Radioactive Waste: DOE Has Acted to Address Delay in New Facility
at Livermore Laboratory, but Challenges Remain (15-MAY-03,	 
GAO-03-558).							 
                                                                 
The Department of Energy's (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National	 
Laboratory in Livermore, California, generates radioactive and	 
hazardous wastes in the course of its research dealing with	 
nuclear weapons. The laboratory's new Decontamination and Waste  
Treatment Facility is a $62 million complex that includes	 
buildings designed for both temporarily storing waste and	 
treating it for off-site disposal. Although construction was	 
completed in 2001, the storage building did not begin operating  
until September 2002, and the treatment buildings remain unused  
to this day. GAO was asked to identify the cause of the delay in 
initiating storage and treatment operations at the facility, the 
effects of the delay in initiating treatment operations, and the 
steps taken to ensure that the latest estimated date for	 
initiating treatment operations at the facility can be met.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-558 					        
    ACCNO:   A06889						        
  TITLE:     Radioactive Waste: DOE Has Acted to Address Delay in New 
Facility at Livermore Laboratory, but Challenges Remain 	 
     DATE:   05/15/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Hazardous substances				 
	     Radioactive wastes 				 
	     Waste treatment					 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Nuclear waste storage				 
	     Federal facilities 				 

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GAO-03-558

Report to the Honorable Ellen Tauscher, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

May 2003 RADIOACTIVE WASTE

DOE Has Acted to Address Delay in New Facility at Livermore Laboratory,
but Challenges Remain

GAO- 03- 558

The delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new
facility occurred because DOE managers did not ensure timely resolution of
disagreements with the laboratory over technical issues affecting safety
at the facility*s waste storage building. Safety documents must be
approved by DOE to ensure the safe operation of nuclear facilities before
operations can begin. The review of the storage building safety document
lasted a year and resulted in postponement of the review of the safety
document for the treatment buildings, which in turn delayed operation of
the treatment buildings.

The delay in initiating treatment operations has had two main effects.
First, the laboratory has had to continue its waste treatment activities
at an older facility, which has fewer environmental and worker
protections. Second, the delay in initiating treatment operations has
postponed off- site disposal of some of the waste.

DOE and the laboratory have taken or are planning to take steps to address
the delay in an effort to begin treatment operations at the new facility
by the current deadline of August 2003, but officials believe that meeting
the deadline will be challenging. One step that DOE is taking to prevent
further delay is to improve its oversight so that any future disagreements
are resolved in a timely manner. However, to meet the deadline, the
laboratory has compressed the time allowed for other tasks. In this
regard, the laboratory has altered the time to prepare for an operational
readiness review* a process needed to ensure that the facility will be
operated

safely* from the normal 6 weeks to 2 weeks. Officials describe the
scheduled start date as challenging but achievable.

DOE generally agreed with the accuracy of the report. GAO incorporated
DOE*s comments as appropriate.

Livermore Laboratory Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility

The Department of Energy*s (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
Livermore, California, generates radioactive and hazardous wastes in the
course of its research dealing with nuclear weapons. The laboratory*s new
Decontamination and Waste

Treatment Facility is a $62 million complex that includes buildings
designed for both temporarily storing waste and treating it for offsite
disposal. Although construction was completed in 2001, the storage
building did not begin operating until September 2002, and the treatment
buildings

remain unused to this day. GAO was asked to identify the cause of the
delay in initiating storage and

treatment operations at the facility, the effects of the delay in
initiating treatment operations, and the steps taken to ensure that the
latest estimated date for initiating treatment operations at the facility
can be met.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 558. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Robin Nazzaro at (202) 512- 3841 or nazzaror@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 558, a report to the

Honorable Ellen Tauscher, House of Representatives

May 2003

RADIOACTIVE WASTE

DOE Has Acted to Address Delay in New Facility at Livermore Laboratory,
but Challenges Remain

Page i GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
Background 3 Delay Occurred because DOE Managers Did Not Resolve

Disagreements in a Timely Manner 8 Delay in Initiating Treatment
Operations Postponed Use of Safety Improvements and Off- Site Disposal of
Some Waste 12 DOE Has Improved Review and Oversight of Laboratory Safety
Documents, but Time Remaining Will Make It Challenging to Meet the August
2003 Deadline for Starting Treatment Operations 13 Agency Comments and Our
Response 14 Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 17

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Energy 18

Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 20

Figures

Figure 1: Current Outdoor Waste Storage 5 Figure 2: Current Waste Storage
under Tent 6 Figure 3: Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF)
Site Plan 7 Figure 4: New Facility*s Treatment Area for Liquid Waste 8
Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste Abbreviations

DOE Department of Energy NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
materials separately from GAO*s product.

Page 1 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

May 15, 2003 The Honorable Ellen Tauscher House of Representatives Dear
Ms. Tauscher: The Department of Energy (DOE) has a complex of sites and
facilities for designing nuclear weapons and producing the nuclear
components for these weapons. One part of that complex is DOE*s weapons
laboratories, including the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Located in Livermore, California, the laboratory conducts research on
nuclear weapons and other areas in the interest of national security. In
carrying out these activities, the laboratory creates radioactive waste
(such as rags and tools contaminated with uranium or plutonium), hazardous
waste (such as acids and solvents), and mixed waste (waste with both
radioactive and hazardous material). Before this waste can be permanently
disposed of, its contents must be analyzed to determine the specific
physical, chemical, and radiological components, and some of the waste
must be treated so that it meets the acceptance criteria of off- site
disposal facilities. While the Livermore laboratory has been able to
analyze and treat some of its wastes for off- site disposal, it has not
been able to analyze and treat all of the various kinds of wastes it
generates. As a result, some of the waste has remained on- site since the
mid- 1980s. The California

Environmental Protection Agency, which regulates the storage and treatment
of hazardous and mixed waste in the state, has given the laboratory
permission to store hazardous and mixed waste in containers outdoors on
pads or in tent structures. In addition, DOE has authorized the laboratory
to store radioactive waste in a similar manner. However, for a number of
years DOE has planned to improve the laboratory*s ability to process its
wastes for off- site shipment and thereby reduce the need for on- site
storage.

In the mid- 1990s, DOE and the Livermore laboratory began building a new
facility to treat the laboratory*s wastes. Called the Decontamination and
Waste Treatment Facility, this $62 million project includes a building of
more than 11,000 square feet for temporarily storing waste and two larger
buildings totaling more than 37,000 square feet for treating waste for
offsite disposal. The new facility is intended not only to enhance the
laboratory*s capability to treat waste, but also to better protect workers
and the environment while doing so. Although construction of the project
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

was completed in June 2001, the storage building did not begin operating
until September 2002, and the treatment buildings remain unused to this
day. In response to your request, this report (1) identifies the cause of
the delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new
facility, (2) identifies the effects of the delay in initiating treatment
operations, and (3) discusses the steps taken to ensure that the latest
estimated date for initiating treatment operations at the facility can be
met.

The delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new
facility occurred because DOE managers did not resolve in a timely way two
technical issues concerning the plan to ensure the safe operation of the
new building for temporarily storing wastes. The first issue concerned how
to categorize the potential severity of hazards faced by workers, the
public, and the environment if wastes stored in the new storage building
were released. This categorization provides the basis for determining what
safety controls are needed to ensure adequate protection of workers, the

public, and the environment from such a release. The second issue involved
whether to include an analysis of the effect of a potential aircraft crash
into the building. Nearly a year after the safety document was

submitted for review and approval, DOE directed the Livermore laboratory
to base its document on a higher- level category that assumed that if a
release of wastes occurred, the consequences for workers, the public, and
the environment could extend beyond the building to other laboratory
areas. Laboratory officials had preferred a lower- level designation that
assumed that the consequences of an accident would not extend beyond the
building. Laboratory officials had contended that this lower- level
designation would cost less to implement and reduce the amount of nuclear
safety oversight the laboratory would receive. In

addition, officials from DOE and the laboratory agreed that the laboratory
would analyze the potential effect an aircraft crash would have on the
building. The laboratory*s position on conducting such an analysis had
been that it was unnecessary because a potential aircraft crash was not a
credible event. The lengthy time frame for approving the laboratory*s
storage building safety planning document delayed the start of treatment
operations.

The delay in initiating treatment operations at the new facility has had
two main effects. First, it postponed the use of the new facility*s safety
improvements. Because of the delay, the laboratory has had to continue
treatment operations for longer than planned in the older facility, which
lacks some of the new facility*s protections for worker safety and the
environment. For example, some waste is treated at the older facility in
Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

uncovered outdoor tanks, while at the new facility the treatment
operations will be conducted indoors using a ventilation system that will
prevent waste particles from being released into the environment. Second,
the delay in initiating treatment operations has postponed off- site
disposal

of some of the waste. Within 6 months of the facility*s becoming
operational, laboratory officials had planned to start treating some of
the waste that could not be treated in the older facility and shipping
this waste off- site for disposal. With a later start- up date, these
shipments will be delayed.

DOE and the laboratory have taken or are planning to take three steps to
address the cause of the delay and begin treatment operations at the new
facility by the current deadline of August 2003, but officials believe
that meeting the deadline will be challenging. First, DOE and the
laboratory implemented a formal process to resolve issues during the
development of the treatment buildings* safety document. Second, the two
issues that led

to the delay in approving the storage building safety document have been
resolved in the treatment buildings* safety document. Third, DOE
management said it will improve oversight so that any future disagreements
are resolved in a timely manner. Even with these steps, DOE and laboratory
officials are unsure if the August 2003 date for initiating operations at
the treatment buildings can be met. To achieve this deadline, the
laboratory has compressed the time allowed for other

interim steps. In this regard, the laboratory has allowed less time than
it typically allows to prepare for an operational readiness review* 2
weeks, rather than the normal 6 weeks. This process is important because
it tests the facility*s procedures, equipment, and personnel to ensure
that the laboratory will operate the facility in accordance with
parameters set out in the safety document. DOE and laboratory officials
describe the scheduled start date as challenging but achievable.

In commenting on a draft of this report DOE generally agreed with GAO*s
findings.

DOE has several research laboratories, including the Livermore laboratory,
devoted primarily to DOE*s nuclear weapons program. Organizations or
universities under contract to DOE manage and operate these laboratories.
For example, the University of California has operated the Livermore
laboratory for DOE and its predecessor agencies since Background

Page 4 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

laboratory operations began in 1952. 1 The Livermore laboratory has an
infrastructure of research, testing, engineering, and waste management
facilities located on the laboratory site in Livermore, California, a city
of about 75,000 people located about 50 miles east of San Francisco. An
additional area located about 15 miles east of the laboratory is used for
experimental testing. The laboratory site*s groundwater is contaminated
with hazardous substances from past operations, 2 and in 1987, the
Environmental Protection Agency added the site to the National Priorities
List of the nation*s most serious hazardous waste sites.

Treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous and mixed wastes are
governed by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended
(RCRA). Under RCRA, owners and operators of new hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities, including federal facilities, are
required to obtain a permit before beginning construction of the facility.
The state of California is authorized to administer the RCRA program for
facilities in California and is responsible for issuing the permit.

DOE is responsible for ensuring that the nuclear activities at its
facilities are carried out safely and in accordance with law and
regulation. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a
separately organized agency within DOE, carries out oversight of nuclear
research, nuclear safety, and related activities. DOE*s Office of
Environmental Management provides oversight of environmental restoration
and waste management activities, such as the construction of the new waste
treatment facility at the Livermore site. NNSA and Office of Environmental
Management staff from NNSA*s Livermore Site Office are responsible for
carrying out these oversight responsibilities. NNSA staff also administer
the contract between DOE and the University of California, which sets out
the parameters and performance requirements for operating the laboratory.

Radioactive and hazardous wastes at the Livermore laboratory amounted to
about 2,700 cubic meters as of January 16, 2003. The wastes include

1 DOE has continued to extend its contract with the University since that
time under a provision in federal statute that allows contracts with
federally funded research and development centers to be extended without
competition in order to maintain essential

research and development capability. See 41 U. S. C. S: 253 (c)( 3)( B).
The University of California also operates another DOE weapons laboratory,
the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. 2 The site is a former
U. S. Navy flight training base and aircraft rework facility.

Page 5 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

low- level radioactive waste, 3 transuranic waste, 4 hazardous waste, and
mixed waste. About one- fourth of the radioactive waste also contains
hazardous substances. The waste is packaged in containers and is stored
outdoors or under tents on asphalt pads, or inside enclosed or partially
enclosed buildings (see figs. 1 and 2). The waste is stored within fenced
areas of the laboratory site where access is controlled. The California

Environmental Protection Agency and DOE have approved storage of the waste
in this manner. Before the waste can be disposed of off- site, much of it
must be treated and repackaged so that it will meet the requirements of
disposal facilities. Because the waste inventory is expected to eventually
decline, the new facility*s storage building is designed to provide less
waste storage capacity than the older storage facilities provide. Most of
the older storage facilities will be closed in future years after the
backlog of waste has been disposed of off- site.

Figure 1: Current Outdoor Waste Storage

3 The Livermore laboratory*s low- level waste has a wide range of
characteristics; it often contains small amounts of radioactivity in large
volumes of material. 4 Transuranic waste is radioactive waste contaminated
with transuranic elements (i. e., elements heavier than uranium, such as
plutonium) with half- lives greater than 20 years, in concentrations above
100 nanocuries per gram of waste.

Page 6 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

Figure 2: Current Waste Storage under Tent

Construction of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility project
was placed on hold for a time after its authorization. The Congress had
provided authorization and funding for the project for fiscal year 1986,
but complaints from the public about an incinerator included in the
facility

design contributed to DOE*s decision to place the project on hold.
Ultimately, the laboratory redesigned the facility without the incinerator
and planned to complete construction of the facility by the end of 1999.

Construction of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility was
completed in June 2001, approximately 1 1/2 years behind schedule.
Construction was delayed because California regulators took longer than
expected to issue a RCRA permit for the facility. Although laboratory
officials had planned to receive the permit in 1997, an accident occurred
at one of the laboratory*s existing waste management facilities, which
exposed workers to higher- than- allowable levels of radioactivity.
According to a California regulator, that accident is likely to have led
the California Environmental Protection Agency to postpone issuing the
permit until an investigation of the accident was completed. Issuance of
the permit was also delayed by a large number of public comments, which

Page 7 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

took longer than expected to address. To mitigate the impact of the delay
in receiving the permit, the laboratory built the facility in two stages.
In the first stage, the laboratory built portions of the facility that did
not require the permit, such as the lobby and offices, which would not
handle hazardous and mixed waste. The laboratory built the rest of the
facility in the second stage after receiving the permit in 1999. The delay
in obtaining

the RCRA permit increased project costs by $2.1 million. The increase was
covered by available contingency funds, allowing the project to remain
within budget. Figure 3 shows the site plan of the facility; figure 4
shows a portion of the interior.

Figure 3: Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Site Plan

Page 8 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

Figure 4: New Facility*s Treatment Area for Liquid Waste

The delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new
facility occurred because DOE managers did not resolve in a timely manner
lingering disagreements about two technical issues. First, DOE and the
laboratory disagreed about how to categorize the potential severity of
hazards faced by workers, the public, and the environment if wastes stored
in the new storage building were released. Proper categorization is
important because it provides the basis for determining what kinds of
safety controls must be in place to protect workers, the public, and the
environment if such an event were to occur. Second, DOE and the laboratory
also disagreed about whether to include an aircraft crash analysis in the
safety document, with the laboratory maintaining that such an analysis was
unnecessary, and DOE officials taking the opposite Delay Occurred

because DOE Managers Did Not Resolve Disagreements in a Timely Manner

DWTF S

Page 9 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

viewpoint. DOE managers did not fully resolve these disagreements for
nearly a year. The lengthy time frame for approving the laboratory*s
storage building safety document delayed the start of treatment
operations.

Federal regulations require contractors operating a DOE nuclear facility
to establish controls upon which they will rely to adequately protect
workers, the public, and the environment against the dangerous materials
on- site. 5 Before a nuclear facility can operate, contractors must
prepare and DOE

must approve a safety document that identifies and assesses the hazards,
risks, and controls needed to safely operate the facility. Contractors
must determine the potential risk to workers, the public, and the
environment of hazards associated with the facility. They must categorize
the level of the facility*s hazards in accordance with DOE requirements.
There are three hazard categories: potential for significant off- site
consequences (category 1), potential for significant on- site consequences
(category 2), and

potential for only significant localized consequences in the facility
(category 3). Using the same methodology that the laboratory had used to
determine

categorization for existing storage facilities, the laboratory determined
that the new storage building should be given a category 3 classification.
The laboratory believed the methodology was adequate because it had
received DOE approval when it had been used before. Laboratory officials
were also concerned that a higher category 2 classification would require
them to conduct a rigorous quantitative accident analysis, which is more
costly and might result in more safety controls and external oversight of
storage building operations that could increase operating costs.

Although the methodology had been approved when used for the laboratory*s
existing facilities, some officials within DOE had questioned its
appropriateness, and these concerns surfaced again as the document was
being reviewed for the new storage building. Some DOE officials believed
that the new storage building warranted a category 2 hazard
classification, because they saw potential for significant on- site
consequences in the event of a release of the stored materials. In
addition, a May 2001 report by the laboratory*s safety document review
group indicated that the laboratory*s methodology for determining the
hazard

5 10 CFR part 830, promulgated in 2001, establishes these safety
requirements. DOE and Laboratory

Officials Disagreed about Hazard Categorization

Page 10 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

category for some of its existing facilities was inappropriate. The report
concluded that the hazard category for the facilities needed further
evaluation. 6 DOE and the laboratory also disagreed over whether to
include an aircraft crash analysis as part of the storage building safety
document. DOE had

issued a standard in October 1996 that provides facilities an approach for
performing an analysis of the health and safety risks to workers on- site
and the public in the event of a release of material resulting from an
aircraft crash. This standard applies to facilities that contain
significant quantities of radioactive and hazardous material. 7 The
standard also applies if special circumstances exist, such as a facility*s
being located near significant numbers of people. The laboratory is
located next to residential areas in the city of Livermore.

Both DOE and laboratory officials believed they had a logical basis for
their positions on the aircraft crash analysis. DOE officials believed
that an aircraft crash analysis should be included in the storage building
safety document because of the laboratory*s proximity to residential areas
and the Livermore airport; an increase in airplane traffic in the area;
and the potential for a release of radioactive material in the event of an
aircraft crash into the storage building, which would pose potential
health and safety risks to workers and the public. Laboratory officials,
on the other

hand, said their previous calculations for an existing storage facility
determined that such a crash was not a credible event, and therefore an
analysis was not required. They contended that the same finding was valid
for the new storage building, as well.

In June 2001 the laboratory submitted the storage building safety document
to DOE for review and approval. Review of the safety document was
scheduled to last approximately 4 months. However, the safety

document was not approved until June 2002, a year later. During the 1-
year period, the laboratory submitted the safety document to DOE three
times,

6 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Baseline Review of LLNL Nuclear
Facilities Authorization Basis Documents, Final Summary Report on Issues
and Recommendations on LLNL- Authorization Basis Documents, May 2001.

7 Accident Analysis For Aircraft Crash Into Hazardous Facilities, DOE-
STD- 3014- 96, October 1996. DOE and the Laboratory

Also Disagreed about the Need for Aircraft Crash Analysis

Review of the Safety Document Lasted a Year

Page 11 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

and each time DOE rejected it. Although the project was falling behind
schedule, DOE field managers responsible for the timely approval of the
safety document did not take steps early on to resolve the situation. This
occurred in part because some DOE officials supported the laboratory*s
efforts to justify a lower category 3 hazard classification. They
concurred with the laboratory that a category 2 hazard classification
would require a more detailed quantitative accident analysis, which would
be more costly

and would result in more safety controls that could increase operating
costs and oversight of its storage building operations. In addition, the
laboratory believed that a category 3 hazard classification would provide
an appropriate level of safety. 8 In May 2002, the DOE manager responsible
for overseeing laboratory

operations took steps to resolve the disagreement over hazard
classification. In a May 10, 2002, letter, the DOE manager directed
laboratory officials to use a category 2 classification for the storage
building. The same letter also stated that DOE and the laboratory agreed
to expedite the review and approval process to accelerate the initiation
of

operations at the storage building. DOE and the laboratory implemented an
intensive review process that consisted of a series of meetings in which
the DOE review team and laboratory officials jointly conducted a line-
byline review and edit of the storage building safety document. In
addition, DOE had determined that the storage building safety document did
not have to include an aircraft crash analysis provided that the
laboratory include the analysis in the June 2003 update of the document.
In the interim, DOE required the laboratory to include compensatory
measures in the document, such as procedures for public notification and
fire department response time in the event of an airplane crash. DOE
approved the safety document on June 28, 2002.

Because of the longer- than- expected time frame for approving the storage
building safety document, the cost for completing the facility*s safety
documents exceeded laboratory estimates by $400,000, according to a
project budget document. However, the laboratory*s project manager stated
that the additional cost was covered by the project*s contingency fund
reserved for unforeseen circumstances, allowing the project to

remain within budget. The delay in approving the storage building safety 8
Concerns over safety issues surfaced in 1996 and 1997 when the laboratory
prepared the preliminary safety documents for the new facility. DOE
required the laboratory to resolve these issues prior to DOE authorizing
facility operations.

Page 12 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

document postponed the review of the safety document for the other portion
of the facility* the treatment buildings. This delay, in turn, prevented
the start of operations at the treatment buildings.

The delay in initiating treatment operations has had two related
consequences. First, because the treatment buildings are not yet
operational, the laboratory has had to continue conducting its waste
treatment activities at the older facility, which lacks some of the new
facility*s environmental and worker protections. In addition, the older
facility has fewer capabilities to treat waste and prepare it for off-
site disposal, requiring the laboratory to postpone disposing of some
waste offsite.

Until DOE approves the treatment buildings* safety document and DOE and
the laboratory conduct an operational readiness review, the treatment
buildings cannot begin operations. These tasks were postponed until DOE

resolved disagreements about the storage buildings* safety document. As a
result, the laboratory has had to continue its waste treatment operations
at the older facility and has not been able to utilize the safety features
of the new facility. Examples of the differences in safety features
between the two facilities follow.

 The new facility has a ventilation system that filters waste particles
from the air in the buildings to prevent the release of contaminants into
the environment; the older facility does not.  The buildings of the new
facility were designed so that all waste

treatment operations are conducted indoors. At the older facility, some
operations are conducted in treatment tanks that do not have covers and
are located outdoors, enabling vapors and waste particles to escape into
the environment.  Compared with the older facility, the new facility has
more areas in

which ventilation systems take in air at a high rate near treatment
equipment to protect workers from exposure to fumes and waste particles.

Because the treatment buildings are not yet operational, the laboratory
has not been able to use the new treatment facility*s enhanced
capabilities to prepare waste for off- site disposal. For example, the new
facility has a debris washer that washes mixed waste to remove the
hazardous portion of the waste from the radioactive portion, allowing each
portion to be sent Delay in Initiating Treatment Operations

Postponed Use of Safety Improvements and Off- Site Disposal of Some Waste

Safety Improvements Not Realized with Continued Use of Older Treatment
Facility

Delay Postponed Off- Site Disposal of Some Waste

Page 13 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

to disposal sites at a lower total cost than disposing of the mixed waste
as a whole. In addition, the new facility is equipped with a glovebox that
enables special handling of the waste in an enclosed, controlled, and
highly ventilated area to treat *reactive* waste 9 that is not acceptable
at disposal sites. Treatment of such waste enables it to meet the
acceptance criteria of disposal sites. The older facility does not have
these features.

Since the laboratory cannot yet utilize the new buildings* treatment
capabilities, some wastes have remained at the laboratory rather than
being disposed of off- site. For example, a laboratory official
responsible for waste management activities stated that the laboratory had
planned to begin treating reactive waste within 6 months of the start of
operations at

the treatment buildings to prepare it for disposal. Because of the delay
in initiating operations, the laboratory has postponed treating and
disposing of this waste.

DOE and the laboratory have taken or are planning to take the following
three steps to address the cause of the delay in approving the storage
building safety document in an effort to meet the August 2003 deadline for
starting treatment operations:

 DOE and the laboratory agreed to hold a series of joint working meetings
to identify and resolve issues during the development of the treatment
buildings* safety document. This action was taken to identify and address
issues or concerns during the development stages of the document rather
than during the document review process. By enhancing communication, DOE
and the laboratory hoped to minimize the possibility that disagreements
would delay the approval of the document and further postpone the
initiation of treatment operations.  In the treatment buildings* safety
document, DOE and the laboratory

resolved the two main issues that led to the delay in approving the
storage building safety document. The laboratory has agreed to limit the
amount of radioactive material it processes during treatment operations to
meet the requirements for a lower category 3 hazard classification for the
treatment buildings. The laboratory also agreed to include an aircraft
crash analysis in the treatment buildings* safety document.

9 An example of reactive waste is material containing sodium metal, which
reacts strongly with water, including water in the air. Such a reaction
could create a large amount of heat, which could cause the material to
ignite. DOE Has Improved

Review and Oversight of Laboratory Safety Documents, but Time Remaining
Will Make It Challenging to Meet the August 2003 Deadline for Starting
Treatment Operations

Page 14 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

 DOE*s management resolved to strengthen oversight by not allowing any
future disagreements to languish unresolved for long periods of time. For
example, DOE*s Livermore Laboratory Site Manager said that it took too
long to resolve the disagreement over the storage building safety document
and that in a similar situation she would take action to ensure that any
disagreement was resolved within 60 to 90 days.

Even with these steps, DOE and laboratory officials are unsure if the
August 2003 date for initiating operations at the treatment buildings can
be met. The laboratory now has less time available to prepare for the

remaining tasks than it typically allows. Once the laboratory has
submitted and received approval of safety documents from DOE, it must
prepare documents and train staff for the facility*s operational readiness
review. An operational readiness review examines the facility*s
procedures, equipment, and personnel to ensure that the contractor will
operate the facility safely in accordance with parameters set out in the
safety document. Laboratory officials said that, typically, the laboratory
allows 6 weeks of preparation for the operational readiness review.
However, for the treatment buildings, the laboratory has compressed the
amount of time to prepare for the operational readiness review to 2 weeks
in order to meet the August 2003 deadline. DOE and laboratory officials
said that the August 2003 deadline is challenging but achievable.

We provided a draft of this report to DOE and Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory for their review and comment. The laboratory provided its
comments through DOE. In written comments, DOE generally agreed with the
accuracy of our report. However, we made changes in

response to two points raised by DOE*s Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management. First, concerning the delays in resolving safety
issues, DOE said our draft report omits the fact that the laboratory had
developed a safety document for the treatment and storage facility as
early as 1996 and some of the safety issues had been unresolved since that

time. We recognize that the laboratory had developed preliminary safety
documents in 1996 and 1997 and some of the safety issues identified at
that time remained unresolved until after they resurfaced in 2001.
However, this information does not help explain why those issues remained
unresolved, and it does not address the cause of the delay in initiating
operations at the new facility. We did clarify in the report that

some of the safety issues surfaced in 1996 and 1997. Agency Comments

and Our Response

Page 15 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

DOE*s second point concerned a statement in the draft report that shipment
of some waste to off- site disposal facilities had been delayed. The
Assistant Secretary said that the treatment and off- site disposal of
legacy waste* the backlog of stored waste from nuclear weapons research
activities* have not been directly postponed by the delay in obtaining
approval of the facility safety documents. However, we found that the
delay in approving the storage building safety document contributed to the
delay in approving the treatment buildings* safety document. Furthermore,
the treatment building cannot operate until after approval of the safety
documents and completion of an operational readiness review. Certain waste
at the laboratory, such as reactive waste, cannot be treated in the
laboratory*s older facilities and has been stored at the site. The
laboratory*s plan was to begin treating this waste for off- site disposal
within 6 months of initiating operations at the new treatment facility.
Therefore, the delay in initiating operations at the treatment facility
has postponed the off- site disposal of some waste.

DOE also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as
appropriate. DOE*s written comments on our draft report are included in
appendix II. We conducted our review from September 2002 through April
2003 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix
I provides details on our scope and methodology.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 1 day after the
report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
Secretary of Energy and the Director of Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http:// www. gao. gov.

Page 16 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512- 3841. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix III. Sincerely yours,

Robin M. Nazzaro Director, Natural Resources

and Environment

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 17 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

To identify the cause of the delay in initiating storage and treatment
operations at the new facility, we reviewed DOE orders and standards and
federal regulations pertaining to safety documents. We also reviewed
safety documents, DOE comments on safety documents, and internal DOE
correspondence discussing disagreements over safety documents. In
addition, we reviewed a DOE memorandum addressing delegations of authority
and also analyzed project schedules to determine the extent of delays for
the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility project. We also analyzed
project cost documents to determine any increases in costs from the delay.
Finally, we interviewed DOE and Livermore laboratory officials about the
preparation and review of safety documents.

To identify the effects of the delay in initiating treatment operations,
we analyzed documents describing waste treatment operations obtained from
the laboratory, and we interviewed Livermore laboratory officials.

To identify the steps taken to ensure that the latest estimated date for
initiating treatment operations at the facility can be met, we interviewed
DOE and laboratory officials and analyzed a DOE and laboratory written
agreement addressing the development of safety documents. We also reviewed
laboratory presentations on safety issues made to DOE. Finally, we
analyzed the project schedule pertaining to the operational readiness
review.

We also toured laboratory and waste storage and treatment facilities and
obtained data on the types, amounts, and locations of waste at the
laboratory. We conducted our review from September 2002 through April 2003
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 18 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 19 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 20 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

Robin M. Nazzaro (202) 512- 3841 William R. Swick (206) 287- 4800

In addition to those named above, Leo G. Acosta, Gary R. Boss, Allen T.
Chan, Nancy L. Crothers, Gary L. Jones, James L. Ohl, Stanley G.
Stenersen, and Yunsian Tai made key contributions to this report. Appendix
III: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Acknowledgments

(360265)

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