Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues
Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces (02-MAY-03, GAO-03-505).
Recent operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the dangers of
providing air support close to troops on the ground. Such close
air support requires timely, well-practiced procedures and
communication between ground and air elements. While most close
air support operations in Afghanistan were successful, "friendly
fire" incidents have resulted from mistakes made while conducting
the mission. At the request of the Ranking Minority Members of
the Subcommittees on Total Force and Readiness, House Committee
on Armed Services, GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD)
efforts to provide adequate close air support training, as well
as efforts to enhance the equipment used to support this mission.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-505
ACCNO: A06800
TITLE: Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment
Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces
DATE: 05/02/2003
SUBJECT: Air defense systems
Defense capabilities
Defense operations
Military aircraft
Military training
A-10 Aircraft
B-52 Aircraft
F-16 Aircraft
F/A-18 Aircraft
******************************************************************
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GAO-03-505
Report to the Ranking Minority Members, Subcommittees on Total Force and
Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
May 2003 MILITARY READINESS
Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground
Forces
GAO- 03- 505
The Department of Defense has had limited success in overcoming the
barriers that prevent troops from receiving the realistic, standardized
close air support training necessary to prepare them for joint operations.
This is the result of four interrelated factors: (1) ground and air forces
have limited opportunities to train together in a joint environment; (2)
home station training is often restricted and thus does not always provide
realistic training to prepare troops to perform the mission; (3) the
services use different training standards and certification requirements
for personnel responsible for coordinating close air support; and (4)
within the individual services, joint close air support training is often
a lower priority than other missions. While the department recognizes the
need to improve the training for the mission, progress has been slow on
many of the issues because the services have been unable to agree on joint
solutions. In the interim, U. S. troops
engaged in joint close air support missions are forced to conduct last-
minute training or create ad hoc procedures on the battlefield.
Efforts to enhance the capabilities of the equipment used to perform the
joint close air support mission have not kept pace with precision weapons
capabilities and as a result do not achieve DOD*s goals for
interoperability and cost- effectiveness. Advanced systems improve the
accuracy of battlefield information and can speed the transmission of
information from the troops on the ground to attacking aircraft. However,
the services have acquired equipment that is not able to communicate
across the services, a key requirement in joint operations. Moreover, the
services are procuring equipment independently to meet individual service
needs, thereby missing opportunities to achieve cost benefits from joint
service purchases.
Typical Steps Required in the Final Coordination of a Close Air Support
Mission
MILITARY READINESS
Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground
Forces
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 505. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Neal Curtin at (757) 552- 8100 or curtinn@ gao. gov.
Highlights of GAO- 03- 505, a report to the
Ranking Minority Members of the Subcommittees on Total Force and
Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services May 2003
Recent operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the dangers of providing air
support close to troops on the ground. Such close
air support requires timely, wellpracticed procedures and communication
between ground and air elements. While most close air support operations
in
Afghanistan were successful, *friendly fire* incidents have resulted from
mistakes made while
conducting the mission. At the request of the Ranking Minority Members of
the Subcommittees on Total Force and Readiness, House Committee on Armed
Services, GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to provide
adequate close air support training, as well as
efforts to enhance the equipment used to support this mission. GAO is
recommending several initiatives to provide the leadership and
accountability needed to resolve the lingering close air support training
shortfalls. GAO is also recommending actions to achieve greater equipment
interoperability among the services.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the report*s
recommendations and is in the process of establishing specific completion
dates for initiatives that will address the lingering training
and equipment interoperability shortfalls.
Page i GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
Background 4 Despite DOD*s Efforts, Joint Close Air Support Training
Deficiencies Remain 6 Lack of Equipment Interoperability and Coordinated
Purchases Hampers Effectiveness of Close Air Support Mission Programs 19
Conclusions 25 Recommendations for Executive Action 26 Matters for
Congressional Consideration 26 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 28
Appendix II Examples of DOD Aircraft That Perform Close Air Support 32
Appendix III Joint Close Air Support Training and Friendly Fire Accidents
34
Appendix IV 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan 35
Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 36
Tables
Table 1: Number of Practices Required Annually by Ground Controllers to
Maintain Currency 15 Table 2: Air Force and Marine Corps Acquisitions
Programs for Ground- Targeting Equipment 24 Table 3: Units and Locations
Included on This Assignment 29 Table 4: Close Air Support Aircraft 32
Table 4: Continued 33 Contents
Page ii GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Table 5: Training and Friendly Fire Incidents since the Persian Gulf War
34 Table 6: 2001 Action Items Status 35 Figures
Figure 1: Typical Steps Required in the Final Coordination of a Close Air
Support Mission 5 Figure 2: Percentage of Time That Close Air Support
Operations
Met Ground Commander*s Intent at Army*s National Training Center (Calendar
Years1998- 2000) 9 Figure 3: Percentage of Correct Attack Decisions for
Combined
Visual and Digital Systems, Digital Systems Alone, and Visual and Voice
Communication 20 Figure 4: Digital Transmission Capabilities between
Ground
Controllers and Selected Aircraft 21 Figure 5: Selected New Ground-
Targeting Equipment Procurements 23 This is a work of the U. S. Government
and is not subject to copyright protection in the
United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety
without further permission from GAO. It may contain copyrighted graphics,
images or other materials. Permission from the copyright holder may be
necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted materials separately
from GAO*s product.
Page 1 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
May 2, 2003 The Honorable Vic Snyder Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee
on Total Force Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
Readiness Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
The success or failure of our military forces in combat is directly linked
to the realism and thoroughness of their training beforehand. This axiom
is especially true when aircraft are needed to deliver bombs on targets
close to troops on the ground. Such close air support requires painstaking
coordination between air and ground elements. Timely, well- practiced
procedures and communication are essential because close air support on
the battlefield often has to happen fast to achieve its objective. Failure
to respond to a call for air support can leave troops exposed to enemy
fire; however, mistakes in communications and targeting can result in
fatalities among friendly forces. In Afghanistan, close air support became
particularly critical because light forces were introduced into battle
without artillery, leaving air power as their sole means of fire support.
Though we completed our work before hostilities began in Iraq, this
operation also showed the increased importance of integrating air power
into the ground fight. While most recent close air support operations have
been successful, *friendly fire* incidents tragically illustrated the
dangers of the mission. Even before the war in Afghanistan, the Department
of Defense (DOD) had begun looking for solutions to long- standing
problems facing the close air support mission. Because joint close air
support is* by its nature* a joint mission that transcends any single
military service, DOD has formed steering groups and other interservice
task forces to examine the mission area. The working groups have addressed
a myriad of issues, but their primary focus has been on improving training
and
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
equipment interoperability 1 across the services in both the active and
reserve components. Because of concerns about such unfortunate *friendly
fire* occurrences, you requested that we review close air support training
and doctrine to ensure that the U. S. military is prepared for future
conflicts. You asked that we recommend any actions that DOD and the
services could take to improve close air support effectiveness while
simultaneously reducing risk to friendly forces. Thus, our objectives were
to assess efforts by DOD and the military services to (1) provide adequate
training for joint close air support missions and (2) enhance the
capabilities of the equipment used to support this mission. A detailed
description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.
DOD has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent troops
from receiving the realistic, standardized training that is needed to
prepare them for joint operations. In discussions with military officials
and during our visits to training sites, we found that adequate realistic
training 2 is often not available because of four lingering problems: (1)
Ground and
air forces have limited opportunities to train together in a joint
environment. When such joint training does occur, according to DOD reports
and unit officials, it is often ineffective. Data from national training
centers show that joint close air support training seldom meets the
expectations and needs of the ground commander. (2) Similarly, the
training that troops receive at their home stations is usually unrealistic
because of range restrictions; moreover, it lacks variety* for example,
pilots often receive rote, repetitive training because of limited air
space and other restrictions. (3) The services train their aircraft
controllers, who are the linchpin for close air support coordination, to
different standards.
The lack of universal standards hampers the ability of these controllers
to perform in a joint operation. (4) Finally, within individual military
services, the training for close air support missions is often given a
lower priority* in doctrine, school curriculum, and training exercises*
than other missions. For example, the Air Force focuses more on deep
strike and airto- air employment during large force exercises, while the
Army places
1 Interoperability refers to the ability of one system to provide and
accept information from another system. 2 Joint Publication 3- 09.3, Joint
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support, December 1995
(currently being revised). Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
more emphasis on training for artillery and the use of its own fire
support. While DOD has recognized the need to improve the effectiveness of
training the mission, 3 the steering committee tasked to implement the
action plan has been unable to resolve most of the plan*s 15 action items
because of the time and effort required to solve the issues and the
services* inability to reach agreement on them. DOD changed the
responsibility for chairing the executive steering committee to Joint
Forces Command in hopes of resolving the lingering interservice issues.
Until these problems are resolved, U. S. troops engaged in joint close air
support missions will be forced to conduct last- minute training or create
ad hoc procedures on the battlefield* practices that reduce the
effectiveness of the mission and increase the risk of injury or death to
friendly forces.
Efforts to enhance the capabilities of the equipment used in joint close
air support have not kept pace with precision weapons capabilities and, as
a result, do not achieve DOD*s goals for ensuring interoperability and
costeffectiveness. The services have acquired digital transmission systems
that are used to share information instantly between airborne and ground
personnel. However, these systems are not yet interoperable across the
services, potentially hampering their effectiveness in joint operations.
While the services have recognized the need for such a system and have
plans to field one by 2007, the absence of an interoperable system in the
near term limits the ability of air and ground forces to coordinate air
attacks efficiently and under all conditions. Moreover, the services have
acquired a variety of ground- targeting systems, which allow ground
controllers to accurately locate targets for attacking aircraft, but they
are not purchasing these systems cost- effectively. Although DOD has
tasked the services to develop joint requirements for ground- targeting
equipment, they have not yet completed them. As a result, the services are
procuring a variety of systems independently and may be missing
opportunities to achieve cost benefits from joint purchases.
We are making several recommendations to help resolve DOD*s lingering
close air support training shortcomings and ensure that equipment procured
for this mission is interoperable and meets interservice requirements. In
written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
stated that it concurred with our recommendations and is in the process of
establishing specific completion 3 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan,
November 2001.
Page 4 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
dates for each of the issues identified in the 2003 Joint Close Air
Support Action Plan. Close air support is an air action by either fixed
and rotary wing aircraft
against hostile targets which are near friendly forces and which require
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and maneuver of
those forces. Several different types of aircraft are assigned the close
air support mission; examples are described in appendix II. To be
successful, this type of combat mission requires detailed integration and
close
coordination between air and ground forces. 4 Air is only one type of fire
support available to ground forces* other forms include artillery,
mortars, and naval surface fires. Ideally, these fires will be integrated
to achieve the intended effect on the target. The controller plays the key
role in coordinating the close air support mission. The controller is
often located on the ground alongside maneuver forces; however, airborne
controllers may also control attacks. The controller is responsible for
ensuring that aircraft strike the target accurately while avoiding hitting
friendly troops. During battle, when a ground commander needs air support,
this specially trained controller initiates a call, using voice or digital
communications, to
the aircraft. The controller provides the attacking aircraft with the
location of the target as well as the position of any friendly troops in
the area. Based on this information, the aircraft*s crew directs the
plane*s bombs to the target. Figure 1 depicts a typical mission.
4 Joint Publication 3- 09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Close Air Support, December 1995 (currently being revised). Background
Page 5 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Figure 1. Typical Steps Required in the Final Coordination of a Close Air
Support Mission
Note: GAO analysis of DOD documents.
DOD is in the process of developing technologically advanced equipment to
improve the military*s ability to conduct close air support missions under
all types of conditions. Historically, such missions were conducted during
the day under favorable weather conditions. This allowed both aircrews and
ground controllers to visually acquire and attack ground targets. Today,
these missions are typically undertaken at night or under poor visibility
conditions. In addition, because the rules of engagement have placed
strict limits on collateral damage, the aircraft need to deliver munitions
precisely. For example, the use of bombers flying at high altitudes to
perform close air support in recent operations in Afghanistan shows how
the mission has evolved. Bombers carried out missions using precision
weapons from altitudes that prevented aircrews from visually acquiring
targets. The use of these weapons required controllers to provide more
accurate target information to the attacking aircraft. In
Page 6 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
addition, technological advancements in equipment continue to improve the
accuracy by which aircraft can strike their targets. For example,
equipment such as laser rangefinders and systems that allow controllers to
transmit information digitally improve accuracy and help mitigate the risk
of human error.
Significant differences exist in the services* approaches to close air
support. Controllers from the Air Force, Marine Corps, and special
operations forces attend different schools to learn the basics of
controlling attack aircraft. To support Army ground units, the Air Force
incorporates officers and enlisted controllers into Army units. These Air
Force personnel live and work with the Army and are intended to become an
integral part of the unit*s fire support staff. The Army must rely on
aircraft from other services during training or combat. In contrast, the
Marine
Corps uses its own aviators* on a rotational assignment with ground
forces* to control aircraft. The Marine Corps* attack aircraft squadrons
are attached to Marine expeditionary forces, and their primary mission is
to support ground forces. Day to day, this means that Marine Corps ground
commanders have attack aircraft at their disposal, allowing them to more
easily incorporate close air support into their training events. The
inherently joint nature of the mission requires that all the services
train together to be adequately prepared. Training is fundamental,
according to a DOD assessment of the mission area, because technological
advancements are *meaningless if not supported by training.*
DOD has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent troops
from receiving the realistic, standardized training that is needed to
prepare them for joint operations. These lingering problems include few
opportunities for ground and air forces to train together in a joint
environment, a lack of realistic training opportunities at troops* home
stations, differences in the training standards for aircraft controllers,
and the low priority placed on joint close air support training in the
services* school curriculum and exercises. While DOD has acknowledged the
need for more effective training in its 2001 Joint Close Air Support
Action Plan, it has been unable to resolve most of the plan*s action items
because of the time and effort required to resolve the issues and
disagreement among the services. Despite DOD*s
Efforts, Joint Close Air Support Training Deficiencies Remain
Page 7 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
According to joint doctrine, training must be habitually emphasized in a
joint training environment, and proficiency can only be obtained though
dedicated, realistic joint training. 5 Historical experience shows that
realistic training is critical to success in combat. Realistic training is
particularly important in the close air support mission where detailed
coordination is required to effectively deliver bombs close to friendly
forces. However, DOD has acknowledged that joint close air support mission
deficiencies have existed for many years. We reviewed documents from the
mid- 1990s that showed that shortfalls in close air support procedures
have led to decreased mission effectiveness and a greater chance of
fratricide. Recent operations in Afghanistan have demonstrated that the
military is placing an increased emphasis on joint close air support, but
some serious challenges remain. Many of the soldiers, pilots, and aircraft
controllers who are asked to perform this mission in combat told us that
they feel ill prepared to do so. Service personnel told us that it was
common for both pilots and ground controllers to be forced to learn
new procedures *on the fly* during actual combat operations. During our
unit visits, personnel from all services expressed concerns over their
ability to perform the joint close air support mission. These concerns
revolve around four interrelated factors, discussed below, which adversely
affect training.
Pilots, controllers, and ground commanders from the services that are
involved in joint close air support need to train together frequently in
order to develop confidence in one another and become familiar with one
another*s procedures. Without such regular exercises, pilots are not
willing to fully trust the instructions they receive from controllers, and
ground commanders are not confident that the air support will be timely
and accurate.
However, opportunities for the services to train together to prepare for
the joint close air support mission are infrequent. Within the United
States, there are primarily three training facilities that have the
necessary maneuver and air space to adequately train close air support
with both ground forces and attacking aircraft. These are the Army*s
National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; the Army*s Joint
Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the Marine Corps*
Air Ground Combat Center at Twenty- nine Palms, California. These training
centers
5 Joint Publication 3- 09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Close Air Support, December 1995 (currently being revised). Close Air
Support Training
Barriers Continue to Linger
Joint Training Opportunities Are Infrequent and Ineffective
Page 8 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
provide the maneuver space, airspace, and live ordnance delivery freedom
to train for this mission under simulated combat conditions that are not
available at home station training ranges. The centers are designed to
offer the most realistic and challenging battlefield experiences
available; however, units normally train at one of these locations only
once every 12 to 18 months and for only 3 weeks at a time.
Information collected from training exercises at the Army*s National
Training Center has pointed to the need for more training in joint close
air support procedures. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, which
collects and consolidates data from operations and training events,
identified several long- standing problems associated with the execution
of close air support during these exercises. For example, in 1995 it
reported that the full effects of the mission are rarely achieved during
training, and in 1998 it found that integration issues between Army and
Air Force personnel continued to hamper the execution of the mission and
may contribute to fratricides.
Observations made by the Secretary of Defense*s Joint Close Air Support
Joint Test and Evaluation task force further confirmed that significant
problems exist. Chartered in 1998, the task force has collected and
analyzed a large quantity of data from the Army*s National Training
Center. By early 2001, it had observed 22 simulated battles that included
more than 200 close air support sorties. One of the key conclusions from
its study is that close air support seldom achieved the outcome sought by
the ground commander during such training exercises. As figure 2 shows,
close air support operations met the ground commander*s intent* that is,
they destroyed or otherwise disrupted enemy troops* less than one- third
of the time. More often than not, close air support failed to meet the
ground commander*s needs.
Page 9 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Figure 2. Percentage of Time That Close Air Support Operations Met Ground
Commander*s Intent at Army*s National Training Center (Calendar Years1998-
2000) The task force attributed this low success rate to several factors,
in particular the lack of integration between the Air Force controllers
and Army fire support teams, whose mission is to coordinate different
types of firepower. Ideally, air power would be employed seamlessly along
with
artillery and other fire support. We heard frequently about this issue
from the commanders of Army units we visited in the United States,
Germany, and Korea. They told us that Army teams did not view assigned
aircraft controllers as a part of their teams and, thus, were not as
comfortable relying on the controllers to provide support as they were
with their own unit personnel. Army unit personnel work with the
controllers only a few times a month or during field training exercises.
Consequently, a deployed Army team may have to rely on controllers with
whom they have not worked during training and in whom they have not
developed confidence.
On the other hand, Air Force controllers who are trying to integrate
themselves into the Army structure must still report to Air Force
leadership, and thus they have to satisfy the needs of two different
commanders. Perhaps most telling, the task force observers also noted
Page 10 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
that integrating close air support was often an *afterthought* during
ground maneuver exercises. Some participants they interviewed expressed
concerns about how well they were prepared for the mission. Air Force
participants, for example, noted they did not get enough practice with the
Army*s teams, and Army participants pointed out that training for this
mission was often overlooked and underemphasized.
In addition to infrequent training opportunities, many of the unit leaders
and soldiers we interviewed expressed disappointment with the
effectiveness of the close air support training they received at the
Army*s training centers. Pilots told us that because training scenarios at
the centers are scripted to maximize training benefits for maneuver
forces, ground commanders fail to use aircrews effectively. In short,
available aircraft are underutilized, thus limiting the training pilots
receive. In the United States, personnel from the 18th Air Support
Operations Group told us that because the Army runs the training events,
nearly all of the training time at the centers is devoted to Army maneuver
tasks rather than to joint close air support. As a result, ground
controllers are often not included in
the planning and execution of missions. In Europe, personnel from the 4th
Air Support Operations Group told us that the Army limits their controller
training to an hour a day at the Army*s Combined Training Center at
Grafenwoehr, Germany. On the other hand, aircraft availability is
sometimes a problem. According to military officials, joint close air
support is planned into all exercises, but in many cases the aircraft do
not arrive for a variety of reasons, such as weather conditions and
mechanical problems. One brigade official told us that during his unit*s
last training center rotation in Germany, 12 sorties were planned, but
none was actually undertaken.
While the Marines are widely considered to be proficient at integrated
close air support training, the training they provide at the Twenty- nine
Palms training center, for example, is typically not joint. Marines supply
their own attack aircraft and ground controller assets to train for close
air support missions. Overall, the task force concluded that Marine Corps
ground controllers figure prominently in the development of offensive and
defensive operational plans and that the mission was generally well
planned and executed. However, the training center presents its own
challenges. The aircraft maneuver space is restrictive, a simulated enemy
rather than a well- trained opposing force is used, and the exercises
focus more on training than on evaluating capabilities.
Combined training events between U. S. and coalition forces are also
infrequent. For example, U. S. officials in Korea told us that Army and
Air
Page 11 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Force personnel rarely practice close air support with South Korean ground
controllers or aircrews. In addition, U. S. ground controllers and pilots
stationed in Korea and Germany said that barriers such as accents and the
use of nonstandard phraseology by foreign aircrews impact the
effectiveness of combined training. Dutch military officials told us that
it is difficult to train with U. S. personnel. While two combined training
exercises promote close air support training* Clean Hunter and Flying
Rhino* Dutch officials stated that U. S. ground controllers have not
participated. Furthermore, these officials said that while A- 10s from the
81st Fighter Squadron support Dutch ground controller training, this
relationship is informal and they cannot rely on U. S. support. U. S.
officials stated there are opportunities to train with coalition military
personnel. For example, Navy officials said that they schedule combined
training with British forces as part of their Joint Maritime Course.
Moreover, they told us that because the Navy does not own training ranges
in the European theater, it schedules training events with host nations to
gain access to live- fire ranges. In addition, U. S. Air Force officials
in Korea told us that they are planning to combine ground controller
training for both U. S. and South Korean personnel. Air Force and Navy
units also have limited opportunities for realistic joint training for air
support missions at their home stations, primarily because
of various air space and range restrictions. 6 For example, Air Force
officials in South Korea said that their pilots experience numerous
airspace restrictions near the demilitarized zone separating North and
South Korea. Because of such restrictions, the Air Force rarely
synchronizes its training with the U. S. Army or South Korean forces. This
impedes the Air Force*s ability to train all the integrated elements they
would need to have in combat. Moreover, Air Force officials told us that
because of live ordnance limitations during training, fighter pilots may
employ live munitions for the first time in combat, under hostile
conditions, and close to friendly forces. Because range limitations often
force units to perform air attacks from the same direction and oriented on
the same targets, training officials frequently refer to this limited
training
as *range close air support,* which means that it is done in a specific
way because of range restrictions rather than as it would be carried out
in
6 Such range limitations have been the subject of related GAO work,
including, Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not
Reflected in Readiness Reporting,
GAO- 02- 525 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 30, 2002) and Military Training: DOD
Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment on Training Ranges, GAO-
02- 614 (Washington, D. C.: June 11, 2002). Range Restrictions Limit Home
Station Training
Page 12 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
actual combat. In short, the training is not realistic, and its value is
diminished because trainees become familiar with the terrain and target.
The following are other additional examples of restricted training
environments: The Fort Bragg, North Carolina, range used by the 23rd
Fighter Group
has altitude and laser restrictions and prohibits the use of tactical
rockets. As a result, close air support cannot be realistically practiced.
The ground controllers from the 25th Air Support Operations Squadron in
Hawaii are not able to maintain their currency requirements 7 at their
home stations because there are no close air support aircraft available to
train them; thus, they must return to the mainland periodically to train.
Airspace restrictions in Germany force A- 10 pilots from the 81st
Fighter Squadron to train at altitudes of 17,000 to 20, 000 feet rather
than 5,000 feet, where the A- 10was designed to operate.
About 10 percent of last year*s planned close air support missions for
the 31st Fighter Wing in Italy were executed. In addition, the squadron
does not have a range where close air support can be undertaken with a
ground controller or where units can train at night.
Likewise, home station training for Navy pilots is limited not only
because of range restrictions but also because of the Navy*s 18- month
deployment cycles. Before they are deployed, Navy pilots are sent to the
Naval Strike Air Warfare Center at Fallon Naval Air Station, Nevada, for 4
weeks of
training. The proficiency pilots gain at Fallon, however, erodes during
their 18- month deployment cycle because they have access to few ranges,
many of which may be inadequate. A second challenge comes after
deployment, when the pilots return to their home stations. According to
Navy personnel, the pilots* mission skills continue to erode because they
have limited access to aircraft and equipment, and they are restricted to
using only local ranges for training that they feel is inadequate. Marine
7 A currency requirement is the frequency with which a skill needs to be
practiced during a given period of time.
Page 13 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Corps pilots at units we visited echoed the concerns voiced about range
restrictions and the lack of varied training opportunities. For example:
Dare County Bomb Range, North Carolina, has only a 7- mile range when 30
miles is necessary for the F/ A- 18 to effectively employ air- toground
weapons for close air support training. 8 One range attached to the
Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, North
Carolina, is not much larger than the Dare County range and is considered
inadequate for effective close air support training. Another range near
the air station prohibits the use of live ordnance. While range
restrictions curtail realistic home station training
opportunities, Air Force and Marine Corps personnel told us that a close
air support simulator device could provide a mechanism to augment live
training opportunities. For example, officials said that the development
of a ground controller simulated training device, linked to an attack
aircraft simulator, would provide valuable training for both controllers
and pilots.
DOD recognizes that simulators can enhance the planning, preparation, and
training for close air support. According to its capstone requirements
document, simulators enable units to practice the communication and
coordination procedures associated with the close air support mission when
constraints prohibit live- fire training. However, the United States does
not currently own any close air support simulated training devices. 9 In
Europe, the Air Force has arranged to lease simulator time from the
Dutch military. We visited the training facility in the Netherlands and
observed controllers using the device to practice simulated close air
support missions. Both Dutch and U. S. officials believe such a simulator
provides the capability to train close air support effectively in a safe
environment.
The individual services and the special operations communities do not use
common certification or currency requirements to train their aircraft
controllers. For initial certification, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps operate formal schools that have curriculums based on the individual
8 The 30- mile standard is documented in the Navy*s Top Gun manual, Volume
IV * Employment/ Tactics, May 2002. 9 After completion of our audit work,
Air Force officials indicated that they have incorporated extremely
limited simulated close air support training devices in their Joint
Firepower Course. Inconsistent Controller Training Hampers Joint
Operations
Page 14 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
services* interpretation of DOD*s Joint Publication 3- 09.3, Joint Tactics
Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support (1995). Overall, this
initial instruction is fairly common among the schools, and the Navy and
Marine Corps schools have the same requirements. The Air Force and the
Navy/ Marine Corps curriculums cover such topics as intelligence,
equipment operation, integration of close air support with other fires,
and battle damage assessments. However, the time devoted to each topic, as
well as the specific instructional material presented, varies among the
services. Two notable differences exist in initial certification
requirements between the Navy/ Marine Corps and the Air Force programs.
The Navy/ Marine Corps program requires its controllers to practice close
air support with a variety of aircraft, including helicopters. The Air
Force does not require helicopter practice because it does not have combat
helicopters in its conventional force, and the Army does not use its
helicopters in a close air support role. A second difference is that the
Navy/ Marine Corps requires its controllers to practice coordinating live
indirect fire support, such as artillery. The Air Force does not require
practice with live artillery for its initial certification. Usually, the
Army coordinates the use of indirect fires on the battlefield. The
controller certification debate is further complicated by the fact that
NATO certification requirements are more demanding and comprehensive in
some areas than those for U. S. personnel. For example, NATO standards
require controllers to have 12 successful low- level controls, controlling
close air support attacking aircraft at altitudes below 500 feet, to be
qualified. No such standard exists for U. S. controllers.
Once schooling is complete and controllers are sent back to their units,
they are required to maintain a level of proficiency throughout the year.
These annual currency requirements vary by service. (See table 1.) For
example, the Marine Corps and Air Force require controllers to practice 12
times a year to remain current, while NATO controllers need 24 practices.
Page 15 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Table 1. Number of Practices Required Annually by Ground Controllers to
Maintain Currency
Total number of practices Number of
daylight practices Number of nighttime practices
Marine Corps 12 8 4 Air Force 12 10 2 NATO 24 20 4 Source: DOD and NATO.
Note: GAO analysis of DOD and NATO training publications. 10 Likewise,
currency requirements for controllers in the special operations
community differ among the Air Force, Navy, and Army because they are
required to meet their service- directed requirements. Special operations
controllers receive their initial certification by attending one of the
service schools. However, the services have different requirements for
maintaining their controllers* status. In fact, only Air Force special
operations controllers have a specific annual currency requirement to
maintain. Because of this situation, some personnel we interviewed told us
that during operations in Afghanistan, ground commanders were hesitant to
have non- Air Force personnel directing close air support missions, and,
in most cases, asked to have Air Force ground controllers attached to
their special operations teams. In addition, it was not clear how recently
nonAir Force special operations controllers had practiced this skill,
adding to the ground commanders* reluctance to use them.
In interviews, controllers from conventional forces told us that while
they have currency standards to maintain, it is difficult to meet them.
According to Air Force officials, 50 percent of the assigned Air Force
ground controllers in Europe are not current in nighttime or live ordnance
controls. One contributing factor is that Air Force pilots can meet all of
their close air support training requirements using an airborne
controller, thus negating the need to provide air support for ground
controller
training. For example, according to personnel from the 81st Fighter
Squadron in Germany, less than 20 percent of their close air support
10 The publications are as follows: Marine Corps order P3500. 37, Aviation
Training and Readiness Manual vol. 9 Tactical Air Control Party Officer,
dated May 8, 2001; Air Force Instruction 13- 102, Air Support Operations
Center and Tactical Air Control Party Training and Evaluation Procedures,
dated September 1, 1996; Minimum Qualifications for Forward Air
Controllers, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Agreement
#3797, dated February 26, 1979.
Page 16 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
training sorties involve the use of a ground controller. Recognizing this
shortage, Air Force officials have requested funding for a simulator to
help train their ground controllers stationed in Europe.
Beyond certification and currency standards, some stark differences exist
in the procedures that U. S. and NATO forces use to pass target
information from ground controllers to attacking aircraft. U. S.
controllers are trained to use a standardized 9- linebriefing format,
while NATO troops use a 15- line briefing. This lack of commonality
creates a potentially hazardous battlefield situation in operations
involving U. S. military allies.
One of the primary reasons the services do not provide the training needed
to adequately prepare U. S. forces to plan and execute the joint close air
support missions is the low priority they give to this mission in
comparison with other training requirements. This lack of emphasis is
apparent in operational doctrine, school instruction, and the number of
pilot sorties devoted to close air support, all of which prevent aircrews
and controllers from developing their mission skills.
The Air Force has historically not placed a high priority on close air
support in its doctrine. Service officials we interviewed stated that the
Air Force tends to emphasize air- to- air and deep attack missions over
close air support. In our review of Air Force doctrine, we found that the
Air Force prioritizes air superiority, strategic attack, and air
interdiction missions because it views such missions as a more effective
and efficient use of its resources. While officials indicated that the Air
Force would provide joint
close air support when it was needed to support ground troops, they said
that it is more efficient to use the aircraft to attack enemies before
they come in contact with friendly forces.
Key Air Force and Navy pilot training schools also give a low priority to
close air support training in their curriculums. At the Air Force weapons
school, for example, only 13 percent of the F- 16*s flight syllabus is
devoted to this mission. Moreover, for pilots of the A- 10* an aircraft
primarily designed to perform close air support* only 31 percent of
Weapons School training sorties were for the mission. At the Navy*s air
warfare center, pilots receive 8 days of close air support training during
their 4- week course. However, because of the number of pilots attending
the course, the 8 days devoted to close air support only allow aircrews to
fly two close air support missions.
Furthermore, some Air Force unit training programs place low emphasis on
this mission. According to the Air Force, active duty F- 16 squadrons Some
Services Give Low
Priority to Joint Close Air Support Training
Page 17 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
stationed in the United States devote only about 5 percent of their
training sorties to close air support. In addition, an Air Force official
in Europe stated that less than 10 percent of his F- 16 squadron*s
training program is devoted to close air support, while 50 percent is for
air- to- air missions. Given the difficult nature of the mission, many
pilots believe that this level of training is not sufficient to develop
adequate mission skills.
According to DOD*s task force, the lack of integration between the Army*s
fire support elements and the Air Force*s ground controller personnel is
the top problem facing joint close air support training. Such poor
integration is primarily the result of the services* low emphasis on joint
training for this mission. We confirmed this conclusion during our visits
to various units. For example, Army commanders have been trained to use
direct and indirect fire, with joint close air support being used as a
last resort. Joint close air support is only one of a myriad of support
options available to ground force commanders that must be trained. Army
units rarely integrate close air support into training exercises outside
the training centers and, as a result, joint close air support integration
training is often unrealistic. In addition, the Air Force*s selection of
air liaison officers, who provide ground commanders with expertise on the
employment of joint close air support, shows a lack of Air Force
commitment and has added to the lack of confidence on the part of the Army
and the ground controllers. Both Army and Air Force personnel at several
locations we visited raised concerns that this position has not been
considered a career- enhancing position. These officers not only do not
get
a chance to fly but they also have to live in the *dirt* with Army forces
during various maneuvers. According to personnel, the best personnel, or
even those with extensive close air support training, have not filled this
position. However, according to Air Force officials in Europe, beginning
in 2000 the service implemented a change that elevates the selection of
candidates for this position to the same level as picking candidates for
flying and operational squadron support commands for their theater. This
should produce higher- quality candidates for the position.
The Marine Corps emphasizes close air support in its training and
considers integrating aviation with other supporting fires as a critical
element because it lacks the amount of artillery available to Army
commanders. However, Marine Corps training is usually limited to
practicing close air support with its own air assets supporting its own
ground forces. The Marines do not emphasize training these skills with
other services. We found that the Marines rarely conduct joint training
for this mission, which limits their ability to integrate on the
battlefield when they are called upon to perform this mission with others.
According to an
Page 18 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
internal Operation Enduring Freedom after- action report, investigators
found that Marine Corps ground controllers require more extensive joint
training opportunities, particularly for controlling air support in joint
operations. Even before the extensive use of close air support in
Afghanistan highlighted the potential dangers inherent in this mission,
DOD had acknowledged that action was needed to improve its effectiveness.
In an internal assessment, DOD concluded that current capabilities do not
meet all present or projected needs and that the joint community faces a
substantial challenge in attaining the new levels of capabilities required
to support emerging war fighting concepts. 11 In January 2000, the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council chartered an
executive steering committee to identify shortfalls across the mission
area. The steering committee developed a Joint Close Air Support action
plan to address a number of training and equipment interoperability
issues. The
training issues include such items as increasing joint training exercises;
establishing joint integrated training plans; and creating a *joint
terminal attack controller* with standardized certifications, which DOD
says will improve joint operations and reduce the potential for accidents
and fratricides. However, none of the action item target dates for
completion were met on time. In fact, only 3 of the 15 action items have
been completed to date, and the remaining 12 issues have rolled over into
the updated 2003 plan. The complete list of issues contained in the action
plan is included in appendix IV.
According to service personnel we interviewed, progress on resolving the
training issues has been slow because of the joint nature of the mission.
Getting agreement across the services is difficult because there are
fundamental differences in how the individual services employ close air
support. Moreover, no joint organization is responsible for overseeing the
training and equipping of the mission. Individual service and joint staff
representatives expressed frustration with the executive steering
committee*s inability to resolve the action items. The services have not
been able to agree on several of them. For example, the services disagree
on what to include in the joint terminal attack controller certification.
The
committee does not have the authority to require individual services to 11
Capstone Requirements Document for Close Air Support, JROCM 067- 02, May
6, 2002. DOD is Making Efforts to
Resolve Training Deficiencies
Page 19 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
train jointly or to compromise by developing common training standards for
their controllers. In October 2002, DOD changed the responsibility for
chairing the Joint Close Air Support Executive Steering Committee to Joint
Forces Command. Previously, the committee had been cochaired by the Air
Force and the Marine Corps. According to DOD officials, this
action was undertaken, at least in part, in hopes of resolving the
interservice issues. At Joint Forces Command, the Joint Requirements and
Integration Directorate (J8) serves as the lead joint integration expert,
ensuring that the various services and defense agencies combine their
capabilities into a single successful effort.
DOD has acknowledged that such deficiencies in joint training are not
limited to the close air support mission. In March 2002, DOD announced a
plan for transforming all of its training programs. This plan emphasizes
the need to provide comprehensive and systematic joint training focused on
the operational requirements of the combatant commanders. Furthermore, it
acknowledges a need for increasing the use of live and virtual training in
its training environment. According to DOD, a Joint National Training
Capability would be established to provide training that is less
servicefocused and more reflective of how U. S. forces actually fight
today. The first training event is scheduled for May 2003 and will focus
on Army maneuver forces at Fort Irwin, California; however, the event will
also include supporting forces at several locations across the United
States.
The military services have not yet achieved DOD*s goals for ensuring that
equipment acquired for close air support missions is interoperable and
cost- effective. The digital transmission systems that the services
procured
to transmit information instantly between airborne and ground personnel
are not interoperable across the services, and a common capability is not
expected to be fielded until 2007. The lack of interoperability does not
allow participants to take advantage of the increased effectiveness that
digital transmissions add to the mission. In addition, the services*
independent purchases of different kinds of ground- targeting equipment
have precluded them from achieving potential cost savings from joint
purchases.
Advanced technological systems that allow ground and air forces to
transmit battlefield information digitally can greatly improve the
effectiveness and timeliness of close air support missions. These systems
are designed to allow a ground controller to input the information needed
for a ground attack into a computer and transmit this information
instantly Lack of Equipment
Interoperability and Coordinated Purchases Hampers Effectiveness of Close
Air Support Mission Programs
Current Digital Transmission Systems Are Not Interoperable across the
Services
Page 20 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
to a computer on board an aircraft. The use of digital communication has a
number of advantages over visual or voice communication. Digital
transmissions speed up the execution of a mission and can reduce
transcription errors between the controllers and the pilots of attack
aircraft. For example, Marine Corps officials told us that the amount of
time required for transmitting and verifying coordinates could be reduced
from about 7 minutes (the time needed for voice communication) to less
than 1 minute for digital communication. Digital transmissions can also
enhance the effectiveness of a mission during darkness, in inclement
weather, or under other conditions when the ground controller may not be
in position to observe the aircraft. In addition, digital transmission
systems can transmit more detailed information, thereby improving the
*situational awareness* of both ground and air forces. For example,
digital systems can provide the ground controller*s mission computer with
detailed and constantly updated battlefield information, including the
position of the attack aircraft, verification of target acquisition, and
the location of friendly forces. According to tests performed at the
Army*s National Training Center during February 2002, the use of digitally
transmitted communication significantly improved mission performance. As
figure 3 shows, this equipment allowed ground controllers to provide the
correct attack decision more often (89 to 93 percent of the time) than
when they relied on only what they could see and communicate by voice to
the attack aircraft (correct 67 percent of the time).
Figure 3. Percentage of Correct Attack Decisions for Combined Visual and
Digital Systems, Digital Systems Alone, and Visual and Voice Communication
Page 21 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Digital transmission systems are currently available on only four types of
aircraft. The Air Force has installed this equipment on less than
threequarters of its active- duty F- 16 fighter aircraft 12 and has
procured a limited number of portable systems for its B- 52 bombers. The
Marine Corps has installed similar equipment on roughly 95 percent of its
AV- 8Bs and on about 20 percent of its F/ A- 18s. Because of the limited
number of aircraft with this equipment, ground controllers told us that
they have had few
opportunities to transmit information digitally to attack aircraft. Even
when digital transmission equipment is available on board an aircraft, it
may be incompatible with the equipment that is on the ground because the
services use different systems. This lack of interoperability across the
services reduces the equipment*s effectiveness and limits its usefulness.
Some ground controllers told us that they would hesitate to bring this
equipment to the battlefield because they would not be able to control
attack aircraft from another service. Figure 4 shows that only one (the
AV8B) of six aircraft that currently perform the close air support mission
is fully capable of receiving digital transmissions from its own service
controllers. However, none is capable of receiving such transmissions
across service lines.
Figure 4: Digital Transmission Capabilities between Ground Controllers and
Selected Aircraft
Note: GAO analysis of DOD data. 12 In addition to the active duty Air
Force effort to enhance digital transmission capabilities, the Air Force
Reserve and Air National Guard have developed the Situational Awareness
Data Link. However, primarily only Air Force Reserve and Air National
Guard F- 16s are equipped with this system.
Page 22 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Given the uncertainties surrounding equipment interoperability, ground
troops and aircrews may have to resort to using multiple means of
communication. In Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, for
example, the primary means of passing targeting information from
controllers to attack aircraft was by voice communication. Service
personnel who took part in these operations stated that the use of
multiple modes of communication was a cause of confusion on the
battlefield.
Recognizing that it needs to improve the interoperability of digital
transmission systems, DOD has developed a plan for the services to field
an interoperable system by 2007. This system, commonly called *Link 16,*
would provide an integrated air and ground display of friendly and enemy
battlefield positions. Link 16, as it is currently fielded, is limited to
air- toair missions, but DOD plans to expand its capabilities to include
the air- toground mission. In the interim, the Air Force and Marine Corps
are seeking ways to improve the interoperability of their current systems
by developing common software applications. However, these efforts are in
a preliminary stage and, according to DOD officials, it will be at least
2004 before the interim solutions are in place.
The services are independently procuring a wide variety of different
ground- targeting systems to improve their execution of close air support
missions. However, these service- specific purchases have not taken
advantage of the benefits of buying common equipment that could reduce
overall program costs.
The services are procuring new ground- targeting equipment to improve
their ability to undertake close air support missions during night
operations, in adverse weather conditions, and from increasingly higher
altitudes. In Afghanistan, for example, U. S. forces delivered precision
weapons from medium to high altitudes; this meant that ground controllers
had to determine target coordinates with precision in order to maximize
mission effectiveness and avoid fratricides. According to DOD
officials, recent technological advancements in ground- targeting
equipment are providing this needed precision. Figure 5 shows examples of
the equipment the services are procuring to enhance ground- targeting
capabilities. Services* Fielding of
Multiple Ground- Targeting Systems Do Not Take Advantage of Possible Cost
Savings
Page 23 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Figure 5: Selected New Ground- Targeting Equipment Procurements
Note: GAO generated based on DOD documents.
Each service has established its own program to acquire more advanced
systems to enhance the capabilities of its ground- targeting equipment.
The Air Force and Marine Corps, for example, have initiated acquisition
programs to buy equipment that will more precisely locate targets at all
levels of visibility, mark targets for attack by precision weapons, and
increase communication connectivity with all battlefield participants.
Table 2 provides an overview of the Marine Corps and Air Force programs,
which were initiated in 1997 and 1999, respectively.
Page 24 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Table 2: Air Force and Marine Corps Acquisitions Programs for Ground-
Targeting Equipment
Dollars in millions
Service Total program cost
Fiscal year 2004 budget
request Examples of groundtargeting equipment
Program fielding completion
date
Marine Corps $79.6 $29.8 Laser rangefinder
GPS receiver
Laser target designator
Multiband radio
Mission computer 2005
Air Force $344 $15.1 Laser rangefinder
GPS receiver
Multiband radio
Mission computer
Infrared laser 2011
Source: GAO. Note: GAO analysis of DOD data. In addition, the Army, Navy,
Air Force, and U. S. Special Operations Command have procured
technologically advanced ground- targeting equipment for their special
operations forces. This equipment was used during Operation Enduring
Freedom and, according to after- action reports, it significantly enhanced
the ground controllers* ability to identify ground targets for attack
aircraft, thereby improving mission effectiveness.
Although this equipment can improve mission effectiveness, because of the
lack of joint requirements, the services have fielded multiple types of
equipment with similar capabilities. For example, Special Operations
Command officials told us that U. S. forces used four different
groundtargeting systems in Operation Enduring Freedom. An analysis of the
services* procurement plans shows that a variety of similar ground
targeting equipment will be fielded. For example, the services have
programmed funding to procure at least six different laser rangefinders
and four different laser target designators.
DOD has determined that equipment commonality for the mission could reduce
overall program costs for the services. The Joint Close Air Support
Executive Steering Committee, for example, recommended that the Air Force
and Marine Corps identify opportunities for multiservice procurement of
ground- targeting equipment to meet joint requirements. U. S. Central
Command officials echoed the recommendation that U. S. forces should
acquire a common set of ground- targeting equipment and
Page 25 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
further emphasized that all forces should be trained in its use and
characteristics. However, with the services continuing to pursue
individual programs based on service- specific requirements, DOD cannot
provide assurances that the services are acquiring the most cost-
effective systems.
GAO has previously reported that DOD fails to consider joint solutions and
broader mission requirements when proposing systems. 13 While the services
conduct considerable analyses in justifying major acquisitions, these
analyses can be narrowly focused and may not fully consider alternative
solutions, such as joint acquisition of a system with other services. As a
result, there is no assurance that DOD and the services are avoiding
costly duplication of systems, investing in the most cost- effective and
affordable solutions, and optimizing mission performance.
Furthermore, because the services plan, acquire, and operate systems to
meet their own operational concepts, not necessarily the requirements of
joint operations, there is no guarantee that fielded systems will operate
together effectively. A joint acquisition strategy, based on broader
mission requirements, would provide assurances that the services are
acquiring systems that are cost- effective and function together during
joint operations.
DOD needs to provide better and more realistic training to prepare U. S.
forces for joint close air support operations. With forces growing
lighter, ground commanders may need to rely more heavily on close air
support.
Even a small mistake in conducting this mission can be deadly to friendly
forces, a tragedy we witnessed in Afghanistan. While ineffective training
is the fundamental problem facing close air support, technological
advancements hold promise for enhancing battlefield information. However,
the services have pursued solutions to meet their individual needs, and it
will be years before DOD takes advantage of the enhancements on a wide
scale. As a result, the services are spending millions of dollars on
uncoordinated efforts to obtain equipment, and different types of systems
are proliferating in the field.
DOD*s efforts to improve close air support training have met with limited
success. DOD*s Joint Close Air Support action plan has hit several
roadblocks* primarily because the services have been unable to agree on 13
U. S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks,
Department of Defense. GAO- 03- 98 (Washington, D. C.: January 2003).
Conclusions
Page 26 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
joint solutions. Thus, the solutions to long- standing problems will
likely have to come from an organization such as the Joint Forces Command.
DOD and the services understand the issues, but a strong commitment from
senior leadership may help to implement pending action items and address
lingering problems. Such problems may also be indicative of larger- scale
training concerns in the department. DOD recognizes that significant
challenges exist in delivering realistic joint training to prepare forces
for a wide range of missions, not just close air support. DOD*s plans to
create a Joint National Training Capability could ultimately provide a
venue for better joint training. Such training is certainly needed to
prepare U. S. troops to conduct close air support missions.
To resolve the lingering training and equipment close air support issues,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense give close air support priority
when implementing the department*s training transformation initiatives.
Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary provide the Commander of the
Joint Forces Command with the authority and
resources, if necessary, to resolve the issues identified in the joint
close air support action plan. The Command*s actions should include
emphasizing close air support as part of the department*s new Joint
National Training Capability to ensure that units receive realistic joint
training;
seeking ways to mitigate home station training limitations, including
the use of simulation to augment live training; and
preparing aircraft controllers to perform in a joint environment by
standardizing training and certifications.
We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint
Forces Command or other appropriate organizational entity, review the
services* plans for procuring advanced close air support equipment to
ensure that it is interoperable and meets valid joint requirements.
Because of the long- standing nature of training and equipment issues
associated with the joint close air support mission, Congress may wish to
consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to report on the progress the
department has made toward resolving the identified issues. Congress needs
this information to ensure that U. S. forces are adequately prepared to
perform the mission and that the department is making cost- effective
Recommendations for
Executive Action Matters for Congressional Consideration
Page 27 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
decisions in procuring equipment to enhance joint performance on the
battlefield.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it
concurred with our recommendations and has tasked the U. S. Joint Forces
Command with establishing specific completion dates for each of the issues
identified in the 2003 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan and to fully
implement them in a timely manner. DOD further stated that it would
provide a copy of the timetable to GAO by May 30, 2003. DOD*s comments are
reprinted in their entirety in appendix V.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air force, the Secretary of
the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon
request.
If you have any questions, please call me on (757) 552- 8100. Key
contributors to this report were John Pendleton, Laura Durland, Vincent
Balloon, Nancy Benco, Ray Carroll, Matthew Ullengren, and Lester Ward.
Neal P. Curtin Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Agency
Comments
and Our Evaluation
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 28 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
To determine what efforts the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services
have made in providing adequate training for the joint close air support
mission, we interviewed officials at all levels of DOD from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, and unit- level service
representatives both within the United States and overseas.
Specifically, we met with members of the Joint Close Air Support Executive
Steering Committee to document the actions they had been able to
accomplish in resolving the training shortcomings listed in their 2001
Joint Close Air Support Action Plan and to identify the reasons for their
lack of progress. In addition, we gathered data from each service to
determine, from the user*s perspective, what barriers were preventing
adequate training in close air support. We also obtained the training
curriculum from each service*s ground controller schools and analyzed
these documents, looking for commonalities and inconsistencies. Table 3
lists all of the major units, commands, and training facilities that we
visited or contacted to obtain our data.
To determine what efforts DOD has made to enhance the capabilities of the
equipment used to support the joint close air support mission, we obtained
the services* acquisition strategies for the specific equipment they were
procuring to enhance mission effectiveness. We interviewed service
personnel and obtained documentation to verify the value these
procurements added and to determine any barriers that would limit their
effectiveness. Once we determined that no joint requirement existed and
that the services were procuring interoperable digital transmission
devices and multiple variants of ground- targeting equipment, we obtained
documentation on the potential solutions for obtaining interoperable
common equipment. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 29 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Table 3. Units and Locations Included on This Assignment Army U. S. Army
Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Ala.
U. S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Ala. Combined Arms Center, Fort
Leavenworth, Kans. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth,
Kans. 101st Air Mobile Division, Fort Campbell, Ky. U. S. Army Artillery
Training Command, Fort Sill, Okla. U. S. Army Headquarters Europe,
Heidelberg, Germany Eighth U. S. Army, Yongsan Post, Republic of Korea 2nd
Infantry Division, Camp Casey, Republic of Korea 2nd Infantry Division,
1st Brigade, Camp Casey, Republic of Korea 25th Infantry Division,
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii
Air Force Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va. U. S. Air Force
Reserve Command, Warner- Robbins Air Force Base, Ga. U. S. Air Force
Doctrine Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Detachment 1, 334th Training
Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla. 23rd Fighter Group, Pope Air Force Base, N.
C.
18th Air Support Operations Group, Pope Air Force Base, N. C. 19th Air
Support Operations Center, Fort Campbell, Ky. U. S. Air Force Air Ground
Operations School, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. U. S. Air Force Weapons
School, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. 6th Combat Training Squadron, Nellis
Air Force Base, Nev. 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis Air Force
Base, Nev.
Detachment 1, 28th Test Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. 2nd
Operations Support Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La. 20th Bomber
Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La. 93rd Bomber Squadron (AF Reserve),
Barksdale Air Force Base, La. 96th Bomber Squadron, Barksdale Air Force
Base, La. 548th Combat Training Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La.
303rd Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo. 457th
Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base, Fort
Worth, Tex. 706th Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Joint Reserve Base, New
Orleans, La. U. S. Air Force Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany 81st
Fighter Squadron, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany 555th Fighter Squadron,
Aviano Air Base, Italy 32nd Air Ground Operations School, Germany 4th Air
Support Operations Group, Germany 1st Air Support Operations Squadron,
Germany
2nd Air Support Operations Squadron, Germany
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 30 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Headquarter Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii 7th Air
Force, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea 51st Operations Support Squadron,
Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea 51st Fighter Wing, Osan Air Base,
Republic of Korea 25th Air Support Operations Squadron, Hickam Air Force
Base, Hawaii
Navy Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Naval Air Station Fallon, Nev.
U. S. Naval Safety Center, Naval Air Reserve, Norfolk, Va. Naval Air
Forces- Atlantic Fleet, Naval Air Station Norfolk, Va. Strike Fighter
Wings Atlantic, Oceana Naval Air Station, Va. VFA- 136, Naval Air Station
Oceana, Va. VF- 211, Naval Air Station Oceana, Va. Expeditionary Warfare
Training Group Pacific, Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, Calif. U. S. Navy
Europe, London, England
Marine Corps Marine Corps, Aviation Plans, Policy, and Budget Branch,
Washington, D. C. Marine Corps, Plans, Policy, and Operations Department,
Washington, D. C. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va.
Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va. Marine Corps Warfighting Lab,
Quantico, Va. Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command, Twenty- nine
Palms, Calif. Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron- One, Yuma
Marine Corps Air Station, Ariz. 2nd Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, N. C.
2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N. C. Marine Air Group 14,
Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, N. C. Marine Air Group 29, New
River Marine Corps Air Station, N. C. Marine Air Group 31, Beaufort Marine
Corps Air Station, S. C. Marine Forces Pacific Command, Hawaii
Special Operations U. S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.
C. 3rd Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, N. C. 5th Special Forces Group,
Fort Campbell, Ky. 720th Special Tactics Group, Hurlburt Field, Fla. 19th
Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla. U. S. Special Operations
Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. U. S. Air Force Special Operations
Command, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
Joint Organizations Joint Combat Identification Evaluation Team, Eglin Air
Force
Base, Fla. Joint Close Air Support Joint Test & Evaluation Task Force,
Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. The Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Readiness and Training, Washington, D. C.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 31 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
The Joint Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments, Washington,
D. C. U. S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. U. S. Forces
Korea, Seoul, Korea U. S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Va. U. S. Pacific
Command, Hawaii Netherlands Royal Netherlands Army Combat Maneuver
Training Center,
Netherlands Source: DOD.
We conducted our review from April 2002 through March 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Examples of DOD Aircraft that Perform Close Air Support
Page 32 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
The services use many different aircraft to deliver close air support.
Table 4 provides pictures and brief descriptions of these aircraft.
Table 4: Close Air Support Aircraft
Appendix II: Examples of DOD Aircraft that Perform Close Air Support
Appendix II: Examples of DOD Aircraft that Perform Close Air Support
Page 33 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Table 4: Continued
Source: DOD.
Appendix III: Joint Close Air Support Training and Friendly Fire Accidents
Page 34 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
DOD and the services identified three close air support training mishaps
that resulted in fatalities since the Persian Gulf War and three official
joint close air support friendly fire events. Friendly fire is a
circumstance in which members of a U. S. or friendly military force are
mistakenly or accidentally killed or injured in action taken by U. S. or
friendly forces actively engaged with an enemy or who are directing fire
at a hostile force or what is thought to be a hostile force. According to
DOD personnel and
the conclusions reached in the investigations, these incidents have been
caused by human error, by not following established standardized
procedures, and by lack of experience and training. Two well- known events
did not meet our criteria and are thus excluded. The April 17, 2002,
incident where an Air National Guard F- 16 bombed Canadian troops did
not involve air support of ground forces, so it was not close air support.
Secondly, the July 1, 2002, *wedding party* incident in which civilians
were killed and injured is not by definition a friendly fire incident.
Table 5 contains a description of the close air support friendly fire and
training incidents and the status of the investigations.
Table 5. Training and Friendly Fire Incidents since the Persian Gulf War
Date Location Description of incident Who was hurt Status of
incident report Training Incidents July 18, 1995 Fort Sill, Oklahoma An
Air Force Reserve A- 10 aircraft
dropped a 500- pound bomb on a forward observation post.
One person was killed and 13 others injured.
Complete April 19, 1999 Atlantic Fleet Weapons
Training Facility, Vieques Island, Puerto Rico
A Marine FA- 18C dropped two 500- pound bombs that impacted outside the
live impact area but within the confines of the range.
One person was killed and 4 others injured.
Complete March 12, 2001 Udairi Range, Kuwait A Navy F/ A- 18C dropped
three 500-
pound bombs on an observation post during a night exercise.
Six people were killed and 11 others injured.
Complete
Friendly Fire Incidents November 26, 2001 Mazar- e Sharif, Afghanistan A
Navy F/ A- 18 aircraft dropped a joint
direct attack munition that exploded near friendly forces.
No fatalities and 5 others injured. Ongoing
December 5, 2001 Afghanistan A B- 52 bomber dropped a joint direct attack
munition that exploded near friendly forces.
Three people were killed and 19 others injured.
Complete March 2, 2002 Terghul Ghar,
Afghanistan During Operation Anaconda, an AC130 engaged coalition forces,
mistaking them for the enemy. One person was
killed and 3 others injured.
Complete Source: DOD.
Appendix III: Joint Close Air Support Training and Friendly Fire Accidents
Appendix IV: 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan Page 35 GAO- 03- 505
Military Readiness
The 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan contained 15 action items.
All of the items originally had completion dates tasked within fiscal year
2002. However, 12 of them have not yet been completed, and the executive
steering committee has recommended that they transition into the updated
2003 action plan. Table 6 lists the action items for 2001, their original
estimated completion dates, and whether the action item has been
completed.
Table 6. Status of Fiscal Year 2001 Action Items Action items Original
date for completion Completed
Standardize ground controller training. Jan. 2002 Standardize airborne
controller training. Mar. 2002 Expand air liaison officer course. Dec.
2001 Expand fire support element curriculum. Jan. 2002 Produce joint
mission essential task lists. Feb. 2002 Establish joint integrated
training plans. Jan. 2002 Increase use of simulated training. Jan. 2002
Increase joint exercises. Feb. 2002 Include new concepts in joint
publication 3- 09. 3. Periodic Yes Update service tactic techniques and
procedures to reflect joint publication 3- 09.3 revisions. Sep. 2002
Develop new concepts experiments to validate
systems and procedures. Feb. 2002 Publish a capstone requirements
document. Aug. 2002 Yes Explore joint Air Force- Marine Corps ground
controller equipment procurement. May. 2002 Standardize symbols and
graphics. Apr. 2002 Coordinate with Combat Identification action plan
team on overlapping issues. Apr. 2002 Yes Source: GAO. Note: GAO analysis
of DOD data. In addition to the 12 remaining items, of which 2 have been
combined, the
executive steering committee has proposed adding 3 new items to the
updated plan. These are the inclusion of unmanned aerial vehicles in joint
close air support operations, an increased emphasis on precision
targeting,
and an increase in live sortie and artillery resources. Appendix IV: 2001
Joint Close Air Support
Action Plan
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 36 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 37 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 38 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 39 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness (350192)
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