Workplace Safety and Health: OSHA Can Strengthen Enforcement	 
through Improved Program Management (22-NOV-02, GAO-03-45).	 
                                                                 
The United States has made great progress in improving working	 
conditions since the construction of the Empire State Building.  
Yet, since the early 1990s, over 50,000 workers have died from	 
work-related accidents and millions experience work-related	 
injuries or illnesses each year. The Occupational Safety and	 
Health Administration (OSHA) is the primary federal agency	 
responsible for protecting workplace safety and health. GAO was  
asked to assess how well OSHA was able to target its enforcement 
resources on hazardous worksites, measure its accomplishments,	 
and ensure inspection staff quality.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-45						        
    ACCNO:   A05572						        
  TITLE:     Workplace Safety and Health: OSHA Can Strengthen	      
Enforcement through Improved Program Management 		 
     DATE:   11/22/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Health hazards					 
	     Industrial accidents				 
	     Inspection 					 
	     Occupational health and safety programs		 
	     Occupational safety				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Safety regulation					 
	     Employment or training programs			 
	     Accident prevention				 
	     OSHA Integrated Management Information		 
	     System						 
                                                                 
	     OSHA National Emphasis Program			 
	     OSHA Local Emphasis Program			 

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GAO-03-45

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, Committee
on Education and the Workforce, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

November 2002 WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH

OSHA Can Strengthen Enforcement through Improved Program Management

GAO- 03- 45

OSHA has taken important steps toward targeting its enforcement resources
on hazardous worksites, measure its accomplishments, and enhance the
professionalism of its staff. However, these systems could be strengthened
by better information and mechanisms that would make targeting efforts
more efficient, measurement more precise, and training efforts more
effective.

OSHA*s targeting processes have not fully ensured that it identifies
hazardous worksites for priority inspection because its worksite-
targeting programs lack the necessary data to effectively identify high-
hazard worksites or those with hazards under OSHA*s jurisdiction. Also,
OSHA*s measurement efforts did not accurately demonstrate its impact on
workplace safety and health because, for example, it used national data on
injuries and illnesses to measure its progress in achieving strategic
goals even though only 31 states are covered by these goals. Finally,
OSHA*s efforts to enhance the quality of its inspection workforce have the
potential to improve enforcement, but the anticipated outcomes could be
jeopardized by a lack of necessary mechanisms, such as a training
directive that reflects current plans, or a comprehensive database that
tracks training or skills obtained by inspection staff.

Hine, Lewis W., Photographs of the Empire State Building under
Construction, 1931. 91PH056.063: A worker hanging onto two steel beams

Source: Photography Collection, Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art,
Prints and Photographs, The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox, and
Tilden Foundations. WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH

OSHA Can Strengthen Enforcement Through Improved Program Management

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 45. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Robert E. Robertson at (202) 512- 7215 or robertsonr@
gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 45, a report to the

Chairman, Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, Committee on Education
and the Workforce, House of Representatives

November 2002

The United States has made great progress in improving working conditions
since the construction of the Empire State Building. (See graphic.) Yet,
since the early 1990s, over 50, 000 workers have died from work- related
accidents and millions experience workrelated injuries or illnesses each
year. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is the
primary federal agency responsible for protecting workplace safety and
health. GAO was asked to assess how well OSHA was able to target its
enforcement resources on hazardous worksites, measure its accomplishments,
and ensure inspection staff quality.

GAO recommends ways that OSHA can get the most out of its targeting
programs, enhance its ability to measure its impact, and help ensure long-
term success of its efforts to enhance inspector quality.

While OSHA expressed concerns about some of the material in the report, it
generally agreed to act on our recommendations.

Page i GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Background 4 OSHA*s Targeting Procedures May Not
Effectively Identify

Hazardous Worksites for Inspection 9 OSHA*s Measurement Efforts Have Not
Accurately Demonstrated

Its Impact 13 OSHA*s Efforts to Enhance Inspector Quality Have Potential
to

Improve Enforcement, but Anticipated Outcomes Could Be Jeopardized 16
Conclusions 20 Recommendations for Executive Action 21 Agency Comments and
Our Evaluation 22

Appendix I Training Databases Used by OSHA*s Regional and Area Offices 24

Appendix II Comments from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration 25

GAO Comments 31

Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 34 GAO Contacts 34
Staff Acknowledgments 34

Tables

Table 1: OSHA*s 3- by- 5 Strategic Plan Impact Goals (1997 to 2002) 6
Table 2: OSHA*s Procedures for Identifying Industries, Hazards, or

Worksites to Target 7 Table 3: Training Databases Used By OSHA Regional
and Area

Offices 24

Figure

Figure 1: Injury and Illness Rates for 3- by- 5 Industries, 1993- 2000 15
Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health Abbreviations

BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
of 1993 IDP individual development plans IMIS Integrated Management
Information System LEP Local Emphasis Program NEP National Emphasis
Program ODI OSHA Data Initiative OSHA Occupational Safety and Health
Administration OTI OSHA Training Institute SST site- specific targeting

Page 1 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

November 22, 2002 The Honorable Charlie Norwood Chairman, Subcommittee on
Workforce Protections Committee on Education and the Workforce House of
Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman: Since the early 1990s, over 50,000 U. S. workers have
lost their lives in workplace accidents. Although workplace fatality and
injury rates have improved significantly over the last decade, the
Department of Labor*s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
continues to strive to reduce work- related injuries, illnesses, and
fatalities for the country*s 120 million workers. In carrying out this
mission, OSHA faces a number of challenges. As with many other
organizations, OSHA seeks to ensure that it (1) focuses its limited
resources on those workplaces most likely to cause worker injury, illness,
or death; (2) shows that its efforts make worksites safer; and (3) has a
highly trained workforce capable of carrying out its mission effectively.
OSHA*s efforts to address these challenges are made more difficult by the
fact that it shares responsibility for workplace safety and health with
numerous other entities. For example, while OSHA enforces safety and
health regulations in 31 *federal OSHA states,* it has delegated its
enforcement authority to protect workplace safety and health to 23 *state-
plan states,* where state agencies have assumed responsibility for
establishing their own goals and enforcing safety and health regulations.
1

As agreed with your office, we assessed the extent to which (1) OSHA*s
worksite- specific targeting processes ensure that OSHA effectively
identifies hazardous worksites, (2) the agency*s measurement efforts allow
it to accurately demonstrate its impact on workplace safety, and (3) its
human capital efforts to enhance inspector quality are likely to improve

1 Both *federal OSHA states* and *state plan states* include
jurisdictions, such as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. For this
review, we included Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York as federal OSHA
states. Although these states have been delegated authority for public
sector workers, OSHA maintains responsibility for private sector workers
in these states.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

enforcement. Our work focused on the inspection and enforcement activities
within the federal OSHA states.

To address the first two objectives, we identified the procedures and data
OSHA used to develop its targets and measure its results. We then obtained
and analyzed relevant historical data from (1) the Department of Labor*s
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on workplace injuries, illnesses, and
fatalities; 2 (2) OSHA*s integrated management information system (IMIS)
inspection database, which compiles activity information on worksite
inspections conducted by OSHA; and (3) the OSHA data initiative (ODI)
database, through which OSHA targets specific worksites for priority
inspection. We also reviewed with experts OSHA*s procedures and methods to
measure its efforts on workplace safety and health. For the third
objective, we reviewed OSHA*s recent efforts to restructure its local
offices. We also reviewed its plans for providing training to its
inspection staff and assessed whether OSHA has in place the policy
directives and database systems needed to ensure the success of these
efforts. 3 We obtained OSHA personnel*s views on these efforts through
interviews with officials at 9 of the 10 OSHA regional offices and 17 of
OSHA*s 85 area offices. 4 For all objectives, we interviewed OSHA and
other Department of Labor officials. We conducted our work in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards between December
2001 and October 2002.

OSHA*s targeting processes have not fully ensured that it effectively
identifies hazardous worksites for priority inspection. Specifically,
OSHA*s efforts to target worksites in the construction industry rely on a
database that does not permit OSHA to accurately identify smaller
worksites for inspection. Consequently, OSHA*s area offices tend to select
larger

2 Throughout this report, we use nonfatal injury and illness *rates,*
which represent the number of work- related nonfatal injuries and
illnesses per 100 workers. 3 OSHA has not yet developed an overall human
capital strategic plan that these efforts would fit into. OSHA*s overall
human capital planning efforts were outside the scope of our review.

4 We did not contact OSHA*s regional office in San Francisco because it
has only state- plan states within its jurisdiction. State- plan states
are not governed by OSHA*s human capital policies and procedures. We
selected the 17 area offices to reflect a mix of characteristics,
including size of office, the level of employment within the geographic
area covered by the office, the average length of service time for the
staff in each office, and whether the office obtained a best practices
designation from OSHA. Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

construction worksites to visit, which experts and several OSHA officials
believe are generally safer than the smaller worksites. OSHA is currently
studying ways to improve construction targeting. In the meantime, some of
OSHA*s local offices are targeting small construction sites on their own.
Also, OSHA*s efforts to target high- hazard worksites across other
industries rely on employer- provided information that may be unsuitable
for accurate targeting. In about 50 percent of the worksites identified,
inspectors were unable to conduct inspections or did not find any serious
violations. Officials from OSHA*s regional and area offices we interviewed
expressed concern about the ability of this program to efficiently target
hazardous worksites.

Several weaknesses in OSHA*s measurement efforts have affected its ability
to accurately demonstrate its impact on workplace safety, a difficult, but
nonetheless important activity. First, OSHA relied on national injury and
illness statistics compiled by BLS to measure progress toward strategic
plan goals, despite the fact that OSHA*s strategic plan only covers the 31
federal OSHA states. OSHA has not made use of BLS data that would allow it
to look at injury and illness rates for these 31 states combined, although
BLS says it could make the data available at reasonable cost. Second, the
methods OSHA used to measure progress toward its strategic goals
potentially misstated its accomplishments. For example, the way it
measured declines in injury and illness rates included declines that
occurred before its strategic plan was implemented. Finally, when
assessing its impact, OSHA did not fully account for many relevant factors
outside its control that may have affected changes. For example, in
reporting that it exceeded goals for reducing fatalities in the
construction industry, OSHA did not acknowledge that some portion of these
fatalities might have been due to hazards under the authority of others,
such as the Department of Transportation. As a result, reductions in such
fatalities would have no direct relationship to OSHA*s efforts.

OSHA*s efforts to enhance the quality of its inspection workforce can
possibly improve enforcement, but anticipated outcomes could be
jeopardized by several factors. OSHA has restructured its local offices
into multidisciplinary teams (i. e., teams comprised of safety inspectors
and health inspectors), with team leaders responsible for overseeing the
work of those teams. While this change has fostered greater collaboration
between safety and health inspectors, the creation of these teams has, in
some locations, led to insufficient internal controls in the supervisory
review process. For example, in some cases where team leaders are safety
inspectors, they may lack the expertise needed to review case files that
support health inspectors* citations. This practice could lead to

Page 4 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

inconsistency in citations or citations being made without the proper
justification. In addition, while OSHA*s plans to upgrade the training
provided to its inspection force have promise, OSHA faces two primary
obstacles to success. First, OSHA*s training directive does not reflect
the agency*s current training plans, so there is no assurance that its
current training plans will have organizational support over the long
term. Second, OSHA lacked the necessary data to assess whether training
contributes to agency performance because it did not use a single,
comprehensive database to efficiently track the training and skills
obtained by its inspection force.

We are recommending that OSHA strengthen management of its enforcement
activities by improving targeting and measurement procedures and by
helping ensure the long- term success of the agency*s efforts to enhance
inspector quality. While OSHA expressed concerns about some of the
material in this report, it generally agreed to act on our
recommendations.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act states that it is congressional
policy to *assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions . . .* 5 In fiscal year 2002,
OSHA pursued this mandate with about $443 million and 2,316 employees,
including 1,123 inspectors. 6 Despite this broad mandate, OSHA does not
have complete authority over all worksites in this country. For example,
through the appropriations process, Congress has placed restrictions on
OSHA*s enforcement activities regarding small farming operations and small
employers in low hazard industries. Also, pursuant to the act, OSHA has
delegated federal enforcement responsibility to 23 state and territorial
governments that carry out their own programs. 7 OSHA has provided half
the funding for these programs to state- plan states, which must have
program standards that are *at least as effective* as the federal program.
In other cases, federal agencies other than OSHA have jurisdiction over

5 29 U. S. C. 651( b). 6 These include safety inspectors, who seek to
prevent workplace- related accidents resulting from unsafe machinery or
procedures; and health inspectors, who seek to prevent illnesses resulting
from toxic exposures.

7 29 U. S. C. 667. Delegations of authority occur only after a state or
territory submits a plan that is determined to be consistent with the
requirements of this section. Background

Page 5 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

particular workplaces or hazards. 8 For example, the Department of Labor*s
Mine Safety and Health Administration is responsible for ensuring the
safety of mining worksites, while transportation- related hazards are
generally within the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation.

OSHA also relies on BLS to provide it with data on injuries, illnesses,
and fatalities. Since 1992, BLS has surveyed a sample of approximately
180,000 employers and asked them to report information on the number of
workrelated injuries and illnesses occurring at their worksites. This
information comes from injury and illness records that private industry
employers are required to maintain. From this information, BLS calculates
injury and illness rates. BLS identifies fatalities from a census of all
50 states, the District of Columbia, and New York City, which report on
all work- related fatalities within their jurisdictions. BLS requires the
reporting entities to corroborate reports on fatalities by obtaining
multiple sources of information, such as OSHA fatality information, death
certificates, medical examiners* reports, media reports, and workers*
compensation documents. BLS makes injury, illness, and fatality data
available at the national as well as at the state level.

To ensure that it makes the best use of its resources, OSHA, like other
federal agencies, established strategic goals that drive agency efforts
and has begun to measure the attainment of those goals. 9 In OSHA*s 1997-
2002 strategic plan, it identified an overarching goal to *[ i] mprove
workplace safety and health for all workers, as evidenced by fewer
hazards, reduced exposures, and fewer injuries, illnesses, and
fatalities.* OSHA characterized this overarching goal as the cornerstone
of its enforcement program. 10 According to OSHA, it planned on *focusing
. . . [a] gency resources on the most prevalent types of workplace
injuries and illnesses, the most hazardous industries, and the most
hazardous workplaces.* OSHA identified specific areas that it believed
were the most hazardous and by which OSHA would measure its progress.
These specific areas, as

8 See our January 31, 2000, report, U. S. General Accounting Office,
Occupational Safety and Health: Federal Agencies Identified as Promoting
Workplace Safety and Health,

GAO/ HEHS- 00- 45R (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 31, 2000), which states that
OSHA works with 14 other federal agencies that have limited jurisdiction
over workplace safety and health.

9 These efforts were primarily driven by the enactment of the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). OSHA reported its goals for
1997- 2002 separately but reported on their attainment as part of the
overall efforts of the Department of Labor.

10 OSHA*s strategic plan includes a variety of goals, many of which
specify the activities that the agency will pursue.

Page 6 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

shown in table 1, focused on three hazards and five industries or industry
sectors (which are subsets of larger industries), and are known as OSHA*s
*3- by- 5 goals.* OSHA also identified a goal to reduce fatalities in the
construction industry by 15 percent and reduce injuries and illnesses by
20 percent in 100,000 workplaces where OSHA initiates an intervention.

Table 1: OSHA*s 3- by- 5 Strategic Plan Impact Goals (1997 to 2002) Goal
Targeted areas

Hazards

 Amputations

 Exposure to lead Reduce three of the most prevalent types of

workplace injuries and causes of illnesses by 15 percent in selected
industries and occupations.

 Exposure to silica

Industries or industry sectors

 Construction industry

 Food processing

 Logging

 Nursing homes Reduce injuries and illnesses by 15 percent in five

industries characterized by high- hazard workplaces.

 Shipyards Source: OSHA Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 1997 to 2002 and
Department of Labor Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1999.

Because GPRA applies only to federal agencies, the 23 state- plan states
are not required to adopt these goals. OSHA asked these states to
establish industry and hazard goals similar to OSHA*s 3- by- 5 goals
relevant to the worksites in their respective states. In some cases, the
state- plan states selected hazards or industries that mirrored the
federal ones; in other cases, they did not.

Recognizing that its 3- by- 5 goals would probably not include every
hazard and industry that would prove dangerous to workers over the 5- year
duration of the strategic plan, OSHA established various other mechanisms
through which it could identify areas that pose hazards to workers.
Through national emphasis programs (NEP), OSHA headquarters has identified
industries or hazards deserving priority attention from its area offices.
In the last several years, OSHA has averaged about 10 NEPs annually. Some
NEPs have reflected areas selected in the strategic plan, while others
have focused on other areas (e. g., the petrochemical industry) not in the
strategic plan. While OSHA provides direction to its area offices for
implementing NEPs, the area offices have considerable flexibility in
selecting actual worksites. In addition, area offices can also use local
emphasis programs (LEP) to highlight industries or hazards within their
jurisdictions that they believe are hazardous. (See table 2.)

Page 7 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

OSHA also has two national targeting programs that are aimed at
identifying worksites for priority inspection. First, as shown in table 2,
OSHA has a targeting program that relies on data from the F. W. Dodge
Report for identifying worksites in the construction industry. Second,
OSHA has a site- specific targeting program (SST), which identifies a list
of high- hazard worksites in other industries through its OSHA data
initiative. OSHA*s targeting efforts must be carried out on a neutral and
objective basis, in accordance with legal requirements.

Table 2: OSHA*s Procedures for Identifying Industries, Hazards, or
Worksites to Target Targeting effort Process followed

NEP Based on national information, OSHA headquarters identifies key
industries, industry sectors, or hazards that regional and area offices
may target. (Over the last few years, OSHA*s NEPs have covered
petrochemical, poultry processing, and nursing homes.) Regional or area
offices develop a particular strategy for targeting workplaces in these
areas. LEP Based on information for its locality, an area or regional
office may decide that an industry,

industry sector, or hazard is particularly dangerous and seek approval to
identify it as an LEP. (In fiscal year 2001, there were over 100 LEPs,
ranging from residential construction to sawmills.) Area and regional
offices develop a particular strategy for targeting workplaces in these
areas. Construction Industry OSHA local offices ask the University of
Tennessee*s Construction Industry Policy and

Research Center to provide them with monthly lists of randomly selected
nonresidential construction projects scheduled to start in the next 60
days on the basis of particular criteria (usually related to project
value) developed by the local office. a To develop these lists, the center
applies a statistical model to data contained in the F. W. Dodge Report,
which is initially generated by the McGraw- Hill Companies. The
information provided to local offices includes the predicted start and
completion dates of the projects. Since construction sites are temporary,
local offices need this information to plan inspections. Local offices
then visit construction sites on the list. ODI/ SST As part of the ODI
begun in 1998, OSHA identifies various industries that have an injury and

illness rate above a predetermined level, as well as other industries that
it believes are hazardous. b OSHA asks Dun and Bradstreet Corporation to
provide it with specific information (such as employer names and
addresses) for approximately 140,000 worksites with 40 or more employees
from these industries. OSHA selects about 80,000 worksites that it
believes have a strong potential for being hazardous based on the relative
hazardousness of their industries. OSHA contacts each of these worksites
and asks them to provide their most recent annual injury and illness data.
Of these 80,000 worksites, OSHA then selects about 14,000 that it
considers to be the most hazardous and sends them a letter informing them
that they might receive a compliance inspection. OSHA provides 3,000 of
these worksite names to area offices for priority inspection. c These
worksites constitute the actual SST list.

a The University of Tennessee*s Construction Industry Policy and Research
Center also maintains the Dodge Data Lines, which provide OSHA with
information on residential construction projects. Access to the Dodge Data
Lines database is included in the price OSHA pays for the F. W. Dodge
Report data. b In past years, OSHA excluded the construction industry from
consideration. OSHA now plans to

include construction in this process.

Page 8 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

c OSHA sends this list only to its area offices in federal OSHA states.
These area offices are expected to visit all SST worksites identified;
however, any office that does not have the resources to inspect all
worksites on the original list may use a random process to select a subset
of these worksites for inspection. OSHA sends information on additional
worksites in state- plan states to the appropriate state agencies. All
state- plan states participate in this process except Oregon, South
Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming.

Source: OSHA.

As another way to help ensure that its resources are well used, OSHA has
restructured local office operations. Before fiscal year 1997, area
offices were organized in single- discipline teams that responded to
worker complaints and conducted planned inspections. Starting in fiscal
year 1997, OSHA reorganized its local offices into multidisciplinary teams
comprised of both safety inspectors 11 and health inspectors. These teams
specialized in either responsive activities (i. e., responding to worker
complaints, accidents, or serious injuries; or acting on referrals from
other agencies) or planned activities, such as conducting planned
inspections and providing employers with compliance assistance (i. e.,
various efforts to help employers who voluntarily seek to comply with OSHA
regulations). To assist these teams, OSHA placed a compliance assistance
specialist at each area office who provides services such as helping
employers correct hazards identified during inspections. OSHA also
instituted new procedures that permitted area offices to expedite the
process for responding to informal worker complaints by allowing
inspectors to resolve complaints by phone or fax without visiting the
worksite.

OSHA has also improved training opportunities for its inspection
workforce. The agency has expanded course offerings available to
inspectors at the OSHA Training Institute (OTI) and through satellite
delivered and web- based training. In addition, OTI is revising its
curriculum to prepare new inspectors both for their new jobs and for
professional certification in either safety, health, or as an engineer.
The agency has also developed a plan to assist experienced inspectors to
obtain professional certification, should they choose to do so, and to
retain professional certifications already achieved. The curriculum for
professional certification will vary considerably depending on the type of
certification sought by the inspector and the inspector*s current
experience and level of training. OSHA*s certification assistance also
includes paying for preparation materials and certification examination

11 For purposes of this report, the term *safety inspector* refers to both
OSHA safety inspectors and safety engineers. Safety engineers have more
education than safety inspectors.

Page 9 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

fees and making time available at work for staff to study. Concurrently,
OSHA managers are using an individual development plan (IDP) process to
help inspectors identify training needs and select appropriate training
opportunities.

The targeting processes that OSHA used have not fully ensured that the
agency effectively identifies hazardous worksites for priority inspection.
Specifically, when targeting the construction industry, OSHA relied on a
database that did not adequately identify the smaller, potentially more
hazardous worksites. In the meantime, however, OSHA area offices have
taken actions on their own to target small construction sites. Also, the
efficiency of OSHA*s efforts to target high- hazard worksites across other
industries through its SST program may be limited by faulty information
that caused OSHA to send inspectors to worksites that were either not
hazardous or that had hazards that were outside of OSHA*s control.

OSHA*s current construction industry targeting procedure has not provided
local offices with adequate information on smaller construction worksites.
OSHA relies on information from the F. W. Dodge Report database, provided
by the University of Tennessee, to identify construction worksites for
potential inspection. This database provides selected information on each
construction site, including the projected start and completion dates.
However, the start and completion dates, which are added to the database
at the University of Tennessee, are often erroneous for small construction
sites.

Since they had more confidence in the information the database provided on
larger worksites, OSHA*s area offices generally selected larger
construction worksites to inspect. About half of the area office directors
we interviewed said they do not request information on smaller
construction sites through the F. W. Dodge Report process. Several local
office directors told us that, when relying on the database to identify
small construction worksites, they would only send inspectors to areas
where there were multiple worksites in close proximity in the hope of
finding at least one that would be available for inspection. Knowledgeable
experts and officials within and outside OSHA, including area office
officials, saw this as problematic because larger construction worksites
are generally safer than smaller ones, although they acknowledge that
conclusive data to demonstrate this are unavailable. OSHA*s Targeting

Procedures May Not Effectively Identify Hazardous Worksites for Inspection

Current Construction Industry Targeting Biased toward Larger Worksites

Page 10 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

OSHA officials acknowledge that the F. W. Dodge process can be improved to
better identify high- hazard construction worksites and are undertaking
efforts to identify ways to improve the construction targeting process.
OSHA has asked the University of Tennessee to study all factors, including
size, that may lead to injuries and illnesses in construction in order to
determine the relative level of hazard represented by individual
construction worksites. As of July 2002, the University of Tennessee had
yet to initiate work on this study. This effort should help OSHA use more
sophisticated criteria to select the most hazardous construction worksites
for priority inspection, but it does not aim to address the immediate bias
toward targeting larger construction worksites. To address current
problems, we found that several of the local offices were using various
methods to supplement the F. W. Dodge Report data to better target smaller
construction worksites. Eight of the 17 area office directors we
interviewed stated that they relied on more informal criteria and LEP
initiatives to target smaller construction workplaces. For example, in
1999- 2000, four area offices developed LEPs for residential construction
worksites because office personnel were seeing increasing numbers of
fatalities or injuries occurring at these sites. These local offices
believed their efforts were successful in locating the smaller, more
hazardous worksites. However, not all area offices had established local
emphasis programs for smaller construction worksites.

The SST program is limited in its ability to effectively identify
hazardous worksites. 12 Our review of OSHA*s own IMIS inspection database
found that for about half the worksites identified through this process,
inspectors were unable to do an inspection or, if they did, cited no
serious violations. While OSHA headquarters officials have not analyzed
why this occurs, our review of IMIS as well as interviews with area office
directors indicate that these outcomes could result from faulty
information that caused OSHA to send inspectors to worksites that were
either not hazardous or that had hazards that were outside of OSHA*s
control.

In some cases, OSHA received outdated or incorrect information about the
establishment itself (i. e., name, location, nature of business, or number
of employees). As a result, inspectors may have been unable to conduct an

12 As shown previously in table 2, through OSHA*s ODI process, OSHA
obtains information on approximately 140,000 worksites in relatively
hazardous industries, obtains injury and illness data from about 80,000 of
them, and narrows down that list to the 3,000 it believes are the most
hazardous. SST Program Does Not

Effectively Identify Hazardous Worksites

Page 11 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

inspection. In other cases, OSHA received miscalculated information about
the employer*s injury and illness rate. In these situations, inspectors
visiting worksites determined from an inspection of its records that the
actual injury and illness rate was not high enough for the employer to
qualify for an inspection. 13 We found, based on inspection data from
OSHA*s IMIS database, that inspectors performed no inspection or just a
records inspection (i. e., a review of the employer*s injury and illness
records) for about 17 percent of the worksites identified on the original
SST list.

In other cases where the information on the worksite injury or illness
rates was correct, the data collected may still have been otherwise
unsuitable for efficiently targeting those high- hazard worksites where
OSHA can have an effect. In collecting information for this program, OSHA
asked employers for only 1 year of injury and illness data. Area office
officials we interviewed said that in some cases, this 1- year rate was an
outlier that did not reflect general worksite operations. Moreover, the
data OSHA collected were generally 2 years old before inspectors conducted
the inspection. As a result, employers might have taken actions, such as
using OSHA*s consultation program, 14 to improve working conditions by the
time the inspector arrived. Also, the injuries and illnesses may have been

13 OSHA generally does not contact employers to give them advance notice
of the specific date when an inspection will occur. Because inspectors do
not contact employers, inspectors may not have the opportunity to know in
advance that the visit may not be worthwhile. Also, according to OSHA
management officials, in order to ensure that every worksite identified
through this program is inspected, OSHA headquarters sends the names of
all identified worksites to area offices even if the injury and illness
rate appears to be incorrect. OSHA withholds information on such worksites
only if the rate is out of meaningful range.

14 Through this program, OSHA provides assistance to small employers in
hazardous industries who voluntarily request a consultation. See our
October 12, 2001, report, U. S. General Accounting Office, Workplace
Safety and Health: OSHA Should Strengthen the Management of Its
Consultation Program, GAO- 02- 60 (Washington, D. C., Oct. 12, 2001). OSHA
procedures do not permit state agencies operating consultation programs to
share information on participating employers with OSHA inspectors.

Page 12 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

caused by workplace hazards OSHA does not address. 15 Again, using IMIS,
we found that for about 17 percent of worksites on the SST list,
inspectors found no violations. In another 14 percent, inspectors found no
serious violations.

Generally, officials from OSHA*s regional and area offices we interviewed
expressed concern about the ability of the SST program to reach those
worksites with hazards that inspectors can address. Over half stated that
the program did not identify a sufficient number of employers with serious
violations to warrant their participation. For example, at one local
office, we were told that 35 percent of worksites on the list were not
cited for a violation. They noted that OSHA spends significant time and
energy to develop the SST list. They also noted that significantly fewer
resources are spent identifying worksites under national or local emphasis
programs, yet they appear to be more successful in identifying serious
violations. Our review of IMIS data on the results of LEP inspections
found that over 60 percent of inspections had serious violations. 16 Also,
our review of reports from area offices on the results of their LEP
efforts identified anecdotal information about the success of LEP
investigations for reaching the most hazardous worksites.

In contrast to the views expressed by regional and area officials, OSHA
headquarters officials noted that a 50 percent serious violation rate
could be acceptable if it meant that employers had actually improved
working conditions between the time they were notified of a possible
inspection

15 This situation was most prevalent in the nursing home industry because
of OSHA*s difficulties in promulgating an ergonomics standard to address a
series of musculoskeletal hazards. OSHA targeted nursing homes, whose
workers frequently experience ergonomicrelated injuries, with the
expectation that it would have a standard for use by inspectors in citing
these hazards. Before the inspections could be conducted, however, OSHA*s
ergonomics standard was legislatively overturned. Inspectors visiting
nursing homes had no standard for citing ergonomics hazards and were
discouraged by OSHA from using OSHA*s general duty clause to cite
violations. Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act*s general duty
clause, OSHA has cited employers for recognized hazards for which the
agency has no specific standard. See 29 U. S. C. 645. According to OSHA
officials, the agency plans to remove nursing homes from future SST
targeting efforts.

16 OSHA*s IMIS system permits individual inspections to be coded as
representing more than one OSHA initiative (i. e., SST, construction, LEP,
and NEP). In deriving this statistic, we identified all inspections coded
as LEP, even if they were also coded for other initiatives.

Page 13 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

and the time the inspection actually took place. 17 However, there is
insufficient information to determine whether this violation rate should
be interpreted as a positive sign that employers are taking action, or
rather an indication that OSHA has not reached the most hazardous
worksites.

Additionally, there is insufficient information available to know what
impact the SST program has on reducing injuries and illnesses. First, OSHA
has little data on injury and illness rates for the period after the SST
inspections occurred. Having this information could help OSHA identify
changes that happened after an inspection took place. Such an analysis
would be imperfect since other intervening factors may have influenced
injury and illness rates, but the results might still be useful. Moreover,
OSHA did not establish a comparison group of employers whose worksites
were equally hazardous, but were not selected for inspections. Developing
such a comparison group has potential to help OSHA address the problem
presented by intervening factors. There are several possibilities for a
comparison group, including employers from the original ODI list that were
not selected to be on the SST list, or similar types of employers located
in state- plan states. We acknowledge that there are many factors to be
considered in developing a comparison group. One expert we interviewed
suggested that it might be difficult to use the ODI database for both
targeting and evaluation and suggested that OSHA develop a similar
database of establishments to be used purely for evaluating SST*s
effectiveness.

Several weaknesses in OSHA*s measurement efforts affected its ability to
accurately demonstrate its impact on workplace safety. To measure progress
toward its strategic plan goals, OSHA relied on national injury and
illness statistics rather than on data specific to those states covered by
OSHA*s strategic plan. Moreover, the methods OSHA used to measure its
progress may have misstated its accomplishments. Finally, when assessing
its impact, OSHA did not account for many relevant factors outside its
control that may have affected changes in the number of work- related
injuries, illnesses, and fatalities.

17 In comments on this report, OSHA noted that there are numerous
interventions that may contribute to the removal of hazards, such as
inspections in response to a worker complaint. OSHA*s Measurement

Efforts Have Not Accurately Demonstrated Its Impact

Page 14 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

By using national data, OSHA lost the opportunity to understand what is
happening with regard to injuries and illnesses in the states covered by
its strategic plan. According to OSHA officials, available data did not
allow them to measure changes in injury and illness rates for all federal
OSHA states combined. In about 10 federal OSHA states, the amount of data
BLS collects about injuries and illnesses is insufficient to allow the
information to be generalized to the entire state. However, BLS uses the
information from these 10 states in calculating its national estimate of
workplace injuries and illnesses. OSHA officials told us that the lack of
data from these states precluded BLS from making injury and illness
estimates for all federal OSHA states combined. Nonetheless, according to
BLS officials, available data from these 10 states could be combined with
data from the other federal OSHA states to provide an overall estimate of
injury and illness rates for the combined federal OSHA states. They said
that this could be done at little or no additional cost to OSHA, but it
may take up to a year to fully generate and test the program needed to
produce this estimate, although some information could be made available
sooner.

OSHA used methods to measure its progress in reducing injury and illness
rates in the industries and hazards highlighted in its strategic plan that
may have misstated its accomplishments. More specifically, to measure its
progress in achieving its strategic plan goals, OSHA compares the most
recent injury and illness data to a 1993 through 1995 baseline. For
example, in its 2001 annual report, OSHA compared calendar year 2000
injury and illness data (the latest information available from BLS) with
the same data for 1993 through 1995. Based on this comparison, OSHA
reported that injury and illness rates declined by 26 percent in
shipyards; 18 percent in food processing; 9 percent in nursing homes; 36
percent in logging; and 23 percent in the construction industry. Yet, as
shown in figure 1, based on data reported by BLS, a portion of these
declines occurred before 1997, the first year of the strategic plan*s
implementation. While the agency may well have contributed to improvements
before 1997, those downward trends in illness and injury cannot be
characterized as an indication of the plan*s effectiveness. Further, even
using the 1993- 95 point of comparison, two of the five industries
highlighted in OSHA*s strategic plan did not have changes that were
statistically significant, according to National Data Do Not

Provide a Reliable Picture of OSHA*s Impact

OSHA*s Methods for Measuring Performance May Have Misstated Its
Accomplishments

Page 15 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

an OSHA official. 18 Comparing changes between 1996 (the year before the
strategic plan went into effect) and 2000, we estimated that three of the
five industries highlighted in OSHA*s strategic plan did not have changes
that were statistically significant. 19

Figure 1: Injury and Illness Rates for 3- by- 5 Industries, 1993- 2000

18 Injury and illness data are collected through a survey. As a result,
there are sampling errors associated with estimates of injury and illness
rates. In some cases, differences in injury and illness rates are not
large enough to determine whether or not changes in injury and illness
rates were real or due to sampling errors. In such cases, changes are not
statistically significant. OSHA performed statistical significance
evaluations of its trend data in response to a draft of this report.

19 Both GAO and OSHA analyses calculated statistical significance at a 95
percent confidence level.

Injury and illness rate 0 2

4 6

8 10

12 14

16 18

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Year

Shipyards Food processing Nursing homes Logging Construction

Source: GAO analysis of BLS data.

Page 16 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

Additionally, OSHA itself has acknowledged that it misstated its progress
in achieving its goals for two of the three hazards highlighted in its
strategic plan, those pertaining to reducing exposure to silica and lead.
Initially, OSHA took reductions in silica and lead exposure at worksites
it inspected and generalized them to the nation as a whole. In its fiscal
year 2001 annual report, however, OSHA acknowledged that this was
inappropriate and that the data and process did not satisfactorily measure
progress on this goal. OSHA added that its methodology did not measure the
average exposure severity for lead and silica in all workplaces; instead
it measured the average exposure severity at workplaces that OSHA
inspected, which have been specially targeted as potentially hazardous.

When assessing its impact, OSHA did not consider many of the factors
outside its control that may have influenced changes in the level or type
of injuries, illnesses, or fatalities. There is general agreement among
those we interviewed within and outside of OSHA that other factors, such
as workers* compensation programs, have an effect on workplace safety and
health. However, in presenting its evaluation of progress toward strategic
goals, OSHA did not account for the potential effects of these other
influences in its annual reports. Also, in some cases, OSHA did not
account for hazards causing injuries, illnesses, or fatalities not under
its full control. For example, while OSHA reported that it exceeded its
goals for reducing fatalities in the construction industry, it did not
report that some portion of this reduction might have occurred because of
declines in transportation- related accidents under the authority of the
Department of Transportation. For example, in 2001, about half of the
fatalities in the construction industry that resulted from transportation
accidents were likely under the authority of the Department of
Transportation.

OSHA*s initial efforts to enhance inspector quality are encouraging, but
the anticipated outcomes could be jeopardized. First, although OSHA*s
restructuring efforts, which included the use of multidisciplinary
inspection teams, have had some positive results, the effort may have also
led to insufficient internal controls in the supervisory review process
that could adversely affect the consistency of enforcement. Additionally,
OSHA*s efforts to increase training opportunities for inspection staff
hold promise but face two obstacles that, if not addressed, may undermine
the long- term success of the resources invested in training. OSHA Did Not
Consider

Many Relevant Factors When Assessing Its Impact

OSHA*s Efforts to Enhance Inspector Quality Have Potential to Improve
Enforcement, but Anticipated Outcomes Could Be Jeopardized

Page 17 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

OSHA*s local office restructuring appears to have strengthened inspectors*
ability to enforce workplace safety and health standards. First, OSHA*s
effort to develop multidisciplinary teams has resulted in increased
opportunities for cross- training among safety and health inspectors.
Indeed, two of the local office directors we interviewed said that
inspectors are better able to detect violations, even if the violations
are outside of their disciplines. Second, having a compliance assistance
specialist at each area office has provided inspectors with a much needed
in- house resource for identifying techniques to make workplaces safer.
Eleven of the 17 area office directors we interviewed said the compliance
assistance specialist position has greatly enhanced inspector quality,
helping inspectors provide cutting- edge information to employers about
how to abate identified hazards. Third, OSHA*s new flexible process for
responding to complaints by phone or fax rather than actual visits has
made inspectors more efficient and able to focus on priority areas. Some
of the 17 area office directors we spoke with stated that this more
flexible complaint process freed up inspectors* time by as much as 30
percent or more, allowing them to focus on planned inspections and
compliance assistance rather than respond to complaints.

However, the move to multidisciplinary teams may have undermined the
internal control process for supervisory review of inspectors* case files.
Some area office directors we interviewed said that some team leaders (who
generally have backgrounds in safety) do not have the expertise needed to
review the health inspectors* case files that accompany and support
proposed violations. About half of the 26 regional administrators and area
directors we interviewed expressed concern about this issue. These
officials explained that when team leaders are unable to review case
files, they generally ask someone else in the local office with the
appropriate expertise to review them, thus resulting in additional review
time and a greater potential for mistakes because of the additional
individuals involved in the process.

Area office officials we interviewed have attempted to address this
problem with varying degrees of success. Some have sought to resolve this
issue working within the multidisciplinary team structure. For example,
those offices that were large enough to establish multiple teams for
carrying out planned activities selected team leaders from both the safety
and health disciplines. They can support each other and provide technical
guidance to inspectors regarding both safety and health issues. Other area
offices did not follow headquarters directives and chose not to
restructure into multidisciplinary teams. Instead, they maintained
separate teams of safety inspectors and health inspectors. These area
office directors told us Restructuring Is Positive,

but May Have Led to Lack of Controls in the Supervisory Review Process

Page 18 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

that they essentially attain the goals of a multidisciplinary team
approach by creating temporary multidisciplinary teams whenever the need
arises. They stated that, in this way, their offices obtain the benefits
of multidisciplinary teams while minimizing the problems other offices
have had with team leaders lacking necessary expertise. Two area office
directors we spoke with expressed a desire to go back to separate teams of
safety inspectors and health inspectors but believed they needed
permission from OSHA headquarters to do so. OSHA has yet to address these
concerns at the national level.

OSHA*s plans to upgrade inspector training have the potential to improve
the professionalism and capabilities of the inspection staff. OSHA
officials we interviewed stated that they are upgrading the curriculum of
the OSHA Training Institute (OTI), which will provide inspectors with
training opportunities that give them a broader understanding of the
issues surrounding worker safety and health and will improve their skills
to conduct inspections. Furthermore, the officials added that OSHA*s
individual development plan process should help ensure that all inspectors
and their managers identify the kind of training they need to maintain
skills and expand expertise. A majority of area office officials we
interviewed were encouraged by OSHA*s plan to offer inspectors
opportunities to become professionally certified. Eight of the 17 area
directors we interviewed stated that inspectors with professional
certifications would appear more credible to employers and be better able
to assist these employers to correct hazards. Over three- quarters of area
office directors we spoke with said they saw value in promoting
professional certifications among the inspector staff. Professional
association officials we spoke with supported continuing education and/ or
certification training for OSHA inspectors, which they believed would
enhance inspector quality.

However, OSHA*s training plans face obstacles that may jeopardize long-
term success. First, OSHA*s official training directive fails to reflect
OSHA*s new commitment to training. It states, *at a minimum, each [OSHA
inspector] is required to attend a safety and health related course once
every 3 years.* This directive is inconsistent with current training
practices and the planned training for professional certification. Two of
the area office directors we spoke with said that they could not rely on
the directive as leverage to encourage those inspectors that may be
unwilling to take needed training to improve their skills. Moreover,
without having a formal directive that reflects what OSHA is trying to
accomplish, area office directors expressed concern that current
management focus and Training Plans Hold

Promise, but Lack of an Appropriate Training Directive and Data System
Pose Obstacles

Page 19 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

initiatives with regard to training could be lost in the event of a budget
cut. This is especially important given that OSHA does not plan on
finalizing its assessment of the level and type of resources that will be
necessary to carry out this training until February 2003.

The second obstacle that may affect OSHA*s long- term success is the lack
of a comprehensive database that tracks training or skills obtained by
inspectors. With regard to training, OSHA*s local offices currently access
or maintain 18 incompatible national, regional, and local (including
formal and informal) databases for inspector training information. For
example, 7 of the 9 regional offices we contacted each maintain their own
training database and 2 regional offices use a human capital database
operated by the Department of Labor. 20 Of the 17 area offices we
interviewed, 8 of them use the relevant regional database, while 4 area
offices developed their own database system and 5 used paper files. (See
table 3 in app. I.) In addition, the OTI operates a separate database that
tracks only the training that it provides. None of these databases track
OSHA inspectors* workrelated skills. Area office directors we interviewed
stated that OSHA often hires inspectors due to expertise in a particular
area (e. g. crane safety) that they obtained prior to joining OSHA. This
expertise is not reflected in any of these databases. As a result, OSHA
managers would be unable to easily identify an inspector hired from the
construction industry who has experience with crane safety developed from
another job.

Because OSHA managers do not have reliable information on training and
skills, they cannot readily identify inspectors with expertise in key
hazards. In addition, OSHA managers seeking to determine whether the
agency can meet certain future contingencies have no formal mechanism for
identifying the skills of inspectors but must rely instead on personal
knowledge or informal paper records held by individuals within the
organization. Furthermore, we have reported that, without reliable data to
assess the level and type of training and skills available, an agency
cannot assess the extent to which training contributed to agency
performance. 21

20 The Department of Labor*s *People Power* database, which is maintained
by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and
Management, contains a broad range of information, including training, on
its employees and serves as a system of record for all personnel actions.
Of the 26 regional and area offices we interviewed, only 2 regional
offices used the People Power system. Regional and area office staff
generally do not have the special training needed to fully use this
system.

21 See our March 15, 2002, exposure draft, U. S. General Accounting
Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO- 02- 373SP
(Washington, D. C.: Mar. 15, 2002).

Page 20 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

OSHA has taken important steps toward targeting its enforcement resources
on high- hazard worksites, measuring its impact, and enhancing the
professionalism and quality of its personnel. However, OSHA*s enforcement
efforts could be strengthened by better information and procedures that
would make targeting efforts more efficient, measurement more precise, and
training efforts more effective.

OSHA may not be getting the most out of its targeting programs because of
data problems that limit OSHA*s ability to inspect high hazard worksites.
For example, the current process for targeting construction worksites may
not allow OSHA to systematically identify potentially more hazardous
construction worksites. OSHA*s long- term research may ultimately address
this problem. However, in the meantime, there is little assurance that
area offices are inspecting smaller worksites. Data problems also limit
the effectiveness of OSHA*s site- specific targeting program. Without
improving the suitability of these data, OSHA will continue to expend
significant resources on this program with little certainty that it is
identifying the most hazardous worksites and making the best use of its
inspection resources. Moreover, OSHA did not set up the site- specific
targeting database in a manner that would allow it to evaluate the
program*s impact on reducing injury and illness rates. As a result, it
lacks sufficient information to determine whether program outcomes justify
the resources expended.

The data and methodologies OSHA has used to measure its progress toward
achieving strategic goals do not offer sufficient assurance that its
efforts to measure its accomplishments produce a true picture of the
agency*s impact on workplace safety and health or that they offer an
appropriate assessment of agency progress in meeting its own goals. OSHA,
as the federal agency responsible for overall workplace safety and health,
understandably has an interest in tracking national trends in workplace
injuries, illnesses, and fatalities. However, these data and methodologies
may not reflect what is happening in those states or for those hazards
that OSHA is responsible for under its strategic plan. As a result, OSHA
lacks valuable management oversight information concerning the impact of
those inspection activities for which it is most directly accountable.

Finally, OSHA has taken significant actions and plans to improve the
quality of its inspection staff. However, unless area offices can share
best practices regarding supervisory review, OSHA may not be able to
ensure that the move to multidisciplinary teams does not adversely affect
internal controls. Moreover, unless its training directive is updated to
reflect Conclusions

Page 21 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

OSHA*s current training strategy, the agency cannot ensure that its
current strategy becomes institutionalized and implemented. And, OSHA
currently lacks reliable information on the training and skills of its
inspection workforce. This information is fundamental to improving the
quality of OSHA*s workforce.

To better ensure that OSHA gets the greatest benefit out of its targeting
programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct OSHA to

 encourage area offices to supplement inspections of large construction
worksites with locally planned efforts to inspect smaller worksites,

 strengthen the validity of the data used to identify worksites in the
site- specific targeting program by addressing the data weaknesses
identified in this report, and

 assess the site- specific targeting program*s impact on workplace
injuries and illnesses in light of the resources expended.

To enhance OSHA*s ability to more precisely measure its impact from the
strategic planning process, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor
encourage OSHA and BLS to work together to obtain the necessary data to
understand those injuries, illnesses, and fatalities occurring in areas
covered by the strategic plan or under OSHA*s authority. This could
include exploring additional ways of analyzing existing BLS data or
exploring the costs of collecting additional information that would allow
state- level estimates.

To help ensure that OSHA*s efforts to improve inspector quality achieve
their potential outcomes, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct
OSHA to

 review area office efforts to develop alternative supervisory review
procedures in order to identify promising practices and disseminate
results to other offices,

 update OSHA*s training directive to reflect its current training
strategy, and

 work with Labor*s Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration
and Management to develop an information system to track and assess
Recommendations for

Executive Action

Page 22 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

training and skills obtained by the inspection staff. This could include
developing a new system or adapting existing systems.

We provided a draft of this report to Labor for comment. Overall, OSHA
said that our report provides useful recommendations to consider as it
moves forward in its efforts to improve the working conditions throughout
the nation. The agency also pointed out a 30- year decline in
occupationalrelated fatalities that took place despite huge increases in
the U. S. workforce. Further, OSHA highlighted its belief that its
enforcement system has achieved striking results, noting recent declines
in injury and illness rates.

Although OSHA generally agreed to take action on the report*s
recommendations, it expressed a number of concerns about material
presented in the report. More specifically, OSHA raised questions about
certain aspects of our analysis of the construction worksite targeting
program. For example, it noted that we had recommended the use of local
emphasis programs to help target small construction sites while
acknowledging an absence of definitive data showing that smaller worksites
are more hazardous than larger sites. We made this recommendation because
(1) knowledgeable experts* including some at OSHA* told us that smaller
sites were more hazardous and (2) the current construction targeting
system does not adequately encompass these sites. We continue to believe
that supplementing inspections of larger worksites with inspections of
smaller ones is a prudent approach to take until OSHA completes its study
of factors to help identify better ways to identify the most hazardous
construction worksites.

OSHA also expressed several concerns about our analysis of the SST
program. For example, it pointed out that, in apparent contrast to our
findings, the agency*s quality control reviews indicated a high level of
accuracy regarding the employer- submitted injury and illness data the
program uses for targeting inspections. In our view, there is not
necessarily an inconsistency between the quality review findings and ours.
For example, the data may have been accurate at the time an employer
submitted it to OSHA but out of date by the time it was used for targeting
purposes. Additionally, OSHA noted that interventions, other than from the
SST program (e. g., consultation visits), could have caused an employer to
correct unsafe conditions and help explain the lack of citations during
the SST visits. We agree. However, the fact remains that there are
insufficient data to determine the validity of this explanation versus
other possible explanations. In the meantime, the SST program* a targeting
Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Page 23 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

program intended to identify high- hazard worksites* continues to direct
inspection resources to large numbers of sites that have no serious
violations.

Finally, OSHA made several comments on our examination of the agency*s
ability to demonstrate impact on workplace safety and health. For example,
it reaffirmed its use of 1993 through 1995 data as a reasonable baseline
from which to measure its strategic plan*s accomplishments, noting, among
other things, that a baseline is by definition arbitrary. We continue to
believe that, by selecting the baseline it did, OSHA took credit for
declines that occurred before 1997, the year when the strategic plan was
implemented.

Labor*s comments in their entirety as well as our responses to their
comments are shown in appendix II. Additionally, both OSHA and BLS offered
technical comments, which we incorporated throughout the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Labor and the
Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health. We will also make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. If
you have any questions about this report, please call me on (202) 512-
7215. Major contributors are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours, Robert E. Robertson Director, Education, Workforce

and Income Security

Appendix I: Training Databases Used by OSHA*s Regional and Area Offices

Page 24 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

Table 3 identifies the various databases and paper files that track work-
related training taken by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) inspectors that were maintained by the regional and
area offices we contacted.

Table 3: Training Databases Used by OSHA Regional and Area Offices
Training systems Regional & area offices interviewed Labor system OTI
system Regional system Area office system Paper system Regional offices

Region I b b

Region II b b

Region III b b

Region IV b b

Region V b b

Region VI b b

Region VII b b

Region VIII b b

Region X b b

Area offices

Area office #1 b b

Area office #2 b b

Area office #3 b b

Area office #4 b b

Area office #5 b b

Area office #6 b b

Area office #7 b b

Area office #8 b b

Area office #9 b b

Area office #10 b b

Area office #11 b b

Area office #12 b b

Area office #13 b b

Area office #14 b b

Area office #15 b b

Area office #16 b b

Area office #17 b b

Total systems used 1 a 1 b 7 c 4 5

a There is only one Labor system, which was accessed by two OSHA regional
offices. b There is only one OSHA Training Institute (OTI) system, which
is accessed by OSHA*s regional and area offices. c There are seven
regional systems, which were accessed by the regional offices and, in some

instances, area offices within the regions. Source: OSHA.

Appendix I: Training Databases Used by OSHA*s Regional and Area Offices

Appendix II: Comments from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration Page 25 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

Appendix II: Comments from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Appendix II: Comments from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration Page 26 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

See comment 5. See comment 4.

See comment 3. See comment 2.

Appendix II: Comments from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration Page 27 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

See comment 9. See comment 8.

See comment 7. See comment 6.

Appendix II: Comments from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration Page 28 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

See comment 11. See comment 10.

Appendix II: Comments from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration Page 29 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

Appendix II: Comments from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration Page 30 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

See comment 12.

Appendix II: Comments from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration

Page 31 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

The following are GAO*s comments on the OSHA letter dated November 14,
2002.

1. We clarified the language in the report to better highlight recent
improvements in work- related fatality and injury rates.

2. Our draft report acknowledged there are no definitive data showing that
smaller worksites are more hazardous than larger worksites. However,
knowledgeable experts* including some at OSHA* believe that the smaller
sites are indeed more dangerous than the larger ones. Furthermore, OSHA*s
current construction targeting efforts do not include these smaller sites.
Accordingly, we continue to believe that supplementing inspections of
larger worksites with inspections of smaller ones is a prudent approach to
take until OSHA completes its study of factors that will help it better
identify the most hazardous construction worksites.

3. While OSHA provided data to show that medium- sized employers may be
more hazardous than smaller ones, employer size and construction worksite
size are two different measures. As a result, these statistics may not
reflect the level of hazards at small construction sites.

4. We believe that using the rate of serious violations cited is a valid
measure of a worksite*s hazardousness, although we acknowledge it is not
the only one. This approach has been used by researchers and OSHA itself
to identify whether OSHA is focusing its inspection resources in the right
places. Additionally, we agree with OSHA that interventions, other than
from the site- specific targeting (SST) program (e. g., consultation
visits), could have caused an employer to correct unsafe conditions and
help explain the lack of citations during the SST visits. However, the
fact remains that there are insufficient data to determine the validity of
this explanation versus other possible explanations. In the meantime, the
SST program* a targeting program intended to identify high- hazard
workplaces* continues to direct inspection resources to large numbers of
sites that have no serious violations.

5. We did not assess the results of OSHA*s efforts to verify the accuracy
of employer- submitted injury and illness data. However, even if the data
are as accurate as OSHA suggests, our report points out other data
limitations that hinder its usefulness in targeting inspections. For
example, the data collected only reflects what happened during a single
year at a particular employer and that data may have been an GAO Comments

Appendix II: Comments from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration

Page 32 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

outlier that did not reflect general worksite operations. Additionally,
the data may not be current* it may be 2 years old before an SST
inspection is conducted.

6. Our earlier report, U. S. General Accounting Office, Program
Evaluation: Studies Helped Agencies Measure or Explain Program
Performance, GAO/ GGD- 00- 204 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 29, 2000) did not
independently assess the quality of OSHA*s recordkeeping audit program.
Instead, we discussed the role of the program in helping OSHA evaluate its
performance.

7. We anticipate that, when implementing our recommendation to encourage
local offices to supplement inspections of larger construction worksites
with inspections of smaller construction worksites, OSHA will ensure that
these inspections are conducted in accordance with all legal constraints.

8. We believe that the report adequately distinguished general industry
from construction targeting. We reported that the SST program to date has
focused on general industry worksites while the Dodge system focuses on
construction worksites. Nonetheless, we do believe they both have data
limitations that affect their ability to effectively identify hazardous
worksites.

9. We understand, based on OSHA*s comments, that more current data would
have been available at the time when OSHA began to evaluate progress
toward the plan*s strategic goals. We continue to believe that OSHA*s
selection of a 1993- 95 baseline allowed it to take credit for declines
that occurred prior to the implementation of the strategic plan. As we
note in the report, while OSHA may have had some effect on these changes,
the changes cannot be seen as an indication of the plan*s success.

10. Our report did not conclude that declines between 1993 and 1995 would
have continued without OSHA*s efforts. We agree that it would be difficult
to determine what would have happened in the absence of OSHA*s strategic
plan efforts.

11. We changed the language in our report to clarify that OSHA, in
presenting its evaluation of its progress toward strategic goals, did not
account for the influence of other factors that affect workplace safety
and health.

Appendix II: Comments from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration

Page 33 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

12. We altered the language of the recommendation to include Labor*s
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management. We
believe that both OSHA and the Assistant Secretary*s office have a role in
developing the kind of data system necessary to accurately track and
assess inspectors* training and skills.

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 34 GAO- 03- 45 Workplace Safety and Health

Lori Rectanus (202) 512- 9847 Joseph Natalicchio (202) 512- 5897

Dennis Gehley, Kris Trueblood, H. Brandon Haller, and Catherine Hurley
made significant contributions to this report. In addition, Richard
Burkard and Julian Klazkin provided legal support, while Patrick
DiBattista, Barbara W. Alsip, and Susan Bernstein provided writing
assistance. Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Staff Acknowledgments

(130096)

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