Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in	 
Selecting and Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability 	 
Assessments (01-MAY-03, GAO-03-502).				 
                                                                 
The events of September 11, 2001, increased attention on efforts 
to assess the vulnerabilities of the nation's transportation	 
infrastructure and develop needed improvements in security. The  
Department of Transportation's (DOT) Research and Special	 
Programs Administration (RSPA) had already begun research in this
area in June 2001. The goals of RSPA's Transportation		 
Infrastructure Assurance program are to identify, and develop	 
ways to mitigate the impact of, threats to the nation's 	 
transportation infrastructure. DOT's Office of Intelligence and  
Security is responsible for defining the requirements for	 
transportation infrastructure protection, ensuring that 	 
vulnerability assessments of transportation infrastructure are	 
conducted, and taking action to mitigate those vulnerabilities.  
The House Committee on Appropriations asked GAO to determine (1) 
the status and anticipated results of the Transportation	 
Infrastructure Assurance (TIA) program, and (2) the extent to	 
which RSPA and the Office of Intelligence and Security have	 
coordinated their activities in selecting the vulnerabilities to 
be assessed and implementing the vulnerability assessments for	 
the program. DOT and RSPA officials reviewed a draft of the	 
report, agreed with its contents, and provided technical	 
clarifications that we incorporated.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-502 					        
    ACCNO:   A06785						        
  TITLE:     Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in 
Selecting and Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability 	 
Assessments							 
     DATE:   05/01/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Interagency relations				 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Transportation research				 
	     Transportation safety				 
	     DOT Transportation Infrastructure			 
	     Assurance Program					 
                                                                 

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GAO-03-502

Report to the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

May 2003 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY RESEARCH

Coordination Needed in Selecting and Implementing Infrastructure
Vulnerability Assessments

GAO- 03- 502

The Transportation Infrastructure Assessment program is scheduled to end
in December 2003 after the completion of four transportation vulnerability
assessments. Congress appropriated $1 million in each of the fiscal years
from 2001 through 2003 to RSPA for the program. RSPA plans to disseminate
reports, conduct workshops, and post information on the Internet to inform
decision- makers in the transportation community about the results.

Program Vulnerability Assessments

Prior to March 2003, RSPA did not fully coordinate their activities with
the Office of Intelligence and Security in selecting the vulnerabilities
to be assessed, or in implementing the assessments for the program. We
discussed this problem with officials from both offices who agreed that
closer coordination would be beneficial, particularly to discuss options
for addressing the challenges facing program researchers in conducting the
program*s vulnerability assessments. In March 2003, officials from both
offices began regular meetings to facilitate this coordination. The events
of September 11, 2001,

increased attention on efforts to assess the vulnerabilities of the
nation*s transportation infrastructure and develop needed improvements in
security. The Department of Transportation*s

(DOT) Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) had already
begun research in this area in June 2001. The goals of RSPA*s
Transportation

Infrastructure Assurance program are to identify, and develop ways to
mitigate the impact of, threats to the nation*s transportation

infrastructure. DOT*s Office of Intelligence and Security is responsible
for defining the requirements for transportation infrastructure
protection, ensuring that vulnerability assessments of

transportation infrastructure are conducted, and taking action to mitigate
those vulnerabilities. The House Committee on

Appropriations asked GAO to determine (1) the status and anticipated
results of the Transportation Infrastructure Assurance (TIA) program, and
(2) the extent to which RSPA and the Office of Intelligence and Security
have coordinated their activities in selecting the vulnerabilities to be
assessed and implementing the

vulnerability assessments for the program. DOT and RSPA officials reviewed
a draft of the report, agreed with its contents, and

provided technical clarifications that we incorporated. www. gao. gov/
cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 502. To view the full report, including the
scope

and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact
Katherine Siggerud at (202) 512- 2834 or siggerudk@ gao. gov. . Highlights
of GAO- 03- 502, a report to the

House Committee on Appropriations

May 2003

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY RESEARCH

Coordination Needed in Selecting and Implementing Infrastructure
Vulnerability Assessments

Page i GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research Letter 1 Results in
Brief 2 Background 3 TIA Program Is Scheduled to End in December 2003 with

Completion of Four Vulnerability Assessments 5 RSPA Has Not Fully
Coordinated Their Activities with OIS in Selecting the Vulnerabilities to
Be Assessed and in Implementing the Assessments for the TIA Program 13
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 16 Appendix I Volpe National
Transportation System Center Studies Related to Transportation
Infrastructure

Assurance 18

Appendix II Stakeholders Involved and Criteria Used in Selecting the
Vulnerabilities Assessed Under the TIA Program 19

Appendix III Entities Reported by RSPA Who Were Involved during the
Implementation of the TIA Program 20

Table

Table 1: TIA Program Planned Products and Progress to Date 11 Figures

Figure 1: Beginning and Completion Dates of Vulnerability Assessments 6
Figure 2: An Air Traffic Controller Uses a Digital Radar Display and

Workstation Computers Interconnected through Telecommunications Systems
for Air Traffic Management 7 Figure 3: Emergency Response Teams
Transported to the Site of

the World Trade Center in New York City Work to Clear Debris After the
Terrorist Attack on September 11, 2001 8 Figure 4: A Global Positioning
Satellite 9 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

Figure 5: Air, Marine and Surface Modes of Transportation of Hazardous
Materials Being Assessed by RSPA 10 Figure 6: TIA Program Funding by
Vulnerability Assessment (Fiscal Years 2001 * 2003) 12 Abbreviations

DOT Department of Transportation FAA Federal Aviation Administration OIS
Office of Intelligence and Security OMB Office of Management and Budget
PDD Presidential Decision Directive RSPA Research and Special Programs
Administration

TIA Transportation Infrastructure Assurance TSA Transportation Security
Administration

This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
materials separately from GAO*s product.

Page 1 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

May 1, 2003 The Honorable C. W. Bill Young Chairman The Honorable David R.
Obey Ranking Minority Member Committee on Appropriations House of
Representatives

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001,
increased attention on federal efforts to assess the vulnerabilities of
the nation*s transportation infrastructure and develop needed improvements
in security. The Department of Transportation (DOT) formally began one
such effort in June 2001* the Transportation Infrastructure Assurance
program* within its Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA).
The Transportation Infrastructure Assurance program focuses on identifying
and mitigating against threats, such as from acts of terrorism and
sabotage, which could adversely affect the operation of the nation*s

transportation infrastructure and cause harm to humans. The program is
crosscutting, defining *transportation infrastructure* to include
highways, transit systems, railroads, airports, waterways, pipelines and
ports, as well as the vehicles, aircraft, and vessels that operate on
these networks. The program is also directly related to the mission of
DOT*s key transportation security stakeholder. DOT*s Office of
Intelligence and Security is responsible on behalf of the Secretary for
defining the requirements for transportation infrastructure protection,
ensuring that vulnerability assessments of transportation infrastructure
are conducted, and taking action to mitigate those vulnerabilities.

In House Report 107- 722, accompanying DOT and Related Agencies
Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 2003, the House Appropriations
Committee asked us to examine the Transportation Infrastructure Assurance
program. In subsequent discussions with Committee staff we agreed to
address the following questions: (1) What is the status and what are the
anticipated results of the Transportation Infrastructure Assurance
program? and (2) To what extent has RSPA coordinated their activities with
DOT*s Office of Intelligence and Security in selecting the vulnerabilities
to be assessed and implementing the assessments for the program?

To answer these questions, we examined Transportation Infrastructure
Assurance program documents, including budget data and project plans.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

We also interviewed officials from RSPA*s Office of Innovation, Research
and Education* which manages the program, and the Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center* which is conducting the program research*
regarding the status, management, and operation of the program, as well as
plans for disseminating and evaluating program results. In addition, we
interviewed officials from the Office of Intelligence and Security about
the extent of their participation in the program.

Although the Transportation Security Administration was formally part of
DOT during the course of our review, it was not established until after
the Transportation Infrastructure Assurance program began. Moreover, the
Transportation Security Administration*s initial efforts focused on

safeguarding the nation*s aviation industry; as a result, the Office of
Intelligence and Security continued to lead DOT*s efforts in fulfilling
national critical infrastructure protection responsibilities.
Consequently, our review focused on the Office of Intelligence and
Security*s involvement in the program. We did, however, talk with
officials from the Transportation Security Administration regarding their
role in identifying and undertaking future research activities necessary
to enhance

transportation security. We conducted our review from September 2002
through February 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

The Transportation Infrastructure Assurance program is scheduled to end in
December 2003 after completing four vulnerability assessments aimed at
identifying and finding ways to mitigate threats against the nation*s
transportation infrastructure. RSPA*s research center, the Volpe National
Transportation System Center, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, is conducting
the assessments to (1) examine the interdependency of the nation*s
transportation system with other critical infrastructures, such as energy
and telecommunications; (2) identify the transportation and logistical
requirements for emergency response teams in dealing with weapons of mass
destruction; (3) examine the feasibility of alternative backup systems for
the global positioning system, upon which aviation, maritime, and surface
transportation industries rely; and (4) assess the options to transition
from hazardous materials transportation security guidelines to security
requirements. According to RSPA officials, RSPA plans to work with the
Office of Intelligence and Security to disseminate program results to
decision- makers in the transportation community through published
reports, workshops, and the Internet. Congress Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

appropriated $1 million in each of the fiscal years from 2001 through 2003
to RSPA for the Transportation Infrastructure Assurance program.

Prior to March 2003, RSPA did not fully coordinate their activities with
the Office of Intelligence and Security in selecting the vulnerabilities
to assess, or in implementing the assessments for the Transportation
Infrastructure Assurance program. RSPA coordinated with the Office of
Intelligence and Security in selecting two vulnerability assessments in
fiscal year 2001. However, RSPA selected two additional transportation
vulnerabilities for assessment in fiscal year 2002 without coordinating
with the Office of Intelligence and Security. According to officials from
RSPA and the Office of Intelligence and Security, this lack of
coordination resulted in part from

disagreements and misunderstandings about each other*s respective role in
the program. RSPA*s coordination with the Office of Intelligence and
Security during the research program*s implementation has been limited to
only one of the four vulnerability assessments under review. Greater

coordination might have enabled officials from the Office of Intelligence
and Security to obtain industry- sensitive information for RSPA*s
assessments and possibly increased the program*s value, according to the
Office of Intelligence and Security*s Associate Director. During the
course of our review, officials from both offices agreed with us that
closer coordination would be beneficial to the program and agreed to meet
regularly. We verified that in March 2003 officials from RSPA and the
Office of Intelligence and Security began to meet regularly to facilitate
this coordination. As a result, this report is making no recommendations.
We provided a copy of the draft report to DOT and RSPA officials who
agreed with the contents of the report and provided technical
clarifications that we incorporated into the report.

On May 22, 1998, President Clinton issued a pair of directives to guide
federal efforts to address critical infrastructure vulnerabilities.
Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD 62) highlighted the growing threat
of unconventional attacks against the United States. It described a new
and more systematic approach to fighting terrorism through interagency
efforts to prepare for response to incidents involving weapons of mass

destruction. Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63) further directed
federal agencies to conduct risk assessments and planning efforts to
reduce exposure to attack. Specifically, the assessments were to consider
attacks that could significantly diminish the abilities of (1) the federal
government to perform essential national security missions and ensure the
general public health and safety; (2) state and local governments to
maintain order and to deliver minimum essential public services; and (3)
Background

Page 4 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

the private sector to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and
the delivery of essential telecommunications, energy, financial, and
transportation services. PDD 63 called for the government to complete
these assessment efforts no later than May 2003. According to the Office
of Intelligence and Security*s (OIS) Associate Director for National
Security (hereafter referred to as the Associate Director), the
Transportation

Infrastructure Assurance (TIA) program is, in part, DOT*s effort to meet
these Presidential Decision Directive requirements.

RSPA concentrates on multimodal issues (research that applies to more than
one mode of transportation) that affect the entire U. S. transportation
system rather than on a specific sector of the system. RSPA*s Office of
Innovation, Research and Education is responsible for managing the TIA
program. The Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, located in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, is the research arm of RSPA and is conducting
the program*s vulnerability assessments. OIS is the key transportation

security stakeholder within DOT responsible for analyzing, developing, and
coordinating departmental and national policies addressing national
defense, border security, and transportation infrastructure assurance and
protection issues. Other OIS responsibilities include: coordinating with
the public and private sectors, international organizations, academia, and
interest groups regarding issues of infrastructure protection; acting as
the Secretary of Transportation*s liaison with the intelligence, law
enforcement, and national defense communities and assisting

departmental organizations in establishing and maintaining direct ties
with those communities; and serving as the Secretary of Transportation*s
primary advisor on significant intelligence issues affecting the traveling
public, the transportation industry, and national security. According to
OIS*s Associate Director, OIS has historically been involved in the
department*s transportation security research efforts. He added that OIS*s
lead role in fulfilling the department*s critical infrastructure

responsibilities, including the implementation of Presidential Decision
Directives addressing critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, is likely
to change as the roles and responsibilities of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and the newly created Department of Homeland Security
are defined.

Congress established TSA in November 2001 1 to be responsible for ensuring
transportation security, including identifying and undertaking

1 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Public Law 107- 71, 115 Stat.
597, Nov. 19, 2001.

Page 5 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

research and development activities necessary to enhance transportation
security. For fiscal year 2003, TSA received $110 million to fund
transportation security research activities for all modes of
transportation. Further, on November 25, 2002, the President signed the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2 which established the Department of
Homeland Security with the responsibility of, among other tasks,
coordinating efforts in securing America*s critical infrastructure. On
March 1, 2003, TSA became part of the newly created Department of Homeland
Security.

The TIA program is scheduled to end in December 2003, resulting in the
completion of four vulnerability assessments aimed at identifying and
finding ways to mitigate threats against the nation*s transportation
infrastructure. RSPA officials said that two of these assessments (the
interdependency of the transportation system with other critical
infrastructures and transportation and logistical requirements for
emergency response teams in dealing with weapons of mass destruction) were
selected, in part, to meet DOT*s PDD 62 and 63 requirements, and are
scheduled for completion in mid- 2003 to meet the deadlines outlined in
the presidential directives. The other two assessments (the feasibility of
alternative backup systems for the global positioning system, and an
assessment of the options to transition from hazardous materials
transportation security guidelines to security requirements) were selected
based upon a perceived need for assessments in these areas as defined by
officials from RSPA*s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety and the Volpe

National Transportation Systems Center, and are scheduled for completion
in December 2003. RSPA*s Volpe Center is conducting the TIA program*s four
assessments and has conducted research related to transportation
infrastructure since 1996. (See app. I for a summary of the Volpe Center*s
Workshops and Studies related to transportation infrastructure assurance
from fiscal years 1996 to 2000.)

Figure 1 shows the TIA program*s beginning and completion dates by
specific vulnerability assessment. RSPA officials told us that it has no
plans to include any additional or future assessments under the TIA
program.

2 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135, Nov.
25, 2002. TIA Program Is

Scheduled to End in December 2003 with Completion of Four Vulnerability
Assessments

Page 6 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

Figure 1: Beginning and Completion Dates of Vulnerability Assessments

The TIA program is assessing four vulnerabilities:  Interdependency of
the transportation system with other critical

infrastructures: According to TIA program documentation, the development
of alternative fuels, changes in telecommunication technologies, and the
evolving financial role of the federal government in the security of
privately operated transportation systems are affecting the relationship
between the nation*s transportation infrastructure and some

of the nation*s other critical infrastructures. The purpose of this
assessment is to describe the current and evolving dependence between the
nation*s transportation infrastructure and some of the nation*s other
critical infrastructures including energy, electronic- commerce, banking
and finance, and telecommunications. For example, the nation*s air traffic

control system relies on telecommunications to manage the safety and
efficiency of air transportation, as shown in figure 2. Researchers plan
to determine the costs, in terms of economic disruption and loss of lives,
associated with terrorists exploiting transportation infrastructure
vulnerabilities.

Page 7 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

Figure 2: An Air Traffic Controller Uses a Digital Radar Display and
Workstation Computers Interconnected through Telecommunications Systems
for Air Traffic Management

 Transportation and logistical requirements for emergency response teams
in dealing with weapons of mass destruction: The purpose of this
assessment is to evaluate the transportation and logistics assets required
in responding to terrorist activities. The assessment will include an
analysis of transportation operations and procedures, personnel, supplies,
and transportation assets such as vehicles, containers, and pallets.

Specifically, researchers plan to analyze the institutional and economic
implications of terrorist activities involving weapons of mass destruction
in order to develop emergency transportation action plans and compile
emergency transportation procedure best practices. Emergency teams were
transported to respond to the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center
on September 11, 2001, as shown in figure 3.

Page 8 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

Figure 3: Emergency Response Teams Transported to the Site of the World
Trade Center in New York City Work to Clear Debris After the Terrorist
Attack on September 11, 2001

 Feasibility of alternative backup systems for the global positioning
system: The purpose of this assessment is to provide a continuation of the
August 2001 report by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center,
Vulnerability of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying On The Global
Positioning System. The report concluded that the global positioning
system is vulnerable to both intentional and nonintentional disruption,
and identified a need for a backup for the global positioning system. To
followup on the August 2001 report, researchers plan to analyze and
describe the performance, cost, and practicality of backup systems and
procedures. Figure 4 shows a picture of a global positioning satellite.

Page 9 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

Figure 4: A Global Positioning Satellite

 Options to transition hazardous materials transportation security
guidelines to security requirements: The purpose of this assessment is to
evaluate the tradeoffs in the transportation of hazardous materials that
exist between security, economic, proprietary, and delivery factors. RSPA
plans to provide an analysis and description of these tradeoffs in
different threat scenarios for different modes of transportation. Figure 5
provides an overview of the types of transportation being assessed.

Page 10 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

Figure 5: Air, Marine, and Surface Modes of Transportation of Hazardous
Materials Being Assessed by RSPA

RSPA plans to work with OIS to disseminate the results of the program to
private transportation system operators and to stakeholders in DOT and
other federal agencies through 11 formal reports, presentations,
workshops, and the Internet. Table 1 provides an overview of the program*s
planned products and progress to date.

Source: Nova Development Corporation.

Page 11 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

Table 1: TIA Program Planned Products and Progress to Date Vulnerability
assessments Planned products and progress to date

Energy:

 TIA program researchers have drafted a report, *Security Risks
Associated with Transportation- Energy Interdependencies,* which will be
reviewed by OIS. This draft report is intended to illustrate the
complexities in defining interdependency vulnerabilities. As of February
2003, this report had not yet been issued.

 A second report studying the relationship between electrical
distribution infrastructure and transportation is scheduled for completion
in May 2003. E- Commerce:  TIA program managers are contracting with the
Transportation Research Board to

develop a report describing information technology in the freight
industry, reviewing current freight security practices, and identifying
potential vulnerabilities in the freight industry. The report is scheduled
for completion in May 2003.

 TIA program researchers have completed a background paper, *E- Commerce
Vulnerabilities: Impacts on the Transportation System,* (March 2002),
which presents information on identifying and protecting critical
information technology infrastructure, ranking vulnerabilities, and
estimating potential impacts (costs) if the vulnerabilities are exploited.
TIA researchers have also conducted a briefing on the impact of electronic
systems in shaping the future transportation system. An accompanying slide
presentation, *Transportation in 2050,* has been drafted and is under
review.

Banking & Finance:

 TIA program researchers are working on a report, *Economic Effects of
the September 11 Terrorist Attacks: A Survey of Current Studies and an
Overview of the Implications for Transportation,* examining the impact of
the events of September 11 on the banking and finance systems and their
associated effects on the nation*s transportation system. While originally
scheduled for release in September 2002, RSPA officials told us that this
report is not yet complete and may be discontinued due to its limited
value in light of numerous studies conducted on this issue.

 A report reviewing the results of other research involving the
interdependency of the nation*s transportation infrastructure with the
nation*s banking and finance system is scheduled for completion in spring
2003. Interdependency of the transportation system with other critical
infrastructures

Telecommunication:

 TIA program researchers are finalizing a report on the interdependency
between the nation*s aviation industry and telecommunications industry.

 Additional research is intended to address the interdependence of the
nation*s telecommunications industry with other nonaviation sectors of the
nation*s transportation system. According to Volpe Center researchers,
this final report is likely to consist of several volumes, each with a
specific modal focus. This report is scheduled for completion in May 2003.
Transportation and logistical requirements for emergency response teams in
dealing with weapons of mass destruction  TIA program researchers
presented a set of data tables describing the various

emergency response teams transportation requirements, including personnel
and equipment. According to program researchers, these tables were
delivered to RSPA*s Office of Emergency Transportation in July 2002.

 TIA program researchers have conducted a bio- terrorism conference to
aid in identifying gaps in the emergency response system. The conference
was held in Washington D. C., on November 19- 20, 2002. Feasibility of
alternative backup systems for the global positioning system

 TIA program researchers are working on a report designed to identify and
provide cost benefit assessments of alternatives to use in backing up the
global positioning system should it be disrupted by sabotage or terrorist
attack. The report intends to assist DOT in determining the most
appropriate alternative radio- navigation system to use in the nation*s
transportation system. This report is scheduled for completion in December
2003.

Page 12 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

Vulnerability assessments Planned products and progress to date

Options to transition hazardous materials transportation security
guidelines to security requirements

 TIA program researchers reviewed recent literature, workshops, and
conferences on security options and implications related to the
transportation of hazardous materials. The final report was released in
December 2002.

 According to program managers, potential areas of work for the second
phase of this project include an assessment of the implementation of
security plans, and the development of better data on hazardous material
shipments with high security concerns. This work is scheduled for
completion in December 2003. Source: RSPA and Volpe Center data.

Congress appropriated $1 million each year to RSPA for the TIA program in
fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003. Figure 6 provides an overview of the
TIA program funding for fiscal years 2001 through 2003 for each of the
four vulnerability assessments.

Figure 6: TIA Program Funding by Vulnerability Assessment (Fiscal Years
2001 * 2003)

Page 13 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

RSPA has not fully coordinated their activities with OIS* DOT*s key
transportation security stakeholder* in selecting the vulnerabilities to
be assessed or in implementing the assessments for the TIA program. RSPA
coordinated with OIS in selecting two vulnerability assessments in fiscal
year 2001. Specifically, in fiscal year 2001, RSPA worked with OIS to
select one vulnerability for assessment and notified OIS of its selection
of a

second vulnerability for assessment. RSPA, however, did not coordinate
with OIS officials in the selection of two additional vulnerability
assessments in fiscal year 2002. RSPA*s coordination with OIS during the
program*s implementation has been limited to only one of the four
vulnerability assessments under review.

RSPA coordinated with OIS and used various criteria, such as PDD 62 and
63, in selecting only two of the four vulnerabilities to be assessed in
the TIA program. For example, RSPA consulted with OIS to select one of the
two vulnerabilities for assessment in fiscal year 2001 and notified OIS of
its selection of a second vulnerability. Specifically, in a memorandum
dated March 6, 2001, OIS identified and proposed a list of critical
infrastructure protection research requirements for assessment and
requested that RSPA address them as a high priority. 3 In this initial
proposal, the Director of OIS said that significant OIS involvement would
be required to effectively implement the program given its
responsibilities for defining transportation security vulnerabilities,
ensuring that vulnerability assessments are conducted, and implementing
actions to mitigate those vulnerabilities. On April 9, 2001, RSPA issued a
memorandum to OIS outlining its research agenda for fiscal year 2001 and
stating that OIS*s involvement in assuring the program*s quality,

credibility, and review was critical. This memorandum confirmed RSPA*s
plans to assess the interdependency of the transportation system with
other critical infrastructures, as suggested by OIS*s proposed list, and
notified OIS of RSPA*s intention to conduct a second assessment* the
transportation and logistical requirements for emergency response teams in
dealing with weapons of mass destruction* that was not included on OIS*s
list.

3 In fiscal year 2000, OIS received funding for transportation
infrastructure protection activities. In fiscal year 2001, funding in this
area of research shifted from OIS to RSPA. RSPA Has Not Fully

Coordinated Their Activities with OIS in Selecting the

Vulnerabilities to Be Assessed and in Implementing the Assessments for the
TIA Program

RSPA*s Coordination with OIS in the Selection of the Vulnerabilities to Be
Assessed in the TIA Program

Page 14 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, RPSA
issued a solicitation on behalf of all DOT modes for additional
transportation security technology research and concepts to be included in
the TIA program or related transportation security programs. OIS officials
participated with RSPA in reviewing the proposals received in response to
the solicitation. However, according to the Associate Administrator of
RSPA*s Office of Innovation, Research, and Education (hereafter referred
to as the Associate Administrator), DOT did not receive the funds to
pursue any of these proposals.

During fiscal year 2002, RSPA did not coordinate with OIS to determine
what additional assessments to select for inclusion in the program.
Instead, RSPA selected two transportation vulnerabilities for assessment
under the program after holding discussions with Volpe Center researchers
and officials from RSPA*s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety. While the
Associate Director of OIS said he was unaware that additional
vulnerabilities had been selected for assessment in fiscal year 2002 prior
to our discussions with him regarding the status of the program, he noted
that both of these assessments* on the feasibility of alternative

backup systems for the global positioning system, and an assessment on
options to transition hazardous materials transportation security
guidelines to security requirements* were valid and of high priority.
According to OIS and RSPA officials, this lack of coordination resulted,
in part, from disagreements and misunderstandings about the other*s
respective role in the program. As indicated by a series of e- mail
communications between OIS and RSPA officials during the period between
October 2001 and January 2002, questions about the respective roles of OIS
and RSPA in the program*s management, specific research areas, and the
logistics of this research were raised on numerous occasions with no
apparent resolution. Neither RSPA nor OIS were able to provide us with
documentation to show that these issues were resolved.

(See app. II for specific stakeholders involved and criteria used to
select the vulnerabilities chosen for assessment under the TIA program in
fiscal years 2001 and 2002.)

RSPA*s coordination with OIS, DOT*s security stakeholder, during the
implementation of the TIA program has been limited to one of the four
vulnerability assessments. While OIS has participated in meetings
regarding the assessment of the options to transition hazardous materials
transportation security guidelines to security requirements, RSPA did not
similarly involve OIS in the program*s three other vulnerability
assessments. OIS and RSPA officials said that this lack of coordination
RSPA*s Coordination with

OIS in the Implementation of the Assessments in the TIA Program

Page 15 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

during the implementation of the program resulted, in part, from continued
disagreements and misunderstandings about the other*s respective role in
the program. Further, OIS*s Associate Director said that because of OIS*s
lack of involvement in the TIA program, he was not

aware of the program*s progress to date and therefore expressed
uncertainty about whether the program*s research is meeting the
requirements of PDD 62 and 63.

OIS*s Associate Director also said that OIS*s working relationships with
private industry stakeholders might have helped RSPA obtain
industrysensitive information for the program*s assessments. RSPA
officials acknowledged that a primary challenge of the TIA program
involves obtaining information on industry- specific, competition-
sensitive issues. For example, RSPA officials said that private sector
owners and operators, such as those from the oil industry, are cautious
about releasing proprietary information because of the possibility that
this information could be used by (1) business rivals to gain a
competitive advantage, (2) terrorists to harm and destroy critical
infrastructure, and (3) the federal government to pursue further
regulations of the industry. As a result, TIA

program researchers told us that they are limited in their ability to
identify specific threats and weaknesses relating to some of the specific
vulnerabilities under assessment. According to RSPA*s Associate
Administrator, because of these limitations, the TIA program is, in some
instances, examining vulnerability issues on a conceptual level rather
than through specific case studies of industry infrastructure. For
example, instead of assessing the vulnerabilities of specific privately
owned infrastructures, such as oil refineries, RSPA is addressing some
critical details of crude oil transport using ports in Louisiana and Texas
to illustrate the complexities in defining the interdependency
vulnerabilities between the nation*s transportation and energy
infrastructures. (See app. III for a summary of OIS involvement in the
implementation of the TIA

program, as well as a listing of all of the significant stakeholders
reported by RSPA who were consulted during the implementation of the TIA
program.)

We discussed our findings about the lack of coordination with RSPA*s
Associate Administrator and OIS*s Associate Director and suggested they
take steps to increase their coordination efforts. They agreed that

increased coordination would be beneficial. Specifically, they agreed to
hold bi- monthly updates on the progress of each of the vulnerability
assessments, discuss program task methodologies and approaches, and
identify options for addressing the challenges facing program researchers
in conducting the program*s vulnerability assessments. The first update

Page 16 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

was held in March 2003. Furthermore, RSPA*s Associate Administrator agreed
to provide TSA*s Director for Threat Assessment and Risk Management 4 with
information on the TIA program*s findings, challenges, and lessons
learned. In our discussions with TSA*s Director for Threat and Risk
Assessment, she said that such information regarding the TIA

program would be helpful in guiding TSA*s future efforts in planning and
conducting transportation security research. Because of actions taken by
RSPA and OIS to improve coordination we are making no recommendations at
this time.

We provided a copy of the draft report to DOT and RSPA officials who
agreed with the contents of the report and provided technical
clarifications that we incorporated into the report. They did not provide
written comments on the report.

We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Transportation,
appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www.
gao. gov.

4 TSA*s Threat Assessment and Risk Management Program was established in
October 2002 to provide oversight and assistance regarding threat and
vulnerability assessments conducted by TSA. The program also serves to
coordinate with other federal agencies to ensure that complete assessments
of the vulnerabilities facing the nation*s transportation system are
conducted. Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Page 17 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

If you have questions about this report, please call me on (202) 512- 2834
or Chris Keisling on (404) 679- 1917. Other key contributors included
Colin Fallon, Bert Japikse, Steve Morris, and Jason Schwartz.

Katherine Siggerud Acting Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

Appendix I: Volpe National Transportation System Center Studies Related to
Transportation Infrastructure Assurance

Page 18 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

Funding source Fiscal year Funding amount Products

Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection

1996 $380,000 Reports:

 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Vulnerabilities (1997)

 National Air Space Vulnerabilities (1997)

 Traffic (Surface) Central Systems Vulnerabilities (1997)

White Papers:

 Electromagnetic Threats to Rail/ Transit Operations (1997) Department of
Defense 1996 Supplemental Appropriation for a Surface Transportation
Vulnerability Assessment

1997 $2,400,000 White Papers:  Criminal Use of Transportation
Infrastructure (1997)

 Railroad Bridges and Tunnels Vulnerability (1998)

 Railroad Signaling and Control Vulnerability (1998)

Reports:

 Intermodal Cargo Security Best Practices (1999)

 Transportation Infrastructure Assurance Research and Development Plan
(1999 and 2000) 1996 $15,000 1997 $15,000 1998 $50,000 1999 $35,000 2000
$85,000 RSPA Research and Technology and Strategic Planning (Total
Terminal Security/ TIA Task)

2001 $50,000

Workshops:

 Emerging Issues in Transportation Information Infrastructure Security
(1996)  Global Positioning Study Interference and Mitigation (1998)

 Chemical/ Biological Incidents (1998)

 Marine Safety and Port Security (2000)

Reports:

 Intermodal Cargo Security Best Practices (1999)

 Transportation Infrastructure Assurance Research and Development Plan
(1999 and 2000)

DOT Office of Intelligence and Security 2000 $700,000 Reports:

 DOT Communications (Security) Reports (2001)

 Updated Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Study (2002)

 Global Positioning System Vulnerability Study (2001) Source: GAO
presentation of RSPA and Volpe Center data.

Appendix I: Volpe National Transportation System Center Studies Related to
Transportation Infrastructure Assurance

Appendix II: Stakeholders Involved and Criteria Used in Selecting the
Vulnerabilities Assessed Under the TIA Program

Page 19 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

Selected in FY 2001 Selected in FY 2002 Stakeholders involved and criteria
used

Interdependency of the transportation system with other

critical infrastructures Transportation and

logistical requirements for

emergency response teams in

dealing with weapons of mass destruction

Feasibility of alternative backup

systems for the global positioning system

Options to transition hazardous materials

transportation security guidelines

to security requirements Stakeholders involved: DOT*s Office of
Intelligence and

Security

Appendix III: Entities Reported by RSPA Who Were Involved during the
Implementation of the TIA Program

Page 20 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

Type of involvement Assessment Entity involved To obtain

information For discussion of task approach For discussion

of interim results Office of Intelligence and Security Federal Aviation
Administration

Appendix III: Entities Reported by RSPA Who Were Involved during the
Implementation of the TIA Program

Page 21 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

Type of involvement Assessment Entity involved To obtain

information For discussion of task approach For discussion

of interim results

Federal Transit Administration

Appendix III: Entities Reported by RSPA Who Were Involved during the
Implementation of the TIA Program

Page 22 GAO- 03- 502 Transportation Security Research

Type of involvement Assessment Entity involved To obtain

information For discussion of task approach For discussion

of interim results Office of Intelligence and Security Booz- Allen
Hamilton

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