebased
missile tracking system. They are:
Autonomous operation:
The ability of each satellite to operate as a self- contained unit and to
perform some decision- making functions before downlinking the results.
Because satellites will be moving at speeds of more than 15,000 mph
relative to one another and across different orbital planes, as well as
moving in and out of the target missile*s range, calculations and
decisions must be made and data passed between sensors and satellites
within seconds. This is a desired future capability.
Discrimination:
Countering more advanced and sophisticated threats will require DOD to be
able to detect and track multiple objects and differentiate the
threatening warhead from decoys. Given technical challenges, DOD deferred
plans to achieve this capability for STSS. However, it plans to achieve
this capability for the missile defense system as a whole before 2015.
MDA could demonstrate space- based missile tracking capabilities by either
continuing earlier efforts or developing new satellites. At the beginning
of the STSS program, MDA chose to combine both, focusing first on
assembling and launching existing satellites and second on developing new
satellites. MDA also sought to avoid the mistakes made in previous space-
based missile tracking efforts by adopting a more flexible,
knowledge- based development strategy and calling for competition in
aspects of satellite development. Recently, MDA decided to launch the
first two demonstration satellites in 2007 and launch the first next
generation satellite in 2011. MDA*s Approach to
Demonstrate STSS Capabilities
Page 11 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
MDA could demonstrate space- based missile tracking capabilities by either
relying on legacy satellites or developing new satellites or a combination
of both. 5 Specifically, MDA could complete work on satellite and ground
components that were partially built during the Air Force*s effort (SBIRS-
low) and put into storage 4 years ago. The satellites were intended to
serve as precursors to a constellation of operational satellites. The
capabilities that were built into the legacy components include
acquisition to track hand over, satellite- to- satellite hand over, stereo
midcourse tracking, and a limited capability to discriminate the types of
missiles launched.
MDA could also develop more capable and more robust satellites based on
newer technology. The satellites could be equipped with more accurate
sensors, faster data processing capacity, and longer lasting components.
The new satellites could also be designed to include features not
available to the existing satellites, such as adding an autonomous
operations capability. As with any approach, a ground segment capable of
supporting future demonstration satellites would be needed.
At the beginning of the STSS program, MDA decided it would pursue a
combination of both approaches. Specifically, it would complete the
assembly of satellite and ground components already in storage and launch
them to coincide with broader missile defense tests that would take place
in 2006- 2007. This would allow MDA to establish a basis for making trade-
off decisions between space-, sea-, and air- based missile defense sensors
(for example, radar systems). MDA also decided to develop a newer design,
including more robust technologies envisioned for the target system.
5 MDA could supplement both approaches by incorporating knowledge from the
results of tests of other satellites with missile tracking capabilities,
though there are limitations to the knowledge that could be applied to
STSS. These include past tests such as the 1996 MSX test discussed earlier
and upcoming tests such as one MDA will be conducting in the near future
with a satellite build by Spectrum Astro to collect infrared data on
intercontinental ballistic missiles during the boost phase. Data to be
collected under the contract will be used to verify MDA*s future selection
of a kill vehicle and tracking sensors for missile engagements during the
boost and ascent phases. The data will also build the foundation for
developing guidance and homing algorithms for MDA*s ground- based, boost-,
and ascent- phase interceptors. The satellite will be designed for an on-
orbit lifetime of at least 1 year, with the objective of a 2- year on-
orbit life, and is planned for launch into low earth orbit in June 2004.
Potential Approaches
Available to MDA
Page 12 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
At the onset of STSS, MDA adopted a more flexible product development
approach that would maximize competition. For example:
As with all missile defense elements, MDA called for a strategy that
would evolve STSS over time, rather than trying to make a big leap in its
capability. This means that new technology would be incorporated into
subsequent increments so that the product*s capability would evolve over
time. Our work has shown this approach reduces risk because it introduces
less new content and technology into a program*s design and development
effort. An evolutionary strategy also enables developers to deliver a
series of interim capabilities to the customer more quickly.
Under its evolutionary approach, MDA deferred requirements that were too
technically challenging or beyond its immediate missile defense mission.
For example, MDA deferred the requirement for a discrimination capability
and has not decided whether the next STSS development block will perform
discrimination. It also deferred requirements for STSS missions beyond
missile defense, including technical intelligence and battlespace
characterization. Instead, these missions would be addressed only to the
extent that inherent or residual capabilities could satisfy them. Our work
has also shown that
programs are more successful when customers are willing to defer
requirements that demand more time or unproven technologies to succeeding
versions of the product. In essence, this flexibility helps to ensure the
product can be developed within available resources. 6 MDA called for
competition in the development and production of the
sensors onboard the satellite that would detect a missile launch
(acquisition sensor) and track a missile flight (tracking sensor) so that
costs could be contained in the future and the best technical solution
could be pursued. Specifically, one satellite would host sensors from one
subcontractor and another satellite would host sensors from a competing
subcontractor. Since contractors may use different materials to build the
infrared sensors, different detector technologies,
and different production methods, performance could vary considerably. In
describing the STSS approach, the Director of MDA stated that injecting
competition into sensor development was
6 U. S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Matching of
Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes GAO- 01-
288 (Washington, D. C.: March 8, 2001). MDA Sought to Avoid Past
Mistakes with a More Flexible Strategy
Page 13 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
necessary to reduce risks, particularly since MDA planned to award a
single contract to a prime contractor.
MDA decided to fly *demonstration* satellites before developing and
producing them in larger numbers. This practice enables MDA to see how
components and subsystems work together as a system in a realistic
environment before a greater investment of procurement funds is made. Our
work has also shown this to be a practice used by successful programs. 7
After MDA laid the foundation for approaching STSS, it decided to
complete development and testing of two satellites and ground station
equipment it acquired under SBIRS- low; launch the first satellite in 2006
and the second in 2007. Then, beginning in 2003, MDA would pursue
development of new demonstration satellites with more robust technology
and launch them beginning in 2010. It would launch and demonstrate a
series of satellites until it arrived at a design that could be used to
support a bigger constellation of satellites for the missile defense
system. The Air Force signed a contract with Northrop Grumman in August
2002 valued at $868.7 million to (1) design, manufacture, and deliver the
satellites and test and check out the satellites on orbit; (2) develop a
ground system; and (3)
conduct preliminary engineering analyses on the new demonstration
satellites.
In late 2002, MDA made significant changes to its strategy after it
decided to allocate less funding to the STSS program in order to fund
other missile defense elements. Specifically, it decided to continue the
STSS program by integrating and testing the existing satellites, but
launch them in tandem in 2007 instead of sequentially in 2006 and 2007.
Work on a single new satellite would begin in 2003, instead of a pair of
satellites as had been originally planned. The program office plans to
define the capabilities for
the follow- on satellite in mid- 2003 and until then, the design,
technologies, and specifications for the new satellite will not be known.
Work on the new satellite will be stretched out, but MDA hopes to launch
the new satellite in 2011, only 1 year later than planned. The STSS
program office has programmed about $1 billion to complete work, launch,
and operate
7 U. S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: A More Constructive
Test Approach Is Key to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 199
(Washington, D. C.: July 31, 2000). Recent Decisions on STSS
Strategy Provide More Time to Learn from First Two Demonstration
Satellites
Page 14 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
the legacy satellites and $1.3 billion for fiscal years 2004 through 2009
for work on the new, follow- on satellite effort. This change has some
benefits in that certain capabilities could be demonstrated over a longer
on- orbit period of time. Under the original strategy, satellite- to-
satellite hand over, midcourse tracking, and dual mission data processing
would only have been demonstrated for about 8 months since this would be
the amount of time that the satellites would be fully operational
together. By contrast, under the new strategy, these same capabilities
could be demonstrated for as long as 2 years since the satellites will be
launched in tandem. Moreover, under the previous strategy, only partial
integration with the missile defense test bed could be demonstrated
because data from the 2006 satellite would be processed off
line. There could also be delays in processing data because the ground
segment may not be fully integrated with the missile defense test bed
until 2008. (The completion of ground connectivity between the STSS ground
station and the missile defense system does not yet have a definitive
schedule.) Since satellites are expected to be fully operable for 2 years,
integration could be demonstrated during the latter part of the second
satellite*s life. But this would limit the extent to which MDA can assess
STSS functions in the context of the overall system.
MDA is using tools to measure the maturity of critical technologies on the
legacy satellites. Specifically, as the table below shows, MDA has
assessed critical technologies for the legacy satellites using technology
readiness levels (TRL). TRLs measure maturity along a scale of one to
nine. TRL 1 characterizes the least mature technologies representing the
point where scientific research begins to be translated into technologies
basic properties. A TRL 9 represents the most mature, an actual
application of the technologies in its final form under mission
conditions. DOD guidance
states that a TRL 7, which means the system has been demonstrated in an
operational environment, is desired but that a TRL 6 represents acceptable
risk for a space- related technology to enter product development. At a
TRL 6, the subsystem or system has been demonstrated in a relevant
environment. MDA expects critical technologies on the legacy satellites to
be at a TRL 6 by June 2006. Moving from a TRL 5 to a TRL 6 to a TRL 7
represents a significant investment.
Page 15 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
Table 2: TRL Assessment for Critical Technologies for Legacy Satellites
Technology area TRL at
fall 2002 Projected TRL at June 2006
Acquisition sensor 5 6 Tracking sensor 5 6 Single- stage cryocooler 5 6
Two- stage cryocooler 5 6 Satellite communication cross- links 6 6 On-
board processor 6 6 Source: Air Force.
Table 3 highlights the main activities that must be done to complete work
on the legacy satellites. MDA developed a schedule to support the original
plan to launch in 2006 and 2007. It is in the process of establishing the
dates that these activities would need to be done by in order to support
the new tandem launch date of 2007. Table 3: Work That Must Be Done on
Legacy Satellites
Area Work
Systems engineering and assessment This includes validating specifications
and configurations, establishing performance baselines, and assessing and
integrating ground test data analyses. Work under this component also
includes analyzing the performance of the satellites after launch. Sensor
development This includes redesign efforts to the track sensor, along with
assembly, and integration
and test. The track sensor is on the critical path, and all work on this
sensor needs to be completed in time to allow for integration onto the
spacecraft. Under the original strategy, this meant the work should be
done by July 2004. While work progresses on the sensor, software in
support of the sensor will also be developed.
Spacecraft development Efforts include developing the spacecraft test bed,
harness, and software. Activities also include integration and test of the
satellite before and after launch. Satellite integration and test is on
the critical path and was to begin in February 2005 and be completed in
November 2005 under the original strategy. At that time the satellite will
be shipped for launch. Ground segment development Activities include
designing and developing the ground systems, installing hardware in the
ground facilities, and integrating and testing the systems. The ground
segment will
involve more software development than the other satellite segments. Also,
operational procedures will be developed and training on ground systems is
to take place. System test and operations planning This includes
developing the system and flight test plans. Readiness reviews are to be
complete by September 2005, under the original strategy. Other activities
planned include training and rehearsals, operations crew test training,
test operations, and site and satellite operations. Source: Air Force
Space and Missile Systems Center.
Page 16 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
MDA*s approach to STSS will limit its ability to achieve its original
goals for the program as well as the knowledge that could be gained from
its satellite demonstrations.
First, the program office decided to forego pursuing production of
onboard sensors from competing contractors, as originally planned. As a
result, MDA will not have the ability to benefit from competition.
Second, to stay within its budget, the STSS program office made a trade-
off decision to develop only one new satellite rather than two and to
delay work on the new satellite. This decision will delay MDA*s ability to
learn about new satellite designs and technologies needed for an
operational capability.
Third, MDA*s decision to launch in 2007 is not knowledge- based. At this
point, it does not know the extent of work that needs be done on the
legacy satellites since it has not completed its assessment of the
condition of the components that have been in storage for 4 years.
Moreover, it is uncertain as to whether some of the activities it does
know it must undertake in order to integrate and test legacy satellite
systems can be completed in time for the 2007 launch. To its credit, MDA
has set aside extra funds for tasks that present particular scheduling
risk. But until it knows more about the working condition of the satellite
hardware and software, it cannot be sure of its ability to deliver on
time.
MDA*s decision to tentatively fund the design, but not the production, of
a sensor from a competing contractor as part of the first effort will
potentially increase long- term costs and risks. Specifically, it will
preclude MDA from gaining knowledge about competing sensors and selecting
the one that offers the best capability. Moreover, it precludes another
contractor from gaining experience in building infrared sensors,
potentially hampering MDA*s ability to compete work in the future and
making the system more costly over the long term.
We recently reported, for example, that DOD*s effort to develop a new
generation of communication satellites (the Advanced Extremely High
Frequency (AEHF) satellite program) incurred significant cost and
scheduling problems partly because of its decision to consolidate
contractors into one team. In commenting on our findings, DOD admitted
that its major failing with the program was the acceptance of this team*s
proposed approach of an overly optimistic performance, schedule, and MDA
May Not Be
Able to Achieve Original Goals With Its Revised Strategy
Limiting Competition Could Increase Long- term Costs and Risks
Page 17 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
profit baseline. Part of the reason DOD chose to limit competition was to
launch a new satellite as soon as possible. In hindsight, it recognized
that this worsened the situation because the contracting team could not
follow
through on its original promises, and DOD had nowhere else to turn to for
a better solution.
Also, under the SBIRS- low program, the Air Force awarded a contract in
1995 for the development of two technology demonstration satellites to the
same contractor. It later recognized the need for competition for the
demonstration to lower costs and reduce schedule and technical risks
because otherwise only one contractor would gain the experience and
knowledge needed to build the full constellation of satellites. To prevent
similar problems, in 1996, the Air Force requested offers for an
alternative system concept from one or more contractors to demonstrate and
validate critical design issues. The goal of this effort was to stimulate
competition, resolve key technical and production risks, and create a plan
to ensure SBIRS- low deployment schedules can be executed.
The decision to launch the two existing satellites in tandem in 2007,
instead of 2006 and 2007, will provide MDA with more time to assess the
working condition of the satellites* components and to complete work on
assembling the satellites. It will also offer more time for MDA to assess
capabilities such as satellite- to- satellite hand over since the two
satellites will be operating as a pair for a longer period of time.
However, MDA already knows that it would like to pursue different designs
and different technologies for its target system as the legacy system is
based on
technologies that are more than a decade old. Its recent decision to delay
work on a new satellite will merely delay the opportunity to learn more
about a design that could offer a future operational capability and a
better basis for making trade- off decisions among missile defense
sensors. In fact, for the next few years, resources will largely be
devoted to work on the legacy satellites versus the new satellites. In
2004, about 92 percent of STSS funds will go to the legacy satellites
versus 8 percent to the new ones.
MDA has not yet completed its assessment of the working condition of
satellite hardware and software, so it does not know the full extent of
work that needs to be done on the legacy satellites. Moreover, MDA
officials recognize that through the process of testing, assembling, and
integrating the hardware and software components, unforeseen problems
could arise that may make it more difficult to complete the satellites in
Delaying Work on New
Design Will Delay Work Toward Operational Capability
Decision to Launch in 2007 Is Not Knowledge- Based
Page 18 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
time for the 2007 launch. These problems could include completing ground
segment software and the infrared sensor software as well as integrating
payload hardware and software. Table 4 highlights these and other
activities MDA believes have costs and scheduling risks.
MDA and the STSS program office have set aside $47.2 million in funding to
address these potential problems and also drafted risk mitigation plans,
which are to be updated in 2003. This money will be used for independent
review teams that can help the program office assess what work needs to be
done as well as other resources (for example, more personnel) and
activities (for example, contingency planning) needed to prevent
scheduling delays. The program office has also identified the need for $26
million in additional funding to more fully address the risks involved
with
hardware and software issues, which has been funded from the contractor*s
management reserves. Program officials said that if the costs prove to be
too high after the assessment of the working condition of the satellites,
they will terminate the legacy effort and move onto the new demonstrators.
Page 19 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
Table 4: Potential Risks for the Current STSS Strategy Risk Description
Potential effect
Risk mitigation funding (millions)
1. Condition of the satellite hardware and software
Hardware and software must be tested to determine their working condition
after being in storage for 4 years.
If hardware and software do not test as expected, launch delays could be
significant, particularly for the first launch.
$ 9.9 2. Completion of the
ground segment software
The schedule to design, develop, and test the ground software is
aggressive and requires these tasks to be done concurrently. Also, the
requirements for the ground segment software were significantly increased.
If the 31- month schedule does not play out, software costs could
increase, and the ground segment might not meet the scheduled launches for
the existing satellites.
$ 5.0 3. Uncertainty of the
STSS Block 2006 performance
Integrated flight test scenarios and targets have not been defined or
analyzed; STSS performance analyses are incomplete; and infrared sensor
tests will not be completed for 2 more years.
If problems surface, costs could increase, schedules could be delayed, and
STSS could provide less on- orbit performance and utility for the
ballistic missile defense system test bed.
$14.1 4. Completion of the
infrared sensor software Software requirements are undefined and
software interface issues could require software redesign.
If the issues are not resolved, costs could increase, and payload testing
and delivery could be delayed, which would delay the launch( es).
$14.6 5. Integration of the
payload hardware and software
Many integration and test activities conducted in serial must be
successful. The schedule has little slack for test equipment or component
failures.
If this work does not proceed as planned, costs would increase and
delivery of the payloads would be late, which could delay the launch( es).
$ 2.9 6. Thermal
modifications to the infrared sensor payload
Thermal performance and its impact on long- wave infrared performance will
not be known until the sensor has been built and tested.
If lower than expected thermal performance occurs, costs would increase
and satellite- tracking capabilities would be reduced.
$ 0.8 Source: Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center.
MDA will not know the extent of work needed on satellite hardware and
software until late 2004. When the Air Force canceled the flight
demonstration system satellites in 1999, the development of hardware and
software was not completed, and the problem areas that had been identified
had not been fully documented, leaving a knowledge gap that will need to
be closed before MDA proceeds with further development. The legacy
components have been retrieved from storage; however, they still need to
be tested to determine their working condition. In November 2002, testing
started on the first satellite*s payload components (including the
acquisition and tracking sensors). As part of the SBIRS- low effort, the
tracking sensor was tested last year and found to be in working order.
This testing should be completed in October 2003. The satellite*s
spacecraft hardware has been visually inspected, and it will be tested
from May 2003
to September 2003. The spacecraft hardware for the second satellite has
also been visually inspected. Under MDA*s schedule for its original Risk
1: Working Condition of
Satellite Hardware and Software Has Not Been Assessed
Page 20 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
strategy, testing for the second satellite was planned for September 2003
through November 2003, and payload testing was planned for December 2003
to August 2004.
MDA expects that many tasks needed to design, develop, and test the ground
software will need to be done concurrently to meet the new schedule. The
effort will also be complicated by the fact that the requirements for the
ground software significantly changed in 2002, at the time of the program
restructure. Specifically, the software will need to support the future
generation and eventual larger constellation of satellites, whereas the
ground software associated with the legacy satellites was originally
supposed to support two demonstration satellites. Program officials
acknowledged that they would not have a high level of
confidence in the software cost estimate or software schedule until the
preliminary design review for the software occurred, which occurred in
March 2003. Critical tests for assessing preflight performance will not be
done and
analyzed until MDA is close to the point where it needs to begin launch
preparations. For example, integrated flight test scenarios and targets
have not yet been defined or analyzed and, as originally scheduled,
infrared sensor performance tests will not be completed until midcalendar
year 2005* a few months before MDA would need to stop work on the
satellites and begin launch preparations. Program officials pointed to
other factors that will make preparing for performance tests difficult,
including the fact that MDA had not yet identified interfaces with other
missile defense elements or integrated test plans and schedules.
Our reports have shown that pushing such testing to the latter stages of a
development program is very risky. Specifically, it prevents programs from
using test results to improve design. It also raises the risk that
problems will not be discovered until a point where it becomes very costly
and timeconsuming to fix them. Moreover, our reports have also shown that
when testing occurs at latter stages, the amount of testing that is
actually conducted is significantly less than planned. 8 Considerable work
needs to be done on the infrared sensors and software
within a short period of time. Three activities are particularly critical:
(1) completing software development for the acquisition sensor, (2)
8 GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 199. Risk 2: Time for Completing
Ground Segment Software May Be Insufficient
Risk 3: Critical Tests for Assessing Whether Performance Is Acceptable
Will Not Be Done Until Shortly Before Launch Preparations
Risks 4, 5, and 6: Considerable Work Remains to Be Done on Infrared
Sensors and Software
Page 21 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
integrating payload hardware and software, and (3) modifying the tracking
sensor to accommodate requirements for long- wave infrared performance.
Software development for the infrared sensors is on the critical path
and must be completed in time to support integration and testing of the
sensors. Software originally developed for the legacy satellites* sensors
was never completed, and the sensors* software requirements are not
completely defined, which may delay software development. According to the
program office, the lack of time scheduled to perform early software
testing on sensors could result in a delay in detecting and resolving
errors. Most of the $14.6 million risk mitigation funding in this area has
been earmarked to address the lack of early software testing. Also,
software interface issues could require a redesign of the software.
Integration of the payload hardware and software will be complex because
many serial integration and test activities must be successful, and the
schedule has little slack for test equipment or component failures,
according to the program office.
The tracking sensor needs additional modifications to accommodate long-
wave infrared performance requirements. However, the impact of the
modifications will not be known until the sensor has been built and
tested. (The sensor was originally designed for mid- wave infrared
performance. In the middle of the SBIRS- low program, the long- wave
infrared requirements were imposed on the program. While modifications
were made to meet this requirement, the sensor still generates more heat
than the satellite coolers were designed to handle. As such, the sensor
still needs thermal modifications to improve its long- wave infrared
performance.)
Since software development is a risk in many areas of the STSS program,
MDA faces an overriding challenge in accurately predicting what work will
need to be done in developing software related to the program. Reports
show that this is a significant problem for many space and other weapon
system programs* commercial and military. For example, in a series of
studies completed in the 1990s, the Standish Group 9 found that the
average cost overrun was 189 percent, the average schedule overrun was 222
percent of the original estimate, and, on average, only 61 percent of the
projects were delivered with originally specified features or functions
9 The CHAOS Report, the Standish Group International, Inc. (West Yarmouth,
Mass.: 1995). Software Development
Schedules Tend to Be Optimistic
Page 22 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
attributable to software development. In November 2000, the Defense
Science Board reported that the majority of problems associated with DOD
software development programs are a result of undisciplined execution. The
Board found that troubled programs lacked well thoughtout, disciplined
program management and/ or software development processes. Meaningful
cost, schedule, and requirement baselines were also lacking, making it
virtually impossible to track progress against them. 10 We have stated in
previous reports that software development schedules
were optimistic for DOD*s AEHF satellite system and SBIRS- high program.
For example, the Air Force originally estimated that the AEHF payload and
spacecraft bus required approximately 257, 000 lines of software code,
but as the requirements and capabilities of the satellite system were
better understood, the estimate grew to approximately 466,000 lines of
software code. AEHF*s ground segment also increased from about 1.1 million
lines of software code to nearly 1.7 million. In early 2002, during the
last SBIRShigh program restructure, Air Force officials estimated that the
amount of ground segment software had grown 48 percent, while the amount
of
space segment software had grown 28 percent. MDA and the prime contractor
recognize that software presents a risk across the board for STSS. The
prime contractor has decided to manage the work on the STSS program based
on milestones that are 6 months earlier than the contractual satellite
launch date milestones. This means that delays attributable to software
development up to 6 months will not directly affect the satellite launch
schedule.
10 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Software,
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
(Washington, D. C.: Nov. 2000).
Page 23 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
There are other approaches MDA could pursue, but they have not been
considered because they would not allow STSS to participate in 2006- 2007
missile defense testing. These include (1) planning the launch of the
legacy
satellites for 2008 and (2) canceling work on completing the existing
satellites and focusing solely on developing new satellites. These
approaches would enable MDA to inject competition into the STSS program,
reduce scheduling risks, and demonstrate more capabilities. Both
approaches also have drawbacks, primarily, they would delay MDA*s ability
to make informed trade- offs between STSS and other competing surveillance
and tracking capabilities, such as ground-, sea-, and air- based radar
systems. Table 5 compares these alternatives in terms of achieving
capabilities to MDA*s original and current strategies. Alternate
Approaches
May Garner More Knowledge
Page 24 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
Table 5: Comparison of MDA*s Strategy and Alternatives Not Being
Considered One approach not being considered involves delaying the launch
of the legacy satellites until 2008. This approach offers several
advantages over the current strategy.
First, it would reduce program risks by allowing more time to complete
the development and testing of satellite hardware and software that have
been in storage for 4 years, and to complete software development and
testing for the ground segment. Delaying Launches of
Existing Satellites Could Reduce Scheduling Risk and Offer More Knowledge
Page 25 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
Second, it would allow time to complete integration of the ground
segment with the missile defense test bed (scheduled for 2008) and ensure
that both satellites would have enough on- orbit life remaining so that
the satellites and ground segment could be tested together while fully
integrated into the ballistic missile defense system test bed. Third, it
would allow MDA to fund both the design and production of a
competing contractor*s acquisition sensor. This would ensure that
competition remains viable for the development of future series of
satellites, and it is key to MDA getting the best prices and technical
solution. Fourth, satellites launched in 2008 will likely still have
some residual
capability when the new satellite is launched in 2010, allowing them to
interact together to provide increased knowledge. One drawback is a
potential delay in demonstrating capabilities and
technologies, since MDA*s current plan would begin to demonstrate some
capability in 2007. But more importantly, this approach will delay the
benefit of incorporating on- orbit lessons learned into the upgraded
design, because this newer design will be well underway by the time the
satellites are launched. Instead, MDA will have to wait for a future
effort before it can incorporate these lessons learned.
MDA is also not considering focusing solely on developing and
demonstrating new satellites that can offer operational capability once a
limited or full constellation is fielded. However, this approach could
demonstrate most capabilities needed for an operational system with at
least two satellites in orbit at the same time for some duration.
Specifically, satellite- to- satellite hand over could be demonstrated
since the new satellites would be designed to be compatible. Additionally,
the new satellites could be fully integrated with the missile defense test
bed. Midcourse stereo tracking and STSS mission dual data processing would
also be demonstrated. Discrimination capability could be demonstrated,
depending on the design selected.
There are other benefits of pursuing the newer technologies beyond meeting
these capabilities. The newer technology satellites would have increased
lifetimes. In addition, the satellites* sensors would likely be more
sensitive and able to detect cooler targets. Software upgrades would
continue to evolve to meet a newer generation of needs with the new
technology satellites. Moreover, this approach would allow more time to
test with the longer on- orbit life expected from these newer satellites.
Focusing Solely on
Developing New Demonstration Satellites Can Allow MDA to Develop More
Robust Satellites Quicker
Page 26 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
Finally, MDA could reach a decision to field an operational capability
sooner than with any other approach. There are also drawbacks to this
approach. There could be at least a 2-
year delay in demonstrating capability. In addition, the technology risk
would be greater because the critical technology for the new satellites is
less mature. For example, the TRLs for the new satellites currently range
from 4 to 5, whereas the TRLs for the existing satellites, according to
the Air Force, range from 5 to 6. 11 Over about the last 20 years, DOD has
invested billions of dollars to
develop a missile tracking capability from space. Past efforts show that a
heavy focus on meeting schedules can debilitate an effort to the point of
failure. Yet DOD is at risk of repeating past mistakes because it has made
decisions that are largely focused on meeting its 2007 launch date rather
than making sure the satellites and ground station can work as intended
and that it can gain the maximum knowledge at the lowest cost. Given the
research and development nature of the program at this point, MDA has the
ability to study and consider alternative ways of moving forward with the
existing satellite components with greater emphasis on gaining knowledge
from its demonstration satellites. If research and development is not the
primary goal and operational capability is, MDA should stop its investment
in completing the existing satellites and concentrate on developing new
satellites.
To better ensure the Missile Defense Agency*s approach to validate
spacebased sensors and technologies for missile acquisition, tracking, and
discrimination, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Director, MDA to take the following actions.
Focus spending on its STSS contract to assessing the working condition
of the legacy satellites and what additional work is necessary to develop,
test, and launch the existing satellites so that MDA has more knowledge on
which to build cost and schedule estimates.
11 This means that for the new satellites, components are testable but do
not exist in their final assembled configuration. For the existing
satellite hardware, prototypes are available that are very close in their
final form, fit, and function, and performance has been demonstrated in a
relevant environment. Conclusions Recommendations for
Executive Actions
Page 27 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
Use this assessment to conduct a broader analysis of alternative
approaches, including the possibility of delaying launches to 2008 as well
as dropping the development of the existing satellite components and
focusing instead on developing demonstration satellites based on later
generation technology. Further, use this assessment to find ways to
ensure that competition at
the sensor level is part of all efforts to develop missile tracking
capabilities. If this assessment concludes that MDA should follow a
different path
for STSS, renegotiate the STSS contract to account for this change. We
received written comments on a draft of this report from the Director of
Defense Systems within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. DOD partially concurred with our
first two recommendations and concurred with our third and fourth
recommendations. In response to the first two recommendations, DOD noted
that efforts to develop, test, and launch the legacy satellite hardware is
well understood and on contract, and that a delay in launching the first
STSS satellites is not prudent, given the overall missile defense sensor
assessments that are to be made. In response to the third and fourth
recommendations, DOD agreed that the sensor payload competition is central
for risk mitigation and that if DOD pursued a different strategy, contract
adjustments would be warranted. DOD also offered additional corrections
and suggestions to clarify our draft report, which we have incorporated as
appropriate. DOD*s comments appear in appendix I.
In responding to our first recommendation, DOD agreed with the need to
assess the working condition of the legacy satellite hardware, but did not
explicitly concur with the need to focus spending on this assessment. DOD
further commented that its efforts to develop, test, and launch the legacy
hardware is well understood. This comment, however, is based on the
assumption that all of the hardware will be found in working condition and
performing within acceptable technical parameters. Our point is that the
condition of the legacy hardware will not be known until after all of the
hardware checks have been conducted. Because its knowledge of the
condition of the legacy satellites is not complete, MDA*s decisions to
develop older technology versus pursuing new technology and to launch
legacy satellites in 2007 may not have the expected results. If key
satellite
components are found to be in unacceptable working condition, MDA may be
forced to spend more time and money than currently estimated to execute
its strategy. Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
Page 28 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
In responding to our second recommendation, DOD asserted that it had
already conducted a broader analysis of alternative approaches to
development of space- based sensor support to the missile defense system.
As noted in our report, however, this analysis did not include the
alternative of launching legacy satellites in 2008 instead of 2007 or
focusing solely on development of new technology. We also disagree with
DOD*s comment that a delay in launching the first STSS satellites is not
prudent, given the overall ballistic missile defense system sensor
assessments that are to be made. First, MDA is striving to launch the STSS
satellites in 2007 to support the 2007 test bed in order to allow DOD to
make informed decisions about the composition of the missile defense
sensor architecture. However, launching both legacy satellites in 2007
also has some long- term affordability consequences. For example, to be
able to fund a launch in 2007, MDA has decided not to fund the procurement
of a
satellite sensor from a competing contractor. Instead, MDA plans to fund
the development of an alternative sensor design from a competing
contractor, if the funds available are sufficient for meaningful design
work. By reducing competition, MDA may well face higher long- term costs
to develop STSS because it may have to rely on a single contractor.
Moreover, competition will enable MDA to pursue the best technical
solution for STSS. Second, a primary goal of the initial STSS satellites
is to demonstrate key capabilities that have never before been
demonstrated
from space. By adopting a strategy designed to meet the target launch
date, however, MDA will be constrained in its ability to learn about these
capabilities. For example, it will not be able to fully assess how well
STSS will interact with other missile defense systems because the legacy
systems will only be partially integrated with the missile defense test
bed. Third, the history of the STSS program warrants a broader assessment
of
alternative investment approaches. The legacy satellites that MDA is
relying on experienced technical and schedule difficulties as well as
significant cost growth when they were developed under the SBIRS- low
program, STSS*s precursor. The SBIRS- low program as a whole was also
schedule driven, it faced technical challenges, and although almost $2
billion was spent on this program, not a single satellite was launched.
The demonstration portion of the program was eventually canceled in 1999.
To avoid similar problems, we believe that MDA should examine
approaches that offer ways to maximize competition and reduce cost and
scheduling risks even if that means a delay in its assessment of STSS*s
participation in the missile defense test bed.
Page 29 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
To determine what capabilities DOD still needs to demonstrate in support
of a missile tracking capability from space, we reviewed briefings of
program goals, acquisition and test plans, management reports, and
internal memoranda relevant to the development of STSS. Specifically, we
reviewed the system element reviews, MDA*s Director Guidance, and the
element capability specification, from MDA and the Air Force*s Space and
Missile Systems Center. We also held discussions on STSS capabilities with
officials at MDA, the Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles,
California, and Northrop- Grumman Space Technology in Redondo Beach,
California. We also reviewed documentation from the Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, regarding the
SBIRS- low program and its risks.
To identify and assess DOD*s prior and current approaches for
demonstrating missile- tracking capabilities, we reviewed the STSS
September and December 2002 System Element Reviews, program briefings, and
the STSS contract. We also held discussions with officials at the Space
and Missile Systems Center. In deriving the different
approaches, we relied on program briefings and supplemented this
information with our own institutional knowledge and experience in
reviewing space systems. Through trial and error for estimation purposes,
we extended launch dates, launched satellites in tandem, or both, to see
which could result in increased knowledge to the program. Through
briefings with officials from the Space and Missile Systems Center and our
own assessments, we determined what the advantages and disadvantages would
be to each approach.
To determine the risk areas involved with the different alternatives for
accomplishing the STSS mission, we reviewed our prior work on the STSS
program and the STSS System Element Review and launch schedules and
discussed with officials at the Missile Defense Agency, the Air Force
Space and Missile Systems Center, and Northrop- Grumman Space Technology,
the work needed to finish development and testing of the existing
demonstration satellites. We reviewed schedule and funding information for
developing both hardware and software for the demonstration satellites, to
include whether components can be fully integrated, tested, and validated
before launch. We also reviewed our prior reports and testimonies on
practices characterizing knowledge- based acquisition processes.
We performed our work from July 2002 through March 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Scope and
Methodology
Page 30 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
We plan to provide copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of the Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense; the House
Committee on Armed Services; and the House Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Defense; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director,
Missile Defense Agency. We will make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO
Web site at http:// www. gao. gov/.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512- 4841. Key contributors to this report were
Cristina Chaplain, Art Gallegos, Tony Beckham, Joseph Dewechter, Dave
Hubbell, Sigrid McGinty, Karen Sloan, Jim Solomon, Hai Tran, and Randy
Zounes.
Katherine V. Schinasi Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 31 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 32 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense
Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 33 GAO- 03- 597 Missile Defense (120156)
The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm
of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of
the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of
public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO*s commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through the Internet. GAO*s Web site (www. gao. gov) contains abstracts
and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding
archive of older products. The Web site features a search engine to help
you locate documents using key words and phrases. You can print these
documents in their entirety, including charts and other graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as *Today*s Reports,* on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full- text document files.
To have GAO e- mail
this list to you every afternoon, go to www. gao. gov and select
*Subscribe to daily E- mail alert for newly released products* under the
GAO Reports heading.
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to: U. S. General Accounting Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D. C. 20548 To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512- 6000
TDD: (202) 512- 2537 Fax: (202) 512- 6061
Contact: Web site: www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm E- mail:
fraudnet@ gao. gov Automated answering system: (800) 424- 5454 or (202)
512- 7470 Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@ gao. gov (202) 512-
4800
U. S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.
C. 20548 GAO*s Mission Obtaining Copies of
GAO Reports and Testimony
Order by Mail or Phone To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal
Programs Public Affairs
*** End of document. ***