    Nuclear Waste: Challenges to Achieving Potential Savings in DOE's
    High-Level Waste Cleanup Program (17-JUN-03, GAO-03-593).

    The Department of Energy (DOE) oversees one of the largest
    cleanup programs in history--the treatment and disposal of 94
    million gallons of highly radioactive nuclear waste from the
    nation's nuclear weapons program. This waste is currently at DOE
    sites in Washington, Idaho, and South Carolina. In 2002, DOE
    began an initiative to reduce the estimated $105-billion cost and
    70-year time frame of this cleanup. GAO was asked to determine
    the status of this initiative, the legal and technical challenges
    DOE faces in implementing it, and any further opportunities to
    reduce costs or improve program management.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-593
        ACCNO:   A07210
      TITLE:     Nuclear Waste: Challenges to Achieving Potential Savings
    in DOE's High-Level Waste Cleanup Program
         DATE:   06/17/2003
      SUBJECT:   Nuclear waste disposal
    	     Nuclear waste management
    	     Nuclear waste storage
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Hanford (WA)
    	     Idaho Falls (ID)
    	     Savannah River (SC)

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    GAO-03-593

    Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
    Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

    June 2003 NUCLEAR WASTE Challenges to Achieving Potential Savings in DOE*s
    High- Level Waste Cleanup Program

    GAO- 03- 593

    DOE*s initiative for reducing the costs and time required for cleanup of
    high- level wastes is still evolving. DOE*s main strategy for treating
    high- level waste continues to include separating and concentrating much
    of the

    radioactivity into a smaller volume for disposal in a geologic repository.
    Under the initiative, DOE sites are evaluating other approaches, such as
    disposing of more waste on site. DOE*s current savings estimate for these

    approaches is $29 billion, but the estimate may not be reliable or
    complete. For example, the savings estimate does not adequately reflect
    uncertainties or take into account the timing of when savings will be
    realized.

    DOE faces significant legal and technical challenges to realize these
    savings. A key legal challenge involves DOE*s authority to decide that
    some waste with relatively low concentrations of radioactivity can be
    disposed of on site. This authority is being challenged in court, and a
    prolonged challenge or an adverse decision could seriously hamper DOE*s
    ability to meet its accelerated schedules. A key technical challenge is
    that DOE*s approach relies on laboratory testing to confirm separation of
    the waste into high- level and low- activity portions. At the Hanford Site
    in Washington State, DOE plans to build a facility before integrated
    testing of the separation technology* an approach that has failed on other
    projects in the past, resulting in significant cost increases and schedule
    delays.

    DOE is exploring proposals, such as increasing the amount of high- level
    waste in each disposal canister, which if successful could result in
    billions of dollars in additional savings. However, considerable
    evaluation remains to be done. DOE also has opportunities to improve
    program management by fully addressing recurring weaknesses GAO has
    identified in DOE*s management of cleanup projects.

    Waste Storage Tanks under Construction at DOE*s Hanford Site, September
    1947

    Many of the waste storage tanks, such as those above, were built in the
    1940s to 1960s. These tanks, now underground, are used to store high-
    level waste and have exceeded their design life of 10- 40 years. Some have
    leaked waste into the soil.

    The Department of Energy (DOE) oversees one of the largest cleanup
    programs in history* the treatment and disposal of 94 million gallons of
    highly radioactive nuclear waste

    from the nation*s nuclear weapons program. This waste is currently at DOE
    sites in Washington, Idaho,

    and South Carolina. In 2002, DOE began an initiative to reduce the
    estimated $105- billion cost and 70- year time frame of this cleanup. GAO
    was asked to determine the

    status of this initiative, the legal and technical challenges DOE faces in
    implementing it, and any further

    opportunities to reduce costs or improve program management. GAO
    recommends that DOE (1) seek clarification of its authority to designate
    waste as other than high- level waste if a prolonged legal challenge
    occurs; (2) conduct integrated testing of waste separations components

    before completing a full- scale facility at the Hanford Site; and (3)
    ensure that DOE management practices include conducting rigorous analyses,
    following best practices for incorporating new technologies, and being
    cautious about using a concurrent design/ build approach for nuclear
    facilities. In commenting on the

    report, DOE agreed to consider seeking clarification of its authority as
    appropriate, but said that its

    practices met the intent of the other two recommendations. GAO believes
    further improvements are needed. www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03-
    593. To view the full product, including the scope

    and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact
    Robin M. Nazzaro at (202) 512- 3841 or nazzaror@ gao. gov. Highlights of
    GAO- 03- 593, a report to the

    Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
    Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives June 2003

    NUCLEAR WASTE

    Challenges to Achieving Potential Savings in DOE*s High- Level Waste
    Cleanup Program

    Page i GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
    Background 5 DOE*s High- Level Waste Is a Complex Mixture That Requires a

    Multi- Step Process to Prepare for Disposal 9 DOE*s Initiative for
    Accelerating Cleanup Is Still Evolving, with the Extent of Savings
    Uncertain 16 Key Legal and Technical Challenges Could Limit Potential
    Savings from DOE*s Accelerated Cleanup Initiative 23 Opportunities Exist
    to Explore Additional Cost Savings and to Strengthen Program Management 35
    Conclusions 42 Recommendations for Executive Action 43 Agency Comments 44
    Appendix I Scope and Methodology 48

    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Energy 50

    Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 64

    Tables

    Table 1: Major Short- Lived Radionuclides Contributing to the Current
    Radioactivity in DOE*s Untreated High- Level Waste 12 Table 2: Main Steps
    in DOE*s Approach to Preparing High- Level

    Waste for Disposal 15 Table 3: Examples of Proposals under Study for
    Accelerating the High- Level Waste Treatment Process 19 Table 4: DOE*s
    Estimated Cost Savings from Proposals to Accelerate Cleanup of High- Level
    Waste 20 Table 5: Description and Status of DOE Incidental Waste
    Determinations for Tank Waste 26 Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste Figures

    Figure 1: Waste Storage Tanks under Construction at DOE*s Hanford Site,
    September 1947 7 Figure 2. Physical Forms of DOE*s Untreated High- Level
    Waste as a

    Percentage of Total Waste Volume 10 Figure 3: Natural Decay of
    Radionuclides in DOE*s Untreated High- Level Waste from 2002 to 2102 13
    Figure 4: Simplified Description of Key Steps in Hanford*s Proposed
    Process for Separating High- Level Waste Constituents 31 Abbreviations

    AEA Atomic Energy Act of 1954 DOE Department of Energy EPA Environmental
    Protection Agency NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRDC Natural Resources
    Defense Council OMB Office of Management and Budget

    RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976

    This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
    copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
    materials separately from GAO*s product.

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    June 17, 2003 The Honorable James C. Greenwood Chairman, Subcommittee on
    Oversight

    and Investigations Committee on Energy and Commerce House of
    Representatives

    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Department of Energy (DOE) oversees one of the
    largest cleanup programs in history: the treatment and disposal of nuclear
    waste created as a result of the nation*s nuclear weapons program. As of
    2003, one major aspect of this effort, DOE*s high- level waste cleanup
    program, was estimated to cost nearly $105 billion and take decades to
    complete. High- level waste contains radioactive elements, such as
    plutonium and uranium, in concentrations sufficient to require long- term
    isolation from the environment. DOE*s high- level waste results from the
    process of dissolving used (or *spent*) nuclear fuel to remove plutonium,
    uranium, and other useful materials. During some of the processing,
    solvents and other materials can be introduced, creating waste that is
    both radioactive and chemically hazardous. About 94 million gallons of
    untreated high- level waste is stored at DOE facilities at Hanford,
    Washington; Savannah River,

    South Carolina; and near Idaho Falls, Idaho* primarily in underground
    tanks. This waste would fill an area the size of a football field to a
    depth of about 260 feet. Since the 1980s, DOE has been actively working on
    ways

    to prepare this waste for permanent disposal. These plans center on
    eventually placing high- level waste in an underground repository where it
    can be safely stored for thousands of years.

    After investing more than 20 years and about $18 billion, DOE acknowledged
    that the program to clean up its high- level waste was far behind
    schedule, far over budget, and in need of major change. In February 2002,
    DOE began an initiative to accelerate the schedule and reduce the costs of
    cleaning up high- level and other radioactive and hazardous waste, while
    focusing its resources on reducing risks to human health and the
    environment at its sites. Although this initiative covers DOE*s entire
    cleanup program, it may have the most significant impact on DOE*s plans
    for high- level waste, which is the highest cost component of DOE*s
    cleanup program. In this context, you asked us to (1) describe the
    components of DOE*s high- level waste and the

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    Page 2 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    process involved in preparing the waste for permanent disposal, (2)
    discuss DOE*s initiative for accelerating its high- level waste cleanup
    and assess the reliability of the associated potential cost savings, (3)
    identify the legal and technical challenges DOE faces regarding this
    initiative, and (4) determine any additional opportunities to reduce the
    costs, as well as opportunities to improve the management of its high-
    level waste program.

    This report is based largely on our detailed work at DOE sites where high-
    level waste is currently stored and our analysis of cost information and
    legal documents pertaining to the high- level waste program. We obtained
    the assistance of a physicist with extensive experience in the nuclear
    field to evaluate the technical aspects of DOE*s high- level waste

    program. A detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is included in
    appendix I. DOE*s high- level waste has many types of components, ranging
    from radioactive isotopes and corrosive chemicals to the water in which
    much of this material was initially discharged. Even the radioactive
    components of the waste vary greatly: a small portion will remain
    dangerously radioactive for millions of years, while the vast majority
    will lose much of their radioactivity more quickly, so that more than 90
    percent of the current radioactivity will be gone within 100 years. To
    prepare this waste for permanent disposal and meet commitments made to
    state and federal regulators, DOE generally plans to separate the waste
    into two waste streams, one with high levels of radioactivity and the
    other with lower concentrations of radioactivity. DOE expects this process
    will concentrate at least 90 percent of the radioactivity into a volume
    that is significantly smaller than the current total volume of waste. DOE
    plans to immobilize and bury the separated highly radioactive portion in a
    permanent underground repository. The remaining waste components will be
    immobilized* usually in a cement- like material* and disposed of at the
    location where the waste is currently stored or at some other location.

    DOE*s initiative to accelerate the cleanup is evolving, and its savings
    estimates are changing accordingly, although we have concerns about the
    reliability of those estimates. DOE originally estimated it could shorten
    the waste cleanup schedule by 20- 35 years and achieve up to $34 billion
    in savings at its three high- level waste sites. To help achieve these
    schedule

    and cost reductions, DOE has identified alternative treatment and disposal
    strategies, involving such steps as developing ways to permanently dispose
    of more of the radioactive waste at current sites rather than moving it to
    Results in Brief

    Page 3 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    the planned underground repository. As of April 2003, DOE*s strategies
    were still being developed, and DOE had lowered the original savings
    estimate to $29 billion. However, our assessment of the revised estimate
    indicates that it may not be reliable. For example, the analysis does not
    take into account all costs associated with alternative treatment
    strategies. Also, the estimates of savings do not compare costs on the
    basis of *present value,* where dollars to be saved in future years are
    discounted to a common year to reflect the time value of money. At
    Savannah River, such an adjustment would lower the site*s savings estimate
    of $5.4 billion for accelerated waste processing to $2.8 billion (in 2003
    dollars).

    DOE is facing significant legal and technical challenges in implementing a
    number of the alternative treatment and disposal strategies. A key legal
    challenge linked to the strategies under consideration at all three sites
    involves DOE*s authority to determine that some waste components with
    relatively low concentrations of radioactivity can be treated and
    permanently disposed of at the sites where the waste is currently stored.
    For example, DOE*s Hanford Site has developed a treatment and disposal
    approach that will prepare about 90 percent of its tank waste for
    permanent disposal at Hanford rather than shipping it to an underground
    repository. This approach involves DOE determining that not all of the
    tank waste is high- level waste. DOE*s authority to make such
    determinations is being challenged in court. A prolonged court battle
    could seriously hamper DOE*s ability to meet accelerated schedules it has
    set under its new initiative. Regarding technical challenges, key elements
    of DOE*s accelerated cleanup strategies rely on technologies for
    separating the waste components that have not been fully developed or
    tested. For example, because of schedule constraints and concerns about
    cost increases, the Hanford Site plans to forgo full integrated testing of
    its proposed process for separating wastes into high- level and low-
    activity portions until after facility construction is complete. This
    approach is not consistent with DOE*s project management guidelines or the
    advice of several independent technical experts. On a past project to
    develop such facilities, failing to fully test the separation technology
    has resulted in significant cost increases and schedule delays. For
    example, at DOE*s Savannah River Site in South Carolina, an attempt to
    speed implementation failed, after nearly $500 million had been spent on
    the project. DOE now plans to spend an additional $1.8 billion to develop
    and implement an alternative separation technology at Savannah River. We
    are

    concerned that DOE*s approach at Hanford may also result in significant
    schedule delays and cost increases.

    Page 4 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    DOE is exploring additional potential cost savings. In addition, there are
    opportunities to improve program management. Additional potential cost-
    saving opportunities have come to light since DOE first developed its
    initiative, and DOE is beginning to assess these opportunities. The
    proposals that offer potential for significant savings are being developed
    by the Savannah River and Hanford sites for increasing the amount of waste
    that can be concentrated into the canisters destined for the permanent
    underground repository. DOE*s data indicates that these proposals, if
    successful, could save several billion dollars. Considerable evaluation of
    these opportunities remains to be done and cost- saving estimates have not
    yet been fully developed, according to DOE officials. DOE also has
    opportunities to improve its management of the cleanup program by
    addressing management weaknesses that we and others have identified in the
    past. When it began the initiative to reduce costs and

    accelerate the cleanup schedule, DOE acknowledged it had systemic problems
    with the way that the program was managed. Although DOE has taken steps to
    improve program management, we have continuing concerns about management
    weaknesses in several areas. These include making key decisions without
    rigorous supporting analysis, incorporating

    technology before it is sufficiently tested, and pursuing a *fast- track*
    approach of launching into facility construction before completing
    sufficient design work. It does not currently appear that DOE*s management
    actions will fully address these weaknesses.

    We are recommending that if the current challenge to DOE*s authority
    becomes an extended legal process, DOE should seek clarification from the
    Congress on the agency*s authority to determine that certain waste does
    not need to be treated and disposed of as high- level waste. We are also
    recommending that the Secretary of Energy reassess the approach for
    incorporating new waste separation technologies at the Hanford site, so
    that the technologies are more fully tested to ensure they will work
    successfully before a full- scale facility is built. Finally, we are
    making recommendations on ways to further strengthen management of the
    high- level waste program.

    DOE agreed to consider our recommendation regarding clarifying its legal
    authority to determine that certain waste does not need to be treated and
    disposed of as high- level waste. DOE disagreed with our recommendation to
    conduct integrated pilot- scale testing of its waste separations process
    at Hanford while constructing a full- scale facility. In addition,
    regarding opportunities to improve program management, DOE responded only
    about the Hanford Site. DOE said that the management activities at Hanford
    were already consistent with our recommendations to conduct

    Page 5 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    rigorous analysis to support decision- making, follow best practices when
    incorporating new technologies into projects, and be cautious about using
    a fast- track approach to designing and building complex nuclear
    facilities. We continue to believe that implementing all of the
    recommendations in this report would help to reduce the risk of costly
    delays and improve overall management of DOE*s entire high- level waste
    program. High- level waste 1 contains radioactive components that emit
    dangerously

    intense radiation. Radiation is generated through a decay process in which
    the atoms of a radioactive component (also known as a radionuclide) lose
    their radioactivity by spontaneously releasing energy in the form of
    subatomic particles or rays similar to X- rays. Even short but extremely
    intense exposure to radiation can cause almost immediate health problems
    such as radiation sickness, burns, and, in severe cases, death. Excessive
    exposure to these particles or rays damages cells in living tissue and is
    believed to cause long- term health problems such as genetic mutations and
    an increased risk of cancer. Because of the intense

    radiation emitted from high- level waste, the waste must be isolated and
    handled remotely behind heavy shielding such as a layer of concrete in
    order to protect humans and the environment. In addition to the intense
    radioactivity, some of the radioactive components can be very mobile in
    the environment and may migrate quickly to contaminate the soil and
    groundwater if not immobilized. Besides radioactive components, DOE high-
    level waste also generally contains hazardous components added during the
    process of dissolving used nuclear fuel to remove plutonium and other
    nuclear materials. These hazardous components include solvents, acids,
    caustic sodas, and toxic heavy metals such as chromium and lead.
    Radioactive waste components, when combined with hazardous components, are
    referred to as *mixed wastes.*

    DOE has a vast complex of sites across the nation dedicated to the nuclear
    weapons program, but the high- level waste stemming from reprocessing
    spent fuel to produce weapons material such as plutonium and uranium has
    been limited mainly to three sites* Hanford, Washington; the Idaho
    National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (* Idaho National

    1 For this report, we use the term *high- level waste* to refer to the
    waste that DOE is or was managing as high- level waste at its sites.
    Background

    Page 6 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Laboratory*) near Idaho Falls, Idaho; and Savannah River, South Carolina.
    2 DOE largely ceased production of plutonium and enriched uranium by 1992,
    but the waste remains. Most of the tanks in which it is stored have
    already exceeded their design life. For example, many of Hanford*s and
    Savannah River*s tanks were built in the 1940s to 1960s and were designed
    to last 10- 40 years. (Figure 1 shows waste storage tanks being
    constructed at the Hanford Site.) These tanks, most of which are
    underground, are used to store high- level waste. Leaks from some of these
    tanks were first detected at Hanford in 1956 and at Savannah River in
    1959. Given the age and deteriorating condition of some of the tanks,
    there is concern that

    some of them will leak additional waste into the soil, where it may
    migrate to the water table. 3 2 DOE also agreed to clean up high- level
    waste at another site* the West Valley

    Demonstration Project at West Valley, New York* where the state sponsored
    reprocessing of both commercial and DOE spent nuclear fuel. Treatment and
    preparation of this waste for disposal was completed in September 2002. 3
    DOE has reported that more than one million gallons of waste have been
    unintentionally released from the tanks into the soil through leaks at the
    Hanford Site. In addition, DOE also intentionally discharged about 121
    million gallons of radioactive tank waste at the

    Hanford Site directly into the ground from 1946 to 1966. At the Savannah
    River Site, one of the 51 tanks is estimated to have leaked tens of
    gallons into the soil.

    Page 7 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Figure 1: Waste Storage Tanks under Construction at DOE*s Hanford Site,
    September 1947

    Treatment and disposal of high- level waste produced at DOE facilities are
    governed by a number of federal laws, including laws that define the roles
    of DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in waste management.
    The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) and the Energy Reorganization Act of
    1974 established responsibility for the regulatory control of radioactive
    materials including DOE*s high- level wastes. 4 The Energy Reorganization
    Act of 1974 assigned the NRC the function of

    4 The AEA authorized the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to provide for the
    safe storage of radioactive waste from defense- related activities. 42 U.
    S. C. 2121( a)( 3). Later, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished
    the AEC, transferring responsibilities to the Energy

    Research and Development Administration (ERDA)* DOE*s predecessor* and the
    NRC. 42 U. S. C. 5814, 5841. In 1977, ERDA was abolished, and its
    functions were transferred to the newly established DOE, explicitly
    leaving the management of the government*s radioactive waste in the hands
    of DOE. 42 U. S. C. 7151( a), 7133( a)( 8).

    Page 8 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    licensing facilities that are expressly authorized for long- term storage
    of high- level radioactive waste generated by DOE and others. 5 The
    Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, defines high- level
    radioactive waste as *the highly radioactive material resulting from the
    reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced
    directly in reprocessing and any solid material derived from such liquid
    waste that contains fission products in sufficient concentrations, and*
    other highly radioactive material that the [NRC]* determines* requires
    permanent isolation.* 6 The act also established a process for developing
    and siting a geologic

    repository (a permanent deep disposal system) for the disposal of high-
    level waste and spent fuel. Regarding DOE*s high- level waste, the act
    provided that unless the President determined that a separate repository
    was required for such waste, DOE should arrange for the use of commercial
    repositories developed under the act for disposal of its defense waste. 7
    In 1985, President Reagan decided that a separate repository for defense
    waste was not needed. Under amendments the Federal Facility Compliance Act
    of 1992 made to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),
    DOE generally must develop waste treatment plans for its sites that
    contain mixed wastes. 8 These plans are approved by states that the
    Environmental Protection

    Agency (EPA) has authorized to administer RCRA or by EPA in states that
    have not been so authorized. DOE carries out its high- level waste cleanup
    program under the leadership of the Assistant Secretary for Environmental
    Management and in consultation with a variety of stakeholders. In addition
    to the EPA and state environmental agencies that have regulatory authority
    in states where the sites are located, stakeholders include county and
    local governmental agencies, citizen groups, advisory groups, and Native
    American tribes. These stakeholders advocate their views through various
    public involvement processes including site- specific advisory boards.
    Over the years, much of the cleanup activity has been implemented under
    compliance agreements between DOE and the regulatory agencies. These
    compliance agreements provide for

    5 42 U. S. C. 5842. 6 42 U. S. C. 10101( 12). 7 42 U. S. C. 10107( b)( 2).
    8 42 U. S. C. 6939c( b).

    Page 9 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    establishing legally enforceable schedule milestones that govern the work
    to be done.

    The waste in the tanks at Hanford, Savannah River, and the Idaho National
    Laboratory is a complex mixture of radioactive and hazardous components,
    and DOE*s process for preparing it for disposal is designed to separate
    much of the radioactive material from other waste components.

    In the tanks, this mixture has transformed into a variety of liquid and
    semisolid forms. The radioactive components are of many different types;
    some remain dangerous for millions of years, while others lose much of

    their radioactivity in relatively short periods of time. Because most of
    the radioactive components decay relatively rapidly, over 90 percent of
    the current radioactivity will dissipate within 100 years. DOE plans to
    isolate the radioactive components and prepare the waste for disposal
    through the use of an extensive and sequential multi- step treatment
    process. To fulfill its current commitment to federal and state
    regulators, DOE expects this process to concentrate at least 90 percent of
    the radioactivity into a much smaller volume that can be permanently
    isolated for at least 10,000 years in a geologic repository. DOE plans to
    dispose of the remaining waste of relatively low radioactivity on- site
    near the surface of the ground, such as in vaults or canisters, or at
    other designated disposal facilities.

    High- level waste generally exists in a variety of physical forms and
    layers inside the underground tanks, depending on the physical and
    chemical properties of the waste components. The waste in the tanks takes
    three main forms:  Sludge: The denser, water insoluble components
    generally settle to the

    bottom of the tank to form a thick layer known as sludge, which has the
    consistency of peanut butter.  Saltcake: Above the sludge may be water-
    soluble components such as

    sodium salts that crystallize or solidify out of the waste solution to
    form a moist sand- like material called saltcake.  Liquid: Above or
    between the denser layers may be liquids comprised of

    water and dissolved salts called supernate. As figure 2 shows, 44 percent
    of the total volume of high- level waste is in saltcake form, followed by
    liquid and sludges. In addition, a small portion of the waste volume is
    also in solid form and is stored in facilities other than tanks. At the
    Idaho National Laboratory, some waste is stored in stainless steel bins,
    enclosed in concrete vaults, after having undergone a DOE*s High- Level

    Waste Is a Complex Mixture That Requires a Multi- Step Process to Prepare
    for Disposal

    Waste Has Turned into a Variety of Forms

    Page 10 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    thermal process that converted the liquid into a solid granular substance
    called calcine. At Hanford, some high- level waste was retrieved from the
    tanks, dried, and stored as solid material in stainless steel capsules. 9
    Figure 2. Physical Forms of DOE*s Untreated High- Level Waste as a
    Percentage of

    Total Waste Volume

    Note: The values in figure 2 are for all untreated high- level waste
    across the DOE complex as of August 2002. At the sites, the actual
    distribution of the waste into the various physical forms may differ from
    that shown above.

    The various layers of waste in the tanks are not uniformly distributed and
    often differ from tank to tank and even from place to place within a tank.
    Depending on how the waste was generated and whether it was mixed or

    transferred from one tank to another, the layers of waste within any given
    tank may be unevenly distributed and liquid is interspersed between layers
    of saltcake. Some tanks contain all three main waste forms* sludge,
    saltcake, and liquid* while others contain only one or two forms. Tank
    contents also vary among sites. For example, at the Idaho National

    9 From 1967 to 1985, DOE encapsulated cesium and strontium from the tank
    waste at the Hanford Site to reduce the amount of heat generated in the
    tanks and for lease to non- DOE organizations for beneficial use. All of
    the leased capsules have been returned to Hanford.

    Page 11 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Laboratory most tanks contain primarily liquid waste because the waste was
    kept in an acidic form, while at Hanford and Savannah River, most tanks
    contain waste in two or three physical forms.

    The radioactive components of the high- level waste vary greatly in terms
    of how long they remain radioactive, with the vast majority losing their
    radioactivity within years or decades. Each radioactive component, or
    radionuclide, in high- level waste loses its radioactivity at a rate that
    differs for each component. This rate of decay, which cannot be changed,
    is measured in *half- lives** that is, the time required for half of the
    unstable atoms to decay and release their radiation. The half- lives of
    major radionuclides in the high- level waste range from 2.6 minutes for
    barium- 137m 10 to 24,131 years for plutonium- 239. To illustrate, for any
    given number of radioactive barium- 137m atoms, half will lose their
    radioactivity within 2.6 minutes. After another 2.6 minutes, half of the
    remaining unstable atoms will lose their radioactivity, leaving only
    onefourth of the original number of unstable atoms still radioactive. The
    process is the same, but the half- life intervals much longer, for long-
    lived radionuclides, such as plutonium- 239 atoms. For radioactive
    plutonium239 atoms, half will lose their radioactivity within 24,131
    years, and half of the remainder will lose their radioactivity after
    another 24,131 years.

    Currently, nearly all of the radioactivity in DOE*s high- level waste
    originates from radionuclides with half- lives of about 30 years or less.
    As table 1 shows, about 98 percent of the radioactivity of the high- level
    waste comes from four radionuclides: barium- 137m, cesium- 137, strontium-
    90, and yttrium- 90. Of these, cesium- 137 is the longest lived, with a
    half- life of 30.17 years.

    10 The *m* in barium- 137m denotes barium- 137 that has an excess of
    energy and will undergo radioactive decay to barium- 137, which is not
    radioactive. Much of the

    Radioactivity Declines Relatively Quickly

    Page 12 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Table 1: Major Short- Lived Radionuclides Contributing to the Current
    Radioactivity in DOE*s Untreated High- Level Waste

    Major short- lived radionuclides Half- life in years

    Percent of total radioactivity in DOE*s high- level waste as of August
    2002

    Barium- 137m a 0.0000049 b 25.6 Yttrium- 90 a 0.0073 c 22.8 Strontium- 90
    28.6 22.8 Cesium- 137 30.17 27.0

    Major short- lived radionuclides total 98.2

    Source: GAO analysis of DOE data. Notes: The radionuclides listed contain
    the largest amount of radioactivity in curies relative to other
    radionuclides in DOE*s untreated high- level waste. Other radionuclides,
    including those with longer half- lives, contain the remaining balance of
    the total current radioactivity. a Barium- 137m and yttrium- 90 are
    generated from the radioactive decay of cesium- 137 and

    strontium- 90 respectively. Consequently, as long as cesium- 137 and
    strontium- 90 are present, barium- 137m and yttrium- 90 will also be
    present. b 2.6 minutes.

    c 2.7 days.

    The relatively short half- lives of most of the radionuclides in the waste
    means that much of the total current radioactivity will decay within 100
    years. For example, within 30 years, about 50 percent of the current
    radioactivity in DOE*s wastes will have decayed away, and within 100
    years, this figure will rise to more than 90 percent. Figure 3 shows the
    pattern of decay, using 2002 to 2102 as the 100- year period. Extending
    the analysis beyond the 100- year period shown in the figure, in 300
    years, 99.8 percent of the radioactivity will have decayed, leaving 0.2
    percent of the current radioactivity remaining.

    Page 13 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Figure 3: Natural Decay of Radionuclides in DOE*s Untreated High- Level
    Waste from 2002 to 2102

    Note: Radioactivity is measured in a unit called a curie. One curie equals
    37 billion atomic disintegrations per second.

    Despite the relatively rapid decay of the current radioactivity in high-
    level waste, a variety of long- lived radionuclides will remain
    radioactive for a very long time and must be isolated from the
    environment. Radionuclides with half- lives greater than cesium- 137
    (30.17 years), such as plutonium- 239 and americium- 241, which have half-
    lives of 24,131 years and 432.2 years respectively, will continue to pose
    a threat to human health and the environment for thousands of years. Once
    the radionuclides with relatively short half- lives have decayed away, the
    longer- lived radionuclides will be the primary source of radioactivity in
    the waste. Some of these long- lived radionuclides, such as technetium-
    99, are potentially very mobile in the environment and therefore must
    remain permanently isolated. If these highly mobile radionuclides leak out
    or are released into the environment, they can contaminate the soil and
    water.

    Page 14 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    DOE*s process for dealing with its high- level waste centers on separating
    the various components of the waste so that the portion that is most
    radioactive can be concentrated into a much smaller volume. While
    currently all high- level waste is radioactive and dangerous, significant
    portions of the waste, such as contaminated water, will have low levels of
    radioactivity if separated from most of the radionuclides that are highly

    radioactive. Contaminated water currently represents 54 percent of the
    total waste by volume across the DOE complex. 11 In overview, DOE*s
    process generally involves separating the waste into two main streams.
    One, the high- level portion, will contain at least 90 percent of the
    radioactivity and a small portion of the waste volume. The other stream,
    the low- activity portion, will contain 10 percent or less of the total
    radioactivity but most of the waste volume.

    DOE*s plans for treating the waste currently call for a set of steps to be
    applied to the waste at each site. The primary steps are shown in table 2.
    11 The percentage of the waste volume that is contaminated water varies
    among sites.

    Contaminated water is a significant constituent of the waste by volume
    because water is used to cool the waste, dilute the waste for treatment
    and transfer from one location to another, and flush out waste from
    pipelines and facilities. Processing Can Concentrate the

    Radioactivity into a Much Smaller Volume of Waste

    Page 15 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Table 2: Main Steps in DOE*s Approach to Preparing High- Level Waste for
    Disposal Step in process Description

    Characterization Determination of the specific physical, chemical, and
    radiological components of the wastes in each tank. This step is important
    because some tanks contain a complex mixture of unknown waste
    constituents, and detailed knowledge of tank contents is needed to
    determine how to best retrieve, pretreat, and treat the wastes.
    Characterization involves analyzing samples drawn from the tanks and using
    process knowledge such as waste transfer records and results from prior
    samples. Retrieval Removal of the stored waste from the tanks by pumping
    or other

    means and its transfer to treatment facilities. Because the waste exists
    in liquid, solid, and other forms, certain steps may be needed to turn the
    waste into a form that will allow the pumping to take place. Pretreatment
    Separation of the high- level portion of the waste from the low- activity

    portion and from other nonradioactive elements, such as aluminum, organic
    compounds, and salts. Evaporation is used during pretreatment to reduce
    the volume of contaminated water in the waste. This step is desirable
    because it decreases the amount of high- level waste that must be treated
    and sent to the high- level waste repository. The remaining low- activity
    waste can then be treated and disposed of less expensively on- site.
    Treatment Immobilization of the waste. DOE plans to stabilize the high-
    level

    portion of the waste separated during pretreatment by mixing it with a
    glass- forming material and melting the mixture into glass. The molten
    glass will be poured into stainless steel canisters to harden. The
    remaining low- activity portion of the waste will generally be mixed with
    cement and other materials so that it will harden into a cement- like
    substance called grout. a Disposal Final emplacement of the immobilized
    waste so as to ensure

    isolation from the surrounding environment until it is no longer
    dangerously radioactive. DOE plans to temporarily store the canisters
    containing the high- level portion of the waste on- site until an
    underground geologic repository is ready to receive them permanently. The
    remaining immobilized waste will be disposed of

    on- site or at other designated near surface disposal sites. Source: GAO.
    a At the Hanford Site, DOE currently plans to vitrify the low- activity
    portion of the waste. DOE plans to permanently dispose of the high- level
    portion of the

    separated waste in a geologic repository developed pursuant to the Nuclear
    Waste Policy Act. This repository is intended to isolate highly
    radioactive waste materials from the public and the environment for

    at least 10, 000 years. The remaining low- activity portion would be
    immobilized in accordance with federal and state environmental laws and
    the agreements made with state regulators and disposed of permanently on-
    site or at other designated locations.

    Page 16 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Although radionuclides with long half- lives are present in both the high-
    level and low- activity portions of the waste after the separations
    processes are concluded, the portion of the waste not sent to the geologic
    repository will have relatively low levels of radioactivity and long-
    lived radionuclides. Based on current disposal standards used by the NRC,
    if the radioactivity of this remaining waste is sufficiently low, it can
    be disposed of on- site near the surface of the ground, using less complex
    and expensive techniques than those required for the highly radioactive
    portion.

    DOE has successfully applied this process in a demonstration project at
    the West Valley site in New York state. At West Valley, separation of the
    low- activity portion from the high- level portion of the waste reduced by
    90 percent the quantity of waste requiring permanent isolation and
    disposal at a geologic repository. The high- level portion was stabilized
    in a glass material (vitrified) and remains stored at the site pending
    completion of the high- level waste geologic repository and resolution of
    other issues

    associated with disposal costs. 12 The remaining low- activity portion was
    mixed with cement- forming materials, poured into drums where it
    solidified into grout (a cement- like material), and remains stored on-
    site, awaiting shipment to an off- site disposal facility.

    DOE*s new initiative, implemented in 2002, attempts to address the
    schedule delays and increasing costs DOE has encountered in its efforts to
    treat and dispose of high- level waste. This initiative is still evolving.
    DOE originally identified several strategies to help it reduce the time
    needed to treat and dispose of the waste. Based on these strategies, DOE
    set a goal

    of achieving up to $34 billion in savings at its three high- level waste
    sites and reducing the waste cleanup schedule by about 20 to 35 years
    compared to the existing program baseline. 13 As of April 2003, DOE*s
    strategies were still under development, and DOE had revised the savings
    estimate to $29 billion. However, even the $29 billion estimate may not be
    reliable. While savings are likely if the strategies are successfully
    implemented, the extent of the savings is still uncertain.

    12 At Savannah River, high- level sludge from the tanks has also been
    stabilized in glass material and is currently stored on- site pending
    completion of the geologic repository. As of August 30, 2002, Savannah
    River had produced 1, 331 canisters of this stabilized waste.

    13 Unless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are as reported by DOE and
    are in current dollars. DOE*s Initiative for Accelerating Cleanup

    Is Still Evolving, with the Extent of Savings Uncertain

    Page 17 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    For the most part, DOE*s past efforts to treat and dispose of high- level
    waste have been plagued with false starts and failures, resulting in
    steadily growing estimates of the program*s total cost. Since the cleanup
    activities began about 20 years ago, DOE has spent about $18 billion in
    its attempts to prepare high- level waste for disposal. However, less than
    5 percent of the waste has been successfully treated to date. Uncontrolled
    cost overruns, numerous schedule delays, and unsuccessful attempts to
    develop treatment processes have pushed the overall estimated cost of the
    high- level waste program from about $63 billion in 1996 (when the first

    comprehensive estimates were developed) to nearly $105 billion in 2003. 14
    In an attempt to gain control over DOE*s waste management program and to
    better ensure its affordability, in February 2002 the Assistant Secretary
    for Environmental Management undertook a new initiative aimed at
    accelerating cleanup at DOE*s sites and focusing on more rapid reduction
    of environmental risks. The initiative came as a result of an internal

    review of the cleanup program, which identified numerous problems and
    recommended a number of corrective actions. Among other things, the review
    noted that the cleanup program was not based on a comprehensive, coherent,
    technically supported risk prioritization; was not focused on accelerating
    risk reduction; and was not addressing the challenges of uncontrolled cost
    and schedule growth. A main focus of the initiative is high- level waste,
    including both the technical approach to treating the waste and improving
    how DOE manages the contracts and project activities. 15 DOE developed
    strategies to speed the cleanup and reduce risk at all

    three sites. Many of these proposals involved ways to do one or more of
    the following:

    14 Both of these lifecycle cost estimates reflect actual program costs
    incurred from fiscal year 1982 to the year of the estimates, and include
    estimated costs through completion of cleanup.

    15 U. S. Department of Energy, A Review of the Environmental Management
    Program

    (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 4, 2002). Initiative Centers on

    Ways to Speed Disposal and Save Money

    Page 18 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

     Dealing with some tank waste as low- level or transuranic 16 waste,
    rather than as high- level waste. Doing so would eliminate the need to
    prepare the waste for off- site disposal in the geologic repository for
    high- level waste. Disposing of waste in the repository currently is based
    on immobilizing the waste in a glass- like substance through a process
    called vitrification.  Completing the waste treatment more quickly by
    using additional or

    supplemental technologies for treating some of the waste. For example,
    DOE*s Hanford Site is considering using up to four supplemental
    technologies, in addition to vitrification, to process its low- activity
    waste. DOE believes these technologies are needed to help ensure it can
    meet a schedule milestone date of 2028 agreed to with regulators to
    complete waste processing. Without these technologies, DOE believes waste
    treatment would not be completed before 2048.  Segregating the waste more
    fully than initially planned and tailoring waste

    treatment to each of the four segregated waste types. By doing so, DOE
    plans to apply less costly treatment methods to waste with lower
    concentrations of radioactivity.  Closing waste storage tanks earlier
    than expected. DOE plans to begin

    closing tanks earlier than scheduled, thereby avoiding the operating costs
    involved in maintaining the tanks and monitoring the wastes. 16 Low- level
    radioactive waste is defined as radioactive material that is not high-
    level radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, transuranic waste, or certain
    by- product material (the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or
    concentration or uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for
    its source material content). 42 U. S. C. 10101( 16). Transuranic wastes
    come primarily from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and from
    fabrication of nuclear weapons. Transuranic waste is defined as waste with
    radionuclides with atomic numbers greater than 92 (that is, uranium) and
    having half- lives greater than 20 years in concentrations greater than
    100 nanocuries per gram.

    Page 19 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Table 3 shows major site- by- site proposals that have been made.

    Table 3: Examples of Proposals under Study for Accelerating the High-
    Level Waste Treatment Process Site Types of proposals

    Hanford (Washington State)  Building one higher capacity vitrification
    facility to process the waste and eliminating a second large facility.

     Developing supplemental technologies to treat and immobilize a large
    fraction of the lowactivity waste outside of the vitrification facility.
    Using a single system to retrieve the waste from each tank rather than two
    systems as

    initially planned.

     Accelerating the shipment of waste to the repository.

     Closing tanks earlier. Savannah River (South Carolina)  Conducting more
    thorough waste separations than initially planned and then tailoring

    waste treatment separately to each waste stream. This would allow Savannah
    River to do the following:

    Apply less costly treatments than initially planned to the low- activity
    waste streams. For example, DOE will remove waste with the lowest
    concentrations of radioactivity and treat it directly by grouting it,
    rather than first processing it through a more costly pretreatment
    facility.

    Adjust vitrification of high- level sludges to each individual batch of
    waste processed. By doing so, DOE is exploring methods to place about 25
    percent more waste in each canister, reducing the overall number of
    canisters that will need to be produced and stored at the repository.

     Closing tanks 8 years earlier than scheduled. Idaho National Laboratory
    (Idaho)  Repackaging calcined waste and shipping it directly for disposal
    at the geological

    repository, rather than vitrifying it.

     Classifying the remaining liquid tank wastes as transuranic wastes,
    which would require less costly treatment than previously planned before
    being shipped off site to a transuranic waste repository. Source: GAO
    analysis of DOE information.

    DOE*s initial estimates in August 2002 were that, if the proposals were
    successfully implemented, total savings could be about $34 billion
    compared to the baseline cost estimate in place when the accelerated
    initiative began. As of April 2003, the savings estimate associated with
    the new strategies had been revised to about $29 billion (see table 4).
    DOE officials told us many of their new strategies are still under
    development and that savings estimates are still subject to additional
    revision.

    Page 20 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Table 4: DOE*s Estimated Cost Savings from Proposals to Accelerate Cleanup
    of High- Level Waste

    Dollars in billions Site Current baseline

    lifecycle cost estimate

    Accelerated lifecycle cost

    estimate Estimated

    savings from accelerated

    initiatives

    Idaho National Laboratory $10.07 $3.10 $6.97 Hanford 56.19 41.67 14.52
    Savannah River 18.82 11.49 7.33

    Totals $85.08 $56.26 $28.82 Source: DOE. Notes: West Valley is not
    included in this table because high- level waste cleanup at the site was
    essentially completed in Sept. 2002.

    Amounts are in billions of current dollars, fiscal year 2003 to end of
    cleanup.

    Our review of these savings estimates suggests that they may not yet be
    reliable and that the actual amounts to be saved if DOE successfully
    implements the strategies may be substantially different from what DOE is
    projecting. We have several concerns about the reliability and
    completeness of the savings estimates. These concerns include the accuracy
    of baseline cost estimates from which savings are calculated, whether all
    appropriate costs are included in the analysis, and whether the savings
    estimates properly reflect uncertainties or the timing of the savings.
    DOE*s current lifecycle cost baseline is used as the base cost from which
    potential savings associated with any improvements are measured.

    However, in recent years, we and others have raised concerns about the
    reliability of DOE*s baseline cost estimates. In a 1999 report, we noted
    that DOE lacked a standard methodology for sites to use in developing
    their lifecycle cost baselines, raising a concern about the reliability of
    data used to develop these cost estimates. 17 DOE*s Office of Inspector
    General also raised a concern in a 1999 review of DOE project estimates,
    noting that several project cost estimates examined were not supported or
    complete. DOE itself acknowledged in its February 2002 review of the
    cleanup

    17 U. S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Waste: DOE*s Accelerated
    Cleanup Strategy Has Benefits but Faces Uncertainties, GAO/ RCED- 99- 129
    (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 30, 1999). Current Savings Estimates

    May Not Be Reliable Baseline Costs Are Not Fully Reliable

    Page 21 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    program that baseline cost estimates do not provide a reliable picture of
    project costs. 18 The National Research Council, which has conducted
    research on DOE*s

    project management, has reported on why DOE*s baseline cost estimates are
    often unreliable. It noted in 1999 that DOE often sets project baselines
    too early and that industry practice calls for completing from 30 percent
    to 35 percent of a design before establishing a baseline cost estimate. 19
    In a

    recent example, we found that the estimated contract price of Hanford*s
    high- level waste treatment facility is expected to increase to $5.8
    billion, about $1.6 billion above the original $4.2 billion contract price
    established in December 2000. The original cost estimate was established
    when less than 15 percent of the facility design was complete. The cost
    increase is due to such factors as adding contingency funds for unforeseen
    occurrences and making some facility modifications not in the original
    contract.

    A second reason for concern about the cost- savings estimates is that some
    of the savings may be based on incomplete estimates of the costs for the
    accelerated proposals. According to the Office of Management and Budget*s
    (OMB) guidance on developing cost estimates, agencies should ensure that
    all appropriate costs are addressed in the estimate. However, for example,
    the Idaho National Laboratory estimates savings of up to

    $7 billion, in large part, by eliminating the need to build a
    vitrification facility to process waste currently in calcine form and in
    tanks, as well as achieving associated reductions in operations and
    decommissioning costs. The waste, as is, may have to undergo an
    alternative treatment method before it can be accepted at a geological
    repository. The Idaho National Laboratory plans to use one of four
    different technologies currently being evaluated to treat its tank waste.
    DOE*s savings estimate reflects the potential cost of only one of those
    technologies. DOE has not yet developed the costs of using any of the
    other waste treatment approaches. DOE noted that the accelerated lifecycle
    estimate could likely change as one of the technologies is selected and
    the associated costs of treating the waste are developed.

    18 U. S. Department of Energy, A Review of the Environmental Management
    Program

    (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 4, 2002). 19 National Research Council, Improving
    Project Management in the Department of Energy (Washington, D. C.: June
    1999). Accelerated Cost Estimates

    May Be Incomplete

    Page 22 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    A third area of concern is that DOE*s savings estimates generally do not
    accurately reflect the timing of when savings will occur, the uncertainty
    associated with cost estimates or the reliability of a technology, or the
    value of potential nonbudgetary impacts of the alternative strategies.
    According to OMB guidance, agencies should ensure that the timing of when
    the savings will occur is accounted for, that uncertainties are recognized
    and quantified where possible, and that nonbudgetary impacts, such as a
    change in the level of risk to workers, are quantified, or at least
    described. Regarding the time value of money, applying OMB guidance would
    mean that estimates of savings in DOE*s accelerated plans should

    reflect a comparison of its baseline cost estimate with the alternative,
    expressed in a *present value,* where the dollars are discounted to a
    common year to reflect the time value of money. Instead, DOE*s savings
    estimates generally measure savings by comparing dollars in different
    years. For example, the Savannah River Site estimates a savings of nearly
    $5.4 billion by reducing by 8 years (from 2027 to 2019) the time required
    to process its high- level waste. Adjusting the savings estimate to
    present value in 2003 results in a savings of $2.8 billion in 2003
    dollars.

    Regarding uncertainties, in contrast to OMB guidance, the DOE savings
    estimates generally do not consider uncertainties. For example, the
    savings projected in the Idaho National Laboratory*s accelerated plan
    reflect the proposal to no longer build the vitrification facility and an
    associated reduction in operations costs. However, the savings do not
    account for uncertainties, such as whether alternatives to vitrification
    will succeed and at what cost. Rather than reflecting uncertainties by
    providing a range of savings, DOE*s savings estimate is a single point
    estimate of $7 billion.

    Regarding nonbudgetary impacts, DOE*s savings estimates generally did not
    fully assess the value of potential nonbudgetary impacts, such as a change
    in the level of risk to workers or potential effects on the environment.
    OMB guidelines recommend identification and, where possible,
    quantification of other expected benefits and costs to society when
    evaluating alternative plans. An example where nonbudgetary impacts were
    partially, but not fully, considered is the Idaho National Laboratory. The
    Idaho National Laboratory*s accelerated plan notes that its proposal not
    to vitrify its calcined high- level waste significantly reduces risk to
    workers and the environment by eliminating the exposure that would have
    been incurred in cleaning up and decommissioning the vitrification
    facility once waste treatment had been completed. While site officials
    told us such analyses are currently underway, the impact has not yet been
    reflected in the savings estimate. However, the proposal does not Savings
    Estimates Do Not

    Reflect Timing, Uncertainty or Nonbudgetary Impacts

    Page 23 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    assess potential increases in environmental risk, if any, from disposing
    of the waste without stabilizing it into a vitrified form. By not
    assessing these benefits and risks to workers and the environment, DOE
    leaves unclear how important these risks and trade- offs are to choosing
    an alternative treatment approach.

    DOE faces significant legal and technical challenges to achieving the cost
    and schedule reductions proposed in its new initiative. On the legal side,
    DOE*s proposals depend heavily on the agency*s authority to apply a
    designation other than *high- level waste* to the low- activity portion of
    the waste stream, so that this low- activity portion does not have to be
    disposed of as high- level waste. DOE*s authority to make such
    determinations is being challenged in court. On the technical side, DOE*s

    proposals rest heavily on the successful application of waste separation
    methods that are still under development and will not be fully tested
    before being put in place. DOE*s track record in this regard has not been
    strong; it has had to abandon past projects that were also based on
    promising* but not fully tested* technologies. Either or both of these
    challenges could limit the potential savings from DOE*s accelerated
    cleanup initiative.

    DOE is involved in a lawsuit over whether it has the authority to manage
    some tank wastes containing lower concentrations of radioactivity as other
    than high- level waste. The outcome could affect DOE*s ability to move
    forward with waste treatment on an accelerated schedule. If DOE retains
    its ability to manage much of the waste as other than high- level waste,
    it can apply less expensive treatment methods to that portion of the
    waste, dispose of the waste on- site, and close the tanks more quickly. If
    DOE loses the legal challenge, these faster and less expensive treatment
    alternatives may not be available. Regardless of the outcome, if an

    extended legal process ensues, DOE may be prevented from realizing the
    full potential savings associated with its accelerated cleanup initiative.

    DOE has traditionally managed all of the wastes in its tanks as high-
    level waste because the waste resulted primarily from the reprocessing of
    spent nuclear fuel and contains significant amounts of radioactivity.
    However, DOE based its approach to treatment and disposal on the
    radioactivity and actual constituents in the waste, as well as the source
    of the waste. Focusing on the radioactivity and constituents would allow
    DOE to use less costly and less complicated treatment approaches for the
    majority of what is now managed as high- level waste. Key Legal and

    Technical Challenges Could Limit Potential Savings from DOE*s Accelerated
    Cleanup Initiative

    DOE*s Initiative Relies Heavily on Authority That Is Being Challenged in
    Court

    DOE*s Authority and Procedures for Designating Waste as *Incidental*

    Page 24 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    DOE has developed a process for deciding when waste in the tanks should
    not be considered high- level waste. In July1999, DOE issued Order 435.1
    setting forth procedures for the management of its radioactive wastes.
    Under this order, DOE formalized its process for determining which waste
    is incidental to reprocessing (* incidental waste*), not high level waste,
    and therefore will not be sent to a geological repository for high- level
    waste disposal. This process provides a basis for DOE to treat and dispose
    of some portion of its wastes less expensively as low- level or
    transuranic wastes.

    DOE*s Order 435.1 establishes the specific criteria for defining the waste
    that could be considered incidental to reprocessing and therefore is not
    high- level waste and would not require the vitrification treatment that
    high- level waste must undergo for disposal purposes. The criteria were
    developed in conjunction with the NRC, the governmental entity with
    regulatory authority over disposal facilities for high- level waste. The
    criteria generally are that the waste (1) has been or will be processed to
    remove key radioactive components to the maximum extent technically and
    economically practical; (2) will be disposed of in conformance with the
    safety requirements for low- activity waste as laid out in NRC
    regulations; and (3) will be put in a solid physical form and will not
    exceed radioactivity levels set by the NRC for the most radioactive
    category of low- level waste, referred to as *Class C standard.* 20 DOE
    must first satisfy itself internally that these requirements have been met
    for waste it wants to determine is waste incidental to reprocessing and
    therefore not high- level waste. DOE then obtains a technical review of
    its determination from the NRC, which provides a concurrence that DOE has
    met its criteria. 21 DOE then considers the waste not to be high- level
    waste, but waste that can be managed as either low- level or transuranic
    waste.

    DOE*s ability to define some waste as incidental to reprocessing, and to
    then follow a different set of treatment and disposal requirements for
    that waste, is central to its overall strategy for addressing its tank
    waste. For

    20 As required by NRC regulations (10 C. F. R. 61. 55), Class C low- level
    waste must not only meet the most rigorous requirements for low- level
    waste form to ensure stability, but also must meet additional requirements
    at the disposal site to protect against inadvertent intrusion. The
    criteria also allow DOE to authorize and use alternative requirements for
    radioactive concentration limits. 21 Although DOE is not required to gain
    NRC*s concurrence with its incidental waste determinations, it does so to
    obtain an independent assessment of its evaluation of waste as incidental
    to reprocessing. Designation as *Incidental*

    Would Apply to Much of the Waste

    Page 25 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    example, DOE plans to use its incidental waste process to manage about 90
    percent of its 54 million gallons of tank waste at Hanford as low- level
    waste, rather than process it through a high- level waste vitrification
    facility. Using that approach, most of the waste would be eligible for
    treatment and disposal on- site. Such an approach would be less expensive
    than treating all of the waste as high- level waste and sending it for
    disposal in a high- level waste geologic repository. DOE has no current
    estimate of the cost increase if all 94 million gallons of tank wastes had
    to be treated in a high- level waste vitrification facility and stored at
    a geological repository. However, a 1996 environmental impact statement at
    the Hanford Site estimated such an alternative for the Hanford Site alone
    would add about $29 billion to $37 billion (in 1995 dollars), nearly
    doubling project costs at that site alone, primarily due to increased
    disposal costs at the repository. Furthermore, there would probably not be
    enough space at the high- level waste repository to dispose of all of this
    waste.

    Hanford is not the only site affected; as of April 2003, DOE had developed
    incidental waste determinations for waste at all four of its high- level
    waste sites. 22 In all, DOE had used its authority to designate some of
    its tank waste as low- level or transuranic waste in seven separate
    incidental waste determinations (see table 5). Although two of these
    determinations were approved prior to the issuance of Order 435.1, DOE
    essentially followed the same criteria found in the subsequent order. DOE
    is planning to initiate further incidental waste determinations as it
    removes the waste from additional tanks.

    22 Because West Valley separated out and treated its waste before the
    waste incidental to reprocessing criteria were formalized in Order 435.1
    in 1999, DOE followed criteria established in the NRC requirements for
    low- level waste (10 C. F. R. 61.55). We did not include this action in
    table 5.

    Page 26 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Table 5: Description and Status of DOE Incidental Waste Determinations for
    Tank Waste Site

    Waste included in incidental waste determination Incidental waste to

    be managed as Estimated volume of incidental waste Status

    Hanford Those tank wastes to be separated from high- activity wastes
    through using separations processes.

    Low- level waste. Approximately 90 percent of Hanford*s 54 million gallon
    waste inventory.

    DOE approved this determination prior to issuing its Order 435.1, although
    DOE essentially followed the same criteria found in 435.1. The NRC agreed
    but said that if DOE decides to treat

    some of its low- activity waste with technologies other than
    vitrification, as it plans under its accelerated initiative, DOE may need
    to update its determination. Savannah River Residual tank waste left in

    tanks 17 and 20 at closure. Low- level waste. Approximately 3500 gallons
    of

    residual waste left in the two tanks.

    DOE approved this determination prior to issuing its Order 435.1, although
    DOE essentially followed the same criteria found in 435.1. Savannah River
    Saltwaste to be treated

    through the grout (Saltstone) facility.

    Low- level waste. Up to 12.3 million gallons of tank waste. DOE approved
    the

    determination, but has not implemented it pending resolution of a lawsuit
    and

    other issues. Savannah River Residual tank waste left in

    tank 19 at closure. Low- level waste. 12,000 to 13,000 gallons of solids
    in tank 19

    at closure. Awaiting DOE approval.

    Idaho National Laboratory Sodium- bearing waste

    in tanks. Transuranic waste (to be disposed of at

    an off- site transuranic repository).

    900,000 gallons of acidic liquid in tanks. Awaiting DOE approval.

    Idaho National Laboratory Residual waste left in tanks

    at closure. Low- level waste. Actual amount of residuals left in the

    tank will be determined at time of individual tank closure.

    Awaiting NRC concurrence and DOE approval.

    West Valley Sodium- bearing waste originally in tanks. Low- level waste.
    12,000 gallons. DOE approved this

    determination. Source: DOE.

    Note: DOE has incidental waste determinations that apply to items other
    than tank waste, such as equipment and materials used in managing high-
    level waste, including contaminated transfer pumps and job wastes. We did
    not include those determinations in this table.

    Page 27 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    DOE is currently involved in a lawsuit focused on its authority to make
    incidental waste determinations. In March 2002, the Natural Resources
    Defense Council and others filed a lawsuit challenging DOE*s authority to
    manage its wastes through its incidental waste process. 23 A primary
    concern of the plaintiffs is that DOE will use its incidental waste
    process to permanently leave intensely radioactive waste sediments in the
    tanks with only minimal treatment. The lawsuit alleges that DOE*s
    incidental waste process improperly allows DOE to reclassify high- level
    waste as incidental waste that does not need to be treated in the same way
    as high- level waste. According to the plaintiffs, the Nuclear Waste
    Policy Act defines all waste originating from a given source* that is,
    from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel* as high- level waste and requires

    that such waste be managed as high- level waste, yet DOE has chosen to
    differentiate its wastes according to the level of radioactivity and
    manage them accordingly.

    This is not the first legal action that resulted from DOE*s process for
    determining which part of its waste can be designated as incidental to
    reprocessing and will not be managed as high- level waste. For example, in
    1993, the NRC denied a formal petition from the states of Washington and
    Oregon requesting that NRC establish the process and criteria for
    determining what part of DOE*s radioactive waste could be managed as other
    than high- level waste. 24 The states* request stemmed from concerns that
    the criteria DOE was applying to wastes had not been formally established
    by regulation and thus had not been given public scrutiny. The NRC, in its
    ruling, concluded that DOE*s process for determining what waste was
    incidental to reprocessing was appropriate for making individual tank- by-
    tank incidental waste determinations, and that the NRC had no
    jurisdiction. Later, in 1998, the Natural Resources Defense Council
    petitioned the NRC to assume immediate licensing authority over the

    51 tanks at the Savannah River Site, arguing that DOE invented the term
    *incidental waste* as a means of circumventing NRC*s authority and
    oversight and, furthermore, that waste to be left in the bottom of the
    tanks at Savannah River did not meet DOE*s own definition of incidental
    waste.

    23 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Abraham, No. 01- CV- 413 (D.
    Idaho, filed Mar. 5, 2002). The lawsuit was originally filed in January
    2000 in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and was subsequently transferred
    to the federal district court in Idaho. The other parties to the lawsuit
    are the Snake River Alliance, the Confederated Tribes and Bands

    of the Yakama Nation, and the Shoshone Bannock Tribes. In addition, the
    states of Washington, Idaho, Oregon, and South Carolina are participating
    as amicus curiae.

    24 58 Fed. Reg. 12, 342 (1993). Legal Challenges to DOE*s

    Authority to Manage Its Tank Waste

    Page 28 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    The NRC concluded it did not have regulatory authority over high- level or
    residual wastes at Savannah River. 25 The current legal challenge, as well
    as any future challenges, could affect DOE*s efforts to implement its
    accelerated treatment and disposal strategies. For example, the challenge
    could place on hold indefinitely all pending incidental waste
    determinations. Since the start of the lawsuit,

    DOE has not implemented any incidental waste determinations and has not
    yet decided whether to defer or move forward with its pending incidental
    waste determinations* such as for closing tanks. DOE is concerned that
    moving forward to implement such determinations could create a risk that
    the court could place a general ban on making any decisions about the
    waste until the legal challenge is resolved. In addition, final resolution
    of the challenge could be further delayed if either party

    appeals the decision. A lengthy legal process could result in delays in
    moving forward with treatment plans for this waste and delays in closing
    tanks on an accelerated schedule. For example, the Idaho National
    Laboratory plans to begin closing tanks in the spring of 2003, but
    approval for the incidental waste determination to close the tanks by
    managing tank waste residuals as low- level waste is still pending. 26 A
    DOE official at the Idaho National Laboratory told us that while a delay
    of several months in obtaining incidental waste approval would not present
    an immediate threat to schedule dates, a delay beyond 24 months would
    seriously impact the site*s ability to meet its accelerated 2012 date to
    close all of the tanks. Savannah River also plans to begin closing
    additional tanks starting in early 2004. 27 A DOE official at the Savannah
    River Site said that if the lawsuit continues, the site may miss a legally
    binding date agreed to with regulators to begin closing the tanks.

    If the court invalidated DOE*s incidental waste determination process, DOE
    may need to find an alternative solution for treating and managing its
    wastes that would allow it to treat waste with lower concentrations of
    radioactivity less expensively. In that case, DOE could begin experiencing

    25 65 Fed. Reg. 62, 377 (2000). 26 Tank closure at the Idaho National
    Laboratory is also pending completion of its National Environmental Policy
    Act process. 27 The Savannah River Site closed its first tanks* tanks 17
    and 20* in 1997. Uncertainty about DOE*s

    Authority Could Delay Implementing New Initiatives

    Page 29 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    delays affecting progress at all three of the high- level waste sites that
    rely on incidental waste determinations. For example, as one of its
    savings strategies, DOE plans to manage about 12.3 million gallons of its
    waste at Savannah River as low- level waste and treat this waste through a
    grout facility. DOE estimates it could begin treating this waste as early
    as August 2003. Although DOE has approved an incidental waste
    determination for this waste, the grout treatment facility must receive an
    operating permit from state regulators. To date, the state has withheld
    approval for the permit, pending resolution of the lawsuit. A site
    official said without the permit, DOE cannot go forward with its plans to
    accelerate treatment of the waste.

    At this point, the department does not appear to have a strategy in place
    to avoid the potential effects of challenges to its incidental waste
    determination authority, either from the current lawsuit or future
    challenges. In a December 2002 internal memorandum, the Assistant
    Secretary for Environmental Management issued guidelines for proceeding
    with making incidental waste determinations as necessary to meet cleanup
    commitments and requirements. However, these guidelines only include
    ensuring that such determinations meet the legal requirements of Order
    435.1; the guidelines do not include any alternative strategies for
    dealing with the waste. DOE officials told us that they believe the
    department will prevail in the legal challenge. Because the outcome of the
    lawsuit is so uncertain, DOE believes it would be premature to explore
    alternative strategies to overcome potentially significant delays to the
    program that could result from a protracted legal conflict or from an
    adverse decision. As of April 2003, DOE had just begun to look at
    potential delays that could result from a lengthy legal challenge, but had
    developed no formal strategy to deal with those delays. Such strategies
    could range from exploring alternative approaches for establishing an
    incidental waste

    regulation to asking that the Congress clarify its intentions regarding
    DOE*s authority to implement an incidental waste policy.

    DOE*s initiative also faces key technical challenges related to the
    process for separating the various components of the waste. Waste
    separation involves a sequential process of filtering and extracting each
    major high- level waste constituent, such as cesium- 137 and strontium-
    90, from the waste. DOE guidance recognizes the risks involved in
    implementing

    a technology without first thoroughly testing it. In order to save time,
    however, DOE managers at the Hanford Site are planning some of their
    strategies around waste separation technologies that will not be fully
    tested before being implemented. Past projects that took this approach
    Initiative Also Relies

    Heavily on Waste Separation Approaches That Will Not Be Fully Tested

    Page 30 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    have experienced major problems, and outside reviewers have raised
    cautions about DOE*s plans to use the same approach in this instance.

    Separating high- level waste into its various components is central to
    DOE*s treatment and disposal plans. Since the 1980s, federal and state
    agreements have reflected DOE*s plan that the waste be processed so that
    at least 90 percent of the radioactivity in high- level waste is
    concentrated into a much smaller waste stream and prepared for permanent
    isolation in a geological repository. The low- activity waste portion,
    which represents

    the majority of the waste volume but significantly less radioactivity,
    must also be immobilized according to federal and state agreements.

    Separating the waste components is important not only to comply with
    federal and state agreements, but also to meet waste cleanup schedule and
    cost goals. If the waste is not separated, all of it* about 94 million
    gallons* may have to be treated as high- level waste and disposed of in
    the geological repository. Doing so would require a much larger repository
    than currently planned and drive up disposal costs by billions of dollars.
    Successful separation will substantially reduce the volume of waste
    needing disposal at the repository, as well as the time and cost required
    to prepare it for disposal, and allow less expensive methods to be used in
    treating and disposing of the remaining low- activity waste.

    The waste separation process is complicated, difficult, and unique in
    scope and size at each site. The waste differs among sites not only in
    volume but also in the way it has been generated, managed, and stored over
    the years. 28 Although the main steps in the process may vary, waste
    separation generally involves a sequential process of filtering and
    extracting various high- level waste constituents from the tank waste (see
    figure 4). The waste treatment approach at the Hanford Site involves
    designing, building, and operating one- of- a- kind separations processes
    and facilities. Developing a successful waste separations process has
    proved challenging for DOE in the past, especially at Savannah River, and
    the current plans for Hanford are no less challenging. 28 Progress in
    successfully separating the waste also varies at each site. Waste
    separation

    operations at the West Valley site were completed in 1995. As part of its
    accelerated cleanup plan, the Idaho National Laboratory is evaluating its
    need for separation technologies for its liquid tank wastes. The
    subsequent discussion focuses on separation processes at the Hanford and
    Savannah River sites. Separating Waste Is Key to Treating It Economically

    Page 31 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Figure 4: Simplified Description of Key Steps in Hanford*s Proposed
    Process for Separating High- Level Waste Constituents

    a Yttrium- 90 and barium- 137m, which are generated from strontium- 90 and
    cesium- 137 respectively, are also present in the waste but additional
    steps to separate these constituents are not necessary because after
    separation from their related constituents (strontium- 90 and cesium-
    137), they will decay within a few weeks until they are no longer
    radioactive. b DOE*s original plan was to remove technetium- 99 at the
    same time as cesium- 137. However, DOE

    officials at the Hanford Site now plan to leave technetium- 99 in the low-
    activity waste stream rather than separating and diverting it to the high-
    level waste stream where it would be vitrified. c Both the high- level and
    low- activity waste streams contain various components of hazardous waste.
    Some hazardous components will be destroyed during the vitrification
    process. DOE plans to apply to the Environmental Protection Agency to have
    the remaining hazardous components declared safe for long- term storage
    and disposal. If successful, the components will remain in the immobilized
    waste.

    Page 32 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    At its Hanford site, DOE intends to build a facility for separating the
    waste before fully testing the separation processes that will be used. The
    technology for separating waste components at Hanford is being developed
    at several laboratories, including the Savannah River Technology Center.
    These facilities are performing tests to help validate underlying
    assumptions about how the processes will work. The laboratory testing
    includes a combination of pilot- scale testing of major individual
    processes and use of operational data for certain of those processes for
    which DOE officials said they had extensive experience. However,
    integrated testing will not be completed until full- scale facilities

    are constructed. DOE plans to fully test the processes for the first time
    during the operational tests of the newly constructed facilities.

    This approach does not fully reflect DOE guidance for incorporating new or
    complex technology into a project, which calls for ensuring that the
    technology is mature before integrating it into a project. More
    specifically, DOE*s project management Order 413.3 requires DOE to assess
    the risks

    associated with technology at various phases of a project*s development.
    For projects with significant technical uncertainties that could affect
    cost and schedule, corrective action plans are required to determine how
    the uncertainties will be resolved before the projects can proceed. In
    addition to this order, DOE has drafted supplementary project management
    guidance. This guidance suggests that technologies are to be developed to
    a reasonable level of maturity before a project can progress to full
    implementation to reduce risks and avoid cost increases and schedule
    delays. The guidance suggests that DOE avoid the risk of performing
    concurrent facility design and technology development.

    The laboratories working to develop Hanford*s waste separation process
    have identified several technical uncertainties, which they are working to
    address. These uncertainties or critical technology risks include problems
    with separating waste solids through an elaborate filtration system,
    problems associated with mixing the waste during separation processes, and
    various problems associated with the low- activity waste evaporator. The
    contractor is also concerned about the availability and performance of a
    special resin for separating out cesium- 137, a radioactive constituent.
    The resin is currently produced by only one supplier, and that supplier
    currently does not have the manufacturing capability to produce the resin
    in the quantities needed for DOE*s full- scale operations, according to
    contractor officials. In an effort to resolve this uncertainty, DOE*s
    construction contractor has asked the manufacturer to expand resin
    production capability, and in April 2003, DOE signed a Hanford Plans to
    Build

    Facilities to Separate Waste before Fully Testing the Separation Processes
    to Be Used

    Page 33 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    contract modification that allows alternative resins to be used in the
    separation process.

    Given these and other uncertainties, Hanford*s construction contractor and
    outside experts have seen Hanford*s approach as having high technical risk
    and have recommended integrated testing during project development.

     In April 2002, concerned about the potential for operational problems
    with the waste separation processes, Hanford*s construction contractor
    proposed building an integrated testing facility to confirm that Hanford*s
    processes will work at a significantly larger scale than has been tested
    to date. The contractor proposed conducting fully integrated tests in a
    pilot facility using simulated waste before full- scale separation
    facilities are completed. The contractor estimated the cost of the pilot
    facility at between $6 million and $12 million.  In October 2002, an
    independent peer review group of industry experts

    concluded that an integrated pilot plant for interim testing to confirm
    the technical processes was a preferred approach. Several other
    independent experts we interviewed also shared this view. These experts
    are

    associated with the National Research Council and various research
    organizations, universities, and private institutions. These experts
    emphasized that performing integrated testing to verify that separation
    processes will work is an essential step, especially for treating
    Hanford*s unique waste in the complicated waste treatment facilities that
    Hanford is building.

    In contrast to these views, DOE*s Office of River Protection and the
    construction contractor decided not to construct an integrated pilot
    facility and instead to accept a higher- risk approach. DOE officials said
    they wanted to avoid increasing project costs and schedule delays, which
    they believe will result from building a testing facility. Instead,
    Hanford

    officials said that they will continue to conduct pilot- scale tests of
    major separation processes. DOE officials said they believe this testing
    will provide assurance that the separation processes will function in an
    integrated manner. After the full- scale treatment facilities are
    constructed, DOE plans to fully test and demonstrate the separation
    process during facility startup operations.

    Full testing of Hanford*s separation process may be a bigger challenge
    than originally envisioned. In April 2003, DOE modified the construction
    contract for the waste treatment facilities and adopted a schedule
    compressing the facility testing and startup period from 4 years to about

    Page 34 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    2.5 years. To meet this compressed schedule, Hanford*s construction
    contractor decided in late April 2003 to drop its proposal for the pilot
    plant. Instead, the contractor plans to continue laboratory testing of
    separation processes in an effort to simulate the results of an integrated
    pilot plant. While contractor officials stated that their original
    proposal for an integrated pilot plant was technically sound, they
    withdrew the proposal in order to ensure that they could meet revised
    contract schedule and budget commitments.

    The consequences of not adhering to sound technology development
    guidelines can be severe. At the Savannah River Site, for example, DOE
    invested nearly $500 million over nearly 15 years to develop a waste
    separations process, called in- tank precipitation, to treat Savannah
    River*s high- level waste. While laboratory tests of this process were
    viewed as

    successful, DOE did not conduct adequate testing of the components until
    it started full- scale operations in the newly constructed facility. DOE
    followed this approach, in part, because the technology was commercially
    available. When DOE started full- scale operations, major problems
    occurred. Benzene, a dangerously flammable byproduct, was produced in
    large quantities. Operations were stopped after DOE spent about

    $500 million because experts could not explain how or why benzene was
    being produced and could not determine how to economically reconfigure the
    facility to minimize it. Consequences of this technology failure included
    significant cost increases, schedule delays, a full- scale facility that
    did not work, and a less- than- optimum waste treatment operation without
    a viable separation process. Savannah River is now taking steps to develop
    and implement a new separation technology at an additional cost

    of about $1.8 billion and a delay of about 7 years. 29 Subsequent
    assessments of the problems that developed at Savannah River found that
    DOE (1) relied on laboratory- scale tests to demonstrate separation
    processes, (2) believed that technical problems could be resolved later
    during facility construction and startup, and (3) decided to scale up the
    technology from lab tests to full- scale without the benefit of

    using additional testing facilities to confirm that processes would work
    at a larger scale. Officials at Hanford are following this same approach.
    Several experts with whom we talked cautioned that if separation

    29 U. S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Waste: Process to Remove
    Radioactive Waste From Savannah River Tanks Fails to Work, GAO/ RCED- 99-
    69 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 30, 1999). Past Experience at Savannah

    River Shows Consequences of Deviating from Technology Development
    Guidelines

    Page 35 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    processes at Hanford do not work as planned, facilities will have to be
    retrofitted, and potential cost increases and schedule delays can be much
    greater than those associated with integrated process testing in a

    pilot facility. In addition to the potential cost savings identified in
    the accelerated site cleanup plans, DOE continues to develop and evaluate
    additional proposals to reduce costs, but is still in the process of fully
    assessing these proposals. Because DOE is still evaluating these
    proposals, the potential cost savings have not been fully developed, but
    could be in the range of

    several billion dollars, if successfully implemented. At the Savannah
    River and Hanford sites, for example, DOE is identifying ways to increase
    the amount of waste that can be placed in its high- level waste canisters
    to reduce treatment and disposal costs. DOE also has a number of
    initiatives under way to improve overall program management. However, we
    are concerned that they may not be adequate. In our examinations of
    problems that have plagued DOE*s project management over the years, three
    contributing factors often emerged* making key project decisions without
    rigorous analysis, incorporating new technology before it has received
    sufficient testing, and using a *fast- track* approach (concurrent design
    and construction) on complex projects. Ensuring that these weaknesses are
    addressed as part of its program management initiatives would further
    improve the management of the program and increase the chances for
    success.

    DOE is continuing to identify other proposals for reducing costs under its
    accelerated cleanup initiative. Senior Environmental Management officials
    realize that the proposals to accelerate cleanup identified in site
    performance management plans do not represent a complete set of options
    for full achievement of DOE*s savings goals. To pursue additional
    potential opportunities, the Assistant Secretary for Environmental
    Management commissioned several special project teams to evaluate
    additional program improvements and cost- savings opportunities. One

    of these teams, the high- level waste project team, has completed the
    initial phase of its work. According to DOE*s high- level waste project
    team leader, it may be some time before their proposals are fully assessed
    and

    decisions are made about how best to proceed. The Assistant Secretary will
    consider the proposals from the project teams, but has not stated when
    final decisions will occur. Opportunities Exist

    to Explore Additional Cost Savings and to Strengthen Program Management

    DOE Is Considering Additional Potential Opportunities to Reduce Costs

    Page 36 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Among the proposals that DOE is considering, the ones that appear to offer
    significant cost- savings opportunities would increase the amount of waste
    placed in each disposal canister. We discussed these cost- savings
    opportunities with both Savannah River and Hanford officials during our

    review. DOE officials at those sites have identified these potential
    savings opportunities as deserving further consideration, but have not yet
    fully assessed the potential benefits, or overcome technical and
    operational barriers.

    Savannah River officials are working to reduce costs by increasing the
    amount of waste immobilized in glass and placed in each disposal canister.
    They have proposed increasing the amount of waste in each canister by
    developing different blends of glass material, called frit, that they
    believe can be tailored to each batch of waste. The amount of waste that
    can be

    placed into a canister depends on a complex set of factors, including the
    specific mix of radioactive material combined with other chemicals in the
    waste, such as chromium and sulfate, that affect the processing and
    quality of the immobilized product. These factors affect the percentage of
    waste than can be placed in each canister because they indicate the
    likelihood that radioactive constituents could leach out of the
    immobilizing glass medium and into the environment. The greater the
    potential for leaching, the lower the allowable percentage of waste and
    the higher the percentage of glass frit that must be used. DOE determines
    that a consistently acceptable glass is produced by evaluating the
    leaching rates of the glass, using a combination of chemical analysis and
    predictive modeling.

    Based on a recent improvement made to DOE*s predictive model involving
    adjustments to the required temperature of the melted waste, and changes
    to the type of glass frit used, Savannah River officials believe they can

    increase the amount of waste loaded in each canister from 28 percent to
    about 35 percent and, for at least one waste batch, to nearly 50 percent.
    Savannah River plans to implement this new process and begin increasing
    the amount of waste in each canister in June 2003. If successful, Savannah
    River*s improved approach could reduce the number of canisters needed by
    about 1,000 canisters and save about $2.7 billion, based on preliminary
    estimates.

    Beyond the specific improvements Savannah River officials have already
    identified, there may be an additional way to increase the loading of
    waste into disposal canisters, resulting in additional savings for DOE.
    During our review, we determined that DOE*s Offices of Environmental
    Management and Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (Radioactive Waste
    Opportunities at Savannah

    River Look Promising but Have Not Been Fully Demonstrated

    Page 37 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Management) have been using different acceptance criteria for evaluating
    the rate at which waste could leach out of the glass in the disposal
    canisters. By conforming to the less restrictive Radioactive Waste
    Management criteria, Environmental Management could possibly increase the
    amount of waste in the canisters to a higher level. 30 After examining

    this possibility, Environmental Management officials at Savannah River
    said that, if the higher waste loading could be achieved, this change
    could eliminate the need for up to 650 canisters. This may permit further
    cost savings of about $1.7 billion. The Savannah River officials stated
    that they were continuing to examine this cost- savings possibility.

    The Hanford Site has also proposed strategies to decrease the number of
    high- level waste canisters that it will need, but its approach is in a
    very early stage of development. In November 2002, Hanford proposed
    broadening the high- level waste acceptance criteria to allow waste forms
    other than standard borosilicate glass* the type of glass being used at
    Savannah River and initially planned for Hanford* to be accepted for
    immobilizing high- level waste. Hanford*s proposal is based on recent
    changes to NRC*s disposal requirements that will allow for alternative
    waste forms to be sent to the repository. 31 These changes may allow
    Hanford to package its high- level waste in fewer canisters.

    Although it is unclear whether DOE orders will be changed to allow these
    other waste forms, DOE has significant incentives to do so. Reducing the
    number of canisters at Hanford is especially important because, based on
    the expected production capacity of the high- level waste vitrification
    plant, only a maximum of 9,600 of the projected 12,800 canisters that DOE
    will need can be filled with waste by the 2028 scheduled completion date.

    30 DOE*s standard for leaching establishes a limitation on the rate at
    which the glass containing the waste can leach material into the
    environment. Radioactive Waste Management, the DOE office responsible for
    managing the final disposal of the waste at the geologic repository,
    requires that the *mean* or average of leaching rates measured or
    predicted for the immobilizing glass must be less than the average of
    leaching rates for standard glass. In contrast, Environmental Management
    suggests (and the sites have adopted) that the average of leaching rates
    measured or predicted for the glass must be *at least two standard
    deviations below* the average leaching rates for standard glass.
    Environmental Management*s more stringent criteria to limit leaching can,
    under some circumstances, restrict the amount of waste that can be placed
    in the canisters to a greater extent than Radioactive Waste Management*s
    standard.

    31 In a November 2002 internal memo to Radioactive Waste Management, the
    Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management stated the need to revise
    its waste acceptance criteria to be consistent with NRC*s disposal
    requirements. DOE has recently begun to

    evaluate the steps necessary to make this revision. Because Opportunities
    at

    Hanford Are in Early Development, Savings Are Not Yet Known

    Page 38 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    However, by using other types of glass, Hanford estimates that it may be
    able to reduce its need for disposal canisters by 2, 500 to 3,900
    canisters. 32 If such a significant reduction in the number of canisters
    produced is

    possible, it could shorten Hanford*s high- level waste treatment schedule
    by 6 years, save billions of dollars, and help to meet its scheduled
    completion date. However, the wide range of Hanford*s estimate reflects
    the rough nature of its proposal and that cost savings have not yet been
    fully estimated.

    In addition to DOE*s efforts to identify site- specific proposals for
    saving time and money, DOE is also undertaking management improvements
    using teams to study individual issues. Nine teams are currently in place,
    while other teams to address issues such as using breakthrough business
    processes in waste cleanup and improving the environmental review process
    to better support decision- making have not yet been formed. Each team has
    a disciplined management process to follow, 33 and even after the teams*
    work is completed, any implementation will take time. These efforts are in
    the early stages, and therefore it is unclear if they will be effective in
    correcting the causes of the performance problems DOE and others have
    identified.

    We are concerned, however, that these management reforms may not go far
    enough in addressing performance problems with the high- level waste
    program. Our concerns stem from our review of initiatives underway in the
    management teams, our discussions with DOE officials, and our past and
    current work, as well as work by others inside and outside DOE. We have
    identified three recurring weaknesses in DOE*s management of cleanup
    projects that we believe need to be addressed as part of this overall
    review. These weaknesses cut across the various issues that the teams are
    working on and are often found at the center of problems that have been
    identified. Two of the three weaknesses have been discussed earlier in
    this report, as we have identified these as potentially significant
    obstacles to achieving savings* lack of rigor in the analysis supporting

    32 Based on *engineering staff judgment,* depending on the waste form
    used, a reduction of as many as 500 canisters may be attributable to
    changing Environmental Management*s more stringent waste quality criteria
    to conform to Radioactive Waste Management*s standard.

    33 Under DOE*s project management principles, for example, teams must
    define project requirements, conduct preliminary risk assessments, and
    prepare a risk mitigation plan prior to developing a baseline cost
    estimate of proposed alternatives. DOE Has Opportunities

    to Improve Management of the Program by Addressing Previously Identified
    Weaknesses

    Page 39 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    key decisions, and incorporating technology into projects before it is
    sufficiently mature. The final area of weakness involves using *fast-
    track* methods to begin construction of complex facilities before
    sufficient planning and design have taken place.

    DOE*s project management guidance emphasizes the importance of rigorous
    and current analysis to support decision- making during the development of
    DOE projects. All DOE projects with costs greater than $5 million require
    risk management activities, including a thorough analysis, to be applied
    continuously, adjusting these analyses throughout the process as necessary
    to ensure DOE is pursuing the best value alternative at the lowest cost.
    Similarly, the Office of Management and Budget guidance states that
    agencies should validate earlier planning decisions with updated
    information before finalizing decisions to construct facilities. This
    validation is particularly important where early cost comparisons are
    susceptible to uncertainties and change.

    However, DOE does not always follow this guidance. Proceeding without
    rigorous review has been a recurring cause of many of the problems we have
    identified in past DOE projects. For example, regarding the need to
    validate planning decisions with updated information before finalizing
    decisions, the decision at Hanford to construct a vitrification plant to
    treat Hanford*s low- activity waste has not undergone such a validation.
    Hanford*s analysis justifying the cost of this approach was prepared in
    1999 and was based on technical performance data, disposal assumptions,
    and cost data developed in the early to mid- 1990s* conditions that are no
    longer applicable. For example, the 1999 analysis compared DOE*s

    low- activity vitrification approach with a disposal approach developed in
    the early 1990s that involved large underground grout vaults with
    elaborate environmental controls. Although this grout approach was
    abandoned in 1994, DOE still used these disposal assumptions for the 1999
    comparison and analysis. Since that time other conditions have changed,
    including the performance capabilities of alternative technologies such as
    grout, the relative costs of different technologies, and the amount of
    waste DOE actually intends to process through a vitrification plant. These
    changes suggest that earlier planning decisions need to be validated with
    updated information to ensure that the current approach is reasonable and
    appropriate. DOE*s high- level waste project team also recognized that the
    DOE officials at Hanford had not performed a current, rigorous analysis of
    low- activity waste treatment options including the use of grout as an
    alternative to vitrification, and encouraged the Hanford site to update
    its analysis based on current waste treatment and disposal assumptions.
    Hanford officials responded in April 2003 by developing life- cycle Key
    Decisions Not Always

    Supported by Rigorous Current Analysis

    Page 40 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    cost estimates that compared the cost of alternate low- activity waste
    approaches. However, they did not fully reassess the decision to vitrify
    low- activity waste. DOE officials at Hanford told us they do not plan to
    reassess the decision to construct a low- activity vitrification facility
    because their compliance agreement with the state of Washington calls for
    vitrification of this waste. They also stated that vitrification is a
    technology needed for destroying hazardous constituents in a portion of
    the waste.

    In our previous work, we noted a similar lack of rigor in reevaluating DOE
    decisions as conditions change. For example, at three sites* Fernald,
    Ohio; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and the Idaho National Laboratory* DOE was
    faced with a decision about whether to dispose of low- level waste on-
    site or to use off- site commercial disposal facilities. Between the time
    that DOE decided to develop on- site disposal facilities at these three
    sites and the time that construction actually began, conditions changed
    that affected the usefulness of earlier cost estimates. However, DOE
    officials at the sites made little effort to update and reevaluate the
    original cost comparisons to validate the on- site disposal decision. 34
    In July 2002, DOE*s Office of Environmental Management issued guidance to
    implement our recommendation to validate cost comparisons before
    constructing or expanding low- level waste disposal facilities at these
    three sites.

    This weakness cuts across the issues that the DOE teams are working on; no
    DOE team appears to be currently addressing it. However, DOE managers need
    to ensure that it receives proper consideration as these management
    improvement efforts proceed.

    Our work on Department of Defense acquisitions has documented a set of
    *best practices* used by industry for integrating new technology into
    major projects. We reported in July 1999 that the maturity of a technology
    at the start of a project is an important determinant of success. 35 As
    technology develops from preconceptual design through preliminary design
    and testing, the maturity of the technology increases and the risks
    associated with incorporating that design into a project decrease. Waiting

    34 U. S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Cleanup: DOE Should Reevaluate
    Waste Disposal Options Before Building New Facilities, GAO- 01- 441
    (Washington, D. C.: May 25, 2001).

    35 U. S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Management of
    Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/ NSIAD- 99-
    162 (Washington, D. C.: July 30, 1999). New Technology Is

    Incorporated before It Is Sufficiently Mature

    Page 41 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    until technology is well- developed and tested before integrating it into
    a project will greatly increase the chances of meeting cost, schedule, and
    technical baselines. On the other hand, integrating technology that is not
    fully mature into a project greatly increases the risk of having cost
    increases and schedule delays. According to industry experts, correcting
    problems after a project has begun can cost 10 times as much as resolving
    technology problems beforehand.

    DOE*s project management guidance issued in October 2000 is consistent
    with these best practices. The guidance discusses technology development
    and sets out suggested steps to ensure that new technology is brought to a
    sufficient level of maturity at each decision point in a project. For
    example, during the conceptual design phase of a project, *proof of
    concept* testing should be performed before approval to proceed to the
    preliminary design phase. Furthermore, the guidance states that projects
    that attempt to concurrently develop the technology and design the
    facility proceed with ill- defined risks to all three baselines* cost,
    schedule, and technical.

    Nevertheless, as we discussed earlier in this report, DOE sites continue
    to integrate immature technologies into their projects. For example, at
    Hanford, DOE is constructing a facility to separate high- level waste
    components, although integrated testing of the many steps in the
    separations process has not occurred and will not occur until after the
    facility is completed. DOE, trying to keep the project on schedule and
    within budget, has decided the risks associated with this approach are
    acceptable. However, there are many projects in which this approach
    created schedule delays and unexpected costs. The continued reliance on
    this approach in the face of so many past problems is a signal of an area

    that needs careful attention as DOE proceeds with its management reform
    efforts. At present, no DOE management team is addressing this issue.
    Finally, we have concerns about DOE*s practice of launching into
    construction of complex, one- of- a- kind facilities well before their
    final design is sufficiently developed, again in an effort to save time
    and money. Both DOE guidance and external reviews stress the importance of
    adequate upfront planning before beginning project construction. DOE*s
    project management guidance identifies a series of well- defined steps
    before construction begins and suggests that complex projects with
    treatment processes that have never before been combined into a facility
    do not lend themselves to being expedited. However, DOE guidance does not
    explicitly prohibit a fast- track* or concurrent design and construction*
    approach to complex, one- of- a- kind projects, and DOE Facility
    Construction Starts

    before Design Is Sufficiently Developed

    Page 42 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    often follows this approach. For example, at the Hanford Site, DOE is
    concurrently designing and constructing facilities for the largest, most
    complex environmental cleanup project in the United States. Problems are
    already surfacing. Only 24 months after the contract was awarded, the
    project was 10 months behind schedule dates, construction activities have
    outpaced design work causing inefficient work sequencing, and DOE has
    withheld performance fee from the design/ construction contractor because
    of these problems.

    DOE experienced similar problems in concurrent design and construction
    activities on other waste treatment facilities. Both the spent nuclear
    fuel project at Hanford and the waste separations facility at the Savannah
    River

    Site encountered schedule delays and cost increases in part because the
    concurrent approach led to mistakes and rework, and required extra time
    and money to address the problems. 36 In its 2001 follow- up report on DOE
    project management, the National Research Council noted that inadequate
    pre- construction planning and definition of project scope led to cost and

    schedule overruns on DOE*s cleanup projects. 37 The Council reported that
    research studies suggest that inadequate project definition accounts for
    50 percent of the cost increases for environmental remediation projects.
    Again, no team is specifically examining the *fast- track* approach, yet
    it frequently contributed to past problems and DOE continues to use this
    approach.

    DOE*s efforts to improve its high- level waste cleanup program and to rein
    in the uncontrolled growth in project costs and schedules are important
    and necessary. The accelerated cleanup initiative represents at least the
    hope of treating and disposing of the waste in a more economical and
    timely way, although the actual savings are unknown at this time.
    Furthermore, specific components of this initiative face key legal and
    technical challenges. Much of the potential for success rests on DOE*s

    36 For a discussion of the problems associated with the fast track design/
    build approach on these projects, see U. S. General Accounting Office,
    Nuclear Waste: DOE*s Hanford Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Project* Cost,
    Schedule, and Management Issues,

    GAO/ RCED- 99- 267 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 20, 1999) and Nuclear Waste:
    Process to Remove Radioactive Waste From Savannah River Tanks Fails to
    Work, GAO- RCED- 99- 69 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 30, 1999).

    37 National Research Council, Progress in Improving Project Management at
    the Department of Energy (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 2001). Conclusions

    Page 43 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    continued ability to dispose of large quantities of waste with relatively
    low concentrations of radioactivity on- site by applying its incidental
    waste process. DOE*s authority in this regard has been challenged in a
    lawsuit that is still pending. Much of the success also rests on DOE*s
    ability to obtain successful technical performance from its as- yet
    unproven waste separation processes. Any technical problems with these
    processes will likely result in costly delays. At DOE*s Hanford Site, we
    believe the potential for such problems warrants reconsidering the need
    for more thorough testing of the processes.

    DOE*s accelerated cleanup initiative should mark the beginning, not the
    end, of DOE*s efforts to identify other opportunities to improve the
    program by accomplishing the work more quickly, more effectively, or at
    less cost. As DOE continues to pursue other management improvements,

    it should reassess certain aspects of its current management approach,
    including the quality of the analysis underlying key decisions, the
    adequacy of its approach to incorporating new technologies into projects,
    and the merits of a fast- track approach to designing and building complex
    nuclear facilities. Although the challenges are great, the opportunities
    for

    program improvements are even greater. Therefore, DOE must continue its
    efforts to clean up its high- level waste while demonstrating tangible,
    measurable program improvements.

    To help ensure that DOE*s accelerated cleanup initiative is effective and
    that cleanup of high- level waste proceeds in a timely and cost- effective
    manner, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Energy

     seek clarification from the Congress regarding DOE*s authority for
    designating waste as incidental to reprocessing if the current challenge
    becomes an extended legal process, in order to help DOE determine what
    strategy it needs to move its initiative forward and realize potential
    savings;  reassess the potential risks, costs, and benefits of
    constructing an

    integrated pilot- scale waste separation facility at the Hanford site to
    more fully test separation technologies before completing construction of
    a full- scale facility; and  ensure that DOE*s high- level waste projects
    (1) include a current and

    rigorous analysis of the risks, costs, and benefits associated with the
    decisions being implemented, in accordance with OMB guidance; (2)
    incorporate new technologies consistent with best practices and DOE
    guidance so that risks and costs are more effectively managed; and (3) are
    carefully evaluated as to the appropriateness of using a fast- track
    Recommendations for

    Executive Action

    Page 44 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    approach to designing and constructing complex nuclear facilities, and
    that the potential risks and costs associated with this approach are
    explicitly identified and considered. We provided a draft of this report
    to the Department of Energy for its

    review and comment. DOE*s Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management
    responded for DOE. DOE*s written comments acknowledged the challenges that
    DOE faces in its high- level waste program, as discussed

    in our report. DOE cited its recent initiative to accelerate cleanup and
    reduce environmental risks as its response to those challenges. DOE agreed
    to consider our recommendation to seek clarification from the Congress
    regarding DOE*s authority to determine what waste is incidental to
    reprocessing, if legal challenges to DOE*s authority to make such
    determinations have a significant effect on implementing proposed cost-
    saving and risk- reduction initiatives. However, DOE disagreed with our
    recommendation that it conduct integrated pilot testing of its waste
    separation processes at Hanford while constructing a full- scale facility.
    In addition, regarding opportunities to improve program management, DOE
    said that at the Hanford project it was already effectively conducting
    rigorous analyses to support decision- making, incorporating new
    technologies into the project consistent with best practices and agency
    guidelines, and using a fast- track approach of concurrently designing and
    building complex nuclear facilities.

    Regarding our recommendation that DOE pursue integrated, pilot- scale
    testing of the waste separations facility at Hanford, DOE believes that
    its current approach is adequate to manage the risks associated with
    designing and constructing the facility. DOE said that it does not intend
    to pursue an integrated pilot test facility that we believe would increase
    the

    chances of success with the full- scale facility. DOE*s position is based
    on two main arguments. DOE believes that (1) the technologies planned for
    the separations facility are commercially available and thus are mature
    technologies having low technical risk and (2) relying on pilot testing of
    individual components of the separation processes in the laboratory
    provides adequate mitigation of the risks involved.

    We disagree with DOE*s view that the separations approach planned for the
    Hanford Site is low risk. DOE has experience with the individual
    technologies, but does not have experience in operating an integrated
    separations process that incorporates all of the operations required for
    Hanford*s unique and complex waste. Furthermore, DOE has experienced
    problems with another separation facility where adequate testing was not
    Agency Comments

    Page 45 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    done until the facility was fully constructed* the in- tank precipitation
    facility at Savannah River. In that case, the separations process failed
    after DOE spent about $500 million trying to make it work properly. And
    the primary technologies used at Savannah River were also in use
    commercially, but had not been fully adapted to the unique Savannah River
    wastes.

    We also disagree that DOE*s plan to conduct extensive testing in the
    laboratory to mitigate the technology risks involved with the separation
    processes will provide adequate assurance that the full- scale separations
    facility will perform effectively. Numerous experts and DOE*s contractor
    have proposed constructing and operating an integrated pilot- scale
    facility. They made the proposals while knowing about DOE*s intention to
    conduct extensive laboratory testing of separation processes. The
    contractor as well as outside experts view the separations facility as
    having significant project risk, in contrast to DOE*s statement that the
    separation processes pose low project risk. Given the risks associated
    with fully constructing the separations facility before conducting
    integrated testing and the cost of any delays associated with having
    significant problems with the separation processes once the facility is
    fully constructed, we continue to believe that conducting integrated
    pilot- scale testing is an important risk- and schedule- management tool
    and that DOE should reconsider its use for the Hanford project. DOE
    officials at Hanford acknowledged that the pilot facility could be
    included in the project without extending the project*s schedule.

    Regarding management improvement issues, DOE said that we inadequately
    portrayed the progress it has made in the three areas in which we
    recommended management improvements. However, our report addresses the
    three management issues from the broader context of DOE*s project
    activities over several years and at a number of sites. Our past work has
    clearly linked these weaknesses to problems on cleanup projects. Because
    DOE did not take issue with that broader context in this report, but did
    assert improved performance on the Hanford project, the following comments
    are limited to needed improvements to the

    Hanford project. Regarding DOE*s view that it performed current and
    rigorous analyses of risks, cost, and benefits for the Hanford waste
    treatment project, our report illustrates our concerns about the analysis
    DOE performed to support its decision to vitrify a portion of Hanford*s
    low- activity waste. DOE stated that this decision, originally made in
    1994, has been revisited numerous times using rigorous analysis and
    provided us with three studies

    Page 46 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    that specifically compared the cost of low- activity waste vitrification
    with other approaches, such as grout, to support its decision. None of
    these studies included a current and rigorous analysis of risks, costs,
    and benefits, as called for in OMB guidance. For example, even the most
    recent study, completed in 2003, was primarily based on technical
    performance, disposal assumptions, and cost data developed in the early
    1990s. The team leader of the high- level waste project team confirmed
    that

    these analyses were not a full and rigorous assessment of the risks, cost,
    and benefits of vitrifying low- activity waste. Thus, we continue to
    believe that additional efforts are needed in this area.

    Regarding our recommendation to follow best practices and DOE guidance
    when incorporating new technology into cleanup projects, DOE commented
    that it was continuing to consider opportunities to improve the Hanford
    project and that the contractor was using a risk- based management process
    to address technical and programmatic project risks. We agree that a risk-
    based management process is appropriate on the project. However, we
    continue to believe that DOE*s approach to incorporating the separation
    technologies planned for the Hanford project is not fully consistent with
    best practices and DOE guidance because the approach involves
    incorporating technologies into the project before they have been fully
    tested as an integrated process. This testing of the integrated process in
    an operational mode is needed to demonstrate that the technologies are
    sufficiently mature to ensure their effective performance when deployed on
    the project.

    Concerning the appropriateness of using a *fast- track* construction
    approach to design and construct complex nuclear facilities for the
    Hanford project, DOE said that our report incorrectly portrays the overall
    strategy for the Hanford project. We believe our report accurately
    describes DOE*s approach, which includes using concurrent design,

    construction, and technology development. We have previously reported on
    the risks associated with this approach, including the increased potential
    for project schedule delays and cost increases.

    DOE also provided technical clarifications and corrections to our report,
    which we incorporated as appropriate. The full text of DOE*s comments and
    our responses are presented in appendix II.

    We conducted our review from July 2002 through May 2003, in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I provides
    details on our scope and methodology.

    Page 47 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
    earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
    after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the
    Secretary of Energy. We will also make copies available to others on
    request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO
    Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. If you or your staff have any questions
    on this report, please call me at (202) 512- 3841. Other staff
    contributing to this report are listed in appendix III.

    Sincerely yours, Robin M. Nazzaro Director, Natural Resources and
    Environment

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 48 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level
    Waste

    To describe the components of DOE*s high- level waste and the process
    involved in preparing the waste for permanent disposal, we analyzed
    information and documents provided by DOE officials and contractors at the
    four sites containing DOE high- level waste: Hanford, Washington; Idaho
    National Laboratory, Idaho; Savannah River, South Carolina; and West
    Valley, New York. We did not independently verify the accuracy of

    the information provided by each DOE site. From these same sites, we also
    obtained information on the types, age, and condition of the facilities
    used to store the high- level waste. To assist in evaluating technical
    aspects of high- level waste, we obtained assistance from our technical
    consultant, Dr. George Hinman. Dr. Hinman has a Doctor of Science degree
    in physics,

    is Professor Emeritus at the Washington State University, and has
    extensive experience in the nuclear energy field in industry, government,
    and academia.

    To examine DOE*s initiative for accelerating its high- level waste cleanup
    and the associated potential cost savings, we obtained and reviewed the
    Performance Management Plans for each of DOE*s four high- level waste
    sites (Hanford, Savannah River, Idaho National Laboratory, and West
    Valley). We discussed these initiatives thoroughly with officials from
    each of the sites and obtained documentation discussing the proposed
    initiatives, as well as savings estimates. We reported all dollar
    estimates as provided by DOE in current dollars and did not adjust these
    figures to constant dollars. We did not verify the accuracy of cost
    information provided by DOE. We also reviewed guidance from the Office of
    Management and Budget circulars, especially circular A- 94, on the type of
    analysis that federal agencies should use when developing benefit and

    cost estimates, and compared DOE*s proposed savings estimates to that
    guidance. We analyzed savings estimate figures provided by DOE*s Savannah
    River staff, discounting the dollars to provide an estimate in constant
    dollars.

    To identify the legal challenges DOE faces, we obtained documentation
    relating to the current Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) lawsuit.
    We discussed the lawsuit separately with attorneys from the NRDC, as well
    as from DOE. We also discussed the waste- incidental- toreprocessing
    process with staff at the NRC. We documented each site*s incidental waste
    determinations, as well as historical information on the development of
    DOE Order 435.1. We also reviewed the appropriate statutes, related
    regulations and orders. To identify the technical challenges and issues
    that must be resolved to realize potential savings, we obtained
    documentation on the technical uncertainties and risks associated with the
    waste treatment approaches at the Hanford, Idaho Appendix I: Scope and
    Methodology

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 49 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level
    Waste

    National Laboratory, and Savannah River sites. Because waste separation is
    central to successful high- level waste treatment and disposal, we
    documented the status of each site*s approach. We identified the major
    technical concerns, uncertainties, and risks associated with the waste
    separations approaches and discussed them with DOE and contractor
    officials at each site. We also visited the Savannah River Technology
    Center to review the progress and results of laboratory tests conducted to
    develop the Savannah River and Hanford sites* waste separations
    technology. With the assistance of our technical consultant, we contacted
    a variety of independent experts in industry and academia to obtain their
    views on the risks associated with these technologies.

    To determine additional opportunities for reducing high- level waste
    program costs, we reviewed DOE waste acceptance policies and requirements,
    planning documents, position papers, and internal memos. We discussed the
    opportunities with DOE officials, contractors, and laboratory officials
    primarily at the Hanford, Idaho National Laboratory, and Savannah River
    sites. We compared the cost- savings concepts with those presented in
    performance management plans at each site to document that they
    represented additional opportunities. We also relied on the expertise of
    our technical consultant to help assess the technical viability of DOE*s
    proposals. To determine opportunities to improve the management of the
    program, we reviewed DOE*s Top- to- Bottom report and we discussed
    management reform proposals with officials at DOE headquarters. We also
    obtained documentation on DOE*s project review teams. We reviewed prior
    reports from GAO, DOE*s IG and the National Research Council to identify
    recurring weaknesses in DOE management

    of its cleanup program, and we developed current examples of those
    weaknesses from our work at the high- level waste sites and meetings with
    DOE officials. We also compared management weaknesses we identified to
    DOE*s current reform efforts to determine the extent to which the
    weaknesses were being addressed and to identify areas needing continued
    attention.

    We conducted our review from July 2002 through May 2003 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 50 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Note: GAO*s comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
    end of this appendix.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 51 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 52 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    See comment 3. Now on p. 2.

    See comment 2. See comment 1.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 53 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Now on p. 19. See comment 4. Now on p. 18.

    See comment 4. Now on p. 15.

    See comment 6. Now on p. 14.

    See comment 5. See comment 4.

    Now on p. 8. See comment 4.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 54 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    See comment 10. See comment 9.

    Now on p. 21. See comment 8. Now on p. 20.

    See comment 7.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 55 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    See comment 4. See comment 13. Now on p. 23.

    See comment 12. See comment 11.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 56 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Now on p. 32. See comment 15. Now on p. 30.

    See comment 4. See comment 14. See comment 4.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 57 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Now on p. 37. See comment 4. Now on p. 37.

    See comment 4. Now on p. 36.

    See comment 4. Now on p. 36.

    See comment 4.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 58 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Now on p. 40. See comment 16. Now on p. 39.

    See comment 15.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 59 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Now on p. 43. See comment 15. Now on p. 43.

    See comment 15. Now on p. 43.

    See comment 15. Now on p. 41.

    See comment 15.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 60 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 61 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 62 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    1. We agree and have modified the final report to clarify that the low-
    activity portion of the separated tank waste would be immobilized and
    disposed of permanently on- site, or at other designated locations.

    2. We agree and have modified the final report to clarify that DOE*s
    approach generally involves separating the waste into two main streams.

    3. We modified the final report to clarify that the intentional discharges
    from the tanks were only at the Hanford Site. We do not agree with DOE*s
    statement that the tank wastes discharged into the soil contained
    relatively low- levels of radioactivity. According to DOE*s

    records, the tank waste discharged into the soil at the Hanford Site
    contained radioactive components with long half- lives, such as
    technetium- 99. The available records show that, as of December 1989,
    decades after the waste was discharged into the soil, the 121 million
    gallons still contained more than 65,000 curies of radioactivity.

    4. We agree and have modified the final report accordingly. 5. We believe
    that using the term *contaminated water* when referring to

    water from the tanks that may include radioactive and hazardous components
    is more accurate. The use of the term *water* by itself could be
    misleading for the general reader.

    6. We agree and have modified the final report to clarify that the use of
    process knowledge is a central part of the characterization step.

    7. Although DOE may use constant dollars to report the department*s
    environmental liabilities under its Government Results and Reporting Act
    requirements, it has not done so in its savings estimates or public
    disclosures for its accelerated cleanup initiative. In addition, to
    correctly compare costs of alternatives with different timing, DOE

    should compare *present values* of costs and not merely the constant
    dollars. Therefore, we made no change to the final report.

    8. We agree and have modified the final report to include the cost
    contingency as a factor in the cost growth for the Hanford high- level
    waste treatment facility.

    9. We believe that this comment reinforces the message in the draft report
    that some of the proposed savings may be based on incomplete estimates of
    the costs for the accelerated proposals. DOE commented that the range of
    costs for the alternative technologies for the sodium- bearing waste in
    the tanks* from $150- 400 million* was GAO Comments

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 63 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    less than the $1 billion estimated cost of vitrifying the waste, and
    therefore was not included in the savings estimate. We continue to believe
    that the savings estimates in the accelerated plan should have reflected
    all associated costs, including the difference between the

    costs for the alternative technologies and the costs for vitrification. We
    disagree that the $7 billion in estimated savings is solely attributable
    to the differences in strategy for treating calcine waste. The July 2002
    accelerated plan for the Idaho National Laboratory specifically states
    that the $7 billion will be saved by the new cleanup approach for both
    calcine and sodium- bearing waste that eliminates the need for a
    vitrification facility. 10. We believe that this comment reinforces the
    message in the report that

    the use of a single point estimate does not reflect uncertainties. We
    disagree that including a section in the accelerated plan that catalogs
    the government furnished services and items is the same or similar to
    accounting for uncertainties by providing a range of savings estimates.

    11. While the accelerated plan for the Idaho National Laboratory briefly
    discusses reductions in risk to workers from less intrusive
    characterization and sampling techniques and elimination of a
    vitrification facility, it does not fully describe the advantages and
    disadvantages to workers and the environment. Therefore, we continue to
    believe that the savings estimates do not fully discuss the nonbudgetary
    impacts such as environmental risks.

    12. We believe this section of the report, including the summary
    paragraph, adequately describes DOE*s management of waste processing
    activities.

    13. Although section 114 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act limits the amount
    of nuclear waste that can be deposited in the repository, this limitation
    is not relevant to the point in this paragraph. Therefore, we made no
    change to the final report.

    14. We believe the report adequately conveys this information. 15. We
    address these comments in the Agency Comments section of the

    report. 16. We agree and have modified the final report to acknowledge
    that

    DOE had implemented the GAO recommendation to validate cost comparisons
    before constructing or expanding disposal facilities for low- level waste.

    Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    Page 64 GAO- 03- 593 DOE High- Level Waste

    William R. Swick (206) 287- 4800 In addition to the individual named
    above, Carole Blackwell, Robert Crystal, Doreen Feldman, Chris Hatscher,
    George Hinman, Gary Jones, Nancy Kintner- Meyer, Avani Locke, Mehrzad
    Nadji, Cynthia Norris, Tom Perry, and Stan Stenersen made key
    contributions to this report. Appendix III: GAO Contact and

    Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Acknowledgments

    (360230)

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