DOD Civilian Personnel: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to	 
Help Ensure Viability of DOD's Civilian Industrial Workforce	 
(30-APR-03, GAO-03-472).					 
                                                                 
Between 1987 and 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) downsized 
the civilian workforce in 27 key industrial facilities by about  
56 percent. Many of the remaining 72,000 workers are nearing	 
retirement. In recent years GAO has identified shortcomings in	 
DOD's strategic planning and was asked to determine (1) whether  
DOD has implemented our prior recommendation to develop and	 
implement a depot maintenance strategic plan, (2) the extent to  
which the services have developed and implemented comprehensive  
strategic workforce plans, and (3) what challenges adversely	 
affect DOD's workforce planning.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-472 					        
    ACCNO:   A06762						        
  TITLE:     DOD Civilian Personnel: Improved Strategic Planning      
Needed to Help Ensure Viability of DOD's Civilian Industrial	 
Workforce							 
     DATE:   04/30/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Best practices					 
	     Civilian employees 				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Labor force					 
	     Private sector					 
	     Strategic planning 				 

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GAO-03-472

Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

April 2003 DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Help Ensure Viability of DOD*s
Civilian Industrial Workforce

GAO- 03- 472

DOD has not implemented our October 2001 recommendation to develop and
implement a DOD depot strategic plan that would delineate workloads to be
accomplished in each of the services* depots. The DOD depot system has
been a key part of the department*s plan to support military systems in
the past, but the increased use of the private sector to perform this work
has decreased the role of these activities. While title 10 of the U. S.
code requires DOD to retain core capability and also requires that at
least 50 percent of depot maintenance funds be spent for public- sector
performance, questions remain about the future role of DOD depots. Absent
a DOD depot strategic plan, the services have in varying degrees, laid out
a framework for strategic depot planning, but this planning is not
comprehensive. Questions also remain about the future of arsenals and
ammunition plants. GAO reviewed workforce planning efforts for 22
maintenance depots, 3 arsenals, and 2 ammunition plants, which employed
about 72,000 civilian workers in fiscal year 2002.

The services have not developed and implemented strategic workforce plans
to position the civilian workforce in DOD industrial activities to meet
future requirements. While workforce planning is done for each of the
industrial activities, generally it is short- term rather than strategic.
Further, workforce planning is lacking in other areas that OPM guidance
and high- performing organizations identify as key to successful workforce
planning. Service workforce planning efforts (1) usually do not assess the
competencies; (2) do not develop comprehensive retention plans; and (3)
sometimes do not develop performance measures and evaluate workforce
plans. Several challenges adversely affect DOD*s workforce planning for
the

viability of its civilian depot workforce. First, given the aging depot
workforce and the retirement eligibility of over 40 percent of the
workforce over the next 5 to 7 years, the services may have difficulty
maintaining the depots* viability. Second, the services are having
difficulty implementing multiskilling* an industry and government best
practice for improving the flexibility and productivity of the workforce*
even though this technique could help depot planners do more with fewer
employees. Finally, increased training funding and innovation in the
training program will be essential for revitalizing the aging depot
workforce.

Staffing Levels, Age, and Retirement Eligibility of Civilian Personnel in
Industrial Facilities Service

FY 2002 civilian staffing levels Average age Percent eligible to retire by
2007

Percent eligible to retire by 2009 Navy 35,563 46 28 39 Army 14,234 49 41
52 Marine Corps 1,323 48 45 60 Air Force 21,152 47 35 44 Total 72,272 47
33 43 Source: DOD (data), GAO (presentation).

Between 1987 and 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) downsized the
civilian workforce in

27 key industrial facilities by about 56 percent. Many of the remaining
72, 000 workers are nearing retirement. In recent years GAO

has identified shortcomings in DOD*s strategic planning and was asked to
determine (1) whether DOD has implemented our prior

recommendation to develop and implement a depot maintenance strategic
plan, (2) the extent to which the services have developed and implemented
comprehensive

strategic workforce plans, and (3) what challenges adversely affect DOD*s
workforce planning.

GAO recommends that the DOD complete revisions to core policy, promulgate
a schedule for

completing core computations, and complete depot strategic planning;
develop a plan for arsenals and

ammunition plants; develop strategic workforce plans; and coordinate the
implementation

of initiatives to address various workforce challenges. DOD concurred with
7 of our 9 recommendations; nonconcurring

with two because it believes the proposed National Security Personnel
System, which was submitted to Congress as a part of the DOD
transformation legislation, will take care of these problems. We believe
it is premature to assume this system will (1) be

approved by Congress as proposed and (2) resolve these issues.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 472. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Derek Stewart at (202) 512- 5559 or stewartd@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 472, a report to

the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives

April 2003

DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Help Ensure Viability of DOD*s
Civilian Industrial Workforce

Page i GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning Letter 1 Results in Brief
3 Background 5 DOD Lacks Strategic Planning to Guide Future Planning for

Industrial Activities 11 Services* Efforts to Develop Industrial Workforce
Plans Vary and Generally Lack Some Key Planning Elements 21 A Number of
Challenges Inhibit Effective Strategic Workforce Planning 31 Conclusions
42 Recommendations for Executive Action 44 Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation 45 Appendix I Scope and Methodology 49

Appendix II Fiscal Year 2002 Services* Depots 52

Appendix III Synopsis of Service Depots* Short- Term Workforce Plans 55

Appendix IV GAO Staff Acknowledgments 64

Related GAO Products 65

Tables

Table 1: Status of Service Depots* Short- Term Workforce Planning Efforts
26 Table 2: Civilian Personnel in Industrial Facilities Eligible to Retire
32 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning Figures

Figure 1: Location of 27 Key DOD Industrial Activities 6 Figure 2:
Collection of Various Maintenance and Manufacturing Activities Performed
in Selected Industrial Activities 8 Figure 3: Office of Personnel
Management*s Workforce Planning Model 11 Abbreviations

ALC Air Logistics Center DOD Department of Defense OPM Office of Personnel
Managment

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Page 1 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

April 30, 2003 The Honorable Joel Hefley Chairman The Honorable Solomon P.
Ortiz Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Readiness Committee on Armed
Services House of Representatives

The manufacture and support of military weapons involves a vast array of
industrial capability some of which is in the private sector and some of
which is in the public sector. The part in the public sector centers
around 27 key Department of Defense (DOD) industrial facilities, including
22 maintenance depots, 3 arsenals, and 2 government- owned and- operated
ammunition manufacturing plants. 1 The civilian workforce in these
activities was reduced by about 56 percent between 1987 and 2002* from
about 163,000 to about 72,000 employees. The workforce reduction occurred
as a result of downsizing initiatives, the increased use of the private
sector for logistics support activities, and other factors. Because
seniority was a major factor in determining which workers would be
retained and little new hiring has occurred in most of these activities,
the result of downsizing is that more than 7,000 civilian employees, or
about 12 percent of the remaining workforce, are currently eligible to
retire and about 43 percent will be eligible to retire by 2009. This has
created a human capital management challenge for DOD. In addition, DOD*s
challenge is exacerbated by the war on terrorism and other critical
military operations while it also is undertaking significant
transformation initiatives and addressing initiatives to further
streamline its operations,

including responding to further downsizing mandates. 1 DOD has nine other
active ammunition manufacturing plants that are government- owned and
contractor- operated. These nine plants have a total of 145 government
civilians, 6 military personnel, and 5, 314 contractor personnel. They are
not included in this report*s discussion.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

In recent years, we have emphasized the importance of strategic planning
in DOD for establishing and achieving key mission objectives. 2 We have
also identified specific deficiencies in DOD*s planning for depot

maintenance operations. For example, in October 2001, we reported that DOD
had no overall plan that tied investments in depot maintenance facilities
and equipment with future workloads 3 and, in turn, with human capital
needs. At that time we recommended that DOD, among other actions, develop
a strategic* or long- term* plan for depot maintenance that addressed
human capital needs and the specific actions necessary to meet them.

This report looks specifically at the strategic workforce planning for the
27 previously mentioned DOD industrial facilities. Concerned about DOD*s
apparent lack of a plan for its depot workforce and the potential
implications of these deficiencies, you asked that we determine

 whether DOD has implemented our prior recommendation to develop and
implement strategic plans for depot maintenance;  the extent to which the
services have developed and implemented

strategic workforce plans to position the civilian depot workforce to meet
future requirements; and  what challenges adversely affect DOD*s
workforce planning for the

long- term viability of its civilian depot workforce. As part of our work,
we reviewed DOD*s and the services* existing strategic and other workforce
plans for these activities. We visited 18 maintenance depots, three
arsenals, and two ammunition manufacturing plants and obtained data from 4
additional maintenance depots we did not visit.

2 Since 1997, we have issued several reports dealing with DOD*s
implementation of strategic planning initiatives generated as a result of
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, P. L. No. 03- 62. Aug.
3, 1993. 3 U. S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Actions
Needed to Overcome Capability Gaps in the Public Depot System, GAO- 02-
105 (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 12, 2001).

Page 3 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

DOD has not implemented our prior recommendation to develop and implement
a departmentwide depot strategic plan that would delineate future
workloads to be accomplished in each of the services* maintenance depots,
and the services efforts to develop comprehensive depot strategic plans
vary. Although recognition and maintenance of depots* core

capabilities and their workforces are key to the continued viability of
the depot system, DOD*s increased use of the private sector in recent
years has decreased the role of DOD*s maintenance depots and raised
questions about their long- term future role that have not been addressed
by a comprehensive strategic plan. Uncertainties also exist about the
future role of DOD arsenals and ammunition plants. Depot officials said
that it is difficult to develop a depot strategic plan with so many
uncertainties about how the military depots will be used in the future.
However, title 10 of the U. S. Code provides direction regarding the role
of the depots and the allocation of depot maintenance work between the
public and private sectors, and it dictates a continuing role for a level
of DOD depot maintenance capability. The lack of a strategic plan may have
serious implications because without forethought to shape the future of
the depots and their workforces, the future capability of the two for
performing work is questionable. Absent a departmentwide plan, the
services* efforts to develop comprehensive depot strategic plans vary. For
example, the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps have developed depot plans,
but the Army plan has been suspended, the Air Force plan does not address
one depot nor identify specific new work, and the Marine Corps plan has
not been approved and has no approval schedule. While the Navy has not
developed a strategic depot plan, two of the Navy components* the shipyard
and aviation communities* have begun strategic planning efforts.

The services have also not developed and implemented strategic workforce
plans that will position the civilian industrial workforce to meet future
requirements. Except for the Air Force, the services industrial
activities* workforce plans are mostly short- term rather than strategic.
The plans are also lacking in other areas that Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) guidance and high- performing organizations identify as
key to successful workforce planning. Specifically, they (1) usually do
not assess the competencies needed for current and future workforces; (2)
do not develop comprehensive retention plans that identify employees
critical to accomplishment of organizational goals, develop an
infrastructure to assist workers in becoming long- term assets of the
organization, or provide meaningful incentives to retain valued employees;
and (3) sometimes do not develop performance measures for evaluating
Results in Brief

Page 4 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

workforce plans to identify corrective actions needed to improve planning
efforts.

Several challenges adversely affect DOD*s workforce planning for the long-
term viability of the workforce industrial workforce. First, given the
aging of the workforce and the eligibility for retirement of about 43
percent of the workforce over the next 7 years, the services could have
difficulty maintaining the viability of these activities. Yet, the
implementation of short- term workforce planning rather than strategic
planning does not address this challenge. Second, the services are having
difficulty implementing multiskilling* an industry and government best

practice for improving the flexibility and productivity of the workforce*
even though this technique could help depot planners do more with fewer
workers. Multiskilling is the process of training maintenance employees in
specific skills that cross the traditional trade or craft lines and then

ensuring that the work is performed. A major advantage of multiskilling is
that particular jobs that require more than one craft not necessarily more
than one individual can be performed by fewer personnel. Being able to
provide additional compensation to workers for obtaining the desired new
complementary skills could enhance the depots* ability to implement this
program successfully. Finally, the need for both increased funds and
innovation in the training program will challenge efforts to revitalize
the depot workforce.

We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to strengthen
strategic workforce planning for DOD industrial activities. DOD provided
oral comments after reviewing a draft of this report, concurring with
seven of our nine recommendations. DOD*s response highlighted the
importance the department places in human capital management. In non-
concurring with two of our recommendations, DOD officials said that DOD*s
new National Security Personnel System will provide all the flexibilities
and authorities needed to maintain and enhance human resources
competencies, capabilities, and performance across the department. Since
the proposed new system has not yet been considered by the Congress, we
believe it is premature to assume that all its provisions will be approved
and that the new system will address our concerns.

Page 5 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

DOD owns and operates industrial activities that support the military
mission by repairing; rebuilding; overhauling; and upgrading components,
ammunitions, or end items to return them to a like- new condition or by
manufacturing new systems components or ammunitions. As of January 2003,
and as shown in figure 1, DOD industrial activities included

 twenty- two maintenance depots 11 in the Navy (three aviation depots,
four shipyards, and four warfare centers* two associated with ship systems
and two associated with engineering analyses and command and control), 5
in the Army, 4 in the Air Force, and 2 in the Marine Corps;  three Army
arsenals 4 that have a manufacturing mission; and  two Army ammunition
manufacturing plants that are government- owned

and -operated. 4 The Arsenal Act (10 U. S. C. 4532) provides that the Army
is to have its supplies made in U. S. factories or arsenals provided they
can do so economically. The act further provides that the Secretary of the
Army may abolish any arsenal considered unnecessary. Background

DOD Industrial Activities

Page 6 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Figure 1: Location of 27 Key DOD Industrial Activities

These activities, which are a part of the combined public and private
sector industrial base and are largely staffed by DOD civilians, are
described in appendix II. This appendix also describes the type of work
performed at the activities and the number of DOD civilians employed in
each. The activities generally require extensive shop facilities and
specialized equipment and employ a range of personnel from highly skilled
technicians and engineers to laborers. Figure 2 shows a collection of
maintenance or manufacturing activities performed in some of the 27
industrial activities. In fiscal year 2002, these activities employed
about 72,000 civilian employees* about 10 percent of DOD*s civilian
workforce. About 1,200 military personnel are also employed in these
activities, with

Page 7 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

over half the military assigned to the Pearl Harbor Shipyard and
Intermediate Maintenance Activity, which in 1998 consolidated its depot
and intermediate maintenance work into one activity, bringing together the
largely military workforce employed in the intermediate activity with the
largely civilian population employed in the shipyard. In the other DOD
industrial activities, military personnel are largely in managerial or
supervisory positions. Of the approximately 72,000 civilian employees, the
Army employs about 14,200; the Navy, about 35,500; the Marine Corps,

about 1,300; and the Air Force, about 21,100. Various factors (such as the
downsizing of the U. S. military force structure; increased use of the
private sector for performing support activities; and changes in repair
processes, increasing equipment*s time in the field) have resulted in
significant reductions in the number of personnel working in these
facilities. For example, the number of personnel assigned to DOD
maintenance depots was reduced by about 60 percent between 1987 and 2001*
from about 156,000 to about 64,500 workers, while the total amount of
maintenance work was cut in half during that period.

Page 8 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Figure 2: Collection of Various Maintenance and Manufacturing Activities
Performed in Selected Industrial Activities

Page 9 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Improved strategic planning has been a key goal of the federal government
in recent years, with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
providing guidance on strategic planning for government activities. 5
Strategic plans are intended to be the starting point for each agency*s

performance measurement efforts. Each plan is to cover a period of 5 years
and must include a comprehensive mission statement, which discusses, among
other things, the agency*s major functions and operations, a set of
outcome- related goals and objectives, and a description of how the agency
intends to achieve these goals and objectives. We previously reported that
high- performing organizations begin their strategic planning by defining
what they want to accomplish and what kind of organization they want to
be. 6 Similarly, agencies establish their missions, visions for the
future, core values, goals and objectives, and strategies.

High- performing public organizations have found that strategic planning
and management can address human capital, or workforce, shortfalls.
Strategic workforce planning* planning that focuses on developing long-
term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining an organization*s
people and for aligning human capital approaches that are clearly linked
to achieving programmatic goals* is a key part of human capital
management. In short, according to a National Academy of Public
Administration guide on building successful organizations, strategic
workforce planning is a systematic process for identifying the human
capital required to meet organizational goals and developing the
strategies to meet these requirements. To help meet organizational goals,
organizations use workforce planning getting the right people with the
right skills in the right jobs at the right time* that is explicitly
linked to the agency*s overall mission and goals.

5 P. L. No. 103- 62, Aug. 3, 1993. 6 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Human Capital: A Self- Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders, GAO/ OCG-
00- 14G (Washington, D. C.: September 2000). The Government

Performance and Results Act of 1993

Strategic Workforce Planning

Page 10 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

While many organizations have developed models for workforce planning, 7
putting aside variations in terminology, the models generally include the
following steps.  Set strategic direction, including the identification
of organizational vision

and objectives at that point in the future on which planning will be
based. This direction should also include human capital goals.  Identify
workforce skills and competencies needed to achieve the

objectives. Analyze the present workforce to determine what skills and
competencies are present. Compare the present workforce skills and
competencies to those needed in the future. This step is sometimes
referred to as *gap analysis.*  Develop an action plan to transition from
the present workforce to the

future workforce. The action plan should address recruiting, hiring,
training, succession, and retention.  Implement the action plan by
developing well- defined objectives, specific

measurable workforce goals, and timetables and milestones; conducting
recruiting and training; and putting retention strategies into practice. 
Establish performance measures; periodically evaluate the workforce

action plans, review the mission and objectives to ensure they remain
valid; and make adjustments as required by changes in mission, objectives,
and workforce skills and competencies.

Strategic workforce planning is an iterative process, as demonstrated by
the OPM*s workforce planning model in figure 3.

7 For example, OPM*s Workforce Planning Model (http:// www. opm. gov/
workforce planning/ wfpmodel. htm) and U. S. General Accounting Office,
Exposure Draft: A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO- 02-
373SP (Washington, D. C.: March 2002).

Page 11 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Figure 3: Office of Personnel Management*s Workforce Planning Model

As a guide to help agencies in their human capital management efforts, the
OPM issued the Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework in
November 2002. This document provides standards for success that include,
among other things: (1) strategic alignment, (2) workforce planning and
deployment, and (3) suggested performance indicators. Criteria provided in
other workforce planning models we reviewed are compatible with the more
recent OPM framework.

Although we have previously recommended the development and implementation
of a strategic plan for depot maintenance, DOD does not yet have a
strategic plan to guide the future development of depot maintenance
activities, and questions continue about core capabilities and future
work. While the DOD depot system has been a key part of the department*s
plan to support military systems, the increased use of the private sector
to perform work previously performed by DOD employees has decreased the
role of the services* depots and raised questions regarding their future.
Title 10 of the U. S. Code provides direction regarding the role that DOD
depots should play in supporting the fighting DOD Lacks Strategic Planning
to Guide

Future Planning for Industrial Activities

Page 12 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

forces and in how depot work should be allocated between the public and
private sectors. However, while some action has been taken to begin
formulating a depot strategic plan, DOD does not yet have a strategic plan
for its depot maintenance activities, and it is uncertain when it will be

completed. Absent a comprehensive DOD plan, the services have in varying
degrees initiated a strategic depot planning effort. Generally, however,
the service versions do not identify what work will be performed in the
service depots in the future, and it is uncertain whether these activities
will continue to be viable as the systems they support age and are phased
out of the inventory.

Although legislation requires the continued performance of some key
industrial activities* core capabilities* in government- owned facilities
and by government personnel and specifies that not more than 50 percent of
funds spent for depot maintenance may be spent for work performed by the
private sector, DOD has in recent years increasingly relied on the private
sector for the performance of various logistics activities, including
depot maintenance. In the past, the department requested repeal of
legislative provisions that influenced the continued use of DOD facilities
and personnel performing depot maintenance activities and recently again
considered proposing the repeal in order to gain flexibility for its
business decisions. However, the identification and acquisition of future
core capabilities are key to strategic depot planning.

Section 2464 of title 10 requires the Secretary of Defense to identify and
maintain a core logistics capability. Under that provision, the core
logistics capability is to be owned and operated by the government to
ensure the existence of a ready and controlled source of technical
competence and resources so that the military can effectively and timely
respond to mobilization, national defense emergencies, and contingencies.
The core capabilities are to include those necessary to maintain and
repair the weapon systems and military equipment that the Secretary, in
consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, identifies as
necessary to

meet the nation*s military needs. Furthermore, the Secretary is to
identify the workloads required to maintain those core capabilities and to
require their performance in government facilities. Finally, the Secretary
is to assign these facilities sufficient workloads to ensure peacetime
cost efficiency, technical competencies, surge capacity, and
reconstitution capabilities to support military strategic and contingency
plans. Nonetheless, the concept of core capabilities is not precise and
has been controversial. We have previously reported that the department*s
implementation of the core statute is not comprehensive and that the
Legislation Provides

Direction Regarding the Continued Performance of Depot Maintenance in DOD
Activities

Page 13 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

policy and implementing procedures and practices provide little assurance
that core maintenance capabilities are being developed as needed to
support future national defense emergencies and contingencies. 8 In
response to our report, DOD has revised its core policy to improve the
department*s guidance to the military services regarding how core
capability requirements should be developed. Although this guidance has
been issued, questions remain about the guidance and the services are not
accomplishing key analyses to identify essential core capabilities.

In addition, 10 U. S. C. 2466 specifies that no more than 50 percent of
the funds made available for depot maintenance may be spent for private
sector performance, unless the requirement is waived for a particular
fiscal year. This sets aside 50 percent of the funding for public- sector
performance of these workloads. In recent years, our mandated reviews of
the allocation of depot maintenance work between the public and private
sector with regard to the 50 percent funding rule have found that
increasing amounts of the service*s depot work was going to the private
sector. For example, during fiscal 2001 and 2002, the Air Force exceeded
the 50 percent limit and waived the requirement; we could not determine
with precision whether the Army was in compliance with the 50 percent
provision. 9 Because DOD implemented an acquisition policy that called on
the private

sector for life- cycle logistics support of its weapons systems, during
the 1990s most new weapon system programs called for using private- sector
maintenance providers, with depot repair of few new programs going to
military depots. 10 With some increased visibility and awareness of the
50- 50 and core provisions, DOD has recognized the need to revitalize the
depots. DOD guidance supports the use of public- private partnerships. In
some of these partnerships, private- sector logistics providers
subcontract with military depots for some depot maintenance work. We
recently reported that public- private partnerships comprise only about 2
percent of DOD*s

8 U. S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to
Overcome Capability Gaps in the Public Depot System, GAO- 02- 105
(Washington, D. C.: Oct. 12, 2001). 9 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Depot Maintenance: Change in Reporting Practices and

Requirements Could Enhance Congressional Oversight, GAO- 03- 16
(Washington, D. C.: Oct. 18, 2002). 10 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD Shifting More Workload for New Weapon
Systems to the Private Sector, GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 8 (Washington, D. C.: Mar.
31, 1998).

Page 14 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

depot maintenance work, and while the department plans to significantly
increase the use of such partnerships, there are some challenges that must
be overcome if the department*s planned expansion of partnerships is to be
realized. 11 It is uncertain the extent to which public- private depot
maintenance partnerships will result in contractor personnel replacing DOD
civilian personnel in depots. However, because the 50- 50 guidance
provides that the funds for some depot partnerships are not counted when
applying the 50 percent limitation, partnership work could be a vehicle
for transferring significant amounts of maintenance to the private sector
without exceeding the 50 percent limitation.

DOD recently considered proposing changes to title 10 depot maintenance
provisions. A legislative proposal that was associated with the
department*s transformation agenda suggested repealing six sections that
impose limitations on the management of depot- level maintenance and
repair by requiring certain amounts of work to be performed in public
depots. 12 According to the proposed repeal, these limitations reduce the
flexibility necessary for the department to make proper and efficient
business decisions in determining the source for depot- level maintenance
and repair. Although DOD decided not to submit this proposed repeal at
this time, similar language could be proposed in the future.

We previously recognized the importance of the depot maintenance mission,
noted that it is unclear what future role is planned for the military
depots in supporting DOD*s military mission, and recommended that the
department develop a strategic plan for the military depots. 13 However,
while DOD has initiated some action toward developing a depot strategic
plan, the department still has no depot strategic plan and the future of
these activities is uncertain.

11 U. S. General Accounting Office, Depot Maintenance: Public- Private
Partnerships Have Increased, but Long- Term Growth and Results Are
Uncertain, GAO- 03- 423 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 10, 2003).

12 The sections that DOD considered proposing for repeal were 2460, 2464,
2466, 2469, 2470, and 2472. 13 U. S. General Accounting Office, Defense
Logistics: Actions Needed to Overcome Capability Gaps in the Public Depot
System, GAO- 02- 105 (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 12, 2001). DOD Still Has No
Strategic

Depot Maintenance Plan and the Future of the Depots Is Uncertain

Page 15 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Thus, DOD continues to manage its depots on an ad hoc basis without
clearly defining their role for the future and the capabilities that are
required to assure the continued performance of that role. The
implications for the future are uncertain. In short, as we have reported,
the future capability for performing work in the military depot
maintenance facilities is questionable because no overall plan exists that
ties investments in depot maintenance facilities and plant equipment with
future workloads and, in turn, with human capital needs. Furthermore,

no other department plan provides required direction to shape the future
of these facilities and their workforce. Without strategic planning that
identifies which capabilities these activities will need to provide in the
future, there is no assurance they will be able to support future
readiness requirements as they have in the past. For example, DOD*s latest
logistics strategic plan, which was developed in August 1999, neither
mentioned maintenance nor the large infrastructure and cadre of personnel
required to operate and support the DOD maintenance depots. 14 This
occurred even though maintenance is an important logistics activity that
is essential for keeping complex weapon systems ready to perform even
though about half the department*s depot maintenance work is currently
performed in military depots.

Under the Government Performance and Results Act, federal agencies are
required to develop strategic plans that include mission statements,
strategic goals and objectives, and describe how the agencies intend to
achieve their goals and objectives through their activities, human
capital, information, and other resources. Depot officials said it is
difficult to develop a depot strategic plan with so many uncertainties
about how the military depots will be used in the future. This is
particularly true in light of the support initiatives implemented in
recent years to contract out to the private sector most logistics support
activities, including depot maintenance, for new and upgraded systems and
also in light of the base realignment and closure process that is planned
for 2005. These initiatives indicate that the role of military depots
could be further reduced in the

future. But how much it will be reduced is not clear. However, as long as
title 10 requirements remain, DOD will be limited in the extent to which
it can reduce the amount of work performed in DOD depot repair activities.

14 DOD has not updated its logistics strategic plan since the 1999 plan.
The document highlighting current logistics initiatives is the Future
Logistics Enterprise, which consists of six elements, one of which is
depot maintenance partnerships.

Page 16 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Without benefit of a departmentwide strategic depot plan that clarifies
the future role of military depots, the military services to varying
degrees have provided a prospective for future depot management, with that
of the Air Force and the Navy shipyards being the most mature. However, by
and large, the vision provided is based on short- term workload
projections* 1 to 2 years beyond the current year* and does not provide
the strategic long- term look that is needed to guide future workforce
decision making. The Army does not have a current strategic depot plan,
and its outdated

plan was not comprehensive. According to Army planners, although the Army
had a Depot Maintenance Enterprise Strategic Plan, the plan was suspended
pending reassessment of depot capabilities and requirements as part of an
ongoing study of depot proliferation. Further, while the suspended plan
was intended to provide mission and vision statements, it was generally
oriented toward improving depot business operations and it was not a
comprehensive plan that provided a basis for guiding future depot
planning.

Although not specifically addressed in the plan, in recent years, work
assigned to the Army depots has greatly declined as have the workforces
assigned to the depots. We reported in November of 1998, however, that the
Army did not have a sound basis for identifying the number of positions to
be eliminated from its depots. 15 This was particularly the case in
determining the number of direct labor personnel needed to support depot
workload requirements. To address this problem, the Army implemented the
Army Workload and Performance System to correlate workload and funding
requirements with the depot workforce. Nonetheless, this system does not
provide the visibility of new systems, modernization programs, and
upgrades that will have depot work that could be assigned to the depots.

Depot planners said they have little assurance that new systems will be
brought in, as the older systems they currently work on are phased out of
the inventory. Recently, ownership of Army depots has shifted to
subordinate commands of the Army Materiel Command that are responsible for
the sustainment of Army systems. It was hoped that this change would
increase the commands* use of the depots and better

15 U. S. General Accounting Office, Army Industrial Facilities: Workforce
Requirements and Related Issues Affecting Depots and Arsenals, GAO/ NSIAD-
99- 31 (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 30, 1998). Absent DOD Direction, the
Military Services*

Efforts to Develop Strategic Plans Vary, but Generally Are Weak in
Defining Future Work Army

Page 17 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

integrate depot work into the overall command mission performance, but it
is too soon to know if this will be successful. The subordinate commands
such as the Tank- automotive and Armaments Command and Aviation and
Missile Command, which are responsible for making decisions about how
support work will be allocated between the public and private sectors,
were also responsible for decisions that moved responsibility for much of
the work that used to be performed by the depots to the private sector.
These actions were based on new acquisition guidance encouraging the use
of contractor support.

The Army*s suspended depot strategic plan identified five issues, one of
which relates to depot workforce planning by keying in on the capability
of the depot workforce to meet future requirements. The plan*s goal for
this strategic issue was *to ensure a sustainable, multi- skilled
workforce that is capable of meeting future depot maintenance
requirements;* and the plan identified implementation objectives and
measurable criteria. Nonetheless, as previously noted, it is unclear what
the depots* future work will be. Therefore, as older systems are phased
out of the inventory, it is unclear what, if any, new work will be phased
in. This was not addressed in the suspended plan.

The arsenals and manufacturing ammunition plants have strategic plans or
draft plans providing a mission, vision statements, and goals for the
organizations. However, it is unclear whether the extent that the vision
these activities have for themselves is the same as the one that Army
headquarters and the parent commands have for these organizations.

Neither the Army nor most of the parent commands have officially published
strategic plans that identify the vision and objectives for these
activities. Most arsenals* workload and corresponding workforce have been
declining for years. The arsenals generally project workload and
corresponding workforce requirements primarily by consulting customers and
prospective customers regarding their future workload for the arsenals.
Arsenal officials said that this methodology provides a reasonable
workload projection for only 2 years. Further, some of the work that is
done in the arsenals is not the type of manufacturing work the arsenals
used to perform. For example, instead of manufacturing large artillery
systems, more than 40 percent of workload performed in the Rock Island
arsenal is manufacturing and assembling tool kits* ranging from carrying-
case sized sets to fully equipped maintenance shelters. A recent Rand
study proposed privatizing the arsenals, but it is unclear to what extent
the Army will pursue this strategy in the future.

Page 18 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

The ammunition plants have a fluctuating workload, sometimes increasing
and sometimes declining. The work at two government- owned and government-
operated ammunition plants has declined in the past years, but it is now
increasing. The McAlester, Oklahoma, ammunition plant, for example, will
hire more than 200 new employees in fiscal year 2003,

primarily because the bomb production workload has increased. According to
ammunition plant managers, they are generally aware of their workload from
less than 1 year to 2 years in advance.

The Navy does not have an overall strategic plan that covers all Navy
depot maintenance activities, but the naval shipyard and aviation
communities each have strategic planning efforts.

The Navy*s plan for shipyards, called the Naval Shipyard Business Plan for
Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005, has the essential elements of a strategic plan.
It is aligned to the Naval Sea Systems Command*s corporate strategy. The
plan communicates the purpose and direction for naval shipyards and
focuses on ship maintenance, workload performance, and associated
improvement initiatives, including making investments in training, skills,
and facilities necessary through 2005. It includes workload information
from fiscal year 2001 to 2010. The plan has a strategic workforce goal for
the naval shipyard workforce to have the skills and flexibility required
to meet the demands of the future workload and business environment.

The naval shipyard plan describes the relationship of the naval shipyards,
which comprise the public sector*s share of the ship industrial base, to
the overall industrial base the total force. According to the plan, the
shipyards must have a workforce that is capable of doing all the work.
However, Navy officials said that, in reality, with regard to the ship
repair business, the public sector and private sector personnel are
complementary and personnel from both sectors are now used to support work
that is primarily the responsibility of a shipyard from the other sector.
This strategic planning approach would appear to drive workforce planning
that is also complementary, but the shipyard business plan does not
discuss private sector shipyard personnel.

The naval aviation community published its Depot Maintenance Strategic
Plan in December 2002. This document is not a complete plan, but it
provides the framework for general doctrinal policies and principles that
will provide the future direction of naval aviation maintenance. It
defines four strategic goals for the depot system: (1) maximize the
ability to favorably impact war fighter readiness and safety, (2) reduce
the war fighters* total cost of ownership, (3) fully integrate depot
maintenance into Navy

Page 19 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

total life- cycle logistics management, and (4) become the knowledge base
for naval aviation depot maintenance. The plan does not identify the
workload and a workforce capability expected to be required at individual
depots but does reveal that airframe work and modification work will be
reduced and component rework and in- service engineering and logistics
support work increased. The plan indicates that public- private
partnerships will be pursued and are expected to be a significant share of
the Navy depot maintenance business. According to Naval Aviation Systems
Command officials, the strategic plan is the first of several documents
that will be produced, with a depot business plan and comprehensive depot
human resources plan to follow. The plan also noted that changes in title
10 legislation could be needed to implement the plan. Strategic planning
for the naval warfare centers is done for an entire

center and includes the depot maintenance function. Depot maintenance is
not the primary function of the centers but is integrated within several
departments* operations and is not centrally managed. For example, depot
maintenance at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division supports
engineering efforts within three departments and is not centrally managed;
rather each department manages the depot operations. Strategic planning

does not specifically address depot operations but includes workforce
goals for the center, which includes depot workers.

The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command has depot operations located
at two centers but depot maintenance is not the primary function of the
centers. Each center has a strategic plan that includes depot operations.
Depot operations are managed at the division levels in the centers, which
provide engineering support for various systems. The divisions have
strategic plans that include workforce goals, which include depot workers.
The two centers* depot operations are not structured like other Navy
depots and shipyards, where certain types of repairs are directed.
Instead, they compete with other depots and repair activities for work.

The Marine Corps does not yet have an approved strategic plan to guide
actions to hire, develop, and retain the depot workforce of the future.
However, efforts are under way to improve strategic planning at the
Headquarters and at the Materiel Command, which is responsible for
identifying depot maintenance requirements and the amounts and types of
workload for the depots. Headquarters Marine Corps has a draft plan, Depot
Level Maintenance

Strategic Plan, that contains mission and vision statements and Marine
Corps

Page 20 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

three related goals for improving the support of weapon systems and
equipment at the depot level. This draft plan does not identify the Marine
Corps organizations or offices responsible for implementing or monitoring
the plan. According to a Headquarters Marine Corps official, no schedule

has been established for the plan to be reviewed, approved, and issued.
The Materiel Command*s draft strategic plan for fiscal years 2003 through
2008 contains mission and vision statements and six goals to improve
materiel life cycle management of weapon systems and equipment at the
depot level, but it is not depot specific. Command officials said that the
plan, when finalized, would have metrics to evaluate implementation but is
on hold pending decisions regarding the reorganization of the Materiel
Command. As of February 2003, the command had no schedule for finalizing
the plan. Logistics Bases, a subordinate command of Materiel Command,
which owns the depots, published its first strategic plan about 2 years
ago. Its current plan is not depot specific and is mostly

business- process oriented, with only one of its six broad goals focused
on workforce issues. Although the plan has mission and vision statements,
Logistics Bases officials acknowledged that planning efforts do not yet
address all the elements of workforce planning suggested by OPM and GAO
because the command did not yet have the data it needed (such as attrition
rates, retirement trends, and skill gaps) for these analyses. Officials of
Logistics Bases also said the command has recently contracted for data
collection and analysis on depot workforce and equipment

activities that would provide a baseline for future strategic planning.
Further, officials said they plan to use metrics to implement the plan and
evaluate the results.

The Air Force is the most progressive in its depot maintenance strategic
planning. In August 2002, the Air Force issued a Depot Maintenance
Strategy and a Depot Maintenance Master Plan covering fiscal years 2004-
2020. These plans provide a roadmap designed to ensure the continuing
viability of Air Force*s three military depots to meet the warfighter
mission needs. However, the plans did not include the Aerospace
Maintenance and Regeneration Center. The plans are intended to posture the
Air Force*s three other depots to support both new weapons systems and new
technologies entering the inventory, as well as its aging systems. They
have a workforce component, which calls for new and younger workers to be
acquired and trained prior to the loss of the highly skilled workers who
are nearing retirement to leverage their knowledge and skills. In
addition, the Air Force plans call for an increased capital

investment of approximately $150 million per year over the next 6 fiscal
years, starting in fiscal year 2004, to modernize the Air Force depots.
Air Force

Page 21 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

However, key financial elements of the strategy and plan have changed
somewhat since the issuance of the strategic and master plans. Most
significantly, future capital investment plans, operational improvements,
and workforce enhancements are still evolving and uncertain. For example,
according to our analysis, funds for replacing and modernizing equipment
used to accomplish current workloads are less than projected; funding
amounts and sources for acquiring new capabilities to be provided by
weapon system acquisition programs and the private sector are lagging and
uncertain; and funding is not sufficient to implement initiatives to
improve depot operations and financial systems and for workforce
enhancements.

Strategic workforce planning is intended to focus on developing, by its
definition, long- term human capital strategies that are linked to
achieving key programmatic goals. Strategic workforce planning requires a
strategic plan, and as previously discussed, DOD still has not developed a
depot strategic plan. Thus, the services generally do not perform
strategic workforce planning that is tied to meaningful long- term
visions, objectives, and strategic goals for their services* military
roles and missions. However, in varying degrees, each of the services
performs short- term depot workforce planning that is tied to the budget
preparation process. The services* existing short- term workforce plans
usually do not assess the workforce competencies needed to address future
skill gaps, do not have comprehensive retention plans, and sometimes lack
performance measures to evaluate the plans all areas identified as key to
successful workforce planning.

Each of the services performs short- term workforce planning that is tied
to the budget process. While largely not strategic in nature, the services
perform most aspects of workforce planning, which in varying degrees
address some elements of workforce planning identified by the OPM and
high- performance organizations. Appendix III provides a synopsis of the
services* short- term depot workforce planning efforts.

The Army Materiel Command and its subordinate commands are responsible for
determining the work for the Army*s five maintenance depots. Semiannually,
they hold workload conferences to review, analyze, document, and assign
work to the depots. Once workload is assigned, the depots determine the
number of employees needed to support the workload, including (1) direct
labor workers who charge time to finite job taskings; (2) indirect
workers, such as shop supervisors and parts Services* Efforts to

Develop Industrial Workforce Plans Vary and Generally Lack Some Key
Planning Elements

Service Depot Workforce Planning Is Largely Short- Term Army

Page 22 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

expediters, whose time supports the overall depot maintenance process
rather than finite jobs; and (3) general and administrative overhead
personnel such as production managers, technical specialists, financial
managers, personnel officers, logisticians, contracting officers, computer
programmers, and computer operators. Determining personnel requirements is
an iterative process that begins with the depots and subordinate commands.
The commands use the Army Workload and Performance System to identify
projected workload and the future staffing requirements based on year- to-
year workload changes, known organizational adjustments, efficiencies such
as the Quadrennial Defense Review, and most efficient organization
studies. After agreement is

reached, the proposed staffing levels, which are included in the
consolidated depot budgets, are forwarded for review up the chain of
command. These commands can revise the levels initially requested based on
past performance and other evolving workload and staffing information.
Once the staffing levels are approved, the depots establish plans and take
actions to size and reshape the workforce to support workload. These
actions, in keeping with workforce planning, include identifying what
skills may be lacking to support the workload and developing hiring plans
to recruit new workers; training plans for new and existing workers to
develop and enhance critically needed skills; or, if staffing levels are
low, measures to accomplish the assigned workload such as increased use of
overtime. These plans could also include reducing the number of depot
workers, if the projected work does not support the number of workers.

Although each of the three arsenals determine their future workload and
estimate future workforce requirements somewhat differently, the arsenals
generally accomplish the task by (1) examining the currently funded work,
(2) requesting customers and prospective customers to predict their
workload for the arsenals for the next 2 to 3 years and estimating the
labor hours and skills to provide the predicted products, (3) examining
historical trends such as unexpected orders received, (4) discussing
workload with their parent organizations, and (5) developing their
workload and workforce requirements. The projected workload and workforce
requirements are reviewed and approved at the parent organizations using a
predictive staffing model to validate the

arsenals* computations. Most arsenals estimate the workload and workforce
requirements for 2 to 3 years in advance, and officials said their
estimates for this time period are generally fairly accurate. The
Watervliet Arsenal in New York estimates its workload for 6 years in
advance, but

officials acknowledged that estimates beyond 3 years are subject to
change. However, they believe estimates are generally reliable.

Page 23 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

The Army*s two ammunition manufacturing plants* workload generally comes
from their parent organization* the Joint Munitions Command (formerly
Operations Support Command) based on customer orders. The orders may come
from other services or from commercial organizations, but the orders are
placed through the parent organization. A predictive staffing model is
used to determine the workforce requirements. Firm orders are usually
placed no more than 1 year in advance, and the plants* workloads are
generally known from less than 1 year to 2 years in advance.

The Naval Air Systems Command distributes the annual and future (2 years)
industrial- based workload to the three naval aviation depots. Once the
depots receive the workload, they use historical workload data and
staffing models to determine the civilian manpower requirements

needed to accomplish the assigned workload. The staffing models break the
total workload into the number of workers needed in each shop and the
related trade skills required. These models include historical factors
such as direct labor personnel, leave, and overtime percentages. The
depots then develop the workforce requirements for the aircraft, engines,
and component programs. Once the requirements are developed, the depots
also prepare plans that include the specific skills, numbers, and types of
workers needed in each production shop. These plans are used to establish
hiring, training, and recruitment efforts at the depots. After the depots
establish the workforce requirements, they are forwarded for review and
approval to the Naval Air Systems Command.

The Naval Sea Systems Command distributes the workload to the four
shipyards that determine the workforce requirements to accomplish the
planned work. The Naval Sea Systems Command provides the shipyards with
depot maintenance workload for at least 6 years. The shipyards* workload
is predetermined from legislation, the availability of ships, depot- level
maintenance requirements, and the budget. The primary tool the Naval Sea
Systems Command and shipyards use to forecast workloads and workforces for
budgeting and planning purposes is the Workload and Resource Report, which
includes data on the current year and 2 subsequent years. Each shipyard is
provided its assigned workload schedules so they can develop their
workload and resource reports for the workforces of each production shop.
As part of the shipyards* processes for determining the workforce and
skills to efficiently execute the workload, each shipyard uses a resource
allocation process. The resource allocation process determines the right
number of workers with the right skills to efficiently execute the
workload. Also, the shipyards* production shops implement hiring and
training plans and skills assessments to Naval Aviation Depots

Naval Shipyards

Page 24 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

support critical skills that are determined to be necessary for successful
execution of ship maintenance. After the shipyards* workforce requirements
are determined, they are forwarded for approval to the Naval Sea Systems
Command and included in the command*s budget.

The Naval Sea Systems Command also has two warfare centers. Depot
operations at both centers receive annual projected workload allocations
from their prospective customers. The centers use the annual budget
workload forecasts and knowledge of program*s future plans to determine
the civilian workforce requirements. Also, civilian workforce requirements
are based on workforce demographics such as attrition and retirements. The
workload allocations combined with changes in the civilian workforce
demographics provide hiring and training requirements for the centers. The
civilian workforce requirements for the depot operations are forwarded
through the centers for approval and review up the chain of command.

The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command has two depot maintenance
activities that are not structured like the other naval depots and
shipyards, where certain types of repairs are directed. Rather, these
centers compete with other depots and repair activities for their
workload. The depot operations* workforce allocations are directly
dependent on the annual workloads they solicit and maintain from customers
such as the Naval Inventory Control Point, other services, and naval
commands. Depot operations at the centers receive annual workload
information from their perspective customers, which are used to develop
civilian workforce requirements. Hiring and training plans are developed
according to the annual civilian depot workforce requirements. The
centers* depot workforce requirements are forwarded through the centers
for approval and review up the chain of command.

The Logistics Bases, a subordinate command of the Marine Corps Materiel
Command, is responsible for identifying depot maintenance requirements and
workloading at the Marine Corps* two maintenance depots. Annually, once
depot maintenance requirements and related funding are identified, the two
centers begin the process for determining the total number of

workers to support the workload* including direct labor and indirect labor
workers. The centers send their staffing requests back up the chain of
command for review and approval. Revisions to staffing requests can occur
as a result of the centers past performance, other evolving workload
information, and staffing information. Once the centers have an approved
staffing level, they establish plans and take actions to size and reshape
the

workforce to support workload. Such actions include, among others, Space
and Naval Warfare

Systems Centers Marine Corps

Page 25 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

identifying skills needed to support the workload; developing hiring plans
to recruit new workers and training plans for new and existing workers to
develop and enhance critically needed skills; or if staffing levels are
reduced, identifying measures to accomplish the assigned workload such as
increased use of overtime; or, if necessary, reducing the number of depot
workers.

In early 2000, the Air Force Materiel Command, which has management and
oversight responsibility for the four Air Force maintenance depots,
developed and institutionalized workforce shaping processes to assist
depot managers in planning and achieving their overall workforce
objective. That objective is to obtain by fiscal year 2005 a trained,
flexible workforce of sufficient size with the appropriate mix of skills
and expertise to accomplish the depot mission. A key aspect of the
command*s workforce planning process is the development of accession or
hiring/ appointment data. The command requires the depots to provide
annual accession data in order to determine the number of potential
vacancies by job series that each center is likely to experience in the
current and the next 5 fiscal years. The command, in turn, applies a
probability loss model to produce out- year accession numbers using
attrition and retirement rates and other loss data, such as separations
and deaths, for each depot by occupational job series. The final accession
numbers basically become the depots *hiring plan.*

According to depot officials at each center we visited, change in the
mission workloads is just one of many factors used in computing future
accession requirements. They further stated that as a general rule,
projected accessions are based primarily on current workloads and
attrition rates rather than on future workload estimates. According to
these officials, because the Air Force depot maintenance strategic plan
does not identify new work to be performed in the depots, they cannot
predict with a high level of confidence what their expected workload
volumes will be more than 2 or 3 years out. Depot officials told us that
their projected accession numbers beyond 2 or 3 years are their best
guess. In addition, the depots annually conduct a bottoms- up workforce
review to ensure that their civilian workforce is the right size and
aligned to meet identified workload requirements. If properly done, the
workforce planning process provides management with the needed data to
make sound workforce decisions from implementing effective recruitment and
retention programs, to developing valuable training programs, and to
arranging for successful accession management. Air Force

Page 26 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Depot workforce planning, as done by the services* depots, generally does
not address elements of three steps identified by OPM and high- performing
organizations as key to effective workforce planning: (1) the assessment
of competencies needed to address skill gaps; (2) the development of
comprehensive retention plans; and (3) the implementation of performance
measures to evaluate the success of the workforce plans. Table 1 provides
an assessment of the status of service depots* short- term workforce
planning efforts in nine key areas of the five steps in strategic
workforce planning. (See also appendix III.)

Table 1: Status of Service Depots* Short- Term Workforce Planning Efforts
Service/ depot type

Human capital goals Vision &

objectives Assessed

Competencies a Gap

analysis Recruiting

and/ or hiring plans

Training plans Succession

plans Comprehensive

retention plans

Evaluate plans and adjust

Army Depots Arsenals Ammo

Plants Navy Aviation Depots Shipyards Naval Surface and Undersea Warfare
Centers

b Space and Naval Warfare Systems Centers

c Marine Corps d Air Force b Source: DOD (data), GAO (analysis). Note:
Checkmark indicates efforts under way to address elements in these steps.
a All the services and depots assessed their skills to address gaps
relative to the future workforce requirements. b The Naval Surface Warfare
Center and the Air Forces* Directorates of Maintenance at Ogden Air

Logistics Center, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, and Warner Robins
Air Logistics Center did not assess competencies. c Space and Naval
Warfare Systems Center San Diego did not have performance measures.

Some Depot Workforce Planning Efforts Lack Competency Assessments,
Comprehensive Retention Plans, and Evaluative Performance Measures

Page 27 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

d The Marine Corps reported that it has an initiative underway to study
establishing competencies and career paths for its logistics and
facilities communities. However, the results of that initiative have not
been published.

Although one Naval Undersea Warfare Center and the Air Force*s Aerospace
Maintenance and Regeneration Center assessed competencies, most depots
have not assessed the competencies* a set of behaviors that encompass
skill, knowledge, abilities, and personal attributes that are critical to
successful work accomplishment; 16 competencies can identify where gaps
exist in the skills of the current depot workforce relative to those
needed in the future.

As shown in table 1, most depot officials did not usually separately
assess competencies for depot workers, relying instead on job skills,
series, or classifications. Workforce planning models, however, suggest
that the assessment of competencies provides more than is discussed in
position descriptions. A survey of several top- performing organizations
suggests that a better approach is to conduct an actual assessment of
employees* competency levels. An actual assessment will provide much more
useful information for determining the number of those available and
capable of fulfilling future functional requirements. It can also give
good information

as to what recruitment, training, and other strategies will be needed to
address workforce gaps and surpluses.

Workforce planning models point out the need for identifying competencies.
For example, the required competencies identified for GAO analysts
include, among others, thinking critically, improving professional
competence, achieving results, collaborating with others, and facilitating
and implementing change. According to the state of Washington*s Workforce
Planning Guide, competencies provide management and staff with a common
understanding of the skills and behaviors that are important to the
organization and the accomplishment of its mission.

Although most depots did not assess competencies separately for their
depot workers, a couple of depots did competency assessments, with one
depot doing competency assessments for its entire workforce and one

16 As defined by several state and federal agencies such as the Washington
State Department of Personnel, New York State Department of Civil Service,
and the U. S. Departments of Interior and Health and Human Services. Most
Depots Did Not

Separately Assess Competencies Needed for the Depot Workforce

Page 28 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

doing an assessment for only a segment of its workforce. The Naval
Undersea Warfare Center identified the following competencies in its
assessment: innovative thinking, situational leadership, managing a
diverse workforce, conflict management, interpersonal/ team skills,
technical competence, problem solving, and oral and written
communications. According to warfare center personnel, these attributes
are critical to the successful achievement of its mission and goals.

Additionally, the Air Force*s Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration
Center developed a supervisor*s needs assessment that identified
supervisor competencies. They included integrity, communication,
listening, empowering others, accepting responsibility, planning, being a
team player, dependability, consistency, fairness, and effective
prioritization. These competencies resulted in the development of a core-
training curriculum for supervisors.

Although all of the services had some retention strategies to ensure
continuity of leadership and for keeping high performing and highly
skilled personnel, none have comprehensive retention plans to further
enhance these strategies.

According to OPM, an important principle behind maintaining a quality
workforce is employee retention. A critical analysis of workforce trends
is essential to determine what factors most affect retention. Current
workforce research has identified the following factors as being critical
to enhancing the retention necessary for the construction of a high

performance organization: diversity, career development and advancement,
work life balance, recognition, employee benefits, and performance.
Furthermore, OPM*s 5- Step Workforce Planning Model states that a
comprehensive retention plan should

 determine those employees who are critical to accomplishment of
organizational goals,  develop a means to provide constant feedback
between these critical

employees, and supervisors/ managers to determine what they want and need
to become long- term assets of the organization, and  develop a means of
providing incentives and/ or working conditions

designed to retain valued employees. Most activities we evaluated had
developed a means of providing incentives designed to retain valued
employees. However, only the Air Force identified a separate list of
occupations critical to accomplishment of organizational goals, with most
depots reporting that every employee Services Lack Comprehensive

Retention Plans

Page 29 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

was critical. Overall, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center and Navy
shipyards were further along in developing their retention plans.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center at Keyport, Washington, developed a
personnel retention program that includes its depot workforce,
concentrating on (1) work and job design, (2) career progression, (3)
awards and compensation, and (4) quality of life. The center developed the
retention program to make the center a great place to work. For example,
the center has reinstituted new hire briefings, developed an employee
handbook, and initiated an improvement award program to provide incentives
to employees to submit new ideas for process improvement.

The Navy*s shipyard retention strategies focus on bonuses, helper-
toworker programs, recognition programs, employment development and career
opportunities, and leadership training. For example, the shipyards*
helper- to- worker programs include, among other things, academics and
trade theory training. Also, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard has used retention
incentives to pay up to 25 percent of salary to retain approximately 30
employees who possessed engineering and technical knowledge that was
critical to the shipyard*s success. Meanwhile, an Air Force depot lost 8
of 12 workers in a shop because the highly skilled software engineers were
disgruntled over not being able to get higher pay, even though their
skills were critical, required years to acquire, and were and are not

widely available. Although workforce planning models emphasize the need
for establishing performance measures to provide a basis for evaluating
workforce planning effectiveness, the workforce plans of some service
depots did not have this element.

The Government Performance and Results Act stresses the need for
establishing and using performance measures. Additionally, OPM*s 5- Step
Workforce Planning Model as well as some state and federal agencies stress
the importance of measuring the effectiveness of workforce action plans as
an element of effective workforce planning. Measuring performance allows
organizations to track the progress they are making toward their goals and
gives managers crucial information on which to base their organizational
and management decisions. Leading organizations recognize that performance
measures can create powerful incentives to influence organizational and
individual behavior. According to the workforce planning guide of one high
performance organization, leaders should regularly review performance
measurement information, Some Service Depots Lacked

Performance Measures for Evaluating Workforce Plans

Page 30 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

assess what is working and not working, and make needed adjustments to the
plan and strategies.

The Air Force depots and the naval shipyard communities did establish
measures for evaluating the effectiveness of their workforce planning
efforts. In April 2001, the Air Force Materiel Command issued a command
wide Human Resources Strategic Plan that addressed critical workforce
issues for depot maintenance workers as well as all other materiel command
personnel. The plan contained, among other things, performance measures
and milestones for each human- resource enabling task. For example, it
identified various performance measures for the

task *Develop and Implement Methods to Attract and Recruit High- quality
Employees.* They included, among others, determining whether milestones
had been completed on time and whether appropriate actions had been taken
after analysis of data from new employees* entrance surveys.

The Naval Sea Systems Command also developed performance measures for
evaluating the effectiveness of workforce plans for Navy shipyard
personnel. Performance measures for the Navy*s shipyards include, among
others, measuring the success of the hiring process by comparing actual to
planned hires. Also, shipyards track the average age to determine whether

the effect of workforce plans is lowering the average age of the overall
shipyards* workforce. Furthermore, evaluations of shipyards* training
plans include post training evaluations and review of the budgeted
training funds expended.

Some Army depots and arsenals and one naval depot have not established
performance measures for evaluating the effectiveness of workforce plans.
Army and Navy officials said they did not develop such performance
measures because their focus was on various business metrics that assessed
the cost, schedule, and performance of their depot operations. However,
while those metrics provide details about depot operations and worker
productivity, they provide little insight into the progress being made
toward achieving workforce goals and objectives.

Performance measures are an important element of workforce planning.
Without establishing and using performance measures, managers will likely
not be able either to evaluate the progress made toward the attainment of
workforce planning goals relative to recruiting, hiring, training,
retention, and succession or to measure the workforce*s contribution
toward achieving programmatic goals.

Page 31 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

The services* depots face a number of challenges that adversely affect
DOD*s strategic workforce planning for the viability of its civilian
workforce. First, the services may have difficulty maintaining the depots*
long- term viability by replacing up to 31,000 skilled depot workers, if
these workers retire when they are eligible by 2009. Second, the services
are having difficulty implementing multiskilling* having one worker
capable of performing more than one skill, or trade, in the depot* which
has been shown to improve worker efficiency and productivity and could
help the depots do more with less. The Navy and the Air Force have
attempted to implement multiskilling but are having difficulty because
additional compensation or other financial incentives have not been
approved or are not available. Lastly, the need for increased training
funding and innovation for workers who replace the large number of
potential retirees will also pose a challenge. The Air Force is already
facing unfunded training costs for its depot workers. As a result of depot
downsizing, the DOD civilian depot workforce has

about 31,000 personnel eligible to retire over the next 5 to 7 years. 17
This creates a challenge for the depots in retaining their viability,
assisting service readiness, and revitalizing their workforces.

Table 2 provides age and retirement eligibility information for the 27 DOD
industrial facilities. The average age ranges from 44 in the McAlester,
Oklahoma, ammunition plant and 45 in three naval shipyards (where
officials have actively worked to lower the average age), to 52 in the San
Diego Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center and the Air Force*s Aerospace
Maintenance and Regeneration Center. In Army maintenance depots, where the
average age is 49, depot officials said it is

difficult to bring down the average age because there are not many new
hires and some of those hired tend to be older employees.

17 Retirement projections were based on date the employee becomes eligible
for optional retirement under the Civil Service Retirement System or the
Federal Employees Retirement System. A Number of

Challenges Inhibit Effective Strategic Workforce Planning

Difficulty Maintaining Depot Viability if Large Numbers of Eligible
Skilled Workers Retire

Page 32 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Table 2: Civilian Personnel in Industrial Facilities Eligible to Retire
Defense industrial facilities

FY 2002 civilian staffing

levels Average

age Number of

civilians eligible to retire

in FY 2002 Percent

eligible to retire by FY 2007

Percent eligible to retire by

FY 2009 Navy depots Cherry Point Aviation Depot 3,839 46 99 24 34

Jacksonville Aviation Depot 3,928 48 133 27 37 North Island Aviation Depot
3,138 49 109 31 43 Norfolk Naval Shipyard 7,525 45 527 27 38 Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard 3,500 46 251 30 41 Puget Sound Naval Shipyard 8,608 45 676
28 38 Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 3,987 45 122 27 38 Crane Naval Surface
Warfare Center a 311 45 10 32 40 Keyport Naval Undersea Warfare Center 608
48 26 41 55 Charleston Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center 49 51 5 47
59 San Diego Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center 70 52 1 43 47

Total Navy 35,563 1,959 Army facilities b Anniston Army Depot 2,429 48 408
48 60 Corpus Christi Army Depot 2,869 49 223 22 27 Letterkenny Army Depot
1,082 49 147 46 59 Red River Army Depot 1,478 48 203 42 55 Tobyhanna Army
Depot 2,237 49 502 58 72 Rock Island Arsenal 1,156 50 82 36 41 Watervliet
Arsenal 484 50 28 42 61 Pine Bluff Arsenal 804 49 89 43 63 Crane Army
Ammunition Activity 620 49 181 49 60 McAlester Army Ammunition Plant 1,075
44 226 30 48

Total Army 14,234 2,089 Marine Corps depots Maintenance Center Albany 659
48 128 47 64 Maintenance Center Barstow 664 47 118 43 56

Total Marine Corps 1,323 246 Air Force depots c Aerospace Maintenance and
Regeneration Center 439 52 139 65 77 Directorate of Maintenance, Ogden ALC
5,852 47 1,015 39 49 Directorate of Maintenance, Oklahoma City ALC 8,533
45 1,167 33 41 Directorate of Maintenance, Warner Robins ALC 6,328 45 988
33 41

Total Air Force 21,152 3,309 Total Defense industrial facilities 72,272 48
d 7,603 33 43

Source: DOD (data), GAO (presentation).

Page 33 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

a Staffing level as of November 2001. b Army industrial facilities include
depots, arsenals and government- owned and* operated ammunition plants. c
Air Force data as of September 30, 2001.

d Total weighted average age based on the number of civilian staff at each
industrial facility. As table 2 shows, about 7,600 employees in these
activities* about 12 percent of the total workforce* were eligible to
retire in fiscal year 2002. However, depot officials told us they cannot
hire replacement workers until the vacancies occur. Given that years of
experience are required to get the average worker to a journeyman level,
these officials are concerned about the impact on depot operations of
trying to replace large numbers of workers during a short time period.
This situation will be aggravated during the next few years as the number
of workers eligible to retire increases significantly. For example, the
percent eligible to retire by fiscal year 2007 ranges from a low of 22 in
one Army depot and 24 in one

naval aviation depot to a high of 65 percent at one Air Force depot and 58
at one Army depot. In 2009, 77 percent of the workers will be eligible to
retire at one Air Force depot, 72 percent at one Army depot, and 64
percent in one Marine Corps depot.

Air Force officials said they expect to hire 13,000 depot workers by
September 2009 to replace retiring workers. They expect to encounter
difficulties during that process, similar to those they experienced when
they hired approximately 4,500 workers during the last 2 years (primarily
as a result of Base Realignment and Closures and transfers). Those
difficulties included the following:

 engineering positions were particularly difficult to fill, and the use
of pay incentives to increase salary levels of engineers and other hard-
to- fill positions was essential;  some qualified and desirable potential
employees went elsewhere because

the hiring process took too long;  new hires were not *shop ready* when
they come in the door and needed

additional training; and  more supervisors are needed to manage the new
workers.

According to officials at the Air Force*s Directorate of Maintenance,
Ogden Air Logistics Center, workers in one software engineering shop
became discouraged at not getting additional pay and 8 out of 12 quit and
went to work for a local contractor. Unable to fill these highly skilled
positions or otherwise get the work accomplished in the depot, the depot
hired the contractor to do the work formerly done in the depot at a

Page 34 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

considerably higher cost than was incurred when the work was done in the
depot.

Army officials noted that a higher average age does not necessarily equate
to high retirement eligibility. For example, workers at the Corpus Christi
depot have an average age of 49, but the number of workers eligible to
retire by 2009 is 27 percent* the lowest of any depot. According to Corpus
Christi depot officials, during the mid- 1980s they hired about 1,700
workers in their mid- 30s, many of which were ex- military. Additionally,
Army officials noted that many depot workers continue to work after they
are eligible to retire. Nonetheless, Army depot officials recognize that
with about 52 percent of the depot workforce eligible to retire by 2009,
it will be difficult to maintain a viable, trained workforce if the
retirement eligible employees choose to retire over a short period of
time.

We analyzed Army retirement eligibility data for the Army depot workforce
and observed that some work centers could lose a majority of their staff
within the next 5 years. Depot officials acknowledged that some work
centers are at risk if all or most of the workers leave during a short
period of time and that realignments, or job transfers, are needed to make
sure a large number of retirement eligible employees are not

assigned to any one area. However, the depots have limited plans to deal
with this situation. They said they cannot hire replacement workers until
after an employee retires. Additionally, transfers to balance retirement
eligible employees could be unwelcomed by personnel and could have an
adverse impact on shop productivity, as workers require time to gain
skills in new areas. It will be a major challenge to balance such concerns
about

current operational impacts and increased training now against longer term
concerns about retirement eligibility over the next 5 to 7 years. However,
the depots are generally not making such analyses and trade- offs.

According to Marine Corps depot officials, attrition rates are low and the
centers have hired few new permanent employees. However, the percent of
employees eligible to retire will increase from 43 and 47 percent in 2007
to 56 and 64 percent in 2009. Officials said it would be difficult to
bring on such large numbers of new workers if these retirement- eligible
personnel do retire about the same time. However, the centers* workload
has declined significantly in the past. Systems that used to comprise the
bulk of the centers* work are phasing out of the inventory, and questions
remain about whether replacement systems will be maintained in the Marine
Corps depots or the private sector. Officials acknowledged that it

Page 35 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

is difficult to plan for the revitalization of the center workforce
without knowing what work will be available for them to do.

An aging workforce has some advantages particularly when the workload is
relatively stable over time. Officials pointed out that as DOD was
downsizing its depot workforce and doing no new hiring, there were fewer
demands for training programs. About half of the depots have
apprenticeship programs, which are the most comprehensive and expensive
type of training for industrial workers. Some of these programs have been
re- established in the past few years. Nonetheless, according to depot
officials, it would be unaffordable to hire enough apprentices to

replace the large numbers of workers who will be eligible to retire over
the next 5 to 7 years.

The services are having difficulty implementing or are not trying to
implement multiskilling a private- sector initiative designed to improve
the flexibility, efficiency, and productivity of workers. Multiskilling is
the process of training maintenance employees in specific skills that
cross the traditional trade or craft lines and then ensuring the work is
performed. It involves reviewing work processes to identify situations
where efficiency and productivity can be enhanced by training workers in
one skill area or occupational series to perform some tasks in another
occupational series. A major advantage of multiskilling is that particular
jobs that require more than one craft not necessarily more than one
individual can be performed by fewer personnel. It can reduce the time it
takes to perform jobs involving multiple skill requirements by eliminating
the time a depot worker must wait for another worker to arrive and perform
a task that the first worker is not trained to do. For example, an
aviation mechanic trained in certain electrical tasks can reduce the times
an electrician must be called when doing aircraft repair. In a 1998 review
of Army industrial facilities we pointed out inefficiencies

in the depots and arsenals and stated that improved systems and procedures
for shifting maintenance workers between different organizational units
and skill areas would offer better opportunities to effectively use
limited numbers of maintenance personnel. 18 Depot

18 U. S. General Accounting Office, Army Industrial Facilities: Workforce
Requirements and Related Issues Affecting Depots and Arsenals, GAO/ NSIAD-
99- 31 (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 30, 1998). Difficulty Implementing

Multiskilling Even Though It Could Improve Worker Efficiency and
Productivity

Page 36 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

officials had noted that prior practices made it difficult to transfer
workers between organizational units and skill areas to adjust for
unanticipated work stoppages caused by changes in work priorities, parts
shortages, technical problems, or temporary labor imbalances. We pointed
out that multiskilled workers offered added flexibility and could allow
depot managers to use a limited number of workers more cost effectively.
We recommended that the Secretary of the Army encourage depot managers

to pursue worker agreements to facilitate multiskilling in industrial
facilities. Although the Army has not been successful in implementing
multiskilling, this initiative remains a goal Army depot planners would
like to pursue.

In recent years, the naval aviation community has done the most to begin
using multiskilling as a depot improvement initiative, but full project
implementation has been delayed because they have not been given
permission to allow an additional pay grade for workers having more than
one skill. Although the Air Force first tried multiskilling in 1993 and
its current depot improvement initiative calls for determining cost
effective ways to implement multiskilling, the Air Force*s multiskilling
initiative is also floundering. In addition, although service, depot, and
other officials attribute improved workforce flexibility and cost-
effectiveness to multiskilling, Army depots and Marine Corps centers and
Navy shipyards are not implementing it. The naval aviation community has
attempted to implement multiskilling

since 1999. Although its current request to pilot a multiskilling
demonstration project to use a certain compensation system had not been
approved as of March 2003, the community is implementing the pilot with an
alternative compensation approach.

As a result of an extensive business process reengineering project
completed in 2002, the Naval Air Systems Command identified multiskilling
as a solution to achieve a more flexible workforce. The program is
intended to provide a more flexible, multitraded, trained workforce that
could react more quickly to fluctuating workloads because managers can
reassign employees based on workload demands. According

to naval aviation managers, a multiskilled worker could be particularly
cost- effective when depot workers go to the weapon system in the field
rather than bringing the weapon to the depot. For example, a worker
trained as both a pneudraulic systems mechanic and an aircraft engine
mechanic could be sent to an operational location to accomplish the work

that previously required workers trained in each of these skills. As a
result, Naval Aviation Multiskill

Efforts Are Delayed

Page 37 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

cost reductions should occur in field team assignments, which comprise an
increasing share of Navy aviation depots* work.

The naval aviation community*s current multiskilling initiative used a
business case analysis to justify a demonstration project that would
provide training for workers who are at the journeyman level in one skill,
such as a sheet metal mechanic, to attain journeyman status in a second
trade, such as an aircraft mechanic. The project called for compensating
the workers involved by increasing their pay by an additional wage grade.
19 According to Naval Air Systems Command officials, the economic analysis

indicated savings could be achieved even though the workers would receive
increased compensation. Increased throughput is expected to result in
efficiencies of up to 20 percent due to redirected travel savings and
increases in volume efficiencies. This same business case analysis
indicated that during a single year one depot could potentially accomplish
519 additional maintenance tasks for the same amount of budget. According
to depot planners, private sector workers receive increased compensation
under similar circumstances, and union officials believe government
workers should also.

However, OPM*s Job Grading Standards do not contemplate providing
compensation for an additional grade for two equal trades. OPM*s job
grading standards state that pay is based on the highest level of work
performed, regardless of how many different trades an employee is required
to perform. According to Naval Air Systems Command officials, OPM*s
standard inhibits their ability to pursue multiskilling initiatives and
achieve reengineering efficiencies.

The Naval Air Systems Command sought permission to go to OPM to request a
demonstration project with additional compensation in September 2000; but
Headquarters, Department of the Navy disapproved the request. Based on the
results of the 2002 business case analysis, which showed that the
multiskill concept would increase readiness by providing a more flexible
and well- trained workforce, in September 2002 the naval aviation
community again sought approval for the proposed demonstration project,
including increased compensation.

19 The additional grade would allow increased compensation (e. g., at wage
grade 10) for work in two equal skills (e. g., both wage grade 09) when
the worker performs the functions of the two skills for a minimum of 25
percent of the time at work.

Page 38 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Navy headquarters has not yet approved the request, but aviation depot
officials are going forward with the project using an alternative
compensation approach. They have established a compensation award at each
site, not to exceed a $2,500 annual award. Five different skill
combinations have been proposed for the Cherry Point Depot and two for the
Jacksonville depot. One combination has begun at the North Island depot.
According to naval aviation officials, workers are reluctant to
participate because while in training they would not have the opportunity
for overtime pay. Officials believe that getting an additional grade would
be sufficient to increase the willingness of depot workers to participate*
a goal that is likely critical to getting the program to sufficient
numbers to make it cost- effective.

Although the Air Force*s current depot maintenance improvement effort
calls for determining cost effective ways to implement multiskilling,
officials are generally supportive of it as a workload tool; however, the
Air Force*s multiskilling program is declining in size. In 1993, the Air
Force Materiel Command prototyped a multiskilling concept using aircraft
mechanics at the Oklahoma City depot. The program involved training and
certifying mechanics in multiple skills (aircraft, sheet metal, and
electrical) that were capable of performing a series of tasks involving
general airframe, structural, and electrical maintenance. By 1997, the
program had over 100 participants. However, since then, depot officials

told us the program has lost its popularity and currently consists of only
49 participants. Officials said that due to production requirements, many
of the skilled workers participating in the original project are now
working in their primary skill and new hires show little interest because
there are no financial incentives.

At the Warner Robins depot, officials designated a specific occupation job
series, 8801, as multiskilling to provide workers with greater job
flexibility and a better career path. As of September 2001, 148 workers
were functioning in this job series. Multiskilled workers primarily
performed tasks in two occupations, such as aircraft mechanic and
electrical mechanic or aircraft mechanic and sheet metal mechanic.
According to depot officials, they used this occupational job series as a
hiring tool to attract younger, multiskilled workers at the entry level.
However, workers did not receive any additional salary. As a part of its
depot maintenance improvement efforts, the Air Force has

refocused on multiskilling. Officials conducted a business case analysis
to determine the feasibility of various opportunities for using
multiskilling at the depots. After several months of data gathering and
analysis, officials Air Force Multiskilling Program Is Older but Declining

Page 39 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

said they were not able to provide a strong business case for developing a
standardized approach or expanding the use of multiskilling at the depots.
We found that, except in very limited cases, the depots are not doing true
multiskilling today. Rather, the depots are doing something similar called
multicrafting that does not involve the combination of two or more skills
at the journeyman skill level. Despite the results of the business case
analysis, officials from Headquarters, Air Force Materiel Command, and the
depots were generally supportive of multiskilling as a tool to deal with
fluctuating homogenous workloads and to facilitate movement of

employees as workload demands fluctuate. Service, depot, and other
organization officials cite the multiskilling concept as a way to provide
a more flexible, productive workforce that can react more quickly to
fluctuating workloads, a key issue in trying to improve the cost-
effectiveness of maintenance operations as well as meet readiness needs.

According to officials of the Naval Air Systems Command, the extensive
business case analysis they conducted indicated that multiskilling will
provide a trained workforce, more flexible for increased readiness, and
more capable of being able to be reassigned on demand to better support
fluctuating workloads. The officials also indicated that a multiskilling
program could also better support readiness by serving as an incentive to
skilled, near- retirement workers to stay and provide on- the- job
training for

younger workers. In addition, depot officials reported, on the basis of
the economic analysis that savings would be achieved even though workers
would receive increased compensation.

Various organizations such as the Tennessee Valley Authority are exempt
from OPM*s job grading standards and are allowed to establish a
classification system that is more flexible and better fits their
environment. Among the flexibilities the Tennessee Valley Authority has
implemented is a multiskilled work force that receives additional
compensation for additional skills and work. The Tennessee Valley
Authority*s program will involve about 1,400 current employees as well as
new hires. According to Authority officials, multiskilling is improving
the flexibility and efficiency of the workforce. As North America*s
largest public power company, the Tennessee Valley Authority developed its
union agreements on multiskilling in fiscal year 2000 and fully
implemented its pilot program by the end of fiscal year 2001, with the
program expected to be fully implemented by 2005. The plan is to review
all preventive maintenance activities and reassign them to utilize
multiskill

employees. Authority officials said that the multiskilling training
program Multiskilling Is Cited as Improving Flexibility and

Cost- Effectiveness of Depot and Other Workforces

Page 40 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

is resulting in a more efficient way to accomplish their work and to
obtain and maintain a versatile group of employees. They reported that
increases in productivity and efficiency were expected to reduce
restaffing after attrition by about 15 percent.

Private sector industrial activities have also implemented multiskilling.
According to Naval Air Systems Command and Air Force officials, they did
benchmarking in the private sector before they began trying to put

together their own multiskilling programs. Navy depot officials also noted
that they see increased usage of this concept when they do private sector
wage grade comparability studies. Based on the potential retirement of
about 31,000 depot workers out of the approximately 72,000 workers in the
workforce eligible to retire by 2009, training requirements will increase
significantly for new hires, and innovation will be required to develop
more cost- effective training alternatives. For over 10 years, most depots
had training costs much smaller than would normally be required for
industrial activities since depot downsizing resulted in hiring few new
employees. However, because the Air Force currently has a significant
deficit in funding training for new hires and refresher training, depot
officials raised concerns over

their ability to fund future training requirements needed for workforce
revitalization. Furthermore, as the depots face the challenge of
developing and implementing plans to address skill imbalances occurring
due to attrition and retirement over the next 5 to 7 years, the need for
increased funding will likely drive the need to find new funding sources
and to develop innovative training programs that cost less.

The Air Force is already challenged by unfunded training costs. Air Force
workers who had received little training for years were required to take
*back- to- basics training.* This came about after accidents occurred at
two depots and additional training requirements evolved from the personnel
changes resulting from closing two Air Force depots and transferring their
work to other locations. However, although training requirements
increased, training budgets have not kept pace. For example, when Air
Force Materiel Command depot managers requested $10 million in 2001 to
train first- line supervisors, the Command did not approve any of that

funding. And when managers requested $11.5 million for budget years 2002
to 2007 to provide added training for new workers, the Command only funded
a portion of that request. Lacking sufficient training dollars to fund
their requirements, Air Force depot managers have been seeking ways to
partner with state government programs. Partnering with the states to Need
for Increased

Funding and Innovation Driven by Increased Training Requirements

Page 41 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

develop training programs and curriculum for co- op students at high
schools, vocational technical colleges, and universities was a cost-
effective strategy that enabled depots to hire certified and credentialed
workers to replace retirees. For example, the Warner Robins and Oklahoma
City depots are working primarily with the states of Georgia and Oklahoma
to establish training programs with local community colleges and high
schools so that new hires will be trained and certified as Federal
Aviation Association Aircraft and Power Plant license holders. Each of the
Air Force depots is developing courses to groom the next generation of
leaders and managers. But according to depot planners, much more needs to
be done and where the funding is to come from is unclear. This is
particularly true as the Air Force plans for the potential retirement of
43 to 52 percent of its depot workforce over the next 5 to 7 years.

The other service depots are also experiencing challenges in funding
training as they begin to hire new employees after years of downsizing.
About half of the depots provide new industrial workers with training
through apprentice programs. The Air Force and one Marine Corps center are
using cooperative education programs, because they believe apprenticeship
programs, which take 3 to 4 years to qualify workers for becoming
journeymen- level workers, are too expensive. The Army Materiel Command
estimated that $7. 9 million was needed to sustain

79 apprentices already in the program and to add 50 additional apprentices
for fiscal year 2002, or about $55, 000 for each apprentice. However, the
Command did not receive this level of funding, which caused the Command to
transfer the costs to the depots as a cost of their operations. Army
Materiel Command reported that it has requested additional funding for the
apprentice program to support an average of 184 apprentices each

year for the 7- year period, fiscal years 2003 through 2009. Army depot
officials said that the program was too small in number to significantly
impact future worker needs. In addition, without the Army directly funding
the program costs; customers pay for depot services will increase, which
could lead to a loss of customer support. Two of the five Army maintenance
depots decided that no additional apprentices will be accepted into the
apprenticeship program unless the program can be directly funded.

In confronting the human capital challenge of revitalizing the depot
workforce, the services have the opportunity to develop innovative
training programs that cost less and to identify new funding sources for

training. According to Navy and Air Force officials, centralized training
programs and centralized funding could be considered cost- effective ways
to support depot revitalization. Officials also noted that centralized

Page 42 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

training programs would help ensure consistency in the quality of training
provided to depot workers. Also, centralized funding would be another
source of funding and would provide centralized oversight and
accountability over how the funds are disbursed.

Continued shortfalls in DOD*s strategic planning process, including the
lack of a DOD depot strategic plan and a strategic plan for arsenals and
ammunition facilities have created questions regarding the future of the
72,000 civilians in the depot maintenance, arsenal, and ammunition
manufacturing plant workforce and their ability to support future military
operations. Without a strategic perspective that complements the
department*s overall mission and objectives, the services do not have the
long- term visibility they need to ensure the continued performance of
these important support missions. When this is coupled with DOD*s adoption
of increased contracting of work to the private sector, the future role of
these industrial facilities and their workforce is clearly in doubt. The
situation is compounded by questions regarding DOD*s implementation of the
core maintenance statute, which is an essential feature in defining the
depot workforce of the future. While in some cases the services have made
a start at defining future objectives for the industrial facilities that
are centered around the development of public- private partnerships, it is
unclear how these partnerships should be folded into future industrial
facilities planning. Further, without a departmental approach that has
been approved by the Congress, future depot planning will continue to be
fragmented, inconclusive, and inefficient. Since we have previously
recommended that DOD develop a depot strategic plan, we are not repeating
that recommendation in this report. However, we continue to believe a
depot strategic plan is needed and we will continue to follow DOD*s
progress toward implementing one.

The absence of strategic guidance regarding the future of the DOD
industrial facilities has generally prevented the development of
comprehensive strategic workforce plans that are required for effectively
managing DOD*s 72,000 civilian industrial facilities workers to meet the
challenges of the future. For example, without having long- term
strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining their workforce that
are clearly linked to achieving programmatic goals, the services continued
to downsize these activities without a vision for what capabilities would
be required in the future. The result of downsizing is that the remaining
depot maintenance workforce averages 47 years of age and has skill
imbalances. With workload in some activities continuing to decline and
with

uncertainties about new work for the future, officials in depots,
arsenals, Conclusions

Page 43 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

and ammunition plants are uncertain whether they should plan to replace
retiring workers and about what skills will be needed in the future.
Furthermore, the industrial planners, in their short- term planning, have
followed some but not all of the steps identified by OPM and high
performing organizations, with the naval shipyard community and Air Force
more comprehensive in their workforce planning approaches. However, the
planners, have not, in general, identified competencies, developed
comprehensive retention plans, or evaluated the performance of workforce
planning efforts and taken corrective actions all best practices that
could help depots more effectively meet current and future challenges.

A number of challenges confront DOD*s workforce planning for the
revitalization of this industrial workforce, about 12 percent of which are
eligible to retire in fiscal year 2002 and about 43 percent of which will
be eligible to retire by 2009. First, workforce planning efforts, which
are generally focused on the short- term, do not address the potential
loss of a third to over 40 percent of the depot workforce over a short
period of time, a challenge that could threaten the depots* viability.
Only the Air Force has taken action to ensure the continued viability of
its depots in 2007 and beyond. Secondly, the current occupational series
may not be the best to most efficiently perform required maintenance
operations. Multiskilling, which has been successfully implemented in the
private sector and in some government activities, has flexibilities
unavailable to most government activities. However, depot activities
trying to implement the flexibilities have been confronted by rules that
do not allow providing an additional grade for performing work in
additional skill areas. While the naval aviation community is trying an
approach that would use a bonus rather than additional pay, naval aviation
officials believe the additional flexibilities are still needed. We also
believe that if it proves to be cost- effective, the full option of
providing an additional grade would help ensure the greatest potential for
success. Finally, with the large number of workers eligible to retire by
2009, training requirements and funding for training will increase
significantly for new hires. Further, the need for increased funding for
training will likely drive the need to find new funding sources and to
develop cost- effective training programs. A centralized DOD depot
training program could be a very practicable way to introduce more
innovative and cost- effective approaches to producing and funding the
required training to support depot revitalization, if the department
intends to continue using the depots as an important part of its
industrial base.

Page 44 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

To improve the management and direction of DOD*s strategic planning for
maintenance depots, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness to

 complete the revisions to DOD*s core policy and develop a schedule for
the services to complete the computation of core requirements;  require
the service secretaries and the Commandant of the Marine Corps

to develop revised core capabilities to provide a baseline for defining
workloads that should be performed in government facilities by government
personnel; and  require the service secretaries and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps

to develop, or complete the development of, and implement strategic plans
that are linked to the services* mission and objectives and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense*s depot strategic plan when it is developed and
that delineate industrial workloads to be accomplished in each service*s
depots, other service*s depots, by contractors at their own sites and at
government sites and using partnerships and identify the workforce
requirements to support the performance of this work.

To improve the management and strategic direction of DOD*s strategic
planning for arsenals and ammunition plants, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense require the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to develop a strategic plan that
provides guidance and a schedule for identifying long- term capabilities
to be provided by the private sector, those to be provided in
governmentowned and -operated plants; and those to be provided in
governmentowned and contractor- operated plants.

To improve the quality and comprehensiveness of the services* workforce
planning efforts, we recommend that the Secretaries of the services and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps develop strategic workforce plans that
include improvements in areas identified in this report as being
deficient, such as assessing workforce competencies required for the
current and future workforce; implementing action plans that include
comprehensive retention plans; and establishing performance metrics to use
in evaluating workforce planning efforts and a mechanism for performing
assessments of prior workforce planning efforts. The strategic workforce
plans should be linked to DOD*s strategic plan for depot maintenance and
the strategic plan for arsenals and ammunition plants when they are
developed. Recommendations for

Executive Action

Page 45 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

To improve DOD*s strategic workforce planning to ensure the viability of
its depot maintenance workforce, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense require the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, in coordination with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, to coordinate the implementation of an
initiative to

 provide guidance for developing workforce revitalization strategies and
strategic plans to address expected depot attrition over the next 5 to 7
years;  provide options for incorporating multiskilling into depot
workforce

planning initiatives; and  implement a working group to explore options
for innovative and costeffective training and to explore appropriate
funding alternatives, to

include centralized funding, to revitalize the depot workforce. Given the
difficulties the Department of Defense is having implementing
multiskilling and its potential for improving the flexibility and
productivity of the department*s maintenance workforce, we recommend that
the

Secretary of Defense require the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness to implement a demonstration project that would give the
military depots the flexibility to provide additional compensation for
multiskilled depot workers when the services have demonstrated by a cost-
benefit analysis the benefits of such a program. The Department of Defense
reviewed a draft of this report and provided

oral comments from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness. The department concurred with seven of our nine
recommendations dealing with the need for completion of the identification
of core depot maintenance requirements and capabilities and for improved
strategic planning and workforce planning for depots, arsenals, and
ammunition plants. The department did not concur with our recommendation
to implement a working group to explore (1) options for innovative and
cost- effective training and (2) appropriate funding alternatives to help
revitalize the depot workforce. Also, the department did not concur with
our recommendation to implement a demonstration project for multiskilling.

The department*s comments noted that the importance of human capital
strategic planning was clearly recognized in the Quadrennial Defense
Review, is the first item on the President*s Management Agenda, and is a
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Page 46 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

top priority for the department. Further, in early 2003, the department
published its FY 2003 Year of Execution Plan as an Annex to the integrated
DOD Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan, and focuses on seven goals

to direct and improve all aspects of human capital strategic planning. We
recognize that the high- level strategic planning efforts undertaken by
the department are a necessary first step, but we also believe that much
more needs to be done to assure that successively lower levels of
organizations and activities accomplish complementary human capital
planning that

addresses specific issues that may be of concern for a given subset of the
department*s population, such as for the workers in the department*s
industrial activities.

DOD agreed with our recommendation that the department complete revisions
to DOD*s core policy and our recommendation to develop revised core
capabilities that provide a baseline for defining workloads that should be
performed in government facilities by government personnel. Officials
noted that the department is finalizing required changes to its revised
methodology and, upon completion, will task the military services with
computing their depot maintenance core requirements. Regarding our
recommendation, to develop depot strategic plans that are linked to the
services* mission and objectives and to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense*s depot strategic plan when it is completed, DOD officials
concurred, noting that in some cases it may be more practical to include
these plans as part of a logistics or systems command strategic plan. DOD
agreed with our recommendation to develop a strategic plan that provides
guidance and a schedule for identifying long- term capabilities for
arsenals and ammunition plants. DOD also agreed with our recommendation to
improve the quality and comprehensiveness of the services* workforce
planning efforts. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to
provide guidance for developing workforce revitalization strategies and
strategic plans to address expected depot attrition over the next 5 to 7
years. Officials said that the department developed the DOD Civilian Human
Resources Strategic Plan 2002- 2008 to ensure a DOD- wide civilian
workforce capable of responding rapidly, efficiently, and effectively to
mission requirements. However, they agreed that a near- term strategic
plan is needed at the depot level. We do not believe that the human
resources strategic plan cited in DOD*s response provides the required
guidance for developing workforce revitalization strategies and strategic
plans and supporting the other issues we noted in our recommendation
because it is at a higher level and does not address issues that need to
be dealt with for this work force group, such as how to provide affordable
technical training for large numbers of blue- collar workers.
Additionally, to be

Page 47 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

useful in supporting revitalization of the depot workforce, a depot
strategic plan should address long- term as well as near- term
requirements.

Regarding our recommendation that the department develop options for
incorporating multiskilling into depot workforce planning initiatives, the
department concurred, stating that its proposed National Security
Personnel System will provide personnel flexibilities designed to address
multiskilling requirements. However, the National Security Personnel
System is a proposed change to the current personnel system that DOD has
requested the Congress to consider as a part of a large and diverse DOD
transformation legislative proposal. Because the Congress has not yet
acted on the department*s transformation proposal, we believe that it is
premature to assume that Congress will approve this new personnel system.
We continue to believe that whether or not the new personnel system is
approved, the depots need options for incorporating multiskilling into
depot workforce planning initiatives.

DOD nonconcurred with our recommendation to implement a working group to
explore (1) options for innovative and cost- effective training and (2)
appropriate funding alternatives to help revitalize the depot workforce.

The department stated that a working group is not necessary to explore
options already offered by new authorities and flexibilities in the
proposed National Security Personnel System. Because the proposed new
personnel system has not yet been considered by the Congress, we believe
that is premature to assume that it will be implemented, and we continue
to believe that a working group*s exploration of options would benefit
depot workforce revitalization. DOD also nonconcurred with our
recommendation regarding the

implementation of a demonstration project that would give the military
depots the flexibility to provide additional compensation for multiskilled
depot workers when the services have demonstrated by a cost- benefit
analysis the benefits of such a program. Again, the department*s response
assumes the flexibilities and authorities expected from the proposed
National Security Personnel System will cover the problems multiskilling
is intended to address. As with our comments on the prior recommendations,
we believe that this response is premature and that independent action
should be taken to implement the recommendation.

The department provided technical comments that have been incorporated
when appropriate.

Page 48 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine
Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will

be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. If
you or your staff have questions regarding this report, please contact me
on (202) 512- 5559 or stewartd@ gao. gov or Julia Denman at (202) 512-
4290 or denmanj@ gao. gov. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix V. Derek B. Stewart Director Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 49 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce
Planning

To determine the extent to which the Office of the Secretary of Defense
has implemented our prior recommendation to develop and implement a
strategic plan for depot maintenance, we interviewed officials and
reviewed the Government Performance and Results Act to identify guidance
on developing strategic plans and various laws providing guidance on the
role of DOD depots.

To determine the extent to which the services have developed and
implemented strategic workforce plans to position the civilian depot
workforce to meet future requirements, we interviewed officials and
obtained and reviewed

 DOD*s Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan 2002- 2008 and the
services* strategic plans for depot maintenance where available to
identify human capital goals, visions, and objectives and  services* and
depots* workforce plans (including recruiting/ hiring plans,

training plans, succession plans, and retention plans) to determine
whether they had a strategic/ long- term perspective or a short- term
focus that was oriented toward the budget process.

In analyzing the extent to which these workforce plans positioned the
civilian depot workforce to meet future mission requirements, we compared
the elements of the depots* workforce plans to applicable workforce
planning documents and guidance issued by the OPM, the GAO, the National
Academy of Public Administration, and other federal and state government
agencies. Based on our analyses, we identified efforts underway that
addressed aspects of these elements.

Additionally, we analyzed the services*  civilian depot workforce skills
and competency assessments to determine

whether they had identified the skills and competencies needed to address
current and future workforce requirements,  civilian depot workforce
retention plans to determine whether they had

the factors identified by current research as being critical to enhancing
the retention necessary for the construction of a high- performance
organization, and  assessments of workforce plans to determine whether
they included

performance measures that evaluated the effectiveness of their workforce
plans. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 50 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce
Planning

Moreover, because OPM had identified the elements that should be included
in a comprehensive retention plan, we compared those elements to those
found in the services* retention plans. We did not do this type of

comparison for the services* recruiting/ hiring, training, and succession
plans because OPM did not identify comprehensive plans for these elements
of workforce plans.

To determine what challenges adversely affect DOD*s strategic planning for
the viability of its civilian depot workforce, we interviewed officials
and obtained, reviewed, and analyzed documentation to identify the types
of challenges that might impact planning for the viability of the civilian
depot workforce. In doing so, we also determined

 civilian depot workforce retirement eligibility and whether the services
will have difficulties replacing an aging workforce if large numbers of
eligible retirees retire over the next 5 to 7 years,  the total weighted
average age based on the civilian staffing at each

industrial facility,  whether the services are having difficulties
implementing the multiskilling

concept to improve worker efficiency and productivity, and  whether
increased funding will be needed to address increased training

requirements. During this review, we visited and obtained information from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army, Air Force, Navy, and
Marine Corps headquarters, all in the Washington, D. C., area;
Headquarters, Army Materiel Command in Alexandria, Virginia; and 5
subordinate Army commands* the Army Aviation and Missile Command,
Huntsville, Alabama; Communications- Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth,
New Jersey; the Tank- automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Michigan;
Operations Support Command (now the Joint Munitions Command), Rock Island,
Illinois; and the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Maryland. Additionally, we visited the following depots
and activities:

 Army: Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama; Corpus Christi Army Depot,
Corpus Christi, Texas; Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania;
Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas; Tobyhanna Army Depot, Tobyhanna,
Pennsylvania; Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, Illinois; Watervliet
Arsenal, Watervliet, New York; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, Arkansas;
Crane Army Ammunition Activity, Crane, Indiana; and McAlester Army
Ammunition Plant, McAlester, Oklahoma.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 51 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce
Planning

 Air Force: Air Force Materiel Command, Wright- Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio; Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center, Tucson, Arizona;
Directorate of Maintenance, Ogden, Utah; Directorate of Maintenance,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Directorate of Maintenance, Warner Robins,
Georgia; and the Joint Depot Maintenance and Activities Group, Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.  Navy: Naval Air Systems Command,
Patuxent River, Maryland; Naval

Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Aviation Depot,
Jacksonville, Florida; and Naval Aviation Depot North Island, San Diego,
California;  Navy: Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D. C.; Norfolk
Naval

Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia; Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New
Hampshire; and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington.  Navy:
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, Charleston, South

Carolina.  Marine Corps: Marine Corps Materiel Command, Albany, Georgia;
Marine

Corps Logistics Bases Albany, Georgia; Marine Corps Logistics Bases
Barstow, California; Marine Corps Maintenance Center, Albany, Georgia; and
the Marine Corps Maintenance Center, Barstow, California.

Additionally, we received written responses to audit questions from the
following activities: Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate
Maintenance Facility, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Center San Diego, California; Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane
Division, Crane, Indiana; and Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport
Division, Keyport, Washington.

We conducted our review from October 2001 to March 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Fiscal Year 2002 Services* Depots

Page 52 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Depots Principal work Number of civilian depot

employees per location Army Army depots Anniston Army Depot

Anniston, Alabama The depot performs maintenance on heavy and light-
tracked combat vehicles

and components and is the designated center of technical excellence for
the M1 Abrams tank.

2,429 Corpus Christi Army Depot Corpus Christi, Texas

As the Army*s only aviation facility, the depot overhauls and repairs DOD
rotary wing aircraft and components, such as the AH- 64 Apache, CH- 47
Chinook, and the UH- 60 Blackhawk.

2,869 Letterkenny Army Depot Chambersburg, Pennsylvania

This depot provides repair and overhaul support for air defense and
tactical missiles such as the Patriot, Hawk, Avenger, Multiple Launch
Rocket System, and Sidewinder.

1,082 Red River Army Depot Texarkana, Texas

For combat and tactical systems, the depot supports systems such as the
Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Multiple Launch Rocket System, and vehicles for
the Patriot and Hawk missiles.

1,478 Tobyhanna Army Depot Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania

From handheld radios to satellite communication, the depot provides repair
and overhaul support for hundreds of communications and electronic
systems. 2,237

Army arsenals Rock Island Arsenal Rock Island, Illinois

The arsenal is primarily a metal manufacturing facility with foundry,
forging, machining, finishing, and fabricating capabilities. It produces
tank and artillery components such as gun mounts and recoil mechanisms,
spare parts, and other equipment. It also fabricates and/ or assembles
tool sets ranging from carrying case- sized sets to fully equipped
shelters.

1,156 Watervliet Arsenal Watervliet, New York

This arsenal is a metal manufacturing facility whose capabilities include
forging, casting, machining, heat- treating, plating, and fabrication. Its
primary products are cannons* such as the large gun tubes for tanks and
howitzers* and mortars.

484 Pine Bluff Arsenal Pine Bluff, Arkansas

The facility produces, renovates, and stores smoke, riot control, and
incendiary ammunitions such as red and white phosphorus. Also, it
manufactures and refurbishes chemical and biological defense equipment.

804

Army ammunition plants Crane Army Ammunition Activity Crane, Indiana The
plant produces, renovates, stores, and demilitarizes conventional

ammunition. Its products include the Navy*s 5- inch projectile, bombs,
missile warheads, pyrotechnic munitions, and plastic explosives.

620 McAlester Army Ammunition Plant McAlester, Oklahoma

The plant produces, renovates, stores, and demilitarizes conventional and
missile ammunition. Its products include bombs* ranging from 500 to 5,000
pounds, missile warheads, rockets, and plastic explosives. 1,075

Total Army 14,234

Appendix II: Fiscal Year 2002 Services* Depots

Appendix II: Fiscal Year 2002 Services* Depots

Page 53 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Depots Principal work Number of civilian depot

employees per location Navy Naval Aviation Depots Naval Aviation Depot,

Cherry Point North Carolina The depot performs standard depot- level
maintenance and periodic

maintenance, modifications, and in- service repairs for crash and battle
damages for helicopters and engines. The depot performs maintenance on
aircraft such as the AV- 8, H- 53, and H- 46. It also repairs such
components as

jet fuel starters and auxiliary power units. 3,839

Naval Aviation Depot Jacksonville, Florida

The depot serves as a production center concentrating on repair and
modification of patrol aircraft, fighter aircraft, attack aircraft,
electronic countermeasures, engines, and associated components. The depot
performs maintenance on aircraft such as the P- 3, F- 14 and SH- 60. Also,
the depot repairs components such as electro- optics, electronic warfare,
and

antisubmarine warfare systems. 3,928

Naval Aviation Depot North Island San Diego, California

The depot serves as the production center concentrating on repair and
modification of miscellaneous aircraft and associated components. The
depot performs maintenance on the following aircraft systems: E- 2
Hawkeye, C- 2 Greyhound, and F/ A 18 Hornet. It also provides engineering,
logistics, and calibration services.

3,138

Naval shipyards Norfolk Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Virginia This shipyard
is the East Coast*s largest facility for surface ship, aircraft

carrier, and submarine overhauls, maintenance and modernization. It also
repairs, overhauls, dry docks, converts, modernizes, and inactivates
ships. Also, the shipyard can perform any technical, fabrication,
manufacturing, and

engineering work required by its customers on site or through
rapiddeployment of special teams to ships and facilities anywhere in the
world.

7,525 Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii

This shipyard is the largest ship repair facility between the West Coast
and Far East, and it is responsible for ship maintenance, modernization,
and nuclear ship recycling. Also, the shipyard provides such services as
reactor plant servicing, nuclear propulsion plant work, and ship
maintenance training.

3,987 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, New Hampshire The shipyard
performs nuclear submarine overhauls, refuelings,

modernizations, and repairs. Also, it provides nuclear maintenance
engineering and planning for the Los Angeles class submarines.

3,500 Puget Sound Naval Shipyard Bremerton, Washington

The shipyard overhauls and repairs all types and sizes of Navy ships.
Also, the shipyard provides other services such as nuclear propulsion
work, reactor compartment disposal, nuclear- powered ship recycling, and
emergent fleet support.

8,608

Naval Warfare Centers Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division Crane,
Indiana The overall center provides acquisition, engineering, logistics,
and maintenance for the fleet*s weapons and electronic systems, ordnance,
and associated equipment components. The majority of its depot maintenance
is in electronic warfare systems, engineering and industrial base support,

electronic module test and repair, microwave components, and radar
systems. 311

Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport Division Keyport, Washington

The overall center provides test and evaluation, in- service engineering,
maintenance and repair, fleet support, and industrial base support for
designated systems. The largest depot workload is the torpedo program.
Also, the depot operates and maintains shops that accomplish mechanical,
electrical and electronic production, and assembly of complex undersea
warfare equipment.

608

Appendix II: Fiscal Year 2002 Services* Depots

Page 54 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Depots Principal work Number of civilian depot

employees per location Space and Naval Warfare Systems Centers Space and
Naval Warfare

Systems Center Charleston Charleston, South Carolina Depot operations,
managed at the division level, provide engineering analysis

and design, hardware/ software development, and integration. Also the
depot operations include repair, fabrication, installation, and logistics
products and services to DOD and federal government sponsors.

49 Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego San Diego, California

The depot operation at the center provides engineering, management, life
cycle support, test, restoration, assessments, and prototype modeling. The
depot operations also include facilities that enable it to serve as a
designated overall point and repair facility for reparables (i. e.,
assemblies, modules, and printed circuit boards drawn from various types
of equipment).

70

Total Navy 35,563 Marine Corps Maintenance Center Albany, Georgia

The depot has multicommodity capability to support overhauls, repairs, and
upgrades for weapons systems such as the Amphibious Assault Vehicle, M1A1
Tank, M198 Howitzer, AN TPS 63 Radar, small arms, and communications-
electronics equipment.

659 Maintenance Center Barstow, California

The depot has multicommodity capability to support overhauls, repairs, and
upgrades for weapons systems such as the Amphibious Assault Vehicle, M1A1
Tank, M198 Howitzer, AN TPS 63 Radar, small arms, and communications-
electronics equipment.

664

Total Marine Corps 1,323 Air Force Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration
Center Tucson, Arizona

The center provides for the storage, regeneration, reclamation, and
disposal of aircraft and related aerospace items such as tooling, pylons,
and engines. 439

Directorate of Maintenance, Ogden Air Logistics Center, Utah

It provides worldwide engineering and logistics management for the F- 16
and maintains the C- 130 aircraft. The center produces more than 250
aircraft and 16,800 avionics and structural components annually. In
addition, the center is responsible for logistical support of the nation*s
fleet of strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles, including the
Minuteman and Peacekeeper missiles. It also overhauls and repairs landing
gear, wheels and brakes, rocket motors, photonic equipment, avionics,
hydraulics, and software.

5,852 Directorate of Maintenance, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center,
Oklahoma

The center is the worldwide manager for a wide range of aircraft, engines,
missile, and commodity items, aided by some of the most sophisticated
technical repair and manufacturing processes in the world. The center
manages an inventory of 2,267 aircraft, which include the B- 1, B- 2, B-
52, KC- 10, C/ KC- 135, E- 3, and about 25 other contractor logistics
support aircraft.

8,533 Directorate of Maintenance, Warner Robins, Air Logistics Center,
Georgia

This activity is the cargo/ transport technology repair center for the Air
Force. It has worldwide management and engineering responsibilities for
the repair, modification, and overhaul of the C- 130, C- 141, C- 5, as
well as F- 15, U- 2,

all Air Force helicopters, and all special operations aircraft and their
avionics systems. 6,328

Total Air Force 21,152 Total 72,272 Source: DOD (data) and GAO
(presentation).

Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots* Short- Term Workforce Plans

Page 55 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots* Short- Term Workforce Plans

Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots* Short- Term Workforce Plans

Page 56 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots* Short- Term Workforce Plans

Page 57 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots* Short- Term Workforce Plans

Page 58 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots* Short- Term Workforce Plans

Page 59 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots* Short- Term Workforce Plans

Page 60 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots* Short- Term Workforce Plans

Page 61 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots* Short- Term Workforce Plans

Page 62 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots* Short- Term Workforce Plans

Page 63 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Appendix IV: GAO Staff Acknowledgments Page 64 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot
Workforce Planning

Carleen Bennett, Johnetta Gatlin- Brown, Thomas W. Gilliam, M. Jane Hunt,
Steve Hunter, Jeanett Reid, Jose Watkins, and Bobby Worrell made
significant contributions to this report. Appendix IV: GAO Staff
Acknowledgments Acknowledgments

Related GAO Products Page 65 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Depot Maintenance: Public- Private Partnerships Have Increased but Long-
Term Growth and Results Are Uncertain. GAO- 03- 423. Washington, D. C.:
April 10, 2003.

Human Capital: Building on the Current Momentum to Address High- Risk
Issues. GAO- 03- 637T. Washington, D. C.: April 8, 2003.

DOD Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Strengthen Civilian Human Capital
Strategic Planning and Integration with Military Personnel and Sourcing
Decisions. GAO- 03- 475. Washington, D. C.: March 28, 2003.

High- Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO- 03- 120.
Washington, D. C.: January 2003.

High- Risk Series: An Update. GAO- 03- 119. Washington, D. C.: January
2003.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense. GAO-
03- 98. Washington, D. C.: January 2003.

Human Capital: Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies in
Managing Their Workforces. GAO- 03- 2. Washington, D. C.: December 6,
2002.

Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help Maintain Momentum of
DOD*s Strategic Human Capital Planning. GAO- 03- 237. Washington, D. C.:
December 5, 2002. Depot Maintenance: Change in Reporting Practices and
Requirements

Could Enhance Congressional Oversight. GAO- 03- 16. Washington, D. C.:
October 18, 2002.

HUD Human Capital Management: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce Planning
Needed. GAO- 02- 839. Washington, D. C.: July 24, 2002.

Managing for Results: Using Strategic Human Capital Management to Drive
Transformational Change. GAO- 02- 940T. Washington, D. C.: July 15, 2002.
Exposure Draft: A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management.

GAO- 02- 373SP. Washington, D. C.: March 15, 2002. Related GAO Products

Related GAO Products Page 66 GAO- 03- 472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning

Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and
Proficiency Shortfalls. GAO- 02- 375. Washington, D. C.: January 31, 2002.

Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Overcome Capability Gaps in the
Public Depot System. GAO- 02- 105. Washington, D. C.: October 12, 2001.

Human Capital: Implementing an Effective Workforce Strategy Would Help EPA
to Achieve Its Strategic Goals. GAO- 01- 812. Washington, D. C.: July 31,
2001. Defense Logistics: Strategic Planning Weaknesses Leave Economy,

Efficiency, and Effectiveness of Future Support Systems at Risk. GAO- 02-
106. Washington, D. C.: October 11, 2000.

Human Capital: A Self- Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders.

GAO/ OCG- 00- 14G. Washington, D. C.: September 2000 Version 1.

Human Capital: Managing Human Capital in the 21 st Century.

GAO/ T- GGD- 00- 77. Washington, D. C.: March 9, 2000.

Human Capital: Strategic Approach Should Guide DOD Civilian Workforce
Management. GAO/ T- GGD/ NSIAD- 00- 120. Washington, D. C.: March 9, 2000.
Army Industrial Facilities: Workforce Requirements and Related Issues

Affecting Depots and Arsenals. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 31. Washington, D. C.:
November 30, 1998.

Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD Shifting More Workload for New Weapon
Systems to the Private Sector. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 8. Washington, D. C.: March
31, 1998.

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