Nuclear Waste: Challenges to Achieving Potential Savings in DOE's
High-Level Waste Cleanup Program (17-JUN-03, GAO-03-593).
The Department of Energy (DOE) oversees one of the largest
cleanup programs in history--the treatment and disposal of 94
million gallons of highly radioactive nuclear waste from the
nation's nuclear weapons program. This waste is currently at DOE
sites in Washington, Idaho, and South Carolina. In 2002, DOE
began an initiative to reduce the estimated $105-billion cost and
70-year time frame of this cleanup. GAO was asked to determine
the status of this initiative, the legal and technical challenges
DOE faces in implementing it, and any further opportunities to
reduce costs or improve program management.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-593
ACCNO: A07210
TITLE: Nuclear Waste: Challenges to Achieving Potential Savings
in DOE's High-Level Waste Cleanup Program
DATE: 06/17/2003
SUBJECT: Nuclear waste disposal
Nuclear waste management
Nuclear waste storage
Program evaluation
Strategic planning
Hanford (WA)
Idaho Falls (ID)
Savannah River (SC)
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GAO-03-593
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
June 2003 NUCLEAR WASTE Challenges to Achieving Potential Savings in DOE*s
High- Level Waste Cleanup Program
GAO- 03- 593
DOE*s initiative for reducing the costs and time required for cleanup of
high- level wastes is still evolving. DOE*s main strategy for treating
high- level waste continues to include separating and concentrating much
of the
radioactivity into a smaller volume for disposal in a geologic repository.
Under the initiative, DOE sites are evaluating other approaches, such as
disposing of more waste on site. DOE*s current savings estimate for these
approaches is $29 billion, but the estimate may not be reliable or
complete. For example, the savings estimate does not adequately reflect
uncertainties or take into account the timing of when savings will be
realized.
DOE faces significant legal and technical challenges to realize these
savings. A key legal challenge involves DOE*s authority to decide that
some waste with relatively low concentrations of radioactivity can be
disposed of on site. This authority is being challenged in court, and a
prolonged challenge or an adverse decision could seriously hamper DOE*s
ability to meet its accelerated schedules. A key technical challenge is
that DOE*s approach relies on laboratory testing to confirm separation of
the waste into high- level and low- activity portions. At the Hanford Site
in Washington State, DOE plans to build a facility before integrated
testing of the separation technology* an approach that has failed on other
projects in the past, resulting in significant cost increases and schedule
delays.
DOE is exploring proposals, such as increasing the amount of high- level
waste in each disposal canister, which if successful could result in
billions of dollars in additional savings. However, considerable
evaluation remains to be done. DOE also has opportunities to improve
program management by fully addressing recurring weaknesses GAO has
identified in DOE*s management of cleanup projects.
Waste Storage Tanks under Construction at DOE*s Hanford Site, September
1947
Many of the waste storage tanks, such as those above, were built in the
1940s to 1960s. These tanks, now underground, are used to store high-
level waste and have exceeded their design life of 10- 40 years. Some have
leaked waste into the soil.
The Department of Energy (DOE) oversees one of the largest cleanup
programs in history* the treatment and disposal of 94 million gallons of
highly radioactive nuclear waste
from the nation*s nuclear weapons program. This waste is currently at DOE
sites in Washington, Idaho,
and South Carolina. In 2002, DOE began an initiative to reduce the
estimated $105- billion cost and 70- year time frame of this cleanup. GAO
was asked to determine the
status of this initiative, the legal and technical challenges DOE faces in
implementing it, and any further
opportunities to reduce costs or improve program management. GAO
recommends that DOE (1) seek clarification of its authority to designate
waste as other than high- level waste if a prolonged legal challenge
occurs; (2) conduct integrated testing of waste separations components
before completing a full- scale facility at the Hanford Site; and (3)
ensure that DOE management practices include conducting rigorous analyses,
following best practices for incorporating new technologies, and being
cautious about using a concurrent design/ build approach for nuclear
facilities. In commenting on the
report, DOE agreed to consider seeking clarification of its authority as
appropriate, but said that its
practices met the intent of the other two recommendations. GAO believes
further improvements are needed. www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03-
593. To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact
Robin M. Nazzaro at (202) 512- 3841 or nazzaror@ gao. gov. Highlights of
GAO- 03- 593, a report to the
Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives June 2003
NUCLEAR WASTE
Challenges to Achieving Potential Savings in DOE*s High- Level Waste
Cleanup Program
Page i GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
Background 5 DOE*s High- Level Waste Is a Complex Mixture That Requires a
Multi- Step Process to Prepare for Disposal 9 DOE*s Initiative for
Accelerating Cleanup Is Still Evolving, with the Extent of Savings
Uncertain 16 Key Legal and Technical Challenges Could Limit Potential
Savings from DOE*s Accelerated Cleanup Initiative 23 Opportunities Exist
to Explore Additional Cost Savings and to Strengthen Program Management 35
Conclusions 42 Recommendations for Executive Action 43 Agency Comments 44
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 48
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Energy 50
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 64
Tables
Table 1: Major Short- Lived Radionuclides Contributing to the Current
Radioactivity in DOE*s Untreated High- Level Waste 12 Table 2: Main Steps
in DOE*s Approach to Preparing High- Level
Waste for Disposal 15 Table 3: Examples of Proposals under Study for
Accelerating the High- Level Waste Treatment Process 19 Table 4: DOE*s
Estimated Cost Savings from Proposals to Accelerate Cleanup of High- Level
Waste 20 Table 5: Description and Status of DOE Incidental Waste
Determinations for Tank Waste 26 Contents
Page ii GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste Figures
Figure 1: Waste Storage Tanks under Construction at DOE*s Hanford Site,
September 1947 7 Figure 2. Physical Forms of DOE*s Untreated High- Level
Waste as a
Percentage of Total Waste Volume 10 Figure 3: Natural Decay of
Radionuclides in DOE*s Untreated High- Level Waste from 2002 to 2102 13
Figure 4: Simplified Description of Key Steps in Hanford*s Proposed
Process for Separating High- Level Waste Constituents 31 Abbreviations
AEA Atomic Energy Act of 1954 DOE Department of Energy EPA Environmental
Protection Agency NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRDC Natural Resources
Defense Council OMB Office of Management and Budget
RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
materials separately from GAO*s product.
Page 1 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
June 17, 2003 The Honorable James C. Greenwood Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight
and Investigations Committee on Energy and Commerce House of
Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Department of Energy (DOE) oversees one of the
largest cleanup programs in history: the treatment and disposal of nuclear
waste created as a result of the nation*s nuclear weapons program. As of
2003, one major aspect of this effort, DOE*s high- level waste cleanup
program, was estimated to cost nearly $105 billion and take decades to
complete. High- level waste contains radioactive elements, such as
plutonium and uranium, in concentrations sufficient to require long- term
isolation from the environment. DOE*s high- level waste results from the
process of dissolving used (or *spent*) nuclear fuel to remove plutonium,
uranium, and other useful materials. During some of the processing,
solvents and other materials can be introduced, creating waste that is
both radioactive and chemically hazardous. About 94 million gallons of
untreated high- level waste is stored at DOE facilities at Hanford,
Washington; Savannah River,
South Carolina; and near Idaho Falls, Idaho* primarily in underground
tanks. This waste would fill an area the size of a football field to a
depth of about 260 feet. Since the 1980s, DOE has been actively working on
ways
to prepare this waste for permanent disposal. These plans center on
eventually placing high- level waste in an underground repository where it
can be safely stored for thousands of years.
After investing more than 20 years and about $18 billion, DOE acknowledged
that the program to clean up its high- level waste was far behind
schedule, far over budget, and in need of major change. In February 2002,
DOE began an initiative to accelerate the schedule and reduce the costs of
cleaning up high- level and other radioactive and hazardous waste, while
focusing its resources on reducing risks to human health and the
environment at its sites. Although this initiative covers DOE*s entire
cleanup program, it may have the most significant impact on DOE*s plans
for high- level waste, which is the highest cost component of DOE*s
cleanup program. In this context, you asked us to (1) describe the
components of DOE*s high- level waste and the
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
process involved in preparing the waste for permanent disposal, (2)
discuss DOE*s initiative for accelerating its high- level waste cleanup
and assess the reliability of the associated potential cost savings, (3)
identify the legal and technical challenges DOE faces regarding this
initiative, and (4) determine any additional opportunities to reduce the
costs, as well as opportunities to improve the management of its high-
level waste program.
This report is based largely on our detailed work at DOE sites where high-
level waste is currently stored and our analysis of cost information and
legal documents pertaining to the high- level waste program. We obtained
the assistance of a physicist with extensive experience in the nuclear
field to evaluate the technical aspects of DOE*s high- level waste
program. A detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is included in
appendix I. DOE*s high- level waste has many types of components, ranging
from radioactive isotopes and corrosive chemicals to the water in which
much of this material was initially discharged. Even the radioactive
components of the waste vary greatly: a small portion will remain
dangerously radioactive for millions of years, while the vast majority
will lose much of their radioactivity more quickly, so that more than 90
percent of the current radioactivity will be gone within 100 years. To
prepare this waste for permanent disposal and meet commitments made to
state and federal regulators, DOE generally plans to separate the waste
into two waste streams, one with high levels of radioactivity and the
other with lower concentrations of radioactivity. DOE expects this process
will concentrate at least 90 percent of the radioactivity into a volume
that is significantly smaller than the current total volume of waste. DOE
plans to immobilize and bury the separated highly radioactive portion in a
permanent underground repository. The remaining waste components will be
immobilized* usually in a cement- like material* and disposed of at the
location where the waste is currently stored or at some other location.
DOE*s initiative to accelerate the cleanup is evolving, and its savings
estimates are changing accordingly, although we have concerns about the
reliability of those estimates. DOE originally estimated it could shorten
the waste cleanup schedule by 20- 35 years and achieve up to $34 billion
in savings at its three high- level waste sites. To help achieve these
schedule
and cost reductions, DOE has identified alternative treatment and disposal
strategies, involving such steps as developing ways to permanently dispose
of more of the radioactive waste at current sites rather than moving it to
Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
the planned underground repository. As of April 2003, DOE*s strategies
were still being developed, and DOE had lowered the original savings
estimate to $29 billion. However, our assessment of the revised estimate
indicates that it may not be reliable. For example, the analysis does not
take into account all costs associated with alternative treatment
strategies. Also, the estimates of savings do not compare costs on the
basis of *present value,* where dollars to be saved in future years are
discounted to a common year to reflect the time value of money. At
Savannah River, such an adjustment would lower the site*s savings estimate
of $5.4 billion for accelerated waste processing to $2.8 billion (in 2003
dollars).
DOE is facing significant legal and technical challenges in implementing a
number of the alternative treatment and disposal strategies. A key legal
challenge linked to the strategies under consideration at all three sites
involves DOE*s authority to determine that some waste components with
relatively low concentrations of radioactivity can be treated and
permanently disposed of at the sites where the waste is currently stored.
For example, DOE*s Hanford Site has developed a treatment and disposal
approach that will prepare about 90 percent of its tank waste for
permanent disposal at Hanford rather than shipping it to an underground
repository. This approach involves DOE determining that not all of the
tank waste is high- level waste. DOE*s authority to make such
determinations is being challenged in court. A prolonged court battle
could seriously hamper DOE*s ability to meet accelerated schedules it has
set under its new initiative. Regarding technical challenges, key elements
of DOE*s accelerated cleanup strategies rely on technologies for
separating the waste components that have not been fully developed or
tested. For example, because of schedule constraints and concerns about
cost increases, the Hanford Site plans to forgo full integrated testing of
its proposed process for separating wastes into high- level and low-
activity portions until after facility construction is complete. This
approach is not consistent with DOE*s project management guidelines or the
advice of several independent technical experts. On a past project to
develop such facilities, failing to fully test the separation technology
has resulted in significant cost increases and schedule delays. For
example, at DOE*s Savannah River Site in South Carolina, an attempt to
speed implementation failed, after nearly $500 million had been spent on
the project. DOE now plans to spend an additional $1.8 billion to develop
and implement an alternative separation technology at Savannah River. We
are
concerned that DOE*s approach at Hanford may also result in significant
schedule delays and cost increases.
Page 4 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
DOE is exploring additional potential cost savings. In addition, there are
opportunities to improve program management. Additional potential cost-
saving opportunities have come to light since DOE first developed its
initiative, and DOE is beginning to assess these opportunities. The
proposals that offer potential for significant savings are being developed
by the Savannah River and Hanford sites for increasing the amount of waste
that can be concentrated into the canisters destined for the permanent
underground repository. DOE*s data indicates that these proposals, if
successful, could save several billion dollars. Considerable evaluation of
these opportunities remains to be done and cost- saving estimates have not
yet been fully developed, according to DOE officials. DOE also has
opportunities to improve its management of the cleanup program by
addressing management weaknesses that we and others have identified in the
past. When it began the initiative to reduce costs and
accelerate the cleanup schedule, DOE acknowledged it had systemic problems
with the way that the program was managed. Although DOE has taken steps to
improve program management, we have continuing concerns about management
weaknesses in several areas. These include making key decisions without
rigorous supporting analysis, incorporating
technology before it is sufficiently tested, and pursuing a *fast- track*
approach of launching into facility construction before completing
sufficient design work. It does not currently appear that DOE*s management
actions will fully address these weaknesses.
We are recommending that if the current challenge to DOE*s authority
becomes an extended legal process, DOE should seek clarification from the
Congress on the agency*s authority to determine that certain waste does
not need to be treated and disposed of as high- level waste. We are also
recommending that the Secretary of Energy reassess the approach for
incorporating new waste separation technologies at the Hanford site, so
that the technologies are more fully tested to ensure they will work
successfully before a full- scale facility is built. Finally, we are
making recommendations on ways to further strengthen management of the
high- level waste program.
DOE agreed to consider our recommendation regarding clarifying its legal
authority to determine that certain waste does not need to be treated and
disposed of as high- level waste. DOE disagreed with our recommendation to
conduct integrated pilot- scale testing of its waste separations process
at Hanford while constructing a full- scale facility. In addition,
regarding opportunities to improve program management, DOE responded only
about the Hanford Site. DOE said that the management activities at Hanford
were already consistent with our recommendations to conduct
Page 5 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
rigorous analysis to support decision- making, follow best practices when
incorporating new technologies into projects, and be cautious about using
a fast- track approach to designing and building complex nuclear
facilities. We continue to believe that implementing all of the
recommendations in this report would help to reduce the risk of costly
delays and improve overall management of DOE*s entire high- level waste
program. High- level waste 1 contains radioactive components that emit
dangerously
intense radiation. Radiation is generated through a decay process in which
the atoms of a radioactive component (also known as a radionuclide) lose
their radioactivity by spontaneously releasing energy in the form of
subatomic particles or rays similar to X- rays. Even short but extremely
intense exposure to radiation can cause almost immediate health problems
such as radiation sickness, burns, and, in severe cases, death. Excessive
exposure to these particles or rays damages cells in living tissue and is
believed to cause long- term health problems such as genetic mutations and
an increased risk of cancer. Because of the intense
radiation emitted from high- level waste, the waste must be isolated and
handled remotely behind heavy shielding such as a layer of concrete in
order to protect humans and the environment. In addition to the intense
radioactivity, some of the radioactive components can be very mobile in
the environment and may migrate quickly to contaminate the soil and
groundwater if not immobilized. Besides radioactive components, DOE high-
level waste also generally contains hazardous components added during the
process of dissolving used nuclear fuel to remove plutonium and other
nuclear materials. These hazardous components include solvents, acids,
caustic sodas, and toxic heavy metals such as chromium and lead.
Radioactive waste components, when combined with hazardous components, are
referred to as *mixed wastes.*
DOE has a vast complex of sites across the nation dedicated to the nuclear
weapons program, but the high- level waste stemming from reprocessing
spent fuel to produce weapons material such as plutonium and uranium has
been limited mainly to three sites* Hanford, Washington; the Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (* Idaho National
1 For this report, we use the term *high- level waste* to refer to the
waste that DOE is or was managing as high- level waste at its sites.
Background
Page 6 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Laboratory*) near Idaho Falls, Idaho; and Savannah River, South Carolina.
2 DOE largely ceased production of plutonium and enriched uranium by 1992,
but the waste remains. Most of the tanks in which it is stored have
already exceeded their design life. For example, many of Hanford*s and
Savannah River*s tanks were built in the 1940s to 1960s and were designed
to last 10- 40 years. (Figure 1 shows waste storage tanks being
constructed at the Hanford Site.) These tanks, most of which are
underground, are used to store high- level waste. Leaks from some of these
tanks were first detected at Hanford in 1956 and at Savannah River in
1959. Given the age and deteriorating condition of some of the tanks,
there is concern that
some of them will leak additional waste into the soil, where it may
migrate to the water table. 3 2 DOE also agreed to clean up high- level
waste at another site* the West Valley
Demonstration Project at West Valley, New York* where the state sponsored
reprocessing of both commercial and DOE spent nuclear fuel. Treatment and
preparation of this waste for disposal was completed in September 2002. 3
DOE has reported that more than one million gallons of waste have been
unintentionally released from the tanks into the soil through leaks at the
Hanford Site. In addition, DOE also intentionally discharged about 121
million gallons of radioactive tank waste at the
Hanford Site directly into the ground from 1946 to 1966. At the Savannah
River Site, one of the 51 tanks is estimated to have leaked tens of
gallons into the soil.
Page 7 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Figure 1: Waste Storage Tanks under Construction at DOE*s Hanford Site,
September 1947
Treatment and disposal of high- level waste produced at DOE facilities are
governed by a number of federal laws, including laws that define the roles
of DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in waste management.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) and the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974 established responsibility for the regulatory control of radioactive
materials including DOE*s high- level wastes. 4 The Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974 assigned the NRC the function of
4 The AEA authorized the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to provide for the
safe storage of radioactive waste from defense- related activities. 42 U.
S. C. 2121( a)( 3). Later, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished
the AEC, transferring responsibilities to the Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA)* DOE*s predecessor* and the
NRC. 42 U. S. C. 5814, 5841. In 1977, ERDA was abolished, and its
functions were transferred to the newly established DOE, explicitly
leaving the management of the government*s radioactive waste in the hands
of DOE. 42 U. S. C. 7151( a), 7133( a)( 8).
Page 8 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
licensing facilities that are expressly authorized for long- term storage
of high- level radioactive waste generated by DOE and others. 5 The
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, defines high- level
radioactive waste as *the highly radioactive material resulting from the
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced
directly in reprocessing and any solid material derived from such liquid
waste that contains fission products in sufficient concentrations, and*
other highly radioactive material that the [NRC]* determines* requires
permanent isolation.* 6 The act also established a process for developing
and siting a geologic
repository (a permanent deep disposal system) for the disposal of high-
level waste and spent fuel. Regarding DOE*s high- level waste, the act
provided that unless the President determined that a separate repository
was required for such waste, DOE should arrange for the use of commercial
repositories developed under the act for disposal of its defense waste. 7
In 1985, President Reagan decided that a separate repository for defense
waste was not needed. Under amendments the Federal Facility Compliance Act
of 1992 made to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),
DOE generally must develop waste treatment plans for its sites that
contain mixed wastes. 8 These plans are approved by states that the
Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has authorized to administer RCRA or by EPA in states that
have not been so authorized. DOE carries out its high- level waste cleanup
program under the leadership of the Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management and in consultation with a variety of stakeholders. In addition
to the EPA and state environmental agencies that have regulatory authority
in states where the sites are located, stakeholders include county and
local governmental agencies, citizen groups, advisory groups, and Native
American tribes. These stakeholders advocate their views through various
public involvement processes including site- specific advisory boards.
Over the years, much of the cleanup activity has been implemented under
compliance agreements between DOE and the regulatory agencies. These
compliance agreements provide for
5 42 U. S. C. 5842. 6 42 U. S. C. 10101( 12). 7 42 U. S. C. 10107( b)( 2).
8 42 U. S. C. 6939c( b).
Page 9 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
establishing legally enforceable schedule milestones that govern the work
to be done.
The waste in the tanks at Hanford, Savannah River, and the Idaho National
Laboratory is a complex mixture of radioactive and hazardous components,
and DOE*s process for preparing it for disposal is designed to separate
much of the radioactive material from other waste components.
In the tanks, this mixture has transformed into a variety of liquid and
semisolid forms. The radioactive components are of many different types;
some remain dangerous for millions of years, while others lose much of
their radioactivity in relatively short periods of time. Because most of
the radioactive components decay relatively rapidly, over 90 percent of
the current radioactivity will dissipate within 100 years. DOE plans to
isolate the radioactive components and prepare the waste for disposal
through the use of an extensive and sequential multi- step treatment
process. To fulfill its current commitment to federal and state
regulators, DOE expects this process to concentrate at least 90 percent of
the radioactivity into a much smaller volume that can be permanently
isolated for at least 10,000 years in a geologic repository. DOE plans to
dispose of the remaining waste of relatively low radioactivity on- site
near the surface of the ground, such as in vaults or canisters, or at
other designated disposal facilities.
High- level waste generally exists in a variety of physical forms and
layers inside the underground tanks, depending on the physical and
chemical properties of the waste components. The waste in the tanks takes
three main forms: Sludge: The denser, water insoluble components
generally settle to the
bottom of the tank to form a thick layer known as sludge, which has the
consistency of peanut butter. Saltcake: Above the sludge may be water-
soluble components such as
sodium salts that crystallize or solidify out of the waste solution to
form a moist sand- like material called saltcake. Liquid: Above or
between the denser layers may be liquids comprised of
water and dissolved salts called supernate. As figure 2 shows, 44 percent
of the total volume of high- level waste is in saltcake form, followed by
liquid and sludges. In addition, a small portion of the waste volume is
also in solid form and is stored in facilities other than tanks. At the
Idaho National Laboratory, some waste is stored in stainless steel bins,
enclosed in concrete vaults, after having undergone a DOE*s High- Level
Waste Is a Complex Mixture That Requires a Multi- Step Process to Prepare
for Disposal
Waste Has Turned into a Variety of Forms
Page 10 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
thermal process that converted the liquid into a solid granular substance
called calcine. At Hanford, some high- level waste was retrieved from the
tanks, dried, and stored as solid material in stainless steel capsules. 9
Figure 2. Physical Forms of DOE*s Untreated High- Level Waste as a
Percentage of
Total Waste Volume
Note: The values in figure 2 are for all untreated high- level waste
across the DOE complex as of August 2002. At the sites, the actual
distribution of the waste into the various physical forms may differ from
that shown above.
The various layers of waste in the tanks are not uniformly distributed and
often differ from tank to tank and even from place to place within a tank.
Depending on how the waste was generated and whether it was mixed or
transferred from one tank to another, the layers of waste within any given
tank may be unevenly distributed and liquid is interspersed between layers
of saltcake. Some tanks contain all three main waste forms* sludge,
saltcake, and liquid* while others contain only one or two forms. Tank
contents also vary among sites. For example, at the Idaho National
9 From 1967 to 1985, DOE encapsulated cesium and strontium from the tank
waste at the Hanford Site to reduce the amount of heat generated in the
tanks and for lease to non- DOE organizations for beneficial use. All of
the leased capsules have been returned to Hanford.
Page 11 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Laboratory most tanks contain primarily liquid waste because the waste was
kept in an acidic form, while at Hanford and Savannah River, most tanks
contain waste in two or three physical forms.
The radioactive components of the high- level waste vary greatly in terms
of how long they remain radioactive, with the vast majority losing their
radioactivity within years or decades. Each radioactive component, or
radionuclide, in high- level waste loses its radioactivity at a rate that
differs for each component. This rate of decay, which cannot be changed,
is measured in *half- lives** that is, the time required for half of the
unstable atoms to decay and release their radiation. The half- lives of
major radionuclides in the high- level waste range from 2.6 minutes for
barium- 137m 10 to 24,131 years for plutonium- 239. To illustrate, for any
given number of radioactive barium- 137m atoms, half will lose their
radioactivity within 2.6 minutes. After another 2.6 minutes, half of the
remaining unstable atoms will lose their radioactivity, leaving only
onefourth of the original number of unstable atoms still radioactive. The
process is the same, but the half- life intervals much longer, for long-
lived radionuclides, such as plutonium- 239 atoms. For radioactive
plutonium239 atoms, half will lose their radioactivity within 24,131
years, and half of the remainder will lose their radioactivity after
another 24,131 years.
Currently, nearly all of the radioactivity in DOE*s high- level waste
originates from radionuclides with half- lives of about 30 years or less.
As table 1 shows, about 98 percent of the radioactivity of the high- level
waste comes from four radionuclides: barium- 137m, cesium- 137, strontium-
90, and yttrium- 90. Of these, cesium- 137 is the longest lived, with a
half- life of 30.17 years.
10 The *m* in barium- 137m denotes barium- 137 that has an excess of
energy and will undergo radioactive decay to barium- 137, which is not
radioactive. Much of the
Radioactivity Declines Relatively Quickly
Page 12 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Table 1: Major Short- Lived Radionuclides Contributing to the Current
Radioactivity in DOE*s Untreated High- Level Waste
Major short- lived radionuclides Half- life in years
Percent of total radioactivity in DOE*s high- level waste as of August
2002
Barium- 137m a 0.0000049 b 25.6 Yttrium- 90 a 0.0073 c 22.8 Strontium- 90
28.6 22.8 Cesium- 137 30.17 27.0
Major short- lived radionuclides total 98.2
Source: GAO analysis of DOE data. Notes: The radionuclides listed contain
the largest amount of radioactivity in curies relative to other
radionuclides in DOE*s untreated high- level waste. Other radionuclides,
including those with longer half- lives, contain the remaining balance of
the total current radioactivity. a Barium- 137m and yttrium- 90 are
generated from the radioactive decay of cesium- 137 and
strontium- 90 respectively. Consequently, as long as cesium- 137 and
strontium- 90 are present, barium- 137m and yttrium- 90 will also be
present. b 2.6 minutes.
c 2.7 days.
The relatively short half- lives of most of the radionuclides in the waste
means that much of the total current radioactivity will decay within 100
years. For example, within 30 years, about 50 percent of the current
radioactivity in DOE*s wastes will have decayed away, and within 100
years, this figure will rise to more than 90 percent. Figure 3 shows the
pattern of decay, using 2002 to 2102 as the 100- year period. Extending
the analysis beyond the 100- year period shown in the figure, in 300
years, 99.8 percent of the radioactivity will have decayed, leaving 0.2
percent of the current radioactivity remaining.
Page 13 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Figure 3: Natural Decay of Radionuclides in DOE*s Untreated High- Level
Waste from 2002 to 2102
Note: Radioactivity is measured in a unit called a curie. One curie equals
37 billion atomic disintegrations per second.
Despite the relatively rapid decay of the current radioactivity in high-
level waste, a variety of long- lived radionuclides will remain
radioactive for a very long time and must be isolated from the
environment. Radionuclides with half- lives greater than cesium- 137
(30.17 years), such as plutonium- 239 and americium- 241, which have half-
lives of 24,131 years and 432.2 years respectively, will continue to pose
a threat to human health and the environment for thousands of years. Once
the radionuclides with relatively short half- lives have decayed away, the
longer- lived radionuclides will be the primary source of radioactivity in
the waste. Some of these long- lived radionuclides, such as technetium-
99, are potentially very mobile in the environment and therefore must
remain permanently isolated. If these highly mobile radionuclides leak out
or are released into the environment, they can contaminate the soil and
water.
Page 14 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
DOE*s process for dealing with its high- level waste centers on separating
the various components of the waste so that the portion that is most
radioactive can be concentrated into a much smaller volume. While
currently all high- level waste is radioactive and dangerous, significant
portions of the waste, such as contaminated water, will have low levels of
radioactivity if separated from most of the radionuclides that are highly
radioactive. Contaminated water currently represents 54 percent of the
total waste by volume across the DOE complex. 11 In overview, DOE*s
process generally involves separating the waste into two main streams.
One, the high- level portion, will contain at least 90 percent of the
radioactivity and a small portion of the waste volume. The other stream,
the low- activity portion, will contain 10 percent or less of the total
radioactivity but most of the waste volume.
DOE*s plans for treating the waste currently call for a set of steps to be
applied to the waste at each site. The primary steps are shown in table 2.
11 The percentage of the waste volume that is contaminated water varies
among sites.
Contaminated water is a significant constituent of the waste by volume
because water is used to cool the waste, dilute the waste for treatment
and transfer from one location to another, and flush out waste from
pipelines and facilities. Processing Can Concentrate the
Radioactivity into a Much Smaller Volume of Waste
Page 15 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Table 2: Main Steps in DOE*s Approach to Preparing High- Level Waste for
Disposal Step in process Description
Characterization Determination of the specific physical, chemical, and
radiological components of the wastes in each tank. This step is important
because some tanks contain a complex mixture of unknown waste
constituents, and detailed knowledge of tank contents is needed to
determine how to best retrieve, pretreat, and treat the wastes.
Characterization involves analyzing samples drawn from the tanks and using
process knowledge such as waste transfer records and results from prior
samples. Retrieval Removal of the stored waste from the tanks by pumping
or other
means and its transfer to treatment facilities. Because the waste exists
in liquid, solid, and other forms, certain steps may be needed to turn the
waste into a form that will allow the pumping to take place. Pretreatment
Separation of the high- level portion of the waste from the low- activity
portion and from other nonradioactive elements, such as aluminum, organic
compounds, and salts. Evaporation is used during pretreatment to reduce
the volume of contaminated water in the waste. This step is desirable
because it decreases the amount of high- level waste that must be treated
and sent to the high- level waste repository. The remaining low- activity
waste can then be treated and disposed of less expensively on- site.
Treatment Immobilization of the waste. DOE plans to stabilize the high-
level
portion of the waste separated during pretreatment by mixing it with a
glass- forming material and melting the mixture into glass. The molten
glass will be poured into stainless steel canisters to harden. The
remaining low- activity portion of the waste will generally be mixed with
cement and other materials so that it will harden into a cement- like
substance called grout. a Disposal Final emplacement of the immobilized
waste so as to ensure
isolation from the surrounding environment until it is no longer
dangerously radioactive. DOE plans to temporarily store the canisters
containing the high- level portion of the waste on- site until an
underground geologic repository is ready to receive them permanently. The
remaining immobilized waste will be disposed of
on- site or at other designated near surface disposal sites. Source: GAO.
a At the Hanford Site, DOE currently plans to vitrify the low- activity
portion of the waste. DOE plans to permanently dispose of the high- level
portion of the
separated waste in a geologic repository developed pursuant to the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act. This repository is intended to isolate highly
radioactive waste materials from the public and the environment for
at least 10, 000 years. The remaining low- activity portion would be
immobilized in accordance with federal and state environmental laws and
the agreements made with state regulators and disposed of permanently on-
site or at other designated locations.
Page 16 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Although radionuclides with long half- lives are present in both the high-
level and low- activity portions of the waste after the separations
processes are concluded, the portion of the waste not sent to the geologic
repository will have relatively low levels of radioactivity and long-
lived radionuclides. Based on current disposal standards used by the NRC,
if the radioactivity of this remaining waste is sufficiently low, it can
be disposed of on- site near the surface of the ground, using less complex
and expensive techniques than those required for the highly radioactive
portion.
DOE has successfully applied this process in a demonstration project at
the West Valley site in New York state. At West Valley, separation of the
low- activity portion from the high- level portion of the waste reduced by
90 percent the quantity of waste requiring permanent isolation and
disposal at a geologic repository. The high- level portion was stabilized
in a glass material (vitrified) and remains stored at the site pending
completion of the high- level waste geologic repository and resolution of
other issues
associated with disposal costs. 12 The remaining low- activity portion was
mixed with cement- forming materials, poured into drums where it
solidified into grout (a cement- like material), and remains stored on-
site, awaiting shipment to an off- site disposal facility.
DOE*s new initiative, implemented in 2002, attempts to address the
schedule delays and increasing costs DOE has encountered in its efforts to
treat and dispose of high- level waste. This initiative is still evolving.
DOE originally identified several strategies to help it reduce the time
needed to treat and dispose of the waste. Based on these strategies, DOE
set a goal
of achieving up to $34 billion in savings at its three high- level waste
sites and reducing the waste cleanup schedule by about 20 to 35 years
compared to the existing program baseline. 13 As of April 2003, DOE*s
strategies were still under development, and DOE had revised the savings
estimate to $29 billion. However, even the $29 billion estimate may not be
reliable. While savings are likely if the strategies are successfully
implemented, the extent of the savings is still uncertain.
12 At Savannah River, high- level sludge from the tanks has also been
stabilized in glass material and is currently stored on- site pending
completion of the geologic repository. As of August 30, 2002, Savannah
River had produced 1, 331 canisters of this stabilized waste.
13 Unless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are as reported by DOE and
are in current dollars. DOE*s Initiative for Accelerating Cleanup
Is Still Evolving, with the Extent of Savings Uncertain
Page 17 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
For the most part, DOE*s past efforts to treat and dispose of high- level
waste have been plagued with false starts and failures, resulting in
steadily growing estimates of the program*s total cost. Since the cleanup
activities began about 20 years ago, DOE has spent about $18 billion in
its attempts to prepare high- level waste for disposal. However, less than
5 percent of the waste has been successfully treated to date. Uncontrolled
cost overruns, numerous schedule delays, and unsuccessful attempts to
develop treatment processes have pushed the overall estimated cost of the
high- level waste program from about $63 billion in 1996 (when the first
comprehensive estimates were developed) to nearly $105 billion in 2003. 14
In an attempt to gain control over DOE*s waste management program and to
better ensure its affordability, in February 2002 the Assistant Secretary
for Environmental Management undertook a new initiative aimed at
accelerating cleanup at DOE*s sites and focusing on more rapid reduction
of environmental risks. The initiative came as a result of an internal
review of the cleanup program, which identified numerous problems and
recommended a number of corrective actions. Among other things, the review
noted that the cleanup program was not based on a comprehensive, coherent,
technically supported risk prioritization; was not focused on accelerating
risk reduction; and was not addressing the challenges of uncontrolled cost
and schedule growth. A main focus of the initiative is high- level waste,
including both the technical approach to treating the waste and improving
how DOE manages the contracts and project activities. 15 DOE developed
strategies to speed the cleanup and reduce risk at all
three sites. Many of these proposals involved ways to do one or more of
the following:
14 Both of these lifecycle cost estimates reflect actual program costs
incurred from fiscal year 1982 to the year of the estimates, and include
estimated costs through completion of cleanup.
15 U. S. Department of Energy, A Review of the Environmental Management
Program
(Washington, D. C.: Feb. 4, 2002). Initiative Centers on
Ways to Speed Disposal and Save Money
Page 18 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Dealing with some tank waste as low- level or transuranic 16 waste,
rather than as high- level waste. Doing so would eliminate the need to
prepare the waste for off- site disposal in the geologic repository for
high- level waste. Disposing of waste in the repository currently is based
on immobilizing the waste in a glass- like substance through a process
called vitrification. Completing the waste treatment more quickly by
using additional or
supplemental technologies for treating some of the waste. For example,
DOE*s Hanford Site is considering using up to four supplemental
technologies, in addition to vitrification, to process its low- activity
waste. DOE believes these technologies are needed to help ensure it can
meet a schedule milestone date of 2028 agreed to with regulators to
complete waste processing. Without these technologies, DOE believes waste
treatment would not be completed before 2048. Segregating the waste more
fully than initially planned and tailoring waste
treatment to each of the four segregated waste types. By doing so, DOE
plans to apply less costly treatment methods to waste with lower
concentrations of radioactivity. Closing waste storage tanks earlier
than expected. DOE plans to begin
closing tanks earlier than scheduled, thereby avoiding the operating costs
involved in maintaining the tanks and monitoring the wastes. 16 Low- level
radioactive waste is defined as radioactive material that is not high-
level radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, transuranic waste, or certain
by- product material (the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or
concentration or uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for
its source material content). 42 U. S. C. 10101( 16). Transuranic wastes
come primarily from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and from
fabrication of nuclear weapons. Transuranic waste is defined as waste with
radionuclides with atomic numbers greater than 92 (that is, uranium) and
having half- lives greater than 20 years in concentrations greater than
100 nanocuries per gram.
Page 19 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Table 3 shows major site- by- site proposals that have been made.
Table 3: Examples of Proposals under Study for Accelerating the High-
Level Waste Treatment Process Site Types of proposals
Hanford (Washington State) Building one higher capacity vitrification
facility to process the waste and eliminating a second large facility.
Developing supplemental technologies to treat and immobilize a large
fraction of the lowactivity waste outside of the vitrification facility.
Using a single system to retrieve the waste from each tank rather than two
systems as
initially planned.
Accelerating the shipment of waste to the repository.
Closing tanks earlier. Savannah River (South Carolina) Conducting more
thorough waste separations than initially planned and then tailoring
waste treatment separately to each waste stream. This would allow Savannah
River to do the following:
Apply less costly treatments than initially planned to the low- activity
waste streams. For example, DOE will remove waste with the lowest
concentrations of radioactivity and treat it directly by grouting it,
rather than first processing it through a more costly pretreatment
facility.
Adjust vitrification of high- level sludges to each individual batch of
waste processed. By doing so, DOE is exploring methods to place about 25
percent more waste in each canister, reducing the overall number of
canisters that will need to be produced and stored at the repository.
Closing tanks 8 years earlier than scheduled. Idaho National Laboratory
(Idaho) Repackaging calcined waste and shipping it directly for disposal
at the geological
repository, rather than vitrifying it.
Classifying the remaining liquid tank wastes as transuranic wastes,
which would require less costly treatment than previously planned before
being shipped off site to a transuranic waste repository. Source: GAO
analysis of DOE information.
DOE*s initial estimates in August 2002 were that, if the proposals were
successfully implemented, total savings could be about $34 billion
compared to the baseline cost estimate in place when the accelerated
initiative began. As of April 2003, the savings estimate associated with
the new strategies had been revised to about $29 billion (see table 4).
DOE officials told us many of their new strategies are still under
development and that savings estimates are still subject to additional
revision.
Page 20 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Table 4: DOE*s Estimated Cost Savings from Proposals to Accelerate Cleanup
of High- Level Waste
Dollars in billions Site Current baseline
lifecycle cost estimate
Accelerated lifecycle cost
estimate Estimated
savings from accelerated
initiatives
Idaho National Laboratory $10.07 $3.10 $6.97 Hanford 56.19 41.67 14.52
Savannah River 18.82 11.49 7.33
Totals $85.08 $56.26 $28.82 Source: DOE. Notes: West Valley is not
included in this table because high- level waste cleanup at the site was
essentially completed in Sept. 2002.
Amounts are in billions of current dollars, fiscal year 2003 to end of
cleanup.
Our review of these savings estimates suggests that they may not yet be
reliable and that the actual amounts to be saved if DOE successfully
implements the strategies may be substantially different from what DOE is
projecting. We have several concerns about the reliability and
completeness of the savings estimates. These concerns include the accuracy
of baseline cost estimates from which savings are calculated, whether all
appropriate costs are included in the analysis, and whether the savings
estimates properly reflect uncertainties or the timing of the savings.
DOE*s current lifecycle cost baseline is used as the base cost from which
potential savings associated with any improvements are measured.
However, in recent years, we and others have raised concerns about the
reliability of DOE*s baseline cost estimates. In a 1999 report, we noted
that DOE lacked a standard methodology for sites to use in developing
their lifecycle cost baselines, raising a concern about the reliability of
data used to develop these cost estimates. 17 DOE*s Office of Inspector
General also raised a concern in a 1999 review of DOE project estimates,
noting that several project cost estimates examined were not supported or
complete. DOE itself acknowledged in its February 2002 review of the
cleanup
17 U. S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Waste: DOE*s Accelerated
Cleanup Strategy Has Benefits but Faces Uncertainties, GAO/ RCED- 99- 129
(Washington, D. C.: Apr. 30, 1999). Current Savings Estimates
May Not Be Reliable Baseline Costs Are Not Fully Reliable
Page 21 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
program that baseline cost estimates do not provide a reliable picture of
project costs. 18 The National Research Council, which has conducted
research on DOE*s
project management, has reported on why DOE*s baseline cost estimates are
often unreliable. It noted in 1999 that DOE often sets project baselines
too early and that industry practice calls for completing from 30 percent
to 35 percent of a design before establishing a baseline cost estimate. 19
In a
recent example, we found that the estimated contract price of Hanford*s
high- level waste treatment facility is expected to increase to $5.8
billion, about $1.6 billion above the original $4.2 billion contract price
established in December 2000. The original cost estimate was established
when less than 15 percent of the facility design was complete. The cost
increase is due to such factors as adding contingency funds for unforeseen
occurrences and making some facility modifications not in the original
contract.
A second reason for concern about the cost- savings estimates is that some
of the savings may be based on incomplete estimates of the costs for the
accelerated proposals. According to the Office of Management and Budget*s
(OMB) guidance on developing cost estimates, agencies should ensure that
all appropriate costs are addressed in the estimate. However, for example,
the Idaho National Laboratory estimates savings of up to
$7 billion, in large part, by eliminating the need to build a
vitrification facility to process waste currently in calcine form and in
tanks, as well as achieving associated reductions in operations and
decommissioning costs. The waste, as is, may have to undergo an
alternative treatment method before it can be accepted at a geological
repository. The Idaho National Laboratory plans to use one of four
different technologies currently being evaluated to treat its tank waste.
DOE*s savings estimate reflects the potential cost of only one of those
technologies. DOE has not yet developed the costs of using any of the
other waste treatment approaches. DOE noted that the accelerated lifecycle
estimate could likely change as one of the technologies is selected and
the associated costs of treating the waste are developed.
18 U. S. Department of Energy, A Review of the Environmental Management
Program
(Washington, D. C.: Feb. 4, 2002). 19 National Research Council, Improving
Project Management in the Department of Energy (Washington, D. C.: June
1999). Accelerated Cost Estimates
May Be Incomplete
Page 22 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
A third area of concern is that DOE*s savings estimates generally do not
accurately reflect the timing of when savings will occur, the uncertainty
associated with cost estimates or the reliability of a technology, or the
value of potential nonbudgetary impacts of the alternative strategies.
According to OMB guidance, agencies should ensure that the timing of when
the savings will occur is accounted for, that uncertainties are recognized
and quantified where possible, and that nonbudgetary impacts, such as a
change in the level of risk to workers, are quantified, or at least
described. Regarding the time value of money, applying OMB guidance would
mean that estimates of savings in DOE*s accelerated plans should
reflect a comparison of its baseline cost estimate with the alternative,
expressed in a *present value,* where the dollars are discounted to a
common year to reflect the time value of money. Instead, DOE*s savings
estimates generally measure savings by comparing dollars in different
years. For example, the Savannah River Site estimates a savings of nearly
$5.4 billion by reducing by 8 years (from 2027 to 2019) the time required
to process its high- level waste. Adjusting the savings estimate to
present value in 2003 results in a savings of $2.8 billion in 2003
dollars.
Regarding uncertainties, in contrast to OMB guidance, the DOE savings
estimates generally do not consider uncertainties. For example, the
savings projected in the Idaho National Laboratory*s accelerated plan
reflect the proposal to no longer build the vitrification facility and an
associated reduction in operations costs. However, the savings do not
account for uncertainties, such as whether alternatives to vitrification
will succeed and at what cost. Rather than reflecting uncertainties by
providing a range of savings, DOE*s savings estimate is a single point
estimate of $7 billion.
Regarding nonbudgetary impacts, DOE*s savings estimates generally did not
fully assess the value of potential nonbudgetary impacts, such as a change
in the level of risk to workers or potential effects on the environment.
OMB guidelines recommend identification and, where possible,
quantification of other expected benefits and costs to society when
evaluating alternative plans. An example where nonbudgetary impacts were
partially, but not fully, considered is the Idaho National Laboratory. The
Idaho National Laboratory*s accelerated plan notes that its proposal not
to vitrify its calcined high- level waste significantly reduces risk to
workers and the environment by eliminating the exposure that would have
been incurred in cleaning up and decommissioning the vitrification
facility once waste treatment had been completed. While site officials
told us such analyses are currently underway, the impact has not yet been
reflected in the savings estimate. However, the proposal does not Savings
Estimates Do Not
Reflect Timing, Uncertainty or Nonbudgetary Impacts
Page 23 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
assess potential increases in environmental risk, if any, from disposing
of the waste without stabilizing it into a vitrified form. By not
assessing these benefits and risks to workers and the environment, DOE
leaves unclear how important these risks and trade- offs are to choosing
an alternative treatment approach.
DOE faces significant legal and technical challenges to achieving the cost
and schedule reductions proposed in its new initiative. On the legal side,
DOE*s proposals depend heavily on the agency*s authority to apply a
designation other than *high- level waste* to the low- activity portion of
the waste stream, so that this low- activity portion does not have to be
disposed of as high- level waste. DOE*s authority to make such
determinations is being challenged in court. On the technical side, DOE*s
proposals rest heavily on the successful application of waste separation
methods that are still under development and will not be fully tested
before being put in place. DOE*s track record in this regard has not been
strong; it has had to abandon past projects that were also based on
promising* but not fully tested* technologies. Either or both of these
challenges could limit the potential savings from DOE*s accelerated
cleanup initiative.
DOE is involved in a lawsuit over whether it has the authority to manage
some tank wastes containing lower concentrations of radioactivity as other
than high- level waste. The outcome could affect DOE*s ability to move
forward with waste treatment on an accelerated schedule. If DOE retains
its ability to manage much of the waste as other than high- level waste,
it can apply less expensive treatment methods to that portion of the
waste, dispose of the waste on- site, and close the tanks more quickly. If
DOE loses the legal challenge, these faster and less expensive treatment
alternatives may not be available. Regardless of the outcome, if an
extended legal process ensues, DOE may be prevented from realizing the
full potential savings associated with its accelerated cleanup initiative.
DOE has traditionally managed all of the wastes in its tanks as high-
level waste because the waste resulted primarily from the reprocessing of
spent nuclear fuel and contains significant amounts of radioactivity.
However, DOE based its approach to treatment and disposal on the
radioactivity and actual constituents in the waste, as well as the source
of the waste. Focusing on the radioactivity and constituents would allow
DOE to use less costly and less complicated treatment approaches for the
majority of what is now managed as high- level waste. Key Legal and
Technical Challenges Could Limit Potential Savings from DOE*s Accelerated
Cleanup Initiative
DOE*s Initiative Relies Heavily on Authority That Is Being Challenged in
Court
DOE*s Authority and Procedures for Designating Waste as *Incidental*
Page 24 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
DOE has developed a process for deciding when waste in the tanks should
not be considered high- level waste. In July1999, DOE issued Order 435.1
setting forth procedures for the management of its radioactive wastes.
Under this order, DOE formalized its process for determining which waste
is incidental to reprocessing (* incidental waste*), not high level waste,
and therefore will not be sent to a geological repository for high- level
waste disposal. This process provides a basis for DOE to treat and dispose
of some portion of its wastes less expensively as low- level or
transuranic wastes.
DOE*s Order 435.1 establishes the specific criteria for defining the waste
that could be considered incidental to reprocessing and therefore is not
high- level waste and would not require the vitrification treatment that
high- level waste must undergo for disposal purposes. The criteria were
developed in conjunction with the NRC, the governmental entity with
regulatory authority over disposal facilities for high- level waste. The
criteria generally are that the waste (1) has been or will be processed to
remove key radioactive components to the maximum extent technically and
economically practical; (2) will be disposed of in conformance with the
safety requirements for low- activity waste as laid out in NRC
regulations; and (3) will be put in a solid physical form and will not
exceed radioactivity levels set by the NRC for the most radioactive
category of low- level waste, referred to as *Class C standard.* 20 DOE
must first satisfy itself internally that these requirements have been met
for waste it wants to determine is waste incidental to reprocessing and
therefore not high- level waste. DOE then obtains a technical review of
its determination from the NRC, which provides a concurrence that DOE has
met its criteria. 21 DOE then considers the waste not to be high- level
waste, but waste that can be managed as either low- level or transuranic
waste.
DOE*s ability to define some waste as incidental to reprocessing, and to
then follow a different set of treatment and disposal requirements for
that waste, is central to its overall strategy for addressing its tank
waste. For
20 As required by NRC regulations (10 C. F. R. 61. 55), Class C low- level
waste must not only meet the most rigorous requirements for low- level
waste form to ensure stability, but also must meet additional requirements
at the disposal site to protect against inadvertent intrusion. The
criteria also allow DOE to authorize and use alternative requirements for
radioactive concentration limits. 21 Although DOE is not required to gain
NRC*s concurrence with its incidental waste determinations, it does so to
obtain an independent assessment of its evaluation of waste as incidental
to reprocessing. Designation as *Incidental*
Would Apply to Much of the Waste
Page 25 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
example, DOE plans to use its incidental waste process to manage about 90
percent of its 54 million gallons of tank waste at Hanford as low- level
waste, rather than process it through a high- level waste vitrification
facility. Using that approach, most of the waste would be eligible for
treatment and disposal on- site. Such an approach would be less expensive
than treating all of the waste as high- level waste and sending it for
disposal in a high- level waste geologic repository. DOE has no current
estimate of the cost increase if all 94 million gallons of tank wastes had
to be treated in a high- level waste vitrification facility and stored at
a geological repository. However, a 1996 environmental impact statement at
the Hanford Site estimated such an alternative for the Hanford Site alone
would add about $29 billion to $37 billion (in 1995 dollars), nearly
doubling project costs at that site alone, primarily due to increased
disposal costs at the repository. Furthermore, there would probably not be
enough space at the high- level waste repository to dispose of all of this
waste.
Hanford is not the only site affected; as of April 2003, DOE had developed
incidental waste determinations for waste at all four of its high- level
waste sites. 22 In all, DOE had used its authority to designate some of
its tank waste as low- level or transuranic waste in seven separate
incidental waste determinations (see table 5). Although two of these
determinations were approved prior to the issuance of Order 435.1, DOE
essentially followed the same criteria found in the subsequent order. DOE
is planning to initiate further incidental waste determinations as it
removes the waste from additional tanks.
22 Because West Valley separated out and treated its waste before the
waste incidental to reprocessing criteria were formalized in Order 435.1
in 1999, DOE followed criteria established in the NRC requirements for
low- level waste (10 C. F. R. 61.55). We did not include this action in
table 5.
Page 26 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Table 5: Description and Status of DOE Incidental Waste Determinations for
Tank Waste Site
Waste included in incidental waste determination Incidental waste to
be managed as Estimated volume of incidental waste Status
Hanford Those tank wastes to be separated from high- activity wastes
through using separations processes.
Low- level waste. Approximately 90 percent of Hanford*s 54 million gallon
waste inventory.
DOE approved this determination prior to issuing its Order 435.1, although
DOE essentially followed the same criteria found in 435.1. The NRC agreed
but said that if DOE decides to treat
some of its low- activity waste with technologies other than
vitrification, as it plans under its accelerated initiative, DOE may need
to update its determination. Savannah River Residual tank waste left in
tanks 17 and 20 at closure. Low- level waste. Approximately 3500 gallons
of
residual waste left in the two tanks.
DOE approved this determination prior to issuing its Order 435.1, although
DOE essentially followed the same criteria found in 435.1. Savannah River
Saltwaste to be treated
through the grout (Saltstone) facility.
Low- level waste. Up to 12.3 million gallons of tank waste. DOE approved
the
determination, but has not implemented it pending resolution of a lawsuit
and
other issues. Savannah River Residual tank waste left in
tank 19 at closure. Low- level waste. 12,000 to 13,000 gallons of solids
in tank 19
at closure. Awaiting DOE approval.
Idaho National Laboratory Sodium- bearing waste
in tanks. Transuranic waste (to be disposed of at
an off- site transuranic repository).
900,000 gallons of acidic liquid in tanks. Awaiting DOE approval.
Idaho National Laboratory Residual waste left in tanks
at closure. Low- level waste. Actual amount of residuals left in the
tank will be determined at time of individual tank closure.
Awaiting NRC concurrence and DOE approval.
West Valley Sodium- bearing waste originally in tanks. Low- level waste.
12,000 gallons. DOE approved this
determination. Source: DOE.
Note: DOE has incidental waste determinations that apply to items other
than tank waste, such as equipment and materials used in managing high-
level waste, including contaminated transfer pumps and job wastes. We did
not include those determinations in this table.
Page 27 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
DOE is currently involved in a lawsuit focused on its authority to make
incidental waste determinations. In March 2002, the Natural Resources
Defense Council and others filed a lawsuit challenging DOE*s authority to
manage its wastes through its incidental waste process. 23 A primary
concern of the plaintiffs is that DOE will use its incidental waste
process to permanently leave intensely radioactive waste sediments in the
tanks with only minimal treatment. The lawsuit alleges that DOE*s
incidental waste process improperly allows DOE to reclassify high- level
waste as incidental waste that does not need to be treated in the same way
as high- level waste. According to the plaintiffs, the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act defines all waste originating from a given source* that is,
from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel* as high- level waste and requires
that such waste be managed as high- level waste, yet DOE has chosen to
differentiate its wastes according to the level of radioactivity and
manage them accordingly.
This is not the first legal action that resulted from DOE*s process for
determining which part of its waste can be designated as incidental to
reprocessing and will not be managed as high- level waste. For example, in
1993, the NRC denied a formal petition from the states of Washington and
Oregon requesting that NRC establish the process and criteria for
determining what part of DOE*s radioactive waste could be managed as other
than high- level waste. 24 The states* request stemmed from concerns that
the criteria DOE was applying to wastes had not been formally established
by regulation and thus had not been given public scrutiny. The NRC, in its
ruling, concluded that DOE*s process for determining what waste was
incidental to reprocessing was appropriate for making individual tank- by-
tank incidental waste determinations, and that the NRC had no
jurisdiction. Later, in 1998, the Natural Resources Defense Council
petitioned the NRC to assume immediate licensing authority over the
51 tanks at the Savannah River Site, arguing that DOE invented the term
*incidental waste* as a means of circumventing NRC*s authority and
oversight and, furthermore, that waste to be left in the bottom of the
tanks at Savannah River did not meet DOE*s own definition of incidental
waste.
23 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Abraham, No. 01- CV- 413 (D.
Idaho, filed Mar. 5, 2002). The lawsuit was originally filed in January
2000 in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and was subsequently transferred
to the federal district court in Idaho. The other parties to the lawsuit
are the Snake River Alliance, the Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakama Nation, and the Shoshone Bannock Tribes. In addition, the
states of Washington, Idaho, Oregon, and South Carolina are participating
as amicus curiae.
24 58 Fed. Reg. 12, 342 (1993). Legal Challenges to DOE*s
Authority to Manage Its Tank Waste
Page 28 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
The NRC concluded it did not have regulatory authority over high- level or
residual wastes at Savannah River. 25 The current legal challenge, as well
as any future challenges, could affect DOE*s efforts to implement its
accelerated treatment and disposal strategies. For example, the challenge
could place on hold indefinitely all pending incidental waste
determinations. Since the start of the lawsuit,
DOE has not implemented any incidental waste determinations and has not
yet decided whether to defer or move forward with its pending incidental
waste determinations* such as for closing tanks. DOE is concerned that
moving forward to implement such determinations could create a risk that
the court could place a general ban on making any decisions about the
waste until the legal challenge is resolved. In addition, final resolution
of the challenge could be further delayed if either party
appeals the decision. A lengthy legal process could result in delays in
moving forward with treatment plans for this waste and delays in closing
tanks on an accelerated schedule. For example, the Idaho National
Laboratory plans to begin closing tanks in the spring of 2003, but
approval for the incidental waste determination to close the tanks by
managing tank waste residuals as low- level waste is still pending. 26 A
DOE official at the Idaho National Laboratory told us that while a delay
of several months in obtaining incidental waste approval would not present
an immediate threat to schedule dates, a delay beyond 24 months would
seriously impact the site*s ability to meet its accelerated 2012 date to
close all of the tanks. Savannah River also plans to begin closing
additional tanks starting in early 2004. 27 A DOE official at the Savannah
River Site said that if the lawsuit continues, the site may miss a legally
binding date agreed to with regulators to begin closing the tanks.
If the court invalidated DOE*s incidental waste determination process, DOE
may need to find an alternative solution for treating and managing its
wastes that would allow it to treat waste with lower concentrations of
radioactivity less expensively. In that case, DOE could begin experiencing
25 65 Fed. Reg. 62, 377 (2000). 26 Tank closure at the Idaho National
Laboratory is also pending completion of its National Environmental Policy
Act process. 27 The Savannah River Site closed its first tanks* tanks 17
and 20* in 1997. Uncertainty about DOE*s
Authority Could Delay Implementing New Initiatives
Page 29 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
delays affecting progress at all three of the high- level waste sites that
rely on incidental waste determinations. For example, as one of its
savings strategies, DOE plans to manage about 12.3 million gallons of its
waste at Savannah River as low- level waste and treat this waste through a
grout facility. DOE estimates it could begin treating this waste as early
as August 2003. Although DOE has approved an incidental waste
determination for this waste, the grout treatment facility must receive an
operating permit from state regulators. To date, the state has withheld
approval for the permit, pending resolution of the lawsuit. A site
official said without the permit, DOE cannot go forward with its plans to
accelerate treatment of the waste.
At this point, the department does not appear to have a strategy in place
to avoid the potential effects of challenges to its incidental waste
determination authority, either from the current lawsuit or future
challenges. In a December 2002 internal memorandum, the Assistant
Secretary for Environmental Management issued guidelines for proceeding
with making incidental waste determinations as necessary to meet cleanup
commitments and requirements. However, these guidelines only include
ensuring that such determinations meet the legal requirements of Order
435.1; the guidelines do not include any alternative strategies for
dealing with the waste. DOE officials told us that they believe the
department will prevail in the legal challenge. Because the outcome of the
lawsuit is so uncertain, DOE believes it would be premature to explore
alternative strategies to overcome potentially significant delays to the
program that could result from a protracted legal conflict or from an
adverse decision. As of April 2003, DOE had just begun to look at
potential delays that could result from a lengthy legal challenge, but had
developed no formal strategy to deal with those delays. Such strategies
could range from exploring alternative approaches for establishing an
incidental waste
regulation to asking that the Congress clarify its intentions regarding
DOE*s authority to implement an incidental waste policy.
DOE*s initiative also faces key technical challenges related to the
process for separating the various components of the waste. Waste
separation involves a sequential process of filtering and extracting each
major high- level waste constituent, such as cesium- 137 and strontium-
90, from the waste. DOE guidance recognizes the risks involved in
implementing
a technology without first thoroughly testing it. In order to save time,
however, DOE managers at the Hanford Site are planning some of their
strategies around waste separation technologies that will not be fully
tested before being implemented. Past projects that took this approach
Initiative Also Relies
Heavily on Waste Separation Approaches That Will Not Be Fully Tested
Page 30 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
have experienced major problems, and outside reviewers have raised
cautions about DOE*s plans to use the same approach in this instance.
Separating high- level waste into its various components is central to
DOE*s treatment and disposal plans. Since the 1980s, federal and state
agreements have reflected DOE*s plan that the waste be processed so that
at least 90 percent of the radioactivity in high- level waste is
concentrated into a much smaller waste stream and prepared for permanent
isolation in a geological repository. The low- activity waste portion,
which represents
the majority of the waste volume but significantly less radioactivity,
must also be immobilized according to federal and state agreements.
Separating the waste components is important not only to comply with
federal and state agreements, but also to meet waste cleanup schedule and
cost goals. If the waste is not separated, all of it* about 94 million
gallons* may have to be treated as high- level waste and disposed of in
the geological repository. Doing so would require a much larger repository
than currently planned and drive up disposal costs by billions of dollars.
Successful separation will substantially reduce the volume of waste
needing disposal at the repository, as well as the time and cost required
to prepare it for disposal, and allow less expensive methods to be used in
treating and disposing of the remaining low- activity waste.
The waste separation process is complicated, difficult, and unique in
scope and size at each site. The waste differs among sites not only in
volume but also in the way it has been generated, managed, and stored over
the years. 28 Although the main steps in the process may vary, waste
separation generally involves a sequential process of filtering and
extracting various high- level waste constituents from the tank waste (see
figure 4). The waste treatment approach at the Hanford Site involves
designing, building, and operating one- of- a- kind separations processes
and facilities. Developing a successful waste separations process has
proved challenging for DOE in the past, especially at Savannah River, and
the current plans for Hanford are no less challenging. 28 Progress in
successfully separating the waste also varies at each site. Waste
separation
operations at the West Valley site were completed in 1995. As part of its
accelerated cleanup plan, the Idaho National Laboratory is evaluating its
need for separation technologies for its liquid tank wastes. The
subsequent discussion focuses on separation processes at the Hanford and
Savannah River sites. Separating Waste Is Key to Treating It Economically
Page 31 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Figure 4: Simplified Description of Key Steps in Hanford*s Proposed
Process for Separating High- Level Waste Constituents
a Yttrium- 90 and barium- 137m, which are generated from strontium- 90 and
cesium- 137 respectively, are also present in the waste but additional
steps to separate these constituents are not necessary because after
separation from their related constituents (strontium- 90 and cesium-
137), they will decay within a few weeks until they are no longer
radioactive. b DOE*s original plan was to remove technetium- 99 at the
same time as cesium- 137. However, DOE
officials at the Hanford Site now plan to leave technetium- 99 in the low-
activity waste stream rather than separating and diverting it to the high-
level waste stream where it would be vitrified. c Both the high- level and
low- activity waste streams contain various components of hazardous waste.
Some hazardous components will be destroyed during the vitrification
process. DOE plans to apply to the Environmental Protection Agency to have
the remaining hazardous components declared safe for long- term storage
and disposal. If successful, the components will remain in the immobilized
waste.
Page 32 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
At its Hanford site, DOE intends to build a facility for separating the
waste before fully testing the separation processes that will be used. The
technology for separating waste components at Hanford is being developed
at several laboratories, including the Savannah River Technology Center.
These facilities are performing tests to help validate underlying
assumptions about how the processes will work. The laboratory testing
includes a combination of pilot- scale testing of major individual
processes and use of operational data for certain of those processes for
which DOE officials said they had extensive experience. However,
integrated testing will not be completed until full- scale facilities
are constructed. DOE plans to fully test the processes for the first time
during the operational tests of the newly constructed facilities.
This approach does not fully reflect DOE guidance for incorporating new or
complex technology into a project, which calls for ensuring that the
technology is mature before integrating it into a project. More
specifically, DOE*s project management Order 413.3 requires DOE to assess
the risks
associated with technology at various phases of a project*s development.
For projects with significant technical uncertainties that could affect
cost and schedule, corrective action plans are required to determine how
the uncertainties will be resolved before the projects can proceed. In
addition to this order, DOE has drafted supplementary project management
guidance. This guidance suggests that technologies are to be developed to
a reasonable level of maturity before a project can progress to full
implementation to reduce risks and avoid cost increases and schedule
delays. The guidance suggests that DOE avoid the risk of performing
concurrent facility design and technology development.
The laboratories working to develop Hanford*s waste separation process
have identified several technical uncertainties, which they are working to
address. These uncertainties or critical technology risks include problems
with separating waste solids through an elaborate filtration system,
problems associated with mixing the waste during separation processes, and
various problems associated with the low- activity waste evaporator. The
contractor is also concerned about the availability and performance of a
special resin for separating out cesium- 137, a radioactive constituent.
The resin is currently produced by only one supplier, and that supplier
currently does not have the manufacturing capability to produce the resin
in the quantities needed for DOE*s full- scale operations, according to
contractor officials. In an effort to resolve this uncertainty, DOE*s
construction contractor has asked the manufacturer to expand resin
production capability, and in April 2003, DOE signed a Hanford Plans to
Build
Facilities to Separate Waste before Fully Testing the Separation Processes
to Be Used
Page 33 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
contract modification that allows alternative resins to be used in the
separation process.
Given these and other uncertainties, Hanford*s construction contractor and
outside experts have seen Hanford*s approach as having high technical risk
and have recommended integrated testing during project development.
In April 2002, concerned about the potential for operational problems
with the waste separation processes, Hanford*s construction contractor
proposed building an integrated testing facility to confirm that Hanford*s
processes will work at a significantly larger scale than has been tested
to date. The contractor proposed conducting fully integrated tests in a
pilot facility using simulated waste before full- scale separation
facilities are completed. The contractor estimated the cost of the pilot
facility at between $6 million and $12 million. In October 2002, an
independent peer review group of industry experts
concluded that an integrated pilot plant for interim testing to confirm
the technical processes was a preferred approach. Several other
independent experts we interviewed also shared this view. These experts
are
associated with the National Research Council and various research
organizations, universities, and private institutions. These experts
emphasized that performing integrated testing to verify that separation
processes will work is an essential step, especially for treating
Hanford*s unique waste in the complicated waste treatment facilities that
Hanford is building.
In contrast to these views, DOE*s Office of River Protection and the
construction contractor decided not to construct an integrated pilot
facility and instead to accept a higher- risk approach. DOE officials said
they wanted to avoid increasing project costs and schedule delays, which
they believe will result from building a testing facility. Instead,
Hanford
officials said that they will continue to conduct pilot- scale tests of
major separation processes. DOE officials said they believe this testing
will provide assurance that the separation processes will function in an
integrated manner. After the full- scale treatment facilities are
constructed, DOE plans to fully test and demonstrate the separation
process during facility startup operations.
Full testing of Hanford*s separation process may be a bigger challenge
than originally envisioned. In April 2003, DOE modified the construction
contract for the waste treatment facilities and adopted a schedule
compressing the facility testing and startup period from 4 years to about
Page 34 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
2.5 years. To meet this compressed schedule, Hanford*s construction
contractor decided in late April 2003 to drop its proposal for the pilot
plant. Instead, the contractor plans to continue laboratory testing of
separation processes in an effort to simulate the results of an integrated
pilot plant. While contractor officials stated that their original
proposal for an integrated pilot plant was technically sound, they
withdrew the proposal in order to ensure that they could meet revised
contract schedule and budget commitments.
The consequences of not adhering to sound technology development
guidelines can be severe. At the Savannah River Site, for example, DOE
invested nearly $500 million over nearly 15 years to develop a waste
separations process, called in- tank precipitation, to treat Savannah
River*s high- level waste. While laboratory tests of this process were
viewed as
successful, DOE did not conduct adequate testing of the components until
it started full- scale operations in the newly constructed facility. DOE
followed this approach, in part, because the technology was commercially
available. When DOE started full- scale operations, major problems
occurred. Benzene, a dangerously flammable byproduct, was produced in
large quantities. Operations were stopped after DOE spent about
$500 million because experts could not explain how or why benzene was
being produced and could not determine how to economically reconfigure the
facility to minimize it. Consequences of this technology failure included
significant cost increases, schedule delays, a full- scale facility that
did not work, and a less- than- optimum waste treatment operation without
a viable separation process. Savannah River is now taking steps to develop
and implement a new separation technology at an additional cost
of about $1.8 billion and a delay of about 7 years. 29 Subsequent
assessments of the problems that developed at Savannah River found that
DOE (1) relied on laboratory- scale tests to demonstrate separation
processes, (2) believed that technical problems could be resolved later
during facility construction and startup, and (3) decided to scale up the
technology from lab tests to full- scale without the benefit of
using additional testing facilities to confirm that processes would work
at a larger scale. Officials at Hanford are following this same approach.
Several experts with whom we talked cautioned that if separation
29 U. S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Waste: Process to Remove
Radioactive Waste From Savannah River Tanks Fails to Work, GAO/ RCED- 99-
69 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 30, 1999). Past Experience at Savannah
River Shows Consequences of Deviating from Technology Development
Guidelines
Page 35 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
processes at Hanford do not work as planned, facilities will have to be
retrofitted, and potential cost increases and schedule delays can be much
greater than those associated with integrated process testing in a
pilot facility. In addition to the potential cost savings identified in
the accelerated site cleanup plans, DOE continues to develop and evaluate
additional proposals to reduce costs, but is still in the process of fully
assessing these proposals. Because DOE is still evaluating these
proposals, the potential cost savings have not been fully developed, but
could be in the range of
several billion dollars, if successfully implemented. At the Savannah
River and Hanford sites, for example, DOE is identifying ways to increase
the amount of waste that can be placed in its high- level waste canisters
to reduce treatment and disposal costs. DOE also has a number of
initiatives under way to improve overall program management. However, we
are concerned that they may not be adequate. In our examinations of
problems that have plagued DOE*s project management over the years, three
contributing factors often emerged* making key project decisions without
rigorous analysis, incorporating new technology before it has received
sufficient testing, and using a *fast- track* approach (concurrent design
and construction) on complex projects. Ensuring that these weaknesses are
addressed as part of its program management initiatives would further
improve the management of the program and increase the chances for
success.
DOE is continuing to identify other proposals for reducing costs under its
accelerated cleanup initiative. Senior Environmental Management officials
realize that the proposals to accelerate cleanup identified in site
performance management plans do not represent a complete set of options
for full achievement of DOE*s savings goals. To pursue additional
potential opportunities, the Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management commissioned several special project teams to evaluate
additional program improvements and cost- savings opportunities. One
of these teams, the high- level waste project team, has completed the
initial phase of its work. According to DOE*s high- level waste project
team leader, it may be some time before their proposals are fully assessed
and
decisions are made about how best to proceed. The Assistant Secretary will
consider the proposals from the project teams, but has not stated when
final decisions will occur. Opportunities Exist
to Explore Additional Cost Savings and to Strengthen Program Management
DOE Is Considering Additional Potential Opportunities to Reduce Costs
Page 36 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Among the proposals that DOE is considering, the ones that appear to offer
significant cost- savings opportunities would increase the amount of waste
placed in each disposal canister. We discussed these cost- savings
opportunities with both Savannah River and Hanford officials during our
review. DOE officials at those sites have identified these potential
savings opportunities as deserving further consideration, but have not yet
fully assessed the potential benefits, or overcome technical and
operational barriers.
Savannah River officials are working to reduce costs by increasing the
amount of waste immobilized in glass and placed in each disposal canister.
They have proposed increasing the amount of waste in each canister by
developing different blends of glass material, called frit, that they
believe can be tailored to each batch of waste. The amount of waste that
can be
placed into a canister depends on a complex set of factors, including the
specific mix of radioactive material combined with other chemicals in the
waste, such as chromium and sulfate, that affect the processing and
quality of the immobilized product. These factors affect the percentage of
waste than can be placed in each canister because they indicate the
likelihood that radioactive constituents could leach out of the
immobilizing glass medium and into the environment. The greater the
potential for leaching, the lower the allowable percentage of waste and
the higher the percentage of glass frit that must be used. DOE determines
that a consistently acceptable glass is produced by evaluating the
leaching rates of the glass, using a combination of chemical analysis and
predictive modeling.
Based on a recent improvement made to DOE*s predictive model involving
adjustments to the required temperature of the melted waste, and changes
to the type of glass frit used, Savannah River officials believe they can
increase the amount of waste loaded in each canister from 28 percent to
about 35 percent and, for at least one waste batch, to nearly 50 percent.
Savannah River plans to implement this new process and begin increasing
the amount of waste in each canister in June 2003. If successful, Savannah
River*s improved approach could reduce the number of canisters needed by
about 1,000 canisters and save about $2.7 billion, based on preliminary
estimates.
Beyond the specific improvements Savannah River officials have already
identified, there may be an additional way to increase the loading of
waste into disposal canisters, resulting in additional savings for DOE.
During our review, we determined that DOE*s Offices of Environmental
Management and Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (Radioactive Waste
Opportunities at Savannah
River Look Promising but Have Not Been Fully Demonstrated
Page 37 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Management) have been using different acceptance criteria for evaluating
the rate at which waste could leach out of the glass in the disposal
canisters. By conforming to the less restrictive Radioactive Waste
Management criteria, Environmental Management could possibly increase the
amount of waste in the canisters to a higher level. 30 After examining
this possibility, Environmental Management officials at Savannah River
said that, if the higher waste loading could be achieved, this change
could eliminate the need for up to 650 canisters. This may permit further
cost savings of about $1.7 billion. The Savannah River officials stated
that they were continuing to examine this cost- savings possibility.
The Hanford Site has also proposed strategies to decrease the number of
high- level waste canisters that it will need, but its approach is in a
very early stage of development. In November 2002, Hanford proposed
broadening the high- level waste acceptance criteria to allow waste forms
other than standard borosilicate glass* the type of glass being used at
Savannah River and initially planned for Hanford* to be accepted for
immobilizing high- level waste. Hanford*s proposal is based on recent
changes to NRC*s disposal requirements that will allow for alternative
waste forms to be sent to the repository. 31 These changes may allow
Hanford to package its high- level waste in fewer canisters.
Although it is unclear whether DOE orders will be changed to allow these
other waste forms, DOE has significant incentives to do so. Reducing the
number of canisters at Hanford is especially important because, based on
the expected production capacity of the high- level waste vitrification
plant, only a maximum of 9,600 of the projected 12,800 canisters that DOE
will need can be filled with waste by the 2028 scheduled completion date.
30 DOE*s standard for leaching establishes a limitation on the rate at
which the glass containing the waste can leach material into the
environment. Radioactive Waste Management, the DOE office responsible for
managing the final disposal of the waste at the geologic repository,
requires that the *mean* or average of leaching rates measured or
predicted for the immobilizing glass must be less than the average of
leaching rates for standard glass. In contrast, Environmental Management
suggests (and the sites have adopted) that the average of leaching rates
measured or predicted for the glass must be *at least two standard
deviations below* the average leaching rates for standard glass.
Environmental Management*s more stringent criteria to limit leaching can,
under some circumstances, restrict the amount of waste that can be placed
in the canisters to a greater extent than Radioactive Waste Management*s
standard.
31 In a November 2002 internal memo to Radioactive Waste Management, the
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management stated the need to revise
its waste acceptance criteria to be consistent with NRC*s disposal
requirements. DOE has recently begun to
evaluate the steps necessary to make this revision. Because Opportunities
at
Hanford Are in Early Development, Savings Are Not Yet Known
Page 38 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
However, by using other types of glass, Hanford estimates that it may be
able to reduce its need for disposal canisters by 2, 500 to 3,900
canisters. 32 If such a significant reduction in the number of canisters
produced is
possible, it could shorten Hanford*s high- level waste treatment schedule
by 6 years, save billions of dollars, and help to meet its scheduled
completion date. However, the wide range of Hanford*s estimate reflects
the rough nature of its proposal and that cost savings have not yet been
fully estimated.
In addition to DOE*s efforts to identify site- specific proposals for
saving time and money, DOE is also undertaking management improvements
using teams to study individual issues. Nine teams are currently in place,
while other teams to address issues such as using breakthrough business
processes in waste cleanup and improving the environmental review process
to better support decision- making have not yet been formed. Each team has
a disciplined management process to follow, 33 and even after the teams*
work is completed, any implementation will take time. These efforts are in
the early stages, and therefore it is unclear if they will be effective in
correcting the causes of the performance problems DOE and others have
identified.
We are concerned, however, that these management reforms may not go far
enough in addressing performance problems with the high- level waste
program. Our concerns stem from our review of initiatives underway in the
management teams, our discussions with DOE officials, and our past and
current work, as well as work by others inside and outside DOE. We have
identified three recurring weaknesses in DOE*s management of cleanup
projects that we believe need to be addressed as part of this overall
review. These weaknesses cut across the various issues that the teams are
working on and are often found at the center of problems that have been
identified. Two of the three weaknesses have been discussed earlier in
this report, as we have identified these as potentially significant
obstacles to achieving savings* lack of rigor in the analysis supporting
32 Based on *engineering staff judgment,* depending on the waste form
used, a reduction of as many as 500 canisters may be attributable to
changing Environmental Management*s more stringent waste quality criteria
to conform to Radioactive Waste Management*s standard.
33 Under DOE*s project management principles, for example, teams must
define project requirements, conduct preliminary risk assessments, and
prepare a risk mitigation plan prior to developing a baseline cost
estimate of proposed alternatives. DOE Has Opportunities
to Improve Management of the Program by Addressing Previously Identified
Weaknesses
Page 39 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
key decisions, and incorporating technology into projects before it is
sufficiently mature. The final area of weakness involves using *fast-
track* methods to begin construction of complex facilities before
sufficient planning and design have taken place.
DOE*s project management guidance emphasizes the importance of rigorous
and current analysis to support decision- making during the development of
DOE projects. All DOE projects with costs greater than $5 million require
risk management activities, including a thorough analysis, to be applied
continuously, adjusting these analyses throughout the process as necessary
to ensure DOE is pursuing the best value alternative at the lowest cost.
Similarly, the Office of Management and Budget guidance states that
agencies should validate earlier planning decisions with updated
information before finalizing decisions to construct facilities. This
validation is particularly important where early cost comparisons are
susceptible to uncertainties and change.
However, DOE does not always follow this guidance. Proceeding without
rigorous review has been a recurring cause of many of the problems we have
identified in past DOE projects. For example, regarding the need to
validate planning decisions with updated information before finalizing
decisions, the decision at Hanford to construct a vitrification plant to
treat Hanford*s low- activity waste has not undergone such a validation.
Hanford*s analysis justifying the cost of this approach was prepared in
1999 and was based on technical performance data, disposal assumptions,
and cost data developed in the early to mid- 1990s* conditions that are no
longer applicable. For example, the 1999 analysis compared DOE*s
low- activity vitrification approach with a disposal approach developed in
the early 1990s that involved large underground grout vaults with
elaborate environmental controls. Although this grout approach was
abandoned in 1994, DOE still used these disposal assumptions for the 1999
comparison and analysis. Since that time other conditions have changed,
including the performance capabilities of alternative technologies such as
grout, the relative costs of different technologies, and the amount of
waste DOE actually intends to process through a vitrification plant. These
changes suggest that earlier planning decisions need to be validated with
updated information to ensure that the current approach is reasonable and
appropriate. DOE*s high- level waste project team also recognized that the
DOE officials at Hanford had not performed a current, rigorous analysis of
low- activity waste treatment options including the use of grout as an
alternative to vitrification, and encouraged the Hanford site to update
its analysis based on current waste treatment and disposal assumptions.
Hanford officials responded in April 2003 by developing life- cycle Key
Decisions Not Always
Supported by Rigorous Current Analysis
Page 40 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
cost estimates that compared the cost of alternate low- activity waste
approaches. However, they did not fully reassess the decision to vitrify
low- activity waste. DOE officials at Hanford told us they do not plan to
reassess the decision to construct a low- activity vitrification facility
because their compliance agreement with the state of Washington calls for
vitrification of this waste. They also stated that vitrification is a
technology needed for destroying hazardous constituents in a portion of
the waste.
In our previous work, we noted a similar lack of rigor in reevaluating DOE
decisions as conditions change. For example, at three sites* Fernald,
Ohio; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and the Idaho National Laboratory* DOE was
faced with a decision about whether to dispose of low- level waste on-
site or to use off- site commercial disposal facilities. Between the time
that DOE decided to develop on- site disposal facilities at these three
sites and the time that construction actually began, conditions changed
that affected the usefulness of earlier cost estimates. However, DOE
officials at the sites made little effort to update and reevaluate the
original cost comparisons to validate the on- site disposal decision. 34
In July 2002, DOE*s Office of Environmental Management issued guidance to
implement our recommendation to validate cost comparisons before
constructing or expanding low- level waste disposal facilities at these
three sites.
This weakness cuts across the issues that the DOE teams are working on; no
DOE team appears to be currently addressing it. However, DOE managers need
to ensure that it receives proper consideration as these management
improvement efforts proceed.
Our work on Department of Defense acquisitions has documented a set of
*best practices* used by industry for integrating new technology into
major projects. We reported in July 1999 that the maturity of a technology
at the start of a project is an important determinant of success. 35 As
technology develops from preconceptual design through preliminary design
and testing, the maturity of the technology increases and the risks
associated with incorporating that design into a project decrease. Waiting
34 U. S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Cleanup: DOE Should Reevaluate
Waste Disposal Options Before Building New Facilities, GAO- 01- 441
(Washington, D. C.: May 25, 2001).
35 U. S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Management of
Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/ NSIAD- 99-
162 (Washington, D. C.: July 30, 1999). New Technology Is
Incorporated before It Is Sufficiently Mature
Page 41 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
until technology is well- developed and tested before integrating it into
a project will greatly increase the chances of meeting cost, schedule, and
technical baselines. On the other hand, integrating technology that is not
fully mature into a project greatly increases the risk of having cost
increases and schedule delays. According to industry experts, correcting
problems after a project has begun can cost 10 times as much as resolving
technology problems beforehand.
DOE*s project management guidance issued in October 2000 is consistent
with these best practices. The guidance discusses technology development
and sets out suggested steps to ensure that new technology is brought to a
sufficient level of maturity at each decision point in a project. For
example, during the conceptual design phase of a project, *proof of
concept* testing should be performed before approval to proceed to the
preliminary design phase. Furthermore, the guidance states that projects
that attempt to concurrently develop the technology and design the
facility proceed with ill- defined risks to all three baselines* cost,
schedule, and technical.
Nevertheless, as we discussed earlier in this report, DOE sites continue
to integrate immature technologies into their projects. For example, at
Hanford, DOE is constructing a facility to separate high- level waste
components, although integrated testing of the many steps in the
separations process has not occurred and will not occur until after the
facility is completed. DOE, trying to keep the project on schedule and
within budget, has decided the risks associated with this approach are
acceptable. However, there are many projects in which this approach
created schedule delays and unexpected costs. The continued reliance on
this approach in the face of so many past problems is a signal of an area
that needs careful attention as DOE proceeds with its management reform
efforts. At present, no DOE management team is addressing this issue.
Finally, we have concerns about DOE*s practice of launching into
construction of complex, one- of- a- kind facilities well before their
final design is sufficiently developed, again in an effort to save time
and money. Both DOE guidance and external reviews stress the importance of
adequate upfront planning before beginning project construction. DOE*s
project management guidance identifies a series of well- defined steps
before construction begins and suggests that complex projects with
treatment processes that have never before been combined into a facility
do not lend themselves to being expedited. However, DOE guidance does not
explicitly prohibit a fast- track* or concurrent design and construction*
approach to complex, one- of- a- kind projects, and DOE Facility
Construction Starts
before Design Is Sufficiently Developed
Page 42 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
often follows this approach. For example, at the Hanford Site, DOE is
concurrently designing and constructing facilities for the largest, most
complex environmental cleanup project in the United States. Problems are
already surfacing. Only 24 months after the contract was awarded, the
project was 10 months behind schedule dates, construction activities have
outpaced design work causing inefficient work sequencing, and DOE has
withheld performance fee from the design/ construction contractor because
of these problems.
DOE experienced similar problems in concurrent design and construction
activities on other waste treatment facilities. Both the spent nuclear
fuel project at Hanford and the waste separations facility at the Savannah
River
Site encountered schedule delays and cost increases in part because the
concurrent approach led to mistakes and rework, and required extra time
and money to address the problems. 36 In its 2001 follow- up report on DOE
project management, the National Research Council noted that inadequate
pre- construction planning and definition of project scope led to cost and
schedule overruns on DOE*s cleanup projects. 37 The Council reported that
research studies suggest that inadequate project definition accounts for
50 percent of the cost increases for environmental remediation projects.
Again, no team is specifically examining the *fast- track* approach, yet
it frequently contributed to past problems and DOE continues to use this
approach.
DOE*s efforts to improve its high- level waste cleanup program and to rein
in the uncontrolled growth in project costs and schedules are important
and necessary. The accelerated cleanup initiative represents at least the
hope of treating and disposing of the waste in a more economical and
timely way, although the actual savings are unknown at this time.
Furthermore, specific components of this initiative face key legal and
technical challenges. Much of the potential for success rests on DOE*s
36 For a discussion of the problems associated with the fast track design/
build approach on these projects, see U. S. General Accounting Office,
Nuclear Waste: DOE*s Hanford Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Project* Cost,
Schedule, and Management Issues,
GAO/ RCED- 99- 267 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 20, 1999) and Nuclear Waste:
Process to Remove Radioactive Waste From Savannah River Tanks Fails to
Work, GAO- RCED- 99- 69 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 30, 1999).
37 National Research Council, Progress in Improving Project Management at
the Department of Energy (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 2001). Conclusions
Page 43 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
continued ability to dispose of large quantities of waste with relatively
low concentrations of radioactivity on- site by applying its incidental
waste process. DOE*s authority in this regard has been challenged in a
lawsuit that is still pending. Much of the success also rests on DOE*s
ability to obtain successful technical performance from its as- yet
unproven waste separation processes. Any technical problems with these
processes will likely result in costly delays. At DOE*s Hanford Site, we
believe the potential for such problems warrants reconsidering the need
for more thorough testing of the processes.
DOE*s accelerated cleanup initiative should mark the beginning, not the
end, of DOE*s efforts to identify other opportunities to improve the
program by accomplishing the work more quickly, more effectively, or at
less cost. As DOE continues to pursue other management improvements,
it should reassess certain aspects of its current management approach,
including the quality of the analysis underlying key decisions, the
adequacy of its approach to incorporating new technologies into projects,
and the merits of a fast- track approach to designing and building complex
nuclear facilities. Although the challenges are great, the opportunities
for
program improvements are even greater. Therefore, DOE must continue its
efforts to clean up its high- level waste while demonstrating tangible,
measurable program improvements.
To help ensure that DOE*s accelerated cleanup initiative is effective and
that cleanup of high- level waste proceeds in a timely and cost- effective
manner, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Energy
seek clarification from the Congress regarding DOE*s authority for
designating waste as incidental to reprocessing if the current challenge
becomes an extended legal process, in order to help DOE determine what
strategy it needs to move its initiative forward and realize potential
savings; reassess the potential risks, costs, and benefits of
constructing an
integrated pilot- scale waste separation facility at the Hanford site to
more fully test separation technologies before completing construction of
a full- scale facility; and ensure that DOE*s high- level waste projects
(1) include a current and
rigorous analysis of the risks, costs, and benefits associated with the
decisions being implemented, in accordance with OMB guidance; (2)
incorporate new technologies consistent with best practices and DOE
guidance so that risks and costs are more effectively managed; and (3) are
carefully evaluated as to the appropriateness of using a fast- track
Recommendations for
Executive Action
Page 44 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
approach to designing and constructing complex nuclear facilities, and
that the potential risks and costs associated with this approach are
explicitly identified and considered. We provided a draft of this report
to the Department of Energy for its
review and comment. DOE*s Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management
responded for DOE. DOE*s written comments acknowledged the challenges that
DOE faces in its high- level waste program, as discussed
in our report. DOE cited its recent initiative to accelerate cleanup and
reduce environmental risks as its response to those challenges. DOE agreed
to consider our recommendation to seek clarification from the Congress
regarding DOE*s authority to determine what waste is incidental to
reprocessing, if legal challenges to DOE*s authority to make such
determinations have a significant effect on implementing proposed cost-
saving and risk- reduction initiatives. However, DOE disagreed with our
recommendation that it conduct integrated pilot testing of its waste
separation processes at Hanford while constructing a full- scale facility.
In addition, regarding opportunities to improve program management, DOE
said that at the Hanford project it was already effectively conducting
rigorous analyses to support decision- making, incorporating new
technologies into the project consistent with best practices and agency
guidelines, and using a fast- track approach of concurrently designing and
building complex nuclear facilities.
Regarding our recommendation that DOE pursue integrated, pilot- scale
testing of the waste separations facility at Hanford, DOE believes that
its current approach is adequate to manage the risks associated with
designing and constructing the facility. DOE said that it does not intend
to pursue an integrated pilot test facility that we believe would increase
the
chances of success with the full- scale facility. DOE*s position is based
on two main arguments. DOE believes that (1) the technologies planned for
the separations facility are commercially available and thus are mature
technologies having low technical risk and (2) relying on pilot testing of
individual components of the separation processes in the laboratory
provides adequate mitigation of the risks involved.
We disagree with DOE*s view that the separations approach planned for the
Hanford Site is low risk. DOE has experience with the individual
technologies, but does not have experience in operating an integrated
separations process that incorporates all of the operations required for
Hanford*s unique and complex waste. Furthermore, DOE has experienced
problems with another separation facility where adequate testing was not
Agency Comments
Page 45 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
done until the facility was fully constructed* the in- tank precipitation
facility at Savannah River. In that case, the separations process failed
after DOE spent about $500 million trying to make it work properly. And
the primary technologies used at Savannah River were also in use
commercially, but had not been fully adapted to the unique Savannah River
wastes.
We also disagree that DOE*s plan to conduct extensive testing in the
laboratory to mitigate the technology risks involved with the separation
processes will provide adequate assurance that the full- scale separations
facility will perform effectively. Numerous experts and DOE*s contractor
have proposed constructing and operating an integrated pilot- scale
facility. They made the proposals while knowing about DOE*s intention to
conduct extensive laboratory testing of separation processes. The
contractor as well as outside experts view the separations facility as
having significant project risk, in contrast to DOE*s statement that the
separation processes pose low project risk. Given the risks associated
with fully constructing the separations facility before conducting
integrated testing and the cost of any delays associated with having
significant problems with the separation processes once the facility is
fully constructed, we continue to believe that conducting integrated
pilot- scale testing is an important risk- and schedule- management tool
and that DOE should reconsider its use for the Hanford project. DOE
officials at Hanford acknowledged that the pilot facility could be
included in the project without extending the project*s schedule.
Regarding management improvement issues, DOE said that we inadequately
portrayed the progress it has made in the three areas in which we
recommended management improvements. However, our report addresses the
three management issues from the broader context of DOE*s project
activities over several years and at a number of sites. Our past work has
clearly linked these weaknesses to problems on cleanup projects. Because
DOE did not take issue with that broader context in this report, but did
assert improved performance on the Hanford project, the following comments
are limited to needed improvements to the
Hanford project. Regarding DOE*s view that it performed current and
rigorous analyses of risks, cost, and benefits for the Hanford waste
treatment project, our report illustrates our concerns about the analysis
DOE performed to support its decision to vitrify a portion of Hanford*s
low- activity waste. DOE stated that this decision, originally made in
1994, has been revisited numerous times using rigorous analysis and
provided us with three studies
Page 46 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
that specifically compared the cost of low- activity waste vitrification
with other approaches, such as grout, to support its decision. None of
these studies included a current and rigorous analysis of risks, costs,
and benefits, as called for in OMB guidance. For example, even the most
recent study, completed in 2003, was primarily based on technical
performance, disposal assumptions, and cost data developed in the early
1990s. The team leader of the high- level waste project team confirmed
that
these analyses were not a full and rigorous assessment of the risks, cost,
and benefits of vitrifying low- activity waste. Thus, we continue to
believe that additional efforts are needed in this area.
Regarding our recommendation to follow best practices and DOE guidance
when incorporating new technology into cleanup projects, DOE commented
that it was continuing to consider opportunities to improve the Hanford
project and that the contractor was using a risk- based management process
to address technical and programmatic project risks. We agree that a risk-
based management process is appropriate on the project. However, we
continue to believe that DOE*s approach to incorporating the separation
technologies planned for the Hanford project is not fully consistent with
best practices and DOE guidance because the approach involves
incorporating technologies into the project before they have been fully
tested as an integrated process. This testing of the integrated process in
an operational mode is needed to demonstrate that the technologies are
sufficiently mature to ensure their effective performance when deployed on
the project.
Concerning the appropriateness of using a *fast- track* construction
approach to design and construct complex nuclear facilities for the
Hanford project, DOE said that our report incorrectly portrays the overall
strategy for the Hanford project. We believe our report accurately
describes DOE*s approach, which includes using concurrent design,
construction, and technology development. We have previously reported on
the risks associated with this approach, including the increased potential
for project schedule delays and cost increases.
DOE also provided technical clarifications and corrections to our report,
which we incorporated as appropriate. The full text of DOE*s comments and
our responses are presented in appendix II.
We conducted our review from July 2002 through May 2003, in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I provides
details on our scope and methodology.
Page 47 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the
Secretary of Energy. We will also make copies available to others on
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO
Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. If you or your staff have any questions
on this report, please call me at (202) 512- 3841. Other staff
contributing to this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours, Robin M. Nazzaro Director, Natural Resources and
Environment
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 48 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level
Waste
To describe the components of DOE*s high- level waste and the process
involved in preparing the waste for permanent disposal, we analyzed
information and documents provided by DOE officials and contractors at the
four sites containing DOE high- level waste: Hanford, Washington; Idaho
National Laboratory, Idaho; Savannah River, South Carolina; and West
Valley, New York. We did not independently verify the accuracy of
the information provided by each DOE site. From these same sites, we also
obtained information on the types, age, and condition of the facilities
used to store the high- level waste. To assist in evaluating technical
aspects of high- level waste, we obtained assistance from our technical
consultant, Dr. George Hinman. Dr. Hinman has a Doctor of Science degree
in physics,
is Professor Emeritus at the Washington State University, and has
extensive experience in the nuclear energy field in industry, government,
and academia.
To examine DOE*s initiative for accelerating its high- level waste cleanup
and the associated potential cost savings, we obtained and reviewed the
Performance Management Plans for each of DOE*s four high- level waste
sites (Hanford, Savannah River, Idaho National Laboratory, and West
Valley). We discussed these initiatives thoroughly with officials from
each of the sites and obtained documentation discussing the proposed
initiatives, as well as savings estimates. We reported all dollar
estimates as provided by DOE in current dollars and did not adjust these
figures to constant dollars. We did not verify the accuracy of cost
information provided by DOE. We also reviewed guidance from the Office of
Management and Budget circulars, especially circular A- 94, on the type of
analysis that federal agencies should use when developing benefit and
cost estimates, and compared DOE*s proposed savings estimates to that
guidance. We analyzed savings estimate figures provided by DOE*s Savannah
River staff, discounting the dollars to provide an estimate in constant
dollars.
To identify the legal challenges DOE faces, we obtained documentation
relating to the current Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) lawsuit.
We discussed the lawsuit separately with attorneys from the NRDC, as well
as from DOE. We also discussed the waste- incidental- toreprocessing
process with staff at the NRC. We documented each site*s incidental waste
determinations, as well as historical information on the development of
DOE Order 435.1. We also reviewed the appropriate statutes, related
regulations and orders. To identify the technical challenges and issues
that must be resolved to realize potential savings, we obtained
documentation on the technical uncertainties and risks associated with the
waste treatment approaches at the Hanford, Idaho Appendix I: Scope and
Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 49 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level
Waste
National Laboratory, and Savannah River sites. Because waste separation is
central to successful high- level waste treatment and disposal, we
documented the status of each site*s approach. We identified the major
technical concerns, uncertainties, and risks associated with the waste
separations approaches and discussed them with DOE and contractor
officials at each site. We also visited the Savannah River Technology
Center to review the progress and results of laboratory tests conducted to
develop the Savannah River and Hanford sites* waste separations
technology. With the assistance of our technical consultant, we contacted
a variety of independent experts in industry and academia to obtain their
views on the risks associated with these technologies.
To determine additional opportunities for reducing high- level waste
program costs, we reviewed DOE waste acceptance policies and requirements,
planning documents, position papers, and internal memos. We discussed the
opportunities with DOE officials, contractors, and laboratory officials
primarily at the Hanford, Idaho National Laboratory, and Savannah River
sites. We compared the cost- savings concepts with those presented in
performance management plans at each site to document that they
represented additional opportunities. We also relied on the expertise of
our technical consultant to help assess the technical viability of DOE*s
proposals. To determine opportunities to improve the management of the
program, we reviewed DOE*s Top- to- Bottom report and we discussed
management reform proposals with officials at DOE headquarters. We also
obtained documentation on DOE*s project review teams. We reviewed prior
reports from GAO, DOE*s IG and the National Research Council to identify
recurring weaknesses in DOE management
of its cleanup program, and we developed current examples of those
weaknesses from our work at the high- level waste sites and meetings with
DOE officials. We also compared management weaknesses we identified to
DOE*s current reform efforts to determine the extent to which the
weaknesses were being addressed and to identify areas needing continued
attention.
We conducted our review from July 2002 through May 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 50 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Note: GAO*s comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 51 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 52 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
See comment 3. Now on p. 2.
See comment 2. See comment 1.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 53 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Now on p. 19. See comment 4. Now on p. 18.
See comment 4. Now on p. 15.
See comment 6. Now on p. 14.
See comment 5. See comment 4.
Now on p. 8. See comment 4.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 54 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
See comment 10. See comment 9.
Now on p. 21. See comment 8. Now on p. 20.
See comment 7.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 55 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
See comment 4. See comment 13. Now on p. 23.
See comment 12. See comment 11.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 56 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Now on p. 32. See comment 15. Now on p. 30.
See comment 4. See comment 14. See comment 4.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 57 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Now on p. 37. See comment 4. Now on p. 37.
See comment 4. Now on p. 36.
See comment 4. Now on p. 36.
See comment 4.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 58 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Now on p. 40. See comment 16. Now on p. 39.
See comment 15.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 59 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Now on p. 43. See comment 15. Now on p. 43.
See comment 15. Now on p. 43.
See comment 15. Now on p. 41.
See comment 15.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 60 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 61 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 62 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
1. We agree and have modified the final report to clarify that the low-
activity portion of the separated tank waste would be immobilized and
disposed of permanently on- site, or at other designated locations.
2. We agree and have modified the final report to clarify that DOE*s
approach generally involves separating the waste into two main streams.
3. We modified the final report to clarify that the intentional discharges
from the tanks were only at the Hanford Site. We do not agree with DOE*s
statement that the tank wastes discharged into the soil contained
relatively low- levels of radioactivity. According to DOE*s
records, the tank waste discharged into the soil at the Hanford Site
contained radioactive components with long half- lives, such as
technetium- 99. The available records show that, as of December 1989,
decades after the waste was discharged into the soil, the 121 million
gallons still contained more than 65,000 curies of radioactivity.
4. We agree and have modified the final report accordingly. 5. We believe
that using the term *contaminated water* when referring to
water from the tanks that may include radioactive and hazardous components
is more accurate. The use of the term *water* by itself could be
misleading for the general reader.
6. We agree and have modified the final report to clarify that the use of
process knowledge is a central part of the characterization step.
7. Although DOE may use constant dollars to report the department*s
environmental liabilities under its Government Results and Reporting Act
requirements, it has not done so in its savings estimates or public
disclosures for its accelerated cleanup initiative. In addition, to
correctly compare costs of alternatives with different timing, DOE
should compare *present values* of costs and not merely the constant
dollars. Therefore, we made no change to the final report.
8. We agree and have modified the final report to include the cost
contingency as a factor in the cost growth for the Hanford high- level
waste treatment facility.
9. We believe that this comment reinforces the message in the draft report
that some of the proposed savings may be based on incomplete estimates of
the costs for the accelerated proposals. DOE commented that the range of
costs for the alternative technologies for the sodium- bearing waste in
the tanks* from $150- 400 million* was GAO Comments
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 63 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
less than the $1 billion estimated cost of vitrifying the waste, and
therefore was not included in the savings estimate. We continue to believe
that the savings estimates in the accelerated plan should have reflected
all associated costs, including the difference between the
costs for the alternative technologies and the costs for vitrification. We
disagree that the $7 billion in estimated savings is solely attributable
to the differences in strategy for treating calcine waste. The July 2002
accelerated plan for the Idaho National Laboratory specifically states
that the $7 billion will be saved by the new cleanup approach for both
calcine and sodium- bearing waste that eliminates the need for a
vitrification facility. 10. We believe that this comment reinforces the
message in the report that
the use of a single point estimate does not reflect uncertainties. We
disagree that including a section in the accelerated plan that catalogs
the government furnished services and items is the same or similar to
accounting for uncertainties by providing a range of savings estimates.
11. While the accelerated plan for the Idaho National Laboratory briefly
discusses reductions in risk to workers from less intrusive
characterization and sampling techniques and elimination of a
vitrification facility, it does not fully describe the advantages and
disadvantages to workers and the environment. Therefore, we continue to
believe that the savings estimates do not fully discuss the nonbudgetary
impacts such as environmental risks.
12. We believe this section of the report, including the summary
paragraph, adequately describes DOE*s management of waste processing
activities.
13. Although section 114 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act limits the amount
of nuclear waste that can be deposited in the repository, this limitation
is not relevant to the point in this paragraph. Therefore, we made no
change to the final report.
14. We believe the report adequately conveys this information. 15. We
address these comments in the Agency Comments section of the
report. 16. We agree and have modified the final report to acknowledge
that
DOE had implemented the GAO recommendation to validate cost comparisons
before constructing or expanding disposal facilities for low- level waste.
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Page 64 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste
William R. Swick (206) 287- 4800 In addition to the individual named
above, Carole Blackwell, Robert Crystal, Doreen Feldman, Chris Hatscher,
George Hinman, Gary Jones, Nancy Kintner- Meyer, Avani Locke, Mehrzad
Nadji, Cynthia Norris, Tom Perry, and Stan Stenersen made key
contributions to this report. Appendix III: GAO Contact and
Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Acknowledgments
(360230)
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