    Radioactive Waste: DOE Has Acted to Address Delay in New Facility
    at Livermore Laboratory, but Challenges Remain (15-MAY-03,
    GAO-03-558).

    The Department of Energy's (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National
    Laboratory in Livermore, California, generates radioactive and
    hazardous wastes in the course of its research dealing with
    nuclear weapons. The laboratory's new Decontamination and Waste
    Treatment Facility is a $62 million complex that includes
    buildings designed for both temporarily storing waste and
    treating it for off-site disposal. Although construction was
    completed in 2001, the storage building did not begin operating
    until September 2002, and the treatment buildings remain unused
    to this day. GAO was asked to identify the cause of the delay in
    initiating storage and treatment operations at the facility, the
    effects of the delay in initiating treatment operations, and the
    steps taken to ensure that the latest estimated date for
    initiating treatment operations at the facility can be met.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-558
        ACCNO:   A06889
      TITLE:     Radioactive Waste: DOE Has Acted to Address Delay in New
    Facility at Livermore Laboratory, but Challenges Remain
         DATE:   05/15/2003
      SUBJECT:   Hazardous substances
    	     Radioactive wastes
    	     Waste treatment
    	     Schedule slippages
    	     Nuclear waste storage
    	     Federal facilities

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    GAO-03-558

    Report to the Honorable Ellen Tauscher, House of Representatives

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

    May 2003 RADIOACTIVE WASTE

    DOE Has Acted to Address Delay in New Facility at Livermore Laboratory,
    but Challenges Remain

    GAO- 03- 558

    The delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new
    facility occurred because DOE managers did not ensure timely resolution of
    disagreements with the laboratory over technical issues affecting safety
    at the facility*s waste storage building. Safety documents must be
    approved by DOE to ensure the safe operation of nuclear facilities before
    operations can begin. The review of the storage building safety document
    lasted a year and resulted in postponement of the review of the safety
    document for the treatment buildings, which in turn delayed operation of
    the treatment buildings.

    The delay in initiating treatment operations has had two main effects.
    First, the laboratory has had to continue its waste treatment activities
    at an older facility, which has fewer environmental and worker
    protections. Second, the delay in initiating treatment operations has
    postponed off- site disposal of some of the waste.

    DOE and the laboratory have taken or are planning to take steps to address
    the delay in an effort to begin treatment operations at the new facility
    by the current deadline of August 2003, but officials believe that meeting
    the deadline will be challenging. One step that DOE is taking to prevent
    further delay is to improve its oversight so that any future disagreements
    are resolved in a timely manner. However, to meet the deadline, the
    laboratory has compressed the time allowed for other tasks. In this
    regard, the laboratory has altered the time to prepare for an operational
    readiness review* a process needed to ensure that the facility will be
    operated

    safely* from the normal 6 weeks to 2 weeks. Officials describe the
    scheduled start date as challenging but achievable.

    DOE generally agreed with the accuracy of the report. GAO incorporated
    DOE*s comments as appropriate.

    Livermore Laboratory Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility

    The Department of Energy*s (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
    Livermore, California, generates radioactive and hazardous wastes in the
    course of its research dealing with nuclear weapons. The laboratory*s new
    Decontamination and Waste

    Treatment Facility is a $62 million complex that includes buildings
    designed for both temporarily storing waste and treating it for offsite
    disposal. Although construction was completed in 2001, the storage
    building did not begin operating until September 2002, and the treatment
    buildings

    remain unused to this day. GAO was asked to identify the cause of the
    delay in initiating storage and

    treatment operations at the facility, the effects of the delay in
    initiating treatment operations, and the steps taken to ensure that the
    latest estimated date for initiating treatment operations at the facility
    can be met.

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 558. To view the full report,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact Robin Nazzaro at (202) 512- 3841 or nazzaror@ gao.
    gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 558, a report to the

    Honorable Ellen Tauscher, House of Representatives

    May 2003

    RADIOACTIVE WASTE

    DOE Has Acted to Address Delay in New Facility at Livermore Laboratory,
    but Challenges Remain

    Page i GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
    Background 3 Delay Occurred because DOE Managers Did Not Resolve

    Disagreements in a Timely Manner 8 Delay in Initiating Treatment
    Operations Postponed Use of Safety Improvements and Off- Site Disposal of
    Some Waste 12 DOE Has Improved Review and Oversight of Laboratory Safety
    Documents, but Time Remaining Will Make It Challenging to Meet the August
    2003 Deadline for Starting Treatment Operations 13 Agency Comments and Our
    Response 14 Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 17

    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Energy 18

    Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 20

    Figures

    Figure 1: Current Outdoor Waste Storage 5 Figure 2: Current Waste Storage
    under Tent 6 Figure 3: Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF)
    Site Plan 7 Figure 4: New Facility*s Treatment Area for Liquid Waste 8
    Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste Abbreviations

    DOE Department of Energy NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
    RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

    This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
    copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
    materials separately from GAO*s product.

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    May 15, 2003 The Honorable Ellen Tauscher House of Representatives Dear
    Ms. Tauscher: The Department of Energy (DOE) has a complex of sites and
    facilities for designing nuclear weapons and producing the nuclear
    components for these weapons. One part of that complex is DOE*s weapons
    laboratories, including the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
    Located in Livermore, California, the laboratory conducts research on
    nuclear weapons and other areas in the interest of national security. In
    carrying out these activities, the laboratory creates radioactive waste
    (such as rags and tools contaminated with uranium or plutonium), hazardous
    waste (such as acids and solvents), and mixed waste (waste with both
    radioactive and hazardous material). Before this waste can be permanently
    disposed of, its contents must be analyzed to determine the specific
    physical, chemical, and radiological components, and some of the waste
    must be treated so that it meets the acceptance criteria of off- site
    disposal facilities. While the Livermore laboratory has been able to
    analyze and treat some of its wastes for off- site disposal, it has not
    been able to analyze and treat all of the various kinds of wastes it
    generates. As a result, some of the waste has remained on- site since the
    mid- 1980s. The California

    Environmental Protection Agency, which regulates the storage and treatment
    of hazardous and mixed waste in the state, has given the laboratory
    permission to store hazardous and mixed waste in containers outdoors on
    pads or in tent structures. In addition, DOE has authorized the laboratory
    to store radioactive waste in a similar manner. However, for a number of
    years DOE has planned to improve the laboratory*s ability to process its
    wastes for off- site shipment and thereby reduce the need for on- site
    storage.

    In the mid- 1990s, DOE and the Livermore laboratory began building a new
    facility to treat the laboratory*s wastes. Called the Decontamination and
    Waste Treatment Facility, this $62 million project includes a building of
    more than 11,000 square feet for temporarily storing waste and two larger
    buildings totaling more than 37,000 square feet for treating waste for
    offsite disposal. The new facility is intended not only to enhance the
    laboratory*s capability to treat waste, but also to better protect workers
    and the environment while doing so. Although construction of the project
    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    Page 2 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    was completed in June 2001, the storage building did not begin operating
    until September 2002, and the treatment buildings remain unused to this
    day. In response to your request, this report (1) identifies the cause of
    the delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new
    facility, (2) identifies the effects of the delay in initiating treatment
    operations, and (3) discusses the steps taken to ensure that the latest
    estimated date for initiating treatment operations at the facility can be
    met.

    The delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new
    facility occurred because DOE managers did not resolve in a timely way two
    technical issues concerning the plan to ensure the safe operation of the
    new building for temporarily storing wastes. The first issue concerned how
    to categorize the potential severity of hazards faced by workers, the
    public, and the environment if wastes stored in the new storage building
    were released. This categorization provides the basis for determining what
    safety controls are needed to ensure adequate protection of workers, the

    public, and the environment from such a release. The second issue involved
    whether to include an analysis of the effect of a potential aircraft crash
    into the building. Nearly a year after the safety document was

    submitted for review and approval, DOE directed the Livermore laboratory
    to base its document on a higher- level category that assumed that if a
    release of wastes occurred, the consequences for workers, the public, and
    the environment could extend beyond the building to other laboratory
    areas. Laboratory officials had preferred a lower- level designation that
    assumed that the consequences of an accident would not extend beyond the
    building. Laboratory officials had contended that this lower- level
    designation would cost less to implement and reduce the amount of nuclear
    safety oversight the laboratory would receive. In

    addition, officials from DOE and the laboratory agreed that the laboratory
    would analyze the potential effect an aircraft crash would have on the
    building. The laboratory*s position on conducting such an analysis had
    been that it was unnecessary because a potential aircraft crash was not a
    credible event. The lengthy time frame for approving the laboratory*s
    storage building safety planning document delayed the start of treatment
    operations.

    The delay in initiating treatment operations at the new facility has had
    two main effects. First, it postponed the use of the new facility*s safety
    improvements. Because of the delay, the laboratory has had to continue
    treatment operations for longer than planned in the older facility, which
    lacks some of the new facility*s protections for worker safety and the
    environment. For example, some waste is treated at the older facility in
    Results in Brief

    Page 3 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    uncovered outdoor tanks, while at the new facility the treatment
    operations will be conducted indoors using a ventilation system that will
    prevent waste particles from being released into the environment. Second,
    the delay in initiating treatment operations has postponed off- site
    disposal

    of some of the waste. Within 6 months of the facility*s becoming
    operational, laboratory officials had planned to start treating some of
    the waste that could not be treated in the older facility and shipping
    this waste off- site for disposal. With a later start- up date, these
    shipments will be delayed.

    DOE and the laboratory have taken or are planning to take three steps to
    address the cause of the delay and begin treatment operations at the new
    facility by the current deadline of August 2003, but officials believe
    that meeting the deadline will be challenging. First, DOE and the
    laboratory implemented a formal process to resolve issues during the
    development of the treatment buildings* safety document. Second, the two
    issues that led

    to the delay in approving the storage building safety document have been
    resolved in the treatment buildings* safety document. Third, DOE
    management said it will improve oversight so that any future disagreements
    are resolved in a timely manner. Even with these steps, DOE and laboratory
    officials are unsure if the August 2003 date for initiating operations at
    the treatment buildings can be met. To achieve this deadline, the
    laboratory has compressed the time allowed for other

    interim steps. In this regard, the laboratory has allowed less time than
    it typically allows to prepare for an operational readiness review* 2
    weeks, rather than the normal 6 weeks. This process is important because
    it tests the facility*s procedures, equipment, and personnel to ensure
    that the laboratory will operate the facility in accordance with
    parameters set out in the safety document. DOE and laboratory officials
    describe the scheduled start date as challenging but achievable.

    In commenting on a draft of this report DOE generally agreed with GAO*s
    findings.

    DOE has several research laboratories, including the Livermore laboratory,
    devoted primarily to DOE*s nuclear weapons program. Organizations or
    universities under contract to DOE manage and operate these laboratories.
    For example, the University of California has operated the Livermore
    laboratory for DOE and its predecessor agencies since Background

    Page 4 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    laboratory operations began in 1952. 1 The Livermore laboratory has an
    infrastructure of research, testing, engineering, and waste management
    facilities located on the laboratory site in Livermore, California, a city
    of about 75,000 people located about 50 miles east of San Francisco. An
    additional area located about 15 miles east of the laboratory is used for
    experimental testing. The laboratory site*s groundwater is contaminated
    with hazardous substances from past operations, 2 and in 1987, the
    Environmental Protection Agency added the site to the National Priorities
    List of the nation*s most serious hazardous waste sites.

    Treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous and mixed wastes are
    governed by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended
    (RCRA). Under RCRA, owners and operators of new hazardous waste treatment,
    storage, and disposal facilities, including federal facilities, are
    required to obtain a permit before beginning construction of the facility.
    The state of California is authorized to administer the RCRA program for
    facilities in California and is responsible for issuing the permit.

    DOE is responsible for ensuring that the nuclear activities at its
    facilities are carried out safely and in accordance with law and
    regulation. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a
    separately organized agency within DOE, carries out oversight of nuclear
    research, nuclear safety, and related activities. DOE*s Office of
    Environmental Management provides oversight of environmental restoration
    and waste management activities, such as the construction of the new waste
    treatment facility at the Livermore site. NNSA and Office of Environmental
    Management staff from NNSA*s Livermore Site Office are responsible for
    carrying out these oversight responsibilities. NNSA staff also administer
    the contract between DOE and the University of California, which sets out
    the parameters and performance requirements for operating the laboratory.

    Radioactive and hazardous wastes at the Livermore laboratory amounted to
    about 2,700 cubic meters as of January 16, 2003. The wastes include

    1 DOE has continued to extend its contract with the University since that
    time under a provision in federal statute that allows contracts with
    federally funded research and development centers to be extended without
    competition in order to maintain essential

    research and development capability. See 41 U. S. C. S: 253 (c)( 3)( B).
    The University of California also operates another DOE weapons laboratory,
    the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. 2 The site is a former
    U. S. Navy flight training base and aircraft rework facility.

    Page 5 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    low- level radioactive waste, 3 transuranic waste, 4 hazardous waste, and
    mixed waste. About one- fourth of the radioactive waste also contains
    hazardous substances. The waste is packaged in containers and is stored
    outdoors or under tents on asphalt pads, or inside enclosed or partially
    enclosed buildings (see figs. 1 and 2). The waste is stored within fenced
    areas of the laboratory site where access is controlled. The California

    Environmental Protection Agency and DOE have approved storage of the waste
    in this manner. Before the waste can be disposed of off- site, much of it
    must be treated and repackaged so that it will meet the requirements of
    disposal facilities. Because the waste inventory is expected to eventually
    decline, the new facility*s storage building is designed to provide less
    waste storage capacity than the older storage facilities provide. Most of
    the older storage facilities will be closed in future years after the
    backlog of waste has been disposed of off- site.

    Figure 1: Current Outdoor Waste Storage

    3 The Livermore laboratory*s low- level waste has a wide range of
    characteristics; it often contains small amounts of radioactivity in large
    volumes of material. 4 Transuranic waste is radioactive waste contaminated
    with transuranic elements (i. e., elements heavier than uranium, such as
    plutonium) with half- lives greater than 20 years, in concentrations above
    100 nanocuries per gram of waste.

    Page 6 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    Figure 2: Current Waste Storage under Tent

    Construction of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility project
    was placed on hold for a time after its authorization. The Congress had
    provided authorization and funding for the project for fiscal year 1986,
    but complaints from the public about an incinerator included in the
    facility

    design contributed to DOE*s decision to place the project on hold.
    Ultimately, the laboratory redesigned the facility without the incinerator
    and planned to complete construction of the facility by the end of 1999.

    Construction of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility was
    completed in June 2001, approximately 1 1/2 years behind schedule.
    Construction was delayed because California regulators took longer than
    expected to issue a RCRA permit for the facility. Although laboratory
    officials had planned to receive the permit in 1997, an accident occurred
    at one of the laboratory*s existing waste management facilities, which
    exposed workers to higher- than- allowable levels of radioactivity.
    According to a California regulator, that accident is likely to have led
    the California Environmental Protection Agency to postpone issuing the
    permit until an investigation of the accident was completed. Issuance of
    the permit was also delayed by a large number of public comments, which

    Page 7 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    took longer than expected to address. To mitigate the impact of the delay
    in receiving the permit, the laboratory built the facility in two stages.
    In the first stage, the laboratory built portions of the facility that did
    not require the permit, such as the lobby and offices, which would not
    handle hazardous and mixed waste. The laboratory built the rest of the
    facility in the second stage after receiving the permit in 1999. The delay
    in obtaining

    the RCRA permit increased project costs by $2.1 million. The increase was
    covered by available contingency funds, allowing the project to remain
    within budget. Figure 3 shows the site plan of the facility; figure 4
    shows a portion of the interior.

    Figure 3: Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Site Plan

    Page 8 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    Figure 4: New Facility*s Treatment Area for Liquid Waste

    The delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new
    facility occurred because DOE managers did not resolve in a timely manner
    lingering disagreements about two technical issues. First, DOE and the
    laboratory disagreed about how to categorize the potential severity of
    hazards faced by workers, the public, and the environment if wastes stored
    in the new storage building were released. Proper categorization is
    important because it provides the basis for determining what kinds of
    safety controls must be in place to protect workers, the public, and the
    environment if such an event were to occur. Second, DOE and the laboratory
    also disagreed about whether to include an aircraft crash analysis in the
    safety document, with the laboratory maintaining that such an analysis was
    unnecessary, and DOE officials taking the opposite Delay Occurred

    because DOE Managers Did Not Resolve Disagreements in a Timely Manner

    DWTF S

    Page 9 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    viewpoint. DOE managers did not fully resolve these disagreements for
    nearly a year. The lengthy time frame for approving the laboratory*s
    storage building safety document delayed the start of treatment
    operations.

    Federal regulations require contractors operating a DOE nuclear facility
    to establish controls upon which they will rely to adequately protect
    workers, the public, and the environment against the dangerous materials
    on- site. 5 Before a nuclear facility can operate, contractors must
    prepare and DOE

    must approve a safety document that identifies and assesses the hazards,
    risks, and controls needed to safely operate the facility. Contractors
    must determine the potential risk to workers, the public, and the
    environment of hazards associated with the facility. They must categorize
    the level of the facility*s hazards in accordance with DOE requirements.
    There are three hazard categories: potential for significant off- site
    consequences (category 1), potential for significant on- site consequences
    (category 2), and

    potential for only significant localized consequences in the facility
    (category 3). Using the same methodology that the laboratory had used to
    determine

    categorization for existing storage facilities, the laboratory determined
    that the new storage building should be given a category 3 classification.
    The laboratory believed the methodology was adequate because it had
    received DOE approval when it had been used before. Laboratory officials
    were also concerned that a higher category 2 classification would require
    them to conduct a rigorous quantitative accident analysis, which is more
    costly and might result in more safety controls and external oversight of
    storage building operations that could increase operating costs.

    Although the methodology had been approved when used for the laboratory*s
    existing facilities, some officials within DOE had questioned its
    appropriateness, and these concerns surfaced again as the document was
    being reviewed for the new storage building. Some DOE officials believed
    that the new storage building warranted a category 2 hazard
    classification, because they saw potential for significant on- site
    consequences in the event of a release of the stored materials. In
    addition, a May 2001 report by the laboratory*s safety document review
    group indicated that the laboratory*s methodology for determining the
    hazard

    5 10 CFR part 830, promulgated in 2001, establishes these safety
    requirements. DOE and Laboratory

    Officials Disagreed about Hazard Categorization

    Page 10 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    category for some of its existing facilities was inappropriate. The report
    concluded that the hazard category for the facilities needed further
    evaluation. 6 DOE and the laboratory also disagreed over whether to
    include an aircraft crash analysis as part of the storage building safety
    document. DOE had

    issued a standard in October 1996 that provides facilities an approach for
    performing an analysis of the health and safety risks to workers on- site
    and the public in the event of a release of material resulting from an
    aircraft crash. This standard applies to facilities that contain
    significant quantities of radioactive and hazardous material. 7 The
    standard also applies if special circumstances exist, such as a facility*s
    being located near significant numbers of people. The laboratory is
    located next to residential areas in the city of Livermore.

    Both DOE and laboratory officials believed they had a logical basis for
    their positions on the aircraft crash analysis. DOE officials believed
    that an aircraft crash analysis should be included in the storage building
    safety document because of the laboratory*s proximity to residential areas
    and the Livermore airport; an increase in airplane traffic in the area;
    and the potential for a release of radioactive material in the event of an
    aircraft crash into the storage building, which would pose potential
    health and safety risks to workers and the public. Laboratory officials,
    on the other

    hand, said their previous calculations for an existing storage facility
    determined that such a crash was not a credible event, and therefore an
    analysis was not required. They contended that the same finding was valid
    for the new storage building, as well.

    In June 2001 the laboratory submitted the storage building safety document
    to DOE for review and approval. Review of the safety document was
    scheduled to last approximately 4 months. However, the safety

    document was not approved until June 2002, a year later. During the 1-
    year period, the laboratory submitted the safety document to DOE three
    times,

    6 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Baseline Review of LLNL Nuclear
    Facilities Authorization Basis Documents, Final Summary Report on Issues
    and Recommendations on LLNL- Authorization Basis Documents, May 2001.

    7 Accident Analysis For Aircraft Crash Into Hazardous Facilities, DOE-
    STD- 3014- 96, October 1996. DOE and the Laboratory

    Also Disagreed about the Need for Aircraft Crash Analysis

    Review of the Safety Document Lasted a Year

    Page 11 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    and each time DOE rejected it. Although the project was falling behind
    schedule, DOE field managers responsible for the timely approval of the
    safety document did not take steps early on to resolve the situation. This
    occurred in part because some DOE officials supported the laboratory*s
    efforts to justify a lower category 3 hazard classification. They
    concurred with the laboratory that a category 2 hazard classification
    would require a more detailed quantitative accident analysis, which would
    be more costly

    and would result in more safety controls that could increase operating
    costs and oversight of its storage building operations. In addition, the
    laboratory believed that a category 3 hazard classification would provide
    an appropriate level of safety. 8 In May 2002, the DOE manager responsible
    for overseeing laboratory

    operations took steps to resolve the disagreement over hazard
    classification. In a May 10, 2002, letter, the DOE manager directed
    laboratory officials to use a category 2 classification for the storage
    building. The same letter also stated that DOE and the laboratory agreed
    to expedite the review and approval process to accelerate the initiation
    of

    operations at the storage building. DOE and the laboratory implemented an
    intensive review process that consisted of a series of meetings in which
    the DOE review team and laboratory officials jointly conducted a line-
    byline review and edit of the storage building safety document. In
    addition, DOE had determined that the storage building safety document did
    not have to include an aircraft crash analysis provided that the
    laboratory include the analysis in the June 2003 update of the document.
    In the interim, DOE required the laboratory to include compensatory
    measures in the document, such as procedures for public notification and
    fire department response time in the event of an airplane crash. DOE
    approved the safety document on June 28, 2002.

    Because of the longer- than- expected time frame for approving the storage
    building safety document, the cost for completing the facility*s safety
    documents exceeded laboratory estimates by $400,000, according to a
    project budget document. However, the laboratory*s project manager stated
    that the additional cost was covered by the project*s contingency fund
    reserved for unforeseen circumstances, allowing the project to

    remain within budget. The delay in approving the storage building safety 8
    Concerns over safety issues surfaced in 1996 and 1997 when the laboratory
    prepared the preliminary safety documents for the new facility. DOE
    required the laboratory to resolve these issues prior to DOE authorizing
    facility operations.

    Page 12 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    document postponed the review of the safety document for the other portion
    of the facility* the treatment buildings. This delay, in turn, prevented
    the start of operations at the treatment buildings.

    The delay in initiating treatment operations has had two related
    consequences. First, because the treatment buildings are not yet
    operational, the laboratory has had to continue conducting its waste
    treatment activities at the older facility, which lacks some of the new
    facility*s environmental and worker protections. In addition, the older
    facility has fewer capabilities to treat waste and prepare it for off-
    site disposal, requiring the laboratory to postpone disposing of some
    waste offsite.

    Until DOE approves the treatment buildings* safety document and DOE and
    the laboratory conduct an operational readiness review, the treatment
    buildings cannot begin operations. These tasks were postponed until DOE

    resolved disagreements about the storage buildings* safety document. As a
    result, the laboratory has had to continue its waste treatment operations
    at the older facility and has not been able to utilize the safety features
    of the new facility. Examples of the differences in safety features
    between the two facilities follow.

     The new facility has a ventilation system that filters waste particles
    from the air in the buildings to prevent the release of contaminants into
    the environment; the older facility does not.  The buildings of the new
    facility were designed so that all waste

    treatment operations are conducted indoors. At the older facility, some
    operations are conducted in treatment tanks that do not have covers and
    are located outdoors, enabling vapors and waste particles to escape into
    the environment.  Compared with the older facility, the new facility has
    more areas in

    which ventilation systems take in air at a high rate near treatment
    equipment to protect workers from exposure to fumes and waste particles.

    Because the treatment buildings are not yet operational, the laboratory
    has not been able to use the new treatment facility*s enhanced
    capabilities to prepare waste for off- site disposal. For example, the new
    facility has a debris washer that washes mixed waste to remove the
    hazardous portion of the waste from the radioactive portion, allowing each
    portion to be sent Delay in Initiating Treatment Operations

    Postponed Use of Safety Improvements and Off- Site Disposal of Some Waste

    Safety Improvements Not Realized with Continued Use of Older Treatment
    Facility

    Delay Postponed Off- Site Disposal of Some Waste

    Page 13 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    to disposal sites at a lower total cost than disposing of the mixed waste
    as a whole. In addition, the new facility is equipped with a glovebox that
    enables special handling of the waste in an enclosed, controlled, and
    highly ventilated area to treat *reactive* waste 9 that is not acceptable
    at disposal sites. Treatment of such waste enables it to meet the
    acceptance criteria of disposal sites. The older facility does not have
    these features.

    Since the laboratory cannot yet utilize the new buildings* treatment
    capabilities, some wastes have remained at the laboratory rather than
    being disposed of off- site. For example, a laboratory official
    responsible for waste management activities stated that the laboratory had
    planned to begin treating reactive waste within 6 months of the start of
    operations at

    the treatment buildings to prepare it for disposal. Because of the delay
    in initiating operations, the laboratory has postponed treating and
    disposing of this waste.

    DOE and the laboratory have taken or are planning to take the following
    three steps to address the cause of the delay in approving the storage
    building safety document in an effort to meet the August 2003 deadline for
    starting treatment operations:

     DOE and the laboratory agreed to hold a series of joint working meetings
    to identify and resolve issues during the development of the treatment
    buildings* safety document. This action was taken to identify and address
    issues or concerns during the development stages of the document rather
    than during the document review process. By enhancing communication, DOE
    and the laboratory hoped to minimize the possibility that disagreements
    would delay the approval of the document and further postpone the
    initiation of treatment operations.  In the treatment buildings* safety
    document, DOE and the laboratory

    resolved the two main issues that led to the delay in approving the
    storage building safety document. The laboratory has agreed to limit the
    amount of radioactive material it processes during treatment operations to
    meet the requirements for a lower category 3 hazard classification for the
    treatment buildings. The laboratory also agreed to include an aircraft
    crash analysis in the treatment buildings* safety document.

    9 An example of reactive waste is material containing sodium metal, which
    reacts strongly with water, including water in the air. Such a reaction
    could create a large amount of heat, which could cause the material to
    ignite. DOE Has Improved

    Review and Oversight of Laboratory Safety Documents, but Time Remaining
    Will Make It Challenging to Meet the August 2003 Deadline for Starting
    Treatment Operations

    Page 14 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

     DOE*s management resolved to strengthen oversight by not allowing any
    future disagreements to languish unresolved for long periods of time. For
    example, DOE*s Livermore Laboratory Site Manager said that it took too
    long to resolve the disagreement over the storage building safety document
    and that in a similar situation she would take action to ensure that any
    disagreement was resolved within 60 to 90 days.

    Even with these steps, DOE and laboratory officials are unsure if the
    August 2003 date for initiating operations at the treatment buildings can
    be met. The laboratory now has less time available to prepare for the

    remaining tasks than it typically allows. Once the laboratory has
    submitted and received approval of safety documents from DOE, it must
    prepare documents and train staff for the facility*s operational readiness
    review. An operational readiness review examines the facility*s
    procedures, equipment, and personnel to ensure that the contractor will
    operate the facility safely in accordance with parameters set out in the
    safety document. Laboratory officials said that, typically, the laboratory
    allows 6 weeks of preparation for the operational readiness review.
    However, for the treatment buildings, the laboratory has compressed the
    amount of time to prepare for the operational readiness review to 2 weeks
    in order to meet the August 2003 deadline. DOE and laboratory officials
    said that the August 2003 deadline is challenging but achievable.

    We provided a draft of this report to DOE and Lawrence Livermore National
    Laboratory for their review and comment. The laboratory provided its
    comments through DOE. In written comments, DOE generally agreed with the
    accuracy of our report. However, we made changes in

    response to two points raised by DOE*s Assistant Secretary for
    Environmental Management. First, concerning the delays in resolving safety
    issues, DOE said our draft report omits the fact that the laboratory had
    developed a safety document for the treatment and storage facility as
    early as 1996 and some of the safety issues had been unresolved since that

    time. We recognize that the laboratory had developed preliminary safety
    documents in 1996 and 1997 and some of the safety issues identified at
    that time remained unresolved until after they resurfaced in 2001.
    However, this information does not help explain why those issues remained
    unresolved, and it does not address the cause of the delay in initiating
    operations at the new facility. We did clarify in the report that

    some of the safety issues surfaced in 1996 and 1997. Agency Comments

    and Our Response

    Page 15 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    DOE*s second point concerned a statement in the draft report that shipment
    of some waste to off- site disposal facilities had been delayed. The
    Assistant Secretary said that the treatment and off- site disposal of
    legacy waste* the backlog of stored waste from nuclear weapons research
    activities* have not been directly postponed by the delay in obtaining
    approval of the facility safety documents. However, we found that the
    delay in approving the storage building safety document contributed to the
    delay in approving the treatment buildings* safety document. Furthermore,
    the treatment building cannot operate until after approval of the safety
    documents and completion of an operational readiness review. Certain waste
    at the laboratory, such as reactive waste, cannot be treated in the
    laboratory*s older facilities and has been stored at the site. The
    laboratory*s plan was to begin treating this waste for off- site disposal
    within 6 months of initiating operations at the new treatment facility.
    Therefore, the delay in initiating operations at the treatment facility
    has postponed the off- site disposal of some waste.

    DOE also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as
    appropriate. DOE*s written comments on our draft report are included in
    appendix II. We conducted our review from September 2002 through April
    2003 in

    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix
    I provides details on our scope and methodology.

    As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
    this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 1 day after the
    report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
    Secretary of Energy and the Director of Lawrence Livermore National
    Laboratory. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
    addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
    http:// www. gao. gov.

    Page 16 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
    me at (202) 512- 3841. Key contributors to this report are listed in
    appendix III. Sincerely yours,

    Robin M. Nazzaro Director, Natural Resources

    and Environment

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    Page 17 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    To identify the cause of the delay in initiating storage and treatment
    operations at the new facility, we reviewed DOE orders and standards and
    federal regulations pertaining to safety documents. We also reviewed
    safety documents, DOE comments on safety documents, and internal DOE
    correspondence discussing disagreements over safety documents. In
    addition, we reviewed a DOE memorandum addressing delegations of authority
    and also analyzed project schedules to determine the extent of delays for
    the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility project. We also analyzed
    project cost documents to determine any increases in costs from the delay.
    Finally, we interviewed DOE and Livermore laboratory officials about the
    preparation and review of safety documents.

    To identify the effects of the delay in initiating treatment operations,
    we analyzed documents describing waste treatment operations obtained from
    the laboratory, and we interviewed Livermore laboratory officials.

    To identify the steps taken to ensure that the latest estimated date for
    initiating treatment operations at the facility can be met, we interviewed
    DOE and laboratory officials and analyzed a DOE and laboratory written
    agreement addressing the development of safety documents. We also reviewed
    laboratory presentations on safety issues made to DOE. Finally, we
    analyzed the project schedule pertaining to the operational readiness
    review.

    We also toured laboratory and waste storage and treatment facilities and
    obtained data on the types, amounts, and locations of waste at the
    laboratory. We conducted our review from September 2002 through April 2003
    in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

    Methodology

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 18 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 19 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

    Page 20 GAO- 03- 558 Radioactive Waste

    Robin M. Nazzaro (202) 512- 3841 William R. Swick (206) 287- 4800

    In addition to those named above, Leo G. Acosta, Gary R. Boss, Allen T.
    Chan, Nancy L. Crothers, Gary L. Jones, James L. Ohl, Stanley G.
    Stenersen, and Yunsian Tai made key contributions to this report. Appendix
    III: GAO Contacts and Staff

    Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Acknowledgments

    (360265)

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