Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance  
Rail Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed (30-APR-03,		 
GAO-03-435).							 
                                                                 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,	 
concerns have been raised that the nation's shipments of	 
hazardous materials by rail may be vulnerable to terrorist	 
attack. Millions of tons of hazardous materials are shipped	 
yearly across the United States. Serious incidents involving	 
these materials have the potential to cause widespread disruption
or injury. GAO was asked to examine recent steps taken by	 
industry and government to improve the safety and security of	 
these shipments and steps taken by local jurisdictions to prepare
to respond to hazardous material rail incidents.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-435 					        
    ACCNO:   A06780						        
  TITLE:     Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to  
Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed		 
     DATE:   04/30/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Hazardous substances				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Railroad safety					 
	     Railroad transportation operations 		 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Transportation safety				 

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GAO-03-435

                                       A

Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2003 RAIL SAFETY AND SECURITY Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance
Rail Security, but Risk- based Plan Needed

GAO- 03- 435

Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Industry Has Taken Steps to
Address the Security of Transportation

of Hazardous Materials by Rail, but TSA Has Not Yet Developed and
Implemented a Rail Security Plan 10 Several Issues Regarding the Safety
and Security of Hazardous

Materials Transported by Rail Remain Unresolved 18 Most Localities Visited
Report They Are Generally Prepared to

Respond to Hazardous Material Rail Incidents, but Sufficiency of Actions
Taken Cannot Be Determined 26 Conclusions 33 Recommendation for Executive
Action 33 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 36 Organizations Visited and Contacted
36

Appendix II: Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials by the
Department of Transportation and Other Federal Agencies 40 DOT and DHS
Oversee Rail Safety and Security 40 EPA Oversees Fixed Facilities That
Handle Hazardous Materials 41 OSHA Focuses on the Safety of Plant Workers
and Emergency

Responders 42 NRC and DOE Oversee Shipments of Nuclear Material 42 DOD
Oversees the Safety and Security of Military Hazardous

Material Shipments 43

Appendix III: Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United
States 44 Department of Transportation Categorizes Hazardous Materials by

Nine Classes 44 Overall Volume of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials
for Rail,

Truck, and Water are Similar by Ton- mile 45 Rail Shipments Represent a
Much Higher Share of Volume for Some

Hazardous Material Classes 48 Poisonous Inhalation Hazardous Materials
Were Among the Ten

Most Commonly Shipped Hazardous Materials from 1998 to 2001

Rail Shipments of Radioactive and Military Hazardous Materials Represent a
Small Fraction of All Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials 51

Appendix IV: Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel 53 Proposed Private Fuel Storage and Yucca
Mountain Repository

Plans Will Result in Substantial Increases in Rail Shipment of Radioactive
Materials 53 Historically Low Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipment Volumes Make
Risk

Assessment from Increased Shipments Difficult 56

Appendix V: Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to
Assist Local First Responders 61 General Procedures for Emergency Response
61 Multiple Federal Plans and Agencies Provide Additional Resources

to Address Hazardous Material Incidents 62 Federal Agencies Provide a
Variety of Assistance for Responding to

and Improving Preparedness for Hazardous Material Rail Incidents 66
Private Organizations Also Play a Role in Emergency Response to

Hazardous Material Incidents 71 Multiple Standards and Guidelines of
Preparedness Exist 72

Appendix VI: Letter from the Federal Railroad Administration, May 28, 2003
76

Appendix VII: GAO Response to Federal Railroad Administration Letter 78
Tables Table 1: NFPA Levels of Professional Competence for First

Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents 30 Table 2: 1997 Hazardous
Materials Shipped by Tons and Ton- miles

46 Table 3: Rail Shipments as Percentage of Hazardous Material

Shipments by All Transportation Modes by Hazard Class and Division, 1997
49 Table 4: The Top 20 Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail by Volume,
1998* 2001 50

Table 5: Transport of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel, 1979* 1996 54 Table
6: Federal Agencies Involved in Emergency Response to

Hazardous Material Incidents 66

Table 7: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
Provided by the Department of Homeland Security*s Office of Domestic
Preparedness (Formerly a

Department of Justice Program) 68 Table 8: Hazardous Material Emergency
Response Assistance and

Grants Provided by the Department of Transportation*s Research and Special
Programs Administration 68 Table 9: Hazardous Material Emergency Response
and Assistance

Grants Provided by the Department of Homeland Security*s Directorate of
Emergency Preparedness and Response 69 Table 10: Hazardous Material
Emergency Response Assistance and

Grants Provided by the Department of Health and Human Services 70 Table
11: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and

Grants Provided by the Department of Energya 70 Figures Figure 1: Photos
of Rail Facilities 14

Figure 2: Components of a Risk Management Approach to Defend Against
Terrorism 18 Figure 3: Tons of Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail,

1998* 2001 47

Abbreviations

AAR Association of American Railroads CFDA Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance CFS Commodity Flow Survey CHEMTREC Chemical Transportation
Emergency Center DHS Department of Homeland Security DOD Department of
Defense DOE Department of Energy DOJ Department of Justice DOL Department
of Labor DOT Department of Transportation EMAP Emergency Management
Accreditation Program EPA Environmental Protection Agency EP& R Emergency
Preparedness and Response FRA Federal Railroad Administration HHS
Department of Health and Human Services HM hazardous materials LEPC local
emergency planning committee MTMC Military Traffic Management Command NFPA
National Fire Protection Association NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board ODP Office of Domestic
Preparedness OREIS Operation Respond Emergency Information System OSHA
Occupational Safety and Health Administration PFS Private Fuel Storage,
LLC RSPA Research and Special Programs Administration SNF spent nuclear
fuel TRANSCAER Transportation Community Awareness Emergency

Response Program TSA Transportation Security Administration USCG U. S.
Coast Guard WMD weapons of mass destruction

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protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
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copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
materials separately from GAO*s product.

Letter

April 30, 2003 The Honorable Henry A. Waxman Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives

The Honorable James L. Oberstar Ranking Minority Member Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings The Honorable Martin T. Meehan House of
Representatives

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns have
been raised that the nation*s shipments of hazardous materials by rail may
be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Millions of tons of hazardous materials
are shipped yearly across the continental United States. Much of this
volume is shipped on rail networks that travel through populated areas,
increasing the concern that accidents or attacks during these shipments
could have severe consequences. While the vast majority of shipments
arrive safely at their destination, serious incidents involving these
materials have the potential to cause widespread disruption or injury.
Additionally, the proposed shipments of spent nuclear fuel at sites from
39 states across the country to the Yucca Mountain Repository have
highlighted the need to safeguard hazardous materials against both
accident and attack. 1 Two federal agencies have primary responsibility
for overseeing the safety

and security of hazardous materials shipped by rail* the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Though originally a part of DOT, the Transportation Security
Administration is now part of DHS. The Transportation Security
Administration is charged with overseeing the security of all modes of
transportation, including rail. Within DOT, the Federal Railroad
Administration promotes railroad safety and enforces rail safety

1 The proposed Yucca Mountain Repository is not scheduled to begin
operations until 2010. For information on the safety and security issues
posed by possible future rail shipments of spent nuclear fuel, see
appendix IV.

regulations, while the Research and Special Programs Administration
regulates the transportation of materials that may pose an unreasonable
risk to health, safety, and property. Other federal agencies having
related responsibilities for the rail shipment of hazardous materials
include the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy,
Department of Defense (DOD), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
Department of Labor*s Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and
DHS* Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response. See appendix II
for

additional information on the oversight roles of DOT and other federal
agencies in the safety and security of hazardous material rail shipments.

In response to your request that we review the safety and security of
transporting hazardous materials by rail in the United States, we examined
(1) recent steps taken by industry and government for improving the safety
and security of hazardous materials transported by rail, (2) issues
pertaining to the safety and security of rail transport of hazardous
materials identified by federal and private sector hazardous material
transportation experts and local officials as being unresolved, and (3)
the preparedness of ten local jurisdictions to respond to rail incidents
involving hazardous materials, whether accidental or intentional. To
address these issues, we used a variety of approaches and methodologies,
including interviews with regulatory officials, analyses of hazardous
materials volume and incident data, a panel of experts, and interviews
with local officials. To report on the preparedness of local jurisdictions
to respond to a potential terrorist attack or accident involving the
shipment of hazardous materials by rail, we performed case studies at ten
jurisdictions selected because they varied in size and experienced a
recent and significant rail incident involving hazardous materials or
typically experienced large amounts of hazardous material shipments
passing through their communities. These jurisdictions are not named due
to the sensitive nature of the issues discussed in this report. While
providing information on the preparedness actions taken by

these specific localities to respond to a hazardous material rail
incident, results from these case studies cannot be generalized to other
jurisdictions. We conducted our review from December 2001 through March
2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
See appendix I for additional information on our scope and methodology.

Results in Brief In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
industry and government have taken steps to improve the safety and
security of the

transportation of hazardous materials by rail. The railroad industry
conducted an industry- wide assessment to identify and prioritize the

exposure of rail facilities to the risk of attack and developed a security
plan to address these risks. The security plan, completed in December
2001, established four alert levels and described a series of actions to
prevent terrorist threats to railroad personnel and facilities that could
be taken at each alert level, including rail operations and police
actions. In March 2003, DOT*s Research and Special Programs Administration
finalized a rule, Hazardous Materials* Security Requirements for Offerors
and

Transporters of Hazardous Materials* which imposes new security
requirements on shippers and carriers of certain hazardous materials. The
Transportation Security Administration has also begun to address rail
security. According to Transportation Security Administration officials,
while much of its resources have been focused on aviation security, it has
assumed responsibility for transportation security in all modes of
transportation, including rail, and is beginning to develop an overall
intermodal transportation system security plan, which these officials
consider a major component of the National Strategy for Homeland Security.
The Transportation Security Administration has signed a

memorandum of agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration, which
these officials said would serve as a guide for relations between the
Transportation Security Administration and modal administrations within
DOT, including the Federal Railroad Administration and Research and

Special Programs Administration. However, while the Transportation
Security Administration has begun work on an overall intermodal
transportation system security plan, it has not yet developed specific
plans to address the security of individual surface transportation modes,
including rail, and does not have time frames established for completing
such an effort. We are recommending that DHS and DOT work jointly to

develop such a plan to assist the departments in determining the adequacy
of security measures already in place to protect hazardous material rail
shipments and identifying any gaps that need to be addressed.

Government and private sector hazardous material experts and officials
from some local jurisdictions that we visited identified several issues
pertaining to the safety and security of transporting hazardous materials
by rail that have not been resolved. These issues include the need for
measures to better safeguard hazardous materials temporarily stored in
rail cars while awaiting delivery to their ultimate destination* a
practice commonly called *storage- in- transit,* the advisability of
requiring companies to notify local communities of the type and quantities
of materials stored in transit, and the appropriate amount of information
rail companies should be required to provide local officials regarding
hazardous material shipments passing through their communities. Federal

Railroad Administration and Transportation Security Administration
officials recognize that security concerns have grown since the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks regarding the vulnerability of hazardous
materials stored in transit in, or passing through, local communities.
However, they are just beginning to address this issue.

In our review of the actions taken by the ten local communities that we
visited to prepare and respond to hazardous material rail incidents,
officials from nine of the ten localities told us that they believe that
their cities are generally prepared to respond to these incidents. Actions
taken by these communities include ensuring that emergency response plans
are in place, employing hazardous material response teams, and planning
and conducting training and drills. However, because no standardized tool
currently exists to gauge preparedness, we were unable to determine the

sufficiency of these localities* actions to prepare for hazardous material
rail incidents. Officials from DHS* Directorate of Emergency Preparedness
and Response 2 are in the process of determining the response capabilities
of the nation by developing a standardized tool for performing
selfassessments of local communities* emergency response capabilities.
They estimate that this effort will be completed by the end of 2004.

DHS and DOT generally agreed with our report and acknowledged that no plan
to specifically address rail security has been developed, but stressed
that they have taken some actions to enhance the security of hazardous
material rail shipments.

Background In 2001, over 83 million tons of hazardous materials were
shipped by rail in the United States across a 170, 000- mile rail network
which extends through every major city as well as thousands of small
communities. Federal hazardous material transportation law defines a
hazardous material as a substance or material that the Secretary of
Transportation has determined

2 This Directorate includes the entire functions of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, formerly an independent federal agency.

is capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property
when transported in commerce. 3 It includes hazardous substances such as
ammonia, hazardous wastes from chemical manufacturing processes, and
elevated temperature materials such as molten aluminum. 4 According to
reported incident data from the DOT*s Research and Special

Programs Administration (RSPA), the number of hazardous material incidents
occurring during rail transportation declined from 1, 128 in 1992 to 894
in 2001 and accounted for approximately 7 percent of all incidents

involving the transportation of these materials in all modes. For the
period 1997 to 2001, hazardous material rail shipments represented an
annual average of approximately 11 incidents and less than 1 serious
incident per million tons of hazardous materials shipped by rail. 5 For
1997, the latest year for which data on intermodal hazardous material
shipment volumes are available, there were approximately 14 incidents and
less than 1 serious incident per million tons of hazardous materials
shipped by truck.

Although rail moves only a small percentage of all hazardous materials, it
is the predominant method of transportation for some types of these
materials, such as flammable solids. 6 When measured in ton- miles, 7
hazardous materials shipped by rail are nearly equivalent to hazardous

materials transported by road and water. 8 The vast majority of shipments
arrive safely at their destination. However, recent accidents in urban
areas, such as the 2001 incident in the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore,

Maryland, involving a fire fueled by hazardous materials, and a leak of
hydrochloric acid from a parked tank car in an urban area in Lowell,

3 49 U. S. C. S: 5103. 4 Where specific references to flammable,
radioactive, or other subsets of material are needed, the distinction will
be made in the report. 5 RSPA defines an incident as an unintentional
release of hazardous materials during the

course of transportation. A serious incident is defined as an incident
that involves a fatality or major injury, substantial property damage,
closure of a major transportation artery or facility, or evacuation due to
a hazardous material release.

6 Appendix III contains additional information on the amounts and types of
hazardous materials shipped by rail throughout the United States. 7 A ton-
mile is a measure of volume that accounts for the distance a commodity is
shipped. One ton- mile is equal to one ton shipped one mile.

8 See appendix III for additional discussion on ton- mile shipments by
transportation mode.

Massachusetts, have called attention to the safety of hazardous materials
shipped by rail. The events of September 11, 2001, and subsequent reviews
of the vulnerability of the transportation sector, including rail, to
terrorist attack have further focused attention on the security of
hazardous materials in rail transport.

The proposed plan to ship spent nuclear fuel, as soon as 2010 and most
likely by rail, to the Yucca Mountain Repository in Nevada* the nation*s
first long- term geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-
level radioactive waste* has raised concerns about the safety and security
of possible transportation to this site. 9 A second proposal to ship spent
nuclear fuel to temporary storage in a private facility in Utah has
heightened these concerns. 10 Such shipments would substantially increase
the volume of nuclear material transported in this country. 11

Two administrations within DOT, RSPA and the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), have responsibilities, respectively, for developing
regulations pertaining to the transportation of hazardous materials and
for rail safety. RSPA is responsible for identifying and regulating the
transportation of materials that may pose an unreasonable risk to health,
safety, and property when transported in commerce. RSPA develops the
hazardous material regulations, coordinating its work with other DOT
administrations, including FRA. These regulations specify how shipments
must be identified, packaged, and handled in transit.

RSPA published a final rule in the March 25, 2003, Federal Register*
Hazardous Materials: Security Requirements for Offerors and Transporters
of Hazardous Materials, also known as HM- 232* which imposes new security
requirements on shippers and carriers of certain hazardous materials. The
final rule requires people who offer or transport hazardous

9 Nuclear fuel is generally used in a nuclear reactor for a number of
years before losing its ability to efficiently create energy. When the
fuel can no longer effectively produce energy, it is considered "spent"
and is replaced, but the spent fuel remains radioactive and hazardous.

10 In March 2003, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing board blocked,
for the time being, the issuance of a license to this private facility
because of the risks that military aircraft operations conducted near the
facility might pose. 11 Appendix IV contains additional information on
safety issues associated with Yucca Mountain and the Utah facility. We are
also currently undertaking a study assessing the findings of federally-
sponsored studies of sabotage and severe accidents involving spent fuel.

materials in amounts that require placarding to develop and implement a
written security plan. The security plan must include an assessment of
possible transportation security risks for the material( s) to be
transported and appropriate measures to address identified risks. Specific
measures established by the plan may vary depending on the level of threat
at a particular time. In addition, the final rule requires all employees
handling hazardous materials to receive security awareness training,
beginning no later than the date of their first scheduled recurrent
training. New employees must receive security awareness training within 90
days of employment. Employees handling hazardous materials in companies
subject to the security plan requirement must receive in- depth training
concerning the security plan and its implementation.

FRA oversees the safety of railroad equipment and operating practices and
has authority to enforce compliance with the hazardous material
regulations. DOT*s regulation of the transport of hazardous materials
under federal hazardous material transportation law preempts similar
regulation by state and local agencies. States and local jurisdictions may
not establish stricter or less stringent regulations governing hazardous
material transportation. 12

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), created within DOT in
the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
and now part of the newly created DHS, initially focused primarily on
aviation issues but, along with DOT, is responsible for the security of
all modes of transportation, including rail. According to TSA officials,
the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator for TSA have
exchanged letters regarding the ongoing cooperation and relationship
between TSA and the DOT operating administrations after the March 1, 2003,
transfer of TSA from DOT to DHS. This correspondence sets forth a number
of principles to guide this relationship.

12 Preemption occurs when Congress enacts a statute intending to preclude
inconsistent state or local law. Depending upon the circumstances,
Congress may choose to preempt all or only some forms of state or local
rulemaking. The law preempts any inconsistent state or local rulemaking.

Several other federal agencies also play a role in regulating rail
shipments of hazardous materials. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
and Department of Energy (DOE) oversee shipments of nuclear material.
Although DOT regulates the transportation of radioactive material,
including spent fuel, as a hazardous material, NRC also regulates the
transportation of radioactive material by its licensees. The primary role
of NRC, under a memorandum of agreement with DOT, is the establishment of
packaging standards for fissile materials and for other radioactive
materials exceeding certain limits. 13 NRC certifies spent fuel casks and
other radioactive material package designs that meet these standards and
requires its licensees to use certified casks for transport. NRC also
plays a significant role through safety and security requirements and
through inspection and enforcement. In its role as developer of the Yucca
Mountain Repository, DOE is responsible for shipping spent nuclear fuel
from nuclear plants. In addition, DOE coordinates policies and program
implementation for shipments of radioactive waste with DOT and NRC.

The Department of Defense*s (DOD) Military Traffic Management Command is
responsible for DOD*s surface transportation shipments and requires that
everyone participating in the shipment of DOD hazardous materials comply
with hazardous material regulations. DOD also requires inspections for
sensitive shipments, including hazardous materials, to be conducted by
railroad police officers, trained railroad employees, or

members of private security firms under contract to DOD. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) each have oversight responsibility regarding facilities that handle
hazardous materials and are the source or destination of many hazardous
material rail shipments. EPA, along with the U. S. Coast Guard (USCG), has
authority for implementing and enforcing legislation governing the
protection of public health and the environment against chemical and other
polluting discharges and for abating and controlling pollution when spills
occur. EPA has provided training and technical assistance to states and
localities to enhance contingency planning and emergency response
capabilities. EPA sometimes participates with other

agencies in responding to hazardous material transportation incidents.
OSHA promulgates and enforces standards to protect the safety and health

13 Fissile material is any material fissionable by slow neutrons. This
involves splitting a nucleus into at least two other nuclei and the
release of a relatively large amount of energy. The three primary fissile
materials are uranium- 233, uranium- 235, and plutonium- 239.

of employees, including workers at facilities that handle hazardous
materials and emergency responders to hazardous material incidents.

The USCG enforces spill prevention regulations on vessels and on the
marine transfer portion of waterfront facilities. Under the National
Contingency Plan, the USCG serves as the federal on scene coordinator for
oil or hazardous substance releases in the coastal zone. All oil and
hazardous material incidents are required to be reported to the National
Response Center, which in turn is to notify state and local agencies and
the appropriate on scene coordinator (either EPA for inland or USCG for
coastal incidents). In each case, the on scene coordinator is to assess
the need for federal involvement and, if appropriate, may respond,
bringing

additional response resources (such as contractors), special teams, and
access to federal funding for hazardous material or oil spills.

The Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP& R) Directorate within DHS
provides federal assistance to supplement the resources of state and local
governments in major disasters, which could include emergencies involving
hazardous material releases. Its assistance is governed by the Federal
Response Plan that provides the mechanism for delivery of federal
assistance and resources to augment state and local government efforts in
a major disaster or emergency. In conjunction with NRC, DOE, DOD, EPA, and
other agencies, DHS* EP& R also participates in the Federal

Radiological Emergency Response Plan to establish an organized and
integrated capability for timely, coordinated response by federal agencies
to peacetime radiological emergencies. For more details on the roles of
various federal agencies in assisting state and local governments to
respond to emergencies, see appendix V.

Industry Has Taken The railroad and chemical industries have taken a
number of steps to

Steps to Address the enhance the security of transportation of hazardous
materials. Some of

these measures include the development of a rail security plan and an
Security of

increase in security measures at some facilities. According to TSA
officials, Transportation of

while much of TSA*s resources have been focused on aviation security, TSA
Hazardous Materials by

has assumed its responsibility for transportation security in all modes of
transportation, including rail, and is beginning to develop an intermodal

Rail, but TSA Has Not national transportation system security plan, which
TSA officials consider

Yet Developed and to be a major component of the National Strategy for
Homeland Security.

Another TSA effort in this area involves the development of a Implemented
a Rail

memorandum of agreement with DOT*s Federal Aviation Administration,
Security Plan

which DOT officials said would serve as a guide for relations between TSA
and modal administrations within DOT, including FRA and RSPA. Although TSA
has begun work on an overall intermodal transportation system security
plan, it has not yet developed a plan to specifically address

the security of individual surface transportation modes, including rail,
and does not have time frames established for completing such an effort.
The development of a security plan addressing rail transportation of
hazardous materials that uses a risk- based management approach, such as
that used by other federal agencies, government commissions, and
multinational corporations to defend against terrorism, would assist TSA
in identifying threats that exist to the shipment of hazardous materials
by rail, vulnerabilities that may be exploited in the system used to ship
these materials, and high- risk, high- consequence facilities that need
protection.

Railroad Industry Has Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, railroad companies*

Developed a Security Plan security efforts focused primarily on the
prevention of theft at rail facilities.

and Taken Other Steps Representatives of several major railroad companies
told us that they had

toll- free emergency telephone numbers to report suspicious activity,
including theft, in place before the terrorist attacks. According to a
representative from the Association of American Railroads (AAR), which
represents the major freight railroads in the United States, Mexico, and
Canada, railroad companies currently employ over 1, 000 police officers.

Within two weeks of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, AAR
created a railroad security task force to analyze the industry*s risk from
and response to the threat of terrorism. AAR worked jointly with several
chemical industry associations and consultants from a security firm to
develop the industry*s security management plan. 14 As part of this
effort, AAR created critical action teams to assess the rail industry*s
security in

five areas: infrastructure, military operations, information technology
and communications, security of operations, and hazardous materials. The
plan that resulted from this effort was presented to its member railroads
and

TSA in December 2001. It established four alert levels and described a
graduated series of actions to prevent terrorist threats to railroad
personnel and facilities that correspond to each alert level. The actions
include progressively rigorous countermeasures to be taken in the areas of
operations, information technology and communications, and police. The
countermeasures include actions to heighten security awareness, limit the
sharing of information about sensitive shipments, and test that security
systems are operating as intended. With U. S. military action in Iraq, the
railroad industry has taken additional security steps, including real-
time monitoring and additional surveillance of designated trains;
increased security at some rail yards; and increased inspection of
priority railroad tracks, tunnels, and bridges.

Representatives of several major railroad companies and the railroad
industry told us that the railroads have implemented a number of new
security measures since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
including the following:

 increasing the awareness of employees about potential security threats;
 enhancing dispatch command and control centers;  monitoring hazardous
materials with video surveillance;  restricting access to facilities
through the use of key cards;  installing better lighting, fencing, and
barricades at rail facilities; 14 See U. S. General Accounting Office,
Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical
Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness Is Unknown, GAO- 03-
439 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 14, 2003) for information on voluntary
actions that the

chemical industry has taken to address security preparedness and the
challenges that it faces in protecting its assets and operations.

 monitoring of critical infrastructure locations by police officers and
contracted security guards;

 employing additional security officers to protect hazardous materials in
storage;

 instituting more threat information sharing with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, as well as state and local government agencies;

 conducting security evaluations of rail facilities;  limiting access to
electronic tracking of shipments of hazardous

materials; and  conducting *red team* assault tests in which rail
companies send

undercover security officers to test employees* responses to trespassers.

We visited rail facilities at five locations, in part to observe security
measures there. Overall, we observed more physical security measures at
large rail facilities than at smaller facilities. Both the small and large
facilities we visited had signs indicating that trespassing was not
permitted and that railroad personnel were on duty part of or all day. In
addition, the large facilities had security video cameras, lights,
observation towers staffed by railroad personnel that can be used as
security lookouts, and fencing along some parts of the facility. However,
all of the facilities we visited could be readily accessed because they
are not fenced or fences did not completely separate the facilities from
adjacent areas, and some of the

facilities did not have gates around them. Figure 1 shows photos of rail
facilities in some of the case study locations we visited. We observed the
following during our visits:

 rail companies relied heavily on the vigilance of employees;  employees
provided photo identifications upon request, but were not

required to display them;  the presence of security guards varied; and 
at intermodal facilities, where hazardous material products are

transferred between rail cars and trucks for continued shipment,

procedures were in place to check for tampering with the valves of tank
cars transporting hazardous materials.

Figure 1: Photos of Rail Facilities

Observation tower at a rail facility

Source: GAO. Gated entrance at an intermodal rail facility Source: GAO.

Entrance to a rail facility Source: DHS.

Despite reporting that they had implemented enhanced security measures,
railroad industry representatives told us that it is not possible to
eliminate all vulnerabilities and, without government assistance, the
industry lacks the resources to counter a significant terrorist attack.

TSA Is Beginning to Address Since its creation in November 2001, TSA has
primarily focused on Rail Security

improving aviation security to meet the deadlines established in the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act for TSA to assume civil aviation
security functions and responsibilities, such as implementing federal
passenger screening. As a result, TSA has not yet assumed full
responsibility for security in other modes of transportation, such as
rail.

The establishment of TSA*s Office of Maritime and Land Security in March
2002 marked the beginning of TSA*s efforts to address security in other
modal areas, including the security of rail transportation. The goals for
this office are to prevent terrorist attacks, protect transportation
without impeding movement, and respond to transportation accidents or
incidents promptly.

TSA*s Office of Maritime and Land Security plans to hire 200 employees to
cover all 50 states by 2004, subject to resource constraints. As of March
2003, the office had filled 83 of the 200 positions. TSA officials said
that since the office*s eventual staff will be relatively small, the
office plans to work jointly with DOT to maximize resources by relying on
other modal administrations to cover day- to- day security operations.
According to TSA officials, the office will focus on identifying security
gaps and improving security plans in each mode.

TSA Has Taken Some Steps TSA has taken some steps to address the security
of hazardous material rail

to Address the Security of shipments, including starting the development
of an intermodal

Hazardous Material transportation system security plan, establishing
working relationships

Transportation by Rail, but with DOT*s modal administrations, and
conducting an initial review of the

rail industry*s own security rail plan. In March 2003, DHS launched Has
Not Yet Developed a

Operation Liberty Shield to help protect the nation*s infrastructure and
Rail Security Plan deter possible terrorist attacks. Among other things,
this national plan calls for (1) state governors to provide additional
police or National Guard forces at selected railroad bridges; and (2)
railroad companies to improve

the security of major rail facilities and hubs, monitor shipments of
hazardous materials, and increase the surveillance of trains carrying
these materials. Nevertheless, TSA has not yet developed a security plan
for rail

that systematically determines the adequacy of security measures already
in place and identifies gaps that need to be addressed.

TSA officials told us that they and officials in other components of DHS
are working on a national transportation system security plan to address
the security challenges of the nation*s transportation system using a
threatbased and risk management approach. This plan is to address the
intermodal aspects of the transportation system first and then to provide
a strategic framework for future TSA activities in transportation
security. TSA officials said that they hope to have the key components of
this intermodal plan in place by May 2003 and after that time they will
consider security on individual transportation modes, including rail. TSA
has also signed a memorandum of agreement with DOT*s Federal Aviation
Administration, which DOT officials said would serve as a guide for

relations between TSA and DOT*s modal administrations, including FRA and
RSPA.

TSA*s Office of Maritime and Land Security officials told us that they
have reviewed AAR*s security plan, and they credited AAR for its efforts
in conducting a very aggressive vulnerability assessment. The TSA
officials said that they are considering using aspects of the AAR
assessment as the basis for a model that TSA plans to develop on how to
conduct vulnerability assessments. However, the officials noted that some
areas of AAR*s plan need to be clarified, such as what specific measures
individual railroad companies will be expected to implement. FRA officials
have also reviewed AAR*s plan and commented that AAR needs to identify
mitigating actions more specifically.

TSA officials told us they are planning to undertake projects in the
future that we believe could become part of a rail security plan,
including the development of physical security standards and an assessment
of vulnerable hazardous material transportation areas. As a first step,
officials said that they plan to visit seaport facilities, which face
similar threats to protecting hazardous material shipments as rail
facilities do, to determine what physical security standards could be
applied to other modes of transportation, in areas such as facility
lighting levels or monitoring by closed- circuit televisions. Given their
initial focus on aviation security priorities, TSA officials said they
have not yet established time frames for developing these physical
security standards or conducting a vulnerability assessment of the rail
industry. FRA officials told us that they are working with TSA on their
efforts to develop and implement federal standards for railroad security.

The development of a security plan addressing rail transportation of
hazardous materials that uses a risk- based management approach would
assist TSA by providing a strategy to identify threats to these shipments,
vulnerabilities that may be targeted in the system used to ship these
materials, and high- risk, high consequence facilities that need
protection. Although TSA has taken steps and is considering future
measures to address the security of hazardous material rail shipments, it
does not yet

have a risk- based plan to guide its actions specifically in this area.
Until TSA develops such a plan, it will not know whether resources are
being deployed as effectively and efficiently as possible to reduce the
risk of possible terrorist attacks.

In our previous work on homeland security, we have determined that the
federal government can benefit from a risk management approach to defend
against terrorism. 15 This approach can provide organizations with a
process for enhancing their preparedness to respond to terrorist attacks

and to permit better direction of national finite resources to areas of
highest priority. Figure 2 shows the components of a risk management
approach to defend against terrorism. This approach includes the
following:

 a threat assessment to identify and evaluate potential threats on the
basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and impact of an
attack;

 a vulnerability assessment to identify weaknesses that may be exploited
by identified threats and suggest options to address those weaknesses; and

 a criticality assessment to evaluate and identify assets and
infrastructure in terms of specific criteria such as their importance to
public safety and the economy.

15 For additional information on the applicability of risk management to
homeland security, see: U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland
Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO-
02- 208T (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 31, 2001).

Figure 2: Components of a Risk Management Approach to Defend Against
Terrorism Risk Management Approach

Threat Vulnerability

Criticality assessment assessment assessment

Source: GAO.

Several Issues Our discussions with federal and private sector hazardous
material

Regarding the Safety transportation experts and local community officials
identified several

issues that, in their opinion, remain unresolved regarding the safe and
and Security of

secure transportation of hazardous materials by rail. These issues include
Hazardous Materials

the need for measures to better safeguard hazardous materials stored in
Transported by Rail

rail cars while awaiting delivery to a final destination* a practice
commonly referred to as *storage- in- transit** the advisability of
requiring

Remain Unresolved companies to notify local communities of the type and
quantities of

materials stored in transit, and the appropriate amount of information
rail companies should be required to provide local officials regarding
hazardous material shipments passing through their communities.

Concerns about the Safety The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
have raised concerns about the

and Security of Hazardous exposure and vulnerability of hazardous
materials stored in transit in

Materials Stored in Transit chemical rail cars on rail sidings and in rail
yards. Emergency response

Have Not Yet Been Fully officials in three of the locations we visited
identified storage- in- transit as a

safety and security concern for their communities. Addressed

The local officials said that they were aware of rail cars that were
unsecured and, in some cases, provided photographs or videotape as
evidence of the lack of security. According to these local officials,
unmonitored chemical cars could develop undetected leaks that could

threaten the nearby population and environment. A May 31, 2002,
hydrochloric acid leak from a rail car in Lowell, Massachusetts, is a
recent example of such an incident. In this incident, a rail car parked on
a siding developed a leak that produced a cloud of hazardous vapor before
the 200-

gallon leak of hazardous materials was contained. Local Government
Officials Although they could not provide documentation to support their
beliefs, Believe Some Shipments Stored

local government officials we interviewed in two locations stated that
they in Transit May Violate a Rule to

believed that, in some cases, shipments stored in transit in their local
areas Expedite Shipments

might be in violation of DOT*s 48- hour rule 16 that generally requires a
carrier to move each shipment of hazardous materials promptly and within
48 hours after its receipt at any yard, transfer station, or interchange
point. Although local officials believe the 48- hour rule is a safety and
security standard for shipments of hazardous materials stored in transit,
FRA

officials told us that the 48- hour rule was not instituted for storage
safety concerns. According to FRA officials, the 48- hour rule was
implemented for economic reasons, not safety reasons. FRA officials said
that the rule was developed in the early 1900s because oil companies were
using rail yards as convenient storage warehouses and not promptly moving
their shipments. 17 The rail companies did not want their property to be
used as a storage

warehouse without compensation. FRA officials said that they do not
necessarily encourage rail companies to move rail cars affected by the
48hour rule to another destination just to meet the time limit because
this might result in moving a car from a safe to a hazardous location.

16 49 CFR S:174.14, Movements To Be Expedited.

17 We were not able to corroborate FRA*s explanation. What became the 48-
hour requirement for expedited movement is found in the 1914 published
rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Regulations for the
Transportation of Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles by Freight and
Express and Specifications for Shipping Containers, Interstate

Commerce Commission, P:P: 1433, 1714, (GPO eff. October 1, 1914). The
origin of the rules themselves can be traced from even earlier Interstate
Commerce Commission rules, which grew out of the need to regulate the safe
transportation of explosives. The 1914 regulations appear to have remained
largely unchanged until 1939, when they were included in the first version
of the Code of Federal Regulations. At that time, 49 C. F. R. S: 80.262
(1939), provided:

*Movement to be expedited. Carriers must forward shipments of explosives
and other dangerous articles promptly and within 48 hours after acceptance
at originating point or receipt at any yard, transfer station, or
interchange point.*

FRA Is Beginning to Address FRA officials recognize that the security
concerns regarding storage- intransit

Potential Safety and Security have grown since the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks. From a

Issues Regarding Storage- intransit security standpoint, the officials
said that new regulations for storage- intransit

materials should be considered. According to these officials, such
measures may include not allowing rail cars containing certain highly
hazardous commodities to be stored in transit.

FRA is currently reviewing the safety and security of hazardous materials
stored in transit through initiatives such as collaboration with the
American Chemistry Council to examine how storage- in- transit shipments
typically move, how the chemical industry can better expedite these
movements, and viable alternatives to storing chemicals in transit. TSA is
leading an initiative to follow chlorine shipments from origin to
destination. Its overall goal is to determine best practices for shipments
as well as the types of measures needed to secure shipments, including
those

stored in transit. TSA has reached out to the Chlorine Institute, American
Chemistry Council, FRA, RSPA, and AAR. TSA hopes to expand the lessons
learned from this initiative to other hazardous material rail shipments.

RSPA Plans to Clarify the In addition to expressing concern about the
safety and security of

Regulatory Oversight of the hazardous materials stored in transit and
their need for information on the

Safety and Security of Hazardous types and quantities of these materials,
a local official that we interviewed

Materials Stored in Transit told us that he was unclear about which
federal agency has regulatory

oversight for the safety and security of this area. Some issues pertaining
to the specific scope of DOT and EPA*s roles in the regulatory oversight
of hazardous materials stored in transit have not been fully determined.
According to RSPA, confusion exists in the regulated community and among
federal, state, and local agencies with hazardous material safety
responsibilities regarding whether and to what extent DOT hazardous
material transportation safety regulations apply to particular operations
related to the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce, such as
storage- in- transit on tracks leased to fixed facilities. 18 18 Leased
tracks are railroad tracks in rail yards or railroad sidings that
manufacturers, such

as chemical companies, lease from railroad companies to temporarily store
their commodities until needed. Commodities are stored in rail cars on
these *leased* tracks. Leases may be *fixed,* when a company enters into a
lease of specific track, or *rolling,* when the company pays a storage fee
for whatever track the car may be sitting on. The location where the car
is held may be the destination identified on the shipping papers but not
the final destination where the hazardous materials will be unloaded.
Fixed facilities are business premises where extremely hazardous materials
are produced, stored, or used in amounts exceeding legally proscribed
threshold quantities.

In response to requests for clarification on whether particular
activities, such as storage- in- transit, should be considered
transportation operations, RSPA has issued a proposed rule* Applicability
of the Hazardous Materials Regulations to Loading, Unloading, and Storage,
also known as HM- 223* to clarify the applicability of DOT*s hazardous
material regulations to specific

functions and activities, including loading and unloading of hazardous
materials and their storage during transportation. RSPA officials have
concluded that, given the potential for continuing terrorist threats and
the critical need to assure the security of hazardous materials at fixed
facilities and in transportation, it is more important than ever to
clarify its jurisdiction over hazardous materials in transportation.

According to RSPA, confusion exists concerning whether EPA or DOT
regulations apply to storage- in- transit on leased tracks because federal
regulations do not clearly articulate whether this operation is
transportation or nontransportation related. Under HM- 223, RSPA is
considering two options for regulatory oversight of storage- in- transit
occurring on leased tracks. Under the first option, storage on leased
tracks would be considered as storage after movement in transportation of
the rail car has been completed whether the hazardous material is to be
unloaded at that destination or not. The hazardous material transportation
regulations would not apply under this option and hazardous material

inspectors could not apply DOT*s hazardous material rail safety
requirements concerning proper shipping papers, operational handling of
rail cars, or placards to indicate the hazardous content of rail cars.

According to EPA officials that we interviewed, under this option, EPA*s
risk management program regulations under the Clean Air Act might apply if
storage on leased tracks contained more than a threshold amount of certain
regulated highly toxic materials, such as chlorine. These officials note
that EPA has stated that the Clean Air Act is not preempted by DOT*s
authority. They said that while EPA generally does not regulate activities
regulated by DOT, there are circumstances where both agencies*

authorities might apply, for example, with respect to long- term storage
or facility equipment involved in loading or unloading.

Under the second option being considered, storage on leased tracks would
be considered storage related to transportation and thus subject to all
the applicable requirements of the DOT hazardous material regulation, even
if the leased tracks were the final destination identified on the shipping
papers. This would ensure that rail cars would be subject to all pertinent

DOT hazardous material requirements.

While RSPA*s efforts to propose rule making on the applicability of the
hazardous material transportation regulations to loading, unloading, and
storage of hazardous materials began with an advanced notice of public
rule making in 1996, RSPA officials said that HM- 223, which culminates
those efforts, will be not be finalized until June 2003. Over this period,
to address issues involved in clarifying jurisdiction in this area, RSPA
published another advanced notice of public rule making in 1999 and held
public meetings to obtain proposals and recommendations on the

applicability of hazardous material regulations from the regulated
community, which includes shippers, carriers, warehouses, and federal,
state, and local public safety agencies. In 2001, RSPA published a notice
of proposed rule making requesting written comments on proposals from
these organizations.

Notifying Local While chemical manufacturers are required to notify their
communities of Communities on the Type

the existence of hazardous materials at their facilities, the advisability
of and Quantities of Hazardous

requiring companies to notify local communities on the type and quantities
Materials Stored in Transit

of materials stored in transit has not been similarly addressed by DOT.
Has Not Been Addressed

Based on their observations, local officials from two of the 10
jurisdictions that we visited told us that they believe storage- in-
transit shipments remain in rail yards for periods longer than 48 hours.
To ensure adequate safety and security for hazardous materials stored in
transit, the officials at one

location suggested that the 48- hour rule be more strongly enforced to
expedite shipments or, if hazardous material shipments remain stationary
for extended periods of time (beyond the 48- hour period), these shipments
should be regulated in a manner similar to hazardous materials stored in
fixed facilities* with reporting requirements for companies to provide

information to emergency response officials on the types and quantities of
materials stored in transit.

The local officials said that, because these hazardous materials stored in
transit are parked in their community for extended periods of time, they
present a risk similar to the potential health and safety risk posed by
chemicals at a fixed facility. They expressed a need to have information
on the types and quantities of hazardous materials stored in transit in
their communities to ensure that they have the proper training and
equipment to respond to incidents involving these materials, and told us
that they had experienced difficulty in obtaining information on these
materials stored in transit. The local officials that we interviewed in
one location feel that companies should be required to provide information
on the contents of the rail cars in a manner similar to that required of
fixed facilities under the

Emergency Planning and Community Right- to- Know Act of 1986. 19 Under the
requirements of this act, chemical manufacturers are required to notify
their communities of the existence, as well as some routine and accidental
releases, of hazardous materials at their facilities to aid in emergency
planning.

While some local officials that we interviewed cited the need to receive
information on the types and quantities of hazardous materials stored in
transit, FRA officials told us that they were not in favor of sharing
real- time data on these shipments. FRA officials said that it would be a
significant logistical challenge for railroads to share real- time data
regarding individual freight movements stored in transit. These officials
said that providing advance notification information could also create new
security concerns as detailed information on the whereabouts of hazardous
materials becomes known in great detail by a large number of individuals.
In addition, FRA officials commented that it would be inappropriate to

require railroads to report to local communities on all hazardous
materials stored in transit because the railroads have limited advance
knowledge of what will be stored at these locations.

19 P. L. 99- 499.

Opinions Differ on While differing opinions exist concerning the adequacy
of hazardous

Adequacy of Hazardous material shipment information currently provided to
local communities, no

Material Shipment determination has been made at a federal level on the
appropriate amount

Information Provided to of information rail companies should be required
to provide to

communities regarding overall hazardous material shipments to enhance
Communities, but No

their emergency preparedness. Officials from five of the ten communities
Determination Has Been that we visited said they did not need advance
notification information on Made on Appropriate

specific shipment types and quantities. Due to the high volume and variety
Amount of Disclosure

of hazardous material shipments through his area, an official from one of
these communities said that they employ an approach to respond to all
types of chemical emergencies. He believes that this approach is more
effective for his community*s circumstances rather than trying to prepare
for specific chemicals that might be involved in incidents. However, some
officials from two of these five communities told us that they would like
to

receive advance notification of special shipments, such as high- level
radioactive materials or explosives. Officials from the other five
communities that we visited said that they would like to receive advance
notification of certain shipments for emergency planning purposes.

AAR suggests to its member railroads that, as a voluntary policy, they
provide, when requested, historical information on hazardous materials
that have been shipped through a community. Officials from AAR member
railroads that we interviewed said that they complied with this voluntary
policy. For example, a railroad, when asked, will inform a community of
the types of hazardous materials most frequently shipped through that
community over the past year. This policy covers AAR member railroads,
which account for more than 96 percent of intercity rail freight service
and 100 percent of intercity passenger service in the United States. 20
Emergency response officials that we spoke to at one of our site visits
said that they had experienced difficulty in obtaining limited historical
information about shipments of hazardous materials from a railroad that

was not an AAR member. The local officials told us that it took 4 years of
requests before the company agreed to provide this information to assist
them in their emergency management planning. In the interim, the locality
had to respond to a hazardous material incident on the company*s tracks

20 AAR*s membership includes the major Class I railroads, two of the
larger short line railroads, and 500 smaller railroads represented through
an AAR operating committee.

involving a tank car leaking hydrochloric acid, which emergency responders
were unaware had been stored on rail tracks in the community.

Officials that we spoke to from national rail industry organizations
offered their opinions on the subject of advance notification. An official
from one organization said that he does not support providing advance
notification information on specific upcoming shipments to local
communities because of the high volume of materials shipped and the low
probability of release. An official from another organization said that
his organization is not in favor of providing advance notification because
it would be too much information sent on a daily basis and would soon be
ignored. He further cautioned that releasing information about planned
shipments could pose a security risk because such information could be
used to identify vulnerabilities.

FRA officials told us that careful consideration needs to be given to the
full implications of advance notification. They said that this includes
security implications, community capability to make constructive use of
the data, the potential costs and benefits of such requirements, and
whether these requirements should be applied to other modes of
transportation, such as motor carriers. Furthermore, in commenting on the
overall consideration of new security measures for the rail industry, FRA
officials told us that whatever security enhancements might be required
for rail shipments of hazardous materials should be accompanied by
appropriate security requirements for truck shipments so that shippers not
switch to a potentially more vulnerable but less expensive alternative.

Most Localities Visited Even though a host of voluntary standards and
self- assessment tools are

Report They Are available to assist localities in assessing aspects of
their emergency response capabilities, no standardized tool currently
exists to objectively

Generally Prepared to determine a locality*s level of preparedness to
respond to hazardous

Respond to Hazardous material incidents. As such, the localities that we
visited provided

Material Rail Incidents, information on their preparedness based on their
own self- assessments

rather than on uniform national criteria. These localities took actions to
but Sufficiency of

prepare for and respond to hazardous material incidents based on
selfassessments Actions Taken Cannot

formed from a variety of factors. For the most part, these localities said
that they found themselves prepared to respond to Be Determined

hazardous material rail incidents based on their own selected criteria.
Due to the absence of a standardized tool to gauge the level of
preparedness, we were unable to determine the sufficiency of local
community actions to prepare for hazardous material rail incidents given
the risk factors that they face. 21

Case Study Findings Show To assess local community capability to prepare
for and respond to

Varying Preparedness potential terrorist attacks or accidents involving
rail shipments, we visited Actions Taken by Local

10 localities in the United States. Each of these localities was
judgmentally Communities selected based on at least one of following three
criteria:

 experienced a recent and significant rail incident involving hazardous
materials,

 had a large population and flow of hazardous materials shipped through
it by rail, and

 had a small population and large flow of hazardous materials shipped
through it by rail. Officials from most localities that we visited
reported that their cities are generally prepared to respond to these
incidents. Officials from the localities told us that they have emergency
response plans in place, access to either their own or another hazardous
material response team, and that they plan and conduct training and
drills. In addition, these localities report

21 Appendix V contains additional information on the federal government
and private sector resources available to localities for emergency
response to rail incidents involving the transportation of hazardous
materials.

that they have most of the basic equipment necessary to respond to a
hazardous material incident on hand. Although officials said they were
generally prepared to respond to incidents involving hazardous chemical
materials, they said that they were less prepared to deal with incidents
involving radioactive materials, with some locations citing a lack of
equipment and training needed to respond. Also, local officials that we

interviewed said that technical communication compatibility could be
improved, but they have developed ways to accommodate communication needs,
such as the use of cellular phones. Finally, local officials from over
half of the locations that we visited said that their communities lacked
sufficient funds to cover the positions left temporarily vacant by
personnel taking training. Self- assessments Show That

Based on their own self- assessments, local fire department officials from
Most Locations Are Prepared to

most of the cities that we visited said that they are generally prepared
to Respond to Hazardous Materials

respond to a hazardous material incident. A few officials whom we
Incidents, but Not to Incidents

interviewed said that although their city is prepared to respond to a
Involving Radioactive Materials

hazardous material incident, their in- house capability would depend on
the types of hazardous materials involved and the scope of the incident.
For example, one fire department official said that he is comfortable with
his city*s capabilities to respond to chemical accidents such as leaking
tank cars, spills, and derailments. He believed that his city could
adequately respond to a hazardous material incident unless it was a
catastrophic event, such as a major derailment involving multiple cars.
This official stated, however, that in the event of a large- scale
hazardous material incident, his city would use additional resources from
private, state, and federal organizations, as well as mutual aid plans,
where neighboring jurisdictions agree to provide emergency response
resources to one another in the event that they are needed to augment
their own response capabilities.

When asked if they were prepared to respond to a hazardous material
incident involving radioactive materials, officials from most of the
locations we visited said that they were less capable of responding to
such incidents, with some locations citing a lack of equipment and
training to respond. To prepare for the increase in spent nuclear fuel
shipments expected with the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository, which is
scheduled to begin operations in 2010, the federal government has begun
preliminary planning to ensure local preparedness for the safe transport
of spent nuclear fuel. If the Yucca Mountain Repository is licensed, DOE
will be required, under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 22 to
implement a

program to train local public safety officials through whose jurisdictions
DOE plans to ship radioactive materials to the repository. According to
DOE, this program will be funded 5 years prior to the start of Yucca
Mountain operations.

Emergency Response Plans Are Emergency response plans are in place at all
the localities we visited. These in Place at All Locations

plans address all the hazards applicable to each location and include
emergency responses to hazardous material incidents, including rail
incidents. The plans vary according to the resources that each locality
relies on and the specific courses of action each identifies to be taken
in the event of an emergency. For example, the plans document which city
agency is designated as a lead response agency in the event of an
incident, 23 identify support agencies that can be called in, such as
police and health departments, and outline civil defense procedures. Plans
also vary on how

often they are updated. In light of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, officials from half of the locations we visited told us that they
have incorporated new terrorism response procedures into their emergency
planning, including training or response protocols.

22 42 U. S. C. S: 10175( c). 23 For hazardous material incidents, a
locality*s fire department is the lead designated agency.

Most Cities We Visited Have More than half of the cities we visited have
their own dedicated hazardous

Dedicated Hazardous Material material teams to respond to incidents
involving the release of hazardous

Teams and All Have Access to materials, including those occurring at fixed
facilities or in rail

Public Hazardous Material transportation. These are all large or medium-
sized cities. 24 Cities that do Teams

not have their own hazardous material teams have access to a local,
regional, state, or private hazardous material response team. For example,
an official from one small city said that the city has access to the
resources of the state police hazardous material team. As part of their
emergency

response plans, other cities have access to chemists from private industry
or universities to provide technical assistance in identifying chemicals
and their hazards in the event of an incident.

All Fire Department Personnel Local fire department officials that we
interviewed in all the locations we

Have at Least Some Hazardous visited said that their fire department
personnel have received at least

Material Response Training awareness- level training, the lowest level of
training recommended in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Standard 472, Professional

Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents. However, a
representative of a national emergency response organization suggested
that the minimum level of training for first responders should actually be
at the operations level, the second highest level of training described in
NFPA Standard 472. Fire departments in the locations we visited varied in
providing operations level training for their fire fighting personnel.

However, for the locations with specialized hazardous material teams, all
hazardous material team personnel received technician level training, the
third highest level of training recommended by NFPA Standard 472. Table 1
lists the four levels of training recommended by NFPA Standard 472.

24 We defined a small city as one having a population of less than 100,
000 people, a mediumsized city as one having a population between 100,000
and 500,000 people, and a large city as one having a population of over
500,000 people. The population figures are based on the 2000 U. S. Census.

Table 1: NFPA Levels of Professional Competence for First Responders to
Hazardous Materials Incidents Level Definition

Awareness The basic competency developed by the NFPA for first responders
to a hazardous materials incident. The training includes providing first
responders with the knowledge and skills to identify a hazardous materials
incident and to contact the appropriate response resource in accordance
with local standard operating procedures. Operational The second level of
competency developed by the NFPA for first responders to hazardous
materials incidents. First

responders trained at this level will meet the competency of the NFPA*s
awareness level training as well as any additional competency designed to
allow the responder to plan and initiate a response to the incident.

Technician The third level of competency developed by the NFPA for first
responders to hazardous materials incidents. First responders trained at
this level will meet the competency of the NFPA*s awareness and
operational standards. Additional training includes appropriate measures
to meet federal and other state, local, or provincial occupation health
and safety regulator requirements.

Incident The highest level of competency developed by the NFPA for first
responders to hazardous materials incidents. First

Commander responders trained at this level will meet all NFPA standards
for awareness and operational levels. In addition, responders trained at
the command level will have the necessary knowledge to analyze a hazardous
material incident and plan for and mitigate incidents.

Source: National Fire Protection Association. Reprinted with permission
from NFPA 472- 2002, Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous
Materials Incidents, Copyright (c) 2002, National Fire Protection
Association, Quincy, MA 02269. Note: This reprinted material is not the
complete and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject,
which is represented only by the standard in its entirety.

In addition to fire departments, officials in some cities we visited told
us that they have trained other departmental personnel, such as police,
health, and public works, for response to hazardous material incidents.
The officials we interviewed said that, while these other agencies are not
expected to serve a primary role in the containment of hazardous material
incidents, this training familiarizes these personnel with response
procedures in the event that they are the first on the scene to an
incident or are required to assist responding fire fighters, such as by
rerouting traffic.

More Than Half of The Cities We Officials from more than half of the case
study locations that we visited Visited Have Conducted

said that they conducted response drills to prepare for hazardous material
Hazardous Material Response

incidents. These cities have had at least one hazardous material drill
within Drills and Cited Lessons Learned

the last 3 years. Officials from some cities said that they have conducted
rail- specific hazardous material response drills.

Among the cities that have conducted drills or experienced prior hazardous
material rail accidents, officials told us that these experiences had
highlighted the need for

 better communication and coordination, including the use of the incident
command system, among departments or mutual aid districts during an
emergency;

 joint training;  better dissemination of information to the public
including better public

awareness of civil defense procedures; and  better crowd control in a
mass decontamination situation. Equipment Is Lacking in Some

In addition to a firefighter*s standard turnout gear, several pieces of
Locations

equipment are commonly used to respond to hazardous material incidents. 25
These include airborne chemical detection equipment, spare turnout gear,
protective gear, air hazard detection equipment, and chemical
identification kits.

While officials that we interviewed said that they have the majority of
this equipment on hand to use in response to a hazardous material
incident, some locations said they lacked some additional equipment that
was not on this list, such as patient extraction equipment and hazardous
material

response vehicles to carry equipment to the scene. More than half the
locations specifically cited a need for additional radiological response
equipment, such as detectors, decontamination equipment, and personal
protective equipment.

Compatibility of Communication Officials in half of the case study
locations we visited told us that

Equipment Varies by Location communication systems are not compatible
between city agencies. In

addition, officials in most of the case study locations we visited said
that they could not communicate with other jurisdictions without the use
of an intermediary communication device, such as a dispatch center. While
officials we interviewed said that communication compatibility could be
improved, most said that they have developed ways to accommodate
communication needs, such as the use of cellular phones. However, in one
location that had experienced a recent rail accident involving hazardous
materials, officials cited radio communication incompatibility as a
problem. These local officials said that they did not have the
compatibility

25 Typically, a firefighter*s standard turnout gear includes a helmet,
coat, gloves, pants, boots, and a self- contained breathing apparatus,
which provides the user with respiratory protection in a toxic or oxygen
deficient environment.

to speak by radio to officials from other agencies outside the city.
Officials from some case study locations also told us that communication
systems do not work as well underground.

Officials Said That Training Can Officials from over half of the case
study locations we visited said that they Be Difficult to Access Because
of

had difficulty accessing hazardous material response training
opportunities Personnel Funding Constraints

because of the cost of providing replacements for those first responders
taking training. In addition, one national response organization stated it
visits localities to provide training to help alleviate costs that may be

associated with travel to off- site training courses. DHS* Directorate of

With the development of a national homeland security strategy, DHS* EP& R
Emergency Preparedness

Directorate has also recognized a need for the federal government to and
Response Is Beginning

conduct an assessment of state emergency response preparedness levels Work
on a Baseline

that would allow it to determine a baseline to measure preparedness across
Assessment Tool to

the country. Since most local emergency response standards and procedures
are voluntary in nature and states employ a wide variety of Determine
Preparedness

guides in their planning, the EP& R Directorate chose to adopt one of
these Levels assessment tools* the Emergency Management Accreditation
Program (EMAP) criteria* to standardize the data collection process and
help the

agency ascertain factors in vulnerabilities on a national level. EP& R
Directorate officials characterized EMAP standards as being very rigorous.

In fiscal year 2003, as a first step toward developing a preparedness
baseline, EP& R Directorate officials plan to request that all 50 states
complete a self- assessment of their level of preparedness to respond to
emergencies using EMAP standards as a guide. From the assessment program,
EP& R Directorate officials said that they hope that communities evaluate
their own capabilities, identify deficits, and establish performance
standards to improve emergency response. EP& R Directorate officials also
plan to work with a team of EMAP peer reviewers to validate the
operability of state emergency response plans as an additional tool in
gauging preparedness. This information would then be used to determine the
EP& R Directorate*s baseline of national preparedness levels.

To validate state emergency response planning, the EP& R Directorate plans
to train assessment teams to evaluate preparedness using a common
methodology. These teams would spend from 3 to 8 days evaluating each

state. Their methodology would include checks of state emergency plan
resources. For example, if a certain organization within a state is
expected to provide a specific resource or serve a role in the plan, the
reviewers

would contact that organization and verify that the resource contacts know
what is expected of them and can perform the tasks. EP& R Directorate
officials said that assessments of all states are due to be completed by
the end of 2004. The EP& R Directorate plans on assessing about half the
states annually in this program and issuing a midprogram assessment
report.

Conclusions The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have focused
attention on the security and potential vulnerabilities of the nation*s
transportation

infrastructure. In response to heightened awareness, the railroad industry
took action to develop a security plan using a risk management approach to
address perceived vulnerabilities. The adequacy of this industry plan to
protect communities and the railroad infrastructure is still unclear since
TSA, which is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation,
including rail, has not yet developed a plan to specifically address the
security of rail transportation, even though it has started developing a
riskbased intermodal transportation system security plan. Without such a
specific plan, TSA lacks a framework for systematically evaluating and
prioritizing actions needed to ensure the safety and security of the
transportation of hazardous materials by rail. Some of the communities
that participated in our case studies expressed concerns regarding the
safety and security of hazardous materials in rail

cars passing through or stored in their communities. They wanted
additional information on the types and quantities of these materials
since, without this information, it is difficult for communities to know
how to prepare for possible incidents involving hazardous releases.
However, this need for information must be balanced against the security
risks that

disclosure could pose. Recommendation for

To help meet the requirement to secure all modes of transportation under
Executive Action

the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, we recommend that the
Secretary of Homeland Security work jointly with the Secretary of
Transportation to develop a risk- based plan that specifically addresses
the security of the nation*s rail infrastructure. This plan should build
upon the railroad industry*s experience with rail infrastructure and the
transportation of hazardous materials and establish time frames for
implementing specific security actions necessary to protect hazardous
material rail shipments. Among the areas that should be addressed in
developing this plan are

 the appropriate roles of the private sector and federal, state, and
local governments;

 minimum security standards for hazardous materials stored in transit in
rail cars; and

 the appropriate level of disclosure to local communities of the types
and quantities of hazardous materials passing through or stored in transit
in these communities.

Agency Comments and We provided the Departments of Defense, Energy, Health
and Human

Our Evaluation Services, Homeland Security, Justice, Labor, and
Transportation, as well as

the Environmental Protection Agency, National Transportation Safety Board,
and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with copies of a draft of this report
for their review and comment. The Departments of Defense, Justice, and
Labor, as well as the National Transportation Safety Board, did not
provide comments. The Departments of Health and Human Services and Energy,
as well as the Environmental Protection Agency and Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, provided technical comments and generally agreed with our
report. The Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security provided
oral comments. They generally agreed with our report and acknowledged that
no plan to specifically address rail security has

been developed, but stressed that they have taken some actions to enhance
the security of hazardous material rail shipments. We incorporated these
comments where appropriate. In addition, the Department of Transportation
raised other issues regarding rail security, which are discussed below.
The Administrator of FRA commented that our report gave the impression

that, in the absence of explicit federal security requirements, railroad
companies were paying insufficient attention to security risks. This was
not our intention. Rather, our report credits the timely effort to address
rail hazardous material risk by the Association of American Railroads,
which was performed with a number of chemical manufacturers. It further
lists security measures reported by individual railroads in the aftermath
of September 11, 2001.

FRA officials also commented that the safety risks associated with the
storage- in- transit of hazardous materials received inappropriate
emphasis in the report, suggesting that the concern is based only on
anecdotal information. We did not attempt to define the magnitude of the
safety risks

associated with storage- in- transit. Rather, we reported the concerns
expressed by some local communities about this practice without attempting
to determine the extent of the problem at a national level.

On May 28, 2003, we subsequently received from FRA a clarification of
their views on the risk- based plan for rail security that we recommended.
FRA wanted to be on record as recognizing the merits of risk- based
management and supportive of its use in day- to- day business. The
agency*s position is contained in a letter to GAO that we have included as
appendix

VI. Our response to this letter is contained in appendix VII. As agreed
with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this
report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the
report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
agencies listed above. We also will make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO
Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512- 2834. Individuals making key contributions to this report included
Colin J. Fallon, Bert Japikse, Jane S. Kim, Victoria E. Miller, John W.
Mingus Jr., Thomas M. Phan, Maria J. Santos, Michael J. Simon, and Robert
E. White.

Peter F. Guerrero Director Physical Infrastructure Issues

Appendi Appendi xes x I

Scope and Methodology We used a combination of approaches and
methodologies to examine (1) recent steps taken by industry and government
to improve the safety and security of hazardous materials transported by
rail, (2) issues pertaining to the safety and security of rail transport
of hazardous materials that, in the opinion of the hazardous material
experts, remain unresolved, and (3) the preparedness of local
jurisdictions to respond to rail incidents involving hazardous materials.
We completed interviews with regulatory officials and representatives of
private industry, analyses of hazardous material volume and incident data,
and case study interviews with local officials.

To obtain the views of experts on the safety and security of rail
transportation of hazardous materials, we sponsored a 1- day panel through
the National Academy of Sciences that brought together representatives
from academia, industry, and local government. The views of panel members
were used to identify issues and perspectives on the current system,
policies, and practices for transporting hazardous materials by rail.

Specifically, we asked the panel members to discuss their opinions on: (1)
the effectiveness of current industry policies for the safe and secure
shipment of hazardous materials by rail, (2) the effectiveness of current
federal regulatory and assistance programs, and (3) suggestions for
improved industry and government cooperation. Their views served to
support our identification of issues that still remain to be addressed in
ensuring the safety and security of hazardous materials shipped by rail.

We did our work at 10 federal agencies, several private organizations
representing the railroad and chemical industries and emergency
responders, private rail companies, and state and local government
agencies in 10 locations nationwide. A complete list of the agencies and
organizations visited and contacted follows. We do not list the local
community case study locations that we visited because of the sensitive
nature of our review in light of homeland security concerns.

Organizations Visited and Contacted

Cabinet Departments  Department of Defense, Washington, D. C.; and Fort
Eustis, Virginia  Department of Energy, Washington, D. C.; and
Albuquerque, New Mexico

 Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, D. C.  Department
of Homeland Security (including the Transportation Security
Administration, U. S. Coast Guard, Directorate of Emergency

Preparedness and Response), Washington, D. C.  Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.  Department of Transportation (including the Federal
Railroad

Administration and the Research and Special Programs Administration),
Washington, D. C.  Department of Labor, Washington, D. C. Other Agencies
 Environmental Protection Agency, Washington D. C.

 National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, D. C.  Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Rockville, Maryland

National Organizations  International Association of Chiefs of Police,
Alexandria, Virginia  International Association of Emergency Managers,
Falls Church, Virginia

 International Association of Fire Chiefs, Fairfax, Virginia 
International Association of Fire Fighters, Washington, D. C.  National
Emergency Management Association, Lexington, Kentucky  National Volunteer
Fire Council, Washington, D. C.

Private Sector  American Chemistry Council, Arlington, Virginia 
Association of American Railroads, Washington, D. C.

 American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association, Washington, D. C.

 American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D. C.  The Chlorine
Institute, Washington, D. C.  Dangerous Goods Advisory Council,
Washington, D. C.  CSX Transportation, various locations  Burlington
Northern- Santa Fe Railroad, various locations  Union Pacific Railroad,
various locations. To examine the current safety and security
infrastructure of the rail industry, we conducted a series of interviews
with agency officials, local first responders, railroad companies, and
industry and trade groups. We then examined supporting documentation from
these interviews,

Department of Transportation databases, federal laws and regulations, and
previous GAO findings. We also conducted site visits of rail facilities to
record observations about security and safety practices. To report on
local jurisdictions* capability to respond to potential terrorist attacks
or chemical accidents, we performed case studies of 10 localities in the
United States. We judgmentally selected two small cities, four mediumsized
cities, and four large cities. The localities met at least one of
following three criteria:

 had experienced a recent and significant rail incident involving
hazardous materials,  had a large population and flow of hazardous
materials shipped through

it by rail, and/ or  had a small population and large flow of hazardous
materials shipped through it by rail.

We obtained locations of recent and significant hazardous material
incidents by researching available reports and information from the
National Transportation Safety Board. We analyzed the Surface
Transportation Board*s carload Waybill Sample, an annual stratified sample

of national rail flows within the United States, to determine flows of
hazardous materials by rail. 1 To estimate carload and tonnage data, we
also used the Waybill Sample. We analyzed the waybill origin and
destination data using the Department of Energy*s Transportation Routing
Analysis Geographic Information System to identify localities with a high
level of hazardous material flows. We reviewed documentation provided with
the waybill sample and the data we received from the sample, and
determined that these data were sufficiently accurate for our purposes.

To obtain information about our case study localities and their
preparedness to respond to incidents involving rail transportation of
hazardous materials, we interviewed officials from city government
agencies such as the fire, police, public works, transportation, emergency
management, and public health departments. We also interviewed local
emergency planning committees and state environmental and emergency
response agencies. In addition, we obtained and examined supporting
documentation from interviews with local officials as part of the study.
As discussed in the report, no standardized tool exists to gauge the
preparedness of a community for a hazardous material incident.

The report encompasses all aspects of rail transport of hazardous
materials, including loading, unloading, and storage, as well as the time
these materials spend in motion. This report uses the definition of

hazardous materials in federal hazardous material transportation law,
which includes flammable and radioactive materials. 2 Although some
hazardous materials enter the United States overland by rail from Canada
and Mexico, this report does not address issues that may be associated
with international shipments. Further, this report does not directly
address issues associated with computer security and possible cyber
attacks.

1 The Waybill Sample is a stratified random 1 percent sample of waybills
prepared by railroads. This sample is stratified by the collection method
(electronic vs. hardcopy) and number of carloads included in a given
waybill. Because the Surface Transportation Board has different sampling
rates for each stratum, each stratum has its own weight. These weights are
applied to the sample calculations of carloads and tonnage to estimate
population values. 2 The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U. S.
C. S: 5103( a), defines a hazardous

material as a substance or material that the Secretary of Transportation
has determined is capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health,
safety, and property when transported in commerce. It includes hazardous
substances, hazardous wastes, marine pollutants, and elevated temperature
materials.

Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials by the Department of

Appendi x II

Transportation and Other Federal Agencies In addition to the Department of
Transportation (DOT), several federal agencies have authority over certain
aspects of rail shipments of hazardous materials. These include the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), Department of Labor*s Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC), Department of Energy (DOE), and Department of
Defense (DOD).

DOT and DHS Oversee Two administrations within DOT* the Research and
Special Programs

Rail Safety and Administration (RSPA) and Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA)* have

responsibilities for developing regulations pertaining to the
transportation Security

of hazardous materials and rail safety. Under the Homeland Security Act of
2002, the Department of Transportation shares responsibility with the
Transportation Security Administration, within DHS, for rail security. 1
RSPA is responsible for discharging the responsibilities of the Secretary
of

Transportation under federal hazardous material transportation law to
identify and regulate the transportation of materials that may pose an
unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported in
commerce. RSPA develops hazardous material regulations, coordinating its
work with other DOT administrations, including FRA. These regulations

specify how shipments must be identified, packaged, and handled in
transit. RSPA also sets hazardous material transportation training
requirements, helps enforce the hazardous material regulations, and funds
hazardous material emergency preparedness grants to assist localities.
RSPA has the authority to pursue civil and criminal penalties for
deliberate violations of hazardous material transportation regulations,
focusing primarily on packaging standards and shippers of hazardous
materials.

According to RSPA officials, RSPA conducts some, but not many, radioactive
material inspections.

FRA oversees the safety of track, signal and train controls, motive power
and equipment, operating practices, highway- rail grade crossing safety,
and hazardous materials. To ensure compliance with railroad safety
regulations, FRA conducts thousands of inspections annually in these six 1
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. L. 107- 296), S: 1711( a)( 1) and
(2) directed the

Secretary of Transportation to regulate transportation security and safety
(49 U. S. C. 5103), and S: 1711( a)( 3) and (b)( 1) through (3) of the act
directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to issue transportation
security regulations.

areas. FRA has several enforcement tools, such as civil and criminal
penalties, if railroad companies do not comply with safety regulations.

For the shipment of spent nuclear fuel and high- level radioactive
materials, FRA has developed a safety compliance and oversight plan to
examine the safety and security of prospective shipping routes, rail
crews, and equipment prior to shipment of these materials and to provide
an additional level of inspection for such shipments. To ensure the safety
and security of these shipments, FRA performs several procedures such as
inspections of rail cars and locomotives and coordination with federal
intelligence and local law enforcement agencies to identify where
shipments could be stored temporarily en route if needed. FRA, in
conjunction with the

Association of American Railroads, DOE, and rail representatives, is
updating its safety compliance and oversight plan to address security
concerns related to terrorism.

Within DHS, TSA, created in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, has focused primarily on aviation issues,
but it is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation,
including rail. Though originally a part of DOT, TSA became a part of DHS,
along with 22 other agencies in an effort to better coordinate the federal
government*s resources to prevent and protect the United States from
domestic

terrorism. In addition, the U. S. Coast Guard has the responsibility for
preventing spills from vessels and waterfront facilities. The Coast Guard
also serves as the federal on scene coordinator under the National
Contingency Plan for oil or hazardous substance releases in the coastal
zone.

EPA Oversees Fixed EPA has authority for implementing and enforcing
legislation governing the

Facilities That Handle protection of public health and the environment
against chemical and other

polluting discharges and for abating and controlling pollution when spills
Hazardous Materials

occur. The regulatory focus of EPA*s Chemical Emergency Preparedness and
Prevention Office is on fixed facilities, such as chemical factories, that
handle large quantities of hazardous materials. Under the Emergency
Planning and Community Right- to- Know Act of 1986, 2 EPA helps

coordinate preparedness among federal, state, and local emergency
responders. The purpose of this act is to encourage and provide support
for

2 P. L. 99- 499.

emergency planning efforts at the state and local levels and provide the
public and local governments information concerning potential chemical
hazards present in their communities. As part of its responsibilities
under this act, EPA identifies substances and quantities that qualify as
extremely hazardous. EPA has also provided training and technical
assistance to states and localities to enhance contingency planning and
emergency response capabilities. Under the Clean Air Act, 3 as amended,
EPA implements a risk management program that requires stationary chemical
facilities to prevent and mitigate accidental releases of extremely
hazardous chemicals. EPA also has responsibilities concerning oil spills.
EPA*s Office of Air and Radiation sometimes participates with other
agencies in responding to hazardous material transportation incidents
involving radioactive materials.

OSHA Focuses on the The Occupational Safety and Health Act, administered
by OSHA, requires

Safety of Plant Workers employers, including chemical and railroad
companies, to provide safe

workplaces. It requires that OSHA promulgate standards to protect the and
Emergency

safety and health of employees. Additionally, the statute and implementing
Responders

regulations require employers to, among other things, inform employees
about potential hazards, provide safety training, keep records of
workplace injuries, notify government administrators of serious accidents,
and post notices informing workers about their rights to complain about
safety and health violations. OSHA establishes hazardous material training
and safety requirements for emergency responders through its general
industry standards, including its hazardous waste operations and emergency
response standard.

NRC and DOE Oversee Although DOT regulates the transportation of nuclear
material, including

Shipments of Nuclear spent fuel, as hazardous material, NRC also regulates
the transportation of

nuclear material by its licensees. The primary role of NRC, under a
Material

memorandum of agreement with DOT, is the establishment of packaging
standards for fissile materials and for other radioactive materials
exceeding certain limits. NRC certifies spent fuel casks and other
radioactive material package designs that meet these standards and
requires its licensees to use certified casks for transport. NRC also
plays a

3 P. L. 84- 159.

significant role through safety and security requirements and through
inspection and enforcement.

The responsibilities of DOE regarding spent nuclear fuel are related to
its role as an operator of nuclear facilities, including its role in
developing the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository. DOE*s Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management is responsible for shipping spent
nuclear fuel and oversees nuclear waste fund activities related to the
Yucca Mountain Repository, which include the transportation of spent
nuclear fuel. The shipping is done in accordance with NRC packaging and
advance notification requirements and DOT*s hazardous material
regulations. Both DOE and NRC have authority to approve packages, such as
casks as suitable for transport under the hazardous material regulations,
NRC*s rule for the packaging and transportation of radioactive material, 4
and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. 5 DOE*s authority is for
defense or DOE- owned materials, while NRC*s authority is for shipments by
its licensees. In addition, DOE*s Office of Environmental Management
coordinates policies and program implementation for shipments of
environmental radioactive waste for DOE, coordinating its operations with
DOT. NRC also performs inspections to determine whether companies that
transport radiological materials take appropriate safety measures to

package these materials. For the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, NRC
performs inspections of shipments by its licensees to ensure that this
material is physically protected against acts of sabotage.

DOD Oversees the DOD*s Military Traffic Management Command, which oversees
the

Safety and Security of shipments of DOD hazardous materials by rail
companies and ensures that

they are shipped according to DOD*s safety and security standards,
Military Hazardous

requires that everyone participating in the shipment of hazardous
materials Material Shipments

comply with the hazardous material regulations. This includes compliance
with requirements for labeling, placarding, and transportation. DOD also
requires inspections for sensitive shipments, including hazardous
materials, to be conducted by railroad police officers, trained railroad
employees, or members of private security firms under contract to DOD.

4 10 C. F. R. 71. 5 P. L. 83- 703.

Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in

Appendi x III

the United States Millions of tons of hazardous materials are shipped
yearly on a 170,000- mile rail network that crisscrosses the continental
United States. The Class I railroads, the largest of the railroad
companies, operate more than 120,000 miles of this road. 1 The rail
network touches every major urban center and

hundreds of smaller communities in between. While the vast majority of
shipments arrive safely at their destination, serious incidents involving
these materials have the potential to cause widespread disruption or
injury. In July 2001, the derailment of a CSX Transportation train in an
underground tunnel and the ensuing fire fueled by hazardous materials
disrupted the city of Baltimore, Maryland, for several days. In January
2002, a Canadian Pacific Railway derailment outside Minot, North Dakota,

ruptured seven tank cars carrying anhydrous ammonia, creating a vapor
plume approximately 5 miles long and 2  1/2 miles wide. The hazardous
material release affected approximately 15,000 people, causing one death
and more than 300 injuries.

Department of The Department of Transportation*s (DOT) hazardous material
regulations

Transportation classify hazardous materials into nine hazard classes.
Among other things,

the classification system helps communicate the hazards of these materials
Categorizes Hazardous

to emergency responders and transportation workers. The nine classes of
Materials by Nine

hazardous materials are Classes

 Class 1, explosives;  Class 2, gases;  Class 3, flammable liquids; 
Class 4, flammable and solids;  Class 5, oxidizing substances and organic
peroxides;  Class 6, poisonous and infectious substances;  Class 7,
radioactive materials;

1 DOT*s Surface Transportation Board designates three classes of freight
railroads based on annual operating revenues. Class I railroads are the
largest of these, with annual operating revenues of $261.9 million or more
(in 2000 dollars). Class II and III railroads are defined by their
revenues, but are often referred to as regional, short line, or switching
railroads.

 Class 8, corrosives; and  Class 9, miscellaneous materials. Some of
these nine classes are further divided into subclasses to denote different
hazards. For example, Class 2 is divided into three divisions: 2.1,
flammable gases; 2.2, nonflammable, nonpoisonous compressed gases; and
2.3, poison gases. Any hazardous materials that are properly packaged and
labeled and suitable for transportation by rail are eligible for shipment
on any class of railroad track.

Overall Volume of Rail DOT estimates that there are over 800,000 shipments
of hazardous

Shipments of materials daily by all modes of transportation in quantities
varying from

several ounces to many thousands of gallons. For comprehensive data
Hazardous Materials

related to flows of hazardous materials for all modes of transportation,
for Rail, Truck, and

DOT and the Department of Commerce jointly conduct the Commodity Water are
Similar by

Flow Survey (CFS). To examine the flow across modes, we used data from the
1997 CFS, the most recently completed survey. We reviewed the

Ton- mile published methodology and determined that the data were
sufficiently

accurate for our purposes. The 1997 CFS data, shown in table 2, estimated
that approximately 97 million tons of hazardous materials were shipped by
rail during that year, fourth among all modes behind truck, water, and
pipeline. However, railtransported

commodities travel a far greater average distance, with the result that
the shipments by ton- mile for rail, truck, and water are similar.

Table 2: 1997 Hazardous Materials Shipped by Tons and Ton- miles Tons

Ton- mi l es Mode (thousands) Percent a (millions) Percent a

All modes 1, 565,196 100% 263,809 100% Truck 869,796 56% 74,939 28% Rail
96,626 6% 71,711 27% Water 143,152 9% 68,212 26% Air (includes truck and
air) 66 <1% 95 <1% Pipeline b 432,075 28% N/ A N/ A Multiple modes 6,022
<1% 3, 061 1% Other and unknown 17,459 2% 1,837 1% Legend N/ A = These
estimates were not published in the CFS because they did not meet
publication standards due to high sampling variability or other reasons.
Some unpublished estimates can be derived from other data published in
this table. However, figures obtained in this manner are subject to

these same limitations. Sources: GAO analysis of DOT and Department of
Commerce data. a Percent figures may not add exactly due to rounding.

b CFS data exclude most shipments of crude oil.

While the 1997 CFS provides the most recent comprehensive data across
modes, total tonnage shipped on rail can also be obtained through analysis
of Waybill Sample data. Figure 3 shows tons of hazardous materials shipped
by rail for 1998- 2001 based on Waybill Sample data.

Figure 3: Tons of Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail, 1998* 2001

Note: Estimates from the Waybill Sample have sampling errors associated
with them. The 95 percent confidence level associated with the 1998
estimate of approximately 95 million tons ranges from approximately 93
million tons to approximately 97 million tons. Except as noted in the
text, all percentage estimates have sampling errors not exceeding plus or
minus 5 percentage points, and all numerical estimates other than
percentages have sampling errors not exceeding 5 percent of the value of
those estimates.

Rail Shipments When data from the 1997 CFS is examined according to hazard
classes and

Represent a Much across transportation modes, it becomes clear that,
despite accounting for

only 6 percent of the overall hazardous material tonnage and 27 percent of
Higher Share of

ton- miles, rail has a much higher share for other hazard classes for
which Volume for Some

data are available. The reason for this divergence is the predominance of
flammable liquids, such as gasoline and diesel fuel, in hazardous material
Hazardous Material

shipments. 2 When the commodities are looked at individually, the large
Classes

role that rail plays in shipping other hazardous materials becomes
apparent. For example, rail moves 55 percent of Class 4, flammable solids,
and 31 percent of Class 6, toxic materials.

If volume data are further separated by division within hazard class, the
prevalence of rail as a shipment mode for some specific subcategories of
materials comes into even sharper focus. For example, as shown in table 3,
59 percent of the tonnage of toxic- by- inhalation gases moves by rail,
representing 95 percent of the ton- miles of these gases.

2 Flammable liquids are approximately 81 percent of all hazardous
materials shipped, about 2 percent of which are transported by rail.

Table 3: Rail Shipments as Percentage of Hazardous Material Shipments by
All Transportation Modes by Hazard Class and Division, 1997

Tons Tons

Ton- miles Ton- miles

Class a Division Hazard division a (thousands) (percent) (millions)
(percent)

1- Explosives N/A N/ AN/A N/ A 1.1 Explosives with a mass explosion hazard
N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A 1.2 Explosives with a projection hazard < 1 < 1% < 1 <
1% 1.3 Explosives with predominantly a fire hazard < 1 < 1% < 1 < 1% 1.4
Explosives with no significant blast hazard N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A 1.5 Very
insensitive explosives, blasting agents < 1 < 1% < 1 < 1% 2- Gases 15, 203
13% 11, 447 52%

2.1 Flammable gases 6, 362 10% 4, 671 50% 2.2 Nonflammable, nontoxic
compressed gases 3, 075 8% 1, 836 25% 2.3 Gases toxic by inhalation 5,766
59% 4, 940 95% 3- Flammable liquids 26, 642 2% 19, 548 12% 4- Flammable
solids 6,477 55% 8, 639 90%

4.1 Flammable solids 5, 904 58% 7, 815 93% 4.2 Spontaneously combustible
materials 390 46% 613 82% 4.3 Dangerous when wet materials 183 22% 211 50%
5- Oxidizers and organic peroxides 3,182 34% 2, 820 63% 6- Toxic (poison)
1,949 31% 1, 446 51% 7- Radioactive materials N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A 8-
Corrosive materials 24,427 27% 16, 998 41% 9- Miscellaneous dangerous
goods 18, 334 28% 13, 064 58%

Tot al 96, 626 6% 74, 711 28%

Legend N/ A = Data do not meet publication standards because of high
sampling variability or other reasons. Source: GAO analysis of DOT data.

a The 1997 CFS uses different names for hazard classes than DOT currently
uses.

Poisonous Inhalation The quantities of specific chemicals shipped by rail
can be determined by

Hazardous Materials analyzing the Waybill Sample data. Table 4 shows the
top 20 materials

shipped by rail from 1998 to 2001 and the average number of carloads Were
Among the Ten

shipped annually during this period. Nonbulk cargoes such as freight Most
Commonly

forwarder traffic and freight rate shipments, both of which may consist of
Shipped Hazardous

mixed materials, were the top two types of hazardous materials shipped.
The top bulk hazardous material cargoes can be in the form of solids,

Materials from 1998 to liquids, or liquefied gases, and include flammable,
corrosive, and toxic

2001 hazardous materials. Poison- by- inhalation hazardous materials, such
as

ammonia and chlorine, are in the top 10 carloads shipped for this time
period.

Table 4: The Top 20 Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail by Volume, 1998*
2001 Estimated

total Estimated average annual

Hazardous materials carloads a number of carloads

1. Freight forwarder traffic b 1,188, 109 297, 027 2. All freight rate
shipments, not elsewhere coded (NEC), or trailer on flat car shipments,
commercial, except where identified by commodity 716, 177 179, 044

3. Sulfur liquid or molten nonmetallic minerals except fuels 273, 005 68,
251 4. Liquefied petroleum gas, NEC, compressed 253, 234 63, 308 5. Sodium
(soda), caustic (sodium hydroxide) 236, 455 59, 114 6. Asphalt pitches or
tars, from petroleum, coal tar, coke oven, or natural gas 222, 163 55, 541
7. Sulfuric acid or oil of vitriol 200, 875 50, 219 8. Ammonia, anhydrous
163, 057 40, 764 9. Chlorine gas, liquefied 128, 600 32, 150 10.
Gasolines, blended, consisting of motor fuels containing 50% or more of
gasolines c 97, 192 24, 298

11. Ethyl alcohol, anhydrous denatured in part with petroleum products
and/ or chemicals (not to exceed 5%) 95, 333 23, 833

12. Phosphatic fertilizer solution, containing not more than 77% of
phosphoric anhydride by weight 90, 779 22, 695

13. Chemicals, NEC 86, 854 21, 713 14. Vinyl chloride (chloroethane or
chloroethylene) 73, 033 18, 258 15. Methanol (methyl or wood alcohol)
liquid 67, 903 16, 976 16. Propane gas, liquefied 65, 702 16, 425 17.
Carbon dioxide gas, liquefied, or carbonic acid gas 63, 020 15, 755 18.
Ammonium nitrate fertilizer 62, 563 15, 641

(Continued From Previous Page)

Estimated total

Estimated average annual Hazardous materials

carloads a number of carloads

19. Muriatic (hydrochloric) acid 58, 165 14, 541 20. Styrene (liquid) 55,
910 13, 977 Source: GAO analysis of DOT data.

a Because the waybill sample data is extrapolated from a 1 percent sample,
there will be uncertainties associated with the totals in this table. b
Nonbulk shipments that may consist of mixed materials.

c The sampling error for this estimate is approximately 25 percent of the
value of the estimate. The sampling errors for all other estimates in this
table do not exceed 5 percent of the value of those estimates.

Rail Shipments of Rail shipments of radioactive and military hazardous
materials are few

Radioactive and compared with overall rail shipments of hazardous
materials. Through its

Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Department of Military
Hazardous

Defense (DOD) contracts with U. S. rail companies for the shipment of
Materials Represent a

arms, ammunition, explosives, and other hazardous materials. The Small
Fraction of All

Department of the Navy and the Department of Energy (DOE) each ship
radioactive material, including high- level spent nuclear fuel. Rail
Shipments of Hazardous Materials DOD Hazardous Materials

From 1997 to 2001, MTMC shipped 728,000 tons of hazardous materials by
Rail Shipments Include rail, which represents a very small percentage of
the 459 million tons of all

Arms, Ammunition, hazardous materials shipped by rail during this time
period. Although some

Explosives, Spent Nuclear DOD hazardous materials are shipped on dedicated
trains, more often they

are shipped in one- or two- car shipments and attached to trains with
other Fuel, and Other Materials

nonmilitary cargoes. The dedicated shipments are usually done in
conjunction with a planned exercise where a large amount of materials are
needed.

The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, a joint organization within both the
Department of Navy and Energy, ships naval spent nuclear fuel from
shipyards to DOE*s Idaho National Engineering and Environmental

Laboratory for examination and temporary storage. According to program
data, spent nuclear fuel from nuclear- powered warships accounts for
approximately 0.05 percent of all spent nuclear fuel in the United States.
From 1957 to 2001, the program shipped 738 containers of radioactive

material without a harmful release of radiation. According to the
Department of the Navy, naval reactor components are designed robustly to
withstand combat conditions. DOE Ships Radioactive

DOE ships its own radioactive waste material shipments, including lowlevel
Waste Materials from Its

radioactive material, transuranic waste, and spent nuclear fuel. 3 Own
Operations by Rail Within DOE, the Office of Environmental Management
coordinates policies and program implementation for shipments of
environmental radioactive waste. DOE*s Office of Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management would have responsibility for the proposed shipments to
the Yucca Mountain Repository. Shipments made under the Office of
Environmental Management are currently made mostly by truck; however, DOE
is exploring the possibility of increasing rail shipments in the future.
DOE officials estimate that of the approximately 500 shipments a month of
lowlevel radioactive material made by DOE, less than 1 percent are made by
rail.

Volume of Commercial According to Nuclear Regulatory Commission
statistics, approximately 2 Spent Nuclear Fuel

million pounds of spent nuclear fuel were transported by rail in the
United Shipments Is Expected to States between 1979 and 1996. These
amounts will increase greatly if a

Increase Substantially if the proposed private fuel storage facility in
Utah is licensed for operation and

will increase again if the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository is approved.
Yucca Mountain Repository

Total shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the private fuel storage facility
are Is Approved

estimated to be 88 million pounds, and the estimated total shipment to
Yucca Mountain is 154 million pounds over a 24- year period. All the
shipments to the private fuel storage facility would be by rail, while
shipments to Yucca Mountain will be by both rail and truck.

3 Transuranic waste is a type of radioactive waste created from the
processing of nuclear materials. Transuranic elements include plutonium,
americium, curium, and neptunium, all of which are created during nuclear
reactor operations. Some transuranic elements are used in production of
nuclear weapons, spacecraft batteries, and consumer products. The
remaining unusable material containing transuranic elements is transuranic
waste. Transuranic waste includes not only the transuranic elements
themselves, but also ordinary items contaminated with transuranic
elements: tools, gloves, protective suits, tarpaulins, soil, and sludge.

Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible

Appendi x IV

Future Rail Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel Proposed Private Fuel If the
proposed Yucca Mountain Repository in Nevada is licensed and Storage and
Yucca begins operation, the number of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments
by rail would greatly increase in the future. Even without the operation
of Yucca Mountain Repository

Mountain, there may be a substantial increase in the shipment of SNF from
Plans Will Result in private efforts to ship and temporarily store SNF.

Substantial Increases The most common method for storing SNF is in dry or
wet fuel storage

in Rail Shipment of facilities on- site at nuclear plants. Some plants,
however, are concerned

Radioactive Materials about reaching full capacity for storage on- site
and the ongoing expense

associated with this type of storage. Under the Nuclear Waste Fund
provision of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the operators of
nuclear plants have been paying fees for a fund maintained by the
Department of Energy (DOE) to pay for the proper disposal of SNF in a
national repository, 1 proposed for Yucca Mountain. 2 To date, operators
have not been able to ship any of their spent fuel off- site to the
repository.

To address SNF on- site storage capacity issues, private power companies
with more than one nuclear plant may ship SNF by rail from one plant to
the storage facility of another if available storage capacity exists. Such
intrautility transfers have constituted most commercial spent fuel
shipments in the past. According to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
statistics, 1,057 metric tons of SNF were commercially transported by rail
in the United States between 1979 and 1996 in 147 separate shipments.
According to NRC data, no radioactive releases above the regulatory limit
have occurred during any of these shipments. Table 5 shows the total
metric tons and shipments of commercial spent nuclear fuel transported by
rail and truck from 1979 to 1996.

1 For storage purposes, SNF material is put into water pools to cool, both
thermally and radioactively. The pools are known as wet storage. Dry
storage is a newer technology that uses concrete and steel to allow heat
and radioactivity to dissipate.

2 42 U. S. C. S: 10222.

Table 5: Transport of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel, 1979* 1996 Metric
tons

Average metric Mode of spent fuel Shipments tons per shipment

Rail 1,057 147 7. 2 Truck 356 1, 172 0.3

Total 1, 413 1,319 1. 1

Source: Congressional Research Service. DOE Estimates That 70,000 The
proposed Yucca Mountain Repository in Nevada would be the largest Metric
Tons of SNF Would

to hold SNF in the country. Although the repository is not yet licensed,
and Be Shipped to the Proposed

would not be scheduled to begin operations until 2010, studies and Yucca
Mountain National

preparations for these shipments have been under way for some time.
According to DOE*s Environmental Impact Statement for Yucca Mountain,
Repository over a 24- Year

approximately 70,000 metric tons of SNF would be shipped to the Period

repository over a 24- year period. DOE officials currently favor the use
of trains versus trucks as the primary mode of transporting SNF to Yucca
Mountain. This decision, however, has not been finalized. The use of rail
would require fewer overall shipments than the use of trucks due to the
larger transport capacity of trains. If trains are chosen as the primary
mode of transportation for SNF to Yucca Mountain, DOE estimates that, on
average, 130 trains carrying approximately 400 casks would transport SNF

every year for 24 years. 3 A rail shipment may include up to three rail
casks. If trains were to be used, a new rail line would need to be
constructed to connect the repository to main line railroad tracks. The
rail line would be approximately 100 to 300 miles in length depending on
the corridor selected. In addition, specific routes for SNF shipments
would also have to

be selected. Finally, DOE would have to determine whether or not to use
dedicated trains to make these shipments.

Association of American The Association of American Railroads (AAR) has
endorsed the use of

Railroads Endorses the Use of dedicated trains for shipments of SNF to
Yucca Mountain. Dedicated trains

Dedicated Trains for SNF would allow shipments to travel from origin to
destination as quickly as

Shipments to Yucca Mountain possible, thereby minimizing exposure en route
and time spent in rail

3 A cask is a hardened container designed specifically for holding SNF.
NRC certifies cask designs.

yards. AAR*s position is that advanced technology that is not routinely
used in regular trains, such as that used for derailment prevention, could
be incorporated in a dedicated train. The Department of Transportation
(DOT) is currently drafting a report on the safety of using dedicated
trains for the rail shipment of spent nuclear fuel.

Proposed Shipment of Spent In order to gain additional storage capacity
for SNF, a consortium of eight

Nuclear Fuel by Private Fuel private utility companies, called Private
Fuel Storage (PFS), LLC, working Storage, LLC, Would Also

with the Skull Valley Band of the Goshute tribe, is pursuing a storage
Result in a Substantial

facility on tribal land. The Goshute reservation is located approximately
50 miles west of Salt Lake City, Utah. This proposed storage facility
would Increase in Shipments

also result in a substantial increase in SNF shipments. If licensed, the
facility would receive up to 40,000 tons of SNF for storage. Unlike the
Yucca Mountain repository, the PFS facility would be a temporary storage
site rather than a permanent repository. An NRC license to store SNF lasts
20 years and is renewable. After the license expires, the

facility would be decommissioned and the material taken off of the
reservation. If the Yucca Mountain repository were in operation at that
time, Yucca Mountain would be the likely recipient of this material.

Provisions would need to be made to safely transport material to and from
the Goshute Reservation. 4

PFS anticipates receiving one to two trains weekly, each carrying two to
four shipping casks containing 10 metric tons of uranium. Dedicated
trains, stopping only for crew changes, refueling, and periodic
inspections, would ship the material. A 32- mile rail line would be
constructed by PFS on federal government owned land to connect the
facility with the nearest

railroad. 4 In March 2003, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing board
blocked for the time being the issuance of a license to PFS because of the
risks that military aircraft operations conducted near the facility might
pose.

Historically Low Spent It is difficult to assess the risk from the
shipment of SNF using historic

Nuclear Fuel Shipment data, since the SNF shipments to date amount to only
a small fraction of

those proposed for shipment to the Yucca Mountain Repository and PFS.
Volumes Make Risk

The 1,057 metric tons of spent fuel that was shipped by rail between 1979
Assessment from

and 1996 is small compared to proposed shipments to the Yucca Mountain
Increased Shipments

Repository and PFS. Difficult

Even though no harmful radiation releases have occurred in past shipments
of SNF, several questions still remain regarding the potential risk posed
by these shipments, including  whether the past safety record is
indicative of potential future accidents

given the difference in volume of materials shipped,  what type of
potential release is possible given cask design and

proposed shipping practices, and  what harm could be done by attacks on
SNF shipments. In addressing concerns about the potential for future
accidents given the expected increase in spent nuclear fuel shipments, NRC
officials told us that they believe that historical transport data for
accident rates, in general, and for spent fuel shipments, in particular,
support the conclusion that

current regulatory programs result in a high degree of safety, even if
applied to a larger shipment campaign. The officials said that NRC has
sponsored risk studies that address the potential impacts related to
changes in shipment parameters for future shipments to a waste facility. 5
They said that they believe there is an adequate technical basis to
conclude current shipments are safe and that future compliant shipments
will be

safe. 5 NUREG/ CR- 6672, Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk
Estimates, March 2000, which is also discussed in this appendix.

Studies Suggest That There Past federal studies have examined risks to the
safety of the shipment of

is a Low Probability of SNF and suggest that there is a low probability of
accidental release of Accidental Release of

radiation during its transportation. To address safety issues associated
with Radiation during

the shipment of SNF, NRC sponsored a series of studies to develop a
predictive model of shipment risk. These include a study conducted by the
Transportation of Spent

Livermore National Laboratory. In addition, we convened a National Nuclear
Fuel

Academy of Sciences panel of rail industry experts to identify issues
involved in the safe and secure transport of hazardous materials by rail,
including SNF.

Livermore National Laboratory The Livermore National Laboratory *Modal
Study,* completed in 1987 and Study

updated in 1995, concluded that 99.8 percent of all accidents involving
SNF would not result in a harmful release of radiation. The Livermore
Study relied on existing accident data to develop

 accident rates for trains and trucks,  a distribution of accident
speeds, and  a distribution of types of accidents.

All of these data were then applied against the structural characteristics
of SNF shipment casks to determine whether the type of accident described
would result in a harmful release of radiation.

The Livermore Study is consistent with Research and Special Programs
Administration data, which indicate that less than 0.10 percent of all
current carloads of hazardous materials are involved in an accident that
causes a release of hazardous material. This study also examined the
effects of four severe scenarios derived from actual transportation
accidents and concluded that in only one of the scenarios, which included
an engulfing fire lasting several days, would the casks have failed to
prevent package radiation levels from exceeding NRC limits.

The state of Nevada sponsored an assessment of the Livermore Study
criticizing its findings on several counts. According to the assessment,
(1) the methodology for deriving the accident rates may not have
considered all the potential causes for cask failure, (2) the study does
not take into consideration the possibility for human error in SNF cask
construction and

the effects that this could have in the severity of an accident, and (3)
the computer simulation used in the Livermore study did not account for
all

potential effects from high heat fires such as the breakdown of spent fuel
pellets into gases or vapors.

In March 2000, NRC sponsored another study to update these earlier
findings, entitled Re- examination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates.

The 2000 NRC study confirmed the results of an earlier 1977 NRC study and
quantified the expected risk of transporting SNF. The 2000 study concluded
that the rail accident risk was only 2 percent of the risk estimate in the
prior study.

National Academy of Sciences Experts at the GAO- sponsored National
Academy of Sciences panel on the

Panel Expressed Confidence in safety and security of hazardous material
rail shipments also expressed

the Safety and Security of that the risks of the transport of SNF were low
relative to the risks of

Hazardous Material Rail transporting other hazardous materials. An AAR
representative at the

Shipments panel, for example, did not cite SNF when discussing the
hazardous

materials that are of special concern for security in shipment. Panel
participants noted that radioactive and nuclear material has historically
been a source of anxiety in the United States, and that this public
perception makes the shipment of radioactive material seem more of a
problem than it is. One panelist noted that, although an attack on
radioactive material in transit would be sure to attract a lot of media

attention, the hardness of the cask would minimize damage and the
potential for a radiation release. In comparison with SNF, he noted, other
materials have the potential for a much greater lethal effect. One
panelist, an emergency first responder, stated that he would rather have
SNF going through his town than a shipment of gasoline because of the
strength of the SNF container.

DOE Rebuts Aspects of Study on In the aftermath of the July 2001 incident
in the Howard Street Tunnel in Safety Issues Regarding the

Baltimore, Radioactive Waste Management Associates prepared a study
Transportation of SNF Casks that concluded that, had SNF casks been part
of the train involved in that accident, the fire in the tunnel would have
resulted in a release of contaminating radiation throughout a section of
the city. This report stated that there are currently no requirements that
SNF be transported separately from other hazardous cargo, and that the
tunnel is part of a route identified as a potential rail corridor for SNF
shipments, concluding that it is feasible that a cask could have been part
of the burning train in the tunnel. DOE provided us with a criticism of
the study prepared by staff from Sandia National Laboratory disputing the
conclusions of the report. According to DOE officials, at least one buffer
car must separate a SNF car

from a car containing any hazardous materials. DOE officials said because
of the separation of at least one car length and the slow, rather than

catastrophic, leak of the tripropylene, the most intense fire heat would
have been localized at the tripropylene car and not at adjacent cars.

In March 2003, NRC also released a report that examined the Baltimore
tunnel fire incident and evaluated what the consequences would have been
had a spent nuclear fuel transportation cask been in the train accident in
the tunnel. 6 NRC concluded in its report that, for a spent nuclear fuel
transportation cask approved under NRC rules for packaging and
transportation of radioactive materials 7 and subjected to the conditions
encountered in the Howard Street tunnel fire, no release of radioactive
materials would have resulted from this postulated event. In addition, the
health and safety of the public would have been maintained.

Safety and Security Issues Since the 1970s, DOE and NRC have conducted
several studies of the effect

Posed by the Substantial of sabotage on the transportation of SNF. These
studies found that a

Increase in Future SNF successful sabotage attack on spent nuclear fuel
being transported would

Shipments and Potential have a limited effect on human health. A study
published by DOE*s Sandia

National Laboratory in 1999 confirmed earlier studies that, under certain
New Threats for These

worst- case scenarios, NRC- certified transportation containers could be
Shipments Are Being

penetrated by armor- piercing weapons and release small quantities of
Studied radioactive materials. 8

Nevertheless, despite their general confidence in the safety of current
regulations for the transportation of spent nuclear fuel shipments,
federal regulators are preparing to address new safety and security issues
posed by the substantial increase in the number of these shipments in the
future and new threats posed after the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001. DOE*s Sandia National Laboratory is currently conducting a cask
sabotage investigation project. Upon its completion, DOE plans to use
results of the project to support its decisions with regard to proposed
SNF safeguard and security procedures. According to DOE, closer estimates
of the consequence of a successful sabotage attack would support policy
decisions relating to the safeguard levels required for SNF shipments, and
a

6 NUREG/ CR- 6799, Analysis of Rail Car Components Exposed to a Tunnel
Fire Environment, March 2003. 7 10 C. F. R. 71. 8 Sandia National
Laboratories, Projected Source Terms for Potential Sabotage Events Related
to Spent Fuel Shipments, SAND99- 0963 (Albuquerque, New Mexico: 1999).

better- defined consequence might also be expected to reduce the cost of
safeguards. DOE and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) are also
reexamining the potential need for routing requirements for SNF rail
shipments given the increase in the expected volume of shipments traveling
through heavily populated rail corridors. NRC is also studying the

potential vulnerabilities to the security of spent fuel and has ongoing
work related to the performance of spent nuclear fuel containers in
accident scenarios.

Finally, we are currently undertaking a study assessing the findings of
federally- sponsored studies of sabotage and severe accidents involving
spent nuclear fuel.

Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist Local
First

Appendi x V

Responders General Procedures for The recognized method for managing an
emergency response is the Emergency Response incident command system, an
on- site management system applicable to all types of emergencies. It
includes a standard organizational structure, training requirements,
procedures, and terminology that enable participating agencies to function
together effectively and efficiently in response to an emergency.
Hazardous material rail incidents involve a multidiscipline emergency
management response approach. While the immediate response is primarily
local, both state and federal governments also provide additional
resources if the need arises.

Typically, at the local level, fire, law enforcement, public works,
emergency medical service, and railroad personnel would be the first
responders to a hazardous material rail incident. For these incidents, a
locality*s fire department is the lead agency in a hazardous material
incident response. Within fire departments that have hazardous material
teams, these teams lead the response to a hazardous material rail
incident. Chemical experts or responders from private industry may provide
additional response assistance.

In response to any suspected hazardous material incident, responders near
or first arriving at the event do an initial reconnaissance to determine
the materials involved and the need for additional resources. Initial
responders determine if an evacuation or shelter in place is needed based
on recommendations from the Emergency Response Guidebook. 1 If hazardous

material incidents are major events, the response would also include an
activation of an emergency operations command center (if one is in place),
the Red Cross, state environmental protection agencies, state emergency
management agencies and, in some cases, federal agencies.

To prepare for responding to hazardous material incidents, local
communities* frequently with state, federal, and industry partners* often
conduct preparedness drills, develop emergency response plans, obtain
technical training, and procure specialized equipment for first
responders.

Although there is no difference in an emergency response to a hazardous
material incident whether it is the result of an accident or terrorist
attack, in cases of terrorism, law enforcement would play a greater role
in a 1 The U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Transport Canada, and
the Secretariat of

Transport and Communications of Mexico developed the Emergency Response
Guidebook jointly for use by fire fighters, police, and other emergency
services personnel who respond to hazardous material incidents.

locality*s overall response and coordinate a criminal investigation. Local
law enforcement would make a determination whether federal law enforcement
assistance is necessary for an investigation.

At the state level, a hazardous material response team typically assists
those localities needing additional resources. In the states that we
visited, such teams provided hazardous material response capability for
locations that did not have their own hazardous material teams. In
addition, state environmental agencies provide assistance in incident
mitigation and monitoring of the environment.

In some instances, federal emergency response assistance may be called for
by state and local governments or by the circumstances of the hazardous
material incident. For example, the Department of Homeland Security*s
(DHS) Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP& R) Directorate may be
requested to provide federal disaster assistance to an area. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U. S. Coast

Guard (USCG), which is now housed within DHS, are required by the National
Contingency Plan to be notified and may send representatives to the
incident scene to assist in evaluating the environmental damage resulting
from a hazardous material release. However, more robust state and federal
resources are generally reserved for more serious incidents, such as the
July 2001 derailment in Baltimore that involved a release of

hazardous materials in a populated area. Multiple Federal Plans

Three federal response plans address emergencies involving hazardous and
Agencies Provide

material releases during rail transport: the Federal Response Plan, the
National Contingency Plan (part of the National Response System), and the
Additional Resources Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. These
plans all involve

to Address Hazardous multiple federal agencies in their administration.
The primary federal

Material Incidents agencies with a role in emergency response for
hazardous material

incidents are DHS* Transportation Security Administration (TSA), EP& R
Directorate, and USCG, EPA, DOT, Department of Energy (DOE), Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), and Department of Labor*s Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA). The Office of Domestic Preparedness
(ODP)* formerly part of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and now in DHS*,
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and OSHA provide
funding for equipment procurement, planning, or training activities. HHS
and OSHA also provide consultations in emergencies when requested.

Federal Response Plan The Federal Response Plan is an all hazard response
plan carried out by the

Addresses All Types of DHS EP& R Directorate and 26 other partner federal
organizations. The

Hazards plan provides the mechanism for delivery of federal assistance and

resources to augment state and local government efforts in a major
disaster or emergency. The plan provides for response with initial
resources such as food, water, and emergency generators. The plan also
provides additional resources to state and local governments to recover
from an emergency. The plan categorizes the types of federal assistance
that a state is most likely to need into 12 emergency support functions.
These functions are:

transportation, communications, public works and engineering,
firefighting, information and planning, mass care, resource support,
health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials,
food, and energy. Each emergency support function is headed by a primary
agency designated on the basis of its capability in that area.

Federal Radiological The objective of the Federal Radiological Emergency
Response Plan, also

Emergency Response Plan published by DHS* EP& R Directorate, is to
establish an organized and

Coordinates Federal integrated capability for a timely, coordinated
response by federal agencies

Response to Radiological to peacetime radiological emergencies. According
to the plan, the lead

federal agency for incidents involving the transportation of radioactive
Emergencies

materials varies by circumstance: the NRC is the lead federal agency for
an emergency that involves radiological material licensed by the NRC or an
agreement state, DOD or DOE are the lead federal agencies when
radiological material is shipped by these agencies at the time of an
accident, and EPA is the lead federal agency when an emergency involves

radiological material that is not licensed or owned by a federal agency or
an agreement state. 2

National Contingency Plan The National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan,

Addresses Oil Spills and more commonly called the National Contingency
Plan, is the federal Hazardous Substance

government's plan for responding to both oil spills and hazardous Releases

substance releases. The lead federal agencies for responding to hazardous
substance releases under the National Contingency Plan are EPA for inland

2 Agreement states are states establishing programs under 42 U. S. C. S:
2021( b) to permit states to exercise some of NRC*s authority.

zones and the USCG for coastal zones, although DOD, DOE, and other federal
agencies are the lead agencies in certain circumstances. The National
Response Center, created by the National Contingency Plan,

receives notifications of chemical, radiological, oil, and biological
releases. Transportation accidents involving hazardous materials must be
reported to the National Response Center by the carrier involved if the
accident

meets one or more of the criteria developed by the center. Some of these
criteria include the following: a person is killed, a person receives
injuries requiring hospitalization, property damage exceeds $50,000, an
evacuation of the general public is required lasting 1 hour or more, and
there is a release of marine pollutant in a quantity exceeding 119 gallons
for liquids or 882 pounds for solids. In addition, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 requires
that all releases of hazardous substances exceeding reportable quantities
be reported by the responsible party to the center.

National Contingency Plan Has The National Response Team*s membership
consists of 16 federal agencies

Three Organizational Levels: with expertise in various aspects of
emergency response to pollution National Response Team,

incidents. EPA serves as the chair agency and the USCG serves as the
vicechair Regional Response Teams, and

agency of the National Response Team. The team is a national On scene
Coordinators

planning, policy, and coordinating body and does not physically respond to
incidents.

The National Contingency Plan has 13 regional response teams that are also
planning, policy, and coordinating bodies and do not physically respond to
the scene of an incident. The regional response teams provide assistance
to state and local governments in preparedness, planning, and training for
emergency response. Another function of the teams is to provide technical
assistance to local and state emergency planning committees to enhance
local emergency response planning. The teams also

coordinate the regional deployment of assets. On scene coordinators are
federal officials predesignated by EPA for inland areas and by the USCG
for coastal areas. The on scene coordinators have the authority to
coordinate containment, removal and disposal efforts, and resources during
an oil spill or hazardous substance release. On scene coordinators for the
USCG handle incidents within or threatening the coastal zone, while their
EPA counterparts are responsible for discharges into, or threatening, the
inland zone. This responsibility includes coordinating federal, state,
local, and responsible party efforts. The USCG National Strike Force,
which consists of three strike teams and a

coordination center equipped to respond to major oil spills and chemical
releases, assists on scene coordinators in incident response. On scene
coordinators also have access to special teams, both those listed in the
National Contingency Plan, such as the USCG National Strike Force and EPA
Environmental Response Teams, and those not specifically listed in the
plan, such as Department of Defense teams.

National Contingency Plan is The National Contingency Plan is a component
of the National Response

Part of the National Response System, a structure for preparedness and
response to oil and hazardous

System to Prepare and Respond material incidents that has been in place
for over 30 years. The National

to Oil and Hazardous Material Response System consists of a network of
interagency coordinating groups

Incidents at the national, regional, area, and local levels that are
responsible for

preparedness activities. The system establishes a network of contingency
plans with different levels of geographical scope that form the federal
government*s efforts to prepare and coordinate responses to emergency
incidents. In addition to the National Contingency Plan, there are
regional

and area contingency plans that coordinate effective responses within each
of the 10 standard federal regions and other designated areas covering
Alaska, the Caribbean, and several islands in the Pacific. These plans

include preparedness information on a regional level and identify useful
response facilities and resources available from government, commercial,
academic, and other sources. At the local level, the National Response
System includes local contingency plans to prepare and organize local
resources in the event of accidental releases of hazardous substances.

USCG officials told us that the National Response System*s coordinating
bodies strive for continual improvement through an ongoing process of plan
development, exercises, and evaluation. Plans and capabilities are tested
through exercises; exercise evaluations provide lessons learned which, in
turn, may result in changes to the plan or modifications to

resource capability. USCG officials told us that, while there currently
exists no national assessment tool to measure preparedness, the National
Response System*s process provides a mechanism for evaluation and
improvement.

Federal Agencies Many federal agencies are responsible for providing
either on- scene

Provide a Variety of response assistance or offering technical expertise
in the event of a hazardous material rail incident. As discussed above,
many of these

Assistance for agencies play a role in the administration of federal
response plans. Table 6

Responding to and lists the agencies responsible for providing either on-
scene assistance or

Improving technical expertise in the event of a hazardous material rail
incident and

outlines their roles. Preparedness for Hazardous Material Rail Incidents

Table 6: Federal Agencies Involved in Emergency Response to Hazardous
Material Incidents Agency Role

DHS TSA TSA is involved in managing transportation security in the event
of a threat via hazardous materials. TSA also has emergency powers in the
event of a national emergency. a

EP& R Directorate The EP& R Directorate is responsible for implementing
and managing federal disaster assistance. Federal assistance is available
to supplement the resources of state and local governments in major
disasters, such as emergencies involving hazardous material releases. Most
federal assistance becomes available only following a declaration by the
President under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act at the request of a state governor or the immediate
declaration by the President.

USCG USCG maintains the National Strike Force, which is comprised of three
strike teams and the National Strike Force Coordination Center. The strike
force is responsible for providing highly- trained responders and
equipment in support of the USCG and EPA federal on scene coordinators who
respond to oil discharges and hazardous substances releases. The USCG*s
Emergency Response Notification System database also records releases. The
USCG maintains this database. The USCG can respond to a hazardous material
rail incident in the coastal zone whenever there is a threat to public
health or the environment. The National Contingency Plan outlines the
appropriate response in the event of a spill. DOT Research and Special
Programs Administration (RSPA)

RSPA issues the Emergency Response Guidebook to assist first responders by
identifying the potential effects of hazardous materials by type. RSPA has
been issuing this guidebook in various formats since the late 1970s, and
it recently distributed over 1.5 million copies of the latest edition. In
1997, RSPA, in conjunction with the Canadian and Mexican governments,
issued a joint North American copy of the guidebook.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Agency Role

EPA EPA can respond to a hazardous material rail incident whenever there
is a threat to public health or the environment. Typically, EPA is invited
to incident scenes by first responders or local emergency management
agencies. The National Contingency Plan outlines appropriate responses by
EPA in the event of an oil spill or hazardous substance release. Under the
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, EPA is the lead agency when
the source of the radioactivity is unknown. Examples of unknown sources
include scrap shipped from overseas and materials with

unknown owners. DOE DOE participates in the Federal Radiological Emergency
Response Plan that coordinates the federal government response to
radiological emergencies. DOE participates in the Federal Radiological
Preparedness Coordinating

Committee. DOE is the lead federal agency for response to an emergency
involving materials that are in DOE custody. DOE also has the initial
responsibility for coordinating off- site federal radiological monitoring
and assessment assistance during response to a radiological emergency. DOE
may respond to a state or lead federal agency request for assistance by
dispatching a Radiological Assistance Program team. According to DOE
officials, if the situation requires more assistance than a team can
provide, DOE will alert or activate additional resources, including the
Aerial Measuring System, Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability, Accident
Response Group, Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center,
Nuclear Emergency Search Team, and Radiation Emergency Assistance Center
and Training Site. NRC NRC is the lead federal agency for emergency
response to radiological events involving NRC- licensed facilities and

the transportation of licensed materials. Although state and local
governments would be the actual responders to an accident or incident
involving radioactive material, NRC*s response teams follow events as they
unfold in a radiological shipment incident and provide federal resources
to responders. When the source of shipments of radioactive materials
cannot be identified during an incident, NRC would assist the EPA*s
Radiological Response Teams to identify the source.

OSHA OSHA is a member of the National Response Team and provides
assistance to ensure the safety and health of personnel deployed at
emergency response sites. Sources: GAO analysis of DHS* EP& R Directorate,
USCG, DOT, EPA, DOE, and NRC data.

a Per 49 U. S. C. S: 114( g).

In addition to providing on- scene assistance or technical expertise in
the event of a hazardous material incident, some of the same federal
agencies listed above provide training or grant assistance to local
communities to improve their emergency preparedness for hazardous material
incidents. Tables 7 to 11 list the federal agencies that have some role in
providing a variety of assistance and grants to emergency responders.

Table 7: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
Provided by the Department of Homeland Security*s Office of Domestic
Preparedness (Formerly a Department of Justice Program) Catalog of Federal
Domestic Assistance (CFDA)

Assistance program FY 2002

number a grant title Purpose funding b

16.007 State Domestic Funding provided to states to plan for and execute a
comprehensive $481 million

Preparedness threat and needs assessment to develop a three- year plan to
enhance

Equipment Support first responder capabilities, and to provide for
equipment purchases

Program and the provision of specialized training.

16.008 Domestic Preparedness Funding to train state and local
jurisdictions to respond to weapons of

$62 million Training and Technical mass destruction domestic terrorist
incidents, involving nuclear, Assistance Program

biological, chemical, and explosive devices 16.580

Organizations, rather than state and local entities, are the one- time $17
million 16.597

recipients of these funds. Grants are used for a multitude of purposes
16.599 c

including, but not limited to, meetings to share best practices and
facilitate discussion on public and private partnerships.

Sources: GAO analysis of DHS and CFDA data. a CFDA is the governmentwide
source document of federal domestic assistance program information
produced by the executive branch.

b According to ODP officials, the total amount awarded in fiscal year 2002
does not include contracts or interagency agreements, which is
approximately $24 million. c According to ODP officials, this program
includes multifunding for different purposes.

Table 8: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
Provided by the Department of Transportation*s Research and Special
Programs Administration Assistance program

FY 2002 CFDA Number grant title Purpose funding

20.703 Hazardous material Intended to provide financial and technical
assistance as well as $13.05 million b emergency preparedness

national direction and guidance to enhance state, territorial, tribal, and
training and planning grants

local hazardous material emergency planning and training. This program
distributes fees collected from shippers and carriers of hazardous
materials to emergency responders for training and to local emergency
planning committees (LEPCs) for planning. a

Sources: GAO analysis of DOT and CFDA data. a Established under the
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986, LEPCs must

develop an emergency plan and review it at least annually. LEPC membership
includes representatives from police, fire, civil defense, public health,
transportation, environmental agencies, as well as representatives from
facilities subject to emergency planning requirements, community

groups, and the media. b $7.8 million of this funding is for the training
of emergency responders, $5 million is for LEPC

planning, and $250,000 is for International Association of Fire Fighter
instructor training in hazardous material response operations.

Table 9: Hazardous Material Emergency Response and Assistance Grants
Provided by the Department of Homeland Security*s Directorate of Emergency
Preparedness and Response Assistance program

FY 2002 CFDA number grant title Purpose funding

83.012 Hazardous materials Provides technical and financial assistance
through the states to

$264,000 assistance program support state, local, and American Indian
tribal governments in oil and

hazardous materials emergency planning and exercising and to enhance
state, tribal, and local governments capabilities to interoperate with the
National Response System. 83.547 First responder counterterrorism Designed
to enhance the capabilities of first responders in managing $4 million

training assistance the consequences of terrorist acts. 83.552 Emergency
management Designed to develop comprehensive emergency management,

$134 million performance grants including terrorism consequence management
preparedness, at the state and local levels and to improve emergency
planning,

preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery capabilities. 83.554
Assistance to firefighters

Designed to enhance abilities with respect to fire and fire- related $144
million grant hazards. This program seeks to identify departments that
lack the

basic tools and resources necessary to protect the health and safety of
the public and their firefighting personnel.

83.009 Hazardous

Provides guidance and technical assistance to state and major $1. 5
million

83.010 materials/ weapons of mass metropolitan training departments on
managing and implementing

destruction (WMD) training hazardous material and WMD responder training.
Purpose is to standards and requirements

improve the quality of hazardous material/ WMD responder training guidance
and training nationally and the cost- effectiveness of state and local use
of federal quality control technical training funds in hazardous material
and WMD response training. assistance (under interagency agreement with
DOT)

83.527 Hazardous materials/ WMD

The National Fire Academy and the Emergency Management Institute $1. 2
million

83.530 responder offer complete and definitive curricula for all facets of
local responder

training training for hazardous material and WMD incidents. curriculum
83.549 Chemical stockpile

To enhance emergency preparedness capabilities of the states and $82
million

emergency preparedness local communities at each of the chemical agent
stockpile storage

program facilities. The purpose of the program is to assist states and
local

communities in efforts to improve their capacity to plan for and respond
to accidents associated with the storage of chemical warfare materials.
83.562

FY 2002 supplemental Provide funding assistance to state and local
governments to update $181 million

83.563 grants for state and local their emergency operations plans for all
hazards with special

83.564 preparedness

emphasis on WMD terrorism preparedness. Funds will also be used to support
the formation of citizen corps councils, expansion of the community
emergency response team program, and to improve state

emergency operations centers. Sources: GAO analysis of DHS, CFDA, and
National Volunteer Fire Council data.

Table 10: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
Provided by the Department of Health and Human Services

Assistance program FY 2002

CFDA number grant title Purpose funding

93.003 Metropolitan Medical Provides assistance to U. S. cities, via
contracts, to prepare for a rapid, $10 million

Response System Program coordinated medical response to large- scale
public emergencies. The (part of the Public Health

contracts enable cities to coordinate emergency first responders, and
Social Services public health systems, and hospitals to better respond to
the needs of Emergency Fund)

their citizens in times of crisis. 93.204 Surveillance of hazardous

To assist state health departments in developing a state- based $1. 5
million substance emergency

surveillance system to monitor hazardous substance emergency events

events and public health impact. The Hazardous Substances and Emergency
Events Surveillance Program, managed by the Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry*s Division of Health Studies, provides data to show
what the health impacts have been of previous hazardous material releases,
which could be used in preparing threat assessments. Sources: GAO analysis
of HHS and CFDA data.

Table 11: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
Provided by the Department of Energy a Assistance program grant

FY 2002 CFDA Number title Purpose funding

81.106 Transport of Transuranic Financial assistance is provided to
support cooperation among the

$3. 2 million wastes to the Waste

tribes, the southern, western, and midwestern states on the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant: States Isolation Pilot Plant corridors, and DOE in
developing plans and and tribal concerns,

procedures for the safe and uneventful transportation of transuranic
proposed solutions

waste from current temporary storage facilities to the plant. Restrictions
on the use of funds depends on the specific collaborative agreement.
According to DOE officials, applicants must meet the guidelines
established by DOE.

Sources: GAO analysis of DOE and CFDA data. a In addition to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant program, DOE officials said that the Transportation

Emergency Planning Program provides tools, including training materials
and access to go- kits for instructors, and assists states and tribes in
developing their transportation emergency capabilities through plans,
procedures and training. DOE officials said that this is not a grant
program and does not provide funding directly to states or tribes for
emergency preparedness.

Private Organizations Rail and chemical companies, both through their
member organizations

Also Play a Role in and individually, participate in a variety of outreach
efforts to better

prepare local emergency responders for hazardous material transportation
Emergency Response

incidents. Key private efforts include the Transportation Community to
Hazardous Material

Awareness Emergency Response Program (TRANSCAER), the Chemical Incidents

Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC), and the Operation Respond
Emergency Information System (OREIS). Individual rail and chemical
companies also work with local communities to prepare for

hazardous material rail incidents through their participation in drills
and sharing of emergency response plans. Transportation Community

The American Chemistry Council; the Association of American Railroads;
Awareness Response

Chemical Education Foundation; National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.; and
Program Helps Prepare the Chlorine Institute sponsor the TRANSCAER program
to provide

Local Communities for support to communities in preparation for
transportation emergencies

Hazardous Material involving hazardous materials. TRANSCAER is supported
through sponsor

resources as well as monetary and in- kind contributions. TRANSCAER
Transportation Incidents

sponsors are directed to engage in a variety of activities with local
communities to improve response capabilities in the event of a hazardous
material transportation incident, including establishing contact with
LEPCs, reviewing existing LEPC emergency response plans, assisting LEPCs
with the establishment of transportation advisory groups, assisting LEPCs
with the implementation of transportation flow studies, and participating
in local emergency response training exercises.

24- hour Emergency CHEMTREC is a public service of the chemistry industry
that provides

Response Information Is services to shippers of hazardous materials,
including a 24- hour, 7- day a

Available to First week emergency call center that provides emergency
response information

Responders in the event of a hazardous material incident. CHEMTREC was
established

in 1971 by the chemical industry as a public service hotline for
firefighters, law enforcement, and other emergency responders to obtain
information and assistance for emergency incidents involving chemicals and
hazardous materials. If an accident occurs, an emergency responder can
call CHEMTREC for information on the product being shipped.

First Responders Can The rail transportation industry supports OREIS, a
software system

Access Database of Rail designed for use in passenger train and hazardous
material incidents that

Carriers in the Event of a connects first responders to the databases of
railroad and motor carriers to

Hazardous Material Incident allow them to obtain information quickly and
accurately on the specific types of hazardous materials that may be
involved in an incident and how

these materials should be handled. All Class I railroads in the United
States and Canada and several short line and regional railroads
participate in the program. The program can be accessed over the Internet
or with a computer software package. Operation Respond is a not- for-
profit institution that distributes OREIS software and assists localities
and transportation companies during a transportation emergency.

Individual Rail and In addition to the industry- wide outreach initiatives
discussed above,

Chemical Shipping individual rail and chemical shipping companies work
with local

Companies Participate in communities to develop preparedness for hazardous
material incidents.

Local Emergency Response For example, rail company officials that we
interviewed said that they Activities

participated in preparedness drills, provided communities with emergency
response guidelines, and participated in local emergency planning
committee activities. Rail and chemical shipping company representatives

also told us that they have hazardous material teams available on an on-
call basis to travel to the scene of an incident to assist local
communities in response.

Cooperative relationships between private sector industry and local
communities to improve preparedness may be formalized or ad hoc. For
example, in some cities, mutual aid agreements are used to leverage
industry technical expertise to assist a community in responding in the

event of an incident. In some cases, there are less formal relationships
where rail companies provide copies of their emergency response plans to
communities and meet with local officials only as the need arises.
Overall, in our case study visits to 10 cities, we found that most cities
had informal emergency response relationships with private sector
industry, where resources were leveraged when needed.

Multiple Standards and A variety of standards and self- assessment tools
are available for local

Guidelines of communities to address their own preparedness needs for
hazardous

material incidents. Some standards are focused on general emergency
Preparedness Exist preparedness, while others are specific to preparing
for and responding to hazardous material incidents or weapons of mass
destruction events.

These standards come from several federal agencies and private
organizations. However, the use of these standards is voluntary and not
required by federal regulations, and local communities adopt their use
based on individual needs. Our research identified a variety of emergency
preparedness standards that have been adopted by local communities to
respond to and prepare for hazardous material incidents by rail. These
standards are described in the next section.

National Fire Protection The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
is an international Association Standards

nonprofit organization that promotes fire safety through the consensus
development of scientifically- based codes, standards, training, and
education. There are three NFPA standards related to hazardous material
incident response, with a fourth related standard for emergency
management. The standards are as follows:

 Recommended Practices for Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents
(NFPA Standard 471) outlines recommended procedures for all organizations
responsible for responding to incidents involving hazardous materials.
These recommended practices include conducting annual training exercises
to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of hazardous material
emergency plans and updating hazardous material emergency response plans
on an annual basis.

 Standard for Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous
Materials Incidents (NFPA Standard 472) identifies the levels of
competency required of responders to hazardous materials incidents. The
standard defines four different levels of first responders, including the
awareness level, operational level, technician level, and incident

commander level as well as the types of competencies expected at each of
these first responder levels.

 Standard for Competencies for Emergency Medical Services Personnel
Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents (NFPA Standard 473) identifies
the levels of competency required of emergency medical service personnel
who respond to hazardous material incidents.

 Standards on Disaster/ Emergency Management and Business Continuity
Programs (NFPA Standard 1600) establishes minimum criteria for disaster/
emergency management. The standards provide common program elements,
techniques, and processes for disaster/ emergency management planning and
operations in the private and public sectors.

Occupational Safety and The OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency
Response

Health Administration Standard establishes worker protection standards for
emergency

Worker Protection Standard responders to hazardous material incidents. The
standard provides

 procedures for handling emergency response,  training requirements
(including refresher training), and  procedures for postemergency
response operation.

EPA Hazardous Material EPA*s hazardous material team- planning guidance
provides assistance to

Team Planning Guidance local fire departments in identifying, acquiring,
and maintaining the

hazardous material response equipment and trained personnel appropriate
for their locale. This manual provides guidance on

 determining requirements for hazardous material response,  establishing
the necessary level of expertise to meet those requirements,  developing
cost estimates for emergency response budget needs, and  preparing
emergency response and standard operating procedures to

include all participants in a local response community. Weapons of Mass

In order to receive grant funds from DHS* Office of Domestic Preparedness
Destruction Vulnerability

(which was formerly part of the Department of Justice) for weapons of
Assessment and Training

mass destruction (WMD) preparedness, states are required to complete a
Standards vulnerability assessment to benchmark a current vulnerability
profile with regard to a WMD terrorist incident. In addition, in August
2002, the Office of Domestic Preparedness issued new guidelines to assist
first responders in determining their training needs and improve their
performance to respond to a WMD terrorist incident. HHS Guidance on
Managing

HHS has developed a three- volume series of guidelines entitled Managing
Hazardous Materials

Hazardous Materials Incidents to help emergency response and health
Incidents

care professionals plan for and respond to hazardous material emergencies.
Volumes I and II are generic planning guides to assist first responders
and hospital personnel to plan for incidents that involve

hazardous materials. Examples of the types of guidance offered include
appropriate personal protection equipment and suggested patient
decontamination procedures. HHS is also developing training in incident
stress management. Volume III is a guide for health care professionals who
treat individuals who have been exposed to hazardous materials. Volume III
describes 51 specific chemical protocols that provide recommendations for
the on- scene and hospital medical management of patients exposed during a
hazardous material incident.

State Capability Assessment In 1996, the U. S. Senate Committee on
Appropriations asked the Federal

for Readiness Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is now part of
DHS* EP& R

Directorate, to develop a system of performance criteria that measures
emergency management capabilities and operational readiness throughout the
United States. The State Capability Assessment for Readiness is the EP& R
Directorate*s yearly status report on this effort. States self- assess
their level of capability for 13 emergency management functions, such as
hazard identification, risk assessment, and hazard mitigation, and the
results are aggregated.

Officials from the EP& R Directorate told us they are working with the
National Emergency Management Association and the International
Association of Emergency Management to develop a local assessment tool
that will provide local emergency managers the opportunity to evaluate
their emergency management programs. According to EP& R Directorate
officials, the local assessment tool is designed to complement a state*s
assessment tool to provide more accurate results. The EP& R Directorate
has completed a draft of this document and it is currently under review by
the National Emergency Management Association, the International
Association of Emergency Management, states, and other organizations.

Emergency Management The Emergency Management Accreditation Program is a
voluntary

Accreditation Program accreditation process for state and local programs
responsible for disaster Standards

mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. An independent team of
emergency managers assesses states and local communities to determine
whether their emergency response programs meet national standards.

These standards are based on NFPA Standard 1600 for emergency management
and business continuity programs and adapts them specifically for state
and local use.

Letter from the Federal Railroad

Appendi VI x Administration, May 28, 2003

GAO Response to Federal Railroad

Appendi VI x I Administration Letter

(545010)

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a

GAO United States General Accounting Office

After the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, industry
and government took steps to improve the safety and security of hazardous
material rail transportation. The railroad and chemical industries
assessed their facilities* exposure to attack and developed a security
plan to address their risks. The Department of Homeland Security*s
Transportation Security Administration has begun to address nonaviation
security by starting development of an overall intermodal transportation
system security plan, but has not yet developed specific plans to address
the security of individual surface transportation modes, including rail.
Such a plan is needed to determine the adequacy of security measures
already in place to protect rail shipments and identify security gaps.

Officials from local jurisdictions that GAO visited, as well as other
government and private sector experts, identified several unresolved
issues pertaining to the safety and security of transporting hazardous
materials by rail. These include the need for measures to better safeguard
hazardous

materials temporarily stored in rail cars while awaiting delivery to their
ultimate destination and the advisability of requiring companies to notify
local communities on the type and quantities of such materials stored or
passing through their communities.

While no standardized tool exists to gauge local preparedness, officials
from nine of the ten cities that GAO visited said that they are generally
prepared to respond to hazardous materials incidents. By the end of 2004,
the Department of Homeland Security plans to determine the response
capabilities of the nation by developing an assessment tool for use by
states in performing assessments of their local communities* emergency
response

capabilities. A Hazardous Material Rail Tank Car

Source: Department of Homeland Security.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns have
been raised that the nation*s shipments of hazardous materials by rail may
be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Millions of tons of hazardous materials
are shipped

yearly across the United States. Serious incidents involving these
materials have the potential to cause widespread disruption or injury. GAO
was asked to examine

recent steps taken by industry and government to improve the safety and
security of these shipments

and steps taken by local jurisdictions to prepare to respond to hazardous
material rail incidents. GAO recommends that the

Secretary of Homeland Security work with the Secretary of Transportation
to develop a riskbased plan to specifically address rail security. The
plan should establish time frames for actions to protect hazardous
material rail shipments. Department of Transportation and Homeland
Security officials generally agreed with the report and acknowledged that
no plan to specifically address rail security has been developed,

but noted that they have taken some actions to enhance the security of
hazardous material rail shipments. www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO-
03- 435. To view the full report, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact
Peter F. Guerrero at (202) 512- 2834 or guerrerop@ gao. gov. Highlights of
GAO- 03- 435, a report to

Congressional Requesters

April 2003

RAIL SAFETY AND SECURITY

Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, but Risked- based
Plan Needed

Page i GAO- 03- 435 Rail Safety and Security

Contents

Contents

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Contents

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Contents

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Appendix I

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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Appendix II

Appendix II Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials by the
Department of Transportation and Other Federal Agencies

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Appendix II Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials by the
Department of Transportation and Other Federal Agencies

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Appendix II Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials by the
Department of Transportation and Other Federal Agencies

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Appendix III

Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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Appendix IV

Appendix IV Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

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Appendix IV Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

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Appendix IV Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

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Appendix IV Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

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Appendix IV Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

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Appendix IV Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

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Appendix IV Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

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Appendix V

Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
Local First Responders

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Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
Local First Responders

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Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
Local First Responders

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Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
Local First Responders

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Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
Local First Responders

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Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
Local First Responders

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Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
Local First Responders

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Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
Local First Responders

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Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
Local First Responders

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Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
Local First Responders

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Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
Local First Responders

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Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
Local First Responders

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Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
Local First Responders

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Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
Local First Responders

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Appendix VI

Appendix VI Letter from the Federal Railroad Administration, May 28, 2003

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Appendix VII

Appendix VII GAO Response to Federal Railroad Administration Letter

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United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001
Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300 Address Service Requested

Presorted Standard Postage & Fees Paid

GAO Permit No. GI00
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