    Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance
    Rail Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed (30-APR-03,
    GAO-03-435).

    In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
    concerns have been raised that the nation's shipments of
    hazardous materials by rail may be vulnerable to terrorist
    attack. Millions of tons of hazardous materials are shipped
    yearly across the United States. Serious incidents involving
    these materials have the potential to cause widespread disruption
    or injury. GAO was asked to examine recent steps taken by
    industry and government to improve the safety and security of
    these shipments and steps taken by local jurisdictions to prepare
    to respond to hazardous material rail incidents.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-435
        ACCNO:   A06780
      TITLE:     Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to
    Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed
         DATE:   04/30/2003
      SUBJECT:   Hazardous substances
    	     Internal controls
    	     Railroad safety
    	     Railroad transportation operations
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Transportation safety

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    GAO-03-435

                                           A

    Report to Congressional Requesters

    April 2003 RAIL SAFETY AND SECURITY Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance
    Rail Security, but Risk- based Plan Needed

    GAO- 03- 435

    Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Industry Has Taken Steps to
    Address the Security of Transportation

    of Hazardous Materials by Rail, but TSA Has Not Yet Developed and
    Implemented a Rail Security Plan 10 Several Issues Regarding the Safety
    and Security of Hazardous

    Materials Transported by Rail Remain Unresolved 18 Most Localities Visited
    Report They Are Generally Prepared to

    Respond to Hazardous Material Rail Incidents, but Sufficiency of Actions
    Taken Cannot Be Determined 26 Conclusions 33 Recommendation for Executive
    Action 33 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

    Appendixes

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 36 Organizations Visited and Contacted
    36

    Appendix II: Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials by the
    Department of Transportation and Other Federal Agencies 40 DOT and DHS
    Oversee Rail Safety and Security 40 EPA Oversees Fixed Facilities That
    Handle Hazardous Materials 41 OSHA Focuses on the Safety of Plant Workers
    and Emergency

    Responders 42 NRC and DOE Oversee Shipments of Nuclear Material 42 DOD
    Oversees the Safety and Security of Military Hazardous

    Material Shipments 43

    Appendix III: Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United
    States 44 Department of Transportation Categorizes Hazardous Materials by

    Nine Classes 44 Overall Volume of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials
    for Rail,

    Truck, and Water are Similar by Ton- mile 45 Rail Shipments Represent a
    Much Higher Share of Volume for Some

    Hazardous Material Classes 48 Poisonous Inhalation Hazardous Materials
    Were Among the Ten

    Most Commonly Shipped Hazardous Materials from 1998 to 2001

    Rail Shipments of Radioactive and Military Hazardous Materials Represent a
    Small Fraction of All Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials 51

    Appendix IV: Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
    Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel 53 Proposed Private Fuel Storage and Yucca
    Mountain Repository

    Plans Will Result in Substantial Increases in Rail Shipment of Radioactive
    Materials 53 Historically Low Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipment Volumes Make
    Risk

    Assessment from Increased Shipments Difficult 56

    Appendix V: Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to
    Assist Local First Responders 61 General Procedures for Emergency Response
    61 Multiple Federal Plans and Agencies Provide Additional Resources

    to Address Hazardous Material Incidents 62 Federal Agencies Provide a
    Variety of Assistance for Responding to

    and Improving Preparedness for Hazardous Material Rail Incidents 66
    Private Organizations Also Play a Role in Emergency Response to

    Hazardous Material Incidents 71 Multiple Standards and Guidelines of
    Preparedness Exist 72

    Appendix VI: Letter from the Federal Railroad Administration, May 28, 2003
    76

    Appendix VII: GAO Response to Federal Railroad Administration Letter 78
    Tables Table 1: NFPA Levels of Professional Competence for First

    Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents 30 Table 2: 1997 Hazardous
    Materials Shipped by Tons and Ton- miles

    46 Table 3: Rail Shipments as Percentage of Hazardous Material

    Shipments by All Transportation Modes by Hazard Class and Division, 1997
    49 Table 4: The Top 20 Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail by Volume,
    1998* 2001 50

    Table 5: Transport of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel, 1979* 1996 54 Table
    6: Federal Agencies Involved in Emergency Response to

    Hazardous Material Incidents 66

    Table 7: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
    Provided by the Department of Homeland Security*s Office of Domestic
    Preparedness (Formerly a

    Department of Justice Program) 68 Table 8: Hazardous Material Emergency
    Response Assistance and

    Grants Provided by the Department of Transportation*s Research and Special
    Programs Administration 68 Table 9: Hazardous Material Emergency Response
    and Assistance

    Grants Provided by the Department of Homeland Security*s Directorate of
    Emergency Preparedness and Response 69 Table 10: Hazardous Material
    Emergency Response Assistance and

    Grants Provided by the Department of Health and Human Services 70 Table
    11: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and

    Grants Provided by the Department of Energya 70 Figures Figure 1: Photos
    of Rail Facilities 14

    Figure 2: Components of a Risk Management Approach to Defend Against
    Terrorism 18 Figure 3: Tons of Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail,

    1998* 2001 47

    Abbreviations

    AAR Association of American Railroads CFDA Catalog of Federal Domestic
    Assistance CFS Commodity Flow Survey CHEMTREC Chemical Transportation
    Emergency Center DHS Department of Homeland Security DOD Department of
    Defense DOE Department of Energy DOJ Department of Justice DOL Department
    of Labor DOT Department of Transportation EMAP Emergency Management
    Accreditation Program EPA Environmental Protection Agency EP& R Emergency
    Preparedness and Response FRA Federal Railroad Administration HHS
    Department of Health and Human Services HM hazardous materials LEPC local
    emergency planning committee MTMC Military Traffic Management Command NFPA
    National Fire Protection Association NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    NTSB National Transportation Safety Board ODP Office of Domestic
    Preparedness OREIS Operation Respond Emergency Information System OSHA
    Occupational Safety and Health Administration PFS Private Fuel Storage,
    LLC RSPA Research and Special Programs Administration SNF spent nuclear
    fuel TRANSCAER Transportation Community Awareness Emergency

    Response Program TSA Transportation Security Administration USCG U. S.
    Coast Guard WMD weapons of mass destruction

    This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
    copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
    materials separately from GAO*s product.

    Letter

    April 30, 2003 The Honorable Henry A. Waxman Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives

    The Honorable James L. Oberstar Ranking Minority Member Committee on
    Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives

    The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings The Honorable Martin T. Meehan House of
    Representatives

    In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns have
    been raised that the nation*s shipments of hazardous materials by rail may
    be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Millions of tons of hazardous materials
    are shipped yearly across the continental United States. Much of this
    volume is shipped on rail networks that travel through populated areas,
    increasing the concern that accidents or attacks during these shipments
    could have severe consequences. While the vast majority of shipments
    arrive safely at their destination, serious incidents involving these
    materials have the potential to cause widespread disruption or injury.
    Additionally, the proposed shipments of spent nuclear fuel at sites from
    39 states across the country to the Yucca Mountain Repository have
    highlighted the need to safeguard hazardous materials against both
    accident and attack. 1 Two federal agencies have primary responsibility
    for overseeing the safety

    and security of hazardous materials shipped by rail* the Department of
    Transportation (DOT) and the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
    Though originally a part of DOT, the Transportation Security
    Administration is now part of DHS. The Transportation Security
    Administration is charged with overseeing the security of all modes of
    transportation, including rail. Within DOT, the Federal Railroad
    Administration promotes railroad safety and enforces rail safety

    1 The proposed Yucca Mountain Repository is not scheduled to begin
    operations until 2010. For information on the safety and security issues
    posed by possible future rail shipments of spent nuclear fuel, see
    appendix IV.

    regulations, while the Research and Special Programs Administration
    regulates the transportation of materials that may pose an unreasonable
    risk to health, safety, and property. Other federal agencies having
    related responsibilities for the rail shipment of hazardous materials
    include the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy,
    Department of Defense (DOD), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
    Department of Labor*s Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and
    DHS* Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response. See appendix II
    for

    additional information on the oversight roles of DOT and other federal
    agencies in the safety and security of hazardous material rail shipments.

    In response to your request that we review the safety and security of
    transporting hazardous materials by rail in the United States, we examined
    (1) recent steps taken by industry and government for improving the safety
    and security of hazardous materials transported by rail, (2) issues
    pertaining to the safety and security of rail transport of hazardous
    materials identified by federal and private sector hazardous material
    transportation experts and local officials as being unresolved, and (3)
    the preparedness of ten local jurisdictions to respond to rail incidents
    involving hazardous materials, whether accidental or intentional. To
    address these issues, we used a variety of approaches and methodologies,
    including interviews with regulatory officials, analyses of hazardous
    materials volume and incident data, a panel of experts, and interviews
    with local officials. To report on the preparedness of local jurisdictions
    to respond to a potential terrorist attack or accident involving the
    shipment of hazardous materials by rail, we performed case studies at ten
    jurisdictions selected because they varied in size and experienced a
    recent and significant rail incident involving hazardous materials or
    typically experienced large amounts of hazardous material shipments
    passing through their communities. These jurisdictions are not named due
    to the sensitive nature of the issues discussed in this report. While
    providing information on the preparedness actions taken by

    these specific localities to respond to a hazardous material rail
    incident, results from these case studies cannot be generalized to other
    jurisdictions. We conducted our review from December 2001 through March
    2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
    See appendix I for additional information on our scope and methodology.

    Results in Brief In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
    industry and government have taken steps to improve the safety and
    security of the

    transportation of hazardous materials by rail. The railroad industry
    conducted an industry- wide assessment to identify and prioritize the

    exposure of rail facilities to the risk of attack and developed a security
    plan to address these risks. The security plan, completed in December
    2001, established four alert levels and described a series of actions to
    prevent terrorist threats to railroad personnel and facilities that could
    be taken at each alert level, including rail operations and police
    actions. In March 2003, DOT*s Research and Special Programs Administration
    finalized a rule, Hazardous Materials* Security Requirements for Offerors
    and

    Transporters of Hazardous Materials* which imposes new security
    requirements on shippers and carriers of certain hazardous materials. The
    Transportation Security Administration has also begun to address rail
    security. According to Transportation Security Administration officials,
    while much of its resources have been focused on aviation security, it has
    assumed responsibility for transportation security in all modes of
    transportation, including rail, and is beginning to develop an overall
    intermodal transportation system security plan, which these officials
    consider a major component of the National Strategy for Homeland Security.
    The Transportation Security Administration has signed a

    memorandum of agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration, which
    these officials said would serve as a guide for relations between the
    Transportation Security Administration and modal administrations within
    DOT, including the Federal Railroad Administration and Research and

    Special Programs Administration. However, while the Transportation
    Security Administration has begun work on an overall intermodal
    transportation system security plan, it has not yet developed specific
    plans to address the security of individual surface transportation modes,
    including rail, and does not have time frames established for completing
    such an effort. We are recommending that DHS and DOT work jointly to

    develop such a plan to assist the departments in determining the adequacy
    of security measures already in place to protect hazardous material rail
    shipments and identifying any gaps that need to be addressed.

    Government and private sector hazardous material experts and officials
    from some local jurisdictions that we visited identified several issues
    pertaining to the safety and security of transporting hazardous materials
    by rail that have not been resolved. These issues include the need for
    measures to better safeguard hazardous materials temporarily stored in
    rail cars while awaiting delivery to their ultimate destination* a
    practice commonly called *storage- in- transit,* the advisability of
    requiring companies to notify local communities of the type and quantities
    of materials stored in transit, and the appropriate amount of information
    rail companies should be required to provide local officials regarding
    hazardous material shipments passing through their communities. Federal

    Railroad Administration and Transportation Security Administration
    officials recognize that security concerns have grown since the September
    11, 2001, terrorist attacks regarding the vulnerability of hazardous
    materials stored in transit in, or passing through, local communities.
    However, they are just beginning to address this issue.

    In our review of the actions taken by the ten local communities that we
    visited to prepare and respond to hazardous material rail incidents,
    officials from nine of the ten localities told us that they believe that
    their cities are generally prepared to respond to these incidents. Actions
    taken by these communities include ensuring that emergency response plans
    are in place, employing hazardous material response teams, and planning
    and conducting training and drills. However, because no standardized tool
    currently exists to gauge preparedness, we were unable to determine the

    sufficiency of these localities* actions to prepare for hazardous material
    rail incidents. Officials from DHS* Directorate of Emergency Preparedness
    and Response 2 are in the process of determining the response capabilities
    of the nation by developing a standardized tool for performing
    selfassessments of local communities* emergency response capabilities.
    They estimate that this effort will be completed by the end of 2004.

    DHS and DOT generally agreed with our report and acknowledged that no plan
    to specifically address rail security has been developed, but stressed
    that they have taken some actions to enhance the security of hazardous
    material rail shipments.

    Background In 2001, over 83 million tons of hazardous materials were
    shipped by rail in the United States across a 170, 000- mile rail network
    which extends through every major city as well as thousands of small
    communities. Federal hazardous material transportation law defines a
    hazardous material as a substance or material that the Secretary of
    Transportation has determined

    2 This Directorate includes the entire functions of the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency, formerly an independent federal agency.

    is capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property
    when transported in commerce. 3 It includes hazardous substances such as
    ammonia, hazardous wastes from chemical manufacturing processes, and
    elevated temperature materials such as molten aluminum. 4 According to
    reported incident data from the DOT*s Research and Special

    Programs Administration (RSPA), the number of hazardous material incidents
    occurring during rail transportation declined from 1, 128 in 1992 to 894
    in 2001 and accounted for approximately 7 percent of all incidents

    involving the transportation of these materials in all modes. For the
    period 1997 to 2001, hazardous material rail shipments represented an
    annual average of approximately 11 incidents and less than 1 serious
    incident per million tons of hazardous materials shipped by rail. 5 For
    1997, the latest year for which data on intermodal hazardous material
    shipment volumes are available, there were approximately 14 incidents and
    less than 1 serious incident per million tons of hazardous materials
    shipped by truck.

    Although rail moves only a small percentage of all hazardous materials, it
    is the predominant method of transportation for some types of these
    materials, such as flammable solids. 6 When measured in ton- miles, 7
    hazardous materials shipped by rail are nearly equivalent to hazardous

    materials transported by road and water. 8 The vast majority of shipments
    arrive safely at their destination. However, recent accidents in urban
    areas, such as the 2001 incident in the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore,

    Maryland, involving a fire fueled by hazardous materials, and a leak of
    hydrochloric acid from a parked tank car in an urban area in Lowell,

    3 49 U. S. C. S: 5103. 4 Where specific references to flammable,
    radioactive, or other subsets of material are needed, the distinction will
    be made in the report. 5 RSPA defines an incident as an unintentional
    release of hazardous materials during the

    course of transportation. A serious incident is defined as an incident
    that involves a fatality or major injury, substantial property damage,
    closure of a major transportation artery or facility, or evacuation due to
    a hazardous material release.

    6 Appendix III contains additional information on the amounts and types of
    hazardous materials shipped by rail throughout the United States. 7 A ton-
    mile is a measure of volume that accounts for the distance a commodity is
    shipped. One ton- mile is equal to one ton shipped one mile.

    8 See appendix III for additional discussion on ton- mile shipments by
    transportation mode.

    Massachusetts, have called attention to the safety of hazardous materials
    shipped by rail. The events of September 11, 2001, and subsequent reviews
    of the vulnerability of the transportation sector, including rail, to
    terrorist attack have further focused attention on the security of
    hazardous materials in rail transport.

    The proposed plan to ship spent nuclear fuel, as soon as 2010 and most
    likely by rail, to the Yucca Mountain Repository in Nevada* the nation*s
    first long- term geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-
    level radioactive waste* has raised concerns about the safety and security
    of possible transportation to this site. 9 A second proposal to ship spent
    nuclear fuel to temporary storage in a private facility in Utah has
    heightened these concerns. 10 Such shipments would substantially increase
    the volume of nuclear material transported in this country. 11

    Two administrations within DOT, RSPA and the Federal Railroad
    Administration (FRA), have responsibilities, respectively, for developing
    regulations pertaining to the transportation of hazardous materials and
    for rail safety. RSPA is responsible for identifying and regulating the
    transportation of materials that may pose an unreasonable risk to health,
    safety, and property when transported in commerce. RSPA develops the
    hazardous material regulations, coordinating its work with other DOT
    administrations, including FRA. These regulations specify how shipments
    must be identified, packaged, and handled in transit.

    RSPA published a final rule in the March 25, 2003, Federal Register*
    Hazardous Materials: Security Requirements for Offerors and Transporters
    of Hazardous Materials, also known as HM- 232* which imposes new security
    requirements on shippers and carriers of certain hazardous materials. The
    final rule requires people who offer or transport hazardous

    9 Nuclear fuel is generally used in a nuclear reactor for a number of
    years before losing its ability to efficiently create energy. When the
    fuel can no longer effectively produce energy, it is considered "spent"
    and is replaced, but the spent fuel remains radioactive and hazardous.

    10 In March 2003, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing board blocked,
    for the time being, the issuance of a license to this private facility
    because of the risks that military aircraft operations conducted near the
    facility might pose. 11 Appendix IV contains additional information on
    safety issues associated with Yucca Mountain and the Utah facility. We are
    also currently undertaking a study assessing the findings of federally-
    sponsored studies of sabotage and severe accidents involving spent fuel.

    materials in amounts that require placarding to develop and implement a
    written security plan. The security plan must include an assessment of
    possible transportation security risks for the material( s) to be
    transported and appropriate measures to address identified risks. Specific
    measures established by the plan may vary depending on the level of threat
    at a particular time. In addition, the final rule requires all employees
    handling hazardous materials to receive security awareness training,
    beginning no later than the date of their first scheduled recurrent
    training. New employees must receive security awareness training within 90
    days of employment. Employees handling hazardous materials in companies
    subject to the security plan requirement must receive in- depth training
    concerning the security plan and its implementation.

    FRA oversees the safety of railroad equipment and operating practices and
    has authority to enforce compliance with the hazardous material
    regulations. DOT*s regulation of the transport of hazardous materials
    under federal hazardous material transportation law preempts similar
    regulation by state and local agencies. States and local jurisdictions may
    not establish stricter or less stringent regulations governing hazardous
    material transportation. 12

    The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), created within DOT in
    the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
    and now part of the newly created DHS, initially focused primarily on
    aviation issues but, along with DOT, is responsible for the security of
    all modes of transportation, including rail. According to TSA officials,
    the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator for TSA have
    exchanged letters regarding the ongoing cooperation and relationship
    between TSA and the DOT operating administrations after the March 1, 2003,
    transfer of TSA from DOT to DHS. This correspondence sets forth a number
    of principles to guide this relationship.

    12 Preemption occurs when Congress enacts a statute intending to preclude
    inconsistent state or local law. Depending upon the circumstances,
    Congress may choose to preempt all or only some forms of state or local
    rulemaking. The law preempts any inconsistent state or local rulemaking.

    Several other federal agencies also play a role in regulating rail
    shipments of hazardous materials. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
    and Department of Energy (DOE) oversee shipments of nuclear material.
    Although DOT regulates the transportation of radioactive material,
    including spent fuel, as a hazardous material, NRC also regulates the
    transportation of radioactive material by its licensees. The primary role
    of NRC, under a memorandum of agreement with DOT, is the establishment of
    packaging standards for fissile materials and for other radioactive
    materials exceeding certain limits. 13 NRC certifies spent fuel casks and
    other radioactive material package designs that meet these standards and
    requires its licensees to use certified casks for transport. NRC also
    plays a significant role through safety and security requirements and
    through inspection and enforcement. In its role as developer of the Yucca
    Mountain Repository, DOE is responsible for shipping spent nuclear fuel
    from nuclear plants. In addition, DOE coordinates policies and program
    implementation for shipments of radioactive waste with DOT and NRC.

    The Department of Defense*s (DOD) Military Traffic Management Command is
    responsible for DOD*s surface transportation shipments and requires that
    everyone participating in the shipment of DOD hazardous materials comply
    with hazardous material regulations. DOD also requires inspections for
    sensitive shipments, including hazardous materials, to be conducted by
    railroad police officers, trained railroad employees, or

    members of private security firms under contract to DOD. The Environmental
    Protection Agency (EPA) and Occupational Safety and Health Administration
    (OSHA) each have oversight responsibility regarding facilities that handle
    hazardous materials and are the source or destination of many hazardous
    material rail shipments. EPA, along with the U. S. Coast Guard (USCG), has
    authority for implementing and enforcing legislation governing the
    protection of public health and the environment against chemical and other
    polluting discharges and for abating and controlling pollution when spills
    occur. EPA has provided training and technical assistance to states and
    localities to enhance contingency planning and emergency response
    capabilities. EPA sometimes participates with other

    agencies in responding to hazardous material transportation incidents.
    OSHA promulgates and enforces standards to protect the safety and health

    13 Fissile material is any material fissionable by slow neutrons. This
    involves splitting a nucleus into at least two other nuclei and the
    release of a relatively large amount of energy. The three primary fissile
    materials are uranium- 233, uranium- 235, and plutonium- 239.

    of employees, including workers at facilities that handle hazardous
    materials and emergency responders to hazardous material incidents.

    The USCG enforces spill prevention regulations on vessels and on the
    marine transfer portion of waterfront facilities. Under the National
    Contingency Plan, the USCG serves as the federal on scene coordinator for
    oil or hazardous substance releases in the coastal zone. All oil and
    hazardous material incidents are required to be reported to the National
    Response Center, which in turn is to notify state and local agencies and
    the appropriate on scene coordinator (either EPA for inland or USCG for
    coastal incidents). In each case, the on scene coordinator is to assess
    the need for federal involvement and, if appropriate, may respond,
    bringing

    additional response resources (such as contractors), special teams, and
    access to federal funding for hazardous material or oil spills.

    The Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP& R) Directorate within DHS
    provides federal assistance to supplement the resources of state and local
    governments in major disasters, which could include emergencies involving
    hazardous material releases. Its assistance is governed by the Federal
    Response Plan that provides the mechanism for delivery of federal
    assistance and resources to augment state and local government efforts in
    a major disaster or emergency. In conjunction with NRC, DOE, DOD, EPA, and
    other agencies, DHS* EP& R also participates in the Federal

    Radiological Emergency Response Plan to establish an organized and
    integrated capability for timely, coordinated response by federal agencies
    to peacetime radiological emergencies. For more details on the roles of
    various federal agencies in assisting state and local governments to
    respond to emergencies, see appendix V.

    Industry Has Taken The railroad and chemical industries have taken a
    number of steps to

    Steps to Address the enhance the security of transportation of hazardous
    materials. Some of

    these measures include the development of a rail security plan and an
    Security of

    increase in security measures at some facilities. According to TSA
    officials, Transportation of

    while much of TSA*s resources have been focused on aviation security, TSA
    Hazardous Materials by

    has assumed its responsibility for transportation security in all modes of
    transportation, including rail, and is beginning to develop an intermodal

    Rail, but TSA Has Not national transportation system security plan, which
    TSA officials consider

    Yet Developed and to be a major component of the National Strategy for
    Homeland Security.

    Another TSA effort in this area involves the development of a Implemented
    a Rail

    memorandum of agreement with DOT*s Federal Aviation Administration,
    Security Plan

    which DOT officials said would serve as a guide for relations between TSA
    and modal administrations within DOT, including FRA and RSPA. Although TSA
    has begun work on an overall intermodal transportation system security
    plan, it has not yet developed a plan to specifically address

    the security of individual surface transportation modes, including rail,
    and does not have time frames established for completing such an effort.
    The development of a security plan addressing rail transportation of
    hazardous materials that uses a risk- based management approach, such as
    that used by other federal agencies, government commissions, and
    multinational corporations to defend against terrorism, would assist TSA
    in identifying threats that exist to the shipment of hazardous materials
    by rail, vulnerabilities that may be exploited in the system used to ship
    these materials, and high- risk, high- consequence facilities that need
    protection.

    Railroad Industry Has Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
    2001, railroad companies*

    Developed a Security Plan security efforts focused primarily on the
    prevention of theft at rail facilities.

    and Taken Other Steps Representatives of several major railroad companies
    told us that they had

    toll- free emergency telephone numbers to report suspicious activity,
    including theft, in place before the terrorist attacks. According to a
    representative from the Association of American Railroads (AAR), which
    represents the major freight railroads in the United States, Mexico, and
    Canada, railroad companies currently employ over 1, 000 police officers.

    Within two weeks of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, AAR
    created a railroad security task force to analyze the industry*s risk from
    and response to the threat of terrorism. AAR worked jointly with several
    chemical industry associations and consultants from a security firm to
    develop the industry*s security management plan. 14 As part of this
    effort, AAR created critical action teams to assess the rail industry*s
    security in

    five areas: infrastructure, military operations, information technology
    and communications, security of operations, and hazardous materials. The
    plan that resulted from this effort was presented to its member railroads
    and

    TSA in December 2001. It established four alert levels and described a
    graduated series of actions to prevent terrorist threats to railroad
    personnel and facilities that correspond to each alert level. The actions
    include progressively rigorous countermeasures to be taken in the areas of
    operations, information technology and communications, and police. The
    countermeasures include actions to heighten security awareness, limit the
    sharing of information about sensitive shipments, and test that security
    systems are operating as intended. With U. S. military action in Iraq, the
    railroad industry has taken additional security steps, including real-
    time monitoring and additional surveillance of designated trains;
    increased security at some rail yards; and increased inspection of
    priority railroad tracks, tunnels, and bridges.

    Representatives of several major railroad companies and the railroad
    industry told us that the railroads have implemented a number of new
    security measures since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
    including the following:

     increasing the awareness of employees about potential security threats;
     enhancing dispatch command and control centers;  monitoring hazardous
    materials with video surveillance;  restricting access to facilities
    through the use of key cards;  installing better lighting, fencing, and
    barricades at rail facilities; 14 See U. S. General Accounting Office,
    Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical
    Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness Is Unknown, GAO- 03-
    439 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 14, 2003) for information on voluntary
    actions that the

    chemical industry has taken to address security preparedness and the
    challenges that it faces in protecting its assets and operations.

     monitoring of critical infrastructure locations by police officers and
    contracted security guards;

     employing additional security officers to protect hazardous materials in
    storage;

     instituting more threat information sharing with the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation, as well as state and local government agencies;

     conducting security evaluations of rail facilities;  limiting access to
    electronic tracking of shipments of hazardous

    materials; and  conducting *red team* assault tests in which rail
    companies send

    undercover security officers to test employees* responses to trespassers.

    We visited rail facilities at five locations, in part to observe security
    measures there. Overall, we observed more physical security measures at
    large rail facilities than at smaller facilities. Both the small and large
    facilities we visited had signs indicating that trespassing was not
    permitted and that railroad personnel were on duty part of or all day. In
    addition, the large facilities had security video cameras, lights,
    observation towers staffed by railroad personnel that can be used as
    security lookouts, and fencing along some parts of the facility. However,
    all of the facilities we visited could be readily accessed because they
    are not fenced or fences did not completely separate the facilities from
    adjacent areas, and some of the

    facilities did not have gates around them. Figure 1 shows photos of rail
    facilities in some of the case study locations we visited. We observed the
    following during our visits:

     rail companies relied heavily on the vigilance of employees;  employees
    provided photo identifications upon request, but were not

    required to display them;  the presence of security guards varied; and
    at intermodal facilities, where hazardous material products are

    transferred between rail cars and trucks for continued shipment,

    procedures were in place to check for tampering with the valves of tank
    cars transporting hazardous materials.

    Figure 1: Photos of Rail Facilities

    Observation tower at a rail facility

    Source: GAO. Gated entrance at an intermodal rail facility Source: GAO.

    Entrance to a rail facility Source: DHS.

    Despite reporting that they had implemented enhanced security measures,
    railroad industry representatives told us that it is not possible to
    eliminate all vulnerabilities and, without government assistance, the
    industry lacks the resources to counter a significant terrorist attack.

    TSA Is Beginning to Address Since its creation in November 2001, TSA has
    primarily focused on Rail Security

    improving aviation security to meet the deadlines established in the
    Aviation and Transportation Security Act for TSA to assume civil aviation
    security functions and responsibilities, such as implementing federal
    passenger screening. As a result, TSA has not yet assumed full
    responsibility for security in other modes of transportation, such as
    rail.

    The establishment of TSA*s Office of Maritime and Land Security in March
    2002 marked the beginning of TSA*s efforts to address security in other
    modal areas, including the security of rail transportation. The goals for
    this office are to prevent terrorist attacks, protect transportation
    without impeding movement, and respond to transportation accidents or
    incidents promptly.

    TSA*s Office of Maritime and Land Security plans to hire 200 employees to
    cover all 50 states by 2004, subject to resource constraints. As of March
    2003, the office had filled 83 of the 200 positions. TSA officials said
    that since the office*s eventual staff will be relatively small, the
    office plans to work jointly with DOT to maximize resources by relying on
    other modal administrations to cover day- to- day security operations.
    According to TSA officials, the office will focus on identifying security
    gaps and improving security plans in each mode.

    TSA Has Taken Some Steps TSA has taken some steps to address the security
    of hazardous material rail

    to Address the Security of shipments, including starting the development
    of an intermodal

    Hazardous Material transportation system security plan, establishing
    working relationships

    Transportation by Rail, but with DOT*s modal administrations, and
    conducting an initial review of the

    rail industry*s own security rail plan. In March 2003, DHS launched Has
    Not Yet Developed a

    Operation Liberty Shield to help protect the nation*s infrastructure and
    Rail Security Plan deter possible terrorist attacks. Among other things,
    this national plan calls for (1) state governors to provide additional
    police or National Guard forces at selected railroad bridges; and (2)
    railroad companies to improve

    the security of major rail facilities and hubs, monitor shipments of
    hazardous materials, and increase the surveillance of trains carrying
    these materials. Nevertheless, TSA has not yet developed a security plan
    for rail

    that systematically determines the adequacy of security measures already
    in place and identifies gaps that need to be addressed.

    TSA officials told us that they and officials in other components of DHS
    are working on a national transportation system security plan to address
    the security challenges of the nation*s transportation system using a
    threatbased and risk management approach. This plan is to address the
    intermodal aspects of the transportation system first and then to provide
    a strategic framework for future TSA activities in transportation
    security. TSA officials said that they hope to have the key components of
    this intermodal plan in place by May 2003 and after that time they will
    consider security on individual transportation modes, including rail. TSA
    has also signed a memorandum of agreement with DOT*s Federal Aviation
    Administration, which DOT officials said would serve as a guide for

    relations between TSA and DOT*s modal administrations, including FRA and
    RSPA.

    TSA*s Office of Maritime and Land Security officials told us that they
    have reviewed AAR*s security plan, and they credited AAR for its efforts
    in conducting a very aggressive vulnerability assessment. The TSA
    officials said that they are considering using aspects of the AAR
    assessment as the basis for a model that TSA plans to develop on how to
    conduct vulnerability assessments. However, the officials noted that some
    areas of AAR*s plan need to be clarified, such as what specific measures
    individual railroad companies will be expected to implement. FRA officials
    have also reviewed AAR*s plan and commented that AAR needs to identify
    mitigating actions more specifically.

    TSA officials told us they are planning to undertake projects in the
    future that we believe could become part of a rail security plan,
    including the development of physical security standards and an assessment
    of vulnerable hazardous material transportation areas. As a first step,
    officials said that they plan to visit seaport facilities, which face
    similar threats to protecting hazardous material shipments as rail
    facilities do, to determine what physical security standards could be
    applied to other modes of transportation, in areas such as facility
    lighting levels or monitoring by closed- circuit televisions. Given their
    initial focus on aviation security priorities, TSA officials said they
    have not yet established time frames for developing these physical
    security standards or conducting a vulnerability assessment of the rail
    industry. FRA officials told us that they are working with TSA on their
    efforts to develop and implement federal standards for railroad security.

    The development of a security plan addressing rail transportation of
    hazardous materials that uses a risk- based management approach would
    assist TSA by providing a strategy to identify threats to these shipments,
    vulnerabilities that may be targeted in the system used to ship these
    materials, and high- risk, high consequence facilities that need
    protection. Although TSA has taken steps and is considering future
    measures to address the security of hazardous material rail shipments, it
    does not yet

    have a risk- based plan to guide its actions specifically in this area.
    Until TSA develops such a plan, it will not know whether resources are
    being deployed as effectively and efficiently as possible to reduce the
    risk of possible terrorist attacks.

    In our previous work on homeland security, we have determined that the
    federal government can benefit from a risk management approach to defend
    against terrorism. 15 This approach can provide organizations with a
    process for enhancing their preparedness to respond to terrorist attacks

    and to permit better direction of national finite resources to areas of
    highest priority. Figure 2 shows the components of a risk management
    approach to defend against terrorism. This approach includes the
    following:

     a threat assessment to identify and evaluate potential threats on the
    basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and impact of an
    attack;

     a vulnerability assessment to identify weaknesses that may be exploited
    by identified threats and suggest options to address those weaknesses; and

     a criticality assessment to evaluate and identify assets and
    infrastructure in terms of specific criteria such as their importance to
    public safety and the economy.

    15 For additional information on the applicability of risk management to
    homeland security, see: U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland
    Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO-
    02- 208T (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 31, 2001).

    Figure 2: Components of a Risk Management Approach to Defend Against
    Terrorism Risk Management Approach

    Threat Vulnerability

    Criticality assessment assessment assessment

    Source: GAO.

    Several Issues Our discussions with federal and private sector hazardous
    material

    Regarding the Safety transportation experts and local community officials
    identified several

    issues that, in their opinion, remain unresolved regarding the safe and
    and Security of

    secure transportation of hazardous materials by rail. These issues include
    Hazardous Materials

    the need for measures to better safeguard hazardous materials stored in
    Transported by Rail

    rail cars while awaiting delivery to a final destination* a practice
    commonly referred to as *storage- in- transit** the advisability of
    requiring

    Remain Unresolved companies to notify local communities of the type and
    quantities of

    materials stored in transit, and the appropriate amount of information
    rail companies should be required to provide local officials regarding
    hazardous material shipments passing through their communities.

    Concerns about the Safety The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
    have raised concerns about the

    and Security of Hazardous exposure and vulnerability of hazardous
    materials stored in transit in

    Materials Stored in Transit chemical rail cars on rail sidings and in rail
    yards. Emergency response

    Have Not Yet Been Fully officials in three of the locations we visited
    identified storage- in- transit as a

    safety and security concern for their communities. Addressed

    The local officials said that they were aware of rail cars that were
    unsecured and, in some cases, provided photographs or videotape as
    evidence of the lack of security. According to these local officials,
    unmonitored chemical cars could develop undetected leaks that could

    threaten the nearby population and environment. A May 31, 2002,
    hydrochloric acid leak from a rail car in Lowell, Massachusetts, is a
    recent example of such an incident. In this incident, a rail car parked on
    a siding developed a leak that produced a cloud of hazardous vapor before
    the 200-

    gallon leak of hazardous materials was contained. Local Government
    Officials Although they could not provide documentation to support their
    beliefs, Believe Some Shipments Stored

    local government officials we interviewed in two locations stated that
    they in Transit May Violate a Rule to

    believed that, in some cases, shipments stored in transit in their local
    areas Expedite Shipments

    might be in violation of DOT*s 48- hour rule 16 that generally requires a
    carrier to move each shipment of hazardous materials promptly and within
    48 hours after its receipt at any yard, transfer station, or interchange
    point. Although local officials believe the 48- hour rule is a safety and
    security standard for shipments of hazardous materials stored in transit,
    FRA

    officials told us that the 48- hour rule was not instituted for storage
    safety concerns. According to FRA officials, the 48- hour rule was
    implemented for economic reasons, not safety reasons. FRA officials said
    that the rule was developed in the early 1900s because oil companies were
    using rail yards as convenient storage warehouses and not promptly moving
    their shipments. 17 The rail companies did not want their property to be
    used as a storage

    warehouse without compensation. FRA officials said that they do not
    necessarily encourage rail companies to move rail cars affected by the
    48hour rule to another destination just to meet the time limit because
    this might result in moving a car from a safe to a hazardous location.

    16 49 CFR S:174.14, Movements To Be Expedited.

    17 We were not able to corroborate FRA*s explanation. What became the 48-
    hour requirement for expedited movement is found in the 1914 published
    rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Regulations for the
    Transportation of Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles by Freight and
    Express and Specifications for Shipping Containers, Interstate

    Commerce Commission, P:P: 1433, 1714, (GPO eff. October 1, 1914). The
    origin of the rules themselves can be traced from even earlier Interstate
    Commerce Commission rules, which grew out of the need to regulate the safe
    transportation of explosives. The 1914 regulations appear to have remained
    largely unchanged until 1939, when they were included in the first version
    of the Code of Federal Regulations. At that time, 49 C. F. R. S: 80.262
    (1939), provided:

    *Movement to be expedited. Carriers must forward shipments of explosives
    and other dangerous articles promptly and within 48 hours after acceptance
    at originating point or receipt at any yard, transfer station, or
    interchange point.*

    FRA Is Beginning to Address FRA officials recognize that the security
    concerns regarding storage- intransit

    Potential Safety and Security have grown since the September 11, 2001,
    terrorist attacks. From a

    Issues Regarding Storage- intransit security standpoint, the officials
    said that new regulations for storage- intransit

    materials should be considered. According to these officials, such
    measures may include not allowing rail cars containing certain highly
    hazardous commodities to be stored in transit.

    FRA is currently reviewing the safety and security of hazardous materials
    stored in transit through initiatives such as collaboration with the
    American Chemistry Council to examine how storage- in- transit shipments
    typically move, how the chemical industry can better expedite these
    movements, and viable alternatives to storing chemicals in transit. TSA is
    leading an initiative to follow chlorine shipments from origin to
    destination. Its overall goal is to determine best practices for shipments
    as well as the types of measures needed to secure shipments, including
    those

    stored in transit. TSA has reached out to the Chlorine Institute, American
    Chemistry Council, FRA, RSPA, and AAR. TSA hopes to expand the lessons
    learned from this initiative to other hazardous material rail shipments.

    RSPA Plans to Clarify the In addition to expressing concern about the
    safety and security of

    Regulatory Oversight of the hazardous materials stored in transit and
    their need for information on the

    Safety and Security of Hazardous types and quantities of these materials,
    a local official that we interviewed

    Materials Stored in Transit told us that he was unclear about which
    federal agency has regulatory

    oversight for the safety and security of this area. Some issues pertaining
    to the specific scope of DOT and EPA*s roles in the regulatory oversight
    of hazardous materials stored in transit have not been fully determined.
    According to RSPA, confusion exists in the regulated community and among
    federal, state, and local agencies with hazardous material safety
    responsibilities regarding whether and to what extent DOT hazardous
    material transportation safety regulations apply to particular operations
    related to the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce, such as
    storage- in- transit on tracks leased to fixed facilities. 18 18 Leased
    tracks are railroad tracks in rail yards or railroad sidings that
    manufacturers, such

    as chemical companies, lease from railroad companies to temporarily store
    their commodities until needed. Commodities are stored in rail cars on
    these *leased* tracks. Leases may be *fixed,* when a company enters into a
    lease of specific track, or *rolling,* when the company pays a storage fee
    for whatever track the car may be sitting on. The location where the car
    is held may be the destination identified on the shipping papers but not
    the final destination where the hazardous materials will be unloaded.
    Fixed facilities are business premises where extremely hazardous materials
    are produced, stored, or used in amounts exceeding legally proscribed
    threshold quantities.

    In response to requests for clarification on whether particular
    activities, such as storage- in- transit, should be considered
    transportation operations, RSPA has issued a proposed rule* Applicability
    of the Hazardous Materials Regulations to Loading, Unloading, and Storage,
    also known as HM- 223* to clarify the applicability of DOT*s hazardous
    material regulations to specific

    functions and activities, including loading and unloading of hazardous
    materials and their storage during transportation. RSPA officials have
    concluded that, given the potential for continuing terrorist threats and
    the critical need to assure the security of hazardous materials at fixed
    facilities and in transportation, it is more important than ever to
    clarify its jurisdiction over hazardous materials in transportation.

    According to RSPA, confusion exists concerning whether EPA or DOT
    regulations apply to storage- in- transit on leased tracks because federal
    regulations do not clearly articulate whether this operation is
    transportation or nontransportation related. Under HM- 223, RSPA is
    considering two options for regulatory oversight of storage- in- transit
    occurring on leased tracks. Under the first option, storage on leased
    tracks would be considered as storage after movement in transportation of
    the rail car has been completed whether the hazardous material is to be
    unloaded at that destination or not. The hazardous material transportation
    regulations would not apply under this option and hazardous material

    inspectors could not apply DOT*s hazardous material rail safety
    requirements concerning proper shipping papers, operational handling of
    rail cars, or placards to indicate the hazardous content of rail cars.

    According to EPA officials that we interviewed, under this option, EPA*s
    risk management program regulations under the Clean Air Act might apply if
    storage on leased tracks contained more than a threshold amount of certain
    regulated highly toxic materials, such as chlorine. These officials note
    that EPA has stated that the Clean Air Act is not preempted by DOT*s
    authority. They said that while EPA generally does not regulate activities
    regulated by DOT, there are circumstances where both agencies*

    authorities might apply, for example, with respect to long- term storage
    or facility equipment involved in loading or unloading.

    Under the second option being considered, storage on leased tracks would
    be considered storage related to transportation and thus subject to all
    the applicable requirements of the DOT hazardous material regulation, even
    if the leased tracks were the final destination identified on the shipping
    papers. This would ensure that rail cars would be subject to all pertinent

    DOT hazardous material requirements.

    While RSPA*s efforts to propose rule making on the applicability of the
    hazardous material transportation regulations to loading, unloading, and
    storage of hazardous materials began with an advanced notice of public
    rule making in 1996, RSPA officials said that HM- 223, which culminates
    those efforts, will be not be finalized until June 2003. Over this period,
    to address issues involved in clarifying jurisdiction in this area, RSPA
    published another advanced notice of public rule making in 1999 and held
    public meetings to obtain proposals and recommendations on the

    applicability of hazardous material regulations from the regulated
    community, which includes shippers, carriers, warehouses, and federal,
    state, and local public safety agencies. In 2001, RSPA published a notice
    of proposed rule making requesting written comments on proposals from
    these organizations.

    Notifying Local While chemical manufacturers are required to notify their
    communities of Communities on the Type

    the existence of hazardous materials at their facilities, the advisability
    of and Quantities of Hazardous

    requiring companies to notify local communities on the type and quantities
    Materials Stored in Transit

    of materials stored in transit has not been similarly addressed by DOT.
    Has Not Been Addressed

    Based on their observations, local officials from two of the 10
    jurisdictions that we visited told us that they believe storage- in-
    transit shipments remain in rail yards for periods longer than 48 hours.
    To ensure adequate safety and security for hazardous materials stored in
    transit, the officials at one

    location suggested that the 48- hour rule be more strongly enforced to
    expedite shipments or, if hazardous material shipments remain stationary
    for extended periods of time (beyond the 48- hour period), these shipments
    should be regulated in a manner similar to hazardous materials stored in
    fixed facilities* with reporting requirements for companies to provide

    information to emergency response officials on the types and quantities of
    materials stored in transit.

    The local officials said that, because these hazardous materials stored in
    transit are parked in their community for extended periods of time, they
    present a risk similar to the potential health and safety risk posed by
    chemicals at a fixed facility. They expressed a need to have information
    on the types and quantities of hazardous materials stored in transit in
    their communities to ensure that they have the proper training and
    equipment to respond to incidents involving these materials, and told us
    that they had experienced difficulty in obtaining information on these
    materials stored in transit. The local officials that we interviewed in
    one location feel that companies should be required to provide information
    on the contents of the rail cars in a manner similar to that required of
    fixed facilities under the

    Emergency Planning and Community Right- to- Know Act of 1986. 19 Under the
    requirements of this act, chemical manufacturers are required to notify
    their communities of the existence, as well as some routine and accidental
    releases, of hazardous materials at their facilities to aid in emergency
    planning.

    While some local officials that we interviewed cited the need to receive
    information on the types and quantities of hazardous materials stored in
    transit, FRA officials told us that they were not in favor of sharing
    real- time data on these shipments. FRA officials said that it would be a
    significant logistical challenge for railroads to share real- time data
    regarding individual freight movements stored in transit. These officials
    said that providing advance notification information could also create new
    security concerns as detailed information on the whereabouts of hazardous
    materials becomes known in great detail by a large number of individuals.
    In addition, FRA officials commented that it would be inappropriate to

    require railroads to report to local communities on all hazardous
    materials stored in transit because the railroads have limited advance
    knowledge of what will be stored at these locations.

    19 P. L. 99- 499.

    Opinions Differ on While differing opinions exist concerning the adequacy
    of hazardous

    Adequacy of Hazardous material shipment information currently provided to
    local communities, no

    Material Shipment determination has been made at a federal level on the
    appropriate amount

    Information Provided to of information rail companies should be required
    to provide to

    communities regarding overall hazardous material shipments to enhance
    Communities, but No

    their emergency preparedness. Officials from five of the ten communities
    Determination Has Been that we visited said they did not need advance
    notification information on Made on Appropriate

    specific shipment types and quantities. Due to the high volume and variety
    Amount of Disclosure

    of hazardous material shipments through his area, an official from one of
    these communities said that they employ an approach to respond to all
    types of chemical emergencies. He believes that this approach is more
    effective for his community*s circumstances rather than trying to prepare
    for specific chemicals that might be involved in incidents. However, some
    officials from two of these five communities told us that they would like
    to

    receive advance notification of special shipments, such as high- level
    radioactive materials or explosives. Officials from the other five
    communities that we visited said that they would like to receive advance
    notification of certain shipments for emergency planning purposes.

    AAR suggests to its member railroads that, as a voluntary policy, they
    provide, when requested, historical information on hazardous materials
    that have been shipped through a community. Officials from AAR member
    railroads that we interviewed said that they complied with this voluntary
    policy. For example, a railroad, when asked, will inform a community of
    the types of hazardous materials most frequently shipped through that
    community over the past year. This policy covers AAR member railroads,
    which account for more than 96 percent of intercity rail freight service
    and 100 percent of intercity passenger service in the United States. 20
    Emergency response officials that we spoke to at one of our site visits
    said that they had experienced difficulty in obtaining limited historical
    information about shipments of hazardous materials from a railroad that

    was not an AAR member. The local officials told us that it took 4 years of
    requests before the company agreed to provide this information to assist
    them in their emergency management planning. In the interim, the locality
    had to respond to a hazardous material incident on the company*s tracks

    20 AAR*s membership includes the major Class I railroads, two of the
    larger short line railroads, and 500 smaller railroads represented through
    an AAR operating committee.

    involving a tank car leaking hydrochloric acid, which emergency responders
    were unaware had been stored on rail tracks in the community.

    Officials that we spoke to from national rail industry organizations
    offered their opinions on the subject of advance notification. An official
    from one organization said that he does not support providing advance
    notification information on specific upcoming shipments to local
    communities because of the high volume of materials shipped and the low
    probability of release. An official from another organization said that
    his organization is not in favor of providing advance notification because
    it would be too much information sent on a daily basis and would soon be
    ignored. He further cautioned that releasing information about planned
    shipments could pose a security risk because such information could be
    used to identify vulnerabilities.

    FRA officials told us that careful consideration needs to be given to the
    full implications of advance notification. They said that this includes
    security implications, community capability to make constructive use of
    the data, the potential costs and benefits of such requirements, and
    whether these requirements should be applied to other modes of
    transportation, such as motor carriers. Furthermore, in commenting on the
    overall consideration of new security measures for the rail industry, FRA
    officials told us that whatever security enhancements might be required
    for rail shipments of hazardous materials should be accompanied by
    appropriate security requirements for truck shipments so that shippers not
    switch to a potentially more vulnerable but less expensive alternative.

    Most Localities Visited Even though a host of voluntary standards and
    self- assessment tools are

    Report They Are available to assist localities in assessing aspects of
    their emergency response capabilities, no standardized tool currently
    exists to objectively

    Generally Prepared to determine a locality*s level of preparedness to
    respond to hazardous

    Respond to Hazardous material incidents. As such, the localities that we
    visited provided

    Material Rail Incidents, information on their preparedness based on their
    own self- assessments

    rather than on uniform national criteria. These localities took actions to
    but Sufficiency of

    prepare for and respond to hazardous material incidents based on
    selfassessments Actions Taken Cannot

    formed from a variety of factors. For the most part, these localities said
    that they found themselves prepared to respond to Be Determined

    hazardous material rail incidents based on their own selected criteria.
    Due to the absence of a standardized tool to gauge the level of
    preparedness, we were unable to determine the sufficiency of local
    community actions to prepare for hazardous material rail incidents given
    the risk factors that they face. 21

    Case Study Findings Show To assess local community capability to prepare
    for and respond to

    Varying Preparedness potential terrorist attacks or accidents involving
    rail shipments, we visited Actions Taken by Local

    10 localities in the United States. Each of these localities was
    judgmentally Communities selected based on at least one of following three
    criteria:

     experienced a recent and significant rail incident involving hazardous
    materials,

     had a large population and flow of hazardous materials shipped through
    it by rail, and

     had a small population and large flow of hazardous materials shipped
    through it by rail. Officials from most localities that we visited
    reported that their cities are generally prepared to respond to these
    incidents. Officials from the localities told us that they have emergency
    response plans in place, access to either their own or another hazardous
    material response team, and that they plan and conduct training and
    drills. In addition, these localities report

    21 Appendix V contains additional information on the federal government
    and private sector resources available to localities for emergency
    response to rail incidents involving the transportation of hazardous
    materials.

    that they have most of the basic equipment necessary to respond to a
    hazardous material incident on hand. Although officials said they were
    generally prepared to respond to incidents involving hazardous chemical
    materials, they said that they were less prepared to deal with incidents
    involving radioactive materials, with some locations citing a lack of
    equipment and training needed to respond. Also, local officials that we

    interviewed said that technical communication compatibility could be
    improved, but they have developed ways to accommodate communication needs,
    such as the use of cellular phones. Finally, local officials from over
    half of the locations that we visited said that their communities lacked
    sufficient funds to cover the positions left temporarily vacant by
    personnel taking training. Self- assessments Show That

    Based on their own self- assessments, local fire department officials from
    Most Locations Are Prepared to

    most of the cities that we visited said that they are generally prepared
    to Respond to Hazardous Materials

    respond to a hazardous material incident. A few officials whom we
    Incidents, but Not to Incidents

    interviewed said that although their city is prepared to respond to a
    Involving Radioactive Materials

    hazardous material incident, their in- house capability would depend on
    the types of hazardous materials involved and the scope of the incident.
    For example, one fire department official said that he is comfortable with
    his city*s capabilities to respond to chemical accidents such as leaking
    tank cars, spills, and derailments. He believed that his city could
    adequately respond to a hazardous material incident unless it was a
    catastrophic event, such as a major derailment involving multiple cars.
    This official stated, however, that in the event of a large- scale
    hazardous material incident, his city would use additional resources from
    private, state, and federal organizations, as well as mutual aid plans,
    where neighboring jurisdictions agree to provide emergency response
    resources to one another in the event that they are needed to augment
    their own response capabilities.

    When asked if they were prepared to respond to a hazardous material
    incident involving radioactive materials, officials from most of the
    locations we visited said that they were less capable of responding to
    such incidents, with some locations citing a lack of equipment and
    training to respond. To prepare for the increase in spent nuclear fuel
    shipments expected with the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository, which is
    scheduled to begin operations in 2010, the federal government has begun
    preliminary planning to ensure local preparedness for the safe transport
    of spent nuclear fuel. If the Yucca Mountain Repository is licensed, DOE
    will be required, under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 22 to
    implement a

    program to train local public safety officials through whose jurisdictions
    DOE plans to ship radioactive materials to the repository. According to
    DOE, this program will be funded 5 years prior to the start of Yucca
    Mountain operations.

    Emergency Response Plans Are Emergency response plans are in place at all
    the localities we visited. These in Place at All Locations

    plans address all the hazards applicable to each location and include
    emergency responses to hazardous material incidents, including rail
    incidents. The plans vary according to the resources that each locality
    relies on and the specific courses of action each identifies to be taken
    in the event of an emergency. For example, the plans document which city
    agency is designated as a lead response agency in the event of an
    incident, 23 identify support agencies that can be called in, such as
    police and health departments, and outline civil defense procedures. Plans
    also vary on how

    often they are updated. In light of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
    attacks, officials from half of the locations we visited told us that they
    have incorporated new terrorism response procedures into their emergency
    planning, including training or response protocols.

    22 42 U. S. C. S: 10175( c). 23 For hazardous material incidents, a
    locality*s fire department is the lead designated agency.

    Most Cities We Visited Have More than half of the cities we visited have
    their own dedicated hazardous

    Dedicated Hazardous Material material teams to respond to incidents
    involving the release of hazardous

    Teams and All Have Access to materials, including those occurring at fixed
    facilities or in rail

    Public Hazardous Material transportation. These are all large or medium-
    sized cities. 24 Cities that do Teams

    not have their own hazardous material teams have access to a local,
    regional, state, or private hazardous material response team. For example,
    an official from one small city said that the city has access to the
    resources of the state police hazardous material team. As part of their
    emergency

    response plans, other cities have access to chemists from private industry
    or universities to provide technical assistance in identifying chemicals
    and their hazards in the event of an incident.

    All Fire Department Personnel Local fire department officials that we
    interviewed in all the locations we

    Have at Least Some Hazardous visited said that their fire department
    personnel have received at least

    Material Response Training awareness- level training, the lowest level of
    training recommended in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
    Standard 472, Professional

    Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents. However, a
    representative of a national emergency response organization suggested
    that the minimum level of training for first responders should actually be
    at the operations level, the second highest level of training described in
    NFPA Standard 472. Fire departments in the locations we visited varied in
    providing operations level training for their fire fighting personnel.

    However, for the locations with specialized hazardous material teams, all
    hazardous material team personnel received technician level training, the
    third highest level of training recommended by NFPA Standard 472. Table 1
    lists the four levels of training recommended by NFPA Standard 472.

    24 We defined a small city as one having a population of less than 100,
    000 people, a mediumsized city as one having a population between 100,000
    and 500,000 people, and a large city as one having a population of over
    500,000 people. The population figures are based on the 2000 U. S. Census.

    Table 1: NFPA Levels of Professional Competence for First Responders to
    Hazardous Materials Incidents Level Definition

    Awareness The basic competency developed by the NFPA for first responders
    to a hazardous materials incident. The training includes providing first
    responders with the knowledge and skills to identify a hazardous materials
    incident and to contact the appropriate response resource in accordance
    with local standard operating procedures. Operational The second level of
    competency developed by the NFPA for first responders to hazardous
    materials incidents. First

    responders trained at this level will meet the competency of the NFPA*s
    awareness level training as well as any additional competency designed to
    allow the responder to plan and initiate a response to the incident.

    Technician The third level of competency developed by the NFPA for first
    responders to hazardous materials incidents. First responders trained at
    this level will meet the competency of the NFPA*s awareness and
    operational standards. Additional training includes appropriate measures
    to meet federal and other state, local, or provincial occupation health
    and safety regulator requirements.

    Incident The highest level of competency developed by the NFPA for first
    responders to hazardous materials incidents. First

    Commander responders trained at this level will meet all NFPA standards
    for awareness and operational levels. In addition, responders trained at
    the command level will have the necessary knowledge to analyze a hazardous
    material incident and plan for and mitigate incidents.

    Source: National Fire Protection Association. Reprinted with permission
    from NFPA 472- 2002, Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous
    Materials Incidents, Copyright (c) 2002, National Fire Protection
    Association, Quincy, MA 02269. Note: This reprinted material is not the
    complete and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject,
    which is represented only by the standard in its entirety.

    In addition to fire departments, officials in some cities we visited told
    us that they have trained other departmental personnel, such as police,
    health, and public works, for response to hazardous material incidents.
    The officials we interviewed said that, while these other agencies are not
    expected to serve a primary role in the containment of hazardous material
    incidents, this training familiarizes these personnel with response
    procedures in the event that they are the first on the scene to an
    incident or are required to assist responding fire fighters, such as by
    rerouting traffic.

    More Than Half of The Cities We Officials from more than half of the case
    study locations that we visited Visited Have Conducted

    said that they conducted response drills to prepare for hazardous material
    Hazardous Material Response

    incidents. These cities have had at least one hazardous material drill
    within Drills and Cited Lessons Learned

    the last 3 years. Officials from some cities said that they have conducted
    rail- specific hazardous material response drills.

    Among the cities that have conducted drills or experienced prior hazardous
    material rail accidents, officials told us that these experiences had
    highlighted the need for

     better communication and coordination, including the use of the incident
    command system, among departments or mutual aid districts during an
    emergency;

     joint training;  better dissemination of information to the public
    including better public

    awareness of civil defense procedures; and  better crowd control in a
    mass decontamination situation. Equipment Is Lacking in Some

    In addition to a firefighter*s standard turnout gear, several pieces of
    Locations

    equipment are commonly used to respond to hazardous material incidents. 25
    These include airborne chemical detection equipment, spare turnout gear,
    protective gear, air hazard detection equipment, and chemical
    identification kits.

    While officials that we interviewed said that they have the majority of
    this equipment on hand to use in response to a hazardous material
    incident, some locations said they lacked some additional equipment that
    was not on this list, such as patient extraction equipment and hazardous
    material

    response vehicles to carry equipment to the scene. More than half the
    locations specifically cited a need for additional radiological response
    equipment, such as detectors, decontamination equipment, and personal
    protective equipment.

    Compatibility of Communication Officials in half of the case study
    locations we visited told us that

    Equipment Varies by Location communication systems are not compatible
    between city agencies. In

    addition, officials in most of the case study locations we visited said
    that they could not communicate with other jurisdictions without the use
    of an intermediary communication device, such as a dispatch center. While
    officials we interviewed said that communication compatibility could be
    improved, most said that they have developed ways to accommodate
    communication needs, such as the use of cellular phones. However, in one
    location that had experienced a recent rail accident involving hazardous
    materials, officials cited radio communication incompatibility as a
    problem. These local officials said that they did not have the
    compatibility

    25 Typically, a firefighter*s standard turnout gear includes a helmet,
    coat, gloves, pants, boots, and a self- contained breathing apparatus,
    which provides the user with respiratory protection in a toxic or oxygen
    deficient environment.

    to speak by radio to officials from other agencies outside the city.
    Officials from some case study locations also told us that communication
    systems do not work as well underground.

    Officials Said That Training Can Officials from over half of the case
    study locations we visited said that they Be Difficult to Access Because
    of

    had difficulty accessing hazardous material response training
    opportunities Personnel Funding Constraints

    because of the cost of providing replacements for those first responders
    taking training. In addition, one national response organization stated it
    visits localities to provide training to help alleviate costs that may be

    associated with travel to off- site training courses. DHS* Directorate of

    With the development of a national homeland security strategy, DHS* EP& R
    Emergency Preparedness

    Directorate has also recognized a need for the federal government to and
    Response Is Beginning

    conduct an assessment of state emergency response preparedness levels Work
    on a Baseline

    that would allow it to determine a baseline to measure preparedness across
    Assessment Tool to

    the country. Since most local emergency response standards and procedures
    are voluntary in nature and states employ a wide variety of Determine
    Preparedness

    guides in their planning, the EP& R Directorate chose to adopt one of
    these Levels assessment tools* the Emergency Management Accreditation
    Program (EMAP) criteria* to standardize the data collection process and
    help the

    agency ascertain factors in vulnerabilities on a national level. EP& R
    Directorate officials characterized EMAP standards as being very rigorous.

    In fiscal year 2003, as a first step toward developing a preparedness
    baseline, EP& R Directorate officials plan to request that all 50 states
    complete a self- assessment of their level of preparedness to respond to
    emergencies using EMAP standards as a guide. From the assessment program,
    EP& R Directorate officials said that they hope that communities evaluate
    their own capabilities, identify deficits, and establish performance
    standards to improve emergency response. EP& R Directorate officials also
    plan to work with a team of EMAP peer reviewers to validate the
    operability of state emergency response plans as an additional tool in
    gauging preparedness. This information would then be used to determine the
    EP& R Directorate*s baseline of national preparedness levels.

    To validate state emergency response planning, the EP& R Directorate plans
    to train assessment teams to evaluate preparedness using a common
    methodology. These teams would spend from 3 to 8 days evaluating each

    state. Their methodology would include checks of state emergency plan
    resources. For example, if a certain organization within a state is
    expected to provide a specific resource or serve a role in the plan, the
    reviewers

    would contact that organization and verify that the resource contacts know
    what is expected of them and can perform the tasks. EP& R Directorate
    officials said that assessments of all states are due to be completed by
    the end of 2004. The EP& R Directorate plans on assessing about half the
    states annually in this program and issuing a midprogram assessment
    report.

    Conclusions The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have focused
    attention on the security and potential vulnerabilities of the nation*s
    transportation

    infrastructure. In response to heightened awareness, the railroad industry
    took action to develop a security plan using a risk management approach to
    address perceived vulnerabilities. The adequacy of this industry plan to
    protect communities and the railroad infrastructure is still unclear since
    TSA, which is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation,
    including rail, has not yet developed a plan to specifically address the
    security of rail transportation, even though it has started developing a
    riskbased intermodal transportation system security plan. Without such a
    specific plan, TSA lacks a framework for systematically evaluating and
    prioritizing actions needed to ensure the safety and security of the
    transportation of hazardous materials by rail. Some of the communities
    that participated in our case studies expressed concerns regarding the
    safety and security of hazardous materials in rail

    cars passing through or stored in their communities. They wanted
    additional information on the types and quantities of these materials
    since, without this information, it is difficult for communities to know
    how to prepare for possible incidents involving hazardous releases.
    However, this need for information must be balanced against the security
    risks that

    disclosure could pose. Recommendation for

    To help meet the requirement to secure all modes of transportation under
    Executive Action

    the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, we recommend that the
    Secretary of Homeland Security work jointly with the Secretary of
    Transportation to develop a risk- based plan that specifically addresses
    the security of the nation*s rail infrastructure. This plan should build
    upon the railroad industry*s experience with rail infrastructure and the
    transportation of hazardous materials and establish time frames for
    implementing specific security actions necessary to protect hazardous
    material rail shipments. Among the areas that should be addressed in
    developing this plan are

     the appropriate roles of the private sector and federal, state, and
    local governments;

     minimum security standards for hazardous materials stored in transit in
    rail cars; and

     the appropriate level of disclosure to local communities of the types
    and quantities of hazardous materials passing through or stored in transit
    in these communities.

    Agency Comments and We provided the Departments of Defense, Energy, Health
    and Human

    Our Evaluation Services, Homeland Security, Justice, Labor, and
    Transportation, as well as

    the Environmental Protection Agency, National Transportation Safety Board,
    and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with copies of a draft of this report
    for their review and comment. The Departments of Defense, Justice, and
    Labor, as well as the National Transportation Safety Board, did not
    provide comments. The Departments of Health and Human Services and Energy,
    as well as the Environmental Protection Agency and Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission, provided technical comments and generally agreed with our
    report. The Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security provided
    oral comments. They generally agreed with our report and acknowledged that
    no plan to specifically address rail security has

    been developed, but stressed that they have taken some actions to enhance
    the security of hazardous material rail shipments. We incorporated these
    comments where appropriate. In addition, the Department of Transportation
    raised other issues regarding rail security, which are discussed below.
    The Administrator of FRA commented that our report gave the impression

    that, in the absence of explicit federal security requirements, railroad
    companies were paying insufficient attention to security risks. This was
    not our intention. Rather, our report credits the timely effort to address
    rail hazardous material risk by the Association of American Railroads,
    which was performed with a number of chemical manufacturers. It further
    lists security measures reported by individual railroads in the aftermath
    of September 11, 2001.

    FRA officials also commented that the safety risks associated with the
    storage- in- transit of hazardous materials received inappropriate
    emphasis in the report, suggesting that the concern is based only on
    anecdotal information. We did not attempt to define the magnitude of the
    safety risks

    associated with storage- in- transit. Rather, we reported the concerns
    expressed by some local communities about this practice without attempting
    to determine the extent of the problem at a national level.

    On May 28, 2003, we subsequently received from FRA a clarification of
    their views on the risk- based plan for rail security that we recommended.
    FRA wanted to be on record as recognizing the merits of risk- based
    management and supportive of its use in day- to- day business. The
    agency*s position is contained in a letter to GAO that we have included as
    appendix

    VI. Our response to this letter is contained in appendix VII. As agreed
    with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this
    report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the
    report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
    agencies listed above. We also will make copies available to others upon
    request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO
    Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

    If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
    512- 2834. Individuals making key contributions to this report included
    Colin J. Fallon, Bert Japikse, Jane S. Kim, Victoria E. Miller, John W.
    Mingus Jr., Thomas M. Phan, Maria J. Santos, Michael J. Simon, and Robert
    E. White.

    Peter F. Guerrero Director Physical Infrastructure Issues

    Appendi Appendi xes x I

    Scope and Methodology We used a combination of approaches and
    methodologies to examine (1) recent steps taken by industry and government
    to improve the safety and security of hazardous materials transported by
    rail, (2) issues pertaining to the safety and security of rail transport
    of hazardous materials that, in the opinion of the hazardous material
    experts, remain unresolved, and (3) the preparedness of local
    jurisdictions to respond to rail incidents involving hazardous materials.
    We completed interviews with regulatory officials and representatives of
    private industry, analyses of hazardous material volume and incident data,
    and case study interviews with local officials.

    To obtain the views of experts on the safety and security of rail
    transportation of hazardous materials, we sponsored a 1- day panel through
    the National Academy of Sciences that brought together representatives
    from academia, industry, and local government. The views of panel members
    were used to identify issues and perspectives on the current system,
    policies, and practices for transporting hazardous materials by rail.

    Specifically, we asked the panel members to discuss their opinions on: (1)
    the effectiveness of current industry policies for the safe and secure
    shipment of hazardous materials by rail, (2) the effectiveness of current
    federal regulatory and assistance programs, and (3) suggestions for
    improved industry and government cooperation. Their views served to
    support our identification of issues that still remain to be addressed in
    ensuring the safety and security of hazardous materials shipped by rail.

    We did our work at 10 federal agencies, several private organizations
    representing the railroad and chemical industries and emergency
    responders, private rail companies, and state and local government
    agencies in 10 locations nationwide. A complete list of the agencies and
    organizations visited and contacted follows. We do not list the local
    community case study locations that we visited because of the sensitive
    nature of our review in light of homeland security concerns.

    Organizations Visited and Contacted

    Cabinet Departments  Department of Defense, Washington, D. C.; and Fort
    Eustis, Virginia  Department of Energy, Washington, D. C.; and
    Albuquerque, New Mexico

     Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, D. C.  Department
    of Homeland Security (including the Transportation Security
    Administration, U. S. Coast Guard, Directorate of Emergency

    Preparedness and Response), Washington, D. C.  Department of Justice,
    Washington, D. C.  Department of Transportation (including the Federal
    Railroad

    Administration and the Research and Special Programs Administration),
    Washington, D. C.  Department of Labor, Washington, D. C. Other Agencies
     Environmental Protection Agency, Washington D. C.

     National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, D. C.  Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission, Rockville, Maryland

    National Organizations  International Association of Chiefs of Police,
    Alexandria, Virginia  International Association of Emergency Managers,
    Falls Church, Virginia

     International Association of Fire Chiefs, Fairfax, Virginia
    International Association of Fire Fighters, Washington, D. C.  National
    Emergency Management Association, Lexington, Kentucky  National Volunteer
    Fire Council, Washington, D. C.

    Private Sector  American Chemistry Council, Arlington, Virginia
    Association of American Railroads, Washington, D. C.

     American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association, Washington, D. C.

     American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D. C.  The Chlorine
    Institute, Washington, D. C.  Dangerous Goods Advisory Council,
    Washington, D. C.  CSX Transportation, various locations  Burlington
    Northern- Santa Fe Railroad, various locations  Union Pacific Railroad,
    various locations. To examine the current safety and security
    infrastructure of the rail industry, we conducted a series of interviews
    with agency officials, local first responders, railroad companies, and
    industry and trade groups. We then examined supporting documentation from
    these interviews,

    Department of Transportation databases, federal laws and regulations, and
    previous GAO findings. We also conducted site visits of rail facilities to
    record observations about security and safety practices. To report on
    local jurisdictions* capability to respond to potential terrorist attacks
    or chemical accidents, we performed case studies of 10 localities in the
    United States. We judgmentally selected two small cities, four mediumsized
    cities, and four large cities. The localities met at least one of
    following three criteria:

     had experienced a recent and significant rail incident involving
    hazardous materials,  had a large population and flow of hazardous
    materials shipped through

    it by rail, and/ or  had a small population and large flow of hazardous
    materials shipped through it by rail.

    We obtained locations of recent and significant hazardous material
    incidents by researching available reports and information from the
    National Transportation Safety Board. We analyzed the Surface
    Transportation Board*s carload Waybill Sample, an annual stratified sample

    of national rail flows within the United States, to determine flows of
    hazardous materials by rail. 1 To estimate carload and tonnage data, we
    also used the Waybill Sample. We analyzed the waybill origin and
    destination data using the Department of Energy*s Transportation Routing
    Analysis Geographic Information System to identify localities with a high
    level of hazardous material flows. We reviewed documentation provided with
    the waybill sample and the data we received from the sample, and
    determined that these data were sufficiently accurate for our purposes.

    To obtain information about our case study localities and their
    preparedness to respond to incidents involving rail transportation of
    hazardous materials, we interviewed officials from city government
    agencies such as the fire, police, public works, transportation, emergency
    management, and public health departments. We also interviewed local
    emergency planning committees and state environmental and emergency
    response agencies. In addition, we obtained and examined supporting
    documentation from interviews with local officials as part of the study.
    As discussed in the report, no standardized tool exists to gauge the
    preparedness of a community for a hazardous material incident.

    The report encompasses all aspects of rail transport of hazardous
    materials, including loading, unloading, and storage, as well as the time
    these materials spend in motion. This report uses the definition of

    hazardous materials in federal hazardous material transportation law,
    which includes flammable and radioactive materials. 2 Although some
    hazardous materials enter the United States overland by rail from Canada
    and Mexico, this report does not address issues that may be associated
    with international shipments. Further, this report does not directly
    address issues associated with computer security and possible cyber
    attacks.

    1 The Waybill Sample is a stratified random 1 percent sample of waybills
    prepared by railroads. This sample is stratified by the collection method
    (electronic vs. hardcopy) and number of carloads included in a given
    waybill. Because the Surface Transportation Board has different sampling
    rates for each stratum, each stratum has its own weight. These weights are
    applied to the sample calculations of carloads and tonnage to estimate
    population values. 2 The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U. S.
    C. S: 5103( a), defines a hazardous

    material as a substance or material that the Secretary of Transportation
    has determined is capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health,
    safety, and property when transported in commerce. It includes hazardous
    substances, hazardous wastes, marine pollutants, and elevated temperature
    materials.

    Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials by the Department of

    Appendi x II

    Transportation and Other Federal Agencies In addition to the Department of
    Transportation (DOT), several federal agencies have authority over certain
    aspects of rail shipments of hazardous materials. These include the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Environmental Protection Agency
    (EPA), Department of Labor*s Occupational Safety and Health Administration
    (OSHA), Nuclear

    Regulatory Commission (NRC), Department of Energy (DOE), and Department of
    Defense (DOD).

    DOT and DHS Oversee Two administrations within DOT* the Research and
    Special Programs

    Rail Safety and Administration (RSPA) and Federal Railroad Administration
    (FRA)* have

    responsibilities for developing regulations pertaining to the
    transportation Security

    of hazardous materials and rail safety. Under the Homeland Security Act of
    2002, the Department of Transportation shares responsibility with the
    Transportation Security Administration, within DHS, for rail security. 1
    RSPA is responsible for discharging the responsibilities of the Secretary
    of

    Transportation under federal hazardous material transportation law to
    identify and regulate the transportation of materials that may pose an
    unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported in
    commerce. RSPA develops hazardous material regulations, coordinating its
    work with other DOT administrations, including FRA. These regulations

    specify how shipments must be identified, packaged, and handled in
    transit. RSPA also sets hazardous material transportation training
    requirements, helps enforce the hazardous material regulations, and funds
    hazardous material emergency preparedness grants to assist localities.
    RSPA has the authority to pursue civil and criminal penalties for
    deliberate violations of hazardous material transportation regulations,
    focusing primarily on packaging standards and shippers of hazardous
    materials.

    According to RSPA officials, RSPA conducts some, but not many, radioactive
    material inspections.

    FRA oversees the safety of track, signal and train controls, motive power
    and equipment, operating practices, highway- rail grade crossing safety,
    and hazardous materials. To ensure compliance with railroad safety
    regulations, FRA conducts thousands of inspections annually in these six 1
    The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. L. 107- 296), S: 1711( a)( 1) and
    (2) directed the

    Secretary of Transportation to regulate transportation security and safety
    (49 U. S. C. 5103), and S: 1711( a)( 3) and (b)( 1) through (3) of the act
    directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to issue transportation
    security regulations.

    areas. FRA has several enforcement tools, such as civil and criminal
    penalties, if railroad companies do not comply with safety regulations.

    For the shipment of spent nuclear fuel and high- level radioactive
    materials, FRA has developed a safety compliance and oversight plan to
    examine the safety and security of prospective shipping routes, rail
    crews, and equipment prior to shipment of these materials and to provide
    an additional level of inspection for such shipments. To ensure the safety
    and security of these shipments, FRA performs several procedures such as
    inspections of rail cars and locomotives and coordination with federal
    intelligence and local law enforcement agencies to identify where
    shipments could be stored temporarily en route if needed. FRA, in
    conjunction with the

    Association of American Railroads, DOE, and rail representatives, is
    updating its safety compliance and oversight plan to address security
    concerns related to terrorism.

    Within DHS, TSA, created in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist
    attacks of September 11, 2001, has focused primarily on aviation issues,
    but it is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation,
    including rail. Though originally a part of DOT, TSA became a part of DHS,
    along with 22 other agencies in an effort to better coordinate the federal
    government*s resources to prevent and protect the United States from
    domestic

    terrorism. In addition, the U. S. Coast Guard has the responsibility for
    preventing spills from vessels and waterfront facilities. The Coast Guard
    also serves as the federal on scene coordinator under the National
    Contingency Plan for oil or hazardous substance releases in the coastal
    zone.

    EPA Oversees Fixed EPA has authority for implementing and enforcing
    legislation governing the

    Facilities That Handle protection of public health and the environment
    against chemical and other

    polluting discharges and for abating and controlling pollution when spills
    Hazardous Materials

    occur. The regulatory focus of EPA*s Chemical Emergency Preparedness and
    Prevention Office is on fixed facilities, such as chemical factories, that
    handle large quantities of hazardous materials. Under the Emergency
    Planning and Community Right- to- Know Act of 1986, 2 EPA helps

    coordinate preparedness among federal, state, and local emergency
    responders. The purpose of this act is to encourage and provide support
    for

    2 P. L. 99- 499.

    emergency planning efforts at the state and local levels and provide the
    public and local governments information concerning potential chemical
    hazards present in their communities. As part of its responsibilities
    under this act, EPA identifies substances and quantities that qualify as
    extremely hazardous. EPA has also provided training and technical
    assistance to states and localities to enhance contingency planning and
    emergency response capabilities. Under the Clean Air Act, 3 as amended,
    EPA implements a risk management program that requires stationary chemical
    facilities to prevent and mitigate accidental releases of extremely
    hazardous chemicals. EPA also has responsibilities concerning oil spills.
    EPA*s Office of Air and Radiation sometimes participates with other
    agencies in responding to hazardous material transportation incidents
    involving radioactive materials.

    OSHA Focuses on the The Occupational Safety and Health Act, administered
    by OSHA, requires

    Safety of Plant Workers employers, including chemical and railroad
    companies, to provide safe

    workplaces. It requires that OSHA promulgate standards to protect the and
    Emergency

    safety and health of employees. Additionally, the statute and implementing
    Responders

    regulations require employers to, among other things, inform employees
    about potential hazards, provide safety training, keep records of
    workplace injuries, notify government administrators of serious accidents,
    and post notices informing workers about their rights to complain about
    safety and health violations. OSHA establishes hazardous material training
    and safety requirements for emergency responders through its general
    industry standards, including its hazardous waste operations and emergency
    response standard.

    NRC and DOE Oversee Although DOT regulates the transportation of nuclear
    material, including

    Shipments of Nuclear spent fuel, as hazardous material, NRC also regulates
    the transportation of

    nuclear material by its licensees. The primary role of NRC, under a
    Material

    memorandum of agreement with DOT, is the establishment of packaging
    standards for fissile materials and for other radioactive materials
    exceeding certain limits. NRC certifies spent fuel casks and other
    radioactive material package designs that meet these standards and
    requires its licensees to use certified casks for transport. NRC also
    plays a

    3 P. L. 84- 159.

    significant role through safety and security requirements and through
    inspection and enforcement.

    The responsibilities of DOE regarding spent nuclear fuel are related to
    its role as an operator of nuclear facilities, including its role in
    developing the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository. DOE*s Office of
    Civilian Radioactive Waste Management is responsible for shipping spent
    nuclear fuel and oversees nuclear waste fund activities related to the
    Yucca Mountain Repository, which include the transportation of spent
    nuclear fuel. The shipping is done in accordance with NRC packaging and
    advance notification requirements and DOT*s hazardous material
    regulations. Both DOE and NRC have authority to approve packages, such as
    casks as suitable for transport under the hazardous material regulations,
    NRC*s rule for the packaging and transportation of radioactive material, 4
    and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. 5 DOE*s authority is for
    defense or DOE- owned materials, while NRC*s authority is for shipments by
    its licensees. In addition, DOE*s Office of Environmental Management
    coordinates policies and program implementation for shipments of
    environmental radioactive waste for DOE, coordinating its operations with
    DOT. NRC also performs inspections to determine whether companies that
    transport radiological materials take appropriate safety measures to

    package these materials. For the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, NRC
    performs inspections of shipments by its licensees to ensure that this
    material is physically protected against acts of sabotage.

    DOD Oversees the DOD*s Military Traffic Management Command, which oversees
    the

    Safety and Security of shipments of DOD hazardous materials by rail
    companies and ensures that

    they are shipped according to DOD*s safety and security standards,
    Military Hazardous

    requires that everyone participating in the shipment of hazardous
    materials Material Shipments

    comply with the hazardous material regulations. This includes compliance
    with requirements for labeling, placarding, and transportation. DOD also
    requires inspections for sensitive shipments, including hazardous
    materials, to be conducted by railroad police officers, trained railroad
    employees, or members of private security firms under contract to DOD.

    4 10 C. F. R. 71. 5 P. L. 83- 703.

    Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in

    Appendi x III

    the United States Millions of tons of hazardous materials are shipped
    yearly on a 170,000- mile rail network that crisscrosses the continental
    United States. The Class I railroads, the largest of the railroad
    companies, operate more than 120,000 miles of this road. 1 The rail
    network touches every major urban center and

    hundreds of smaller communities in between. While the vast majority of
    shipments arrive safely at their destination, serious incidents involving
    these materials have the potential to cause widespread disruption or
    injury. In July 2001, the derailment of a CSX Transportation train in an
    underground tunnel and the ensuing fire fueled by hazardous materials
    disrupted the city of Baltimore, Maryland, for several days. In January
    2002, a Canadian Pacific Railway derailment outside Minot, North Dakota,

    ruptured seven tank cars carrying anhydrous ammonia, creating a vapor
    plume approximately 5 miles long and 2  1/2 miles wide. The hazardous
    material release affected approximately 15,000 people, causing one death
    and more than 300 injuries.

    Department of The Department of Transportation*s (DOT) hazardous material
    regulations

    Transportation classify hazardous materials into nine hazard classes.
    Among other things,

    the classification system helps communicate the hazards of these materials
    Categorizes Hazardous

    to emergency responders and transportation workers. The nine classes of
    Materials by Nine

    hazardous materials are Classes

     Class 1, explosives;  Class 2, gases;  Class 3, flammable liquids;
    Class 4, flammable and solids;  Class 5, oxidizing substances and organic
    peroxides;  Class 6, poisonous and infectious substances;  Class 7,
    radioactive materials;

    1 DOT*s Surface Transportation Board designates three classes of freight
    railroads based on annual operating revenues. Class I railroads are the
    largest of these, with annual operating revenues of $261.9 million or more
    (in 2000 dollars). Class II and III railroads are defined by their
    revenues, but are often referred to as regional, short line, or switching
    railroads.

     Class 8, corrosives; and  Class 9, miscellaneous materials. Some of
    these nine classes are further divided into subclasses to denote different
    hazards. For example, Class 2 is divided into three divisions: 2.1,
    flammable gases; 2.2, nonflammable, nonpoisonous compressed gases; and
    2.3, poison gases. Any hazardous materials that are properly packaged and
    labeled and suitable for transportation by rail are eligible for shipment
    on any class of railroad track.

    Overall Volume of Rail DOT estimates that there are over 800,000 shipments
    of hazardous

    Shipments of materials daily by all modes of transportation in quantities
    varying from

    several ounces to many thousands of gallons. For comprehensive data
    Hazardous Materials

    related to flows of hazardous materials for all modes of transportation,
    for Rail, Truck, and

    DOT and the Department of Commerce jointly conduct the Commodity Water are
    Similar by

    Flow Survey (CFS). To examine the flow across modes, we used data from the
    1997 CFS, the most recently completed survey. We reviewed the

    Ton- mile published methodology and determined that the data were
    sufficiently

    accurate for our purposes. The 1997 CFS data, shown in table 2, estimated
    that approximately 97 million tons of hazardous materials were shipped by
    rail during that year, fourth among all modes behind truck, water, and
    pipeline. However, railtransported

    commodities travel a far greater average distance, with the result that
    the shipments by ton- mile for rail, truck, and water are similar.

    Table 2: 1997 Hazardous Materials Shipped by Tons and Ton- miles Tons

    Ton- mi l es Mode (thousands) Percent a (millions) Percent a

    All modes 1, 565,196 100% 263,809 100% Truck 869,796 56% 74,939 28% Rail
    96,626 6% 71,711 27% Water 143,152 9% 68,212 26% Air (includes truck and
    air) 66 <1% 95 <1% Pipeline b 432,075 28% N/ A N/ A Multiple modes 6,022
    <1% 3, 061 1% Other and unknown 17,459 2% 1,837 1% Legend N/ A = These
    estimates were not published in the CFS because they did not meet
    publication standards due to high sampling variability or other reasons.
    Some unpublished estimates can be derived from other data published in
    this table. However, figures obtained in this manner are subject to

    these same limitations. Sources: GAO analysis of DOT and Department of
    Commerce data. a Percent figures may not add exactly due to rounding.

    b CFS data exclude most shipments of crude oil.

    While the 1997 CFS provides the most recent comprehensive data across
    modes, total tonnage shipped on rail can also be obtained through analysis
    of Waybill Sample data. Figure 3 shows tons of hazardous materials shipped
    by rail for 1998- 2001 based on Waybill Sample data.

    Figure 3: Tons of Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail, 1998* 2001

    Note: Estimates from the Waybill Sample have sampling errors associated
    with them. The 95 percent confidence level associated with the 1998
    estimate of approximately 95 million tons ranges from approximately 93
    million tons to approximately 97 million tons. Except as noted in the
    text, all percentage estimates have sampling errors not exceeding plus or
    minus 5 percentage points, and all numerical estimates other than
    percentages have sampling errors not exceeding 5 percent of the value of
    those estimates.

    Rail Shipments When data from the 1997 CFS is examined according to hazard
    classes and

    Represent a Much across transportation modes, it becomes clear that,
    despite accounting for

    only 6 percent of the overall hazardous material tonnage and 27 percent of
    Higher Share of

    ton- miles, rail has a much higher share for other hazard classes for
    which Volume for Some

    data are available. The reason for this divergence is the predominance of
    flammable liquids, such as gasoline and diesel fuel, in hazardous material
    Hazardous Material

    shipments. 2 When the commodities are looked at individually, the large
    Classes

    role that rail plays in shipping other hazardous materials becomes
    apparent. For example, rail moves 55 percent of Class 4, flammable solids,
    and 31 percent of Class 6, toxic materials.

    If volume data are further separated by division within hazard class, the
    prevalence of rail as a shipment mode for some specific subcategories of
    materials comes into even sharper focus. For example, as shown in table 3,
    59 percent of the tonnage of toxic- by- inhalation gases moves by rail,
    representing 95 percent of the ton- miles of these gases.

    2 Flammable liquids are approximately 81 percent of all hazardous
    materials shipped, about 2 percent of which are transported by rail.

    Table 3: Rail Shipments as Percentage of Hazardous Material Shipments by
    All Transportation Modes by Hazard Class and Division, 1997

    Tons Tons

    Ton- miles Ton- miles

    Class a Division Hazard division a (thousands) (percent) (millions)
    (percent)

    1- Explosives N/A N/ AN/A N/ A 1.1 Explosives with a mass explosion hazard
    N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A 1.2 Explosives with a projection hazard < 1 < 1% < 1 <
    1% 1.3 Explosives with predominantly a fire hazard < 1 < 1% < 1 < 1% 1.4
    Explosives with no significant blast hazard N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A 1.5 Very
    insensitive explosives, blasting agents < 1 < 1% < 1 < 1% 2- Gases 15, 203
    13% 11, 447 52%

    2.1 Flammable gases 6, 362 10% 4, 671 50% 2.2 Nonflammable, nontoxic
    compressed gases 3, 075 8% 1, 836 25% 2.3 Gases toxic by inhalation 5,766
    59% 4, 940 95% 3- Flammable liquids 26, 642 2% 19, 548 12% 4- Flammable
    solids 6,477 55% 8, 639 90%

    4.1 Flammable solids 5, 904 58% 7, 815 93% 4.2 Spontaneously combustible
    materials 390 46% 613 82% 4.3 Dangerous when wet materials 183 22% 211 50%
    5- Oxidizers and organic peroxides 3,182 34% 2, 820 63% 6- Toxic (poison)
    1,949 31% 1, 446 51% 7- Radioactive materials N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A 8-
    Corrosive materials 24,427 27% 16, 998 41% 9- Miscellaneous dangerous
    goods 18, 334 28% 13, 064 58%

    Tot al 96, 626 6% 74, 711 28%

    Legend N/ A = Data do not meet publication standards because of high
    sampling variability or other reasons. Source: GAO analysis of DOT data.

    a The 1997 CFS uses different names for hazard classes than DOT currently
    uses.

    Poisonous Inhalation The quantities of specific chemicals shipped by rail
    can be determined by

    Hazardous Materials analyzing the Waybill Sample data. Table 4 shows the
    top 20 materials

    shipped by rail from 1998 to 2001 and the average number of carloads Were
    Among the Ten

    shipped annually during this period. Nonbulk cargoes such as freight Most
    Commonly

    forwarder traffic and freight rate shipments, both of which may consist of
    Shipped Hazardous

    mixed materials, were the top two types of hazardous materials shipped.
    The top bulk hazardous material cargoes can be in the form of solids,

    Materials from 1998 to liquids, or liquefied gases, and include flammable,
    corrosive, and toxic

    2001 hazardous materials. Poison- by- inhalation hazardous materials, such
    as

    ammonia and chlorine, are in the top 10 carloads shipped for this time
    period.

    Table 4: The Top 20 Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail by Volume, 1998*
    2001 Estimated

    total Estimated average annual

    Hazardous materials carloads a number of carloads

    1. Freight forwarder traffic b 1,188, 109 297, 027 2. All freight rate
    shipments, not elsewhere coded (NEC), or trailer on flat car shipments,
    commercial, except where identified by commodity 716, 177 179, 044

    3. Sulfur liquid or molten nonmetallic minerals except fuels 273, 005 68,
    251 4. Liquefied petroleum gas, NEC, compressed 253, 234 63, 308 5. Sodium
    (soda), caustic (sodium hydroxide) 236, 455 59, 114 6. Asphalt pitches or
    tars, from petroleum, coal tar, coke oven, or natural gas 222, 163 55, 541
    7. Sulfuric acid or oil of vitriol 200, 875 50, 219 8. Ammonia, anhydrous
    163, 057 40, 764 9. Chlorine gas, liquefied 128, 600 32, 150 10.
    Gasolines, blended, consisting of motor fuels containing 50% or more of
    gasolines c 97, 192 24, 298

    11. Ethyl alcohol, anhydrous denatured in part with petroleum products
    and/ or chemicals (not to exceed 5%) 95, 333 23, 833

    12. Phosphatic fertilizer solution, containing not more than 77% of
    phosphoric anhydride by weight 90, 779 22, 695

    13. Chemicals, NEC 86, 854 21, 713 14. Vinyl chloride (chloroethane or
    chloroethylene) 73, 033 18, 258 15. Methanol (methyl or wood alcohol)
    liquid 67, 903 16, 976 16. Propane gas, liquefied 65, 702 16, 425 17.
    Carbon dioxide gas, liquefied, or carbonic acid gas 63, 020 15, 755 18.
    Ammonium nitrate fertilizer 62, 563 15, 641

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Estimated total

    Estimated average annual Hazardous materials

    carloads a number of carloads

    19. Muriatic (hydrochloric) acid 58, 165 14, 541 20. Styrene (liquid) 55,
    910 13, 977 Source: GAO analysis of DOT data.

    a Because the waybill sample data is extrapolated from a 1 percent sample,
    there will be uncertainties associated with the totals in this table. b
    Nonbulk shipments that may consist of mixed materials.

    c The sampling error for this estimate is approximately 25 percent of the
    value of the estimate. The sampling errors for all other estimates in this
    table do not exceed 5 percent of the value of those estimates.

    Rail Shipments of Rail shipments of radioactive and military hazardous
    materials are few

    Radioactive and compared with overall rail shipments of hazardous
    materials. Through its

    Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Department of Military
    Hazardous

    Defense (DOD) contracts with U. S. rail companies for the shipment of
    Materials Represent a

    arms, ammunition, explosives, and other hazardous materials. The Small
    Fraction of All

    Department of the Navy and the Department of Energy (DOE) each ship
    radioactive material, including high- level spent nuclear fuel. Rail
    Shipments of Hazardous Materials DOD Hazardous Materials

    From 1997 to 2001, MTMC shipped 728,000 tons of hazardous materials by
    Rail Shipments Include rail, which represents a very small percentage of
    the 459 million tons of all

    Arms, Ammunition, hazardous materials shipped by rail during this time
    period. Although some

    Explosives, Spent Nuclear DOD hazardous materials are shipped on dedicated
    trains, more often they

    are shipped in one- or two- car shipments and attached to trains with
    other Fuel, and Other Materials

    nonmilitary cargoes. The dedicated shipments are usually done in
    conjunction with a planned exercise where a large amount of materials are
    needed.

    The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, a joint organization within both the
    Department of Navy and Energy, ships naval spent nuclear fuel from
    shipyards to DOE*s Idaho National Engineering and Environmental

    Laboratory for examination and temporary storage. According to program
    data, spent nuclear fuel from nuclear- powered warships accounts for
    approximately 0.05 percent of all spent nuclear fuel in the United States.
    From 1957 to 2001, the program shipped 738 containers of radioactive

    material without a harmful release of radiation. According to the
    Department of the Navy, naval reactor components are designed robustly to
    withstand combat conditions. DOE Ships Radioactive

    DOE ships its own radioactive waste material shipments, including lowlevel
    Waste Materials from Its

    radioactive material, transuranic waste, and spent nuclear fuel. 3 Own
    Operations by Rail Within DOE, the Office of Environmental Management
    coordinates policies and program implementation for shipments of
    environmental radioactive waste. DOE*s Office of Civilian Radioactive
    Waste Management would have responsibility for the proposed shipments to
    the Yucca Mountain Repository. Shipments made under the Office of
    Environmental Management are currently made mostly by truck; however, DOE
    is exploring the possibility of increasing rail shipments in the future.
    DOE officials estimate that of the approximately 500 shipments a month of
    lowlevel radioactive material made by DOE, less than 1 percent are made by
    rail.

    Volume of Commercial According to Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    statistics, approximately 2 Spent Nuclear Fuel

    million pounds of spent nuclear fuel were transported by rail in the
    United Shipments Is Expected to States between 1979 and 1996. These
    amounts will increase greatly if a

    Increase Substantially if the proposed private fuel storage facility in
    Utah is licensed for operation and

    will increase again if the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository is approved.
    Yucca Mountain Repository

    Total shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the private fuel storage facility
    are Is Approved

    estimated to be 88 million pounds, and the estimated total shipment to
    Yucca Mountain is 154 million pounds over a 24- year period. All the
    shipments to the private fuel storage facility would be by rail, while
    shipments to Yucca Mountain will be by both rail and truck.

    3 Transuranic waste is a type of radioactive waste created from the
    processing of nuclear materials. Transuranic elements include plutonium,
    americium, curium, and neptunium, all of which are created during nuclear
    reactor operations. Some transuranic elements are used in production of
    nuclear weapons, spacecraft batteries, and consumer products. The
    remaining unusable material containing transuranic elements is transuranic
    waste. Transuranic waste includes not only the transuranic elements
    themselves, but also ordinary items contaminated with transuranic
    elements: tools, gloves, protective suits, tarpaulins, soil, and sludge.

    Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible

    Appendi x IV

    Future Rail Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel Proposed Private Fuel If the
    proposed Yucca Mountain Repository in Nevada is licensed and Storage and
    Yucca begins operation, the number of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments
    by rail would greatly increase in the future. Even without the operation
    of Yucca Mountain Repository

    Mountain, there may be a substantial increase in the shipment of SNF from
    Plans Will Result in private efforts to ship and temporarily store SNF.

    Substantial Increases The most common method for storing SNF is in dry or
    wet fuel storage

    in Rail Shipment of facilities on- site at nuclear plants. Some plants,
    however, are concerned

    Radioactive Materials about reaching full capacity for storage on- site
    and the ongoing expense

    associated with this type of storage. Under the Nuclear Waste Fund
    provision of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the operators of
    nuclear plants have been paying fees for a fund maintained by the
    Department of Energy (DOE) to pay for the proper disposal of SNF in a
    national repository, 1 proposed for Yucca Mountain. 2 To date, operators
    have not been able to ship any of their spent fuel off- site to the
    repository.

    To address SNF on- site storage capacity issues, private power companies
    with more than one nuclear plant may ship SNF by rail from one plant to
    the storage facility of another if available storage capacity exists. Such
    intrautility transfers have constituted most commercial spent fuel
    shipments in the past. According to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
    statistics, 1,057 metric tons of SNF were commercially transported by rail
    in the United States between 1979 and 1996 in 147 separate shipments.
    According to NRC data, no radioactive releases above the regulatory limit
    have occurred during any of these shipments. Table 5 shows the total
    metric tons and shipments of commercial spent nuclear fuel transported by
    rail and truck from 1979 to 1996.

    1 For storage purposes, SNF material is put into water pools to cool, both
    thermally and radioactively. The pools are known as wet storage. Dry
    storage is a newer technology that uses concrete and steel to allow heat
    and radioactivity to dissipate.

    2 42 U. S. C. S: 10222.

    Table 5: Transport of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel, 1979* 1996 Metric
    tons

    Average metric Mode of spent fuel Shipments tons per shipment

    Rail 1,057 147 7. 2 Truck 356 1, 172 0.3

    Total 1, 413 1,319 1. 1

    Source: Congressional Research Service. DOE Estimates That 70,000 The
    proposed Yucca Mountain Repository in Nevada would be the largest Metric
    Tons of SNF Would

    to hold SNF in the country. Although the repository is not yet licensed,
    and Be Shipped to the Proposed

    would not be scheduled to begin operations until 2010, studies and Yucca
    Mountain National

    preparations for these shipments have been under way for some time.
    According to DOE*s Environmental Impact Statement for Yucca Mountain,
    Repository over a 24- Year

    approximately 70,000 metric tons of SNF would be shipped to the Period

    repository over a 24- year period. DOE officials currently favor the use
    of trains versus trucks as the primary mode of transporting SNF to Yucca
    Mountain. This decision, however, has not been finalized. The use of rail
    would require fewer overall shipments than the use of trucks due to the
    larger transport capacity of trains. If trains are chosen as the primary
    mode of transportation for SNF to Yucca Mountain, DOE estimates that, on
    average, 130 trains carrying approximately 400 casks would transport SNF

    every year for 24 years. 3 A rail shipment may include up to three rail
    casks. If trains were to be used, a new rail line would need to be
    constructed to connect the repository to main line railroad tracks. The
    rail line would be approximately 100 to 300 miles in length depending on
    the corridor selected. In addition, specific routes for SNF shipments
    would also have to

    be selected. Finally, DOE would have to determine whether or not to use
    dedicated trains to make these shipments.

    Association of American The Association of American Railroads (AAR) has
    endorsed the use of

    Railroads Endorses the Use of dedicated trains for shipments of SNF to
    Yucca Mountain. Dedicated trains

    Dedicated Trains for SNF would allow shipments to travel from origin to
    destination as quickly as

    Shipments to Yucca Mountain possible, thereby minimizing exposure en route
    and time spent in rail

    3 A cask is a hardened container designed specifically for holding SNF.
    NRC certifies cask designs.

    yards. AAR*s position is that advanced technology that is not routinely
    used in regular trains, such as that used for derailment prevention, could
    be incorporated in a dedicated train. The Department of Transportation
    (DOT) is currently drafting a report on the safety of using dedicated
    trains for the rail shipment of spent nuclear fuel.

    Proposed Shipment of Spent In order to gain additional storage capacity
    for SNF, a consortium of eight

    Nuclear Fuel by Private Fuel private utility companies, called Private
    Fuel Storage (PFS), LLC, working Storage, LLC, Would Also

    with the Skull Valley Band of the Goshute tribe, is pursuing a storage
    Result in a Substantial

    facility on tribal land. The Goshute reservation is located approximately
    50 miles west of Salt Lake City, Utah. This proposed storage facility
    would Increase in Shipments

    also result in a substantial increase in SNF shipments. If licensed, the
    facility would receive up to 40,000 tons of SNF for storage. Unlike the
    Yucca Mountain repository, the PFS facility would be a temporary storage
    site rather than a permanent repository. An NRC license to store SNF lasts
    20 years and is renewable. After the license expires, the

    facility would be decommissioned and the material taken off of the
    reservation. If the Yucca Mountain repository were in operation at that
    time, Yucca Mountain would be the likely recipient of this material.

    Provisions would need to be made to safely transport material to and from
    the Goshute Reservation. 4

    PFS anticipates receiving one to two trains weekly, each carrying two to
    four shipping casks containing 10 metric tons of uranium. Dedicated
    trains, stopping only for crew changes, refueling, and periodic
    inspections, would ship the material. A 32- mile rail line would be
    constructed by PFS on federal government owned land to connect the
    facility with the nearest

    railroad. 4 In March 2003, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing board
    blocked for the time being the issuance of a license to PFS because of the
    risks that military aircraft operations conducted near the facility might
    pose.

    Historically Low Spent It is difficult to assess the risk from the
    shipment of SNF using historic

    Nuclear Fuel Shipment data, since the SNF shipments to date amount to only
    a small fraction of

    those proposed for shipment to the Yucca Mountain Repository and PFS.
    Volumes Make Risk

    The 1,057 metric tons of spent fuel that was shipped by rail between 1979
    Assessment from

    and 1996 is small compared to proposed shipments to the Yucca Mountain
    Increased Shipments

    Repository and PFS. Difficult

    Even though no harmful radiation releases have occurred in past shipments
    of SNF, several questions still remain regarding the potential risk posed
    by these shipments, including  whether the past safety record is
    indicative of potential future accidents

    given the difference in volume of materials shipped,  what type of
    potential release is possible given cask design and

    proposed shipping practices, and  what harm could be done by attacks on
    SNF shipments. In addressing concerns about the potential for future
    accidents given the expected increase in spent nuclear fuel shipments, NRC
    officials told us that they believe that historical transport data for
    accident rates, in general, and for spent fuel shipments, in particular,
    support the conclusion that

    current regulatory programs result in a high degree of safety, even if
    applied to a larger shipment campaign. The officials said that NRC has
    sponsored risk studies that address the potential impacts related to
    changes in shipment parameters for future shipments to a waste facility. 5
    They said that they believe there is an adequate technical basis to
    conclude current shipments are safe and that future compliant shipments
    will be

    safe. 5 NUREG/ CR- 6672, Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk
    Estimates, March 2000, which is also discussed in this appendix.

    Studies Suggest That There Past federal studies have examined risks to the
    safety of the shipment of

    is a Low Probability of SNF and suggest that there is a low probability of
    accidental release of Accidental Release of

    radiation during its transportation. To address safety issues associated
    with Radiation during

    the shipment of SNF, NRC sponsored a series of studies to develop a
    predictive model of shipment risk. These include a study conducted by the
    Transportation of Spent

    Livermore National Laboratory. In addition, we convened a National Nuclear
    Fuel

    Academy of Sciences panel of rail industry experts to identify issues
    involved in the safe and secure transport of hazardous materials by rail,
    including SNF.

    Livermore National Laboratory The Livermore National Laboratory *Modal
    Study,* completed in 1987 and Study

    updated in 1995, concluded that 99.8 percent of all accidents involving
    SNF would not result in a harmful release of radiation. The Livermore
    Study relied on existing accident data to develop

     accident rates for trains and trucks,  a distribution of accident
    speeds, and  a distribution of types of accidents.

    All of these data were then applied against the structural characteristics
    of SNF shipment casks to determine whether the type of accident described
    would result in a harmful release of radiation.

    The Livermore Study is consistent with Research and Special Programs
    Administration data, which indicate that less than 0.10 percent of all
    current carloads of hazardous materials are involved in an accident that
    causes a release of hazardous material. This study also examined the
    effects of four severe scenarios derived from actual transportation
    accidents and concluded that in only one of the scenarios, which included
    an engulfing fire lasting several days, would the casks have failed to
    prevent package radiation levels from exceeding NRC limits.

    The state of Nevada sponsored an assessment of the Livermore Study
    criticizing its findings on several counts. According to the assessment,
    (1) the methodology for deriving the accident rates may not have
    considered all the potential causes for cask failure, (2) the study does
    not take into consideration the possibility for human error in SNF cask
    construction and

    the effects that this could have in the severity of an accident, and (3)
    the computer simulation used in the Livermore study did not account for
    all

    potential effects from high heat fires such as the breakdown of spent fuel
    pellets into gases or vapors.

    In March 2000, NRC sponsored another study to update these earlier
    findings, entitled Re- examination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates.

    The 2000 NRC study confirmed the results of an earlier 1977 NRC study and
    quantified the expected risk of transporting SNF. The 2000 study concluded
    that the rail accident risk was only 2 percent of the risk estimate in the
    prior study.

    National Academy of Sciences Experts at the GAO- sponsored National
    Academy of Sciences panel on the

    Panel Expressed Confidence in safety and security of hazardous material
    rail shipments also expressed

    the Safety and Security of that the risks of the transport of SNF were low
    relative to the risks of

    Hazardous Material Rail transporting other hazardous materials. An AAR
    representative at the

    Shipments panel, for example, did not cite SNF when discussing the
    hazardous

    materials that are of special concern for security in shipment. Panel
    participants noted that radioactive and nuclear material has historically
    been a source of anxiety in the United States, and that this public
    perception makes the shipment of radioactive material seem more of a
    problem than it is. One panelist noted that, although an attack on
    radioactive material in transit would be sure to attract a lot of media

    attention, the hardness of the cask would minimize damage and the
    potential for a radiation release. In comparison with SNF, he noted, other
    materials have the potential for a much greater lethal effect. One
    panelist, an emergency first responder, stated that he would rather have
    SNF going through his town than a shipment of gasoline because of the
    strength of the SNF container.

    DOE Rebuts Aspects of Study on In the aftermath of the July 2001 incident
    in the Howard Street Tunnel in Safety Issues Regarding the

    Baltimore, Radioactive Waste Management Associates prepared a study
    Transportation of SNF Casks that concluded that, had SNF casks been part
    of the train involved in that accident, the fire in the tunnel would have
    resulted in a release of contaminating radiation throughout a section of
    the city. This report stated that there are currently no requirements that
    SNF be transported separately from other hazardous cargo, and that the
    tunnel is part of a route identified as a potential rail corridor for SNF
    shipments, concluding that it is feasible that a cask could have been part
    of the burning train in the tunnel. DOE provided us with a criticism of
    the study prepared by staff from Sandia National Laboratory disputing the
    conclusions of the report. According to DOE officials, at least one buffer
    car must separate a SNF car

    from a car containing any hazardous materials. DOE officials said because
    of the separation of at least one car length and the slow, rather than

    catastrophic, leak of the tripropylene, the most intense fire heat would
    have been localized at the tripropylene car and not at adjacent cars.

    In March 2003, NRC also released a report that examined the Baltimore
    tunnel fire incident and evaluated what the consequences would have been
    had a spent nuclear fuel transportation cask been in the train accident in
    the tunnel. 6 NRC concluded in its report that, for a spent nuclear fuel
    transportation cask approved under NRC rules for packaging and
    transportation of radioactive materials 7 and subjected to the conditions
    encountered in the Howard Street tunnel fire, no release of radioactive
    materials would have resulted from this postulated event. In addition, the
    health and safety of the public would have been maintained.

    Safety and Security Issues Since the 1970s, DOE and NRC have conducted
    several studies of the effect

    Posed by the Substantial of sabotage on the transportation of SNF. These
    studies found that a

    Increase in Future SNF successful sabotage attack on spent nuclear fuel
    being transported would

    Shipments and Potential have a limited effect on human health. A study
    published by DOE*s Sandia

    National Laboratory in 1999 confirmed earlier studies that, under certain
    New Threats for These

    worst- case scenarios, NRC- certified transportation containers could be
    Shipments Are Being

    penetrated by armor- piercing weapons and release small quantities of
    Studied radioactive materials. 8

    Nevertheless, despite their general confidence in the safety of current
    regulations for the transportation of spent nuclear fuel shipments,
    federal regulators are preparing to address new safety and security issues
    posed by the substantial increase in the number of these shipments in the
    future and new threats posed after the terrorist attacks on September 11,
    2001. DOE*s Sandia National Laboratory is currently conducting a cask
    sabotage investigation project. Upon its completion, DOE plans to use
    results of the project to support its decisions with regard to proposed
    SNF safeguard and security procedures. According to DOE, closer estimates
    of the consequence of a successful sabotage attack would support policy
    decisions relating to the safeguard levels required for SNF shipments, and
    a

    6 NUREG/ CR- 6799, Analysis of Rail Car Components Exposed to a Tunnel
    Fire Environment, March 2003. 7 10 C. F. R. 71. 8 Sandia National
    Laboratories, Projected Source Terms for Potential Sabotage Events Related
    to Spent Fuel Shipments, SAND99- 0963 (Albuquerque, New Mexico: 1999).

    better- defined consequence might also be expected to reduce the cost of
    safeguards. DOE and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) are also
    reexamining the potential need for routing requirements for SNF rail
    shipments given the increase in the expected volume of shipments traveling
    through heavily populated rail corridors. NRC is also studying the

    potential vulnerabilities to the security of spent fuel and has ongoing
    work related to the performance of spent nuclear fuel containers in
    accident scenarios.

    Finally, we are currently undertaking a study assessing the findings of
    federally- sponsored studies of sabotage and severe accidents involving
    spent nuclear fuel.

    Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist Local
    First

    Appendi x V

    Responders General Procedures for The recognized method for managing an
    emergency response is the Emergency Response incident command system, an
    on- site management system applicable to all types of emergencies. It
    includes a standard organizational structure, training requirements,
    procedures, and terminology that enable participating agencies to function
    together effectively and efficiently in response to an emergency.
    Hazardous material rail incidents involve a multidiscipline emergency
    management response approach. While the immediate response is primarily
    local, both state and federal governments also provide additional
    resources if the need arises.

    Typically, at the local level, fire, law enforcement, public works,
    emergency medical service, and railroad personnel would be the first
    responders to a hazardous material rail incident. For these incidents, a
    locality*s fire department is the lead agency in a hazardous material
    incident response. Within fire departments that have hazardous material
    teams, these teams lead the response to a hazardous material rail
    incident. Chemical experts or responders from private industry may provide
    additional response assistance.

    In response to any suspected hazardous material incident, responders near
    or first arriving at the event do an initial reconnaissance to determine
    the materials involved and the need for additional resources. Initial
    responders determine if an evacuation or shelter in place is needed based
    on recommendations from the Emergency Response Guidebook. 1 If hazardous

    material incidents are major events, the response would also include an
    activation of an emergency operations command center (if one is in place),
    the Red Cross, state environmental protection agencies, state emergency
    management agencies and, in some cases, federal agencies.

    To prepare for responding to hazardous material incidents, local
    communities* frequently with state, federal, and industry partners* often
    conduct preparedness drills, develop emergency response plans, obtain
    technical training, and procure specialized equipment for first
    responders.

    Although there is no difference in an emergency response to a hazardous
    material incident whether it is the result of an accident or terrorist
    attack, in cases of terrorism, law enforcement would play a greater role
    in a 1 The U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Transport Canada, and
    the Secretariat of

    Transport and Communications of Mexico developed the Emergency Response
    Guidebook jointly for use by fire fighters, police, and other emergency
    services personnel who respond to hazardous material incidents.

    locality*s overall response and coordinate a criminal investigation. Local
    law enforcement would make a determination whether federal law enforcement
    assistance is necessary for an investigation.

    At the state level, a hazardous material response team typically assists
    those localities needing additional resources. In the states that we
    visited, such teams provided hazardous material response capability for
    locations that did not have their own hazardous material teams. In
    addition, state environmental agencies provide assistance in incident
    mitigation and monitoring of the environment.

    In some instances, federal emergency response assistance may be called for
    by state and local governments or by the circumstances of the hazardous
    material incident. For example, the Department of Homeland Security*s
    (DHS) Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP& R) Directorate may be
    requested to provide federal disaster assistance to an area. The
    Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U. S. Coast

    Guard (USCG), which is now housed within DHS, are required by the National
    Contingency Plan to be notified and may send representatives to the
    incident scene to assist in evaluating the environmental damage resulting
    from a hazardous material release. However, more robust state and federal
    resources are generally reserved for more serious incidents, such as the
    July 2001 derailment in Baltimore that involved a release of

    hazardous materials in a populated area. Multiple Federal Plans

    Three federal response plans address emergencies involving hazardous and
    Agencies Provide

    material releases during rail transport: the Federal Response Plan, the
    National Contingency Plan (part of the National Response System), and the
    Additional Resources Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. These
    plans all involve

    to Address Hazardous multiple federal agencies in their administration.
    The primary federal

    Material Incidents agencies with a role in emergency response for
    hazardous material

    incidents are DHS* Transportation Security Administration (TSA), EP& R
    Directorate, and USCG, EPA, DOT, Department of Energy (DOE), Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission (NRC), and Department of Labor*s Occupational Safety
    and Health Administration (OSHA). The Office of Domestic Preparedness
    (ODP)* formerly part of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and now in DHS*,
    the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and OSHA provide
    funding for equipment procurement, planning, or training activities. HHS
    and OSHA also provide consultations in emergencies when requested.

    Federal Response Plan The Federal Response Plan is an all hazard response
    plan carried out by the

    Addresses All Types of DHS EP& R Directorate and 26 other partner federal
    organizations. The

    Hazards plan provides the mechanism for delivery of federal assistance and

    resources to augment state and local government efforts in a major
    disaster or emergency. The plan provides for response with initial
    resources such as food, water, and emergency generators. The plan also
    provides additional resources to state and local governments to recover
    from an emergency. The plan categorizes the types of federal assistance
    that a state is most likely to need into 12 emergency support functions.
    These functions are:

    transportation, communications, public works and engineering,
    firefighting, information and planning, mass care, resource support,
    health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials,
    food, and energy. Each emergency support function is headed by a primary
    agency designated on the basis of its capability in that area.

    Federal Radiological The objective of the Federal Radiological Emergency
    Response Plan, also

    Emergency Response Plan published by DHS* EP& R Directorate, is to
    establish an organized and

    Coordinates Federal integrated capability for a timely, coordinated
    response by federal agencies

    Response to Radiological to peacetime radiological emergencies. According
    to the plan, the lead

    federal agency for incidents involving the transportation of radioactive
    Emergencies

    materials varies by circumstance: the NRC is the lead federal agency for
    an emergency that involves radiological material licensed by the NRC or an
    agreement state, DOD or DOE are the lead federal agencies when
    radiological material is shipped by these agencies at the time of an
    accident, and EPA is the lead federal agency when an emergency involves

    radiological material that is not licensed or owned by a federal agency or
    an agreement state. 2

    National Contingency Plan The National Oil and Hazardous Substances
    Pollution Contingency Plan,

    Addresses Oil Spills and more commonly called the National Contingency
    Plan, is the federal Hazardous Substance

    government's plan for responding to both oil spills and hazardous Releases

    substance releases. The lead federal agencies for responding to hazardous
    substance releases under the National Contingency Plan are EPA for inland

    2 Agreement states are states establishing programs under 42 U. S. C. S:
    2021( b) to permit states to exercise some of NRC*s authority.

    zones and the USCG for coastal zones, although DOD, DOE, and other federal
    agencies are the lead agencies in certain circumstances. The National
    Response Center, created by the National Contingency Plan,

    receives notifications of chemical, radiological, oil, and biological
    releases. Transportation accidents involving hazardous materials must be
    reported to the National Response Center by the carrier involved if the
    accident

    meets one or more of the criteria developed by the center. Some of these
    criteria include the following: a person is killed, a person receives
    injuries requiring hospitalization, property damage exceeds $50,000, an
    evacuation of the general public is required lasting 1 hour or more, and
    there is a release of marine pollutant in a quantity exceeding 119 gallons
    for liquids or 882 pounds for solids. In addition, the Comprehensive
    Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 requires
    that all releases of hazardous substances exceeding reportable quantities
    be reported by the responsible party to the center.

    National Contingency Plan Has The National Response Team*s membership
    consists of 16 federal agencies

    Three Organizational Levels: with expertise in various aspects of
    emergency response to pollution National Response Team,

    incidents. EPA serves as the chair agency and the USCG serves as the
    vicechair Regional Response Teams, and

    agency of the National Response Team. The team is a national On scene
    Coordinators

    planning, policy, and coordinating body and does not physically respond to
    incidents.

    The National Contingency Plan has 13 regional response teams that are also
    planning, policy, and coordinating bodies and do not physically respond to
    the scene of an incident. The regional response teams provide assistance
    to state and local governments in preparedness, planning, and training for
    emergency response. Another function of the teams is to provide technical
    assistance to local and state emergency planning committees to enhance
    local emergency response planning. The teams also

    coordinate the regional deployment of assets. On scene coordinators are
    federal officials predesignated by EPA for inland areas and by the USCG
    for coastal areas. The on scene coordinators have the authority to
    coordinate containment, removal and disposal efforts, and resources during
    an oil spill or hazardous substance release. On scene coordinators for the
    USCG handle incidents within or threatening the coastal zone, while their
    EPA counterparts are responsible for discharges into, or threatening, the
    inland zone. This responsibility includes coordinating federal, state,
    local, and responsible party efforts. The USCG National Strike Force,
    which consists of three strike teams and a

    coordination center equipped to respond to major oil spills and chemical
    releases, assists on scene coordinators in incident response. On scene
    coordinators also have access to special teams, both those listed in the
    National Contingency Plan, such as the USCG National Strike Force and EPA
    Environmental Response Teams, and those not specifically listed in the
    plan, such as Department of Defense teams.

    National Contingency Plan is The National Contingency Plan is a component
    of the National Response

    Part of the National Response System, a structure for preparedness and
    response to oil and hazardous

    System to Prepare and Respond material incidents that has been in place
    for over 30 years. The National

    to Oil and Hazardous Material Response System consists of a network of
    interagency coordinating groups

    Incidents at the national, regional, area, and local levels that are
    responsible for

    preparedness activities. The system establishes a network of contingency
    plans with different levels of geographical scope that form the federal
    government*s efforts to prepare and coordinate responses to emergency
    incidents. In addition to the National Contingency Plan, there are
    regional

    and area contingency plans that coordinate effective responses within each
    of the 10 standard federal regions and other designated areas covering
    Alaska, the Caribbean, and several islands in the Pacific. These plans

    include preparedness information on a regional level and identify useful
    response facilities and resources available from government, commercial,
    academic, and other sources. At the local level, the National Response
    System includes local contingency plans to prepare and organize local
    resources in the event of accidental releases of hazardous substances.

    USCG officials told us that the National Response System*s coordinating
    bodies strive for continual improvement through an ongoing process of plan
    development, exercises, and evaluation. Plans and capabilities are tested
    through exercises; exercise evaluations provide lessons learned which, in
    turn, may result in changes to the plan or modifications to

    resource capability. USCG officials told us that, while there currently
    exists no national assessment tool to measure preparedness, the National
    Response System*s process provides a mechanism for evaluation and
    improvement.

    Federal Agencies Many federal agencies are responsible for providing
    either on- scene

    Provide a Variety of response assistance or offering technical expertise
    in the event of a hazardous material rail incident. As discussed above,
    many of these

    Assistance for agencies play a role in the administration of federal
    response plans. Table 6

    Responding to and lists the agencies responsible for providing either on-
    scene assistance or

    Improving technical expertise in the event of a hazardous material rail
    incident and

    outlines their roles. Preparedness for Hazardous Material Rail Incidents

    Table 6: Federal Agencies Involved in Emergency Response to Hazardous
    Material Incidents Agency Role

    DHS TSA TSA is involved in managing transportation security in the event
    of a threat via hazardous materials. TSA also has emergency powers in the
    event of a national emergency. a

    EP& R Directorate The EP& R Directorate is responsible for implementing
    and managing federal disaster assistance. Federal assistance is available
    to supplement the resources of state and local governments in major
    disasters, such as emergencies involving hazardous material releases. Most
    federal assistance becomes available only following a declaration by the
    President under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
    Assistance Act at the request of a state governor or the immediate
    declaration by the President.

    USCG USCG maintains the National Strike Force, which is comprised of three
    strike teams and the National Strike Force Coordination Center. The strike
    force is responsible for providing highly- trained responders and
    equipment in support of the USCG and EPA federal on scene coordinators who
    respond to oil discharges and hazardous substances releases. The USCG*s
    Emergency Response Notification System database also records releases. The
    USCG maintains this database. The USCG can respond to a hazardous material
    rail incident in the coastal zone whenever there is a threat to public
    health or the environment. The National Contingency Plan outlines the
    appropriate response in the event of a spill. DOT Research and Special
    Programs Administration (RSPA)

    RSPA issues the Emergency Response Guidebook to assist first responders by
    identifying the potential effects of hazardous materials by type. RSPA has
    been issuing this guidebook in various formats since the late 1970s, and
    it recently distributed over 1.5 million copies of the latest edition. In
    1997, RSPA, in conjunction with the Canadian and Mexican governments,
    issued a joint North American copy of the guidebook.

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Agency Role

    EPA EPA can respond to a hazardous material rail incident whenever there
    is a threat to public health or the environment. Typically, EPA is invited
    to incident scenes by first responders or local emergency management
    agencies. The National Contingency Plan outlines appropriate responses by
    EPA in the event of an oil spill or hazardous substance release. Under the
    Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, EPA is the lead agency when
    the source of the radioactivity is unknown. Examples of unknown sources
    include scrap shipped from overseas and materials with

    unknown owners. DOE DOE participates in the Federal Radiological Emergency
    Response Plan that coordinates the federal government response to
    radiological emergencies. DOE participates in the Federal Radiological
    Preparedness Coordinating

    Committee. DOE is the lead federal agency for response to an emergency
    involving materials that are in DOE custody. DOE also has the initial
    responsibility for coordinating off- site federal radiological monitoring
    and assessment assistance during response to a radiological emergency. DOE
    may respond to a state or lead federal agency request for assistance by
    dispatching a Radiological Assistance Program team. According to DOE
    officials, if the situation requires more assistance than a team can
    provide, DOE will alert or activate additional resources, including the
    Aerial Measuring System, Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability, Accident
    Response Group, Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center,
    Nuclear Emergency Search Team, and Radiation Emergency Assistance Center
    and Training Site. NRC NRC is the lead federal agency for emergency
    response to radiological events involving NRC- licensed facilities and

    the transportation of licensed materials. Although state and local
    governments would be the actual responders to an accident or incident
    involving radioactive material, NRC*s response teams follow events as they
    unfold in a radiological shipment incident and provide federal resources
    to responders. When the source of shipments of radioactive materials
    cannot be identified during an incident, NRC would assist the EPA*s
    Radiological Response Teams to identify the source.

    OSHA OSHA is a member of the National Response Team and provides
    assistance to ensure the safety and health of personnel deployed at
    emergency response sites. Sources: GAO analysis of DHS* EP& R Directorate,
    USCG, DOT, EPA, DOE, and NRC data.

    a Per 49 U. S. C. S: 114( g).

    In addition to providing on- scene assistance or technical expertise in
    the event of a hazardous material incident, some of the same federal
    agencies listed above provide training or grant assistance to local
    communities to improve their emergency preparedness for hazardous material
    incidents. Tables 7 to 11 list the federal agencies that have some role in
    providing a variety of assistance and grants to emergency responders.

    Table 7: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
    Provided by the Department of Homeland Security*s Office of Domestic
    Preparedness (Formerly a Department of Justice Program) Catalog of Federal
    Domestic Assistance (CFDA)

    Assistance program FY 2002

    number a grant title Purpose funding b

    16.007 State Domestic Funding provided to states to plan for and execute a
    comprehensive $481 million

    Preparedness threat and needs assessment to develop a three- year plan to
    enhance

    Equipment Support first responder capabilities, and to provide for
    equipment purchases

    Program and the provision of specialized training.

    16.008 Domestic Preparedness Funding to train state and local
    jurisdictions to respond to weapons of

    $62 million Training and Technical mass destruction domestic terrorist
    incidents, involving nuclear, Assistance Program

    biological, chemical, and explosive devices 16.580

    Organizations, rather than state and local entities, are the one- time $17
    million 16.597

    recipients of these funds. Grants are used for a multitude of purposes
    16.599 c

    including, but not limited to, meetings to share best practices and
    facilitate discussion on public and private partnerships.

    Sources: GAO analysis of DHS and CFDA data. a CFDA is the governmentwide
    source document of federal domestic assistance program information
    produced by the executive branch.

    b According to ODP officials, the total amount awarded in fiscal year 2002
    does not include contracts or interagency agreements, which is
    approximately $24 million. c According to ODP officials, this program
    includes multifunding for different purposes.

    Table 8: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
    Provided by the Department of Transportation*s Research and Special
    Programs Administration Assistance program

    FY 2002 CFDA Number grant title Purpose funding

    20.703 Hazardous material Intended to provide financial and technical
    assistance as well as $13.05 million b emergency preparedness

    national direction and guidance to enhance state, territorial, tribal, and
    training and planning grants

    local hazardous material emergency planning and training. This program
    distributes fees collected from shippers and carriers of hazardous
    materials to emergency responders for training and to local emergency
    planning committees (LEPCs) for planning. a

    Sources: GAO analysis of DOT and CFDA data. a Established under the
    Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986, LEPCs must

    develop an emergency plan and review it at least annually. LEPC membership
    includes representatives from police, fire, civil defense, public health,
    transportation, environmental agencies, as well as representatives from
    facilities subject to emergency planning requirements, community

    groups, and the media. b $7.8 million of this funding is for the training
    of emergency responders, $5 million is for LEPC

    planning, and $250,000 is for International Association of Fire Fighter
    instructor training in hazardous material response operations.

    Table 9: Hazardous Material Emergency Response and Assistance Grants
    Provided by the Department of Homeland Security*s Directorate of Emergency
    Preparedness and Response Assistance program

    FY 2002 CFDA number grant title Purpose funding

    83.012 Hazardous materials Provides technical and financial assistance
    through the states to

    $264,000 assistance program support state, local, and American Indian
    tribal governments in oil and

    hazardous materials emergency planning and exercising and to enhance
    state, tribal, and local governments capabilities to interoperate with the
    National Response System. 83.547 First responder counterterrorism Designed
    to enhance the capabilities of first responders in managing $4 million

    training assistance the consequences of terrorist acts. 83.552 Emergency
    management Designed to develop comprehensive emergency management,

    $134 million performance grants including terrorism consequence management
    preparedness, at the state and local levels and to improve emergency
    planning,

    preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery capabilities. 83.554
    Assistance to firefighters

    Designed to enhance abilities with respect to fire and fire- related $144
    million grant hazards. This program seeks to identify departments that
    lack the

    basic tools and resources necessary to protect the health and safety of
    the public and their firefighting personnel.

    83.009 Hazardous

    Provides guidance and technical assistance to state and major $1. 5
    million

    83.010 materials/ weapons of mass metropolitan training departments on
    managing and implementing

    destruction (WMD) training hazardous material and WMD responder training.
    Purpose is to standards and requirements

    improve the quality of hazardous material/ WMD responder training guidance
    and training nationally and the cost- effectiveness of state and local use
    of federal quality control technical training funds in hazardous material
    and WMD response training. assistance (under interagency agreement with
    DOT)

    83.527 Hazardous materials/ WMD

    The National Fire Academy and the Emergency Management Institute $1. 2
    million

    83.530 responder offer complete and definitive curricula for all facets of
    local responder

    training training for hazardous material and WMD incidents. curriculum
    83.549 Chemical stockpile

    To enhance emergency preparedness capabilities of the states and $82
    million

    emergency preparedness local communities at each of the chemical agent
    stockpile storage

    program facilities. The purpose of the program is to assist states and
    local

    communities in efforts to improve their capacity to plan for and respond
    to accidents associated with the storage of chemical warfare materials.
    83.562

    FY 2002 supplemental Provide funding assistance to state and local
    governments to update $181 million

    83.563 grants for state and local their emergency operations plans for all
    hazards with special

    83.564 preparedness

    emphasis on WMD terrorism preparedness. Funds will also be used to support
    the formation of citizen corps councils, expansion of the community
    emergency response team program, and to improve state

    emergency operations centers. Sources: GAO analysis of DHS, CFDA, and
    National Volunteer Fire Council data.

    Table 10: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
    Provided by the Department of Health and Human Services

    Assistance program FY 2002

    CFDA number grant title Purpose funding

    93.003 Metropolitan Medical Provides assistance to U. S. cities, via
    contracts, to prepare for a rapid, $10 million

    Response System Program coordinated medical response to large- scale
    public emergencies. The (part of the Public Health

    contracts enable cities to coordinate emergency first responders, and
    Social Services public health systems, and hospitals to better respond to
    the needs of Emergency Fund)

    their citizens in times of crisis. 93.204 Surveillance of hazardous

    To assist state health departments in developing a state- based $1. 5
    million substance emergency

    surveillance system to monitor hazardous substance emergency events

    events and public health impact. The Hazardous Substances and Emergency
    Events Surveillance Program, managed by the Agency for Toxic Substances
    and Disease Registry*s Division of Health Studies, provides data to show
    what the health impacts have been of previous hazardous material releases,
    which could be used in preparing threat assessments. Sources: GAO analysis
    of HHS and CFDA data.

    Table 11: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants
    Provided by the Department of Energy a Assistance program grant

    FY 2002 CFDA Number title Purpose funding

    81.106 Transport of Transuranic Financial assistance is provided to
    support cooperation among the

    $3. 2 million wastes to the Waste

    tribes, the southern, western, and midwestern states on the Waste
    Isolation Pilot Plant: States Isolation Pilot Plant corridors, and DOE in
    developing plans and and tribal concerns,

    procedures for the safe and uneventful transportation of transuranic
    proposed solutions

    waste from current temporary storage facilities to the plant. Restrictions
    on the use of funds depends on the specific collaborative agreement.
    According to DOE officials, applicants must meet the guidelines
    established by DOE.

    Sources: GAO analysis of DOE and CFDA data. a In addition to the Waste
    Isolation Pilot Plant program, DOE officials said that the Transportation

    Emergency Planning Program provides tools, including training materials
    and access to go- kits for instructors, and assists states and tribes in
    developing their transportation emergency capabilities through plans,
    procedures and training. DOE officials said that this is not a grant
    program and does not provide funding directly to states or tribes for
    emergency preparedness.

    Private Organizations Rail and chemical companies, both through their
    member organizations

    Also Play a Role in and individually, participate in a variety of outreach
    efforts to better

    prepare local emergency responders for hazardous material transportation
    Emergency Response

    incidents. Key private efforts include the Transportation Community to
    Hazardous Material

    Awareness Emergency Response Program (TRANSCAER), the Chemical Incidents

    Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC), and the Operation Respond
    Emergency Information System (OREIS). Individual rail and chemical
    companies also work with local communities to prepare for

    hazardous material rail incidents through their participation in drills
    and sharing of emergency response plans. Transportation Community

    The American Chemistry Council; the Association of American Railroads;
    Awareness Response

    Chemical Education Foundation; National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.; and
    Program Helps Prepare the Chlorine Institute sponsor the TRANSCAER program
    to provide

    Local Communities for support to communities in preparation for
    transportation emergencies

    Hazardous Material involving hazardous materials. TRANSCAER is supported
    through sponsor

    resources as well as monetary and in- kind contributions. TRANSCAER
    Transportation Incidents

    sponsors are directed to engage in a variety of activities with local
    communities to improve response capabilities in the event of a hazardous
    material transportation incident, including establishing contact with
    LEPCs, reviewing existing LEPC emergency response plans, assisting LEPCs
    with the establishment of transportation advisory groups, assisting LEPCs
    with the implementation of transportation flow studies, and participating
    in local emergency response training exercises.

    24- hour Emergency CHEMTREC is a public service of the chemistry industry
    that provides

    Response Information Is services to shippers of hazardous materials,
    including a 24- hour, 7- day a

    Available to First week emergency call center that provides emergency
    response information

    Responders in the event of a hazardous material incident. CHEMTREC was
    established

    in 1971 by the chemical industry as a public service hotline for
    firefighters, law enforcement, and other emergency responders to obtain
    information and assistance for emergency incidents involving chemicals and
    hazardous materials. If an accident occurs, an emergency responder can
    call CHEMTREC for information on the product being shipped.

    First Responders Can The rail transportation industry supports OREIS, a
    software system

    Access Database of Rail designed for use in passenger train and hazardous
    material incidents that

    Carriers in the Event of a connects first responders to the databases of
    railroad and motor carriers to

    Hazardous Material Incident allow them to obtain information quickly and
    accurately on the specific types of hazardous materials that may be
    involved in an incident and how

    these materials should be handled. All Class I railroads in the United
    States and Canada and several short line and regional railroads
    participate in the program. The program can be accessed over the Internet
    or with a computer software package. Operation Respond is a not- for-
    profit institution that distributes OREIS software and assists localities
    and transportation companies during a transportation emergency.

    Individual Rail and In addition to the industry- wide outreach initiatives
    discussed above,

    Chemical Shipping individual rail and chemical shipping companies work
    with local

    Companies Participate in communities to develop preparedness for hazardous
    material incidents.

    Local Emergency Response For example, rail company officials that we
    interviewed said that they Activities

    participated in preparedness drills, provided communities with emergency
    response guidelines, and participated in local emergency planning
    committee activities. Rail and chemical shipping company representatives

    also told us that they have hazardous material teams available on an on-
    call basis to travel to the scene of an incident to assist local
    communities in response.

    Cooperative relationships between private sector industry and local
    communities to improve preparedness may be formalized or ad hoc. For
    example, in some cities, mutual aid agreements are used to leverage
    industry technical expertise to assist a community in responding in the

    event of an incident. In some cases, there are less formal relationships
    where rail companies provide copies of their emergency response plans to
    communities and meet with local officials only as the need arises.
    Overall, in our case study visits to 10 cities, we found that most cities
    had informal emergency response relationships with private sector
    industry, where resources were leveraged when needed.

    Multiple Standards and A variety of standards and self- assessment tools
    are available for local

    Guidelines of communities to address their own preparedness needs for
    hazardous

    material incidents. Some standards are focused on general emergency
    Preparedness Exist preparedness, while others are specific to preparing
    for and responding to hazardous material incidents or weapons of mass
    destruction events.

    These standards come from several federal agencies and private
    organizations. However, the use of these standards is voluntary and not
    required by federal regulations, and local communities adopt their use
    based on individual needs. Our research identified a variety of emergency
    preparedness standards that have been adopted by local communities to
    respond to and prepare for hazardous material incidents by rail. These
    standards are described in the next section.

    National Fire Protection The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
    is an international Association Standards

    nonprofit organization that promotes fire safety through the consensus
    development of scientifically- based codes, standards, training, and
    education. There are three NFPA standards related to hazardous material
    incident response, with a fourth related standard for emergency
    management. The standards are as follows:

     Recommended Practices for Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents
    (NFPA Standard 471) outlines recommended procedures for all organizations
    responsible for responding to incidents involving hazardous materials.
    These recommended practices include conducting annual training exercises
    to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of hazardous material
    emergency plans and updating hazardous material emergency response plans
    on an annual basis.

     Standard for Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous
    Materials Incidents (NFPA Standard 472) identifies the levels of
    competency required of responders to hazardous materials incidents. The
    standard defines four different levels of first responders, including the
    awareness level, operational level, technician level, and incident

    commander level as well as the types of competencies expected at each of
    these first responder levels.

     Standard for Competencies for Emergency Medical Services Personnel
    Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents (NFPA Standard 473) identifies
    the levels of competency required of emergency medical service personnel
    who respond to hazardous material incidents.

     Standards on Disaster/ Emergency Management and Business Continuity
    Programs (NFPA Standard 1600) establishes minimum criteria for disaster/
    emergency management. The standards provide common program elements,
    techniques, and processes for disaster/ emergency management planning and
    operations in the private and public sectors.

    Occupational Safety and The OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency
    Response

    Health Administration Standard establishes worker protection standards for
    emergency

    Worker Protection Standard responders to hazardous material incidents. The
    standard provides

     procedures for handling emergency response,  training requirements
    (including refresher training), and  procedures for postemergency
    response operation.

    EPA Hazardous Material EPA*s hazardous material team- planning guidance
    provides assistance to

    Team Planning Guidance local fire departments in identifying, acquiring,
    and maintaining the

    hazardous material response equipment and trained personnel appropriate
    for their locale. This manual provides guidance on

     determining requirements for hazardous material response,  establishing
    the necessary level of expertise to meet those requirements,  developing
    cost estimates for emergency response budget needs, and  preparing
    emergency response and standard operating procedures to

    include all participants in a local response community. Weapons of Mass

    In order to receive grant funds from DHS* Office of Domestic Preparedness
    Destruction Vulnerability

    (which was formerly part of the Department of Justice) for weapons of
    Assessment and Training

    mass destruction (WMD) preparedness, states are required to complete a
    Standards vulnerability assessment to benchmark a current vulnerability
    profile with regard to a WMD terrorist incident. In addition, in August
    2002, the Office of Domestic Preparedness issued new guidelines to assist
    first responders in determining their training needs and improve their
    performance to respond to a WMD terrorist incident. HHS Guidance on
    Managing

    HHS has developed a three- volume series of guidelines entitled Managing
    Hazardous Materials

    Hazardous Materials Incidents to help emergency response and health
    Incidents

    care professionals plan for and respond to hazardous material emergencies.
    Volumes I and II are generic planning guides to assist first responders
    and hospital personnel to plan for incidents that involve

    hazardous materials. Examples of the types of guidance offered include
    appropriate personal protection equipment and suggested patient
    decontamination procedures. HHS is also developing training in incident
    stress management. Volume III is a guide for health care professionals who
    treat individuals who have been exposed to hazardous materials. Volume III
    describes 51 specific chemical protocols that provide recommendations for
    the on- scene and hospital medical management of patients exposed during a
    hazardous material incident.

    State Capability Assessment In 1996, the U. S. Senate Committee on
    Appropriations asked the Federal

    for Readiness Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is now part of
    DHS* EP& R

    Directorate, to develop a system of performance criteria that measures
    emergency management capabilities and operational readiness throughout the
    United States. The State Capability Assessment for Readiness is the EP& R
    Directorate*s yearly status report on this effort. States self- assess
    their level of capability for 13 emergency management functions, such as
    hazard identification, risk assessment, and hazard mitigation, and the
    results are aggregated.

    Officials from the EP& R Directorate told us they are working with the
    National Emergency Management Association and the International
    Association of Emergency Management to develop a local assessment tool
    that will provide local emergency managers the opportunity to evaluate
    their emergency management programs. According to EP& R Directorate
    officials, the local assessment tool is designed to complement a state*s
    assessment tool to provide more accurate results. The EP& R Directorate
    has completed a draft of this document and it is currently under review by
    the National Emergency Management Association, the International
    Association of Emergency Management, states, and other organizations.

    Emergency Management The Emergency Management Accreditation Program is a
    voluntary

    Accreditation Program accreditation process for state and local programs
    responsible for disaster Standards

    mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. An independent team of
    emergency managers assesses states and local communities to determine
    whether their emergency response programs meet national standards.

    These standards are based on NFPA Standard 1600 for emergency management
    and business continuity programs and adapts them specifically for state
    and local use.

    Letter from the Federal Railroad

    Appendi VI x Administration, May 28, 2003

    GAO Response to Federal Railroad

    Appendi VI x I Administration Letter

    (545010)

    GAO*s Mission The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and
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    constitutional responsibilities

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    a

    GAO United States General Accounting Office

    After the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, industry
    and government took steps to improve the safety and security of hazardous
    material rail transportation. The railroad and chemical industries
    assessed their facilities* exposure to attack and developed a security
    plan to address their risks. The Department of Homeland Security*s
    Transportation Security Administration has begun to address nonaviation
    security by starting development of an overall intermodal transportation
    system security plan, but has not yet developed specific plans to address
    the security of individual surface transportation modes, including rail.
    Such a plan is needed to determine the adequacy of security measures
    already in place to protect rail shipments and identify security gaps.

    Officials from local jurisdictions that GAO visited, as well as other
    government and private sector experts, identified several unresolved
    issues pertaining to the safety and security of transporting hazardous
    materials by rail. These include the need for measures to better safeguard
    hazardous

    materials temporarily stored in rail cars while awaiting delivery to their
    ultimate destination and the advisability of requiring companies to notify
    local communities on the type and quantities of such materials stored or
    passing through their communities.

    While no standardized tool exists to gauge local preparedness, officials
    from nine of the ten cities that GAO visited said that they are generally
    prepared to respond to hazardous materials incidents. By the end of 2004,
    the Department of Homeland Security plans to determine the response
    capabilities of the nation by developing an assessment tool for use by
    states in performing assessments of their local communities* emergency
    response

    capabilities. A Hazardous Material Rail Tank Car

    Source: Department of Homeland Security.

    In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns have
    been raised that the nation*s shipments of hazardous materials by rail may
    be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Millions of tons of hazardous materials
    are shipped

    yearly across the United States. Serious incidents involving these
    materials have the potential to cause widespread disruption or injury. GAO
    was asked to examine

    recent steps taken by industry and government to improve the safety and
    security of these shipments

    and steps taken by local jurisdictions to prepare to respond to hazardous
    material rail incidents. GAO recommends that the

    Secretary of Homeland Security work with the Secretary of Transportation
    to develop a riskbased plan to specifically address rail security. The
    plan should establish time frames for actions to protect hazardous
    material rail shipments. Department of Transportation and Homeland
    Security officials generally agreed with the report and acknowledged that
    no plan to specifically address rail security has been developed,

    but noted that they have taken some actions to enhance the security of
    hazardous material rail shipments. www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO-
    03- 435. To view the full report, including the scope

    and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact
    Peter F. Guerrero at (202) 512- 2834 or guerrerop@ gao. gov. Highlights of
    GAO- 03- 435, a report to

    Congressional Requesters

    April 2003

    RAIL SAFETY AND SECURITY

    Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, but Risked- based
    Plan Needed

    Page i GAO- 03- 435 Rail Safety and Security

    Contents

    Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 435 Rail Safety and Security

    Contents

    Page iii GAO- 03- 435 Rail Safety and Security

    Contents

    Page iv GAO- 03- 435 Rail Safety and Security

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    Appendix I

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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    Appendix II

    Appendix II Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials by the
    Department of Transportation and Other Federal Agencies

    Page 41 GAO- 03- 435 Rail Safety and Security

    Appendix II Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials by the
    Department of Transportation and Other Federal Agencies

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    Appendix II Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials by the
    Department of Transportation and Other Federal Agencies

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    Appendix III

    Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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    Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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    Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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    Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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    Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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    Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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    Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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    Appendix III Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United States

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    Appendix IV

    Appendix IV Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
    Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

    Page 54 GAO- 03- 435 Rail Safety and Security

    Appendix IV Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
    Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

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    Appendix IV Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
    Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

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    Appendix IV Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
    Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

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    Appendix IV Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
    Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

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    Appendix IV Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
    Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

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    Appendix IV Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail
    Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

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    Appendix V

    Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
    Local First Responders

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    Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
    Local First Responders

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    Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
    Local First Responders

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    Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
    Local First Responders

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    Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
    Local First Responders

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    Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
    Local First Responders

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    Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
    Local First Responders

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    Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
    Local First Responders

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    Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
    Local First Responders

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    Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
    Local First Responders

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    Local First Responders

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    Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
    Local First Responders

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    Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
    Local First Responders

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    Appendix V Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to Assist
    Local First Responders

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    Appendix VI

    Appendix VI Letter from the Federal Railroad Administration, May 28, 2003

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    Appendix VII

    Appendix VII GAO Response to Federal Railroad Administration Letter

    Page 79 GAO- 03- 435 Rail Safety and Security

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001
    Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300 Address Service Requested

    Presorted Standard Postage & Fees Paid

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