    Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Action Needed to Ensure Continued
    Recovery of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources (15-APR-03,
    GAO-03-483).

    Potentially dangerous sealed sources containing
    greater-than-Class-C radioactive material pose a threat to
    national security because terrorists could use them to make
    "dirty bombs." Public Law 99-240 requires the Department of
    Energy (DOE) provide a facility for disposing of unwanted
    sources. Because DOE has no disposal facility for these sources,
    its Off-Site Source Recovery Project is recovering and
    temporarily storing them at Los Alamos, New Mexico. GAO was asked
    to determine (1) the number of unwanted sealed sources that DOE
    plans to recover through 2010 and the estimated cost, (2) the
    status of recovery efforts and any problems that DOE may face,
    and (3) the status of DOE's efforts to provide a disposal
    facility for these sealed sources
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-483
        ACCNO:   A06662
      TITLE:     Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Action Needed to Ensure
    Continued Recovery of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources
         DATE:   04/15/2003
      SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism
    	     Radioactive wastes
    	     Terrorism
    	     Radioactive waste disposal
    	     Bombs
    	     Hazardous substances
    	     National preparedness
    	     DOE Off-Site Source Recovery Project

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    GAO-03-483

    Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial
    Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee on
    Governmental Affairs, U. S. Senate

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

    April 2003 NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

    DOE Action Needed to Ensure Continued Recovery of Unwanted Sealed
    Radioactive Sources

    GAO- 03- 483

    The exact number of unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources in the
    United States is unknown, but DOE estimates it will recover about 14,300
    such sources by the end of fiscal year 2010, at a total cost of about $69
    million. DOE*s estimate of the number of sealed sources it will recover
    was based on three assumptions* that a permanent disposal facility would
    be available by fiscal year 2007; that the Off- Site Source Recovery
    Project*s recovery operations would be phased out from fiscal years 2007
    through 2010; and that, after fiscal year 2010, all sealed sources would
    be sent directly to a disposal facility and the project would cease
    operations.

    Through February 2003, DOE*s Off- Site Source Recovery Project had
    recovered more than 5,000 greater- than- Class- C sealed sources from
    about 160 sites across the United States; however, the project faces three
    problems that could hinder future recovery efforts. First, the project is
    not a priority

    with DOE*s Office of Environmental Management, because, according to
    office officials, the project does not conform with the mission of the
    office. The project did not receive full funding, even after September 11,
    2001,

    because of the Office of Environmental Management*s other higher priority
    projects, and the office*s current budget specifies future annual funding
    levels that, according to project officials, would be insufficient to
    enable the project to recover additional sealed sources. Second, DOE
    cannot recover any additional sealed sources containing plutonium- 239
    because the project has already run out of space at the Los Alamos
    National Laboratory that meets DOE*s higher security standards for storing
    these sources. Third, DOE has not approved a means for storing sealed
    sources containing strontium- 90 and cesium- 137 until a permanent
    disposal facility is available.

    As of February 2003, more than 17 years after the enactment of Public Law
    99- 240, DOE had not made progress toward providing for the permanent
    disposal of greater- than- Class- C radioactive sealed sources, as
    required by the act. Specifically, DOE had not assigned responsibility to
    an office within DOE to begin developing such a facility. Also, according
    to DOE officials, DOE lacks a plan for ensuring the continued recovery of
    sealed sources in the likely event that the disposal facility is delayed
    beyond fiscal year 2007.

    Example of a Radioactive Sealed Source That Contains Americium- 241

    NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

    DOE Action Needed to Ensure Continued Recovery of Unwanted Sealed
    Radioactive Sources

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 483. To view the full report,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact Gene Aloise, 202- 512- 3841, aloisee@ gao. gov.
    Highlights of GAO- 03- 483, a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
    Subcommittee

    on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee
    on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate

    April 2003

    Potentially dangerous sealed sources containing greater- thanClass- C
    radioactive material pose a threat to national security because terrorists
    could use them to make *dirty bombs.* Public Law 99- 240

    requires the Department of Energy (DOE) provide a facility for disposing
    of unwanted sources. Because DOE has no disposal facility for these
    sources, its OffSite Source Recovery Project is recovering and temporarily
    storing them at Los Alamos, New Mexico. GAO was asked to determine (1)

    the number of unwanted sealed sources that DOE plans to recover through
    2010 and the estimated cost, (2) the status of recovery efforts and any
    problems that DOE may face, and (3) the status of DOE*s efforts to provide
    a disposal

    facility for these sealed sources. GAO recommends that the Secretary of
    Energy (1) determine whether the priority given to the project is
    commensurate with the

    threat these sources pose; (2) ensure adequate resources are devoted to
    the project; (3) take immediate action to provide space to store sealed
    sources containing plutonium- 239, strontium- 90, and

    cesium- 137; (4) initiate the process to develop a permanent disposal
    facility for greater- than- Class- C radioactive waste; and (5) develop a
    plan to ensure the continued

    recovery of greater- than- Class- C waste until a disposal facility is
    available. DOE did not comment on our recommendations.

    Page i GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation Letter 1 Results in Brief 3
    Background 5 The Exact Number of Unwanted Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed
    Sources Is Unknown, but DOE Plans to Recover About 14,000

    Sealed Sources by the End of Fiscal Year 2010 at an Estimated Cost of
    About $69 Million 9 DOE Has Recovered a Large Number of Sources, but
    Unresolved

    Problems Could Hinder Future Recovery Efforts 13 DOE Has Not Made Progress
    toward Providing a Permanent Disposal Facility 25 Conclusions 28
    Recommendations for Executive Action 29 Agency Comments 29 Scope and
    Methodology 30 Appendix I Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Low- Level
    Radioactive

    Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law 99- 240 33

    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Energy 37

    Tables

    Table 1: Estimated Number of Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed Sources DOE
    Plans to Recover Annually, Fiscal Years 1999 through 2010 11 Table 2:
    Number of Each Type of Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed

    Source that DOE Plans to Recover by the End of Fiscal Year 2010 12 Table
    3: Estimated Annual Cost to Complete the Recovery of 14,309 Greater- Than-
    Class- C Sealed Sources, Fiscal Years

    2002 through 2011 12 Table 4: Estimated Total Cost to Complete Remaining
    Recovery and Closeout Activities, as of Fiscal Year 2002 13 Table 5:
    Number of Each Type of Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed Source Recovered and
    Associated Grams and Curies of Radioactive Material, as of February 2003
    14 Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Table 6: Number of Each Type of Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed Source
    Awaiting Recovery and Associated Number of Holders and Grams and Curies of
    Radioactive Material, as of February 2003 17 Figures

    Figure 1: The Off- Site Source Recovery Project*s Process for Recovering
    Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed Sources 7 Figure 2: Photograph of a
    Structure at the Los Alamos National

    Laboratory in Which Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed Sources Recovered by
    the Off- Site Source Recovery Project Are Stored as Waste 8 Figure 3:
    Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed Sources Recovered by State,

    as of February 2003 16 Figure 4: Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed Sources in
    Need of Recovery by State, as of February 2003 19 Abbreviations

    DOE Department of Energy NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
    NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

    This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
    copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
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    materials separately from GAO*s product.

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation April 15, 2003 The Honorable
    Daniel K. Akaka Ranking Minority Member

    Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International
    Security Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate

    Dear Senator Akaka: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
    there has been a great deal of concern about the control of sealed sources
    containing radioactive material used in medicine, agriculture, research,
    and industry throughout the United States. The radioactive material in
    these sealed sources is encapsulated, or sealed, in metal* such as
    stainless steel, titanium, or platinum* to prevent its dispersal. The
    small size and portability of the sealed sources make them susceptible to
    misuse, improper disposal, and theft. If these sealed sources fell into
    the hands of terrorists, they could be used as simple and crude but
    potentially dangerous radiological weapons,

    commonly called dirty bombs. In general, a dirty bomb is produced by
    packaging explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive material, which
    would be dispersed when the bomb went off. The radioactive material
    dispersed* depending on the type, form (e. g., solid or powder), amount,
    and concentration* could cause radiation sickness for people nearby as
    well as the serious economic costs and social disruption associated with
    the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of the contaminated area.

    Certain sealed sources are considered particularly attractive for
    potential use in producing dirty bombs because, among other things, they
    contain more concentrated amounts of nuclear material known as *greater-
    thanClass- C material** typically americium- 241, cesium- 137, plutonium-
    238,

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    Page 2 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation plutonium- 239, and
    strontium- 90. 1 Applications of greater- than- Class- C sealed sources
    include portable and fixed gauges used in commercial

    manufacturing processes, gauges used by the construction industry for
    testing the moisture content of soil, medical pacemakers, medical
    diagnostics and treatments, gauges used for petroleum exploration, and
    government and private research and development.

    The Low- Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law
    99- 240, requires the Department of Energy (DOE) to provide a facility for
    disposing of all greater- than- Class- C radioactive waste, including
    greater- than- Class- C sealed sources that are no longer wanted by their
    owners, but DOE has not yet developed a disposal facility (see app. I).
    Until a disposal facility is available, DOE created the Off- Site Source
    Recovery Project, which, since fiscal year 1999, has been recovering
    unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources from their owners and
    temporarily storing them at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los
    Alamos, New Mexico. Currently, owners of unwanted greater- than- Class- C
    sealed sources must continue to store and secure their sources on their
    premises until either DOE recovers and temporarily stores them or a
    disposal facility becomes available. Once a permanent disposal facility
    becomes available, source holders will be able to send their sources
    directly to the facility, and the sources that DOE is storing at Los
    Alamos will be transferred to the facility for permanent disposal.

    To assess DOE*s progress toward improving its control of greater-
    thanClass- C sealed sources, you asked us to determine (1) the number of
    greater- than- Class- C sealed sources that are unwanted, the number that
    DOE plans to recover and dispose of through 2010, and the estimated cost
    and schedule to recover and temporarily store these sources until a
    permanent disposal facility is available; (2) the status of recovery
    efforts to date and any problems that DOE may face in recovering and
    temporarily storing greater- than- Class- C sealed sources; and (3) the
    status of DOE*s

    1 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission classifies low- level radioactive
    waste (i. e., waste not specifically classified as high- level waste, such
    as used fuel rods from nuclear power plants) as A, B, or C for the purpose
    of disposal. Radioactive waste is classified by type of radionuclide (e.
    g., americium- 241) and concentration of radioactivity (often measured in
    curies per gram). Class A, B, and C radioactive wastes must meet
    progressively more stringent requirements for disposal. Class A, B, and C
    wastes (e. g., exit signs containing tritium and contaminated soil or lab
    equipment) generally can be disposed of at existing commercial disposal
    facilities. Wastes that exceed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission*s
    criteria for Class C, known as greater- than- Class- C wastes, generally
    cannot be disposed of at existing facilities.

    Page 3 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation efforts to meet the
    requirements of Public Law 99- 240 to provide long- term disposal for
    greater- than- Class- C radioactive waste. To address these objectives,
    we, among other things, visited the Off- Site Source Recovery

    Project office at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to observe the
    storage facilities and interview project officials, reviewed studies
    estimating the number of greater- than- Class- C sealed sources and DOE*s
    budget documents, and analyzed data on the progress of recovery efforts.
    This report is the first of three we are preparing at your request to
    examine efforts to control sealed radiological sources. Forthcoming
    reports will

    review domestic and international efforts to control these sources beyond
    those of the Off- Site Source Recovery Project. The exact number of
    unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources is unknown but DOE*s Off-
    Site Source Recovery Project officials estimate they will recover about
    14,300 unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources by the end of
    fiscal year 2010, at an estimated total cost of about $69 million. These
    officials told us that the number of unwanted greaterthan- Class- C sealed
    sources that would be recovered is a rough estimate, which was derived by
    reviewing, among other information, studies completed by the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission and DOE*s Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and
    information provided by sealed source manufacturers. Although the Idaho
    National Engineering Laboratory study estimated that there currently could
    be about 250,000 to 500,000 greater- than- Class- C sealed sources in the
    United States, the actual number of greater- than- Class- C sealed sources
    that are no longer wanted is not known because no one kept track of this
    information. The estimate

    of the number of greater- than- Class- C sealed sources that DOE*s project
    will recover is based on three assumptions* that a permanent disposal
    facility for greater- than- Class- C sealed sources will be available by
    fiscal year 2007; that the Off- Site Source Recovery Project will continue
    to recover sources from certain holders of sources during a transition
    period from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2010; and that, after
    fiscal year 2010, all greater- than- Class- C sealed sources will be sent
    directly to the disposal facility and the Off- Site Source Recovery
    Project will cease operations.

    As of February 2003, DOE*s Off- Site Source Recovery Project had recovered
    more than 5,000 greater- than- Class- C sealed sources from about 160
    sites across the United States; however, the project faces three problems
    that could hinder future recovery efforts. These problems include the
    questionable long- term commitment of DOE*s Office of Environmental
    Management to the project, inadequate storage capacity Results in Brief

    Page 4 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation that meets the higher
    security needs of sealed sources containing plutonium- 239, and the lack
    of a means for temporarily storing sealed

    sources containing strontium- 90 and cesium- 137. With regard to the first
    problem, officials from DOE*s Office of Environmental Management, which is
    responsible for the Off- Site Source Recovery Project, told us that they
    would like the responsibility for the project to be placed in another DOE
    office because the mission of the project is inconsistent with the mission
    of the Office of Environmental Management. They also told us that the
    project did not receive full funding, even after September 11, 2001,

    because of other higher priority projects, and current Office of
    Environmental Management budget documents specify future annual funding
    levels that, according to project officials, would limit the project*s
    ability to recover additional greater- than- Class- C sealed sources.
    Without funding available to the Off- Site Source Recovery Project to
    recover additional sources, owners of unwanted greater- than- Class- C
    sealed sources will be forced to store and secure their sources on their
    premises until a disposal facility is available.

    Further, the Off- Site Source Recovery Project cannot recover any
    additional greater- than- Class- C sealed sources containing plutonium-
    239 because there is no more space at the Los Alamos National Laboratory
    that meets DOE*s security standards for storing these sources. As a
    result, about 150 holders of unwanted sources containing plutonium- 239,
    most of which are universities, must retain them and keep them properly
    secured until space becomes available. Although this nuclear material
    requires

    special security measures because of its potential for use in a crude
    nuclear bomb, two holders of these sources have told us of instances in
    which doors to the rooms containing unwanted greater- than- Class- C
    sealed sources were left unlocked and open, and most holders expressed
    their desire to dispose of the sources as quickly as possible. In
    addition, DOE has not approved a means for temporarily storing strontium-
    90 and cesium- 137 at a DOE facility until a permanent disposal facility
    is developed as DOE has done for the other types of radioactive materials
    contained in the sealed sources it needs to recover. According to DOE, it
    recognizes these problems and is developing options to resolve them. Our
    report recommends that DOE determine whether the priority that it is
    giving the project is commensurate with the risks these sealed sources
    pose, ensure adequate resources are devoted to the project, and provide,
    as soon as possible, storage space for sealed sources containing
    plutonium- 239, strontium- 90, and cesium- 137 with the appropriate level
    of security.

    Page 5 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation As of February 2003, DOE*s
    Office of Environmental Management had not made progress toward providing
    for the permanent disposal of greaterthan-

    Class- C radioactive waste, and it is unlikely to provide such a facility
    by fiscal year 2007, as previously assumed, because it is not a priority
    with the office. Specifically, the office had not begun the first step in
    developing a disposal facility* completing an appropriate analysis as
    required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and implementing
    regulations, which would likely be an Environmental Impact Statement.
    Officials from DOE*s Office of Environmental Management told us that the
    office had

    provided funding for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to develop such an
    analysis, but that after the office reviewed the budget in February 2002,
    it reallocated these funds to other priorities. These officials also told
    us that DOE is considering moving the responsibility for developing the
    analysis to another office within DOE, and they anticipate that this
    decision will be made some time in fiscal year 2003. In an Environmental
    Impact Statement, which Office of Environmental Management officials say
    could take 2 years to develop, DOE could propose that either a new
    disposal facility be built or an existing facility be used. If a new
    facility were decided upon, developing it could take at least 7 years,
    according to DOE*s estimates. If an existing facility were selected,
    disposal services could be provided sooner, depending upon the
    availability of the facility. For example, DOE has been exploring the
    possibility of sending greater- thanClass- C sealed sources containing
    plutonium- 239 to an existing facility, its Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
    located in Carlsbad, New Mexico, but it remains uncertain when or if this
    will be possible. Finally, according to Office of Environmental Management
    officials, DOE does not have a plan for recovering greater- than- Class- C
    sealed sources in the event that the

    disposal facility is delayed. Our report recommends that DOE initiate the
    process to provide a permanent disposal facility for greater- than- Class-
    C waste, develop a plan to help manage this process, and develop a plan to
    ensure the continued recovery and storage of greater- than- Class- C
    sealed

    sources in the likely event that availability of the disposal facility is
    delayed beyond fiscal year 2007.

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates medical, industrial, and
    research uses of radioactive materials through a combination of
    activities, including regulatory requirements; licensing; and safety
    oversight, including inspection and enforcement. NRC issues licenses for
    the ownership of radioactive material and for the possession and use of
    this material in certain items, such as sealed sources. NRC licensees
    include medical, industrial, and academic organizations. In addition, NRC
    has delegated its licensing authority to 32 states, called *agreement
    states.* Background

    Page 6 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation These agreement states
    administer 76 percent of the licensees while NRC administers the remainder
    of the licensees.

    In the 1970s, DOE began to recover unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed
    sources containing plutonium- 239. Through 1998, DOE recovered more than
    1,300 such sealed sources, mainly from universities, and destroyed them by
    chemical processing. During this time, the Congress also enacted the Low-
    Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law 99- 240,
    which requires the Department of Energy (DOE) to provide a

    facility for disposing of all greater- than- Class- C radioactive waste,
    including all greater- than- Class- C sealed sources that are no longer
    wanted by their owners. However, DOE has not yet developed such a
    facility.

    Although DOE had no formal program to accept unwanted greater- thanClass-
    C sealed sources from their owners, in 1992, the agency established a
    working agreement with NRC to address greater- than- Class- C sealed
    sources that might cause potential health and safety problems. Between
    1993 and 1999, DOE recovered over 40 greater- than- Class- C sealed
    sources at the request of NRC. By 1999, however, DOE determined that
    chemically processing greater- than- Class- C sealed sources was
    expensive, exposed laboratory workers involved in the chemical processing
    to unacceptable doses of radioactivity, and created problematic waste that
    needed

    disposal. In addition, DOE lacked sufficient capacity to process the
    growing numbers of greater- than- Class- C sealed sources that were being
    reported as unwanted. As a result, DOE determined in 1999 that chemical
    processing should be discontinued. That same year, DOE*s Office of

    Environmental Management, whose main mission is to clean up DOE*s
    contaminated weapons development facilities that DOE plans to close,
    created the Off- Site Source Recovery Project to recover and temporarily
    store unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources until a disposal
    facility was available. The Office of Environmental Management funds and
    provides oversight and direction to the project; DOE*s National Nuclear
    Security Administration Service Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
    provides project oversight and direction for the Los Alamos National
    Laboratory; and the University of California conducts planning and
    recovery operations for DOE at Los Alamos.

    The greater- than- Class- C sealed source recovery process begins when a
    holder of a source notifies the project that it has no further use for its
    source or when NRC or state regulators notify the project that a source
    needs to be recovered because it might cause a potential health or safety
    problem (see fig. 1).

    Page 7 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation Figure 1: The Off- Site
    Source Recovery Project*s Process for Recovering Greater- Than- Class- C
    Sealed Sources

    Source: DOE.

    Project officials obtain extensive descriptive information about the
    source, maintain the information in a database, and work with NRC to use
    the information to prioritize recoveries. Once a decision has been made to
    recover a greater- than- Class- C sealed source, the recovery effort can
    occur in one of three ways: (1) the source holder packages and ships the
    source to the Los Alamos National Laboratory; (2) project staff travel to
    the source*s location to characterize, package, and ship the source to Los
    Alamos; or (3) project subcontractors accomplish the required work for the
    project. In any of these cases, the sources may be shipped directly to the
    Los Alamos National Laboratory for receipt and storage, or they may

    Page 8 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation first be shipped to a
    subcontractor facility where they are consolidated and stored until a
    larger shipment to Los Alamos is prepared. Greaterthan-

    Class- C sealed sources sent to the Los Alamos National Laboratory are
    either stored as nuclear material under appropriate security or, if
    security requirements are waived, may be stored as waste in some of the
    same structures as other radioactive waste stored by the laboratory (see
    fig. 2).

    Figure 2: Photograph of a Structure at the Los Alamos National Laboratory
    in Which Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed Sources Recovered by the Off- Site
    Source Recovery Project Are Stored as Waste

    At the request of the Secretary of Energy and NRC Chairman in June 2002,
    the DOE/ NRC Interagency Working Group on Radiological Dispersal Devices
    was convened to identify any concerns with the nation*s ability to
    adequately protect nuclear materials, including radiological sources, that

    can be used in a radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb. The working
    group was tasked to provide a report to the Secretary of Energy and NRC
    Chairman detailing recommendations for protecting radioactive materials of
    concern. The objectives of the working group were to identify those
    radioactive materials of concern for use as a radiological dispersal
    device, examine the options for tracking these materials in a national
    database

    system, assess potential technologies for tagging these materials for
    tracking purposes, and identify actions needed to ensure that sources are
    secure and that storage and disposal is available for unsecured, excess,

    Page 9 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation and unwanted sources. The
    report provides recommendations that DOE and NRC can pursue to enhance
    control of materials that could be used in radiological dispersal devices.
    These include coordination with the

    Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies to establish
    national policies for defining threats and radiological dispersal device
    protection levels, implementing a national source tracking system, and
    developing national strategies for recovering and disposing of unsecured
    sources. As of February 2003, the report was still in draft.

    Neither DOE nor any other government agency has kept track of the number
    of greater- than- Class- C sealed sources that are no longer wanted;
    therefore, this number is not known with certainty. Also, DOE created the
    Off- Site Source Recovery Project to enable DOE to comply with Public Law
    99- 240 until a disposal facility became available; hence, the project was
    never envisioned as a permanent solution. As a result, before DOE could
    estimate the number of greater- than- Class- C sealed sources that the
    project would recover, it had to estimate how long the project would be in
    operation. In fiscal year 2002, DOE estimated that the Off- Site Source

    Recovery Project would operate from fiscal years 1999 through 2010 and,
    during that time frame, the project would recover and temporarily store
    14,309 unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources. 2 DOE also
    estimated the total cost to complete the planned recovery effort at $69.3
    million.

    To develop its estimate of the number of unwanted greater- than- Class- C
    sealed sources it planned to recover, DOE first determined how long the
    Off- Site Source Recovery Project would operate. Prior to 1999, DOE*s
    activity was limited to recovering and destroying unwanted greater-
    thanClass- C sealed sources. At the time, DOE was processing and
    destroying up to 100 sealed sources per year. According to a project
    official, the rate at which DOE estimated it could process and destroy
    sealed sources

    played a key role in determining the time frame for Off- Site Source
    Recovery Project operations. According to this official, prior to 1999,
    DOE planned to increase its processing capability to about 400 sealed
    sources

    2 As of February 2003, DOE had not modified these estimates. The Exact
    Number of

    Unwanted GreaterThan- Class- C Sealed Sources Is Unknown, but DOE Plans to
    Recover About 14,000 Sealed Sources by the End of Fiscal Year 2010 at an
    Estimated Cost of About $69 Million

    DOE*s Estimate of How Long the Off- Site Source Recovery Project Will
    Operate and How Many Sealed Sources DOE Plans to Recover

    Page 10 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation annually, and in 1999, DOE
    estimated that a backlog of about 4,000 to 5,000 unwanted greater- than-
    Class- C sealed sources existed. As a result,

    DOE set the time frame for the Off- Site Source Recovery Project at 12
    years (fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2010), which was approximately
    the amount of time DOE estimated it would take to manage the existing
    backlog. Although DOE plans to store the sources it recovers instead of
    destroying them, the time frame for the project has remained the same.

    DOE then estimated the number of greater- than- Class- C sealed sources
    that would become unwanted from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2010.
    To do this, DOE officials reviewed, among other information, its
    preliminary database of about 3,000 unwanted greater- than- Class- C
    sealed sources, discussions with representatives from the sealed source
    industry, and past studies by NRC and DOE*s Idaho National Engineering

    Laboratory, which included surveys of source holders and manufacturers
    conducted by NRC and state regulatory agencies. 3 The study by the Idaho
    National Engineering Laboratory, completed in 1994 at the request of DOE,
    estimated that there could be about 250,000 to 500,000 greater- thanClass-
    C sealed sources currently in the United States and as many as 24,000 new
    greater- than- Class- C sealed sources are being produced each year.
    According to a project official, the estimate of how many of these sealed
    sources will become unwanted during the time period that the OffSite
    Source Recovery Project is in operation represents a best guess based on
    all of the information available.

    As such, DOE officials estimated that about 18,000 greater- than- Class- C
    sealed sources would become unwanted from fiscal years 1999 through 2010.
    DOE initially developed a plan detailing how many of the 18,000 unwanted
    greater- than- Class- C sealed sources it planned to recover each fiscal
    year. However, DOE later modified the plan to recover 14,309

    unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources on the basis of three key
    assumptions: (1) that a permanent disposal facility for the sources would
    be available by fiscal year 2007; (2) that the Off- Site Source Recovery
    Project would continue to recover sources from certain holders of sources

    3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Above Class C Source/ Device Inventory
    Survey

    (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 1989) and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
    Characterization of Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed Sources, Volumes 1, 2,
    and 3,

    DOE/ LLW- 163 (Idaho Falls, Idaho: Sept. 1994).

    Page 11 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation during a transition period
    from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2010; 4 and (3) that after
    fiscal year 2010, all greater- than- Class- C sealed sources would be
    shipped by their owners to the disposal facility and the Off- Site

    Source Recovery Project would cease operations. 5 Table 1 shows DOE*s plan
    for recovering 14, 309 unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources
    through the end of fiscal year 2010.

    Table 1: Estimated Number of Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed Sources DOE
    Plans to Recover Annually, Fiscal Years 1999 through 2010

    Fiscal years 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
    Total number of

    sources

    53 39 2,915 1,325 2,130 2,470 2,332 1,680 675 412 203 75 14,309

    Source: DOE. Note: GAO*s presentation of DOE*s data.

    According to DOE*s estimates, about 85 percent of the 14,309 greater-
    thanClass- C sealed sources that the project plans to recover would
    contain americium- 241, with the remainder containing plutonium- 238,
    plutonium- 239, and various other radioactive materials (see table 2). DOE
    did not specify the number of sealed sources containing cesium- 137 or
    strontium- 90 that it planned to recover.

    4 According to a project official, DOE assumed that, based on past
    experience, owners of small numbers of unwanted greater- than- Class- C
    sealed sources initially might have difficulty shipping their sources
    directly to a disposal facility without the assistance of the Off- Source
    Recovery Project. DOE assumed that by the end of the transition period
    these difficulties would be resolved. 5 At 14,309, the number of greater-
    than- Class- C sealed sources that DOE plans to recover appears more
    precise than it is because DOE reduced the number of sealed sources it
    initially planned to recover during the transition years, fiscal years
    2007 through 2010, by a certain percentage each year.

    Page 12 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation Table 2: Number of Each Type
    of Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed Source that DOE Plans to Recover by the
    End of Fiscal Year 2010

    Type of greater- than- Class- C sealed source Number of sources

    DOE plans to recover

    Americium- 241 12,176 Plutonium- 238 1,722 Plutonium- 239 364 Other 47

    Total 14,309

    Source: DOE. Note: GAO*s analysis of DOE*s data.

    In fiscal year 2002, DOE estimated that it would cost about $56.5 million
    to complete the recovery of 14,309 greater- than- Class- C sealed sources
    from fiscal years 2002 through 2011 (see table 3). 6 In addition, since
    DOE had already spent about $12.7 million on recovery activities from
    fiscal years 1999 through 2001, DOE estimated the total cost to recover
    the 14,309 sealed sources at about $69.3 million. 7 Table 3: Estimated
    Annual Cost to Complete the Recovery of 14,309 Greater- Than- Class- C
    Sealed Sources, Fiscal Years 2002

    through 2011

    (Dollars in millions)

    Fiscal years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 a Total
    cost to

    complete activities

    $5.1 $7.1 $6.7 $8.7 $8.0 $6.7 $4.9 $4.4 $4.5 $0.4 $56.5

    Source: DOE. Note: GAO*s presentation of DOE*s data. a The $400,000 cost
    estimated for fiscal year 2011 is for project closeout activities.

    6 Although DOE planned to cease project operations by the end of fiscal
    year 2010, DOE planned project closeout activities for fiscal year 2011.
    As of February 2003, DOE had not changed its estimate of the cost to
    complete the planned recovery activities. 7 DOE*s $56.5 million estimate
    of the cost to complete the recovery of 14, 309 greater- thanClass- C
    sealed sources and the $12.7 million that DOE had spent from fiscal years
    1999 through 2001 do not add to $69.3 million because of rounding. DOE
    Estimates the Total

    Cost to Recover 14,309 Sealed Sources at $69.3 Million

    Page 13 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation Table 4 shows how DOE plans
    to spend the $56.5 million the agency estimates it will need to complete
    remaining project activities. Table 4: Estimated Total Cost to Complete
    Remaining Recovery and Closeout

    Activities, as of Fiscal Year 2002

    (Dollars in millions)

    Activity Estimated cost

    Recovering, inspecting, and storing greater- than- Class- C sealed
    sources, including planning recoveries, maintaining contracts with
    subcontractors, and preparing waste for future permanent disposal

    $24.2 Upgrading equipment at Los Alamos and designing, testing, and
    acquiring tools and containers for packaging, transporting, and storing
    greater- than- Class- C sealed sources

    9.0 Conducting other activities supporting project operations, including
    overseeing and controlling the quality of project performance, complying
    with applicable regulations and requirements, maintaining project data,
    training staff, disseminating information, and paying the project*s share
    of the costs associated with the Los Alamos National Laboratory*s
    management and support staff

    11.2 Conducting activities related to planning a disposal facility and
    transitioning project operations to this facility, including facilitating
    the recovery of nuclear material leased to federal agencies and
    universities, characterizing and certifying greater- than- Class- C waste
    stored at Los Alamos, transferring the waste to a disposal facility, and
    closing out project operations

    12.1

    Total estimated cost to complete remaining recovery and closeout
    activities $56.5

    Source: DOE. Note: GAO*s analysis of DOE*s data.

    As of February 2003, DOE*s Off- Site Source Recovery Project had recovered
    5,294 unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources, but the project
    faces three problems that could hinder future recovery efforts. These
    problems include the questionable long- term commitment of DOE*s Office of
    Environmental Management to the project, the lack of storage capacity
    needed to allow the recovery of sealed sources containing plutonium- 239,
    and the lack of an approved means for temporarily storing sealed sources
    containing strontium- 90 and cesium- 137. DOE Has Recovered a

    Large Number of Sources, but Unresolved Problems Could Hinder Future
    Recovery Efforts

    Page 14 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation As of February 2003, the
    Off- Site Source Recovery Project had identified and recovered 5,294
    unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources, and

    owners of an additional 4,380 greater- than- Class- C sealed sources had
    reported to DOE that they no longer wanted their sources, but DOE had not
    yet recovered them. According to DOE*s estimates, these 4,380 sealed
    sources and another 4,635 greater- than- Class- C sealed sources that DOE

    estimates are either currently in use or not yet reported as unwanted will
    need to be recovered by the end of fiscal year 2010.

    About 65 percent of the 5,294 unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed
    sources that DOE had recovered contained the radioactive material
    americium- 241, either alone or in combination with cesium- 137, and about
    35 percent of the sources recovered contained plutonium- 238 (see table
    5). As table 5 shows, DOE had recovered 15 of the 364 sealed sources
    containing plutonium- 239 it planned to recover before running out of
    storage capacity and had recovered no sealed sources containing strontium-
    90. All together, the project has secured almost 2 kilograms of unwanted
    radioactive material.

    Table 5: Number of Each Type of Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed Source
    Recovered and Associated Grams and Curies of Radioactive Material, as of
    February 2003

    Type of greaterthan- Class- C sealed source Number of

    sources recovered

    Number of grams of radioactive material

    recovered Number of curies

    of radioactive material recovered

    Americium- 241 3,004 730 2,513 Americium- 241 and Cesium- 137 411 5 24
    Curium- 244 2 Less than 1 Less than 1 Plutonium- 238 1,862 489 7,235
    Plutonium- 239 15 696 44

    Total 5,294 a 1,920 9,816

    Source: DOE. Note: GAO*s analysis of DOE*s data. a Total includes 16
    greater- than- Class- C sealed sources that DOE recovered before Off- Site
    Source

    Recovery Project operations began.

    The Off- Site Source Recovery Project Has Recovered a Large Number of
    Unwanted GreaterThan- Class- C Sealed Sources

    Page 15 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation These greater- than- Class-
    C sealed sources were recovered from 157 sites nationwide. Figure 3 shows
    the number of unwanted greater- than- Class- C

    sealed sources that DOE recovered from each state. These recoveries
    include sealed sources contained in

     1,632 gauges that had been used by the construction industry for testing
    the moisture content of soil from a manufacturer in North Carolina who is
    consolidating these sources for shipment to Los Alamos and another 231
    gauges from a manufacturer in California;

     1,500 gauges used for petroleum exploration from a DOE subcontractor
    that is consolidating sources for shipment to Los Alamos and various
    companies in Texas; and  588 medical pacemakers from a manufacturer in
    Minnesota, 483 from a

    manufacturer in Pennsylvania, 233 from a manufacturer in Florida, and 219
    from DOE*s Oak Ridge research facility in Tennessee.

    Page 16 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation Figure 3: Greater- Than-
    Class- C Sealed Sources Recovered by State, as of February 2003

    Note: GAO*s presentation of DOE*s data. In addition, the project recovered
    one source from a site in Puerto Rico.

    The 4,380 unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources that awaited
    recovery as of February 2003, were estimated to contain about 80.3
    kilograms of radioactive material (see table 6). About 80 percent of these
    unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources (3,495 out of 4,380)
    contained the radioactive material americium- 241, either alone or in
    combination with cesium- 137. Table 6 also shows that the Off- Site Source
    Recovery Project has identified 85 more sealed sources containing
    plutonium- 239 that need to be recovered than it initially estimated

    Page 17 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation (currently totaling 449 as
    compared to the 364 initially estimated). In addition, the project has
    identified 46 unwanted strontium- 90 sealed

    sources that need to be recovered, which contain about 78 percent (about
    62.8 kilograms) of the total amount of radioactive material that needs to
    be recovered.

    Table 6: Number of Each Type of Greater- Than- Class- C Sealed Source
    Awaiting Recovery and Associated Number of Holders and Grams and Curies of
    Radioactive Material, as of February 2003

    Type of source Number of holders Number of

    sources Curies Grams

    Americium- 241 193 3,343 11,904 3,542 Americium- 241 and Cesium- 137 19
    152 23 3 Californium- 252 a 3 15 22 Less than 1 Cesium- 137 b 9 21 3,435
    57 Cobalt- 60 b 1 8 363 2 Curium- 244 6 59 Less than 1 Less than 1
    Plutonium- 238 47 282 11,925 881 Plutonium- 239 149 449 812 13,034 Radium-
    226 c 5 5 2 2 Strontium- 90 8 46 3,971,315 62,786

    Total 440 d 4,380 3,999,801 80,308 e Source: DOE. Note: GAO*s analysis of
    DOE*s data. a According to an Off- Site Source Recovery Project official,
    because californium- 252 is expensive to

    make, all greater- than- Class- C sealed sources containing californium-
    252 are recycled. b According to an Off- Site Source Recovery Project
    official, owners of 29 sealed sources containing

    cesium- 137 or cobalt- 60 have reported to the project that their sources
    are no longer wanted. Although most of these sources are not greater than
    Class C and could be sent to an existing commercial disposal facility, the
    owners for various reasons have been unable to dispose of them. c
    According to an Off- Site Source Recovery Project official, because
    radium- 226 is a naturally

    occurring radioactive material, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 places
    naturally occurring radioactive material outside of federal jurisdiction.
    However, this official told us that although such sources are the
    responsibility of the states, few states currently have the ability to
    recover these sources. d Some holders of sources have more than one type
    of source.

    e Total does not add to 80,308 because of rounding.

    Page 18 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation The 4,380 unwanted greater-
    than- Class- C sealed sources that awaited recovery were held by 328
    different owners located across the United

    States. 8 As figure 4 shows, about 59 percent of these unwanted sealed
    sources are located in the state of Texas in gauges that had been used for
    petroleum exploration. 8 The number of different holders of unwanted
    greater- than- Class- C sealed sources that awaited recovery is lower than
    the number in table 6 because some holders of sources have more than one
    type of source.

    Page 19 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation Figure 4: Greater- Than-
    Class- C Sealed Sources in Need of Recovery by State, as of February 2003

    Note: GAO*s presentation of DOE*s data.

    Page 20 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation The Office of Environmental
    Management*s most recent budget plan, which was completed in fiscal year
    2001, showed DOE providing about

    $3 million annually to the Off- Site Source Recovery Project from fiscal
    year 2002 through fiscal year 2030. 9 Consequently, the amount of funding
    that the Office of Environmental Management authorized for the Off- Site
    Source Recovery Project in fiscal year 2002 was about $2.2 million less
    than the $5.1 million that the project estimated it needed.

    In February 2002, the Office of Environmental Management conducted a
    review of its priorities with the goal of improving program performance.
    The review recommended that the office realign its priorities in a manner
    more consistent with its main mission to accelerate the cleanup and
    closure of contaminated DOE weapons development facilities. Office of
    Environmental Management officials told us that they questioned whether it
    is appropriate that the Off- Site Source Recovery Project be assigned to
    their office and they are looking into the possibility of moving
    responsibility for managing the project to another office in DOE. These
    officials told us that the Office of Environmental Management planned to
    allocate more funding to cleaning up and closing contaminated DOE nuclear
    weapons production facilities, which the office considered a higher
    priority, and only provide the project funding to store sealed sources
    that already had been recovered. Consequently, DOE*s Office of
    Environmental Management reduced its request for funding for the project
    for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 to $2.2 million and $2 million,
    respectively. However, a DOE official told us that the office plans to
    reduce future requests further to $1 million annually beginning in fiscal
    year 2005, a funding level that, according to this official, would be
    insufficient to keep current project staff assigned to the project.

    In August 2002, the Congress appropriated an additional $10 million for
    DOE*s Off- Site Source Recovery Project, as part of the 2002 Supplemental
    Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist
    Attacks on the United States, Public Law 107- 206. According to a DOE
    official, the Congress may have appropriated these funds, in part, as a
    result of a January 2002 letter from the NRC Chairman to the Secretary of
    Energy requesting an acceleration of efforts to recover greater- than-
    Class- C sealed sources. In the letter, the NRC Chairman noted that NRC

    9 The Office of Environmental Management*s budget plan was completed
    before DOE finalized the time frame for the Off- Site Source Recovery
    Project, which, as currently planned, will cease operations by the end of
    fiscal year 2010. The Off- Site Source

    Recovery Project Is Not a Priority of DOE*s Office of Environmental
    Management

    Page 21 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation had completed an evaluation
    that concluded that* in light of the events of September 11, 2001* the
    possession or storage of unwanted radioactive

    sealed sources with no disposal outlet presents a potential vulnerability
    to terrorist threats. The letter urged DOE to recover, within 18 months,
    all greater- than- Class- C sealed sources currently known to be unwanted.

    Rather than accelerating DOE*s recovery efforts, however, these funds will
    be needed to keep DOE*s recovery efforts on track through fiscal year
    2004. The Off- Site Source Recovery Project had planned recovery
    activities for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 with a total cost of $13.8
    million, but DOE*s Office of Environmental Management had requested from
    the Congress a total of $4.2 million for these years, leaving a funding
    shortfall of $9.6 million. Prior to fiscal year 2003, the Off- Site Source
    Recovery Project was able to make up for funding shortfalls by carrying
    over unspent funds from prior fiscal years. However, by the end of fiscal
    year 2002, the size of the shortfall far exceeded the amount of funding
    available to carry forward. Therefore, almost all of the supplemental
    funding appropriated by the Congress will go toward helping the Off- Site
    Source Recovery Project make up the funding shortfall and continue
    recovering greater- than- Class- C sealed sources as planned through the
    end of fiscal year 2004. Beyond fiscal year 2004, however, it remains
    unclear whether the Off- Site Source Recovery Project will receive the
    funding it needs to continue its planned recovery activities. The
    Secretary of Energy publicly stated in November 2002 that securing and
    reducing radiological materials that could be fabricated into dirty bombs
    is DOE*s highest priority and an

    urgent problem. However, without funding available to the Off- Site Source
    Recovery Project to recover additional sources, owners of unwanted
    greater- than- Class- C sealed sources will be forced to store and secure
    their sources on their premises until a disposal facility is available.

    The Off- Site Source Recovery Project has not been able to recover
    additional greater- than- Class- C sealed sources containing plutonium-
    239 since mid- 2002 because DOE lacks storage capacity at the Los Alamos
    National Laboratory that meets the security requirements for this
    material. Because plutonium- 239 can be used to make a crude nuclear bomb,
    as well as a dirty bomb, DOE regulations require that any DOE facility
    storing 6 kilograms or more of this material must meet DOE*s most
    stringent security requirements. Meeting these requirements means that,
    among other things, the sources containing plutonium- 239 must be stored
    in a vault- like room in a facility protected by two layers of physical
    barriers (e. g., an outer and an inner fence) providing access controls
    and intrusion detection; armed guards who are capable of responding to an
    intrusion; DOE Lacks Storage

    Capacity Meeting the Security Requirements for Storing Additional Sealed
    Sources Containing Plutonium- 239

    Page 22 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation inspections of personnel,
    vehicles, and hand- carried items entering and exiting the facility; and
    exits that are alarmed or controlled at all times. As

    of February 2003, the greater- than- Class- C sealed sources in storage at
    the Los Alamos National Laboratory contain a total of less than 1 kilogram
    of plutonium- 239. DOE*s security requirements for this smaller amount of
    material are less stringent and have already been met in the locations at
    the Los Alamos National Laboratory where it is being stored. However,
    according to a DOE official, these storage locations have also been used
    to store radioactive material associated with other programs operating at
    Los

    Alamos. As a result, by mid- 2002, the Off- Site Source Recovery Project
    had reached the limits of its capacity to store additional plutonium- 239
    at Los Alamos without needing to meet DOE*s most stringent security

    requirements. As of February 2003, the project had identified an
    additional 449 unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources containing
    about 13 kilograms of plutonium- 239 that it will not be able to recover
    until storage space meeting DOE*s most stringent security requirements is
    made available. 10 DOE is currently pursuing two parallel efforts to allow
    the Off- Site Source

    Recovery Project to recover and store additional greater- than- Class- C
    sealed sources containing plutonium- 239. First, DOE is evaluating two
    options for physically increasing the amount of storage space available
    that meets the stringent security requirements for the additional
    plutonium- 239 that the project plans to recover. These options include
    packaging and placing the sources in a secure trailer at the Los Alamos
    National Laboratory in such a way that they are stored at least as
    securely as if they were in a vault and creating secured storage space at
    the Nevada Test Site in Nye County, Nevada. DOE is developing these
    options but is

    not yet able to provide us with a time frame for how long it will take to
    select and implement an alternative. An official from the Off- Site Source
    Recovery Project told us that the project budgeted $1.5 million to cover
    the initial cost of creating additional secure storage space for
    plutonium- 239 but was unable to provide a plan for ensuring that the

    project received the additional funding that would be needed to continue
    to maintain this storage space for as long as it was needed.

    10 The Off- Site Source Recovery Project also identified greater- than-
    Class- C sealed sources containing another 15 kilograms of plutonium- 239
    that are currently in use. According to an official from the Off- Site
    Source Recovery Project, DOE will eventually need to recover these sources
    as well. Consequently, DOE could need to provide the capacity to securely
    store a total of an additional 28 kilograms of this material, if a
    disposal facility were not made available beforehand.

    Page 23 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation Concurrent with efforts to
    increase physical storage capacity, DOE is also exploring whether all of
    the sealed sources containing plutonium- 239 that

    the Off- Site Source Recovery Project plans to recover meet the legal and
    regulatory requirements for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
    Currently, by law, only radioactive waste resulting from the development
    of nuclear weapons, referred to as defense waste, can be disposed of at
    the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Any greater- than- Class- C sealed
    sources containing plutonium- 239 that were used in this manner can be
    disposed of at this facility; however, most of the plutonium- 239 sources
    that the OffSite Recovery Project plans to recover were not directly used
    for defense purposes. DOE is exploring whether a case can be made that,
    although these sources were used for research and other purposes, the
    plutonium- 239 that they contain was originally manufactured for use in
    weapons development and thus can be disposed of at the Waste Isolation
    Pilot Plant. In this way, DOE could potentially bypass the plutonium- 239
    storage problem entirely by establishing a permanent disposal facility.
    However, DOE regulations specify that no amount of plutonium- 239
    requiring secured storage can be discarded, whether or not the material is
    defense- related, without special approval to terminate the security

    requirements. In March 2003, DOE approved the termination of the security
    requirements for less than 2 kilograms of plutonium- 239 so that the Off-
    Site Source Recovery Project can dispose of the defense- related
    plutonium- 239 it is storing at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, but it
    has not yet approved such a termination for non- defense- related
    plutonium- 239 in storage at Los Alamos.

    Until DOE is able to increase its capacity to store greater- than- Class-
    C sealed sources containing plutonium- 239, 149 holders of unwanted
    sources containing this radioactive material must continue to store and
    secure their sources on their premises. About 77 percent of the holders of
    unwanted plutonium- 239 sources are universities. Six of the universities
    we contacted told us that they received the sources during the 1950s and
    1960s as part of a national effort to promote research related to nuclear
    physics and they have not used these sources for many years. As a result,
    these universities each told us that they are storing and securing from 1
    to 10 sealed sources of plutonium- 239 that they no longer want. In
    general, the sources are stored in rooms or closets, typically without
    windows, and access to the rooms can only be gained by passing through one
    or more locked doors. Access to the keys to the doors is controlled, and
    doors are checked periodically by campus safety personnel to ensure that
    they are locked. In addition, NRC or state regulatory agencies review how
    the universities are securing their sealed sources as part of the
    agencies* reviews of the universities* nuclear safety programs. However,

    Page 24 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation representatives from two
    universities told us of instances in which the doors to the sources had
    been found unlocked or open, and representatives from six of the
    universities told us that they wanted the

    Off- Site Source Recovery Project to recover their sources immediately. 11
    We also talked to officials from a Department of Defense facility, a DOE
    facility, and a decommissioned nuclear power plant about their plutonium-
    239 sources, one of which had as many as 60 plutonium- 239 sealed sources
    on- site. Officials at these facilities told us that their sources were
    secure, and no instances of concern were mentioned. The official at the
    nuclear power plant told us that the facility would like the Off- Site
    Source Recovery Project to recover its sources as soon as possible because
    it was in the process of shutting down operations.

    The Off- Site Source Recovery Project cannot recover unwanted greaterthan-
    Class- C sealed sources containing strontium- 90 and cesium- 137, because
    DOE has not approved a means for temporarily storing these types of sealed
    sources at a DOE facility until a permanent disposal facility is developed
    as it has done for the other types of sealed sources it needs to recover.
    12 In deciding how and where sealed sources containing strontium90

    and cesium- 137 will be stored, DOE must do an appropriate analysis as
    required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and
    implementing regulations. Once DOE completes and approves the NEPA
    analysis process for each type of source, it could begin to implement a
    storage alternative. DOE prepared its NEPA analysis for strontium- 90 in
    December 2001, which offered nine alternatives for storing sealed sources
    containing this radioactive material until a disposal facility is
    available. As of February 2003, the Office of Environmental Management had
    not

    approved its analysis for strontium- 90 and had not begun its analysis for
    cesium- 137, and DOE was unable to provide us with an estimate of how long
    it might take. According to Off- Site Source Recovery Project data, almost
    all of the greater- than- Class- C sealed sources containing strontium90
    that need to be recovered are currently being stored at facilities

    11 Representatives from two universities told us that they wanted to keep
    their sealed sources even though these sources were listed as unwanted on
    the project*s database. 12 Strontium- 90 and cesium- 137 are nuclear
    materials that remain radioactive for a long period of time, can
    contaminate property, and require an extensive clean- up. These nuclear

    materials can also be absorbed in the food chain and are potential cancer
    causing risks. According to an Off- Site Recovery Project official, the
    project is able to store the unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed
    sources that contain both americium- 241 and cesium- 137 because the
    americium- 241 in the sources determines how the sources must be stored.
    DOE Lacks an Approved

    Means for Temporarily Storing Sealed Sources Containing Strontium- 90 and
    Cesium- 137

    Page 25 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation operated by the Department
    of Defense and DOE. Also, while, according to a project official, most
    unwanted sealed sources containing cesium- 137 that have been reported to
    the project do not contain a greater- than-

    Class- C amount of radioactive material, this official told us that there
    are about 100 medical devices currently in use for treating blood that
    contain cesium- 137 sealed sources and that some of these sources may
    contain a

    greater- than- Class- C amount of the radioactive material. The owners of
    these medical devices have told project officials that they would like to
    replace the devices with new technology.

    As of February 2003, DOE had not made progress toward providing a
    permanent disposal facility for greater- than- Class- C radioactive waste,
    as required by Public Law 99- 240. Specifically, DOE had not decided which
    office within the agency would begin the first step in developing such a
    facility, completing the appropriate NEPA analysis, which would likely be
    an Environmental Impact Statement. According to DOE officials, it is
    unlikely that DOE will be able to provide a permanent disposal facility by
    fiscal year 2007 unless the agency makes it a priority. Furthermore, the
    agency lacks a plan for recovering and storing unwanted greater-
    thanClass- C sealed sources in the event that the disposal facility is
    delayed.

    According to officials from the Off- Site Source Recovery Project, DOE is
    unlikely to be able to provide a disposal facility by fiscal year 2007, as
    it had assumed, unless the agency makes it a priority. As of February
    2003, DOE had not decided which DOE office would be assigned the
    responsibility for beginning the first step in providing a disposal
    facility for greater- than- Class- C radioactive waste* completing the
    appropriate NEPA analysis. Public Law 99- 240 gave DOE responsibility for
    providing for the disposal of greater- than- Class- C radioactive waste.
    In developing a disposal facility, DOE must determine, as required by NEPA
    and implementing regulations, whether an Environmental Impact Statement is
    necessary. If an Environmental Impact Statement is necessary, DOE would

    have to propose a number of disposal alternatives, and the public would
    have an opportunity to comment. Following completion of the Environmental
    Impact Statement and a mandatory 30- day waiting period, DOE would
    initiate a Record of Decision, in which the agency would select the
    alternative to be implemented. After the Record of Decision is completed,
    approved, and made public, DOE may begin to implement the decision.
    Whether the alternative selected is to construct a new facility or modify
    an existing facility, funding would need to be identified, and after the
    facility was built, it would need to be licensed by NRC. All together, DOE
    Has Not Made

    Progress toward Providing a Permanent Disposal Facility

    DOE Is Unlikely to Provide a Disposal Facility by Fiscal Year 2007

    Page 26 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation developing a new disposal
    facility could take at least 7 years, not including the time to physically
    build the facility. Also, DOE had neither provided funding nor produced a
    timeline for

    completing the NEPA analysis. Officials in DOE*s Office of Environmental
    Management told us that the office had identified funding for completing
    the Environmental Impact Statement for fiscal years 2002 and 2003;
    however, after office management reviewed the budget in February 2002, the
    office redirected the funding to other higher priority projects. They also
    told us that they anticipated that DOE would decide which DOE office would
    be responsible for the NEPA analysis some time in fiscal year 2003, and
    the Office of Environmental Management*s most recent budget plan for the
    Off- Site Source Recovery Project mentioned the office*s intention to
    defer the development of the facility.

    DOE officials told us that it typically takes about 2 years to complete an
    Environmental Impact Statement and as long as 3 years or more to complete
    a Record of Decision. If the Record of Decision indicates that a new
    facility is needed, funding would need to be secured, and construction
    activities completed. The officials told us that there was not enough
    information available at this time to estimate how long construction
    activities would take. However, they told us that the NRC licensing
    process that would follow could take at least 2 years. In a 1987 report to
    the Congress, DOE estimated that providing a new facility, including
    construction, could require at least 7 to 9 years to complete. 13 In the
    1987 report, DOE also stated that if an existing facility could be used

    for disposal of greater- than- Class- C sealed sources, disposal services
    could be provided sooner, depending upon the availability of the facility.
    However, it remains uncertain when or if this will be possible. DOE has
    been exploring whether the acceptance criteria for the Waste Isolation
    Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico, can be broadened to include more of
    the sealed sources that the project is recovering. Currently, the Waste
    Isolation Pilot Plant can only accept certain types of radioactive waste
    resulting from DOE*s defense- related activities, which would preclude it

    13 Public Law 99- 240 also requires DOE to submit a report to the Congress
    setting forth the agency*s recommendations for ensuring the safe disposal
    of greater- than- Class- C radioactive waste, which the agency completed
    in February 1987. See U. S. Department of Energy, Recommendations for
    Management of Greater- Than- Class- C Low- Level Radioactive Waste, Report
    to Congress in Response to Public Law 99- 240 (Washington, D. C.: Feb.
    1987).

    Page 27 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation from taking the majority of
    the sources recovered by the project. Furthermore, although the
    Environmental Protection Agency has certified

    the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, the facility did not require an NRC
    license because the waste sent there did not result from NRC- licensed
    activities. However, Public Law 99- 240 requires DOE to dispose of any
    greater- thanClass- C radioactive waste that resulted from NRC- licensed
    activities, which includes most of the sealed sources that the Off- Site
    Source Recovery Project is recovering, at a facility licensed by NRC.
    These legal matters would need to be resolved before the Waste Isolation
    Pilot Plant could be considered a viable option. Another possibility being
    explored is the potential for disposing of greaterthan-

    Class- C sealed sources at DOE*s planned repository for waste resulting
    from the nuclear power industry. For example, the Environmental Impact
    Statement for building a disposal facility at Yucca Mountain discussed the
    potential for disposing of greater- than- Class- C radioactive waste at
    this facility. The purpose of such a repository is to enable DOE to meet
    the requirements of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which establishes DOE*s
    responsibility for providing for the permanent disposal of high- level
    radioactive waste. However, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act limits the amount
    of high- level waste that can be disposed of at a facility built to
    satisfy the requirements of the Act and does not explicitly state whether
    greater- than- Class- C waste could also be disposed of at the

    same facility. As with the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, these legal
    matters would need to be resolved before sending unwanted greater- than-
    Class- C sealed sources to DOE*s planned repository could be considered a
    viable option.

    As of February 2003, DOE*s Office of Environmental Management did not have
    a plan for continuing the recovery of greater- than- Class- C sealed
    sources in the event that the disposal facility is delayed. The Off- Site
    Source Recovery Project was originally envisioned as providing DOE with
    the means of recovering and temporarily storing unwanted greater-
    thanClass- C sealed sources until a permanent disposal facility was
    available. However, DOE still plans to begin phasing out the Off- Site
    Source Recovery Project*s operations in fiscal year 2007 and cease
    operations altogether in fiscal year 2010 as originally assumed. As a
    result, under the current plan, any delays in providing a disposal
    facility could begin to hinder DOE*s efforts to ensure unwanted greater-
    than- Class- C sealed sources are properly secured as early as fiscal year
    2007. DOE Lacks a Plan for

    Recovering Sealed Sources if the Disposal Facility Is Delayed

    Page 28 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation Since September 11, 2001,
    recovering and disposing of greater- than- Class- C radioactive sealed
    sources has taken on added significance

    because doing so would secure nuclear materials that have the potential
    for being misused and that pose a threat to national security. The
    Secretary of Energy publicly stated in November 2002 that securing and
    reducing radiological materials that could be fabricated into dirty bombs
    is DOE*s highest priority and an urgent problem. We believe that
    continuing the recovery efforts of the Off- Site Source Recovery Project
    and providing a permanent disposal facility for greater- than- Class- C
    radioactive sealed sources should be key elements in any DOE strategy to
    address this problem. However, responsibility for these efforts is
    currently located in an office within DOE where they are not a priority.
    As a result, the Off- Site Source Recovery Project has not received
    adequate funding; key decisions about how and where to temporarily store
    and ultimately dispose of greater- than- Class- C sealed sources have not
    been made; and future progress toward permanently securing unwanted sealed
    sources is likely to be limited.

    The Off- Site Source Recovery Project has made progress recovering
    greater- than- Class- C sealed sources, but future progress will depend on
    whether DOE gives the project the priority that is commensurate with the
    risks that these sealed sources pose to the public; ensures adequate
    resources are devoted to the project; and provides, as soon as possible,

    sufficient space to store, at an appropriate level of security, any sealed
    sources that it needs to recover. Ultimately, however, all unwanted
    greater- than- Class- C sealed sources will need to be placed in a
    permanent disposal facility. Since already more than 17 years have passed
    since the

    enactment of Public Law 99- 240, we believe it is time that DOE initiate
    the process to provide such a facility. DOE will have difficulty ensuring
    the success of this effort, however, without a plan that would, at a
    minimum, assign responsibility for developing the facility; establish
    milestones by which progress could be measured; evaluate potential
    disposal options; estimate costs and schedules; and address legislative,
    regulatory, and licensing considerations. Also, because it is unlikely
    that such a facility will be operational by fiscal year 2007 when the Off-
    Site Source Recovery Project is scheduled to begin phasing out operations,
    a plan to ensure the continued recovery and storage of greater- than-
    Class- C sealed sources until a disposal facility is available would help
    DOE prevent any gaps in its ability to secure unwanted greater- than-
    Class- C sealed sources.

    As sealed sources currently in use wear out or become obsolete, the
    proliferation of unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources of all
    types across the United States will continue to increase. Unless action is
    taken, Conclusions

    Page 29 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation DOE*s efforts to recover,
    temporarily store, and ultimately dispose of unwanted greater- than-
    Class- C sealed sources will be severely impeded,

    ultimately forcing owners of these dangerous materials to continue storing
    and securing them on their premises where they will remain susceptible to
    misuse, improper disposal, and theft. Because of the risk that unwanted
    greater- than- Class- C sealed sources

    could be used as weapons of terror, we recommend that the Secretary of
    Energy determine whether the priority given to the Off- Site Source
    Recovery Project is commensurate with the threat posed by these sealed
    sources. Once this determination has been made, the Secretary should

    ensure that adequate resources are devoted to the project to cover the
    costs of recovering and storing these sealed sources as quickly as
    possible. To ensure that unwanted greater- than- Class- C sealed sources
    containing plutonium- 239, strontium- 90, and cesium- 137 are properly
    secured to

    prevent their use in dirty bombs or, in the case of sources containing
    plutonium- 239, nuclear weapons, we further recommend that the Secretary
    of Energy take immediate action to provide storage space for these sources
    at a secure DOE facility and establish milestones by which progress can be
    measured to ensure that the storage space is provided as soon as possible.

    In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy initiate the
    process to develop a permanent disposal facility for greater- than- Class-
    C radioactive waste to carry out the requirements of Public Law 99- 240.
    To help manage the process, the Secretary should develop a plan that
    would,

    at a minimum, assign responsibility for developing the facility; establish
    milestones by which progress can be measured; evaluate potential disposal
    options; estimate costs and schedules; and address legislative,
    regulatory, and licensing considerations. Because it is unlikely that a
    permanent disposal facility for such waste will be operational by fiscal
    year 2007 when the Off- Site Source Recovery Project is scheduled to begin
    phasing out operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy develop
    a plan to ensure the continued recovery and storage of greaterthan- Class-
    C sealed sources until a disposal facility is available.

    During a discussion of our report with DOE officials, including the
    Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Integration and Disposition,
    agency officials expressed general agreement with our findings,
    conclusions, and recommendations. In a subsequent March 31, 2003, letter,
    which is reproduced in appendix II, DOE provided written comments on
    Recommendations for Executive Action

    Agency Comments

    Page 30 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation our report and raised three
    issues. Specifically, DOE asserted that (1) our report did not mention a
    joint DOE and NRC working group that was

    chartered to address the issue of unwanted sealed sources and their
    potential use in radiological dispersal devices; (2) the project baseline
    we reviewed had not been revised to incorporate the results of the working

    group*s draft report and the need to change the recovery effort from a
    general health- and- safety- driven program to a national- security-
    andnuclear- nonproliferation- driven program; and (3) we did not interview
    any policy executives within DOE in preparing our report.

    Regarding the first issue, we have added to the report a discussion of the
    purpose and objectives of this working group and its preliminary
    recommendations to DOE and NRC. Although the efforts of this working group
    are broader than the scope of the Off- Site Source Recovery Project, in
    our view, the working group*s preliminary findings, conclusions, and

    recommendations generally support the conclusions and recommendations in
    our report. Regarding the second issue, our report states that the
    greater- than- Class- C sealed sources that are being recovered by the
    project are a national security concern because they are particularly
    attractive for potential use in producing dirty bombs. In

    addition, DOE has been required to provide a facility for disposing of
    these sources for more than 17 years. Finally, regarding the third issue,
    it is unclear to us why this point is being raised. During the course of
    our review, we met with the Director and then the Acting Director for
    Technical Program Integration, and on February 20, 2003, we met with the
    Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Integration and Disposition to
    obtain her comments on our written findings and discuss our preliminary
    conclusions and potential recommendations. Furthermore, on March 26, 2003,
    at her request, we met with the Assistant Secretary for Environmental
    Management. During the meeting, we offered to accept any additional
    information she wanted to provide and make appropriate

    changes to the draft as needed. During this meeting, no changes were
    suggested to our findings, conclusions, or recommendations.

    We performed our review at the Off- Site Source Recovery Project office at
    the Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico; DOE*s
    Albuquerque Operations Office in Albuquerque, New Mexico; and DOE*s and
    NRC*s headquarters in Washington, D. C. We reviewed statutes, regulations,
    and appropriate guidance as well as interviewed agency officials to
    determine the relevant statutory framework. We reviewed cost

    and schedule estimates from DOE and interviewed appropriate officials to
    determine how much DOE had spent to date recovering and storing Scope and

    Methodology

    Page 31 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation unwanted greater- than-
    Class- C sealed sources and how DOE estimated the number of sealed sources
    it planned to recover from fiscal years 1999

    through 2010 and the cost to complete the remaining project activities. We
    also obtained and reviewed the studies and other information on which DOE
    based its estimates. We reviewed data from the Off- Site Source Recovery
    Project on the number of greater- than- Class- C sealed sources recovered
    to date and the number still awaiting recovery. In addition, we visited
    the Los Alamos National Laboratory to see how sealed sources that the
    project had recovered were being stored. We reviewed budget data and
    interviewed headquarters officials from DOE*s Office of

    Environmental Management to assess the level of the office*s commitment to
    the Off- Site Source Recovery Project. We also interviewed appropriate
    officials to determine what efforts DOE was undertaking to provide safe
    and secure storage capacity for greater- than- Class- C sealed sources
    containing plutonium- 239, strontium- 90, and cesium- 137. To understand
    how owners of unwanted sources containing plutonium- 239 were managing
    their sources until they were recovered, we spoke with representatives
    from eight universities, a Department of Defense facility, a DOE facility,
    and a decommissioned nuclear power plant, which were located throughout
    the United States and listed on the project*s database as having unwanted
    sources awaiting recovery. Finally, we interviewed

    headquarters officials from DOE*s Office of Environmental Management to
    determine the progress DOE had made toward providing a permanent disposal
    facility.

    We conducted our work from June 2002 through April 2003 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

    As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
    this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days
    from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Secretary of
    Energy, the Acting Administrator, National Nuclear Security
    Administration, the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and
    interested congressional committees and other interested parties. We will
    also make copies available to others who request them. In addition, the
    report will be available at no charge at GAO*s web site at http: www. gao.
    gov.

    Page 32 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation If you or your staff have
    any questions about this report, I can be reached at (202) 512- 3841.
    Major contributors to this report include Gene Aloise,

    Stephen Cleary, and Ilene Pollack. Sincerely yours,

    Robert A. Robinson Managing Director, Natural

    Resources and Environment

    Appendix I: Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy
    Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law 99- 240

    Page 33 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix I: Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy
    Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law 99- 240

    Appendix I: Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy
    Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law 99- 240

    Page 34 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix I: Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy
    Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law 99- 240

    Page 35 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix I: Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy
    Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law 99- 240

    Page 36 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 37 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation Appendix II: Comments from
    the Department of Energy

    Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
    end of this appendix.

    See comment 2. See comment 1.

    See comment 1.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 38 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation See comment 3.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 39 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation The following are GAO*s
    comments on the Department of Energy*s (DOE) letter dated March 31, 2003.

    1. DOE commented that our draft report does not adequately consider a
    number of issues that DOE is addressing concerning nonproliferation of
    sealed sources. Specifically, DOE mentions a joint DOE and Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission (NRC) working group that was chartered to address
    the issue of unwanted sealed sources and their potential use in
    radiological dispersal devices. A discussion of the working group and its
    draft report will be addressed in our forthcoming report on the control of
    domestic radiological sources. However, we have added, in the background
    section of this report, a discussion of the purpose of the working group,
    the objectives it was addressing, and its preliminary recommendations to
    DOE and NRC regarding the disposal of radiological sources. The efforts of
    this working group are broader than the scope of the Off- Site Source
    Recovery Project in that they include a discussion of all radiological
    materials not just greater- than- Class- C sealed sources. In our view,
    the working group*s preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations
    generally support our conclusions and recommendations regarding the need
    for DOE to (1) provide sufficient resources to ensure the continued
    operations of the Off- Site Source Recovery Project; (2) provide secure
    storage space for greater- thanClass- C sealed sources that DOE needs to
    recover; (3) initiate the process to provide a permanent disposal facility
    for greater- than- Class- C waste; and (4) develop a plan to ensure
    continued recovery of these sources in the likely event that a permanent
    facility is delayed.

    DOE also makes the point that one major focus of this DOE and NRC working
    group*s effort is to ensure DOE*s resources are spent wisely and to focus
    recovery efforts on those sealed sources that pose the greatest concern.
    However, greater- than- Class- C sealed sources have already been
    identified as particularly attractive for potential use in

    producing dirty bombs. Among other things, they contain concentrated
    amounts of high- risk nuclear materials, such as americium- 241, cesium-
    137, plutonium- 238, plutonium- 239, and strontium- 90. Furthermore,
    Public Law 99- 240 specifically requires that DOE provide for the
    permanent disposal of greater- than- Class- C sealed sources, a task even
    more important now, following the events of September 11, 2001, than when
    the law was enacted. GAO Comments

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 40 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation 2. DOE commented that the
    project*s baseline that we reviewed had not yet been revised to
    incorporate the results of the working group*s draft

    report and the need to change the recovery effort from a general health-
    and- safety- driven program to a national- security- and-
    nuclearnonproliferation- driven program. In addition, the project*s
    baseline proposes a budget for fiscal year 2005 that will be considered,
    along with the working group*s report, during DOE*s fiscal year 2005
    request preparation, which is ongoing. Regarding DOE*s comment that the
    project*s baseline will be revised to focus on national security and
    nonproliferation, greater- than- Class- C sealed sources are a concern
    because they are particularly attractive for potential use in producing
    dirty bombs. Furthermore, for more than 17 years, DOE has been required by
    Public Law 99- 240 to provide a facility for disposing of all greater-
    than- Class- C waste, including greater- than- Class- C sealed sources
    that are no longer wanted by their owners. To date, however, DOE has not
    developed such a facility. Regarding DOE*s point about the budget, DOE*s
    comments indicate that the project*s future estimated budget needs will be
    considered along with the recommendations of the working group. However,
    there is still no indication that the Off- Site Source Recovery Project
    will get the funding it needs to recover greater- than- Class- C sealed
    sources beyond fiscal year 2004. As stated in our report, DOE*s Office of
    Environmental Management reduced its request for funding for the Off- Site
    Source Recovery Project for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 to $2.2 million and
    $2 million, respectively, to provide the funds necessary to store sealed
    sources that had already been recovered. In addition, a DOE official told
    us that the office plans to reduce future requests further to $1 million
    annually beginning in fiscal year 2005, a funding level that, according to
    this official, would be insufficient to keep current project staff
    assigned to the project. 3. DOE commented that we failed to interview any
    policy executives

    within DOE in preparing this report and that the draft report reflects
    this fact. It is unclear to us why this point is being raised. During the
    course of our review, in addition to meeting with a variety of project
    managers, we met with the Director and then the Acting Director for
    Technical Program Integration. These officials are directly responsible
    for the management of the Off- Site Source Recovery Project. On February
    19, 2003, we provided DOE with our written findings, prior to sending the
    draft to DOE for agency comment, to confirm that the critical facts and
    key information used to formulate our analyses and findings were current,
    correct, and complete. On February 20, 2003, we met with a variety of
    program officials, including the Associate

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy

    Page 41 GAO- 03- 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation Deputy Assistant Secretary
    for Integration and Disposition to discuss our findings, preliminary
    conclusions, and potential recommendations

    that flowed from the factual information we collected. These officials
    agreed with our findings and preliminary conclusions and recommendations.
    They did provide us technical changes, which we made to the draft report
    as appropriate. In addition, on March 26, 2003, at her request, we met
    with the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management. At this
    meeting, we said that we were willing to accept any information regarding
    the findings, conclusions, and recommendations in our draft report that
    the Assistant Secretary may have. In addition, we said that we were
    willing to make appropriate changes to the draft. The Assistant Secretary
    did not dispute the findings, conclusions, or recommendations in our draft
    report but said that our draft did not mention the working group and its
    resulting draft report dated February 2003. As stated above, we included a
    discussion of the working group*s efforts in the background section of
    this report.

    (360234)

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