    Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues
    Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces (02-MAY-03, GAO-03-505).

    Recent operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the dangers of
    providing air support close to troops on the ground. Such close
    air support requires timely, well-practiced procedures and
    communication between ground and air elements. While most close
    air support operations in Afghanistan were successful, "friendly
    fire" incidents have resulted from mistakes made while conducting
    the mission. At the request of the Ranking Minority Members of
    the Subcommittees on Total Force and Readiness, House Committee
    on Armed Services, GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD)
    efforts to provide adequate close air support training, as well
    as efforts to enhance the equipment used to support this mission.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-505
        ACCNO:   A06800
      TITLE:     Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment
    Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces
         DATE:   05/02/2003
      SUBJECT:   Air defense systems
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Defense operations
    	     Military aircraft
    	     Military training
    	     A-10 Aircraft
    	     B-52 Aircraft
    	     F-16 Aircraft
    	     F/A-18 Aircraft

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    GAO-03-505

    Report to the Ranking Minority Members, Subcommittees on Total Force and
    Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

    May 2003 MILITARY READINESS

    Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground
    Forces

    GAO- 03- 505

    The Department of Defense has had limited success in overcoming the
    barriers that prevent troops from receiving the realistic, standardized
    close air support training necessary to prepare them for joint operations.
    This is the result of four interrelated factors: (1) ground and air forces
    have limited opportunities to train together in a joint environment; (2)
    home station training is often restricted and thus does not always provide
    realistic training to prepare troops to perform the mission; (3) the
    services use different training standards and certification requirements
    for personnel responsible for coordinating close air support; and (4)
    within the individual services, joint close air support training is often
    a lower priority than other missions. While the department recognizes the
    need to improve the training for the mission, progress has been slow on
    many of the issues because the services have been unable to agree on joint
    solutions. In the interim, U. S. troops

    engaged in joint close air support missions are forced to conduct last-
    minute training or create ad hoc procedures on the battlefield.

    Efforts to enhance the capabilities of the equipment used to perform the
    joint close air support mission have not kept pace with precision weapons
    capabilities and as a result do not achieve DOD*s goals for
    interoperability and cost- effectiveness. Advanced systems improve the
    accuracy of battlefield information and can speed the transmission of
    information from the troops on the ground to attacking aircraft. However,
    the services have acquired equipment that is not able to communicate
    across the services, a key requirement in joint operations. Moreover, the
    services are procuring equipment independently to meet individual service
    needs, thereby missing opportunities to achieve cost benefits from joint
    service purchases.

    Typical Steps Required in the Final Coordination of a Close Air Support
    Mission

    MILITARY READINESS

    Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground
    Forces

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 505. To view the full report,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact Neal Curtin at (757) 552- 8100 or curtinn@ gao. gov.
    Highlights of GAO- 03- 505, a report to the

    Ranking Minority Members of the Subcommittees on Total Force and
    Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services May 2003

    Recent operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the dangers of providing air
    support close to troops on the ground. Such close

    air support requires timely, wellpracticed procedures and communication
    between ground and air elements. While most close air support operations
    in

    Afghanistan were successful, *friendly fire* incidents have resulted from
    mistakes made while

    conducting the mission. At the request of the Ranking Minority Members of
    the Subcommittees on Total Force and Readiness, House Committee on Armed
    Services, GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to provide
    adequate close air support training, as well as

    efforts to enhance the equipment used to support this mission. GAO is
    recommending several initiatives to provide the leadership and
    accountability needed to resolve the lingering close air support training
    shortfalls. GAO is also recommending actions to achieve greater equipment
    interoperability among the services.

    In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the report*s
    recommendations and is in the process of establishing specific completion
    dates for initiatives that will address the lingering training

    and equipment interoperability shortfalls.

    Page i GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
    Background 4 Despite DOD*s Efforts, Joint Close Air Support Training

    Deficiencies Remain 6 Lack of Equipment Interoperability and Coordinated
    Purchases Hampers Effectiveness of Close Air Support Mission Programs 19
    Conclusions 25 Recommendations for Executive Action 26 Matters for
    Congressional Consideration 26 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27
    Appendix I Scope and Methodology 28

    Appendix II Examples of DOD Aircraft That Perform Close Air Support 32

    Appendix III Joint Close Air Support Training and Friendly Fire Accidents
    34

    Appendix IV 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan 35

    Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 36

    Tables

    Table 1: Number of Practices Required Annually by Ground Controllers to
    Maintain Currency 15 Table 2: Air Force and Marine Corps Acquisitions
    Programs for Ground- Targeting Equipment 24 Table 3: Units and Locations
    Included on This Assignment 29 Table 4: Close Air Support Aircraft 32
    Table 4: Continued 33 Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Table 5: Training and Friendly Fire Incidents since the Persian Gulf War
    34 Table 6: 2001 Action Items Status 35 Figures

    Figure 1: Typical Steps Required in the Final Coordination of a Close Air
    Support Mission 5 Figure 2: Percentage of Time That Close Air Support
    Operations

    Met Ground Commander*s Intent at Army*s National Training Center (Calendar
    Years1998- 2000) 9 Figure 3: Percentage of Correct Attack Decisions for
    Combined

    Visual and Digital Systems, Digital Systems Alone, and Visual and Voice
    Communication 20 Figure 4: Digital Transmission Capabilities between
    Ground

    Controllers and Selected Aircraft 21 Figure 5: Selected New Ground-
    Targeting Equipment Procurements 23 This is a work of the U. S. Government
    and is not subject to copyright protection in the

    United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety
    without further permission from GAO. It may contain copyrighted graphics,
    images or other materials. Permission from the copyright holder may be
    necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted materials separately
    from GAO*s product.

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    May 2, 2003 The Honorable Vic Snyder Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee
    on Total Force Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

    The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
    Readiness Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

    The success or failure of our military forces in combat is directly linked
    to the realism and thoroughness of their training beforehand. This axiom
    is especially true when aircraft are needed to deliver bombs on targets
    close to troops on the ground. Such close air support requires painstaking
    coordination between air and ground elements. Timely, well- practiced
    procedures and communication are essential because close air support on
    the battlefield often has to happen fast to achieve its objective. Failure
    to respond to a call for air support can leave troops exposed to enemy
    fire; however, mistakes in communications and targeting can result in
    fatalities among friendly forces. In Afghanistan, close air support became
    particularly critical because light forces were introduced into battle
    without artillery, leaving air power as their sole means of fire support.
    Though we completed our work before hostilities began in Iraq, this
    operation also showed the increased importance of integrating air power
    into the ground fight. While most recent close air support operations have
    been successful, *friendly fire* incidents tragically illustrated the
    dangers of the mission. Even before the war in Afghanistan, the Department
    of Defense (DOD) had begun looking for solutions to long- standing
    problems facing the close air support mission. Because joint close air
    support is* by its nature* a joint mission that transcends any single
    military service, DOD has formed steering groups and other interservice
    task forces to examine the mission area. The working groups have addressed
    a myriad of issues, but their primary focus has been on improving training
    and

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    Page 2 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    equipment interoperability 1 across the services in both the active and
    reserve components. Because of concerns about such unfortunate *friendly
    fire* occurrences, you requested that we review close air support training
    and doctrine to ensure that the U. S. military is prepared for future
    conflicts. You asked that we recommend any actions that DOD and the
    services could take to improve close air support effectiveness while
    simultaneously reducing risk to friendly forces. Thus, our objectives were
    to assess efforts by DOD and the military services to (1) provide adequate
    training for joint close air support missions and (2) enhance the
    capabilities of the equipment used to support this mission. A detailed
    description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.

    DOD has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent troops
    from receiving the realistic, standardized training that is needed to
    prepare them for joint operations. In discussions with military officials
    and during our visits to training sites, we found that adequate realistic
    training 2 is often not available because of four lingering problems: (1)
    Ground and

    air forces have limited opportunities to train together in a joint
    environment. When such joint training does occur, according to DOD reports
    and unit officials, it is often ineffective. Data from national training
    centers show that joint close air support training seldom meets the

    expectations and needs of the ground commander. (2) Similarly, the
    training that troops receive at their home stations is usually unrealistic
    because of range restrictions; moreover, it lacks variety* for example,
    pilots often receive rote, repetitive training because of limited air
    space and other restrictions. (3) The services train their aircraft
    controllers, who are the linchpin for close air support coordination, to
    different standards.

    The lack of universal standards hampers the ability of these controllers
    to perform in a joint operation. (4) Finally, within individual military
    services, the training for close air support missions is often given a
    lower priority* in doctrine, school curriculum, and training exercises*
    than other missions. For example, the Air Force focuses more on deep
    strike and airto- air employment during large force exercises, while the
    Army places

    1 Interoperability refers to the ability of one system to provide and
    accept information from another system. 2 Joint Publication 3- 09.3, Joint
    Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support, December 1995
    (currently being revised). Results in Brief

    Page 3 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    more emphasis on training for artillery and the use of its own fire
    support. While DOD has recognized the need to improve the effectiveness of
    training the mission, 3 the steering committee tasked to implement the
    action plan has been unable to resolve most of the plan*s 15 action items
    because of the time and effort required to solve the issues and the
    services* inability to reach agreement on them. DOD changed the
    responsibility for chairing the executive steering committee to Joint
    Forces Command in hopes of resolving the lingering interservice issues.
    Until these problems are resolved, U. S. troops engaged in joint close air
    support missions will be forced to conduct last- minute training or create
    ad hoc procedures on the battlefield* practices that reduce the
    effectiveness of the mission and increase the risk of injury or death to
    friendly forces.

    Efforts to enhance the capabilities of the equipment used in joint close
    air support have not kept pace with precision weapons capabilities and, as
    a result, do not achieve DOD*s goals for ensuring interoperability and
    costeffectiveness. The services have acquired digital transmission systems
    that are used to share information instantly between airborne and ground
    personnel. However, these systems are not yet interoperable across the
    services, potentially hampering their effectiveness in joint operations.
    While the services have recognized the need for such a system and have
    plans to field one by 2007, the absence of an interoperable system in the
    near term limits the ability of air and ground forces to coordinate air
    attacks efficiently and under all conditions. Moreover, the services have
    acquired a variety of ground- targeting systems, which allow ground

    controllers to accurately locate targets for attacking aircraft, but they
    are not purchasing these systems cost- effectively. Although DOD has
    tasked the services to develop joint requirements for ground- targeting
    equipment, they have not yet completed them. As a result, the services are
    procuring a variety of systems independently and may be missing
    opportunities to achieve cost benefits from joint purchases.

    We are making several recommendations to help resolve DOD*s lingering
    close air support training shortcomings and ensure that equipment procured
    for this mission is interoperable and meets interservice requirements. In
    written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
    stated that it concurred with our recommendations and is in the process of
    establishing specific completion 3 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan,
    November 2001.

    Page 4 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    dates for each of the issues identified in the 2003 Joint Close Air
    Support Action Plan. Close air support is an air action by either fixed
    and rotary wing aircraft

    against hostile targets which are near friendly forces and which require
    detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and maneuver of
    those forces. Several different types of aircraft are assigned the close
    air support mission; examples are described in appendix II. To be
    successful, this type of combat mission requires detailed integration and
    close

    coordination between air and ground forces. 4 Air is only one type of fire
    support available to ground forces* other forms include artillery,
    mortars, and naval surface fires. Ideally, these fires will be integrated
    to achieve the intended effect on the target. The controller plays the key
    role in coordinating the close air support mission. The controller is
    often located on the ground alongside maneuver forces; however, airborne
    controllers may also control attacks. The controller is responsible for
    ensuring that aircraft strike the target accurately while avoiding hitting
    friendly troops. During battle, when a ground commander needs air support,
    this specially trained controller initiates a call, using voice or digital
    communications, to

    the aircraft. The controller provides the attacking aircraft with the
    location of the target as well as the position of any friendly troops in
    the area. Based on this information, the aircraft*s crew directs the
    plane*s bombs to the target. Figure 1 depicts a typical mission.

    4 Joint Publication 3- 09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
    Close Air Support, December 1995 (currently being revised). Background

    Page 5 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Figure 1. Typical Steps Required in the Final Coordination of a Close Air
    Support Mission

    Note: GAO analysis of DOD documents.

    DOD is in the process of developing technologically advanced equipment to
    improve the military*s ability to conduct close air support missions under
    all types of conditions. Historically, such missions were conducted during
    the day under favorable weather conditions. This allowed both aircrews and
    ground controllers to visually acquire and attack ground targets. Today,
    these missions are typically undertaken at night or under poor visibility
    conditions. In addition, because the rules of engagement have placed
    strict limits on collateral damage, the aircraft need to deliver munitions
    precisely. For example, the use of bombers flying at high altitudes to
    perform close air support in recent operations in Afghanistan shows how
    the mission has evolved. Bombers carried out missions using precision
    weapons from altitudes that prevented aircrews from visually acquiring
    targets. The use of these weapons required controllers to provide more
    accurate target information to the attacking aircraft. In

    Page 6 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    addition, technological advancements in equipment continue to improve the
    accuracy by which aircraft can strike their targets. For example,
    equipment such as laser rangefinders and systems that allow controllers to
    transmit information digitally improve accuracy and help mitigate the risk
    of human error.

    Significant differences exist in the services* approaches to close air
    support. Controllers from the Air Force, Marine Corps, and special
    operations forces attend different schools to learn the basics of
    controlling attack aircraft. To support Army ground units, the Air Force
    incorporates officers and enlisted controllers into Army units. These Air
    Force personnel live and work with the Army and are intended to become an
    integral part of the unit*s fire support staff. The Army must rely on
    aircraft from other services during training or combat. In contrast, the
    Marine

    Corps uses its own aviators* on a rotational assignment with ground
    forces* to control aircraft. The Marine Corps* attack aircraft squadrons
    are attached to Marine expeditionary forces, and their primary mission is
    to support ground forces. Day to day, this means that Marine Corps ground
    commanders have attack aircraft at their disposal, allowing them to more
    easily incorporate close air support into their training events. The
    inherently joint nature of the mission requires that all the services
    train together to be adequately prepared. Training is fundamental,
    according to a DOD assessment of the mission area, because technological
    advancements are *meaningless if not supported by training.*

    DOD has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent troops
    from receiving the realistic, standardized training that is needed to
    prepare them for joint operations. These lingering problems include few
    opportunities for ground and air forces to train together in a joint
    environment, a lack of realistic training opportunities at troops* home
    stations, differences in the training standards for aircraft controllers,
    and the low priority placed on joint close air support training in the
    services* school curriculum and exercises. While DOD has acknowledged the
    need for more effective training in its 2001 Joint Close Air Support
    Action Plan, it has been unable to resolve most of the plan*s action items
    because of the time and effort required to resolve the issues and
    disagreement among the services. Despite DOD*s

    Efforts, Joint Close Air Support Training Deficiencies Remain

    Page 7 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    According to joint doctrine, training must be habitually emphasized in a
    joint training environment, and proficiency can only be obtained though
    dedicated, realistic joint training. 5 Historical experience shows that
    realistic training is critical to success in combat. Realistic training is
    particularly important in the close air support mission where detailed
    coordination is required to effectively deliver bombs close to friendly
    forces. However, DOD has acknowledged that joint close air support mission
    deficiencies have existed for many years. We reviewed documents from the
    mid- 1990s that showed that shortfalls in close air support procedures
    have led to decreased mission effectiveness and a greater chance of
    fratricide. Recent operations in Afghanistan have demonstrated that the
    military is placing an increased emphasis on joint close air support, but
    some serious challenges remain. Many of the soldiers, pilots, and aircraft
    controllers who are asked to perform this mission in combat told us that
    they feel ill prepared to do so. Service personnel told us that it was
    common for both pilots and ground controllers to be forced to learn

    new procedures *on the fly* during actual combat operations. During our
    unit visits, personnel from all services expressed concerns over their
    ability to perform the joint close air support mission. These concerns
    revolve around four interrelated factors, discussed below, which adversely
    affect training.

    Pilots, controllers, and ground commanders from the services that are
    involved in joint close air support need to train together frequently in
    order to develop confidence in one another and become familiar with one
    another*s procedures. Without such regular exercises, pilots are not
    willing to fully trust the instructions they receive from controllers, and
    ground commanders are not confident that the air support will be timely
    and accurate.

    However, opportunities for the services to train together to prepare for
    the joint close air support mission are infrequent. Within the United
    States, there are primarily three training facilities that have the
    necessary maneuver and air space to adequately train close air support
    with both ground forces and attacking aircraft. These are the Army*s
    National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; the Army*s Joint
    Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the Marine Corps*
    Air Ground Combat Center at Twenty- nine Palms, California. These training
    centers

    5 Joint Publication 3- 09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
    Close Air Support, December 1995 (currently being revised). Close Air
    Support Training

    Barriers Continue to Linger

    Joint Training Opportunities Are Infrequent and Ineffective

    Page 8 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    provide the maneuver space, airspace, and live ordnance delivery freedom
    to train for this mission under simulated combat conditions that are not
    available at home station training ranges. The centers are designed to
    offer the most realistic and challenging battlefield experiences
    available; however, units normally train at one of these locations only
    once every 12 to 18 months and for only 3 weeks at a time.

    Information collected from training exercises at the Army*s National
    Training Center has pointed to the need for more training in joint close
    air support procedures. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, which
    collects and consolidates data from operations and training events,
    identified several long- standing problems associated with the execution
    of close air support during these exercises. For example, in 1995 it
    reported that the full effects of the mission are rarely achieved during
    training, and in 1998 it found that integration issues between Army and
    Air Force personnel continued to hamper the execution of the mission and
    may contribute to fratricides.

    Observations made by the Secretary of Defense*s Joint Close Air Support
    Joint Test and Evaluation task force further confirmed that significant
    problems exist. Chartered in 1998, the task force has collected and
    analyzed a large quantity of data from the Army*s National Training
    Center. By early 2001, it had observed 22 simulated battles that included
    more than 200 close air support sorties. One of the key conclusions from
    its study is that close air support seldom achieved the outcome sought by
    the ground commander during such training exercises. As figure 2 shows,
    close air support operations met the ground commander*s intent* that is,
    they destroyed or otherwise disrupted enemy troops* less than one- third
    of the time. More often than not, close air support failed to meet the

    ground commander*s needs.

    Page 9 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Figure 2. Percentage of Time That Close Air Support Operations Met Ground
    Commander*s Intent at Army*s National Training Center (Calendar Years1998-
    2000) The task force attributed this low success rate to several factors,
    in particular the lack of integration between the Air Force controllers
    and Army fire support teams, whose mission is to coordinate different
    types of firepower. Ideally, air power would be employed seamlessly along
    with

    artillery and other fire support. We heard frequently about this issue
    from the commanders of Army units we visited in the United States,
    Germany, and Korea. They told us that Army teams did not view assigned
    aircraft controllers as a part of their teams and, thus, were not as
    comfortable relying on the controllers to provide support as they were
    with their own unit personnel. Army unit personnel work with the
    controllers only a few times a month or during field training exercises.
    Consequently, a deployed Army team may have to rely on controllers with
    whom they have not worked during training and in whom they have not
    developed confidence.

    On the other hand, Air Force controllers who are trying to integrate
    themselves into the Army structure must still report to Air Force
    leadership, and thus they have to satisfy the needs of two different
    commanders. Perhaps most telling, the task force observers also noted

    Page 10 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    that integrating close air support was often an *afterthought* during
    ground maneuver exercises. Some participants they interviewed expressed
    concerns about how well they were prepared for the mission. Air Force
    participants, for example, noted they did not get enough practice with the
    Army*s teams, and Army participants pointed out that training for this
    mission was often overlooked and underemphasized.

    In addition to infrequent training opportunities, many of the unit leaders
    and soldiers we interviewed expressed disappointment with the
    effectiveness of the close air support training they received at the
    Army*s training centers. Pilots told us that because training scenarios at
    the centers are scripted to maximize training benefits for maneuver
    forces, ground commanders fail to use aircrews effectively. In short,
    available aircraft are underutilized, thus limiting the training pilots
    receive. In the United States, personnel from the 18th Air Support
    Operations Group told us that because the Army runs the training events,
    nearly all of the training time at the centers is devoted to Army maneuver
    tasks rather than to joint close air support. As a result, ground
    controllers are often not included in

    the planning and execution of missions. In Europe, personnel from the 4th
    Air Support Operations Group told us that the Army limits their controller
    training to an hour a day at the Army*s Combined Training Center at
    Grafenwoehr, Germany. On the other hand, aircraft availability is
    sometimes a problem. According to military officials, joint close air
    support is planned into all exercises, but in many cases the aircraft do
    not arrive for a variety of reasons, such as weather conditions and
    mechanical problems. One brigade official told us that during his unit*s
    last training center rotation in Germany, 12 sorties were planned, but
    none was actually undertaken.

    While the Marines are widely considered to be proficient at integrated
    close air support training, the training they provide at the Twenty- nine
    Palms training center, for example, is typically not joint. Marines supply
    their own attack aircraft and ground controller assets to train for close
    air support missions. Overall, the task force concluded that Marine Corps
    ground controllers figure prominently in the development of offensive and
    defensive operational plans and that the mission was generally well
    planned and executed. However, the training center presents its own
    challenges. The aircraft maneuver space is restrictive, a simulated enemy
    rather than a well- trained opposing force is used, and the exercises
    focus more on training than on evaluating capabilities.

    Combined training events between U. S. and coalition forces are also
    infrequent. For example, U. S. officials in Korea told us that Army and
    Air

    Page 11 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Force personnel rarely practice close air support with South Korean ground
    controllers or aircrews. In addition, U. S. ground controllers and pilots
    stationed in Korea and Germany said that barriers such as accents and the
    use of nonstandard phraseology by foreign aircrews impact the
    effectiveness of combined training. Dutch military officials told us that
    it is difficult to train with U. S. personnel. While two combined training
    exercises promote close air support training* Clean Hunter and Flying
    Rhino* Dutch officials stated that U. S. ground controllers have not
    participated. Furthermore, these officials said that while A- 10s from the
    81st Fighter Squadron support Dutch ground controller training, this
    relationship is informal and they cannot rely on U. S. support. U. S.
    officials stated there are opportunities to train with coalition military
    personnel. For example, Navy officials said that they schedule combined
    training with British forces as part of their Joint Maritime Course.
    Moreover, they told us that because the Navy does not own training ranges
    in the European theater, it schedules training events with host nations to
    gain access to live- fire ranges. In addition, U. S. Air Force officials
    in Korea told us that they are planning to combine ground controller
    training for both U. S. and South Korean personnel. Air Force and Navy
    units also have limited opportunities for realistic joint training for air
    support missions at their home stations, primarily because

    of various air space and range restrictions. 6 For example, Air Force
    officials in South Korea said that their pilots experience numerous
    airspace restrictions near the demilitarized zone separating North and
    South Korea. Because of such restrictions, the Air Force rarely
    synchronizes its training with the U. S. Army or South Korean forces. This
    impedes the Air Force*s ability to train all the integrated elements they
    would need to have in combat. Moreover, Air Force officials told us that
    because of live ordnance limitations during training, fighter pilots may
    employ live munitions for the first time in combat, under hostile
    conditions, and close to friendly forces. Because range limitations often
    force units to perform air attacks from the same direction and oriented on
    the same targets, training officials frequently refer to this limited
    training

    as *range close air support,* which means that it is done in a specific
    way because of range restrictions rather than as it would be carried out
    in

    6 Such range limitations have been the subject of related GAO work,
    including, Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not
    Reflected in Readiness Reporting,

    GAO- 02- 525 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 30, 2002) and Military Training: DOD
    Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment on Training Ranges, GAO-
    02- 614 (Washington, D. C.: June 11, 2002). Range Restrictions Limit Home

    Station Training

    Page 12 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    actual combat. In short, the training is not realistic, and its value is
    diminished because trainees become familiar with the terrain and target.
    The following are other additional examples of restricted training

    environments:  The Fort Bragg, North Carolina, range used by the 23rd
    Fighter Group

    has altitude and laser restrictions and prohibits the use of tactical
    rockets. As a result, close air support cannot be realistically practiced.

     The ground controllers from the 25th Air Support Operations Squadron in
    Hawaii are not able to maintain their currency requirements 7 at their
    home stations because there are no close air support aircraft available to
    train them; thus, they must return to the mainland periodically to train.

     Airspace restrictions in Germany force A- 10 pilots from the 81st
    Fighter Squadron to train at altitudes of 17,000 to 20, 000 feet rather
    than 5,000 feet, where the A- 10was designed to operate.

     About 10 percent of last year*s planned close air support missions for
    the 31st Fighter Wing in Italy were executed. In addition, the squadron
    does not have a range where close air support can be undertaken with a
    ground controller or where units can train at night.

    Likewise, home station training for Navy pilots is limited not only
    because of range restrictions but also because of the Navy*s 18- month
    deployment cycles. Before they are deployed, Navy pilots are sent to the
    Naval Strike Air Warfare Center at Fallon Naval Air Station, Nevada, for 4
    weeks of

    training. The proficiency pilots gain at Fallon, however, erodes during
    their 18- month deployment cycle because they have access to few ranges,
    many of which may be inadequate. A second challenge comes after
    deployment, when the pilots return to their home stations. According to
    Navy personnel, the pilots* mission skills continue to erode because they
    have limited access to aircraft and equipment, and they are restricted to
    using only local ranges for training that they feel is inadequate. Marine

    7 A currency requirement is the frequency with which a skill needs to be
    practiced during a given period of time.

    Page 13 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Corps pilots at units we visited echoed the concerns voiced about range
    restrictions and the lack of varied training opportunities. For example:

     Dare County Bomb Range, North Carolina, has only a 7- mile range when 30
    miles is necessary for the F/ A- 18 to effectively employ air- toground
    weapons for close air support training. 8  One range attached to the
    Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, North

    Carolina, is not much larger than the Dare County range and is considered
    inadequate for effective close air support training. Another range near
    the air station prohibits the use of live ordnance. While range
    restrictions curtail realistic home station training

    opportunities, Air Force and Marine Corps personnel told us that a close
    air support simulator device could provide a mechanism to augment live
    training opportunities. For example, officials said that the development
    of a ground controller simulated training device, linked to an attack
    aircraft simulator, would provide valuable training for both controllers
    and pilots.

    DOD recognizes that simulators can enhance the planning, preparation, and
    training for close air support. According to its capstone requirements
    document, simulators enable units to practice the communication and
    coordination procedures associated with the close air support mission when
    constraints prohibit live- fire training. However, the United States does
    not currently own any close air support simulated training devices. 9 In
    Europe, the Air Force has arranged to lease simulator time from the

    Dutch military. We visited the training facility in the Netherlands and
    observed controllers using the device to practice simulated close air
    support missions. Both Dutch and U. S. officials believe such a simulator
    provides the capability to train close air support effectively in a safe
    environment.

    The individual services and the special operations communities do not use
    common certification or currency requirements to train their aircraft
    controllers. For initial certification, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine
    Corps operate formal schools that have curriculums based on the individual

    8 The 30- mile standard is documented in the Navy*s Top Gun manual, Volume
    IV * Employment/ Tactics, May 2002. 9 After completion of our audit work,
    Air Force officials indicated that they have incorporated extremely
    limited simulated close air support training devices in their Joint
    Firepower Course. Inconsistent Controller Training Hampers Joint

    Operations

    Page 14 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    services* interpretation of DOD*s Joint Publication 3- 09.3, Joint Tactics
    Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support (1995). Overall, this
    initial instruction is fairly common among the schools, and the Navy and
    Marine Corps schools have the same requirements. The Air Force and the

    Navy/ Marine Corps curriculums cover such topics as intelligence,
    equipment operation, integration of close air support with other fires,
    and battle damage assessments. However, the time devoted to each topic, as
    well as the specific instructional material presented, varies among the
    services. Two notable differences exist in initial certification
    requirements between the Navy/ Marine Corps and the Air Force programs.
    The Navy/ Marine Corps program requires its controllers to practice close
    air support with a variety of aircraft, including helicopters. The Air
    Force does not require helicopter practice because it does not have combat
    helicopters in its conventional force, and the Army does not use its
    helicopters in a close air support role. A second difference is that the
    Navy/ Marine Corps requires its controllers to practice coordinating live
    indirect fire support, such as artillery. The Air Force does not require
    practice with live artillery for its initial certification. Usually, the
    Army coordinates the use of indirect fires on the battlefield. The
    controller certification debate is further complicated by the fact that
    NATO certification requirements are more demanding and comprehensive in
    some areas than those for U. S. personnel. For example, NATO standards
    require controllers to have 12 successful low- level controls, controlling
    close air support attacking aircraft at altitudes below 500 feet, to be
    qualified. No such standard exists for U. S. controllers.

    Once schooling is complete and controllers are sent back to their units,
    they are required to maintain a level of proficiency throughout the year.
    These annual currency requirements vary by service. (See table 1.) For
    example, the Marine Corps and Air Force require controllers to practice 12
    times a year to remain current, while NATO controllers need 24 practices.

    Page 15 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Table 1. Number of Practices Required Annually by Ground Controllers to
    Maintain Currency

    Total number of practices Number of

    daylight practices Number of nighttime practices

    Marine Corps 12 8 4 Air Force 12 10 2 NATO 24 20 4 Source: DOD and NATO.
    Note: GAO analysis of DOD and NATO training publications. 10 Likewise,
    currency requirements for controllers in the special operations

    community differ among the Air Force, Navy, and Army because they are
    required to meet their service- directed requirements. Special operations
    controllers receive their initial certification by attending one of the
    service schools. However, the services have different requirements for
    maintaining their controllers* status. In fact, only Air Force special
    operations controllers have a specific annual currency requirement to
    maintain. Because of this situation, some personnel we interviewed told us
    that during operations in Afghanistan, ground commanders were hesitant to
    have non- Air Force personnel directing close air support missions, and,
    in most cases, asked to have Air Force ground controllers attached to
    their special operations teams. In addition, it was not clear how recently
    nonAir Force special operations controllers had practiced this skill,
    adding to the ground commanders* reluctance to use them.

    In interviews, controllers from conventional forces told us that while
    they have currency standards to maintain, it is difficult to meet them.
    According to Air Force officials, 50 percent of the assigned Air Force
    ground controllers in Europe are not current in nighttime or live ordnance
    controls. One contributing factor is that Air Force pilots can meet all of
    their close air support training requirements using an airborne
    controller, thus negating the need to provide air support for ground
    controller

    training. For example, according to personnel from the 81st Fighter
    Squadron in Germany, less than 20 percent of their close air support

    10 The publications are as follows: Marine Corps order P3500. 37, Aviation
    Training and Readiness Manual vol. 9 Tactical Air Control Party Officer,
    dated May 8, 2001; Air Force Instruction 13- 102, Air Support Operations
    Center and Tactical Air Control Party Training and Evaluation Procedures,
    dated September 1, 1996; Minimum Qualifications for Forward Air
    Controllers, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Agreement
    #3797, dated February 26, 1979.

    Page 16 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    training sorties involve the use of a ground controller. Recognizing this
    shortage, Air Force officials have requested funding for a simulator to
    help train their ground controllers stationed in Europe.

    Beyond certification and currency standards, some stark differences exist
    in the procedures that U. S. and NATO forces use to pass target
    information from ground controllers to attacking aircraft. U. S.
    controllers are trained to use a standardized 9- linebriefing format,
    while NATO troops use a 15- line briefing. This lack of commonality
    creates a potentially hazardous battlefield situation in operations
    involving U. S. military allies.

    One of the primary reasons the services do not provide the training needed
    to adequately prepare U. S. forces to plan and execute the joint close air
    support missions is the low priority they give to this mission in
    comparison with other training requirements. This lack of emphasis is
    apparent in operational doctrine, school instruction, and the number of
    pilot sorties devoted to close air support, all of which prevent aircrews
    and controllers from developing their mission skills.

    The Air Force has historically not placed a high priority on close air
    support in its doctrine. Service officials we interviewed stated that the
    Air Force tends to emphasize air- to- air and deep attack missions over
    close air support. In our review of Air Force doctrine, we found that the
    Air Force prioritizes air superiority, strategic attack, and air
    interdiction missions because it views such missions as a more effective
    and efficient use of its resources. While officials indicated that the Air
    Force would provide joint

    close air support when it was needed to support ground troops, they said
    that it is more efficient to use the aircraft to attack enemies before
    they come in contact with friendly forces.

    Key Air Force and Navy pilot training schools also give a low priority to
    close air support training in their curriculums. At the Air Force weapons
    school, for example, only 13 percent of the F- 16*s flight syllabus is
    devoted to this mission. Moreover, for pilots of the A- 10* an aircraft
    primarily designed to perform close air support* only 31 percent of
    Weapons School training sorties were for the mission. At the Navy*s air
    warfare center, pilots receive 8 days of close air support training during
    their 4- week course. However, because of the number of pilots attending
    the course, the 8 days devoted to close air support only allow aircrews to
    fly two close air support missions.

    Furthermore, some Air Force unit training programs place low emphasis on
    this mission. According to the Air Force, active duty F- 16 squadrons Some
    Services Give Low

    Priority to Joint Close Air Support Training

    Page 17 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    stationed in the United States devote only about 5 percent of their
    training sorties to close air support. In addition, an Air Force official
    in Europe stated that less than 10 percent of his F- 16 squadron*s
    training program is devoted to close air support, while 50 percent is for
    air- to- air missions. Given the difficult nature of the mission, many
    pilots believe that this level of training is not sufficient to develop
    adequate mission skills.

    According to DOD*s task force, the lack of integration between the Army*s
    fire support elements and the Air Force*s ground controller personnel is
    the top problem facing joint close air support training. Such poor
    integration is primarily the result of the services* low emphasis on joint
    training for this mission. We confirmed this conclusion during our visits
    to various units. For example, Army commanders have been trained to use
    direct and indirect fire, with joint close air support being used as a
    last resort. Joint close air support is only one of a myriad of support
    options available to ground force commanders that must be trained. Army
    units rarely integrate close air support into training exercises outside
    the training centers and, as a result, joint close air support integration
    training is often unrealistic. In addition, the Air Force*s selection of
    air liaison officers, who provide ground commanders with expertise on the
    employment of joint close air support, shows a lack of Air Force
    commitment and has added to the lack of confidence on the part of the Army
    and the ground controllers. Both Army and Air Force personnel at several
    locations we visited raised concerns that this position has not been
    considered a career- enhancing position. These officers not only do not
    get

    a chance to fly but they also have to live in the *dirt* with Army forces
    during various maneuvers. According to personnel, the best personnel, or
    even those with extensive close air support training, have not filled this
    position. However, according to Air Force officials in Europe, beginning
    in 2000 the service implemented a change that elevates the selection of
    candidates for this position to the same level as picking candidates for
    flying and operational squadron support commands for their theater. This
    should produce higher- quality candidates for the position.

    The Marine Corps emphasizes close air support in its training and
    considers integrating aviation with other supporting fires as a critical
    element because it lacks the amount of artillery available to Army
    commanders. However, Marine Corps training is usually limited to
    practicing close air support with its own air assets supporting its own
    ground forces. The Marines do not emphasize training these skills with
    other services. We found that the Marines rarely conduct joint training
    for this mission, which limits their ability to integrate on the
    battlefield when they are called upon to perform this mission with others.
    According to an

    Page 18 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    internal Operation Enduring Freedom after- action report, investigators
    found that Marine Corps ground controllers require more extensive joint
    training opportunities, particularly for controlling air support in joint

    operations. Even before the extensive use of close air support in
    Afghanistan highlighted the potential dangers inherent in this mission,
    DOD had acknowledged that action was needed to improve its effectiveness.
    In an internal assessment, DOD concluded that current capabilities do not
    meet all present or projected needs and that the joint community faces a
    substantial challenge in attaining the new levels of capabilities required
    to support emerging war fighting concepts. 11 In January 2000, the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council chartered an

    executive steering committee to identify shortfalls across the mission
    area. The steering committee developed a Joint Close Air Support action
    plan to address a number of training and equipment interoperability
    issues. The

    training issues include such items as increasing joint training exercises;
    establishing joint integrated training plans; and creating a *joint
    terminal attack controller* with standardized certifications, which DOD
    says will improve joint operations and reduce the potential for accidents
    and fratricides. However, none of the action item target dates for
    completion were met on time. In fact, only 3 of the 15 action items have
    been completed to date, and the remaining 12 issues have rolled over into
    the updated 2003 plan. The complete list of issues contained in the action
    plan is included in appendix IV.

    According to service personnel we interviewed, progress on resolving the
    training issues has been slow because of the joint nature of the mission.
    Getting agreement across the services is difficult because there are
    fundamental differences in how the individual services employ close air
    support. Moreover, no joint organization is responsible for overseeing the
    training and equipping of the mission. Individual service and joint staff
    representatives expressed frustration with the executive steering
    committee*s inability to resolve the action items. The services have not
    been able to agree on several of them. For example, the services disagree
    on what to include in the joint terminal attack controller certification.
    The

    committee does not have the authority to require individual services to 11
    Capstone Requirements Document for Close Air Support, JROCM 067- 02, May
    6, 2002. DOD is Making Efforts to

    Resolve Training Deficiencies

    Page 19 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    train jointly or to compromise by developing common training standards for
    their controllers. In October 2002, DOD changed the responsibility for
    chairing the Joint Close Air Support Executive Steering Committee to Joint
    Forces Command. Previously, the committee had been cochaired by the Air
    Force and the Marine Corps. According to DOD officials, this

    action was undertaken, at least in part, in hopes of resolving the
    interservice issues. At Joint Forces Command, the Joint Requirements and
    Integration Directorate (J8) serves as the lead joint integration expert,
    ensuring that the various services and defense agencies combine their
    capabilities into a single successful effort.

    DOD has acknowledged that such deficiencies in joint training are not
    limited to the close air support mission. In March 2002, DOD announced a
    plan for transforming all of its training programs. This plan emphasizes
    the need to provide comprehensive and systematic joint training focused on
    the operational requirements of the combatant commanders. Furthermore, it
    acknowledges a need for increasing the use of live and virtual training in
    its training environment. According to DOD, a Joint National Training

    Capability would be established to provide training that is less
    servicefocused and more reflective of how U. S. forces actually fight
    today. The first training event is scheduled for May 2003 and will focus
    on Army maneuver forces at Fort Irwin, California; however, the event will
    also include supporting forces at several locations across the United
    States.

    The military services have not yet achieved DOD*s goals for ensuring that
    equipment acquired for close air support missions is interoperable and
    cost- effective. The digital transmission systems that the services
    procured

    to transmit information instantly between airborne and ground personnel
    are not interoperable across the services, and a common capability is not
    expected to be fielded until 2007. The lack of interoperability does not

    allow participants to take advantage of the increased effectiveness that
    digital transmissions add to the mission. In addition, the services*
    independent purchases of different kinds of ground- targeting equipment
    have precluded them from achieving potential cost savings from joint
    purchases.

    Advanced technological systems that allow ground and air forces to
    transmit battlefield information digitally can greatly improve the
    effectiveness and timeliness of close air support missions. These systems
    are designed to allow a ground controller to input the information needed
    for a ground attack into a computer and transmit this information
    instantly Lack of Equipment

    Interoperability and Coordinated Purchases Hampers Effectiveness of Close
    Air Support Mission Programs

    Current Digital Transmission Systems Are Not Interoperable across the
    Services

    Page 20 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    to a computer on board an aircraft. The use of digital communication has a
    number of advantages over visual or voice communication. Digital
    transmissions speed up the execution of a mission and can reduce
    transcription errors between the controllers and the pilots of attack
    aircraft. For example, Marine Corps officials told us that the amount of
    time required for transmitting and verifying coordinates could be reduced
    from about 7 minutes (the time needed for voice communication) to less
    than 1 minute for digital communication. Digital transmissions can also

    enhance the effectiveness of a mission during darkness, in inclement
    weather, or under other conditions when the ground controller may not be
    in position to observe the aircraft. In addition, digital transmission
    systems can transmit more detailed information, thereby improving the
    *situational awareness* of both ground and air forces. For example,
    digital systems can provide the ground controller*s mission computer with
    detailed and constantly updated battlefield information, including the
    position of the attack aircraft, verification of target acquisition, and
    the location of friendly forces. According to tests performed at the
    Army*s National Training Center during February 2002, the use of digitally
    transmitted communication significantly improved mission performance. As
    figure 3 shows, this equipment allowed ground controllers to provide the
    correct attack decision more often (89 to 93 percent of the time) than
    when they relied on only what they could see and communicate by voice to
    the attack aircraft (correct 67 percent of the time).

    Figure 3. Percentage of Correct Attack Decisions for Combined Visual and
    Digital Systems, Digital Systems Alone, and Visual and Voice Communication

    Page 21 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Digital transmission systems are currently available on only four types of
    aircraft. The Air Force has installed this equipment on less than
    threequarters of its active- duty F- 16 fighter aircraft 12 and has
    procured a limited number of portable systems for its B- 52 bombers. The
    Marine Corps has installed similar equipment on roughly 95 percent of its
    AV- 8Bs and on about 20 percent of its F/ A- 18s. Because of the limited
    number of aircraft with this equipment, ground controllers told us that
    they have had few

    opportunities to transmit information digitally to attack aircraft. Even
    when digital transmission equipment is available on board an aircraft, it
    may be incompatible with the equipment that is on the ground because the
    services use different systems. This lack of interoperability across the
    services reduces the equipment*s effectiveness and limits its usefulness.
    Some ground controllers told us that they would hesitate to bring this
    equipment to the battlefield because they would not be able to control
    attack aircraft from another service. Figure 4 shows that only one (the
    AV8B) of six aircraft that currently perform the close air support mission
    is fully capable of receiving digital transmissions from its own service
    controllers. However, none is capable of receiving such transmissions
    across service lines.

    Figure 4: Digital Transmission Capabilities between Ground Controllers and
    Selected Aircraft

    Note: GAO analysis of DOD data. 12 In addition to the active duty Air
    Force effort to enhance digital transmission capabilities, the Air Force
    Reserve and Air National Guard have developed the Situational Awareness
    Data Link. However, primarily only Air Force Reserve and Air National
    Guard F- 16s are equipped with this system.

    Page 22 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Given the uncertainties surrounding equipment interoperability, ground
    troops and aircrews may have to resort to using multiple means of
    communication. In Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, for
    example, the primary means of passing targeting information from
    controllers to attack aircraft was by voice communication. Service

    personnel who took part in these operations stated that the use of
    multiple modes of communication was a cause of confusion on the
    battlefield.

    Recognizing that it needs to improve the interoperability of digital
    transmission systems, DOD has developed a plan for the services to field
    an interoperable system by 2007. This system, commonly called *Link 16,*
    would provide an integrated air and ground display of friendly and enemy
    battlefield positions. Link 16, as it is currently fielded, is limited to
    air- toair missions, but DOD plans to expand its capabilities to include
    the air- toground mission. In the interim, the Air Force and Marine Corps
    are seeking ways to improve the interoperability of their current systems
    by developing common software applications. However, these efforts are in
    a preliminary stage and, according to DOD officials, it will be at least
    2004 before the interim solutions are in place.

    The services are independently procuring a wide variety of different
    ground- targeting systems to improve their execution of close air support
    missions. However, these service- specific purchases have not taken
    advantage of the benefits of buying common equipment that could reduce
    overall program costs.

    The services are procuring new ground- targeting equipment to improve
    their ability to undertake close air support missions during night
    operations, in adverse weather conditions, and from increasingly higher
    altitudes. In Afghanistan, for example, U. S. forces delivered precision
    weapons from medium to high altitudes; this meant that ground controllers
    had to determine target coordinates with precision in order to maximize
    mission effectiveness and avoid fratricides. According to DOD

    officials, recent technological advancements in ground- targeting
    equipment are providing this needed precision. Figure 5 shows examples of
    the equipment the services are procuring to enhance ground- targeting
    capabilities. Services* Fielding of

    Multiple Ground- Targeting Systems Do Not Take Advantage of Possible Cost
    Savings

    Page 23 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Figure 5: Selected New Ground- Targeting Equipment Procurements

    Note: GAO generated based on DOD documents.

    Each service has established its own program to acquire more advanced
    systems to enhance the capabilities of its ground- targeting equipment.
    The Air Force and Marine Corps, for example, have initiated acquisition
    programs to buy equipment that will more precisely locate targets at all
    levels of visibility, mark targets for attack by precision weapons, and
    increase communication connectivity with all battlefield participants.
    Table 2 provides an overview of the Marine Corps and Air Force programs,
    which were initiated in 1997 and 1999, respectively.

    Page 24 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Table 2: Air Force and Marine Corps Acquisitions Programs for Ground-
    Targeting Equipment

    Dollars in millions

    Service Total program cost

    Fiscal year 2004 budget

    request Examples of groundtargeting equipment

    Program fielding completion

    date

    Marine Corps $79.6 $29.8  Laser rangefinder

     GPS receiver

     Laser target designator

     Multiband radio

     Mission computer 2005

    Air Force $344 $15.1  Laser rangefinder

     GPS receiver

     Multiband radio

     Mission computer

     Infrared laser 2011

    Source: GAO. Note: GAO analysis of DOD data. In addition, the Army, Navy,
    Air Force, and U. S. Special Operations Command have procured
    technologically advanced ground- targeting equipment for their special
    operations forces. This equipment was used during Operation Enduring
    Freedom and, according to after- action reports, it significantly enhanced
    the ground controllers* ability to identify ground targets for attack
    aircraft, thereby improving mission effectiveness.

    Although this equipment can improve mission effectiveness, because of the
    lack of joint requirements, the services have fielded multiple types of
    equipment with similar capabilities. For example, Special Operations

    Command officials told us that U. S. forces used four different
    groundtargeting systems in Operation Enduring Freedom. An analysis of the
    services* procurement plans shows that a variety of similar ground
    targeting equipment will be fielded. For example, the services have
    programmed funding to procure at least six different laser rangefinders
    and four different laser target designators.

    DOD has determined that equipment commonality for the mission could reduce
    overall program costs for the services. The Joint Close Air Support
    Executive Steering Committee, for example, recommended that the Air Force
    and Marine Corps identify opportunities for multiservice procurement of
    ground- targeting equipment to meet joint requirements. U. S. Central
    Command officials echoed the recommendation that U. S. forces should
    acquire a common set of ground- targeting equipment and

    Page 25 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    further emphasized that all forces should be trained in its use and
    characteristics. However, with the services continuing to pursue
    individual programs based on service- specific requirements, DOD cannot
    provide assurances that the services are acquiring the most cost-
    effective systems.

    GAO has previously reported that DOD fails to consider joint solutions and
    broader mission requirements when proposing systems. 13 While the services
    conduct considerable analyses in justifying major acquisitions, these
    analyses can be narrowly focused and may not fully consider alternative
    solutions, such as joint acquisition of a system with other services. As a
    result, there is no assurance that DOD and the services are avoiding
    costly duplication of systems, investing in the most cost- effective and
    affordable solutions, and optimizing mission performance.

    Furthermore, because the services plan, acquire, and operate systems to
    meet their own operational concepts, not necessarily the requirements of
    joint operations, there is no guarantee that fielded systems will operate
    together effectively. A joint acquisition strategy, based on broader
    mission requirements, would provide assurances that the services are
    acquiring systems that are cost- effective and function together during
    joint operations.

    DOD needs to provide better and more realistic training to prepare U. S.
    forces for joint close air support operations. With forces growing
    lighter, ground commanders may need to rely more heavily on close air
    support.

    Even a small mistake in conducting this mission can be deadly to friendly
    forces, a tragedy we witnessed in Afghanistan. While ineffective training
    is the fundamental problem facing close air support, technological
    advancements hold promise for enhancing battlefield information. However,
    the services have pursued solutions to meet their individual needs, and it
    will be years before DOD takes advantage of the enhancements on a wide
    scale. As a result, the services are spending millions of dollars on
    uncoordinated efforts to obtain equipment, and different types of systems
    are proliferating in the field.

    DOD*s efforts to improve close air support training have met with limited
    success. DOD*s Joint Close Air Support action plan has hit several
    roadblocks* primarily because the services have been unable to agree on 13
    U. S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program
    Risks,

    Department of Defense. GAO- 03- 98 (Washington, D. C.: January 2003).
    Conclusions

    Page 26 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    joint solutions. Thus, the solutions to long- standing problems will
    likely have to come from an organization such as the Joint Forces Command.
    DOD and the services understand the issues, but a strong commitment from
    senior leadership may help to implement pending action items and address
    lingering problems. Such problems may also be indicative of larger- scale
    training concerns in the department. DOD recognizes that significant
    challenges exist in delivering realistic joint training to prepare forces
    for a wide range of missions, not just close air support. DOD*s plans to
    create a Joint National Training Capability could ultimately provide a
    venue for better joint training. Such training is certainly needed to
    prepare U. S. troops to conduct close air support missions.

    To resolve the lingering training and equipment close air support issues,
    we recommend that the Secretary of Defense give close air support priority
    when implementing the department*s training transformation initiatives.
    Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary provide the Commander of the
    Joint Forces Command with the authority and

    resources, if necessary, to resolve the issues identified in the joint
    close air support action plan. The Command*s actions should include

     emphasizing close air support as part of the department*s new Joint
    National Training Capability to ensure that units receive realistic joint
    training;

     seeking ways to mitigate home station training limitations, including
    the use of simulation to augment live training; and

     preparing aircraft controllers to perform in a joint environment by
    standardizing training and certifications.

    We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint
    Forces Command or other appropriate organizational entity, review the
    services* plans for procuring advanced close air support equipment to
    ensure that it is interoperable and meets valid joint requirements.

    Because of the long- standing nature of training and equipment issues
    associated with the joint close air support mission, Congress may wish to
    consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to report on the progress the
    department has made toward resolving the identified issues. Congress needs
    this information to ensure that U. S. forces are adequately prepared to
    perform the mission and that the department is making cost- effective
    Recommendations for

    Executive Action Matters for Congressional Consideration

    Page 27 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    decisions in procuring equipment to enhance joint performance on the
    battlefield.

    In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it
    concurred with our recommendations and has tasked the U. S. Joint Forces
    Command with establishing specific completion dates for each of the issues
    identified in the 2003 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan and to fully
    implement them in a timely manner. DOD further stated that it would
    provide a copy of the timetable to GAO by May 30, 2003. DOD*s comments are
    reprinted in their entirety in appendix V.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
    Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air force, the Secretary of
    the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director, Office of

    Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon
    request.

    If you have any questions, please call me on (757) 552- 8100. Key
    contributors to this report were John Pendleton, Laura Durland, Vincent
    Balloon, Nancy Benco, Ray Carroll, Matthew Ullengren, and Lester Ward.

    Neal P. Curtin Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Agency
    Comments

    and Our Evaluation

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 28 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    To determine what efforts the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services
    have made in providing adequate training for the joint close air support
    mission, we interviewed officials at all levels of DOD from the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, and unit- level service
    representatives both within the United States and overseas.

    Specifically, we met with members of the Joint Close Air Support Executive
    Steering Committee to document the actions they had been able to
    accomplish in resolving the training shortcomings listed in their 2001

    Joint Close Air Support Action Plan and to identify the reasons for their
    lack of progress. In addition, we gathered data from each service to
    determine, from the user*s perspective, what barriers were preventing
    adequate training in close air support. We also obtained the training
    curriculum from each service*s ground controller schools and analyzed
    these documents, looking for commonalities and inconsistencies. Table 3

    lists all of the major units, commands, and training facilities that we
    visited or contacted to obtain our data.

    To determine what efforts DOD has made to enhance the capabilities of the
    equipment used to support the joint close air support mission, we obtained
    the services* acquisition strategies for the specific equipment they were
    procuring to enhance mission effectiveness. We interviewed service
    personnel and obtained documentation to verify the value these
    procurements added and to determine any barriers that would limit their
    effectiveness. Once we determined that no joint requirement existed and
    that the services were procuring interoperable digital transmission
    devices and multiple variants of ground- targeting equipment, we obtained
    documentation on the potential solutions for obtaining interoperable
    common equipment. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 29 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Table 3. Units and Locations Included on This Assignment Army U. S. Army
    Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Ala.

    U. S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Ala. Combined Arms Center, Fort
    Leavenworth, Kans. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth,
    Kans. 101st Air Mobile Division, Fort Campbell, Ky. U. S. Army Artillery
    Training Command, Fort Sill, Okla. U. S. Army Headquarters Europe,
    Heidelberg, Germany Eighth U. S. Army, Yongsan Post, Republic of Korea 2nd
    Infantry Division, Camp Casey, Republic of Korea 2nd Infantry Division,
    1st Brigade, Camp Casey, Republic of Korea 25th Infantry Division,
    Schofield Barracks, Hawaii

    Air Force Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va. U. S. Air Force
    Reserve Command, Warner- Robbins Air Force Base, Ga. U. S. Air Force
    Doctrine Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Detachment 1, 334th Training
    Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla. 23rd Fighter Group, Pope Air Force Base, N.
    C.

    18th Air Support Operations Group, Pope Air Force Base, N. C. 19th Air
    Support Operations Center, Fort Campbell, Ky. U. S. Air Force Air Ground
    Operations School, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. U. S. Air Force Weapons
    School, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. 6th Combat Training Squadron, Nellis
    Air Force Base, Nev. 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis Air Force
    Base, Nev.

    Detachment 1, 28th Test Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. 2nd
    Operations Support Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La. 20th Bomber
    Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La. 93rd Bomber Squadron (AF Reserve),
    Barksdale Air Force Base, La. 96th Bomber Squadron, Barksdale Air Force
    Base, La. 548th Combat Training Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La.
    303rd Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo. 457th
    Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base, Fort
    Worth, Tex. 706th Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Joint Reserve Base, New
    Orleans, La. U. S. Air Force Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany 81st
    Fighter Squadron, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany 555th Fighter Squadron,
    Aviano Air Base, Italy 32nd Air Ground Operations School, Germany 4th Air
    Support Operations Group, Germany 1st Air Support Operations Squadron,
    Germany

    2nd Air Support Operations Squadron, Germany

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 30 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Headquarter Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii 7th Air
    Force, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea 51st Operations Support Squadron,
    Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea 51st Fighter Wing, Osan Air Base,
    Republic of Korea 25th Air Support Operations Squadron, Hickam Air Force
    Base, Hawaii

    Navy Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Naval Air Station Fallon, Nev.
    U. S. Naval Safety Center, Naval Air Reserve, Norfolk, Va. Naval Air
    Forces- Atlantic Fleet, Naval Air Station Norfolk, Va. Strike Fighter
    Wings Atlantic, Oceana Naval Air Station, Va. VFA- 136, Naval Air Station
    Oceana, Va. VF- 211, Naval Air Station Oceana, Va. Expeditionary Warfare
    Training Group Pacific, Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, Calif. U. S. Navy
    Europe, London, England

    Marine Corps Marine Corps, Aviation Plans, Policy, and Budget Branch,
    Washington, D. C. Marine Corps, Plans, Policy, and Operations Department,
    Washington, D. C. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va.
    Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va. Marine Corps Warfighting Lab,
    Quantico, Va. Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command, Twenty- nine
    Palms, Calif. Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron- One, Yuma
    Marine Corps Air Station, Ariz. 2nd Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, N. C.
    2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N. C. Marine Air Group 14,
    Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, N. C. Marine Air Group 29, New
    River Marine Corps Air Station, N. C. Marine Air Group 31, Beaufort Marine
    Corps Air Station, S. C. Marine Forces Pacific Command, Hawaii

    Special Operations U. S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.
    C. 3rd Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, N. C. 5th Special Forces Group,
    Fort Campbell, Ky. 720th Special Tactics Group, Hurlburt Field, Fla. 19th
    Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla. U. S. Special Operations
    Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. U. S. Air Force Special Operations
    Command, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

    Joint Organizations Joint Combat Identification Evaluation Team, Eglin Air
    Force

    Base, Fla. Joint Close Air Support Joint Test & Evaluation Task Force,
    Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. The Office of the Secretary of Defense,
    Readiness and Training, Washington, D. C.

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 31 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    The Joint Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments, Washington,
    D. C. U. S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. U. S. Forces
    Korea, Seoul, Korea U. S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Va. U. S. Pacific
    Command, Hawaii Netherlands Royal Netherlands Army Combat Maneuver
    Training Center,

    Netherlands Source: DOD.

    We conducted our review from April 2002 through March 2003 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix II: Examples of DOD Aircraft that Perform Close Air Support

    Page 32 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    The services use many different aircraft to deliver close air support.
    Table 4 provides pictures and brief descriptions of these aircraft.

    Table 4: Close Air Support Aircraft

    Appendix II: Examples of DOD Aircraft that Perform Close Air Support

    Appendix II: Examples of DOD Aircraft that Perform Close Air Support

    Page 33 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Table 4: Continued

    Source: DOD.

    Appendix III: Joint Close Air Support Training and Friendly Fire Accidents

    Page 34 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    DOD and the services identified three close air support training mishaps
    that resulted in fatalities since the Persian Gulf War and three official
    joint close air support friendly fire events. Friendly fire is a
    circumstance in which members of a U. S. or friendly military force are
    mistakenly or accidentally killed or injured in action taken by U. S. or
    friendly forces actively engaged with an enemy or who are directing fire
    at a hostile force or what is thought to be a hostile force. According to
    DOD personnel and

    the conclusions reached in the investigations, these incidents have been
    caused by human error, by not following established standardized
    procedures, and by lack of experience and training. Two well- known events
    did not meet our criteria and are thus excluded. The April 17, 2002,
    incident where an Air National Guard F- 16 bombed Canadian troops did

    not involve air support of ground forces, so it was not close air support.
    Secondly, the July 1, 2002, *wedding party* incident in which civilians
    were killed and injured is not by definition a friendly fire incident.
    Table 5 contains a description of the close air support friendly fire and
    training incidents and the status of the investigations.

    Table 5. Training and Friendly Fire Incidents since the Persian Gulf War
    Date Location Description of incident Who was hurt Status of

    incident report Training Incidents July 18, 1995 Fort Sill, Oklahoma An
    Air Force Reserve A- 10 aircraft

    dropped a 500- pound bomb on a forward observation post.

    One person was killed and 13 others injured.

    Complete April 19, 1999 Atlantic Fleet Weapons

    Training Facility, Vieques Island, Puerto Rico

    A Marine FA- 18C dropped two 500- pound bombs that impacted outside the
    live impact area but within the confines of the range.

    One person was killed and 4 others injured.

    Complete March 12, 2001 Udairi Range, Kuwait A Navy F/ A- 18C dropped
    three 500-

    pound bombs on an observation post during a night exercise.

    Six people were killed and 11 others injured.

    Complete

    Friendly Fire Incidents November 26, 2001 Mazar- e Sharif, Afghanistan A
    Navy F/ A- 18 aircraft dropped a joint

    direct attack munition that exploded near friendly forces.

    No fatalities and 5 others injured. Ongoing

    December 5, 2001 Afghanistan A B- 52 bomber dropped a joint direct attack
    munition that exploded near friendly forces.

    Three people were killed and 19 others injured.

    Complete March 2, 2002 Terghul Ghar,

    Afghanistan During Operation Anaconda, an AC130 engaged coalition forces,

    mistaking them for the enemy. One person was

    killed and 3 others injured.

    Complete Source: DOD.

    Appendix III: Joint Close Air Support Training and Friendly Fire Accidents

    Appendix IV: 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan Page 35 GAO- 03- 505
    Military Readiness

    The 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan contained 15 action items.
    All of the items originally had completion dates tasked within fiscal year
    2002. However, 12 of them have not yet been completed, and the executive
    steering committee has recommended that they transition into the updated
    2003 action plan. Table 6 lists the action items for 2001, their original
    estimated completion dates, and whether the action item has been
    completed.

    Table 6. Status of Fiscal Year 2001 Action Items Action items Original
    date for completion Completed

    Standardize ground controller training. Jan. 2002 Standardize airborne
    controller training. Mar. 2002 Expand air liaison officer course. Dec.
    2001 Expand fire support element curriculum. Jan. 2002 Produce joint
    mission essential task lists. Feb. 2002 Establish joint integrated
    training plans. Jan. 2002 Increase use of simulated training. Jan. 2002
    Increase joint exercises. Feb. 2002 Include new concepts in joint
    publication 3- 09. 3. Periodic Yes Update service tactic techniques and
    procedures to reflect joint publication 3- 09.3 revisions. Sep. 2002
    Develop new concepts experiments to validate

    systems and procedures. Feb. 2002 Publish a capstone requirements
    document. Aug. 2002 Yes Explore joint Air Force- Marine Corps ground
    controller equipment procurement. May. 2002 Standardize symbols and
    graphics. Apr. 2002 Coordinate with Combat Identification action plan

    team on overlapping issues. Apr. 2002 Yes Source: GAO. Note: GAO analysis
    of DOD data. In addition to the 12 remaining items, of which 2 have been
    combined, the

    executive steering committee has proposed adding 3 new items to the
    updated plan. These are the inclusion of unmanned aerial vehicles in joint
    close air support operations, an increased emphasis on precision
    targeting,

    and an increase in live sortie and artillery resources. Appendix IV: 2001
    Joint Close Air Support

    Action Plan

    Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Page 36 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Page 37 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Page 38 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness

    Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Page 39 GAO- 03- 505 Military Readiness (350192)

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