Military Personnel: Navy Actions Needed to Optimize Ship Crew	 
Size and Reduce Total Ownership Costs (09-JUN-03, GAO-03-520).	 
                                                                 
The cost of a ship's crew is the single largest incurred over the
ship's life cycle. One way to lower personnel costs, and thus the
cost of ownership, is to use people only when it is		 
cost-effective--a determination made with a systems engineering  
approach called human systems integration. GAO was asked to	 
evaluate the Navy's progress in optimizing the crew size in four 
ships being developed and acquired: the DD(X) destroyer, T-AKE	 
cargo ship, JCC(X) command ship, and LHA(R) amphibious assault	 
ship. GAO assessed (1) the Navy's use of human systems		 
integration principles and goals for reducing crew size, and (2) 
the factors that may impede the Navy's use of those principles.  
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-520 					        
    ACCNO:   A07121						        
  TITLE:     Military Personnel: Navy Actions Needed to Optimize Ship 
Crew Size and Reduce Total Ownership Costs			 
     DATE:   06/09/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Cost analysis					 
	     Defense cost control				 
	     Financial analysis 				 
	     Naval personnel					 
	     Ships						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Cost effectiveness analysis			 
	     Labor force					 
	     Arleigh-Burke Class Destroyers			 
	     CVN(X) Aircraft Carrier				 
	     DD(X) Destroyer					 
	     JCC(X) Command Ship				 
	     LHA(R) Amphibious Assault Ship			 
	     Sirius Class Warship				 
	     T-AE 26 Kilauea-class Warship			 
	     T-AFS 1/8 Mars-class Warship			 
	     T-AKE Cargo Ship					 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-03-520

Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

June 2003 MILITARY PERSONNEL

Navy Actions Needed to Optimize Ship Crew Size and Reduce Total Ownership
Costs

GAO- 03- 520

The Navy*s use of human systems integration principles and crew size
reduction goals varied significantly for the four ships GAO reviewed. Only
the DD( X) destroyer program emphasized human systems integration early in
the acquisition process and established an aggressive goal to reduce crew
size. The Navy*s goal is to cut personnel on the DD( X) by about 70
percent from that of the previous destroyer class* a reduction GAO
estimated could eventually save about $18 billion over the life of a 32-
ship class. The goal was included in key program documents to which
program managers are held accountable. Although the Navy did not set
specific crew reduction goals for the T- AKE cargo ship, it made some use
of human systems integration principles and expects to require a somewhat
smaller crew than similar legacy ships. The two other ships* the recently
cancelled JCC( X) command

ship and the LHA( R) amphibious assault ship* did not establish human
systems integration plans early in the acquisition programs, and did not
establish ambitious crew size reduction goals. Unless the Navy more
consistently applies human systems integration early in the acquisition
process and establishes meaningful goals for crew size reduction, the Navy
may miss opportunities to lower total ownership costs for new ships, which
are determined by decisions made early in the acquisition process (see
figure). For example, the Navy has not clearly defined the human systems

integration certification standards for new ships. Several factors may
impede the Navy*s consistent application of human systems integration
principles and its use of innovations to optimize crew size: (1) DOD
acquisition policies and discretionary Navy guidance that allow program
managers latitude in optimizing crew size and using human systems
integration, (2) funding challenges that encourage the use of legacy
systems to save near- term costs and discourage research and investment in
labor- saving technology that could reduce long- term costs, (3) unclear
Navy organizational authority to require human systems integration*s use
in acquisition programs, and (4) the Navy*s lack of cultural acceptance of
new concepts to optimize crew size and its layers of personnel policies
that require consensus from numerous stakeholders to revise.

Total Ownership Costs Are Determined Early in a System*s Development The
cost of a ship*s crew is the single largest incurred over the ship*s life
cycle. One way to lower

personnel costs, and thus the cost of ownership, is to use people only
when it is cost- effective* a determination made with a systems
engineering approach called human systems integration. GAO was asked to
evaluate the Navy*s progress in optimizing the crew size in four ships
being developed and acquired: the DD( X) destroyer, T- AKE cargo ship,
JCC( X) command ship, and LHA( R) amphibious assault ship. GAO

assessed (1) the Navy*s use of human systems integration principles and
goals for reducing crew size, and (2) the factors that may impede the
Navy*s use of those

principles. To facilitate the Navy*s efforts to optimize ship crew sizes
and minimize total ownership costs, GAO is recommending that the

Secretary of the Navy: (1) require that ship programs use human systems
integration to establish crew size goals and help achieve them, (2)
clearly define the human systems integration certification standards for
new ships, (3) formally establish a process to examine and facilitate the
adoption of labor- saving technologies and

best practices across Navy systems. In commenting on a draft of this
report, DOD agreed with GAO*s recommendations.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 520. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Henry L. Hinton, Jr., at (202) 512- 4300 or hintonh@
gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 520, a report to

Congressional Requesters

June 2003

MILITARY PERSONNEL

Navy Actions Needed to Optimize Ship Crew Size and Reduce Total Ownership
Costs

Page i GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing Letter 1 Results in Brief 3
Background 5 Navy*s Use of Human Systems Integration to Optimize Crew Size
and Efforts to Establish Crew Size Goals Vary Considerably

Across Ship Programs 10 Several Factors Contribute to the Inconsistent
Application of Human Systems Integration and May Impede the Navy*s Ability
to Optimize Crew Size 20 Conclusions 26 Recommendations for Executive
Action 28 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29 Appendix I Scope and
Methodology 31

Appendix II Ships Included in Our Evaluation 33

Appendix III Defense Acquisition 37

Appendix IV Summary of DD( X) Destroyer Gold Team Trade Studies 41

Appendix V Comparison of DDG 51 and DD( X) Crew Sizes 42

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Defense 49 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing Tables

Table 1: Selected DD( X) Destroyer Trade Studies Conducted by Northrop
Grumman Ingalls Shipyard and Raytheon, from 1998- 2002 41 Table 2:
Comparison of Watchstations for the DDG 51 Flight II A

and the DD( X) 45 Table 3: Comparison of Crew Size for Selected Special
Evolutions on DDG 51 Flight IIA and DD( X) Destroyers 48 Figures

Figure 1: Total Ownership Costs Are Determined Early in a System*s
Development 6 Figure 2: The DOD Acquisition System Process, Phases,

Milestones, and Key Activities 39 Abbreviations

DD( X) destroyer DOD Department of Defense JCC( X) joint command and
control ship LHA( R) amphibious assault ship replacement MSC Military
Sealift Command

T- AKE auxiliary cargo and ammunition ship

This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
materials separately from GAO*s product.

Page 1 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing June 9, 2003 The Honorable Jim
Talent

Chairman The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Seapower Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The cost of a ship*s crew is the single largest expense incurred over a
ship*s life cycle. As such, transitioning from the personnel- and
workload- intensive ships of the past to optimally crewed ships with
reduced workloads has tremendous potential to free up resources for the
Navy to use in recapitalizing the fleet. The Department of Defense*s (DOD)
planned procurement rate for fiscal years 2004- 2008 is 7.4 ships per
year, a rate that supports a fleet of about 259 ships* below the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review goal of 310 and farther below the Navy*s
desired fleet of 375 ships. In recognition of the budgetary challenges the
Navy faces in

recapitalizing its fleet, House and Senate conferees have expressed an
interest in identifying ways to reduce these personnel expenses through
the acquisition of ships that would require smaller crews. 1 One way to
lower costs associated with personnel is to use people only

when it is cost- effective to do so* determining this by using a systems
engineering approach known as human systems integration. In this process,
tasks and functions are systematically analyzed and assigned to the most
cost- effective solution* humans, software, or hardware. When applied to
ships early in their development and throughout their design, human
systems integration has the potential to substantially reduce requirements
for personnel, leading to significant cost savings. Additionally, it can
improve operational performance by enhancing situational awareness and
decision making; reduce human error, which causes an estimated 80 percent
of ship accidents; and reduce training difficulty and cost. Human systems
integration also has the potential to improve shipboard habitability,
reduce workload and fatigue, and

1 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 Conference
Report 107- 772 (Nov. 12, 2002).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing thereby improve a sailor*s
quality of life* key enablers for recruiting and retention.

Because the size of ship crews has such a significant impact on long- term
costs, you asked us to evaluate the Navy*s progress in optimizing the crew
size in four new ships that DOD was in the process of developing and
acquiring: the DD( X) destroyer, 2 the T- AKE cargo ship, 3 the recently
canceled JCC( X) command ship, 4 and the LHA( R) amphibious assault ship.
During our review, three of these ships were in the early stages of
development while only one ship, the T- AKE, had entered acquisition phase
three, production and deployment. (App. II includes a description of the
ships* missions and acquisition program history and status.) In this
report, we assess (1) the Navy*s use of human systems integration
principles and goals to reduce crew size on these four ships and (2) the
factors that may impede the Navy*s use of human systems integration
principles in developing new ships.

To assess the Navy*s use of human systems integration principles and crew
size reduction goals, we obtained and analyzed key program and ship
crewing documents as well as human systems integration plans and analyses.
We also assessed whether and to what extent human systems integration
principles and crew reduction goals were addressed in the first two
acquisition phases (concept and technology development and system
development and demonstration) and reflected in key acquisition documents.
To evaluate factors that may impede the Navy*s application of human
systems integration principles, we interviewed DOD officials,

2 At the time the ship*s mission need statement was developed, it was
referred to as the Surface Combatant 21, a term used in the early stages
of the Land Attack Destroyer program. It eventually became known as DD 21
and subsequently as the DD( X). For uniformity, we will refer to the ship
as the DD( X) in all of its stages.

3 The ship program was previously known as the Auxiliary Dry Cargo Carrier
(ADC( X) or T- ADC( X)). The program subsequently became known as the
Auxiliary Cargo and Ammunition Ship (T- AKE). For uniformity, we refer to
the ship as the T- AKE or the T- AKE cargo ship in all of its stages.

4 The program was formally named the Joint Maritime Command and Control
Capability Ship Program, hereafter referred to as the JCC( X) command
ship. DOD*s fiscal year 2004 Program Objective Memorandum canceled the
JCC( X) program. Instead, DOD has directed that the analysis of
alternatives for the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF( F),

examine the feasibility of incorporating as a module or variant an
additional mission package that provides joint and coalition command and
control. MPF( F) ships are the Marine Corps* forward- deployed floating
warehouses of military ammunition, fuel, and food that are the centerpiece
of the Navy*s future sea basing concept.

Page 3 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing contractors, and human systems
integration experts and reviewed acquisition guidance to determine the
extent to which it discusses or

requires the use of human systems integration principles in ship programs.
We conducted our review from June 2002 through April 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. The scope and
methodology used in our review are described in further detail in appendix
I.

The Navy*s use of human systems integration and crew size reduction goals
varied significantly in the four ship programs we examined. Only the DD(
X) destroyer program placed a significant emphasis on human systems

integration early in the acquisition process and established an aggressive
goal to reduce crew size. The Navy*s goal for the DD( X) destroyer, which
was included as a principal program goal or key performance parameter, is
expected to cut the ship crew size by about 60 to 70 percent from that of

the previous destroyer ship class, 5 a reduction we estimated could save
about $18 billion (fiscal year 2002 dollars) 6 in personnel- related costs
over the service life of a future class of 32 ships. 7 This goal was
established at program initiation, provided the initiative for developing
a comprehensive human systems integration plan, and was reiterated in the
key program documents to which the program manager is held accountable at
key

milestone reviews. For the T- AKE cargo ship, the Navy made some use of
human systems integration and expects to require somewhat fewer personnel
than the legacy ships it is replacing. It did not, however, establish
specific crew size reduction goals or apply human systems integration
principles to the ship*s primary mission, intership underway
replenishment. The remaining two programs, the JCC( X) command and the
LHA( R) amphibious assault ships, did not develop comprehensive human
systems integration plans early in the acquisition process and do not have
crew size reduction as a formal program goal. Because the Navy did not
consistently apply human systems integration principles and set goals for
reducing crew size for three of the ships we reviewed, it may have missed
opportunities to reduce crewing requirements and lower total ownership
costs, which are determined largely by decisions made early in

5 A ship class represents a number of vessels built alike or nearly so. 6
Unless otherwise noted, all dollars are expressed as current dollars (also
known as then- year dollars).

7 Although the DD 21 destroyer program consisted of 32 ships, it is not
yet clear how many DD( X) s will be purchased. Results in Brief

Page 4 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing the acquisition process but
which will be incurred throughout these ships* 30- 40 year life spans.

Based on briefings and discussions with agency officials and a review of
acquisition policies, we found that a number of related factors contribute
to the Navy*s inconsistent application of human systems integration
principles and may impede the adoption of innovations to optimize crew
size. These factors include the following:

 DOD and Navy acquisition policies allow program managers considerable
latitude in optimizing crew size and in determining the timing and extent
to which they employ human systems integration.  Funding challenges when
acquiring new ships encourage the use of legacy

subsystems to save near- term costs instead of the investment in research
and development of labor- saving technologies that would reduce costs over
the long term.  Most Navy organizations responsible for human systems
integration

oversight are not empowered to require the use of human systems
integration to optimize crew size. The Naval Sea Systems Command*s newly
established directorate for human systems integration, which is
responsible for certifying that ships delivered to the fleet have
optimized crews, had not established a process or criteria for achieving
certification.  Even when new labor- saving approaches and technologies
are identified

during the concept and technology development phase, implementing them is
a difficult and time- consuming process due to the Navy*s long- standing
traditions and culture and the extensive network of personnel, safety,
training, maintenance, and other policies and procedures that affect ship
personnel levels. Moreover, there is no process to help Navy program
managers identify and coordinate with other stakeholders to modify or
eliminate policies and procedures that may impede the introduction of
labor- saving practices and technology identified during ship design.

These factors cause Navy decision makers to set goals of not exceeding the
crew size of 30- year old ships, for program managers to wait until
preliminary design to begin human systems integration efforts, and exclude
primary and secondary ship functions from rigorous analysis. As a result,
the Navy is designing and procuring some new ships that may not cost-
effectively address one of the biggest cost drivers in the Navy*
personnel. The DD( X) experience also shows that even when these practices
are followed, the program will still face challenges in achieving these
goals and encounter pressures to relax the goals as the system design
progresses, thereby supporting human systems integration experts* view
that human systems integration plans and activities should receive

Page 5 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing continued review and focus
throughout the acquisition process. Unless the Navy more consistently
applies human systems integration at the earliest

stages of the development process and establishes meaningful goals for
crew size reduction, the Navy may miss opportunities to lower total
ownership costs for new ships, which are determined by decisions made
early in the acquisition process.

To facilitate the Navy*s efforts to optimize ship crew sizes and minimize
total ownership costs, we are recommending that the Secretary of the Navy
(1) require that ship programs use human systems integration to establish
crew size goals and help achieve them, (2) clearly define the human
systems integration certification standards for new ships, (3) formally
establish a policy evaluation function to examine and facilitate the
adoption of cost- saving technologies and best practices across Navy
systems. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our
recommendations.

Decisions made in setting requirements very early in a ship*s development
have enormous impact on the total ownership costs. 8 Total ownership costs
include the costs to research, develop, acquire, own, operate, maintain,
and dispose of weapon and support systems; the costs of other equipment
and real property; the costs to recruit, retrain, separate, and otherwise
support military and civilian personnel; and all other costs of

DOD*s business operations. Navy analyses show that by the second
acquisition milestone (which assesses whether a system is ready to advance
to the system development and demonstration phase), roughly 85 percent of
a ship*s total ownership cost has been *locked in* by design, production
quantity, and schedule decisions while less than 10 percent of its total
costs has actually been expended. (See fig. 1.)

8 In another report we recommend that DOD treat total ownership costs as a
performance requirement equal in priority to any other performance
requirement prior to beginning the acquisition program. See U. S. General
Accounting Office, Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could
Reduce Weapon Systems* Total Ownership Costs,

GAO- 03- 57 (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 11, 2003). Background

Total Ownership Costs Are Determined Early in a System*s Development

Page 6 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing Figure 1: Total Ownership Costs
Are Determined Early in a System*s Development Figure 1 depicts the
relative apportionment of research and development, procurement, and
operating and support costs over the typical life cycle of a ship program
(the complete life cycle of a ship, from concept

development through disposal, typically ranges from 40 to 60 years).
Research and development funds are spent at program initiation and
generally comprise only a small fraction of a new ship*s total ownership
costs. Then, in the next acquisition phase, procurement funds, comprising
about 30 percent of total ownership costs, are spent to acquire the new
ship. The vast majority of the total ownership costs, about 65 percent, is
comprised of operating and support costs and is incurred over the life of
the ship. Personnel costs are the largest contributor to operating and
support costs* approximately 50 percent.

Page 7 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing Recognizing that fiscal
constraints pose a long- term challenge, DOD policy states that total
ownership costs of new military systems should

be identified and that DOD officials should treat cost as a military
requirement during the acquisition process. 9 This approach, referred to
as treating cost as an independent variable, requires program managers to
consider cost- performance trade- offs in setting program goals.

During the acquisition process, program managers are held accountable for
making progress toward meeting established goals and requirements at
checkpoints, or milestones, over a program*s life cycle. 10 (See app. III
for a discussion of the DOD acquisition process). These goals and
requirements are contained in several key documents. The first to be
generated is a mission need statement that describes a warfighting
deficiency, or opportunity to provide new capabilities, in broad
operational terms and identifies constraints such as crewing, personnel,
and training that may affect satisfying the need. These capabilities and
constraints are examined during the initial phase of the program in a
second key document, a study called the analysis of alternatives. This
study assesses the operational effectiveness and estimated costs of
alternative systems to meet the mission need. The analysis assesses the
pros and cons of each alternative and their sensitivity to possible
changes in key assumptions. The analysis should consider personnel as both
a life- cycle cost and a design driver. Systems engineering best practices
dictate that the analysis of alternatives should be supported by a front-
end analysis 11 and trade- off studies so that better and more informed
decisions can be made. Using the results of the analysis of alternatives,
program objectives are formalized in an operational requirements document.
This third key document specifies those capabilities or characteristics
(known as key performance parameters) that are so significant that failure
to meet them can be cause for the system to be canceled or restructured.
In establishing key performance parameters, DOD officials specify both a
threshold and an

9 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Defense Acquisition, Attachment
1, The Defense Acquisition System, October 30, 2002, sec. 3.23. 10
According to defense acquisition system policy, the program manager is
assigned the single point of accountability for accomplishment of program
objectives* a minimum number of cost, schedule, and performance parameters
that describe the program over its life cycle. Progress toward meeting
these objectives is assessed at milestone decision meetings and during
interim senior management reviews.

11 In Navy new ship acquisitions, the front- end analysis consists of a
top- down requirements analysis supported by a variety of mission and
functional analyses that together inform designers about the human
requirements for the ship under study. Defense Acquisition Policy

Requires Setting Goals to Optimize Performance and Minimize Cost

Page 8 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing objective value. For
performance, the threshold is the minimum acceptable value that, in the
user*s judgment, is necessary to satisfy the

need. For schedule and cost, the threshold is the maximum allowable value.
The objective value is the value desired by the user and the value the
program manager tries to work with the contractor( s) to obtain.

During our review, DOD was revising its acquisition guidance. On October
30, 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense canceled three key DOD documents
governing the defense acquisition process and issued interim guidance in a
memorandum. DOD officials expect to issue a new acquisition guidance in
the near future. 12 The Deputy Secretary*s interim guidance retains the
basic acquisition system structure and milestones,

emphasizes evolutionary acquisition, modifies the requirements documents,
and makes several other changes. For example, the mission need statement
and the operational requirements document are replaced by three new
documents: (1) the initial capability document replaces the

mission need statement at milestone A, (2) the capability development
document replaces the operational requirements document at milestone B,
and (3) the capability production document replaces the operational
requirements document at milestone C. (See app. III for a discussion of
the acquisition process and milestones.)

Human systems integration is a systems engineering approach to optimize
the use of people. Optimized crewing for ships refers to the minimum crew
size consistent with the ship*s mission, affordability, risks, and human
performance and safety requirements. When initiated from the outset of a
new ship acquisition (during concept exploration and prior to establishing
key performance parameters) and continued through ship design, human
systems integration has the potential to reduce workload leading to
smaller, optimized crews; reduced operating and support costs; and
improved operational performance. According to human systems integration
experts, for Navy ship acquisitions, human systems integration may begin
with a top- down requirements analysis that examines the ship*s

functions and mission requirements and determines whether human or machine
performance is required for each task. By reevaluating which functions
humans should perform and which can be performed by

12 On May 12, 2003, DOD released a new version of DOD Directive 5000.1 and
DOD Instruction 5000.2. A streamlined version of the nonmandatory
Guidebook is under development. Because this guidance was issued following
the completion of our audit work, the description of the acquisition
process in this report is based on DOD*s interim guidance issued on
October 30, 2002. Human Systems

Integration Has Potential to Optimize Ship Crew Size and Reduce Costs for
New Systems

Page 9 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing technology, human systems
integration minimizes personnel requirements while maximizing gains from
technological applications. A human systems

integration approach also ensures that a person*s workload and other
concerns, such as personnel and training requirements, safety, and health
hazards, are considered throughout the acquisition process. In a recent

memorandum, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs stated, *failure to incorporate HSI [human systems integration]
approaches can only lead to increasing manpower costs in the future that
will threaten the ability of the Department to sustain the transformation,
readiness and investment priorities we have established.*

Human systems integration has been used successfully in military and
commercial settings. MANPRINT, the Army*s human systems integration
program, reports that the Comanche helicopter program, when fielded, will
avoid $3.29 billion in operating and support costs ($ 2.67 billion of
which resulted from personnel reductions) due to the application of human
systems integration. Human systems integration has also been used in
airplane cockpit design, aircraft maintenance, and in rear- center
automobile brake lights design. Additionally, foreign navies* efforts,
such as those to develop British Type 23 and Dutch M- Class Frigates,
achieved a 30 to 40 percent reduction in crew size relative to the
previous generation of ships by employing a human systems integration
approach.

DOD*s acquisition policy for using human systems integration is general in
nature but requires program managers to develop a human systems
integration approach early in the acquisition process to minimize total
ownership costs. The Navy*s acquisition guidance requires that human
systems integration costs and impacts be adequately considered along with
other engineering and logistics elements beginning at program

initiation, but the guidance does not provide for specific procedures and
metrics. 13 13 Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2B, *Implementation
of Mandatory Procedures for

Major and Non- Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major and Non- Major
Information Technology Acquisition Programs,* December 6, 1996.

Page 10 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing Despite the potential of human
systems integration to optimize crew size and reduce total ownership
costs, the Navy*s use of human systems

integration and goals to reduce crew size varied considerably across the
four new ship acquisition programs we examined. Only the DD( X) destroyer
program used human systems integration extensively to optimize crewing
during the concept and technology development phase of the acquisition. In
doing so, the program developed a comprehensive plan that describes the
human systems integration objectives, strategy, and scope and mandated its
use by means of key program documents. The T- AKE cargo ship program was
required to apply human systems integration principles to the ship*s
design, but not to the ship*s primary mission of intership underway
replenishment. In contrast, the JCC( X) command ship and LHA( R)
amphibious assault ship programs had not emphasized human systems
integration early in the acquisition process or developed a comprehensive
human systems integration approach. The Navy*s crew size reduction goals
for the four ships range from an

aggressive goal of about 60 to 70 percent on the DD( X) destroyer, to a
lack of any formal reduction goal on the JCC( X) command ship and the LHA(
R) amphibious assault ship. The inconsistent use of human systems
integration to optimize ship crews and the lack of formal crew size
reduction goals for three of the four programs we examined represent a
missed opportunity to potentially achieve significant savings in total
ownership costs.

From the inception of the program through the selection of a design agent
in 2002, the DD( X) program has had a significant crew size reduction goal
and has used human systems integration to identify potential ways to

achieve this goal. Requirements for using human systems integration and
crew size goals were included in the key acquisition documents to which
program managers are held accountable. The program began human systems
integration activities in the first acquisition phase* concept and
technology development* by inviting industry to develop conceptual

designs to meet these goals and produce a human systems integration plan.
Subsequently, the Navy restructured the program in November 2001 and is
reevaluating the ship*s operational requirements, including crew size.
However, the Navy*s contract with the design agent continues to specify a
significant crew size reduction calling for a crew of between 125 and 175.
These revised crew size requirements still represent a greater than 50
percent reduction when compared to the legacy ship it is replacing. Navy*s
Use of Human Systems Integration

to Optimize Crew Size and Efforts to Establish Crew Size Goals Vary
Considerably Across Ship Programs DD( X) Program Has

Aggressive Crew Size Reduction Goals and Uses Human Systems Integration
Extensively

Page 11 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing From the earliest stages of
the program and continuing through award of the design agent contract, the
program maintained a focus on optimizing

crew size. For example:  The 1993 mission need statement directed *the
ship must be automated to a sufficient degree to realize significant
manpower reductions.* The document also required a human systems
integration- type analysis, 14 to recommend options to exploit technology
to reduce crewing, personnel, and training requirements and directed that
trade- offs to reduce these requirements be favored during design and
development.  The 1998 cost and operational effectiveness analysis
(currently known as

the analysis of alternatives) included an analysis of the ship crew and
personnel requirements for the various alternatives that ultimately
influenced the Navy*s decision to initially establish an aggressive crew
size goal of 95 and identify human systems integration requirements to be
included in the operational requirements document. This goal represents a
greater than 70 percent reduction in crew size from that of the Arleigh
Burke- class destroyers developed in the 1980s.  In 1997, the DD( X)
operational requirements document specified a crew

size goal of between 95 and 150 as a key performance parameter. 15 It also
required that human systems integration be used to minimize life- cycle
costs and maximize performance effectiveness, reliability, readiness, and
safety of the ship and crew.  In 1997, the program also established a
ship crewing/ human systems

integration integrated process team whose charter requires a top- down
functional analysis, the analytical centerpiece of the Navy*s human
systems integration approach, in the early phases to obtain a major
reduction in personnel.  In 1998, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology

continued to hold DD( X) destroyer program managers accountable for
achieving an aggressive crew size reduction when he required validation
that the DD( X) crew size will meet the key performance parameter
threshold before ship construction begins.

14 The Surface Combatant for the 21st Century [DD( X)] Mission Need
Statement recommended performing a military crewing/ hardware integration
(* HARDMAN*) analysis in accordance with Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 5311.7, *Determining Manpower, Personnel,
and Training (MPT) Requirements for Navy Acquisitions,* August 12, 1985.
HARDMAN is one type of

human systems integration methodology. 15 The document specified 95 as the
objective value and 150 as the threshold value. These values represent a
60 to 70 percent reduction from the DDG- 51 class crew level of 365.

Page 12 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing  The Phase 1 solicitation
issued in 1998 for trade studies and analyses and development of two
competitive system concept designs required that

both contractors provide a human systems integration plan.  The design
agent contract awarded in 2002 requires the contractor to develop and
demonstrate a human systems integration engineering effort that addresses
the crewing, personnel, training, human performance, sailor survivability,
and quality of life aspects of the DD( X) design. It also relaxed the
original crew size goal, stating that crewing requirements shall not
exceed 175.

To achieve the proposed reductions, the DD( X) program plans to employ
human- centered design and reasoning systems, advances in ship cleaning
and preservation, a new maintenance strategy, and remote support from
shore- based facilities for certain administrative and personnel services.
For example, cleaning requirements are expected to be reduced by a ship
design that capitalizes on commercial shipping practices such as

cornerless spaces and maintenance- free deck coverings. The ship will also
rely on an integrated bridge system that provides computer- based
navigation, planning and monitoring, automated radar plotting, and
automated ship control. DD( X) program officials stated that their
experience in using the human

systems integration engineering approach, establishing an aggressive crew
size reduction goal early in the acquisition process, and including this
goal as a key performance parameter in the operational requirements
document has been critical in maintaining a focus on reducing crew size.
Moreover, these practices led to examining innovative approaches from the
beginning and holding program managers accountable during program

reviews. Program officials anticipate that the emphasis on reducing crew
size will help to minimize DD( X) operating and support and total
ownership costs once the ship is built and enters the fleet. For
illustrative purposes, we calculated that the Navy could avoid personnel-
related costs of about $600 million per ship over a 35- year service life
if it achieves a

crew of 150 sailors rather than requiring the 365 sailors needed to
operate its legacy ship, the Arleigh Burke- class destroyer. This could
potentially save more than $18 billion for a class of 32 ships (both
amounts are in fiscal year 2002 dollars). 16 See appendix V for a
comparison of crew functions and workload on the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-
class destroyer and those proposed for the DD( X).

16 Although the DD 21 destroyer program consisted of 32 ships, it is not
yet clear how many DD( X) s will be purchased.

Page 13 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing DD( X) program officials also
stated that, even with sustained early emphasis on crew size reduction and
the use of human systems integration

for crew optimization, achieving such an aggressive crew size goal remains
a significant technological challenge as the program is relying on a
number of immature labor- saving technologies, such as those required to
conduct damage control and run the ship*s computers. Program officials
stated that

informal goals or those established later in the acquisition process would
not have been nearly as effective in getting the program to focus on
achieving significant personnel reductions. However, in recognition of the
technological challenge of achieving the crew size goal and several other
technological challenges, the Navy restructured the DD( X) program in
November 2001 to better manage the program*s risk. As such, it adopted an
acquisition strategy consisting of multiple capability increments, or
*flights.* The newly restructured program relaxed the crew size goals to
between 125 and 175, which still represents a greater than 50 percent
reduction below legacy ship levels, for the first of three planned DD( X)
flights. While briefings prepared by Navy officials retain the original
crew size goals for the third DD( X) flight, it is unclear whether these
goals will

be retained as key performance parameters in the operational requirements
document currently under revision. In developing the T- AKE cargo ship,
which is in procurement and is

expected to become operational in 2005, elements of human systems
integration were used to streamline intraship cargo handling and to refine
the requirements for civilian mariners and active- duty personnel.

However, human systems integration was not applied to the process of
intership underway replenishment, the transfer of cargo between ships
while at sea. 17 Moreover, early acquisition documents for the T- AKE
cargo ship program did not establish specific goals for reducing crew
size, although they required the use of civilian mariners or Merchant
Marines instead of active- duty Navy personnel and mandated the
examination of cargo handling innovations to reduce crew workload. Use of
Merchant Marines or Military Sealift Command personnel generally results
in a smaller crew because these organizations employ more experienced
seamen, have reduced watchstanding requirements, and use a different
maintenance and training philosophy. The T- AKE will be operated by the

17 Underway replenishment may be accomplished via connected replenishment
(in which the receiving and cargo ships are alongside and connected to
each other by hoses/ cables) or via vertical replenishment (in which a
helicopter transfers solid cargo from ship to ship). T- AKE Cargo Ship
Program

Used Human Systems Integration in Some Aspects of Ship Design, Expects
Crew Size Reductions, but Did Not Establish Specific Crew Size Goals

Page 14 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing Military Sealift Command, and
its projected crew will be between 5 and 20 percent smaller than the crew
of the command*s legacy ships and about

60 percent smaller than the legacy ships previously operated exclusively
with Navy sailors. 18 The following examples illustrate the strengths and
limitations of

the program*s use of human systems integration early in the acquisition
process.

 The 1992 mission need statement lacked a direct reference to human
systems integration, although it does indicate that the ship*s size will
be the result of various trade- offs, including cost and crew size, and
required that the ship*s design incorporate modern propulsion, auxiliary,
and cargo handling systems to minimize operating and maintenance

personnel requirements.  The 2001 operational requirements document
stated that *human

engineering principles and design standards shall be applied to the design
of all compartments, spaces, systems, individual equipment, workstations
and facilities in which there is a human interface.* However, this

document also required the T- AKE cargo ship to use U. S. Navy standard
underway replenishment equipment because of the need to interface with
other U. S. Navy and allied ships, the lack of any equivalent commercial

system, and the costs to redesign existing Navy equipment and maintain
nonstandard equipment. As a result, human systems integration was not
applied to one of the main drivers of crew size* the number of crewmembers
required to perform connected replenishment at each replenishment station.

Program officials indicated that, because intership underway replenishment
involves the interface between the T- AKE cargo ship and all other ship
classes requiring replenishment at sea, redesign of the Navy*s process of
underway replenishment was not within their purview and, therefore, was
not addressed in the program*s human systems integration analyses.
Instead, the program*s focus was to ensure that the T- AKE cargo

ship*s design met the current requirements for performing underway
replenishment and had the flexibility for future equipment modification.
To address underway replenishment across ship platforms, in 2000 the Navy
established a naval operational logistics integrated product team 18 The
Navy*s Military Sealift Command is one of three components of the

U. S. Transportation Command, the DOD command that manages the defense
transportation system.

Page 15 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing whose mission is to establish
policy and doctrine for future operational systems and ensure the
integration of operational logistics systems

across ships. Since reexamining intership underway replenishment was
beyond the scope of the ship program, program personnel said they focused
on identifying ways to reduce crew workload. In the first acquisition
phase, four contractors 19 prepared trade studies on the integration of
cargo handling functions on the ship. 20 In the second acquisition phase,
one of the contractors, National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, was
awarded the contract to design and construct the ship. Ultimately, labor-
saving innovations such as item scanners; an automated, rather than paper-
based, warehouse management inventory system; and safer and easier to
operate elevator doors were adopted. 21 Although the T- AKE cargo ship is
expected to require fewer personnel

than its legacy ships, early acquisition documents did not establish a
specific crew size goal as a key performance parameter and thus did not
hold the program manager accountable for specific reductions. Rather, the
operational requirements document required that the T- AKE be crewed
largely by U. S. Merchant Marines or Military Sealift Command civilian
mariners. The Navy currently estimates that the T- AKE will be crewed by
172 individuals: 123 civilian mariners, 13 active- duty sailors in the
military department who perform cargo management/ inventory functions, and
36 active- duty sailors in the aviation detachment who perform intership
cargo transfer using a helicopter (vertical replenishment).

19 The following four contractors were each awarded $1.5 million to
complete Phase I Ship/ Cargo Integration Design studies: Avondale
Industries (now Northrop Grumman Ship Systems Avondale Operations); Halter
Marine, Inc. (now Friede Goldman Halter); Litton Ingalls Shipbuilding (now
Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipbuilding); and National Steel and
Shipbuilding Company. Phase I concluded on May 5, 2000, and on October 18,
2001, the Navy announced it had awarded National Steel and Shipbuilding
Company the Phase II

Detail Design and Construction contract. 20 The studies addressed one or
more of five topic areas: (1) warehouse management system/ automation; (2)
material handling equipment/ cargo handling systems/ cargo elevators; (3)
cargo flow studies/ modeling and simulation; (4) general arrangements/
cargo hold and transfer deck design; and (5) cargo heating, ventilation,
air conditioning, and refrigeration.

21 T- AKE officials also provided us with the titles of 16 studies
involving safety, human engineering, manpower, personnel, training, and
habitability domains of human systems integration that were included in
the shipbuilding contract.

Page 16 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing The T- AKE cargo ship*s
projected crew size of 172 personnel will be somewhat smaller than that of
its Military Sealift Command legacy ships,

the T- AE 26 Kilauea- class ammunition ships and the T- AFS 1/ 8 Mars-
class and Sirius- class combat stores ships, which have crews of 182- 215
personnel and also use civilian mariners. The T- AKE*s crew size is
significantly smaller than when these legacy ships were crewed by active-
duty personnel. When crewed entirely by active Navy personnel, these ships
had crews of 435 and 508 sailors, respectively. Despite the smaller crew
size, the T- AKE will have a greater carrying capacity for dry and
refrigerated cargo than its legacy ships. Each T- AKE ship will be able to
carry at least 63 percent of the combined cargo capacity of a T- AFS 1 and
T- AE 26.

Although the ship program did not perform the top- down analyses
recommended by human system integration experts to optimize crewing, it
did use elements of the approach to finalize staffing requirements. To
finalize the requirement for civilian mariners, program personnel
performed a functional analysis (which identified ship functions and their
crew size requirements) and ultimately determined that the initial crew
size estimate developed by the Navy could be reduced by 12, resulting in a
final requirement for 123 civilian mariners. The size of the military
department is based on an analysis that projects workload and personnel
requirements for every ship function during the most labor- intensive
operational scenarios and then allocates the workload and personnel
requirements to the minimum number of billets and skill levels.

The recently canceled JCC( X) command ship program made very limited use
of human systems integration to optimize crew size and planned to wait
until preliminary design in the next acquisition phase to begin human
systems integration activities. The program also did not hold program
managers accountable for reducing crew size below that of the legacy
command ships. The following are examples.

 The mission need statement did not require the use of human systems
integration. Instead, the document required that the ship *be automated
wherever practical to reduce workload and manpower requirements* and
directed that operation by Military Sealift Command personnel be
considered for selected functions rather than Navy personnel. However, the
document stated that *changes to manpower requirements are not expected.*
 The analysis of alternatives examined crew sizes ranging from 60 percent

smaller to 50 percent larger than those of current command ships and JCC(
X) Command Ship

Program Made Limited Use of Human Systems Integration and Had No Formal
Goals to Reduce Crew Size

Page 17 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing using civilian mariners to
perform JCC( X) crew functions to reduce crew size. The analysis found
that using a mix of military and civilian personnel rather than all
military personnel would reduce personnel costs by nearly

a third, saving $2.3 billion for four ships over a 40- year service life.
However, the analysis did not include a full human systems integration
assessment of each design alternative.  At the time of its cancellation,
the program had not received approval of

its operational requirements document, which would have established key
performance parameters.

Program officials stated that although achieving crew size reduction was
not included in key program documents, they expected to achieve some crew
size reductions on the JCC( X) when compared to existing command

ships through the use of modern, more reliable equipment, for example,
diesel propulsion instead of steam propulsion. 22 Yet, despite the
program*s informal interest in reducing the size of the crew needed to
operate the ship, the analysis of alternatives did not examine optimizing
via human systems integration one of the main drivers of crew size* the
size of the embarked command staff. The total crew size of the JCC( X)
equals the sum of the embarked joint command staff and the crew needed to
operate the ship and perform basic ship functions. Navy analyses show that
the

crew size needed to operate the ship depends upon the joint command staff
size and the mission equipment that is to be maintained by the crew. Yet,
all of the Navy analyses examined joint command staff alternatives,

ranging from 500 to 1,500 staff, which were larger than the fleet
commander*s staff of 285 to 449 currently embarked on existing command
ships. None of the analyses used human systems integration to determine
the optimal size of the joint command staff.

The program did fund three crewing studies as part of its early industry
involvement effort that included ship crewing, workload, and functional
analyses. However, these analyses were performed only on the command
ship*s crew and not on the embarked joint staff. These crewing studies,
prepared by contractors for the JCC( X) command ship program in June 2002,
also reiterated the importance of beginning human systems integration
efforts at the earliest opportunity in the ship acquisition process and
called into question the adequacy of the human systems

22 To achieve these reductions, the Navy would have to adopt the latest
fleet work practices and automation, eliminate functions not relevant to
the JCC( X), reduce engineering watchstanders, and use a centralized
galley and Military Sealift Command- like food service.

Page 18 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing integration efforts to date.
For example, a study by one contractor stated that

*The HSI [human systems integration] team was not part of a larger JCC( X)
System Engineering effort, as would be expected in a full- up proposal or
system development activity. The HSI [human systems integration] team also
did not have contact with potential JCC( X) users or with Navy/ Joint HSI
[human systems integration] Team members, as would be expected and desired
in a normal system acquisition environment. This was due to the unique
nature of a very limited scope manning study with very limited funds.*

The study also urged the program to adopt a human systems integration
approach stating that *a human- centered design approach, implemented at
the front- end and as part of an integrated system engineering process,
will yield an optimal crew size.* The study also stated that the same
human systems integration tools could be effectively used to optimize the
size for the embarked command staff.

JCC( X) command ship program officials stated that the program planned to
employ human systems integration to optimize crew size in the next
acquisition phase by contracting with industry to perform a functional
analysis. However, according to Navy officials, the program was canceled
before these efforts began, in part because of the unacceptably high crew

size estimated for the program. The LHA( R) program has not yet developed
a comprehensive human systems integration strategy to outline the
program*s human systems integration objectives and guide its efforts. In
addition, officials told us that very little human systems integration
work was done early in the acquisition process because officials plan to
begin human systems integration activities during preliminary design in
the next acquisition phase, called system development and demonstration.
Also, early acquisition documents for the LHA( R) amphibious assault ship
program did not establish formal goals to reduce the number of personnel
required

to operate the ship. The following are examples.  The mission need
statement required the use of human systems integration to optimize
manning. However, it also stated that no changes to Navy personnel
requirements were expected. Currently, the program plans only to not
exceed the crew size of the older ships that perform similar missions.
These legacy LHA 1 class ships have a crew of about 1,230 to operate the
ship and can embark about 1,700 Marines. LHA( R) Amphibious Assault Ship
Made Limited

Use of Human Systems Integration and Had No Formal Goals to Reduce Crew
Size

Page 19 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing  The analysis of alternatives
stated that in order for the LHA( R) to achieve major reductions in
personnel, significant new technology and research

and development funds to integrate this technology into the LHA( R) design
would be required as well as changes in culture (organization and
procedures) to adapt reduced crew size practices of the commercial sector
to the naval environment.

 At the time of our review, the operational requirements document for the
LHA( R) had not been developed.

The Navy*s plans for the LHA( R) are not in concert with the Chief of
Naval Operations* desire for major reductions in the personnel levels for
all new shipbuilding programs. In August 2002, the Chief of Naval
Operations commented on the size of the LHA- 1 (the legacy ship that the
LHA( R) is replacing) saying, *I don*t want any more ships like that. The
more low technology systems that are on it, the more people we will need.
And we will need more crewmembers for support services. It [the LHA- 1*s
replacement] will be built from the keel up to support the type of
striking capability that you need in your aviation arm. It is going to be
a totally different ship.* 23 Program officials offered two major reasons
for not conducting human

systems integration early in the acquisition process: (1) they believed it
was not appropriate to start human systems integration during the very
early phases of the acquisition program (i. e., in concept and technology
development) and (2) the program lacked funding to conduct human systems
integration activities in the first acquisition phase. Program officials
plan to conduct human systems integration efforts during the

system development and demonstration acquisition phase when the program
begins preliminary design efforts. Some of these efforts, scheduled to
begin in February 2003, are to include a top- down requirements analysis
and a total ship manpower assessment. In contrast to the opinions of LHA(
R) program officials, the Navy*s human systems integration experts stated
that human systems integration is a

critical part of planning and design in the early stages of acquisition,
including the concept and technology development phase. In addition,
experience with the DD( X) program shows that the potential
personnelrelated cost savings resulting from the application of human
systems

23 Kauchak, Marty, *Navigating Changing Seas, Navy Chief Harbors No
Illusions About the Challenges That Lie Ahead,* Armed Forces Journal
International, August 2002.

Page 20 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing integration early on in a
program can be significant. Moreover, experts stated that every program,
regardless of its funding levels or its reliance on legacy systems, can
benefit from a comprehensive human systems

integration approach, especially those developing crew- intensive
platforms such as the LHA( R).

The program managers and the human systems integration experts we spoke to
identified four factors that inhibit the Navy*s ability to consistently
implement human systems integration across programs. These factors are (1)
neither DOD nor Navy acquisition policies establish specific requirements
for using human systems integration, such as its timing and whether the
approach should be addressed in the key acquisition documents; (2) funding
challenges often result in decisions to defer human systems integration
activities and use legacy subsystems when acquiring new ships to save
near- term costs instead of investing in

research and development to reduce costs over the long term; (3) DOD and
Navy oversight of human systems integration activities is limited and the
Naval Sea Systems Command*s role in certifying that ships delivered to the
fleet have optimum crew sizes is unclear; and (4) the Navy lacks an
effective process to change its long- standing culture and the extensive

network of policies and procedures that have institutionalized current
manning practices. As a result, some programs we examined set goals not to
exceed the crew size of 30- year old ships, waited until preliminary

design in the second acquisition phase to begin human systems integration
efforts, and excluded primary and secondary ship functions from a rigorous
analysis. In recognition of these impediments, the Navy has taken steps to
resolve some of these issues.

Recent DOD and Navy acquisition guidance provides program managers with
latitude about the timing and extent of human systems integration
activities and whether the approach should be addressed in key acquisition
documents. DOD guidance on the role of human systems integration in
acquisition is contained in two documents, the Defense Acquisition
memorandum and the Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook, issued by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, both dated October 30, 2002. Compliance with
the Defense Acquisition memorandum is mandatory; compliance with the
Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook is discretionary. Both documents
state that program managers will

develop a human systems integration strategy early in the acquisition
process to minimize total ownership cost. Neither document, however,
specifies how early in the process these efforts should begin or requires
Several Factors

Contribute to the Inconsistent Application of Human Systems Integration
and May Impede the Navy*s Ability to Optimize Crew Size

Lack of Specific Navy Requirements to Use Human Systems Integration
Results in Inconsistent Implementation Across Programs

Page 21 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing that human systems integration
analyses be performed on the various alternatives considered in the formal
analysis of alternatives. The Navy*s main acquisition instruction requires
that human systems

integration costs and impacts be adequately considered along with other
engineering and logistics elements beginning at program initiation but
does not provide for specific procedures. 24 The Navy*s section of the
acquisition deskbook 25 provides more detailed guidance on human systems
integration (such as providing a format for the human systems integration
plan and discussing the contents of a human systems integration program).
However, because these sources provide only broad guidelines or are
discretionary, a program manger can decide when, how, and to what extent
they will use human systems integration in their acquisition program. The
Navy also has developed other guidance on using human systems

integration, but its use is also discretionary. For example, human systems
integration experts developed a guide for the Office of the Chief Naval
Operations, which states that a human systems integration assessment and
trade- off of design alternatives should be conducted during the first
acquisition phase. The Surface Warfare Program Manager*s Guide to Human
Systems Integration also states that human systems integration cost,
schedule, and design risk areas for each alternative concept should

be identified and evaluated. The guidance also recommends that human
systems integration assessments should be conducted at each milestone
decision review.

Because of the wording of DOD guidance and the discretionary nature of
some Navy guidance, new ship program managers vary in when they use human
systems integration during ship development. For example, the DD( X)
program specified using the approach in the mission need statement and the
analysis of alternatives further specified human systems integration
requirements be included in the operational requirements document. In
contrast, the program managers for both the JCC( X)

24 Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2B, *Implementation of Mandatory
Procedures for Major and Non- Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major
and Non- Major Information Technology Acquisition Programs,* December 6,
1996.

25 *Department of the Navy (DON) Section (Discretionary) of Defense
Acquisition Deskbook (Reference Library), Appendix XI- Acquisition Program
Plans Formats, February 12, 1997 (the *Acquisition Deskbook* is now called
the *Acquisition Knowledge

Sharing System*).

Page 22 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing command ship and the LHA( R)
amphibious assault ship told us that they planned to begin their human
systems integration efforts during

preliminary design after the design alternative has been selected in the
next acquisition phase-- system development and demonstration. Neither
program conducted human systems integration analyses of the alternative
designs during the analysis of alternatives. As such, program officials
lacked information on how each of the alternatives compared with respect
to their proposed crew size and how their crew size would affect total
ownership costs.

Both JCC( X) and LHA( R) program officials cited challenges in funding a
new acquisition program as a barrier to using human systems integration to
optimize crew size and therefore reduce total ownership cost. These

challenges affect whether programs conduct crew- optimizing human systems
integration activities in the earliest phases of acquisition and whether
the program will choose to invest in labor- saving technologies.

JCC( X) program officials told us that achieving personnel reductions and
using human systems integration to optimize crew size could increase
acquisition costs. The Navy*s human systems integration experts stated
that program managers have long been incentivized to hold down acquisition
costs without considering how such choices may affect operating and
support costs, such as personnel- related costs, over the life of the
ship. According to the Navy*s human systems integration experts, labor-
saving technology may add to the acquisition cost of a ship but may also
reduce the operating and support costs incurred over the ship*s service
life. Whether to use technology or sailors to perform a function should be
determined by a systematic analysis of costs and capabilities performed as
part of the human systems integration functional analysis* an effort not
undertaken by the JCC( X) command ship program.

Similarly, at the time the LHA( R) program was initiated in 2001, the Navy
decided not to invest in human systems integration activities and research
and development on new labor- saving technologies for the ship. The

program plans to capitalize, where appropriate, on systems already in
development for other ships such as the DD( X) destroyer and the CVN( X)
aircraft carrier but has not yet identified any labor- saving technologies
or processes that might be adapted from these programs. Program officials
said the program was not resourced to develop new technologies, having
received only $20 million in research and development funds from program
initiation through fiscal year 2002. However, the up- front savings of not
investing in research and development and human systems Challenges in
Funding

Acquisition Programs Discourage Investment in Labor- Saving Technology

Page 23 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing integration activities must be
weighed against the higher operating and support costs incurred over the
life of the ship and the foregone capability

and quality of life improvements that can accompany new technology and
human- centered design. For illustrative purposes, we calculated that a
nominal 25 percent reduction in a 1, 245- person crew could provide a
personnel cost avoidance of nearly $1 billion over the service life of a
ship, or nearly $4 billion for a 4- ship class. 26 In addition, DD( X)
destroyer program officials were uncertain about the extent to which
programs now in development outside the DD( X) destroyer family of ships
will be able to leverage its new technology, citing the costs associated
with adapting technology to new platforms that perform different missions.
Rather, DD( X) program officials told us that it is imperative for the new
ship programs to use human systems integration to inform such decisions.

Several offices within DOD and the Navy have an advisory role regarding
the implementation of human systems integration, although they lack the
authority to require that it be used to optimize crew size and that it be
addressed in specific acquisition documents or at each acquisition
milestone. The Offices of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and
Readiness, and the Chief of Naval Operations (Acquisition Division)
Acquisition and Human Systems Integration Requirements Branch both review
new program acquisition documents and provide guidance on human systems
integration policy. 27 Additionally, the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, assists in the development
of human systems integration policy and addresses policy issues at
meetings of defense acquisition executives. The Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) Chief
Engineer, uses human systems integration in its *system of systems*
examination of capability above the individual ship level to ensure that
systems can function together across various ships to perform the mission.
28 26 Fiscal year 2002 dollars.

27 The Chief of Naval Operations (Acquisition Division) Acquisition and
Human Systems Integration Requirements Branch also encourages manning
reductions of up to 20 percent, if possible, for new acquisition programs.
It has, however, no authority to require such reductions. 28 This approach
embodies the overarching system requirements for a broad mission need,
such as surveillance or missile defense. DOD and Navy Offices Have Limited
or Unclear

Authority to Require Human Systems Integration Activities for Ship
Programs

Page 24 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing In recognition of the need for
an organization within the ship community to *lead the effort to
institutionalize humans systems integration*,* the

Navy, in October 2002, created the Human Systems Integration Directorate
within the Naval Sea Systems Command whose missions include

 establishing human systems integration policy and standards for the
Naval Sea Systems Command;  ensuring the implementation of human systems
integration policy,

procedures, and best practices;  assisting program offices in developing
and sustaining human systems

integration plans; and  certifying that ships and systems delivered to
the fleet optimize

ship crewing, personnel, and training and promote personnel safety,
survivability, and quality service. 29 Because of its role as the
certifying authority for human systems

integration within the Naval Sea Systems Command, the directorate may have
more authority than the previously mentioned organizations to ensure that
human systems integration is implemented. However, the memorandum
establishing the directorate and the instruction specifying its functions
do not specify how certification will be accomplished, the acquisition
stage at which it will be required, or consequences of noncompliance.

Navy acquisition officials also identified the layers of Navy policies,
procedures, and instructions that affect ship crew levels and cultural
resistance to novel concepts as impediments to optimizing ship crews. They
told us that even when human systems integration is used in the early
stages of an acquisition program to identify ways to reduce crew size, it
is difficult to achieve a consensus among numerous stakeholders within the
Navy to change long- standing policies and practices so that labor- saving
approaches or technologies can be implemented. To facilitate this process,
the DD( X) destroyer program established a forum to evaluate policy
barriers to proposed innovations and facilitate needed changes.

However, this effort was limited to selected ships. Other programs such as
the LHA( R) amphibious assault ship and the JCC( X) command ship had not
established a similar forum to resolve the policy barriers to optimize

29 Naval Sea Systems Command Notice 5400, *Establishment of the Human
Systems Integration (HSI) Directorate (SEA 03),* October 15, 2002. Navy
Policies and

Culture May Impede Introduction of Labor- Saving Technologies and
Approaches

Page 25 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing crewing on these ships. As a
result, the Navy currently lacks an ongoing process to facilitate
examination of outmoded policies and procedures that may impede optimizing
crewing in all new ship acquisition programs.

Navy officials explained that changing policies and procedures is a
complex and time- consuming task because the current way of doing business
has been incorporated in instructions at all levels in the Navy, ranging
from the Secretary of the Navy to commanders of the Atlantic and

Pacific Fleets, and across a number of areas, such as recruiting,
retention, training, quality of life, and the environment. In addition,
new ways of doing business, such as those envisioned for the DD( X)
destroyer, will affect and require modifications to Navy doctrine,
tactics, and operational requirements. Furthermore, proposed changes must
be evaluated for compliance with governing statutes in such areas as
compensation, occupational safety and health, and aviation. As such, any
change involves numerous stakeholders who must be consulted and grant
approval.

For example, DD( X) officials told us that it took about 18 months to
coordinate with numerous stakeholders to change applicable policies to
reduce the number of crewmembers required during flight operations from 48
to 15. Moreover, officials told us that this change is just the beginning
since the DD( X) destroyer program has identified numerous Navy policies
and procedures across a wide spectrum of topics that need to be changed in
order to adopt the innovations proposed by industry to meet the DD( X) *s
cost and capability requirements.

Officials with the other programs we examined also viewed Navy policies as
a barrier to optimized crewing. JCC( X) command ship program officials
reported that current Navy policy and practice would have been a barrier
to implementing potential crew size reductions had this program gone
forward. Two examples cited by program officials are bridge watchstanding
and main propulsion machinery monitoring. At present, Navy practice for
bridge watch requires approximately 11 personnel in contrast to commercial
practice, which requires 1 person on watch and 1 on stand by. Similarly,
Navy practice for machinery monitoring requires personnel in the machinery
space at all times to ensure that power is available. This contrasts with
commercial practice, which permits putting machinery on automatic and
using sensors with alarms routed to a watchstanders* stateroom during
certain hours. Officials stated that implementing these commercial
practices would have required evaluating their appropriateness for a Navy
operating environment and, if approved, would have required modifying
existing policies and procedures. Furthermore, the LHA( R) analysis of
alternatives concluded that significant changes in organization and
procedures are crucial to achieving Policy and Cultural Impediments

Page 26 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing a substantial reduction in
crew size. Cultural change is a particular challenge for the LHA( R)
program because the amphibious mission is

complex and both Navy and Marine organizations would be involved in
developing and implementing changes. Navy officials stated that current
funding practices in which personnel costs are funded from centralized
accounts and not out of the operating fleets* budget do not foster an
awareness of the true cost of having sailors on board ships and encourage
viewing sailors as a *free resource.*

Additionally, because traditional, time- tested methods and crewing have
proven successful in the past, officials told us that Navy commanders have
little incentive to assume the risks associated with adopting new ways of
accomplishing shipboard tasks with fewer crewmembers, especially when they
lack awareness of and accountability for personnel costs.

Because of the magnitude of changes needed to reduce and optimize crewing
on the DD( X) destroyer, the program established an effort to identify and
resolve policy barriers to implementing labor- saving approaches that
conflict with current policy, statutes, or practice. This effort includes
(1) reaching out to Navywide personnel development and training
organizations and to Atlantic and Pacific Fleet commanders and (2)
establishing the DD( X) Policy Clearinghouse Web- based tool to facilitate
collaboration with multiple stakeholders and resolve policy impediments to
implementing innovations planned for the DD( X) destroyer. The DD( X)
clearinghouse was recently transferred to the Naval Sea Systems Command*s
Human Systems Integration Directorate. However, there are currently no
requirements for this forum to address the policy barriers to optimizing
crewing encountered in all new ship acquisitions.

Given the Navy*s recapitalization challenges, efforts to control personnel
costs and minimize total ownership costs are becoming increasingly
important. Applying human systems integration principles to optimize crew
size has the potential to result in a host of cost and operational
benefits, including saving billions of dollars by reducing total ownership
costs and increasing operational performance and ship maintainability. The
experience to date in the DD( X) destroyer program shows that requiring
human systems integration from the earliest stages of a program (during
concept and technology development) and using the results to

establish a crew size reduction goal as a key performance parameter are
effective strategies to holding program managers accountable during
program reviews for making significant progress toward reducing crew Navy
Lacks a Process to

Systematically Address Impediments to Innovation in All New Ship Programs

Conclusions

Page 27 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing size. The DD( X) experience
also shows that even when these practices are followed, the program will
still face challenges to achieving these

goals and encounter pressures to relax the goals as the system design
progresses, thereby supporting human systems integration experts* view
that human systems integration plans and activities should receive
continued review and focus throughout the acquisition process. In
contrast, programs such as the JCC( X) and LHA (R) that do not use human
systems integration early and do not hold program managers accountable
during program reviews for crew size reduction are less likely to achieve
the meaningful reduction in crew size. Unless the Navy more consistently
applies human systems integration early in the acquisition process and
establishes meaningful goals for crew size reduction, the Navy may miss
opportunities to lower total ownership costs for new ships, which are
determined by decisions made early in the acquisition process.

The Navy*s varied approach to applying human systems integration has
occurred partly because Navy guidance allows program managers considerable
discretion in determining the extent to which they apply human systems
integration principles in developing new systems. In the absence of clear
requirements that human systems integration programs will be a key feature
of all future acquisition programs, efforts to optimize

crew size will continue to vary due to the competing pressures placed on
program managers, and the Navy is likely to continue to miss opportunities
to reduce personnel requirements for future ships. As a result, the Navy*s
funding challenges may be exacerbated, and it may not be able to build or
support the number of ships it believes are necessary to support the new
defense strategy. Although the Navy*s recent efforts to establish a focal
point for human systems integration policy within the Naval Sea Systems
Command is a positive step, the success of this office will depend on its
authority to influence acquisition programs in their initial stages.
Because the instruction establishing this office does not clearly explain
the process this office will use to certify that ships delivered to the
fleet will have optimized crews, there is a risk that the office may not
have sufficient leverage to influence new programs in their early stages
and that this may result in missed opportunities to reduce crew size and
achieve long- term cost savings.

Even when the Navy uses a disciplined human systems integration process
early in an acquisition program to identify ways to optimize crew size,
implementation of new technologies and procedures is often hindered by the
Navy*s culture and traditions, which are institutionalized in a wide array
of policies and procedures affecting personnel levels, maintenance
requirements, and training. In recognition of these barriers, the DD( X)

Page 28 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing program and the operational
logistics community have established processes to address these barriers
for their particular ship or community.

However, not all new ship acquisition programs have developed or have
access to such a forum to facilitate removing barriers to optimized
manning to ensure that costly outdated policies and procedures are
systematically reexamined as new innovations are developed. To ensure that
the nation*s multibillion- dollar investment in Navy ships

maximizes military capability and sailor performance at the lowest
feasible total ownership cost, we recommend that the Secretary of the Navy
develop and implement mandatory policies on human systems integration
requirements, standards, and milestones. Specifically, for each new system
the Navy plans to acquire, the Secretary of the Navy should require that 
a human systems integration assessment be performed as concepts for the
system are developed and alternative concepts are evaluated;  human
systems integration analyses, including trade- off studies of design

alternatives, be used to establish an optimized crew size goal that will
become a key performance parameter in the program*s requirements document;
and  human systems integration assessments be updated prior to all

subsequent milestones. To strengthen the Naval Sea Systems Command*s role
in promoting the use of human systems integration for new ship systems, we
recommend that the Secretary of the Navy require the command to clarify
the Human Systems Integration Directorate*s role in and process for
certifying that ships and systems delivered to the fleet optimize ship
crewing.

To facilitate the review of possibly outdated policies and procedures as
new labor- saving innovations are identified through human systems
integration efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of the Navy require
that the Naval Sea Systems Command*s Human Systems Integration Directorate
establish a process to evaluate or revise existing policies and procedures
that may impede innovation in all new ship acquisitions. Recommendations
for

Executive Action

Page 29 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing In commenting on a draft of
this report, DOD agreed with our recommendations and indicated that
actions were underway or planned

to implement them. DOD stated that actions taken in response to our
recommendations would only enhance ongoing human systems integration
initiatives; ensure more consistent application of human systems
integration processes across all ship acquisition programs; and lead to
optimized ship crews, increased system performance, and reduced lifecycle
costs. The Navy intends to implement our recommendation that it require
ship programs to use human systems integration to establish crew size
goals and help achieve them, in part, by developing a new program called
SEAPRINT (Systems Engineering, Acquisition and PeRsonnel INTegration),
modeled after the Army*s MANPRINT program that we cite in our report. The
Navy*s SEAPRINT program will develop Navywide policy that identifies,
mandates, and establishes accountability for human systems integration
analyses. This policy will mandate that human systems integration is to be
addressed in

 a specific plan before the acquisition*s earliest milestone,  the
initial capabilities document (formerly called the mission needs

statement),  the capabilities development document (formerly called the
operational

requirements document), and  assessments performed as part of concept
exploration and development

and updated prior to all subsequent milestones. DOD also stated that it
endorses a manpower- related key performance parameter for all new ship
acquisition programs. In response to our recommendation that the Navy
clearly define human systems integration certification standards for new
ships, DOD stated that the Navy is

developing technical human systems integration criteria and metrics that
will be used for measuring and certifying that ships and ship systems meet
human systems integration standards. With regard to our recommendation
that the Navy formally establish a process to examine and facilitate the
adoption of labor- saving technologies and best practices across Navy
systems, DOD stated that the Navy has established a new human systems
integration clearinghouse, implemented a pilot study using the
clearinghouse, and involved stakeholders from across the Navy. DOD also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
DOD*s comments are included in appendix VI of this report. Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Page 30 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing We are sending copies of this
report to interested congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense;
the Secretary of the Navy; and the

Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me
at (202) 512- 4402 or e- mail me at stlaurentj@ gao. gov. Key staff
members that contributed to this report were Roderick Rodgers, Jacquelyn
Randolph, Suzanne Wren, Mary Jo LaCasse, Charles Perdue, and Jane Hunt.

Janet A. St. Laurent Acting Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 31 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship
Crewing To assess the Navy*s use of human systems integration principles
to optimize crews and goals to reduce crew size on the four new ship

programs we were asked to review, we obtained and analyzed key acquisition
documents such as mission need statements, analyses of alternatives, and
operational requirements documents as well as human systems integration
plans and analyses. We also interviewed Naval Sea Systems Command and
Military Sealift Command officials who are responsible for the DD( X), T-
AKE, JCC( X), and LHA( R) programs to discuss the use of human systems
integration and crew size goals. We obtained current ship crewing
documents from the Navy*s Manpower Analysis Center and the Military
Sealift Command and compared the crew size goals for the four ship
programs we reviewed to the crew size levels for older ships that perform
similar missions. We also obtained data from the Naval Sea Systems Command
on the Arleigh Burke- class destroyer program on crew sizing and workload
to compare with the contractor*s crew size estimate for the DD( X). To
understand the extent to which the T- AKE*s primary mission of underway
replenishment affects crew size, we interviewed (1) experts from the
Underway Replenishment Department at the Naval Surface Warfare Center
(Port Hueneme Division) and the National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
(which designed and will build the T- AKE) and (2) a subject matter expert
on Navy underway replenishment. To gain an understanding of operational
logistics and cargo storage and warehousing, we interviewed officials from
the Chief of Naval Operations (Strategic Mobility/ Combat Logistics) and
St. Onge Company (a subcontractor for the T- AKE ship program) and visited
the Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna, Pennsylvania, one of the
Department of Defense*s (DOD) largest and most automated distribution
centers. To obtain information on the Navy*s methods of calculating total
ownership costs, we interviewed officials from the Naval Center for Cost
Analysis and the Center for Naval Analyses. To calculate the ship crewing
cost avoidance potential for the DD( X) and LHA( R) programs, we used data
from the Navy*s Cost of a Sailor study for capturing comprehensive
personnel costs and converted the data to fiscal year 2002 dollars.

To evaluate factors that may impede the Navy*s use of human systems
integration principles, we obtained and analyzed DOD, Joint Staff, and
Navy systems acquisition directives, instructions, and guidance (e. g.,
the internet- based Defense Acquisition Deskbook and the Program Appendix
I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 32 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship
Crewing Management Community of Practice). 1 We reviewed the interim
defense acquisition guidance as it pertains to the acquisition process,
human

systems integration, and total ownership cost. We did not assess the ship
programs* compliance with the several prior versions of DOD and Navy
acquisition guidance, but we did evaluate the extent to which human
systems integration was applied and whether crew size goals were
established. We also obtained and reviewed numerous articles on military
and civilian applications of human systems integration. To obtain
information on the formulation and oversight of human systems integration
policy and guidance, we met with officials from the offices of the
Secretary of Defense; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research

Development and Acquisition; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Chief
Engineer; and the Chief of Naval Operations (Acquisition and Human Systems
Integration Requirements Branch). To obtain additional information on the
benefits of human systems integration and best practices, we interviewed
subject matter experts with the Naval Sea Systems Command*s Human Systems
Integration Directorate, the DD( X) Program Office, the Army*s Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Manpower and Personnel
Integration (MANPRINT) Directorate, Carlow International Incorporated, and
the Office of Naval Research*s Human Systems Science and Technology
Department, and we

attended the American Society of Naval Engineers Conference on Human
Systems Integration. To gain insight on labor- saving technologies and
changes to policies and procedures required to implement these
innovations, we met with officials from the Naval Sea Systems Command*s
SMARTSHIP Program Office; met with officials and toured the Office of
Naval Research*s Afloat Lab in Annapolis, Maryland; and met with officials
responsible for the DD( X) Policy Clearinghouse and the Naval Sea Systems
Command*s Human Systems Integration Directorate. We discussed the funding
for human systems integration with the Naval Sea Systems program managers
for the four ship programs we reviewed.

We conducted our review from June 2002 through April 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

1 The program management communities of practice include acquisition,
systems engineering, total ownership costs, and many other related
disciplines. The communities may be accessed at http:// www. pmcop. dau.
mil/.

Appendix II: Ships Included in Our Evaluation Page 33 GAO- 03- 520
Optimized Ship Crewing In 1995, the Navy established the 21st Century
Surface Combatant program to develop the next generation of surface
combatants that would replace retiring destroyers and frigates on a timely
basis. In November 2001, the Navy restructured this program from one
intended to develop a single ship class of 32 ships into its current form
known as the DD( X). The new program aims to develop and acquire three new
classes of surface combatants to include the DD( X) as the centerpiece, a
cruiser called CG( X), and a smaller littoral combat ship.

The first DD( X) destroyer is to be procured in fiscal year 2005 and enter
service in fiscal year 2011. The initial DD( X) is viewed as a *test bed*
for the host of new technologies under development. The Navy plans to
employ a spiral acquisition strategy for the ship class in which new
technology will be phased in over three distinct ship flights.

Plans call for the DD( X) destroyer to have a number of new features and
technologies, including

 an advanced electric- drive/ integrated power system for propelling the
ship that could become the basis for applying electric- drive technology
more widely throughout the fleet,  labor- saving technologies that may
permit the ship to be operated with a

crew of 125 to 175 people instead of the more than 350 needed to operate
current Arleigh Burke- class (DDG- 51) destroyers,  a new hull design for
reduced detectability,  two new 155- mm Advanced Gun Systems for
supporting Marine forces

ashore, and  128 vertical- launch tubes for Tomahawk cruise missiles and
other weapons. 1 The Navy is now reevaluating many of the ship*s
operational requirements

and cost estimates (which were determined and approved under the earlier
DD- 21 program) and may make substantial changes to the originally
envisioned capabilities, including relaxing the crew size and
detectability goals, changing the type of gun and amount of munitions
carried, and reducing the number of vertical launch tubes.

Previously, the Navy projected the unit procurement cost for the DD- 21
destroyer to be not more than $750 million in fiscal year 1996 dollars

1 The number of vertical- launch tubes is being reevaluated. Appendix II:
Ships Included in

Our Evaluation DD( X) Destroyer

Appendix II: Ships Included in Our Evaluation Page 34 GAO- 03- 520
Optimized Ship Crewing (the equivalent of about $795 million in fiscal
year 2001 dollars)* somewhat less than the $950 million unit procurement
cost of today*s

Arleigh Burke- class destroyers. 2 The DD- 21 was also envisioned to have
an operating and support cost of not more than $6,000 per hour* about one-
third less than that of the Arleigh Burke- class, in large part resulting
from the smaller crew planned for the future destroyer. In April 2002, the
Navy selected Northrop Grumman Ship Systems as the design agent for the
DD( X) and the program entered detailed design.

The T- AKE cargo ship is the new combat logistics force ship to be
operated by the Military Sealift Command. The ship*s primary mission is to
shuttle food, ammunition, repair parts, supplies, and limited quantities
of fuel to station ships and combatants. The new ship will replace T- AE
26

Kilauea- class ammunition ships and T- AFS 1/ 8 Mars- class and

Sirius- class combat stores ships in the Military Sealift Command. The
ship*s secondary mission is to operate with an oiler (T- AO 187

Kaiser- class) to provide logistics support to a carrier battle group. In
this capacity, the T- AKE will replace AOE 1 Sacramento- class ships.

The ship program initiated development in 1995 and began procurement in
October 2001. The Navy has purchased 3 of the 12 planned ships for a total
of almost $1 billion, with delivery expected in fiscal years 2005 and
2006. Current plans are to purchase the 4 th through 12 th ships between
fiscal year 2003 and 2007 for delivery between fiscal year 2006 and 2010.
Once all are purchased and delivered, T- AKE cargo ships will represent 41
percent of

the recapitalized combat logistics force fleet (at full operating status).
Military Sealift Command officials mentioned several factors* mission
requirements and personnel policies* that explain why, in comparison to
the Navy, they are able to operate combat logistics force ships with
smaller crews. Logistics ships in the Military Sealift Command have fewer
missions and therefore can operate with smaller crews. For example, unlike
Navy ships, Military Sealift Command logistics ships do not carry weapons
and therefore their crews do not require weapon operators. Military
Sealift Command ships also incorporate several other crew reduction
practices, including an unattended engine room, minimal bridge watch by
use of integrated bridge system technology, self- service laundry

2 Cost estimates are for the fifth destroyer built by each shipbuilder
involved in the program. T- AKE Cargo Ship

Appendix II: Ships Included in Our Evaluation Page 35 GAO- 03- 520
Optimized Ship Crewing facilities and food service initiatives. Command
officials also said that because of their personnel policies, civilian
mariners are more experienced than their Navy counterparts. Specifically,
because there are no personnel policies requiring job rotation or that
individuals leave the service if they are not promoted (* up or out*),
civilian mariners are more likely to have been in their current job longer
than active- duty Navy personnel. Command officials said that these
personnel policies result in a workforce that is more experienced than
their Navy counterparts. 3 The Military Sealift Command*s operating
policies also enable it to operate

cargo ships with smaller crews than the Navy. For example, command
officials said that their policy requires 9 crewmembers per underway
replenishment station and that the Navy requires 20 per station. The
Military Sealift Command also does not assign a safety officer to each
underway replenishment station as the Navy does. In November 1999, the
Navy established the Joint Command and Control

(Experimental) or JCC( X) program to replace the Navy*s four aging command
ships built in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, the JCC( X)
was intended to provide an afloat platform for performing joint command
and control functions, such as those performed by a joint force commander
without the need to obtain permission from host countries to establish a
land- based headquarters operation.

By November 2001, the Navy had received the Office of the Secretary of
Defense*s endorsement for an afloat command capability and completed its
formal analysis of alternatives. This analysis showed that the assigned
Navy crew (the ship*s operators) would account for roughly half the life-
cycle cost for a JCC( X). It also showed that a mix of Navy sailors and
civilian mariners would be capable of performing the crew functions at

3 To confirm whether civilian mariners were more experienced than their
Navy peers, we compared the average age and tenure of civilian mariners to
active- duty Navy personnel. Relative to Navy personnel, civilian mariners
were older (average age is 46 years, Navy average is about 29), although
they had similar tenure (average tenure in the Military Sealift Command is
about 8 years; the Navy average is almost 9). The Military Sealift Command
provided data on civilian mariners. Navy age data was taken from

Population Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal Year 2000,
dated February 2002. Navy tenure data was calculated from Tabulations of
Responses from the 1999 Survey of Active Duty Personnel, Volume 2:
Programs and Services, Family, Economic Issues, and Background, conducted
by the Defense Manpower Data Center, dated September 2000. JCC( X) Command

Ship

Appendix II: Ships Included in Our Evaluation Page 36 GAO- 03- 520
Optimized Ship Crewing two- thirds of the personnel cost, saving about $2
billion for four ships over a 40- year service life. The analysis further
estimated that a newly designed ship sized for an embarked command staff
of about 800 (these people are in addition to the ship*s crew) would cost
about $1 billion for a lead ship in fiscal year 2006 and $850 million for
a follow- on ship if three were built. Subsequent to this analysis, the
Navy*s draft 2004 budget plan eliminated funding for the JCC( X) and
instead directed another ship program, the Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future), 4 to study developing joint command and control modules or
variants.

In 2001, the Navy established the Amphibious Assault Ship, General Purpose
(Replacement) or LHA( R) program to replace its five aging LHA 1

Tarawa- class amphibious assault ships. These ships are primarily designed
to move large quantities of Marines, their equipment, and supplies onto
any shore during hostilities.

The first LHA ship will be replaced by a Wasp- class amphibious assault
ship, the LHD- 8, 5 in approximately fiscal year 2007, and the remaining
ships will be replaced by a modified version of the LHD 8 no later than
fiscal year 2024. The modified variant will be made longer and wider to
accommodate the larger and heavier aircraft the Marines are developing,
the MV- 22 Osprey and the Joint Strike Fighter.

The Navy estimates the cost for the first ship to be about $3 billion with
the three successor ships costing about $2.1 billion each. 6 The ship*s
annual operating and support cost is estimated to be about $111 million.
The LHA( R) program is currently in the first acquisition phase called
concept technology and development.

4 The MPF( F) ships will be the Marine Corps* civilian operated forward-
deployed floating equipment warehouses. The MPF( F) ships are intended to
replace and update the capability currently provided by 13 aging Maritime
Prepositioning Ships. 5 The Wasp- class LHD is the Navy*s largest
amphibious assault ship. This class is an improved follow- on the to five
Tarawa- class LHA ships. The LHD 8, currently under

construction, will incorporate improvements, including a gas- turbine
propulsion system and a new electrical auxiliary system that will
eliminate steam service. 6 All LHD cost figures are in constant fiscal
year 2003 dollars. LHA( R) Amphibious

Assault Ship Replacement

Appendix III: Defense Acquisition Page 37 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship
Crewing Although its regulatory structure is undergoing change, the
Department of Defense*s (DOD) complex process to deliver a new ship class
to the

fleet occurs in three steps. First, the Navy*s requirements community
establishes requirements for a new system. Second, the Navy*s acquisition
organizations and contractors design and produce the ship. Finally, after
building the ship, the warfighter assumes responsibility for operating and
maintaining the ship. DOD*s policy is to acquire weapons systems using a

disciplined systems engineering process designed to optimize total system
performance and minimize total ownership costs. 1 The regulation,
requirements, and design aspects of the acquisition process are discussed
below.

Weapons systems acquisition is governed by a complex regulatory structure
ranging from public laws to nonmandatory policies, practices, and
guidance. Until recently, three major DOD regulatory documents guided the
management of Defense acquisition: DOD Directive 5000.1, *The Defense
Acquisition System;* DOD Instruction 5000.2, *The Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System;* and DOD Regulation 5000. 2- R, *Mandatory Procedures
for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated
Information Systems (MAIS) Acquisition

Programs.* On October 30, 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense canceled
all three documents and by memorandum issued interim guidance. On an
interim basis, the DOD 5000.2- R was reissued as a

guidebook, Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook, to be used for best
practices, lessons learned, and expectations; but its guidance is not
mandatory. 2 Additional, supporting, discretionary best practices; lessons
learned; and expectations are posted on DOD*s internet Web site, DOD 5000
Series Resource Center. 3 The interim DOD guidance retains the basic
acquisition system structure (i. e., no new phases), emphasizes

evolutionary acquisition, modifies the requirements generation documents,
and makes several other changes. Policies and procedures for

1 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Defense Acquisition, Attachment
1, The Defense Acquisition System, October 30, 2002. 2 On May 12, 2003,
DOD released a new version of DOD Directive 5000.1 and DOD Instruction
5000.2. A streamlined version of the nonmandatory Guidebook is under
development. Because this guidance was issued following the completion of
our audit work, the description of the acquisition process in this report
is based on DOD*s interim guidance issued on October 30, 2002.

3 See http:// dod5000. dau. mil/. Another internet- based aid, commonly
known as *The Acquisition Deskbook,* is located at http:// deskbook. dau.
mil/ jsp/ default. jsp. Appendix III: Defense Acquisition

Defense Acquisition Regulatory Structure Is Undergoing Change

Appendix III: Defense Acquisition Page 38 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship
Crewing developing and approving requirements for new systems are also
under revision. 4 DOD*s acquisition process, as outlined in its interim
guidance issued

October 30, 2002, provides an ordered structure of tasks and activities to
bring a program to the next major checkpoint. These checkpoints, called
milestones, are the points at which a recommendation is made and approval
sought regarding starting or continuing an acquisition program into one of
three phases: concept and technology development, system

development and demonstration, and production and deployment (see fig. 2).
The phases are intended to provide a logical means of progressively
translating broadly stated mission needs into well defined system-
specific requirements and ultimately into effective systems. A fourth
phase, operations and support, follows the system acquisition. This phase
represents the ownership period of the system when a unit, in this case a
ship, is fielded and operated by sailors for a period of 30 to 50 years. A
program*s progress toward established program goals, or key performance
parameters, is assessed at milestones.

4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170. 01B,
Requirements Generation System, Apr. 15, 2001. The new CJCSI 3170.01C and
CJCSM 3170.01 are expected to be reissued in mid- 2003. The Acquisition

Process Contains Several Checkpoints for Assessing Progress

Appendix III: Defense Acquisition Page 39 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship
Crewing Figure 2: The DOD Acquisition System Process, Phases, Milestones,
and Key Activities

The concept and technology development phase has two major efforts:
concept exploration and technology development. This phase begins with a
milestone A decision to enter concept and technology development. Entrance
into this phase depends upon a validated and approved initial capability
document [mission need statement]. Concept exploration

typically consists of competitive, parallel, short- term concept studies
guided by the initial capability document (mission need statement). The
focus of these studies is to refine and evaluate the feasibility of
alternative solutions to the initial concept and to provide a basis for
assessing the relative merits of these solutions. Analyses of alternatives
are used to facilitate comparisons. A project may enter technology
development when a solution for the needed capability has been identified.
This effort intends to reduce technology risk and to determine the
appropriate set of technologies. A project exits technology development
when an affordable increment of militarily- useful capability has been
identified, the technology for that increment has been demonstrated in a
relevant environment, and a system can be developed for production within
a short time frame (normally less than 5 years). During technology
development, the user is required to prepare the capability development
document [operational requirements document] to support subsequent program
initiation. An affordability determination is made in the process of

Appendix III: Defense Acquisition Page 40 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship
Crewing addressing cost as a military requirement and included in the
capability development document [operational requirements document], using

life- cycle cost or, if available, total ownership cost. The purpose of
the system development and demonstration phase is to develop a system.
This phase has two major efforts: system integration and system
demonstration. The entrance point is milestone B, which is also the
initiation of an acquisition program. The system integration effort
intends to integrate subsystems and reduce system- level risk. The system
can enter system integration when the program manager has a technical

solution for the system, but has not yet integrated the subsystems into a
complete system. The critical design review during system development and
demonstration provides an opportunity for mid- phase assessment of design
maturity. The system demonstration effort intends to demonstrate the
ability of the system to operate in a useful way consistent with the
validated key performance parameters. The program can enter system
demonstration when the program manager has demonstrated the system with
prototypes. This work effort ends when a system demonstrates

its capabilities in its intended environment using engineering development
models or integrated commercial items (in addition to several other
criteria).

The purpose of the production and deployment phase is to achieve an
operational capability that satisfies mission needs. The decision to
commit DOD to low- rate initial production takes place at milestone C.
Continuation into full- rate production results from a successful full-
rate production decision review. During this effort, units shall attain
initial operational capability.

Operations and support has two major efforts: sustainment and disposal.
The objectives of this activity are the execution of a support program
that meets operational support performance requirements and sustainment of
systems in the most cost- effective manner for the life cycle of the
system. When the system has reached the end of its useful life, it must be
disposed of in an appropriate manner.

Appendix IV: Summary of DD( X) Destroyer Gold Team Trade Studies

Page 41 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing Trade studies are required to
support decisions throughout the systems engineering process. During a
requirements analysis, requirements are

balanced against other requirements or constraints, including cost.
Requirements analysis trade studies examine and analyze alternative
performance and functional requirements to resolve conflicts and satisfy
customer needs. As part of the design competition for the DD( X)
destroyer, the competing contractors conducted trade studies and analyses
on their system concept designs and the related systems requirements.
Table 1 highlights some of the 23 trade studies conducted by the winning
design agent, Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipyard and

Raytheon.

Table 1: Selected DD( X) Destroyer Trade Studies Conducted by Northrop
Grumman Ingalls Shipyard and Raytheon, from 1998- 2002

Study topic Scope of analysis

Command center design Incorporated analytic processes from Westinghouse
Electric commercial nuclear power plant design efforts. Operator crewing*
propulsion, electrical, and auxiliary plant Studied processes and toured
U. S. N. S. Red Cloud, a operated by Maersk Line Limited, Inc, b to

gain insight into civilian crewing of noncombat portions of ship
operations. Food service Investigated commercial advanced food service
program used by many hotel chains. Damage control Investigated chemical
plant firefighting methods, particularly telerobotics, for inclusion in
the

automated fire suppression system engineering development model. Cognitive
work analysis This process, which was the foundation of the human systems
integration effort, was

developed in the Netherlands. Training concepts Investigated Ford Motor
Company distance learning and *Just- in- Time* training system for their

maintenance and service department personnel. Remote equipment monitoring
Received briefings on the Delta Airlines and Boeing Corporation remote
monitoring capability

of in- flight data from their commercial airline fleet. Facility
maintenance/ cleaning Reviewed design requirements and practices of Maersk
Line, Ltd., for reductions in the work

required for common area cleaning and maintenance. Self- service laundry
Reviewed Maersk Line, Ltd., use of self- service laundry on its United
States Naval Ship

contract ships. Reviewed both reliability of the equipment and crew
satisfaction. Ashore administrative, personnel, and disbursing service
Reviewed program provided by Northrop Grumman Information Technology to
the Navy at the

precommissioning sites. Reduced bridge watchstanders Investigated United
States Naval Ship and commercial operations with Maersk Line, Ltd., as

well as Navy Smart Ship and Sperry Integrated Bridge System programs.
Portable computing Investigated wearable computers developed by Boeing in
Seattle, Washington, and the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Media Lab at Cambridge,
Massachusetts. Source: Navy.

a U. S. N. S. Red Cloud is a Watson- class large, medium speed, roll- on/
roll- off sealift ship. The ship is operated by the Military Sealift
Command and crewed by contract civilian mariners. b Maersk Sealand is one
of the largest liner shipping companies in the world, serving customers
all

over the globe.

Appendix IV: Summary of DD( X) Destroyer Gold Team Trade Studies

Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and DD( X) Crew Sizes

Page 42 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing Plans for the DD( X) destroyer
envision significant reductions when compared to previous destroyer ships
in the number of crewmembers

required to man watches, provide support functions, and perform special
evolutions. For example, DD( X) plans call for 20 watchstations, requiring
60 billets, 1 a significant reduction from the DDG 51 destroyer, which has

61 watchstations requiring 163 billets. Similarly, DD( X) ship crew sizing
studies project that 833 hours will be required per week for own unit
support functions such as administration, messing, and supply while the
DDG 51 requires 5,500 for the same functions. To achieve these proposed
reductions, the DD( X) plans to employ a new operational crewing concept,
human- centered design and reasoning systems, advances in ship cleaning
and preservation, a new maintenance strategy, an automated

damage control system, and *reach back* technologies and distance support.
Officials emphasized that the DD( X) plans will continue to evolve as the
program matures. In addition, changes to the DD( X) destroyer*s
operational requirements, which are currently being reevaluated, will
likely further affect these estimates.

The approach to operational crewing on the DD( X) destroyer will differ
markedly from that employed on legacy ships. The older ship classes tend
to have legacy systems and watchstations that are *stovepiped,* meaning

that they maintain separate stations and databases for such things as
sensors, weapon systems, and logistics, which are not linked together and
which require people to be specially trained on these systems. This
results

in an inflexible work environment in which commanders are unable to level
workload across watchstanders because they are trained in separate
disciplines. It requires extra people, with little increase in capability.
The

DD( X) concept is to have watchstanders trained functionally across
warfare areas who can be flexibly employed as the situation demands. This
approach results in a more compact, flexible watch team, which requires
fewer augmentations and which is designed to flexibly respond to a variety
of tactical situations. Underpinning this concept is a strategy in

which crewmembers will be highly trained across multiple warfare areas or
maintenance tasks and advanced skills will apply across multiple
disciplines with specialized skills only being used periodically.

1 Watchstations are manned in three sections, or 8- hour shifts, over the
course of a day. Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and DD( X) Crew Sizes

DD( X) Operational Crew Size Concept

Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and DD( X) Crew Sizes

Page 43 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing The DD( X) destroyer envisions
reducing underway watchstanding through greater use of human- centered
design and reasoning systems such as

 integrated bridge system technologies demonstrated in CG 47

Ticonderoga- class *smart ship* and many commercial ships that provide
computer- based navigation, planning and monitoring, automated radar
plotting, and automated ship control; 2  the integrated command
environment that provides reduced combat

information center crewing by using *multi- modal watchstation* type
displays, the ability to monitor more than one watchstation at each
console, and the use of decision support systems to facilitate
instantaneous situational awareness;  computerized engineering control
systems that are extensively used in the commercial shipping industry and
machinery space design that permits

zero underway crewing by using remote monitors and sensors; and  a
flexible watch team- type organization.

The DD( X) destroyer plans to use advances in ship cleaning and
preservation to free sailors from traditional maintenance and preservation
duties and privatizing the preservation work that cannot be engineered

away. Reliability- centered maintenance 3 and condition- based maintenance
4 concepts will be employed on the DD( X) instead of the traditional
planned maintenance system currently used on DDG 51 destroyers. This
change is expected to reduce noncorrective type maintenance and
significantly reduce corrective maintenance induced by the planned
maintenance

2 According to the Smart Ship Assessment Report, the experiment aboard a

Ticonderoga- class guided missile cruiser has reduced workload and ship
crewing requirements while enhancing combat readiness and improving the
crew*s quality of life. The experiment validated the use of cost-
effective commercial technology and policy changes to allow sailors to
focus on their war fighting and professional skills by freeing them from
repetitive tasks.

3 Reliability- centered maintenance is a maintenance scheme based on the
reliability of the various components of the system or product in
question. It requires extensive knowledge about the reliability and
maintainability of the system and all of its subsequent components,
including the mean time to repair and failure rates of the product or
system. Implementing this kind of preventative maintenance program can
greatly reduce the cost of ownership.

4 The objective of condition- based maintenance is to accurately detect
the current state of mechanical systems and accurately predict systems*
remaining useful lives. This enables organizations to perform maintenance
only when needed to prevent operational deficiencies or failures,
essentially eliminating costly periodic maintenance and greatly reducing
the likelihood of machinery failures. Human- Centered Design and Reasoning

Systems Advances in Cleaning and Preservation

Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and DD( X) Crew Sizes

Page 44 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing system. In addition, routine
maintenance on the DD( X) is projected to be reduced by increased
equipment reliability and a strategy of replacing failed components on
board instead of repairing them at sea. Lastly, cleaning is expected to be
reduced by better ship design that capitalizes on commercial shipping
industry best practices such as cornerless spaces and maintenance- free
deck coverings.

The DD( X) destroyer maintenance strategy focuses on allowing sailors to
concentrate on war- fighting tasks and skills rather than on ship
maintenance and preservation (i. e., *rust busting* skills). The DD( X)
maintenance strategy envisions no organizational level repair conducted on
the ship. As such, many repair watches have been eliminated. Three

key elements of the DD( X) maintenance strategy include  reducing
maintenance requirements through improved system reliability

and redundancy and to leverage labor- saving advances in corrosion control
materials and technology,  improving maintenance work efficiency by
conducting condition- based

maintenance instead of scheduled maintenance, and  using reach back and
remote monitoring support while deployed.

The DD( X) destroyer will employ extensive automated damage control
systems, integrated with an optimally manned damage control organization
to quickly suppress and extinguish fires and control their spread. The DD(
X) destroyer plans to use *reach back* technologies and distance

support to reduce crew workload. *Tele- systems* initiatives are being
studied for ship crew reduction in the areas of medicine, personnel, pay,
training, and maintenance. DD( X) also envisions having real- time
collaboration between the ship and shore, and between ships. Ships would
access expertise from the systems commands, industry, and other deployed
ships on a year round, around the clock basis.

Table 2 compares the workload and crew composition for the DDG 51 Flight
IIA and those proposed for the DD( X). DD( X) Maintenance

Strategy Automated Damage Control System Use of Reach Back

Technologies and Distance Support

Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and DD( X) Crew Sizes

Page 45 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing Table 2: Comparison of
Watchstations for the DDG 51 Flight II A and the DD( X) DDG51 Flight II A
watchstations DD( X) watchstations a Position( s) No. Position No.
Potential workload reduction enablers

Tactical action officer 1 Tactical action officer 1 No change anticipated
Combat systems coordinator Own ship display controller Combat systems
office of the

watch/ combat system maintenance supervisor Fire control supervisor Radar
repairman Computer repairman Display repairman Electronics support
supervisor 8 Command center warfare officer 1  DD( X) maintenance
strategy (increase

reliability and replace instead of repair) will eliminate need for on-
station repairmen

 Automated damage control system Combat information center

supervisor 1 Watch supervisor cross warfare

area advanced 1 No change anticipated Engineering officer of the watch
Propulsion/ auxiliary control

console operator Electrical plant control

console operator Engine room operator Auxiliary system monitor Engine room
operator Propulsion system monitor Damage control/ integrated

survivability management system operator Sounding and security watch 9
Engineering officer of the watch 1  Use of condition- based maintenance

philosophy and reliability- centered maintenance instead of planned
maintenance system

 Increased systems reliability

 Use of monitors and sensors

 System redundancy

 Speedy *plug & play* repairs  Automated damage control system Tactical
information

coordinator Local area network manager 2 Information dominance advanced 1
Human- centered design and reasoning

systems with integrated information displays

Intelligence console operator Intelligence console operator Tactical
intelligence operator 3 Cross warfare area basic

(intelligence) 1 Human- centered design and reasoning systems with
integrated information

displays b Communications supervisor Communication systems

manager Communications systems

operator No. 1 3 Cross warfare area basic

communications 1 Human- centered design and reasoning systems with
integrated information

displays Electronic warfare supervisor Damage control console

operator Super rapid blooming off-

board chaff operator Identification supervisor

4 Information dominance advanced 1  DDG 51 workload involves electronic
warfare *soft kill* signatures management. Improved signatures on the DD(
X) will negate the need for countermeasures and chaff operators.

 Human- centered design and reasoning systems with integrated information
displays

 Automated damage control system

Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and DD( X) Crew Sizes

Page 46 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing DDG51 Flight II A
watchstations DD( X) watchstations a Position( s) No. Position No.
Potential workload reduction enablers

Antiair warfare coordinator Missile system supervisor Radar system
controller

3 Cross warfare area advanced (Antiair warfare) 1  Multifunction radar
provides improved capability and reduced human anti- air warfare workload

 Human- centered design and reasoning systems with integrated information
displays Land attack warfare

coordinator c 1 Land attack warfare specialist 1 No change anticipated Gun
fire control system console operator Tomahawk weapons system

supervisor 2 Cross warfare area basic (land attack warfare) 1 Human-
centered design and reasoning

systems with integrated information displays

Tomahawk weapons system operator Tomahawk weapons system

operators (+ 3) d 2 Cross warfare area advanced 1 Human- centered design
and reasoning systems with integrated information

displays Quarter master of the watch Boatswain mate of the watch

ship control 3 Assistant officer of the deck 1 Human- centered design and
reasoning

systems with integrated information displays

Junior officer of the deck 1 Junior officer of the deck 1 No change
anticipated Officer of the deck Messenger Surface detector tracker Lookout
starboard Lookout port Lookout aft Signal watch Supervisor/ operator

recorder 8 Officer of the deck 1  Change to current Navy policy and

procedures for bridge crewing  Use of cameras

 Electronic log keeping

 Improved communications

 Integrated bridge system Surface/ subsurface/

engagement control officer warfare coordinator Surface/ subsurface warfare

supervisor 2 Cross warfare area basic

integrated air/ surface dominance 1 Human- centered design and reasoning
systems with integrated information

displays Undersea warfare coordinator sonar supervisor

2 Cross warfare area basic undersea warfare 1 Human- centered design and
reasoning

systems with integrated information displays Undersea warfare console

operator Undersea warfare console

operator Undersea warfare console

operator 3 Undersea warfare specialist 1 Human- centered design and
reasoning

systems with integrated information displays

Air intercept controller Antisubmarine/ surface

tactical air controller Unmanned aerial vehicle

controller e 3 Antisubmarine/ surface tactical air controller 1 Human-
centered design and reasoning

systems with integrated information displays

Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and DD( X) Crew Sizes

Page 47 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing DDG51 Flight II A
watchstations DD( X) watchstations a Position( s) No. Position No.
Potential workload reduction enablers

Flex watchstation cross warfare area f 1

Total (163 watch billets over a 3 section watch) g 61 Total (60 watch
billets over a 3 section watch) 20 Source: Navy

a This table was created by us based on data provided by Naval Sea Systems
Command (PMS 500). Watchstation numbers for the DDG 51 Flight II A
destroyer are from the ship*s Preliminary Ship Manning Document, dated
October 5, 2002, version for Flight IIA. Watchstation numbers for the DD(
X) destroyer are from the design agent*s (Gold Team) Phase III working
document dated September 26, 2002, which reflects a summary of the design
agent*s Phase II crewing studies. Officials stated that this is the
closest comparison possible from the DDG 51 to the DD( X). They noted that
not all responsibilities clearly map to the new system. Officials also
stated that these numbers will continue to evolve as the program matures.
This table has been reviewed by PMS 500 officials for accuracy and
includes official comments provided to us on November 18, 2002. b
Officials noted that intelligence system requirements will be dictated to
DD( X) and that achieving

reductions in this area relies heavily on successful software development
efforts. The DD( X) design agent is currently working on this area. c This
is one of six DDG 51 watchstations for land attack.

d This is three of six DDG 51 watchstations for land attack. e This is one
of six DDG 51 watchstations for land attack. f This position provides
flexibility in the event of workload surges. g Total does not equal 3
times 61 due to the fact that some watches are not always manned.

In addition to the daily shipboard routine of standing watches in the
various ship*s departments, designated crewmembers also have collateral
duties to support special events, referred to as special evolutions. These

evolutions involve activities such as underway replenishment of fuel, food
and ammunition transferred from either helicopters or other ships, flight
operations, small boat operations, and anchoring. The number of people
required and the estimated labor hours per week for these special
evolutions are other indicators of ship workload. Table 3 compares the
number of billets and weekly workload required for selected special
evolutions on the Arleigh Burke- class destroyer with those estimated for
the DD( X) destroyer. Table 3 compares the billets and labor hours
required per week for special evolutions on the DDG 51 Flight IIA and
those proposed for the DD( X).

Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and DD( X) Crew Sizes

Page 48 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing Table 3: Comparison of Crew
Size for Selected Special Evolutions on DDG 51 Flight IIA and DD( X)
Destroyers DDG 51 Flight IIA DD( X) Gold Team Phase II Evolution Billets

Labor hours per

week Billets Labor

hours per week Change in

billets Percent

change in labor hours

Fueling at sea 57 228 9 11.61 48 -95 Connected replenishment 38 19 12 6.12
26 -68 Vertical replenishment 32 7.8 11 5.61 21 -28 Boat operations 15 8.4
6 5.67 9 -33 Flight operations 41 351 16 87.50 25 -75 Restricted
navigation operations 12 12.2 3 .93 9 -92 Towing/ towed 41 5.9 7 3.13 34
-47 Source: Navy.

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 49 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing Appendix VI: Comments from the
Department of Defense

Note: A GAO comment supplementing those in the report text appears at the
end of this appendix.

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 50 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing See comment 1.

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense Page 51 GAO- 03- 520
Optimized Ship Crewing

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense Page 52 GAO- 03- 520
Optimized Ship Crewing

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense Page 53 GAO- 03- 520
Optimized Ship Crewing

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 54 GAO- 03- 520 Optimized Ship Crewing The following is GAO*s comment
on the Department of Defense*s letter dated May 12, 2003.

1. We disagree that the tone of our report implies a lack of interest or
desire on the part of program managers to pursue manpower reductions.
Rather, our report notes that a number of factors, including funding
issues, create barriers that make it more difficult for program managers
to pursue manpower reductions and develop robust human systems integration
programs. Moreover, we agree that resourcing human systems integration and
supporting analyses at the earliest stages of the program is a
responsibility that does not wholly reside with the program manager but is
shared by the Navy staff. As our report clearly points out, given the
existing barriers and an absence of specific requirements to implement a
comprehensive human systems integration approach, the JCC( X) and LHA( R)
programs did not identify or request resources for performing human
systems integration and related analyses to support the research and
development required to pursue advanced technology that could have enabled
workload and manpower reductions. GAO*s Comment

(350269)

The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm
of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of
the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of
public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO*s commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through the Internet. GAO*s Web site (www. gao. gov) contains abstracts
and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding
archive of older products. The Web site features a search engine to help
you locate documents using key words and phrases. You can print these
documents in their entirety, including charts and other graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as *Today*s Reports,* on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full- text document files.
To have GAO e- mail

this list to you every afternoon, go to www. gao. gov and select
*Subscribe to daily E- mail alert for newly released products* under the
GAO Reports heading.

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to: U. S. General Accounting Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D. C. 20548 To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512- 6000

TDD: (202) 512- 2537 Fax: (202) 512- 6061

Contact: Web site: www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm E- mail:
fraudnet@ gao. gov Automated answering system: (800) 424- 5454 or (202)
512- 7470 Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@ gao. gov (202) 512-
4800

U. S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.
C. 20548 GAO*s Mission Obtaining Copies of

GAO Reports and Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal
Programs Public Affairs
*** End of document. ***