Potential Terrorist Attacks: Additional Actions Needed to Better 
Prepare Critical Financial Market Participants (12-FEB-03,	 
GAO-03-414).							 
                                                                 
September 11 exposed the vulnerability of U.S. financial markets 
to wide-scale disasters. Because the markets are vital to the	 
nation's economy, GAO assessed (1) the effects of the attacks on 
market participants' facilities and telecommunications and how	 
prepared participants were for attacks at that time, (2) physical
and information security and business continuity plans market	 
participants had in place after the attacks, and (3) regulatory  
efforts to improve preparedness and oversight of market 	 
participants' risk reduction efforts.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-414 					        
    ACCNO:   A06039						        
  TITLE:     Potential Terrorist Attacks: Additional Actions Needed to
Better Prepare Critical Financial Market Participants		 
     DATE:   02/12/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Banking regulation 				 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Information resources management			 
	     Risk management					 
	     Securities regulation				 
	     Stock exchanges					 
	     Stocks (securities)				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     SEC Automation Review Policy Program		 

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GAO-03-414

                                       A

Transmi tal t Lett er

February 12, 2003 The Honorable Michael Oxley, Chairman The Honorable
Barney Frank, Ranking Minority Member The Honorable Paul E. Kanjorski
Committee on Financial Services House of Representatives This report
presents the results of the review you requested on the preparations that
financial markets have made since the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks to protect themselves from physical and electronic attacks and to
develop business continuity plans for recovering rapidly and resuming
operations if damage occurs. The massive destruction caused by the attacks
on the World Trade Center and the resulting loss of life, facilities,
telecommunications, and power significantly affected U. S. financial
markets. The markets reopened within days despite enormous obstacles, but
the attacks also exposed the vulnerability of the financial markets to
disruption by such events. In conducting this work, we assessed:

the effects of the attacks on the facilities and telecommunications
services of participants in the stock and option markets, the markets for
government securities and money market instruments, and the banking and
payments systems and how prepared market participants were for the attacks
at that time;

1. the physical and information security and business continuity measures
15 exchanges, clearing organizations, electronic communication networks,
and payment system processors had in place after the attacks to reduce the
risk of operations disruptions in the future; and 2. the financial
regulators* oversight of market participants* efforts to reduce their
operations risks

and regulatory efforts under way to better prepare the markets for future
attacks. 3. This report contains recommendations to the Chairman,
Securities and Exchange Commission

(SEC) designed to better ensure that U. S. securities markets are better
prepared to recover from future disasters. The report also contains
recommendations to improve SEC*s oversight of information technology
issues. As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30
days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the

secretary, Treasury; the Chairman, SEC; the Chairman, Federal Reserve; and
the Comptroller of the Currency; and others who request them. Davi M.
D*Agostino Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment Robert F.
Dacey Transmi Lett tal t er

Director, Information Security Linda Koontz Director, Information
Management Keith Rhodes Chief Technologist Director, Center for Technology
and Engineering

Executive Summary Purpose The massive destruction caused by the September
11, 2001, terrorist

attacks on the World Trade Center and the resulting loss of life,
facilities, telecommunications, and power significantly affected U. S.
financial markets, which were concentrated in lower Manhattan. Despite
enormous obstacles, the markets for stocks, options, government
securities, and

money market instruments all had reopened by the following week, but the
attacks also exposed the vulnerability of the financial markets to
disruption by such events. 1 Because the markets are vital to the nation*s
economy, congressional requesters asked GAO to review preparations that
financial

markets have made since the attacks to protect themselves from physical
and electronic attacks and the business continuity plans (BCP) that
describe the resources and procedures they would use to recover and resume
operations if damage occurs. GAO assessed (1) the effects of the attacks
on the facilities and telecommunications services of participants in the
stock and option markets, the markets for government securities and money
market instruments, and the banking and payment systems and how prepared
market participants were for the attacks at that time; (2) the physical
and information security and business continuity measures 15 market
organizations had in place after the attacks to reduce the risk of
operations disruptions in the future; and (3) joint regulatory efforts to
better prepare the markets for future attacks and individual financial
regulators* oversight of market participants* efforts to reduce their
operations risks.

In performing its work, GAO reviewed regulatory and industry documents and
studies and interviewed staff from broker- dealer and bank participants,
regulators, infrastructure providers, industry associations, and others to
determine the impact of the attacks and the preparedness of market
participants at the time. To determine security and business continuity
measures that 15 financial market organizations had in place to prevent
and recover from disruptions in the future, GAO reviewed physical and
electronic security measures, and BCP capabilities between February and
June 2002 at 15 financial market organizations that perform trading and
clearing functions, including 7 exchanges, 3 clearing and trade processing
organizations, 3 electronic communications networks (ECN), and 2 payment
system processors. 2 Stock and stock options exchanges match

1 Money markets instruments include federal funds, Treasury bills,
commercial paper, and repurchase agreements. 2 For simplicity, this report
will refer to NASDAQ as an exchange.

orders from buyers and sellers to execute trades. Broker- dealers send
these orders to the exchanges on behalf of individual investors or large
institutional clients. Clearing organizations process trading information
to ensure that buyers receive their securities and sellers receive their
payments. ECNs provide alternative venues for trading securities. Payment

system processors that transmit large dollar payments among banks are
crucial to the basic functioning of the U. S. economy and financial
markets. Banks also maintain accounts to pay for or receive payments from
securities transactions for broker- dealers or their customers and, as
custodians, maintain accounts for securities owned by their customers. For
purposes of its analysis, GAO categorized 7 of the 15 organizations
reviewed as more important than others on the basis of whether viable
immediate substitutes existed for their products or services or whether
the functions they performed were critical to the overall markets' ability
to function. 3 GAO relied on documentation and descriptions provided by
market participants and regulators and reviews conducted by other
organizations. When feasible, GAO also directly observed controls in place
for physical security and business continuity at the organizations
assessed. GAO did not test these controls by attempting to gain
unauthorized entry or access to market participants* facilities or
information systems. In assessing the organizations* physical and
electronic security and BCPs, GAO used criteria that were generally
accepted by government or industry, including that used to review federal
organizations* information systems. 4 GAO performed its work in various U.
S. cities from November 2001

through October 2002. Results in Brief The financial markets were able to
recover within days despite significant

damage to the World Trade Center area, but the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks also revealed that financial market participants would
have to improve their business continuity capabilities. The attacks
resulted

3 For example, some exchanges transmit information on all executed trades
or establish prices used by other exchanges. Also, clearing organizations
or payment system processors are essential to overall market functioning
because they often may be the only organizations that perform these
functions.

4 This guidance included the Federal Information System Controls Audit
Manual, Volume

I: Financial Statement Audits GAO/ AIMD- 12.19.6 (Washington, D. C.: Jan.
1999); the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council*s FFIEC
Information Systems Handbook: Volume 1, (Washington, D. C.: 1996); and the
Business Continuity Institute*s

Business Guide to Continuity Management (Worcester, United Kingdom: Jan.
19, 2001).

in significant loss of life and extensive physical damage, including to
the telecommunications and power infrastructure, and physical access to
the financial district was severely restricted for several days. Although
the exchanges and clearing organizations largely escaped direct damage,
trading did not resume on the stock and options markets because of damage
to telecommunications, the lack of physical access to the affected

area, and the loss of facilities and personnel by many broker- dealers,
including firms representing 40 percent of normal market trading volume,
and other financial institutions such as mutual funds and insurance
companies that participated in these markets. Displaced firms and
infrastructure providers made heroic efforts sometimes involving ad hoc
and innovative solutions to recreate operations at new locations and
restore needed telecommunications connections. Rather than trade without
these significant firms and risk operational difficulties in the unstable
conditions, regulators and market participants chose to conduct
telecommunications testing over the weekend and the securities exchanges
reopened on Monday, September 17, 2001, at record volumes. However, if any
of the key exchanges or clearing organizations had been physically

damaged, the markets would not have been able to open as quickly. The
markets for government securities and money market instruments were also
significantly disrupted by the loss of key broker- dealer facilities and
connectivity and processing difficulties that the Bank of New York, one of
the two clearing banks for these markets, and its customers experienced.
To prevent organizations from defaulting on their obligations and creating
a widespread solvency crisis, the Federal Reserve provided over $323
billion in funding to banks over the period from September 11 to September
14, 2001. Government securities trading resumed within 2 days but at much
lower levels than normal and problems in settling some trades persisted
for weeks. The impact of the attacks on the banking and payment

systems was less severe because most banks* and payment processors*
operations were located outside of the affected area.

Regulators and market participants have acknowledged that the attacks
revealed the need to improve business continuity capabilities to address
future disasters. At the time of the attacks, some market participants
lacked backup facilities to which they could relocate their operations;
others had backup facilities but they were located too close to their
primary sites and were also inaccessible. Some organizations* backup sites
were not large enough or did not have the equipment or software needed for
critical operations. Many organizations also found that the

arrangements they had made for backup telecommunications service were

inadequate. Financial institutions* plans had also called for their staff
to assemble at designated locations or to proceed to their backup sites;
but some organizations could not locate their staff, and some
organizations* personnel had difficulty reaching alternative operating
locations.

Although the 15 exchanges, clearing organizations, ECNs, and payment
system processors that GAO reviewed had implemented various physical and
information security measures and business continuity capabilities

since the attacks, some organizations continued to have limitations in
their preparations that increased the risk of their operations being
disrupted by future disasters. Because hostile entities have openly
threatened to directly attack participants in the U. S. financial markets
in the future, the need for these organizations to be prepared has
increased. However, reducing the risk of an operations disruption can
require organizations to make tradeoffs between implementing additional
measures to protect their facilities and systems or using their resources
to expand their business continuity capabilities. For example, an
organization whose primary site is located in a highly trafficked, public
area may have limited ability to reduce all of its physical security risks
but could mitigate these risks by having a separately staffed backup
facility or cross- training staff.

The 15 organizations GAO reviewed, including the 7 organizations whose
ability to operate could be critical to the markets, have taken steps such
as installing physical barriers around their facilities to prevent
physical damage and using passwords or firewall software to limit access
to information systems to prevent disruptions from electronic attacks. All
15

organizations had developed BCPs, including some that had established
backup facilities hundreds of miles from their primary sites, that
addressed procedures for restoring operations after a disaster. However, 9
of the 15 organizations, including 2 GAO considered critical to the
functioning of the financial markets, had limitations in their protection
and recovery measures, which increased the risk of their operations being
disrupted. Although federal information systems standards and other
guidance recommend having backup personnel, these 9 organizations had not
developed business continuity procedures for ensuring that staff capable
of conducting their critical operations would be available if an attack
incapacitated personnel at their primary sites. At least 8 of the 9
organizations had physical vulnerabilities such as inability to control
vehicular traffic around their facilities. Although most organizations had

backup facilities as standards recommend, 10 of the 15 organizations,
including 4 of the critical ones, faced increased risk of being unable to
operate after a wide- scale disruption because they either lacked backup

facilities or had facilities within 2 to 10 miles of their primary site.
Finally, although many of the 15 organizations had attempted to reduce
their risks by testing their risk reduction measures, GAO found that few
organizations had tested their physical security measures, and about half
had tested their business continuity capabilities and key information
systems protections. Although banking and securities regulators have begun
to take steps to prevent future disasters from causing widespread
settlement and payment

defaults, they have not taken important actions that would better ensure
that trading in critical U. S. financial markets could resume in a fair
and orderly way after a major disaster. 5 The three regulators for major
market participants, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are
working jointly with market participants to develop recovery goals and
sound business continuity practices that will apply to a limited number of
financial market organizations to ensure that these entities can clear and
settle transactions and meet their financial obligations after future

disasters. Although heroic efforts allowed the markets to recover after
the September 11 attacks, future attacks could directly target critical
financial market organizations and close the markets for an extended
period. However, the regulators* recovery goals and sound practices would
only apply to clearing activities and do not extend to organizations*
trading activities or to the stock exchanges. Regulators told GAO that
their efforts focus on clearing activities because clearing problems would
pose the greatest risk to the markets and because one trading organization
could replace another that was unable to operate in future disasters.
However, without identifying specific recovery goals and sound business
continuity practices for trading organizations, the appropriate exchanges,
brokerdealers,

and banks needed for trading to occur may not take all necessary steps to
be operational. The regulators also had not developed complete strategies
that identify where trading could be resumed or which organizations would
have to be ready to conduct trading if a major exchange or multiple
broker- dealers were unlikely to be operational for an extended period.
SEC has proposed one strategy for resuming trading, but it does not
include all securities, and it has not been fully tested.

5 For additional discussion of how the financial markets are being
addressed as part of U. S. efforts to protect critical infrastructure, see
U. S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Efforts of Financial Services Sector to Address Cyber Threats,

GAO- 03- 173 (Washington D. C.: Jan. 30, 2003).

Individually, SEC, the Federal Reserve, and OCC have overseen operations
risks in the past, but these efforts had not comprehensively addressed
risks for all of the entities they regulate. Despite the importance of
ensuring that the exchanges and clearing organizations are operational,
SEC uses a voluntary program* the Automation Review Policy (ARP) program*
to oversee how these organizations reduce risks to their operations. Under

ARP, SEC staff have reviewed important risks at these institutions and
spurred operations improvements. However, although SEC issued a rule
requiring ECNs with sufficient trading volume to comply with the full
range of ARP practices, they have not issued a similar rule to require the
other 22 exchanges and clearing organizations subject to ARP to comply.
However, GAO has found that some organizations, including critical
organizations, have resisted developing recommended backup facilities or
making other

important improvements to address weaknesses SEC staff identified. Having
a rule similar to that issued for the ECNs could provide SEC with flexible
but specific regulatory authority to require all the organizations subject
to ARP to take prudent actions when deemed necessary. The ARP program has
had difficulties in maintaining experienced, qualified staff and

lacks the resources to conduct examinations frequently. In addition,
although the disruptions at key broker- dealers severely affected the
markets* ability to resume trading after the attacks, the securities laws
do not generally contain specific requirements applicable to such firms,
and SEC*s reviews therefore did not generally examine the extent to which
broker- dealers had reduced their operations risks with regard to physical
and information system security and BCP measures.

The Federal Reserve and OCC are tasked with overseeing the safety and
soundness of banks* operations and had issued and were updating guidance
that covered information system security and business continuity planning.
Staff from these regulators told GAO that they conduct annual examinations
of the largest entities they oversee and that they reviewed information
security in all examinations and business continuity during

most examinations, but the reviews did not generally assess banks*
protections against terrorist attacks. GAO did not review bank
examinations to independently determine the frequency and extensiveness

of these regulators* reviews. This report includes recommendations to SEC
intended to ensure that the financial markets are better able to recover
and resume operations in the event of a future disaster and to improve
their individual oversight of operations risks. In commenting on a draft
of this report, SEC agreed with the goals of our recommendations.

Principal Findings September 2001 Attacks

The September 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent collapse of the
Significantly Affected U. S.

twin World Trade Center towers damaged more than 400 structures across
Financial Markets and

a 16- acre area, and claimed almost 2, 800 lives. Financial services
industry Demonstrated the Need for employees accounted for about 74
percent of the victims. Dust and debris blanketed the area, creating
difficult and hazardous conditions that Improvements in BCPs

complicated recovery efforts. Many financial organizations lost
telecommunications service when the 7 World Trade Center building also
collapsed and debris struck a major Verizon central switching office that
served approximately 34,000 businesses and residences. 6 Over 13, 000
customers also lost power. To accommodate the rescue and recovery efforts
and maintain order, pedestrian and vehicle access to the area encompassing
the financial district was restricted through September 13,

2001. As a result of the extensive damage to the area surrounding the
World Trade Center and the need to ensure the health and safety of people
affected by the attacks, U. S. financial markets closed on September 11
and took several days to resume operations. If the exchanges and clearing
organizations had sustained direct damage, the reopening of the markets

would have likely taken longer because some lacked backup operating
facilities at the time. However, several key broker- dealers did sustain
considerable damage and had to recreate their trading operations at other
locations. These firms employed ad hoc and innovative solutions, such as
renting out an entire hotel or moving their traders to the trading
facilities of a recently purchased subsidiary. However, because these and
other firms were unable to operate fully in the days following the
attacks, securities regulators, market officials, and other key
participants were concerned that insufficient liquidity would exist to
conduct fair and orderly trading in the markets. By Friday, September 14,
2001, sufficient telecommunications capabilities to conduct trading had
been restored to firms representing only about 60 percent of the normal
order volume. After communications lines to the remaining firms were
restored and tested, U. S. stock and options exchanges reopened on
September 17, 2001, trading record volumes without noticeable
difficulties. Full trading of U. S. government securities in 6 Verizon is
the major provider of local telecommunications service in lower Manhattan.

the United States was resumed within 2 days following the attacks but at
lower- than- normal volumes, and funds transmittal problems at some
institutions persisted for several days. The difficulties experienced by
broker- dealers that trade government securities and the Bank of New York
and its customers also disrupted the markets for short- term debt
instruments that fund the operations of broker- dealers and other firms.
To ensure that firms could meet their settlement obligations, the Federal

Reserve had to provide over $323 billion in liquidity to market
participants by offering discount window loans, purchasing securities from
participants needing funds, and taking other actions. Although some banks
in Manhattan lost telecommunications service or experienced other

disruptions, the U. S. banking system as a whole was not severely affected
because most banks* facilities were located outside of the World Trade
Center area. Similarly, the primary processors for most of the large-
value payments between banks in the United States* Fedwire and the
Clearing House Inter- bank Payments System* were also able to continue
operating because their primary processing sites were located outside the
affected area.

According to information GAO obtained from broker- dealers, banks,
regulators, industry associations and others, the attacks revealed that
improvements were needed in financial institutions* business continuity
capabilities to address future disasters. Many financial institutions*
BCPs addressed limited- scope events such as damage to just one of their
buildings. As a result, many either had not established backup facilities
or had backup facilities located near their primary facilities that were
also destroyed or unusable. Others found that their backup facilities were
too small and not properly equipped to accommodate all of their critical
operations. In addition, some firms learned that the actions they had
taken to ensure continuity of telecommunications service were not
adequate. For example, after relocating their operations, some firms found
that their backup facilities only had connections to the primary sites of
organizations critical to their operations and not to the existing backup
locations of other participants. Others whose facilities were not damaged
also had to have telecommunications restored even though they thought that
they had obtained redundant telecommunications capabilities by contracting
with multiple telecommunications providers or by having their lines routed
over different physical paths. In some cases, disruptions occurred because
the alternative providers routed financial firms* lines through the same
Verizon switching facility that was damaged by the attacks. Others whose
services had originally used physically diverse paths found that their
service providers had rerouted these lines over time onto identical
pathways

without their knowledge. Recovery efforts at financial institutions were
also hampered by shortcomings in the human capital component of BCPs.
These firms had trouble locating critical personnel in the confusion after
the attacks; and, in some cases, their staff had difficulty reaching
backup locations as a result of the transportation shutdowns.

Financial Market All 15 organizations that GAO reviewed, including the 7
critical

Organizations Have Taken organizations, had taken steps since the attacks
to reduce the risk of

Actions to Protect Facilities operations disruptions by implementing
measures to prevent physical

and Information Systems damage to their facilities and unauthorized access
to their information

systems and developing business continuity capabilities to recover from
and Resume Operations

disruptions. 7 For example, many organizations had installed physical
after Disruptions, but barriers to minimize damage or prevent unauthorized
access by vehicles to Limitations Remain

their facilities. In addition, the 15 exchanges, clearing organizations,
ECNs, and payment system processors used private networks and proprietary
message formats that reduced the risk that they would be disrupted by
electronic attacks. These organizations had also implemented various
information security protections recommended for federal organizations,
including hardware or software controls that allow only authorized users
to gain system access and monitoring systems to detect attacks or
intrusions. All 15 organizations also had developed BCPs addressing how
they would continue operations after a disruption. For example, 11 of the
15 had established separate backup facilities, including 3 whose backup
facilities

were hundreds of miles away. However, 9 of the 15 exchanges, clearing
organizations, ECNs, and payment system processors, including 2
organizations critical to the functioning of the markets, had limitations
in their risk reduction efforts. These 9 organizations were at greater
risk of experiencing an operations disruption if a physical attack on
their primary facility left a large percentage of their staff
incapacitated because they did not maintain staff outside of their primary
facility that could conduct all their critical operations. Eight of these
9 organizations also had physical security vulnerabilities at their
primary sites that they either had not or could not mitigate, such as the
inability to restrict vehicle movement around their facilities. In
addition, 10 of the 15 organizations, including 4 critical organizations,
had limitations in their BCPs that increased the risk of their

7 This analysis presents the measures these organizations had in place at
the time GAO conducted reviews at these entities* physical locations from
February to June 2002.

operations being disrupted by a wide- scale disaster. These 10
organizations faced this risk because 4 lacked any backup facilities, and
the backup facilities of the other 6 organizations were 2* 10 miles from
their primary sites* including 4 whose sites were separated by 5 miles or
less. Another way that organizations can minimize their operations risk is
by testing their physical and information security measures and BCPs, but
GAO found that few of these organizations had fully tested all elements.
Only 3 organizations had tested their physical security measures. Although
all 7 of the critical organizations recently had assessed the
vulnerabilities of their

key trading and clearing systems, only 1 of the other 8 organizations had
done so. Five of the critical organizations and 2 of the other 8 had
tested their business continuity capabilities.

Securities and Banking Securities and banking regulators have begun to
jointly develop recovery

Regulators Have Not goals and sound business continuity practices that
will apply to market Developed Recovery Goals

participants that perform clearing functions, but they have not identified
for Resuming Trading recovery goals and practices for resuming trading
activities. In August 2002, the Federal Reserve, OCC, SEC and the New York
State Banking Activities and Their

Department jointly issued a white paper seeking industry comment on
Oversight of Operations sound practices to ensure that organizations that
perform critical clearing Risk Could Be Strengthened activities be able to
promptly recover these functions after a wide- scale, regional disruption.
8 These sound practices could require organizations performing these
functions to identify the clearing activities they perform to support
critical markets, develop plans to recover clearing functions on the same
business day, and maintain out- of- region recovery facilities that do not
depend on the same labor pool or transportation, telecommunications,
water, and power infrastructure. The practices would be applied to
clearing organizations, clearing banks, and to the clearing functions of
about 15 to 20 active broker- dealers and banks whose transaction volumes,
if not promptly cleared and settled, could create liquidity or solvency
problems for organizations awaiting payments from them. The regulators are
still analyzing the comments that they have received but hoped to issue a
final version of the practices in 2003. GAO agrees that taking actions to
ensure that clearing functions can be recovered after a disaster is
important to the U. S. financial markets and the

8 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, OCC, SEC, Draft Interagency
White Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U. S.
Financial System, (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 30, 2002). The New York State
Banking Department issued the same paper

separately.

economy overall, and that sound business continuity practices, if adopted,
would likely reduce the potential for future disasters to cause broader
financial crises. However, trading on U. S. financial markets is also a
critical economic function for investing savings, funding daily business
operations, and

raising capital for new ventures; but the securities regulators have not
similarly begun efforts to develop recovery goals and business continuity
practices applicable to trading activities in stock, options, and other
financial markets. Regulatory staff told GAO that the white paper*s
practices apply only to clearing activities because such functions are
usually concentrated in single entities for some markets or in very few
organizations for others, and thus pose a greater potential for
disruption. They said the paper does not cover trading activities and
organizations that conduct only trading, such as the securities exchanges,
because other

organizations could perform the same functions. Although trading could
likely be moved to other venues if a major exchange was not able to
operate after a disaster, such transfers have not been frequently done and
could be subject to operational problems such as insufficient processing

capacity if not clearly established and tested in advance. Securities
regulators have not developed complete strategies for ensuring that
trading could resume when appropriate. For example, SEC has asked two
major exchanges* New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ, which each trade
thousands of securities* to be able to trade each other*s securities as
one strategy for ensuring that trading could resume if either organization
was unable to operate. However, as of December 2002, SEC had not
identified the specific capabilities that these organizations should
implement. For example, NASDAQ staff said that various alternatives are
being proposed for conducting this trading and each would involve varying
amounts of system changes or processing capacity considerations. New York
Stock Exchange staff said they have proposed trading only the top 250 of
NASDAQ*s securities, and the others would have to be traded elsewhere.
NASDAQ staff plan to trade all New York Stock Exchange securities. These
strategies have also not been fully tested to ensure that processing can
occur accurately and that each exchange has sufficient capacity.

Although the attacks demonstrated sufficient numbers of broker- dealers
have to be able to recover their trading operations and provide access to
their customers* cash and securities for markets to resume operating
smoothly and in a timely manner, the regulators have not similarly
developed recovery goals and sound business continuity practices
applicable to these firms* trading or brokerage activities. With hostile

entities openly targeting U. S. financial markets, setting recovery goals
and ensuring that the appropriate organizations have adopted sound
business continuity practices would reduce the risk that trading may not
be able to resume smoothly or in a timely manner if key market
participants are severely damaged.

Regulators* Oversight of Although SEC has reviewed operations risk at
exchanges and clearing Operations Risks Had

organizations, its oversight has limitations. In response to operational
Limitations problems experienced by the markets during the 1980s, SEC
created a

program in 1989 for addressing operations risk issues, including physical
and information security and business continuity planning at securities
exchanges and clearing organizations. SEC did not create rules for these
organizations to follow but instead issued two ARP statements that
provided practices in various information technology and operational areas
with which the exchanges and clearing organizations would be expected to
comply voluntarily. By analyzing all 10 of the SEC ARP examination reports
completed between January 2001 and July 2002, GAO found that SEC ARP staff
had reviewed information security in 9 of these examinations and business
continuity in 7. SEC ARP staff reviewed physical security and

controls at data centers, but they discussed organizations* overall
physical security in only one report. Although none of the 10 reports GAO
reviewed discussed how these organizations* BCPs covered
telecommunications resiliency, ARP staff said that all of these operations
risk issues would be addressed as part of future reviews.

Given the increased threats demonstrated by the September 11 attacks and
the need for assurance that key financial market organizations are
following sound practices, the importance of SEC*s ARP program oversight
has increased. However, currently the program faces several limitations.
Although the efforts of SEC*s ARP staff have improved market participant
operations, only ECNs are required by rule to comply with ARP policies and
exchanges and clearing organizations are expected to comply voluntarily.
Although SEC staff said they have been satisfied with the level of these
organizations* compliance, GAO reported in 2001 that some organizations,
including critical organizations, had not taken actions to address
important weaknesses ARP staff identified. For example, SEC had long-
standing concerns that three exchanges lacked backup facilities and that
another major exchange had insufficient processing capacity for

several years. 9 GAO analysis of recent ARP reviews indicated that SEC
staff continue to identify significant weaknesses at some organizations.
Having a rule that requires these organizations to engage in practices
consistent with

the ARP policies would provide SEC staff with the flexibility to adjust
ARP expectations as technology and industry best practices evolve while
providing specific regulatory authority to require prudent actions when
deemed necessary. The ARP program has also faced resource limitations.
During work conducted as part of a prior GAO review of overall SEC
operations, market participants raised concerns over the inexperience and
insufficient technical expertise of ARP staff that reviewed their
organizations. 10 In addition, SEC staff said that the staffing level
limits their ability to conduct more frequent reviews of the organizations
subject to ARP. GAO*s analysis of the frequency of ARP examinations found
that an average of 39 months had passed between the most recent and prior
examinations for the organizations critical to the markets that are
subject to ARP. In contrast, guidance for audits of federal information
systems calls for high- risk systems to be reviewed more frequently.

Operations Risks Not Generally Lacking specific requirements in the
securities laws or SRO rules, SEC and

Reviewed at Broker- Dealers exchange reviews of broker- dealers have also
not generally addressed

operational issues such as physical and information security and BCPs.
Whereas SEC ARP staff review exchanges and clearing organizations, staff
from SEC*s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE)
conduct examinations of broker- dealers, mutual funds, and other
securities market participants. 11 Prior to the September 11 attacks, OCIE
staff only reviewed operational issues at a few broker- dealers that
offered on- line trading. The exchanges, which act as self- regulatory
organizations and conduct their own reviews of their members, and SEC OCIE
staff also have

recently begun conducting reviews relating to information security issues
as the result of Gramm- Leach- Bliley Act, which requires financial
institutions to safeguard customer information. The SROs also plan to
review their broker- dealer members* compliance with rules recently

9 GAO reported on these issues in 2001. See U. S. General Accounting
Office, Information Systems: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen SEC*s
Oversight of Capacity and Security,

GAO- 01- 863 (Washington, D. C.: Jul. 25, 2001). 10 See U. S. General
Accounting Office, SEC Operations: Increased Workload Creates Challenges,
GAO- 02- 302 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 5, 2002). 11 Other market
participants that SEC oversees include investment advisers and transfer
agents.

submitted for SEC approval, which will require these firms to develop
BCPs.

Bank Regulators Report Because the banking regulators are required to
assess the safety and

Overseeing Operations Risks but soundness of bank operations, in 1996, the
banking regulators jointly

Not Banks* Measures Against developed guidance for their staff and the
institutions they oversee relating

Physical Attacks to information security and business continuity issues.
They intend to issue

more expanded guidance on information security and business continuity in
early 2003. The banking regulators also conduct examinations that address
operational issues as part of their regular cycle of annual reviews. Staff
from the Federal Reserve and OCC, which oversee the majority of the

largest institutions, indicated that they examine information security at
all banks and business continuity during most examinations. They also said
that their examiners or bank internal auditors review banks* physical

security, but these reviews were not generally focused on the extent to
which institutions have protected themselves from terrorist or other
physical attacks. GAO did not review bank examinations to independently
determine the frequency and extensiveness of these regulators reviews.
Recommendations This report includes recommendations to the Chairman, SEC,
to work with

industry to develop goals and strategies to resume trading in securities
markets; determine sound business continuity practices that organizations
would need to follow to meet these goals; identify the organizations,
including broker- dealers, that would likely need to operate for the
markets to resume trading and ensure that these organizations implement
sound business continuity practices that, at a minimum, allow investors to
readily access their cash and securities; and test trading resumption
strategies to better ensure their success. The report also recommends that
SEC improve its oversight of operations risk by issuing a rule to require
exchanges and clearing organizations to engage in practices consistent
with its ARP program and expand the resources dedicated to the ARP
program.

Agency Comments and GAO requested comments on a draft of this report from
the heads, or their

GAO Evaluation designees, of the Federal Reserve, OCC, Treasury, and SEC.
The Federal Reserve and SEC provided written comments, which appear in
appendixes

III and IV, respectively. The Federal Reserve, OCC, and SEC also provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. SEC generally
agreed with the report and the goals of its recommendations. The SEC
staff*s letter agreed that the financial markets should be prepared to

resume trading in a timely, fair, and orderly fashion following a
catastrophe, which is the goal of GAO*s recommendations that SEC work with
the industry to develop business continuity goals, strategies, and
practices. SEC*s letter expressed a concern that this recommendation
expects SEC to ensure that broker- dealers implement business continuity

practices that would allow trading activities to resume after a disaster.
The SEC staff noted that, although broker- dealers are required to be able
to ensure that any completed trades are cleared and settled and that
customers have access to the funds and securities in their accounts as
soon as is physically possible, these firms are not required to conduct
trading or provide liquidity to markets. Instead, this is a business
decision on the part

of these firms* management. As a result, SEC*s letter stated that the BCP
expectations for these firms must reflect these considerations. GAO agreed
that the business continuity practices that SEC develops in

conjunction with market participants should reflect these considerations.
As SEC works with the exchanges and other market participants to develop
goals and strategies for recovering from various disaster scenarios, GAO*s
recommendations envision that these strategies will have to take into
account the business continuity capabilities implemented by brokerdealers
that normally provide significant order flow and liquidity to the markets.
To the extent that many of these major broker- dealers may be unable to
conduct their normal volume trading in the event of some potential
disasters without extended delays, SEC would need to develop strategies
that would allow U. S. securities markets to resume trading when
appropriate through other broker- dealers that are less affected by the
disaster, such as regional firms. To ensure that such trading is orderly
and fair to all investors, broker- dealers* business continuity practices
should at least be adequate to allow prompt transfers of customer funds
and securities to other firms so that the customers of firms unable to
resume trading are not disadvantaged. In response to GAO*s recommendations
relating to ARP, the SEC staff*s letter states that they will continue to
assess whether rulemaking is appropriate and will consider recommending to
the Chairman that ARP staffing and resources be expanded if the agency*s
funding is increased.

Chapt er 1

Introduction Thousands of market participants are involved in trading
stocks, options, government bonds, and other financial products in the
United States. These participants include exchanges at which orders to buy
and sell are executed, broker- dealers who present those orders on behalf
of their customers, clearing organizations that ensure that ownership is
transferred, and banks that process payments for securities transactions.
Although many organizations are active in the financial markets, some
organizations, such as the major exchanges, clearing firms, and large
broker- dealers are more important for the overall market*s ability to
function because they offer unique products or perform vital services. The
participants in these markets are overseen by various federal securities
and banking regulators whose regulatory missions vary. Financial markets
also rely heavily on information technology systems and extensive and
sophisticated communications networks. As a result, physical and
electronic security measures and business continuity planning are critical

to maintaining and restoring operations in the event of a disaster or
attack. Various Organizations

Customer orders for stocks and options, including those from individual
investors and from institutions such as mutual funds, are usually executed
Participate in Stock

at one of the many exchanges located around the United States. 1
Currently, and Options Markets

stocks are traded on at least eight exchanges, including the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange, and the NASDAQ. 2
Securities options are traded at five exchanges, including the Chicago

Board Options Exchange and the Pacific Stock Exchange. Trading on the
stock exchanges usually begins when customers* orders are routed to the
exchange floor either by telephone or through electronic systems to
specialist brokers. These brokers facilitate trading in specific stocks by
matching orders to buy and sell. For stocks traded on NASDAQ, customers*
orders are routed for execution to the various brokers who act as market
makers by posting price quotes at which they are willing to buy or sell
particular securities on that market*s electronic quotation system. Some
stocks traded on NASDAQ can be quoted by just a single broker making a
market for that security, but others have hundreds of brokers acting as

1 Securities options are contracts that provide the right for the
purchaser to buy or sell a specified quantity of a security at a specified
price at a future date. 2 Although currently operating as a market
operated by an association of dealers, NASDAQ is seeking to become
registered with SEC as a national securities exchange, and for simplicity,
we will refer to it as an exchange in this report.

market makers in a particular security by buying and selling shares from
their own inventories. Orders for options are often executed on the floors
of an exchange in an open- outcry pit in which the representatives of
sometimes hundreds of brokers buy and sell options contracts on behalf of
their customers.

The orders executed on the various markets usually come from
brokerdealers. Individual and institutional investors open accounts with
these firms and, for a per- transaction commission or an annual fee, the
brokerdealer buys and sells stocks, bonds, options, and other securities
on the customers* behalf. Employees of these firms may provide specific
investment advice or develop investment plans for investors. Although some
firms only offer brokerage services and route customer orders to other
firms or exchanges for execution, some also act as dealers and fill
customer orders to buy or sell shares from their own inventory.

In addition to the exchanges, customers* orders can also be executed on
electronic communications networks (ECN), which match their customers* buy
and sell orders to those submitted by their other customers. The various
ECNs specialize in providing different services to their customers such as
rapid executions or anonymous trading for large orders.

After a securities trade is executed, the ownership of the security must
be transferred and payment must be exchanged between the buyer and the
seller. This process is known as clearance and settlement. Figure 1
illustrates the clearance and settlement process and the various
participants, including broker- dealers, the clearing organization for
stocks (the National Securities Clearing Corporation or NSCC), and the
Depository Trust Company (which maintains records of ownership for the
bulk of the securities traded in the United States).

Figure 1: Clearance and Settlement Process for Stocks The Options Clearing
Corporation plays a similar role in clearing and settling securities
options transactions. After options trades are executed, the broker-
dealers on either side of the trade compare trade details with each other,
and the clearing organization and payments are exchanged on T+ 1.

Banks also participate in U. S. securities markets in various ways. Some
banks act as clearing banks by maintaining accounts for broker- dealers
and accepting and making payments for these firms. Some banks also act as
custodians of securities by maintaining custody of securities owned by
other financial institutions or individuals.

Government Securities The market for the U. S. government securities
issued by the Department of

and Money Market the Treasury (Treasury) is one of the largest markets in
the world. These

securities include Treasury bills, notes, and bonds of varying maturities.
Instruments Are

Trading in government securities does not take place on organized Traded
Differently exchanges. Instead, these securities are traded in an *over-
the- counter*

from Stocks market and are carried out by telephone calls between buying
and selling

dealers. To facilitate this trading, a small number of specialized firms,
known as inter- dealer brokers (IDB) act as intermediaries and arrange
trades in Treasury securities between other broker- dealers. The use of
the IDBs allows other broker- dealers to maintain anonymity in their
trading

activity, which reduces the likelihood that they will obtain
disadvantageous prices when buying or selling large amounts of securities.

Trades between the IDBs and other broker- dealers are submitted for
clearance and settled at the Government Securities Clearing Corporation
(GSCC). After trade details are compared on the night of the trade date,
GSCC provides settlement instructions to the broker- dealers and their
clearing banks. Settlement with these banks and the clearing
organization*s bank typically occurs one business day after the trade (T+
1) with

ownership of securities bought and sold transferred either on the books of
clearing banks or the books of the Federal Reserve through its Fedwire
Securities Transfer System. Two banks, JPMorgan Chase and the Bank of New
York, provide clearing and settlement services for many major
brokerdealers in the government securities market. Many of the same
participants in the government securities markets are also active in the
markets for money market instruments. These are shortterm instruments that
include federal funds, 3 foreign exchange transactions, and commercial
paper. Commercial paper issuances are debt obligations issued by banks,
corporations, and other borrowers to obtain financing for 1 to 270 days.
Another type of money market instrument widely used for short- term
financing is the repurchase agreement or repo, in which a party seeking
financing sells securities, typically government securities, to another
party while simultaneously agreeing to buy them back at a future date,
such as overnight or some other set term. The seller obtains the use of
the funds exchanged for the securities, and the buyer earns a return on
their funds when the securities are repurchased at a higher price than
originally sold. Active participants in the repo market include the
Federal Reserve, which uses repos in the conduct of monetary policy, and
large holders of government securities, such as foreign central banks or
pension funds, which use repos to obtain additional investment income.
Broker- dealers are active users of repos for financing their daily
operations. To facilitate this market, the IDBs often match buyers and
sellers of repos; and the funds involved are exchanged between the
government securities clearing organization and the clearing banks of
market participants. According to data reported by the Federal Reserve,
repo transactions valued at over $1 trillion occur daily in the United
States.

3 Federal funds are balances deposited by commercial banks at Federal
Reserve Banks to meet reserve requirements. These amounts can be lent
among banks.

Payment Systems Payments for corporate and government securities
transactions, as well as Processors Transfer

for business and consumer transactions, are transferred by payment system
processors. One of these processors is the Federal Reserve, which Funds
for Financial

owns and operates the Fedwire Funds Transfer System. Fedwire connects
Markets and Other

9,500 depository institutions and electronically transfers large dollar
value Transactions

payments associated with financial market and other commercial activities
in the United States. Fedwire is generally the system used to transfer
payments for securities between the banks used by the clearing
organization and market participants. Another large dollar transfer system
is the Clearing House Inter- bank Payments System (CHIPS). CHIPS is a
system for payment transfers, particularly for those U. S. dollar payments
relating to foreign exchange and other transactions between banks in the
United States and in other countries.

Certain Market Although thousands of entities are active in the U. S.
securities markets, Participants Are

certain key participants are critical to the ability of the markets to
function. Although multiple markets exist for trading stocks or stock
options, some Critical to Overall

are more important than others as a result of the products they offer or
the Functioning of the

functions they perform. For example, an exchange that attracts the
greatest Securities Markets

trading volume may act as a price setter for the securities it offers, and
the prices for trades that occur on that exchange are then used as the
basis for trades in other markets that offer those same securities. On
June 8, 2001,

when a software malfunction halted trading on NYSE, the regional exchanges
also suspended trading although their systems were not affected. Other
market participants are critical to overall market

functioning because they consolidate and distribute price quotations or
information on executed trades. Markets also cannot function without the
activities performed by the clearing organizations; and in some cases,
only one clearing organization exists for particular products.

In contrast, disruptions at other participants may have less severe
impacts on the ability of the markets to function. For example, many of
the options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange are also traded
on other U. S. options markets. Thus if this exchange was not operational,
investors would still be able to trade these options on the other markets,
although certain proprietary products, such as options on selected
indexes, might be unavailable temporarily.

Other participants may be critical to the overall functioning of the
markets only in the aggregate. Investors can choose to use any one of
thousands of

broker- dealers registered in the United States. If one of these firms is
unable to operate, its customers may be inconvenienced or unable to trade,
but the impact on the markets as a whole may just be a lower level of
liquidity or reduced price competitiveness. But a small number of large
broker- dealers account for sizeable portions of the daily trading volume
on many exchanges and if several of these large firms are unable to
operate, the markets might not have sufficient trading volume to function
in an orderly or fair way. Various Regulators

Several federal organizations oversee the various securities market
Oversee Securities participants. The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) regulates the stock and options exchanges and the clearing
organizations for those Market Participants,

products. In addition, SEC regulates the broker- dealers that trade on
these but Approaches and

markets and other participants, such as mutual funds, which are active
Regulatory Goals Vary

investors. The exchanges also have responsibilities as self- regulatory
organizations (SRO) for ensuring that their participants comply with the
securities laws and the exchanges* own rules.

SEC or one of the depository institution regulators oversees participants
in the government securities market, but Treasury also plays a role.
Treasury issues rules pertaining to that market, but SEC or the bank
regulators are

responsible for conducting examinations to ensure that these rules are
followed.

Several federal organizations have regulatory responsibilities over banks
and other depository institutions, including those active in the
securities markets. The Federal Reserve oversees bank holding companies
and statechartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) examines nationally

chartered banks. 4 Securities and banking regulators have different
regulatory missions and focus on different aspects of the operations of
the entities they oversee. Because banks accept customer deposits and use
those funds to lend to borrowers, banking regulators focus on the
financial soundness of these institutions to reduce the likelihood that
customers will lose their deposits.

4 Other organizations that oversee depository institutions include the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision,
and the National Credit Union Administration.

Poor economic conditions or bank mismanagement have periodically led to
extensive bank failures and customer losses in the United States. As a
result, banking and the other depository institution regulators issue
guidance and conduct examinations over a wide range of financial and
operational issues pertaining to these institutions, such as what

information security steps these institutions have taken to minimize
unauthorized access to their systems and what business continuity
capabilities they have.

In contrast, securities regulators have a different mission and focus on
other aspects of the operations of the entities they oversee. Securities
regulation in the United States arose with the goal of protecting
investors from abusive practices and ensuring that they were treated
fairly. To achieve this, SEC and the exchanges, which act as self
regulatory organizations (SRO) to oversee their broker- dealer members,
focus

primarily on monitoring securities market participants to ensure that the
securities laws are not being violated; for example, restricting insider
trading or requiring companies issuing securities to completely and
accurately disclose their financial condition. As a result, few securities
regulations specifically address exchange and broker- dealer operational
issues, and securities regulators have largely considered the conduct of
such operations to be left to the business decisions of these
organizations.

Telecommunications Information technology and telecommunications are vital
to the securities

and Information markets and the banking system. Exchanges and markets rely
on

information systems to match orders to buy and sell securities for
millions Technology Are Vital to

of trades. They also use such systems to instantaneously report trade
Securities Markets

details to market participants in the United States and around the world.
Information systems also compile and compare trading activity and
determine all participants* settlement obligations. The information
exchanged by these information systems is transmitted over various types
of telecommunications technology, including fiber optic cable.

Broker- dealers also make extensive use of information technology and
communications systems. These firms connect not only to the networks of
the exchanges and clearing organizations but may also be connected to the
thousands of information systems or communications networks operated by
their customers, other broker- dealers, banks, and market data vendors.

Despite widespread use of information technology to transmit data,
securities market participants are also heavily dependent on voice
communications. Broker- dealers still use telephones to receive, place,
and

confirm orders. Voice or data lines transmit the information for the
system that provides instructions for personnel on exchange floors.
Fedwire and CHIPS also rely heavily on information technology and
communications networks to process payments. Fedwire*s larger bank
customers have permanent network connections to computers at each of
Fedwire*s data centers, but smaller banks connect via dial- up modem.
CHIPS uses fiberoptic networks and mainframe computers to transfer funds
among its 54 member banks.

Financial Because financial market participants* operations could be
disrupted by Organizations Manage

damage to their facilities, systems, or networks, they often invest in
physical and information security protection and develop business
Operations Risks by

continuity capabilities to ensure they can recover from such damage. To
Protecting Physical reduce the risk that facilities and personnel would be
harmed by

and Information individuals or groups attempting unauthorized entry,
sabotage, or other

criminal acts, market participants invest in physical security measures
Security and Business such as guards or video monitoring systems. Market
participants also Continuity Planning invest in information security
measures such as firewalls, which reduce the risk of damage from threats
such as hackers or computer viruses. Finally, participants invest in
business continuity capabilities, such as backup locations, that can
further reduce the risk that damage to primary facilities will disrupt an
organization*s ability to continue operating.

Objectives, Scope, and To describe the impact of the September 11, 2001,
attacks on the financial

Methodology markets and the extent to which organizations had been
prepared for such

events, we reviewed studies of the attacks* impact by regulators and
private organizations. We also obtained documents and interviewed staff
from over 30 exchanges, clearing organizations, broker- dealers, banks,
and payment system processors, including organizations located in the
vicinity

of the attacks and elsewhere. We toured damaged facilities and discussed
the attacks* impact on telecommunications and power infrastructure with
three telecommunications providers (Verizon, AT& T, and WorldCom) and Con
Edison, a power provider. Finally, we discussed the actions taken to
stabilize the markets and facilitate their reopening with financial market
regulators.

To determine how financial market organizations were attempting to reduce
the risk that their operations could be disrupted, we selected 15 major
financial market organizations that included many of the most active

participants, including 7 stock and options exchanges, 3 clearing and
securities processing organizations, 3 ECNs, and 2 payment system
processors. For purposes of our analysis, we also categorized these
organizations into two groups: seven whose ability to operate is critical
to the overall functioning of the financial markets and eight for whom
disruptions in their operations would have a less severe impact on the
overall markets. We made these categorizations by determining whether
viable immediate substitutes existed for the products or services the
organizations offer or whether the functions they perform were critical to
the overall markets' ability to function. To maintain the organizations*
security and the confidentiality of proprietary information, we agreed
with these organizations that we would not discuss how they were affected
by the attacks or how they were addressing their risks through physical
and

information security and business continuity efforts in a way that could
identify them. However, to the extent that information about these
organizations is already publicly known, we sometimes name them in the
report.

To determine what steps these 15 organizations were taking to reduce the
risks to their operations from physical attacks, we conducted on- site
*walkthroughs* of these organizations* primary facilities, reviewed their
security policies and procedures, and met with key officials responsible
for physical security to discuss these policies and procedures. We
compared these policies and procedures to 52 standards developed by the
Department of Justice for federal buildings. 5 Based on these standards,
we evaluated these organizations* physical security efforts across several
key operational elements, including measures taken to secure perimeters,
entryways, and interior areas and whether organizations had conducted
various security planning activities. To determine what steps these 15
organizations were taking to reduce the

risks to their operations from electronic attacks, we reviewed the
security policies of the organizations we visited and reviewed
documentation of their system and network architectures and
configurations. We also

5 See Department of Justice, Vulnerability Assessment of Federal
Facilities, (Washington, D. C.: June 28, 1995), which presents security
standards that were developed following the bombing of the Murrah Building
in Oklahoma City in 1995 and are intended to be used to assess security at
all federal facilities. Under the standards, each facility is to be placed
in five categories, with Level 1 facilities having the least need for
physical security and Level 5 facilities having the highest need. Based on
its risk level, a facility would be expected to implement increasingly
stringent measures in 52 security areas.

compared their information security measures to those recommended for
federal organizations in the Federal Information System Controls Audit
Manual (FISCAM). 6 Using these standards, we attempted to determine
through discussions and document reviews how these organizations had
addressed various key operational elements for information security,
including how they controlled access to their systems and detected
intrusions, what responses they made when such intrusions occurred, and
what assessments of their systems* vulnerabilities they had performed.

To determine what steps these 15 organizations had taken to ensure they
could resume operations after an attack or other disaster, we discussed
their business continuity plans (BCP) with staff and toured their primary
facilities and the backup facilities they maintained. 7 In addition, we
reviewed their BCPs and assessed them against practices recommended for
federal and private- sector organizations, including FISCAM, bank

regulatory guidance, and the practices recommended by the Business
Continuity Institute. 8 Comparing these standards with the weaknesses
revealed in some financial market participants* recovery efforts after the

September 2001 attacks, we determined how these organizations* BCPs
addressed several key operational elements. Among the operational elements
we considered were the existence and capabilities of backup facilities,
whether the organizations had procedures to ensure the availability of
critical personnel and telecommunications, and whether they completely
tested their plans. In evaluating these organizations* backup facilities,
we attempted to determine whether these organizations had backup
facilities that would allow them to recover from damage to their primary
sites or from damage or inaccessibility resulting from a wide- scale
disaster. We also met with staff of several major banks and securities
firms to discuss their efforts to improve BCPs. We also reviewed results
of a survey by the NASD* which oversees broker- dealer members of

6 U. S. General Accounting Office, Federal Information Systems Controls
Audit Manual, Volume I: Financial Statement Audits, GAO/ AIMD- 12.19.6
(Washington, D. C.: Jan. 1999). 7 We conduct our reviews of these 15
organizations physical and electronic security measures and BCP
capabilities between February and June 2002. When feasible, we also
directly observed controls in place for physical security and business
continuity at the organizations assessed. We did not test these controls
by attempting to gain unauthorized entry or access to market participants*
facilities or information systems.

8 This guidance included FISCAM; the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council*s

Information Systems Handbook: Volume 1 (Washington, D. C.: 1996); and the
Business Continuity Institute*s Business Guide to Continuity Management
(Worcester, United Kingdom: Jan. 19, 2001).

NASDAQ* that reported on the business continuity capabilities of 120 of
its largest members and a random selection of 150 of approximately 4,000
remaining members.

To assess how the financial regulators were addressing physical security,
electronic security, and business continuity planning at the financial
institutions they oversee, we met with staff from SEC, the Federal
Reserve, OCC, and representatives of the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination

Council. In addition, we met with NYSE and NASD staff responsible for
overseeing their members* compliance with the securities laws. At SEC, we
also collected data on the examinations SEC had conducted of exchanges,
clearing organizations, and ECNs since 1995 and reviewed the examiners*

work program and examination reports for the 10 examinations completed
between July 2000 and August 2002. In addition, we reviewed selected SEC
and NYSE examinations of broker- dealers.

To determine how the financial markets were being addressed as part of the
United States* critical infrastructure protection efforts, we reviewed
previously completed GAO work, met with staff from Treasury and
representatives of the Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure
Committee (FBIIC), which is undertaking efforts to ensure that critical
assets in the financial sector are protected. We also discussed
initiatives to improve responses to future crises and improve the
resiliency of the

financial sector and its critical telecommunications services with
representatives of industry trade groups, including the Bond Market
Association and the Securities Industry Association, as well as
regulators, federal telecommunications officials, telecommunications
providers, and financial market participants. The results of this work are
presented in appendix II.

We conducted our work in various U. S. cities from November 2001 to
October 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

September 11 Attacks Severely Disrupted U. S.

Chapt er 2

Financial Markets The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, resulted in
significant loss of life and extensive property and other physical damage,
including damage to the telecommunications and power infrastructure
serving lower Manhattan. Because many financial market participants were
concentrated in the area surrounding the World Trade Center, U. S.
financial markets

were severely disrupted. Several key broker- dealers experienced extensive
damage, and the stock and options markets were closed for the longest
period since the 1930s. The markets for government securities and money
market instruments were also severely disrupted as several key
participants in these markets were directly affected by the attacks.
However, financial market participants, infrastructure providers, and
regulators made tremendous efforts to successfully reopen these markets

within days. Regulators also took various actions to facilitate the
reopening of the markets, including granting temporary relief from
regulatory reporting and other requirements and providing funds and
issuing securities to ensure that financial institutions could fund their
operations. The impact on the banking and payments systems was less
severe, as the primary operations of most banks and payment systems
processors were located outside of the area affected by the attacks, or
because they had fully operational backup facilities in other locations.
Although many factors affected the ability of the markets to resume
operations, the attacks

also revealed limitations in many participants* BCPs for addressing such a
widespread disaster. These factors included not having backup facilities
that were sufficiently geographically dispersed or comprehensive enough to
conduct all critical operations, unanticipated loss of telecommunications
service, and difficulties in locating staff and transporting them to new
facilities.

Attacks Caused On September 11, 2001, two commercial jet airplanes were
hijacked by Extensive Damage and

terrorists and flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center.
Within hours, the two towers completely collapsed, resulting in the loss
of four Loss of Life and

other buildings that were part of the World Trade Center complex. As
Created Difficult

shown in figure 2, the attacks damaged numerous structures in lower
Conditions That

Manhattan. Impeded Recovery Efforts

Figure 2: Buildings Destroyed or Damaged on September 11, 2001

The attacks caused extensive property damage. According to estimates by
the Securities Industry Association, the total cost of the property
damages ranges from $24 to $28 billion. According to one estimate, the
damage to structures beyond the immediate World Trade Center area extended
across 16 acres. The six World Trade Center buildings that were lost
accounted for

over 13 million square feet of office space, valued at $5.2 to $6.7
billion. 1 One of these buildings was 7 World Trade Center, which was a
46- story office building directly to the west of the two towers. It
sustained damage as a result of the attacks, burned for several hours, and
collapsed around 5: 00 p. m. on September 11, 2001. An additional nine
buildings containing about 15 million square feet of office space were
substantially damaged and

were expected to require extensive and lengthy repair before they could be
reoccupied. Sixteen buildings with about 10 million square feet of office
space sustained relatively minor damage and will likely be completely
reoccupied. Finally, another 400 buildings sustained damage primarily to
facades and windows. A study by an insurance industry group estimated that
the total claims for property, life, and other insurance would exceed $40
billion. 2 In comparison, Hurricane Andrew of 1992 caused an estimated
$15.5 billion in similar insurance claims.

The loss of life following the attacks on the World Trade Center was also
devastating with the official death toll for the September 11 attacks
reaching 2, 795, as of November 2002. Because of the concentration of
financial market participants in the vicinity of the World Trade Center, a
large percentage of those killed were financial firm employees. Excluding
the 366 members of the police and fire departments and the persons on the
airplanes, the financial industry*s loss represented over 74 percent of
the total civilian casualties in the World Trade Center attacks. Four
firms accounted for about a third of the civilian casualties, and 658 were
employees of one firm* Cantor Fitzgerald, a key participant in the
government securities markets. The loss of life also exacted a heavy
psychological toll on staff that worked in the area, who both witnessed
the tragedy and lost friends or family. Representatives of several
organizations we met with told us that one of the difficulties in the
aftermath of the attacks was addressing the psychological impact of the
event on staff. As a result, individuals attempting to restore operations
often had to do so

under emotionally traumatic conditions. 1 The seventh building was a
hotel. 2 According to another study by the Insurance Information
Institute, One Hundred Minutes of Terror That Changed the Global Insurance
Industry Forever, the total value of insurance claims for this event will
be about $40 billion. This study estimated that about $2. 7 billion, or
6.7 percent of this amount, would be for life insurance claims, and the
remaining $37 billion to be for nonlife insurance claims, which include
property damages, business interruption, and nonaviation liability claims.

The dust and debris from the attacks and the subsequent collapse of the
various World Trade Center structures covered an extensive area of lower
Manhattan, up to a mile beyond the center of the attacks, as shown in
figure 3.

Figure 3: Geographic Extent of Damage and Debris from Attacks in Lower
Manhattan

Figures 4 and 5 include various photographs that illustrate the damage to
buildings from the towers* collapse and from the dust and debris that
blanketed the surrounding area. Figure 4: Damage to Buildings from Attacks
and Resulting Debris

Figure 5: Dust and Debris Resulting from Attack

This dust and debris created serious environmental hazards that resulted
in additional damage to other facilities and hampered firms* ability to
restore operations in the area. For example, firms with major data
processing centers could not operate computer equipment until the dust
levels had been substantially reduced because of the sensitivity of this
equipment to dust contamination. In addition, dust and other hazardous
materials made

working conditions in the area difficult and hazardous. According to staff
of one of the infrastructure providers with whom we met, the entire area
near the World Trade Center was covered with a toxic dust that contained
asbestos and other hazardous materials.

Restrictions on physical access to lower Manhattan, put into place after
the attacks, also complicated efforts to restore operations. To facilitate
rescue and recovery efforts and maintain order, the mayor ordered an
evacuation of lower Manhattan, and the New York City Office of Emergency
Management restricted all pedestrian and vehicle access to most of this
area from September 11 through September 13, 2001. During this time,
access to the area was only granted to persons with the appropriate
credentials. Federal and local law enforcement agencies also restricted
access because of the potential for additional attacks and to facilitate

investigations at the World Trade Center site. Figure 6 shows the areas
with access restrictions in the days following the attacks.

Figure 6: Lower Manhattan Area Subject to Access Restrictions Following
September 11, 2001, Attacks

Some access restrictions were lifted beginning September 14, 2001;
however, substantial access restrictions were in place through September
18. From September 19, most of the remaining restrictions were to cordon
off the area being excavated and provide access for heavy machinery and
emergency vehicles.

Damage from Attacks The September 11 terrorist attacks extensively damaged
the

Significantly Disrupted telecommunications infrastructure serving lower
Manhattan, disrupting

voice and data communications services throughout the area. (We discuss
Telecommunications

the impact of the attacks on telecommunications infrastructure and and
Power

telecommunications providers* recovery efforts in more detail in appendix
I of this report.) Most of this damage occurred when 7 World Trade Center,
itself heavily damaged by the collapse of the twin towers, collapsed into
a major telecommunications center at 140 West Street operated by Verizon,
the major telecommunications provider for Manhattan. The collateral

damage inflicted on that Verizon central office significantly disrupted
local telecommunications services to approximately 34,000 businesses and
residences in the surrounding area, including the financial district. 3
Damage to the facility was compounded when water from broken mains

and fire hoses flooded cable vaults located in the basement of the
building and shorted out remaining cables that had not been directly cut
by damage and debris. As shown in figure 7, the damage to this key
facility was extensive.

3 A central office is a telephone company facility containing the
switching equipment linking customers with public voice and data networks
within and outside of the local service area.

Figure 7: Damage to Verizon Central Office at 140 West Street

Because of the damage to Verizon facilities and equipment, significant
numbers of customers lost telecommunications services for extended
periods. When Verizon*s 140 West Street central office was damaged, about
182,000 voice circuits, more than 1.6 million data circuits, almost
112,000 private branch exchange (PBX) trunks, and more than 11,000 lines
serving

Internet service providers were lost. 4 As shown in figure 8, this central
office served a large part of lower Manhattan.

4 A PBX is an automatic telephone switching system that is owned,
operated, and located within a private enterprise. This system switches
calls between enterprise users on local lines while allowing all users to
share a certain number of external telephone lines. A PBX trunk line
connects the PBX to the serving telecommunications carrier*s local central
office switch.

Figure 8: Area Served by Verizon 140 West Street Central Office

The attacks also damaged other Verizon facilities and affected customers
in areas beyond that served directly from the Verizon West Street central
office. Three other Verizon switches in the World Trade Center towers and
in 7 World Trade Center were also destroyed in the attacks. Additional
services were disrupted because 140 West Street also served as a transfer
station on the Verizon network for about 2.7 million circuits carrying
data traffic that did not originate or terminate in that serving area, but
that

nevertheless passed through that particular physical location. For
example, communications services provided out of the Verizon Broad Street
central office that passed through West Street were also disrupted until
new cabling could be put in place to physically carry those circuits
around the damaged facility. As a result, a total of about 4.4 million
Verizon data circuits had to be restored.

Other telecommunications carriers that serviced customers in the affected
area also experienced damage and service disruptions. For example, in 140
West Street, 30 telecommunications providers had equipment that linked
their networks to Verizon. Other firms lost even more equipment than
Verizon. For example, AT& T lost a key transmission facility that serviced
its customers in lower Manhattan and had been located in one of the World
Trade Center towers.

The attacks also caused major power outages in lower Manhattan. Con
Edison, the local power provider, lost three power substations and more
than 33 miles of cabling; total damage to the power infrastructure was
estimated at $410 million. As a result, more than 13,000 Con Edison
business customers lost power, which required them to either relocate
operations or use alternative power sources such as portable generators.

To restore telecommunications and power, service providers had to overcome
considerable challenges. Access restrictions made this work more
difficult* staff from WorldCom told us that obtaining complete clearance
through the various local, state, and federal officials, including the
National Guard, took about 2 days. In some cases, environmental and

other factors also prevented restoration efforts from beginning. According
to Verizon staff, efforts to assess the damage and begin repairs on 140
West Street initially were delayed by concerns over the structural
integrity of the damaged facility and other nearby buildings; several
times staff had to halt assessment and repair efforts because government
officials ordered evacuations of the building.

In some cases, infrastructure providers employed innovative solutions to
restore telecommunications and power quickly. For example, these providers
placed both telecommunications and power cables that are normally
underground directly onto the streets and covered them with temporary
plastic barriers. Con Edison repair staff also had tanks of liquid
nitrogen placed on street corners so that their employees could freeze
cables, which makes them easier to cut when making repairs. To work around
the debris that blocked access to 140 West, Verizon staff ran cables over
the ground and around damaged cabling to quickly restore services. Because
of damage to the reinforced vault that previously housed the cables at
Verizon*s facility, a new cable vault was reconstructed on the first
floor, and cables were run up the side of the building to the fifth and
eighth floors, as shown in figure 9.

Figure 9: Verizon Used Temporary Cabling Solutions at 140 West Street

Attacks Severely Although the facilities of the stock and options
exchanges and clearing

Affected Financial organizations in lower Manhattan were largely undamaged
by the attacks,

many market participants were affected by the loss of telecommunications
Markets but Heroic

and lack of access to lower Manhattan. As a result, many firms, including
Efforts Were Made to

some of the broker- dealers responsible for significant portions of the
Restore Operations

overall securities market trading activity, were forced to relocate
operations to backup facilities and alternative locations. To resume
operations, these new facilities had to be prepared for trading and
provided with sufficient telecommunications capacity. Some firms had to
have telecommunications restored although they thought they had redundant
communications services. Regulators and market participants delayed the
opening of the stock and options market until September 17, until the key
broker- dealers responsible for large amounts of market liquidity were
able to operate and telecommunications had been tested.

Most Securities Exchanges Although several securities exchanges and market
support organizations

and Market Support were located in the vicinity of the attacks, most did
not experience direct

damage. The NYSE, Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation, 5 Securities
Organizations Were Not

Industry Automation Corporation (SIAC), International Securities Directly
Damaged

Exchange, and the Island ECN all had important facilities located in close
proximity to the World Trade Center, but none of these organizations*
facilities were damaged. The American Stock Exchange (Amex) was the only
securities exchange that experienced incapacitating damage. 6 Amex was
several hundred feet from the World Trade Center towers, but sustained
mostly broken windows and damage to some offices. However, its drainage
and ventilation systems were clogged by dust and debris and

the building lost power, telephones, and access to water and steam. The
loss of steam and water coupled with the inadequate drainage and
ventilation meant that Amex computer systems could not run due to a lack
of air conditioning. As a result, the Amex building was not cleared for
reoccupation until October 1, 2001, after inspectors had certified the
building as structurally sound and power and water had been fully
restored. Although the remaining exchanges were not damaged, U. S. stock

5 The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation is the holding company for
various organizations that conduct clearance and settlement services,
including the Depository Trust Company and the National Securities
Clearing Corporation.

6 Several futures exchanges experienced damage, including one whose
operations were located in one of the World Trade Center towers.

and options exchanges nationwide closed the day of the attacks and did not
reopen until September 17, 2001. However, regulators and market
participants acknowledged that if the major exchanges or clearing
organizations had sustained damage, trading in the markets would have
likely taken longer to resume.

Damage to Financial Although most exchanges and market support
organizations were not

Institutions* Facilities and damaged by the attacks, several key firms
with substantial operations in Telecommunications Forced

the area sustained significant facilities damage. As a result of this
damage Relocations and Made

and the inability to access the area in the days following the attacks,
many financial institution participants had to relocate their operations,
in some Recovery Efforts

cases using locations not envisioned by their BCPs. They then faced the
Challenging

challenge of recreating their key operations and obtaining sufficient
telecommunications services at these new locations. For example, one large
broker- dealer with headquarters that had been located across from the
World Trade Center moved operations to midtown Manhattan, taking over an
entire hotel. To resume operations, firms had to obtain computers and
establish telecommunications lines in the rooms that were converted to
work spaces. Another large broker- dealer whose facilities were damaged by
the attacks attempted to reestablish hundreds of direct lines to its major
customers after relocating operations to the facilities of a recently
purchased broker- dealer subsidiary in New Jersey. The simultaneous
relocation of so many firms meant that they also had to establish
connections to the new operating locations of other organizations.
Although Verizon managers were unable to estimate how much of its

restoration work in the days following the attacks specifically addressed
such needs, they told us that considerable capacity was added to the New
Jersey area to accommodate many of the firms that relocated operations
there, including financial firms.

Restoring operations often required innovative approaches. According to
representatives of the exchanges and other financial institutions we spoke
with, throughout the crisis financial firms that are normally highly
competitive instead exhibited a high level of cooperation. In some cases,
firms offered competitors facilities and office space. For example,
traders

who normally traded stocks on the Amex floor obtained space on the trading
floor of NYSE, and Amex options traders were provided space at the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange. In some cases, innovative approaches were
used by the exchanges and utilities to restore lost connectivity to their
customers. For example, technicians at the Island ECN created virtual
private network connections for those users whose services were

disrupted. 7 Island also made some of its trading applications available
to its customers through the Internet. In another example, SIAC, which
processes trades for NYSE and the American Stock Exchange, worked closely
with its customers to reestablish their connectivity, reconfiguring
customers* working circuits that had been used for testing or clearing and
settlement activities to instead transmit data to SIAC*s trading systems.

The Bond Market Association, the industry association representing
participants in the government and other debt markets, and the Securities
Industry Association (SIA), which represents participants in the stock
markets, played critical roles in reopening markets. Both associations
helped arrange daily conference calls with market participants and
regulators to address the steps necessary to reopen the markets. At times,
hundreds of financial industry officials were participating in these
calls. These organizations also made recommendations to regulators to
provide

some relief to their members so that they could focus on restoring their
operations. For example, the Bond Market Association recommended to its
members that they extend the settlement date for government securities
trades from the day following trade date (T+ 1) to five days after to help
alleviate some of the difficulties that were occurring in the government
securities markets. Through a series of conference calls with major banks
and market support organizations, SIA was instrumental in helping to
develop an industrywide consensus on how to resolve operational issues

arising from the damage and destruction to lower Manhattan and how to
mitigate operational risk resulting from the destruction of physical (that
is, paper) securities, which some firms had maintained for customers. SEC
also took actions to facilitate the successful reopening of the markets.

To allow market participants to focus primarily on resuming operations,
SEC issued rules to provide market participants temporary relief from
certain regulatory requirements. For example, SEC extended deadlines for
disclosure and reporting requirements, postponed the implementation date
for new reporting requirements, and temporarily waived some capital
regulation requirements. SEC implemented other relief measures targeted
toward stabilizing the reopened markets. For example, SEC relaxed rules

that restrict corporations from repurchasing their own shares of publicly
7 A virtual private network is a private data network that uses public
telecommunication infrastructure such as the Internet to provide remote
users with secure access to an organization's network.

traded stock, and simplified registration requirements for airline and
insurance industries so that they could more easily raise capital.

Stock and Options Markets Partially because of the difficulties
experienced by many firms in restoring

Opening Was Delayed until operations and obtaining adequate
telecommunications service, the

Sufficient Connectivity and reopening of the markets was delayed. Although
thousands of brokerdealers

Liquidity Existed may participate in the securities markets, staff at NYSE
and

NASDAQ told us that a small number of firms account for the majority of
the trading volume on their markets. Many of those firms had critical
operations in the area affected by the attacks. For example, 7 of the top
10 broker- dealers ranked by capital had substantial operations in the
World Trade Center or the World Financial Center, across from the World
Trade Center. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, these and other
firms were either attempting to restore operations at their existing
locations or at new locations. In addition, financial market participant
staff and the

financial regulators told us that their staffs did not want to return to
the affected area too soon to avoid interfering with the rescue and
recovery efforts. For example, the SEC Chairman told us that he did not
want to

send 10,000 to 15,000 workers into lower Manhattan while the recovery
efforts were ongoing and living victims were still being uncovered.

Because of the considerable efforts required for broker- dealers to
restore operations, insufficient liquidity existed to open the markets
during the week of the attacks. According to regulators and exchange
staff, firms able to trade by Friday, September 14, accounted for only
about 60 percent of the market*s normal order flow. As a result,
securities regulators, market

officials, and other key participants decided that, until more firms were
able to operate normally, insufficient liquidity existed in the markets.
Opening the markets with some firms but not others was also viewed as
unfair to many of the customers of the affected firms. Although
institutional clients often have relationships with multiple broker-
dealers, smaller customers and individual investors usually do not; thus,
they may not have been able to participate in the markets under these
circumstances. In addition, connectivity between market participants and
exchanges had

not been tested. For this reason, it was unclear how well the markets
would operate when trading resumed because so many critical
telecommunication connections were damaged in the attacks and had been

either repaired or replaced. Staff from the exchanges and market
participants told us that the ability to conduct connectivity testing
prior to

the markets reopening was important. Many firms experienced technical
difficulties in getting the new connections they had obtained to work
consistently as telecommunication providers attempted to restore
telecommunications service. According to officials at one exchange,
restoring connections to its members was difficult because existing or

newly restored lines that were initially operational would erratically
lose their connectivity throughout the week following September 11.
Representatives of the exchanges and financial regulators with whom we met
told us that opening the markets but then having to shut them down again
because of technical difficulties would have greatly reduced investor
confidence.

Because of the need to ensure sufficient liquidity and a stable operating
environment, market participants and regulators decided to delay the
resumption of stock and options trading until Monday, September 17. This
delay allowed firms to complete their restoration efforts and use the
weekend to test connectivity with the markets and the clearing
organizations. As a result of these efforts, the stock and options markets

reopened on September 17 and traded record volumes without significant
operational difficulties.

Disruptions in The attacks also severely disrupted the markets for
government securities Government Securities

and money market instruments primarily because of the impact on the
broker- dealers that trade in the market and on one of the key banks that
and Money Markets

perform clearing functions for these products. According to regulatory
Severely Affected

officials, at the time of the attacks, eight of the nine IDBs, which
provide Clearance and

brokerage services to other dealers in government securities, had
operations that were severely disrupted following the attacks. The most
Settlement, Liquidity, notable was Cantor Fitzgerald Securities, whose U.
S. operations had been and Trade Volumes

located on several of the highest floors of one of the World Trade Center
towers. Because much of the trading in the government securities market
occurs early in the day, the attacks and subsequent destruction of the
towers created massive difficulties for this market. When these IDBs*
facilities were destroyed, the results of trading, including information
on which firms had purchased securities and which had sold, also were
largely lost. These trades had to be reconstructed from the records of the
dealers who had conducted trades with the IDBs that day. In addition, with
the loss of their facilities, most of the primary IDBs were not able to
communicate with the Government Securities Clearing Corporation (GSCC),
which also complicated the clearing and settlement of these trades. Staff
from

financial market participants told us that reconciling some of these
transactions took weeks, and in some cases, months.

Two banks* the Bank of New York (BONY) and JP Morgan Chase* were the
primary clearing banks for government securities. Clearing banks are
essentially responsible for transferring funds and securities for their
dealer and other customers that purchase or sell government securities.
For trades cleared through GSCC, the clearing organization for these
instruments, instructs its dealer members and the clearing banks as to the
securities and associated payments to be transferred to settle its
members* net trade obligations.

As a result of the attacks, BONY and its customers experienced
telecommunications and other problems that contributed to the disruption
in the government securities market because it was the clearing bank for
many major market participants and because it maintained some of GSCC*s
settlement accounts. BONY had to evacuate four facilities including its

primary telecommunications data center and over 8, 300 staff, because they
were located near the World Trade Center. At several of these facilities,
BONY conducted processing activities as part of clearing and settling
government securities transactions on behalf of its customers and GSCC.
The communication lines between BONY and the Fedwire systems for payment
and securities transfers, as well as those between BONY and its clients,
were critical to BONY*s government

securities operations. Over these lines, BONY transmitted data with
instructions to transfer funds and securities from its Federal Reserve
accounts to those of other banks for transactions in government securities
and other instruments. BONY normally accessed its Federal Reserve

accounts from one of the lower Manhattan facilities that had to be
abandoned. In the days following the attacks, BONY had difficulties in
reestablishing its Fedwire connections and processing transactions. In

addition, many BONY customers also had to relocate and had their own
difficulties in establishing connections to the BONY backup site. As a
result of these internal processing problems and inability to communicate
with its customers, BONY had problems determining what amounts should be
transferred on behalf of the clients for whom it performed clearing
services. For example, by September 12, 2001, over $31 billion had been
transferred to BONY*s Federal Reserve account for GSCC, but because BONY
could not access this account, it could not transfer funds to which its
clients were entitled. BONY was not able to establish connectivity with

GSCC and begin receiving and transmitting instructions for payment
transfers until September 14, 2001.

The problems at the IDBs and BONY affected the ability of many government
securities and money markets participants to settle their trades. Before a
trade can be cleared and settled, the counterparties to the trade and the
clearing banks must compare trade details by exchanging messages to ensure
that each is in agreement on the price and amount of

securities traded. To complete settlement, messages then must be exchanged
between the parties to ensure that the funds and ownership of securities
are correctly transferred. If trade information is not correct and funds
and securities are not properly transferred, the trade will be considered
a *fail.* As shown in figure 10, failed transactions increased
dramatically, rising from around $500 million per day to over $450 billion
on September 12, 2001. The level of fails also stayed high for many days
following the attacks, averaging about $100 billion daily through
September 28.

Figure 10: Failed Transactions in the Government Securities Markets During
September 2001 The problems in the government securities markets also
created liquidity

problems for firms participating in and relying on these markets to fund
their operations. Many firms, including many large broker- dealers, fund

their operations using repurchase agreements, or repos, in which one party
sells government securities to another party and agrees to repurchase
those securities on a future date at a fixed price. Because repos are used
to finance firms* daily operations, many of these transactions are
executed before 9: 00 a. m. As a result, by the time the attacks occurred
on September

11, over $500 billion in repos had been transacted. With so many IDB
records destroyed, many of the transactions could not be cleared and
settled, causing many of these transactions to fail. As a result, some
firms that relied on this market as a funding source experienced major
funding shortfalls. Although trading government securities was officially
resumed within 2

days of the attacks, overall trading activity was low for several days.
For example, as shown in figure 11, trading volumes went from around $500
billion on September 10 to as low as $9 billion on September 12, 2001.
Similarly, repo activity fell from almost $900 billion on September 10 to

$145 billion on September 13.

Figure 11: Cash Purchases of Government Securities and Repo Market
Activity During September 2001 1,000

Dollars in billions 800 600 400 200

0 10

11 12 13 14 17 18 19 20 21 24 25 26 27 28 September

Repos Purchases of Government Securities Source: GSCC.

The attacks also disrupted the markets for commercial paper, which are
short- term securities issued by financial and other firms to raise funds.
According to clearing organization officials, the majority of commercial
paper redemptions* when the investors that originally purchased the
commercial paper have their principal returned-- that were scheduled to be
redeemed on September 11 and September 12 were not paid until September
13. Firms that relied on these securities to fund their operations had to
obtain other sources of funding during this period.

The Federal Reserve took several actions to mitigate potential damage to
the financial system resulting from liquidity disruptions in these
markets. Banking regulatory staff told us that the attacks largely
resulted in a funding liquidity problem rather than a solvency crisis for
banks. Thus, the challenge they faced was ensuring that banks had adequate
funds to meet their financial obligations. The settlement problems also
prevented brokerdealers and others from using the repo markets to fund
their daily operations. Soon after the attacks, the Federal Reserve
announced that it would remain open to help banks meet their liquidity
needs. Over the next 4 days, the Federal Reserve provided about $323
billion to banks through various means to overcome the problems resulting
from unsettled government securities trades and financial market
dislocations. For example, from September 11 through September 14, the
Federal Reserve loaned about $91 billion to banks through its discount
window, in contrast to normal lending levels of about $100 million. 8 It
also conducted securities purchase transactions and other open market
operations of about $189 billion to provide needed funds to illiquid
institutions. Had these actions not been taken, some firms unable to
receive payments may not have had sufficient liquidity to meet their other
financial obligations, which could

have produced other defaults and magnified the effects of September 11
into a systemic solvency crisis.

Regulators also took action to address the failed trades resulting from
the attacks. From September 11 through September 13, the Federal Reserve
loaned $22 billion of securities from its portfolio to broker- dealers
that needed securities to complete settlements of failed trades. According
to Federal Reserve staff, the Federal Reserve subsequently reduced
restrictions on its securities lending that led to a sharp increase in

8 The discount window is the lending mechanism used by the Federal Reserve
Banks to lend funds to depository institutions on a short- term basis to
cover temporary liquidity needs or reserve deficiencies.

borrowings at the end of September 2001. Treasury also played a role in
easing the failed trades and preventing a potential financial crisis by
conducting an unplanned, special issuance of 10- year notes to help
address a shortage of notes of this duration in the government securities
markets. Market participants typically use these securities as collateral
for financing or to meet settlement obligations.

To provide dollars needed by foreign institutions, the Federal Reserve
also conducted currency swaps with the Bank of Canada, the European
Central Bank, and the Bank of England. The swaps involved exchanging
dollars for the foreign currencies of these jurisdictions, with agreements
to reexchange amounts later. These temporary arrangements provided funds
to settle dollar- denominated obligations of foreign banks whose U. S.
operations were affected by the attacks. The Federal Reserve, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, OCC, and the

Office of Thrift Supervision issued a joint statement after the attacks to
advise the institutions they oversee that any temporary declines in
capital would be evaluated in light of the institution*s overall financial
condition. The Federal Reserve also provided substantial amounts of
currency so that banks would be able to meet customer needs.

Impact of Attacks on With a few exceptions, commercial banks were not as
adversely affected as

the Banking and broker- dealers by the attacks. Although some banks had
some facilities

and operations in lower Manhattan, they were not nearly as geographically
Payments Systems Was

concentrated as securities market participants. As discussed previously,
Less Severe

BONY was one bank with significant operations in the World Trade Center
area, but only a limited number of other large banks had any operations
that were affected. According to regulatory officials that oversee
national

banks, seven of their institutions had operations in the areas affected by
the attacks. Most payment system operations continued with minimal
disruption. The

Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) manages the Federal Reserve*s
Fedwire securities and payments transfer systems. Although the FRBNY
sustained damage to some telecommunications lines, Fedwire continued
processing transactions without interruption because the actual facilities
that process the transactions are not located in lower Manhattan. However,
Federal Reserve officials noted that some banks experienced problems
connecting to Fedwire because of the widespread damage to

telecommunications systems. Over 30 banks lost connectivity to Fedwire

because their data first went to the FRBNY facility in lower Manhattan
before being transmitted to Fedwire*s system*s processing facility outside
the area. However, most were able to reestablish connections through
dialup backup systems and some began reporting transfer amounts manually
using voice lines. Federal Reserve officials noted that normal volumes for

manually reported transactions were about $200*$ 400 million daily, but
from September 11 through September 13, 2001, banks conducted about $151
billion in manually reported transactions. A major private- sector
payments system, CHIPS, also continued to function without operational
disruptions, although 19 of its members temporarily lost connectivity with
CHIPs in the aftermath of the attacks and had to reconnect from backup

facilities. Retail payments systems, including check clearing and
automated clearing house transactions, generally continued to operate.
However, the grounding of air transportation did complicate and delay some
check clearing, since both the Federal Reserve and private providers rely
on overnight air delivery to transport checks between banks in which they
are deposited and banks from which they are drawn. 9 Federal Reserve
officials said they were able to arrange truck transportation between some
check clearing offices until they were able to gain approval for their
chartered air

transportation to resume several days later. According to Federal Reserve
staff, transporting checks by ground slowed processing and could not
connect all offices across the country. The staff said that the Federal
Reserve continued to credit the value of deposits to banks even when it
could not present checks and debit the accounts of paying banks. This
additional liquidity *normally less than $1 billion* peaked at over $47
billion on September 13, 2001. 9 The Expedited Funds Availability Act of
1987, which is implemented through Federal

Reserve Board Regulation CC, requires that banks make funds available for
withdrawal within 2 days when the bank of first deposit and the paying
bank are located within the same Federal Reserve check processing
territory and within 5 days when the banks are not in the same territory.
Meeting those deadlines frequently requires air transport of checks.

Attacks Revealed The terrorist attacks revealed that limits that existed
in market

Limitations in participants* business continuity capabilities at the time
of the attacks.

Based on our discussions with market participants, regulators, industry
Financial Market

associations and others, the BCPs of many organizations had been too
Participants* Business

limited in scope to address the type of disaster that occurred. Instead,
Continuity Capabilities BCPs had procedures to address disruptions
affecting a single facility such as power outages or fires at one
building. For example, a 1999 SEC examination report of a large broker-
dealer that we reviewed noted that in the event of an emergency this
firm*s BCP called for staff to move just onetenth

of a mile to another facility. By not planning for wide- scale events,
many organizations had not invested in backup facilities that could
accommodate key aspects of their operations, including several of the
large broker- dealers with primary operations located near the World Trade
Center that had to recreate their trading operations at new locations.
Similarly, NYSE and several of the other exchanges did not have backup

facilities at the time of the attacks from which they could conduct
trading. The attacks also illustrated that some market participants*
backup facilities were too close to their primary operations. For example,
although BONY had several backup facilities for critical functions located
several miles from the attacks, the bank also backed up some critical
processes at facilities that were only blocks away. According to clearing
organization and regulatory staff, one of the IDBs with facilities located
in one of the destroyed towers of the World Trade Center had depended on
backup facilities in the other tower.

Additionally, firms* BCPs did not adequately take into account all
necessary equipment and other resources needed to resume operations as
completely and rapidly as possible. For example, firms that occupied
backup facilities or other temporary space found that they lacked
sufficient space for all critical staff or did not have all the equipment
needed to conduct their operations. Others found that their backup sites
did not have the most current versions of the software and systems that
they use, which caused some restoration problems. Some firms had
contracted with third- party vendors for facilities and equipment to
conduct operations during emergencies, but because so many firms were
disrupted by the attacks, some of these facilities were overbooked, and
firms had to find other locations in which to resume operations.

Organizations also learned that their BCPs would have to better address
human capital issues. For example, some firms had difficulties in locating

key staff in the confusion after the attacks. Others found that staff were
not able to reach their backup locations as quickly as their plans had
envisioned due to the closure of public transit systems, bridges, and
roads. Other firms had not planned for the effects of the trauma and grief
on their staff and had to provide access to counseling for those that were
overwhelmed by the events.

The attacks also revealed the need to improve some market participants*
business continuity capabilities for telecommunications. According to
broker- dealers and regulator staff with whom we spoke, some firms found
that after relocating their operations, they learned that their backup
locations connected to the primary sites of the organizations critical to
their operations but not to these organizations* backup sites. Some
financial firms that did not have damaged physical facilities nonetheless
learned that their supporting telecommunications services were not as
diverse and redundant as they expected. Diversity involves establishing
different physical routes in and out of a building, and using different
equipment along those routes if a disaster or other form of interference
adversely affects one route. Redundancy involves having extra capacity
available, generally from more than one source, and also incorporates
aspects of diversity. Therefore, users that rely on telecommunications
services to support important applications try to ensure that those
services use facilities that are diverse and redundant so that no single
point in the communications path can cause all services to fail. Ensuring
that carriers actually maintain physically redundant and diverse
telecommunications services has been a longstanding concern within the
financial industry. For example, the President*s National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee in December 1997 reported, *despite
assurances about diverse networks from the carriers, a consistent concern
among the financial services industry was the trustworthiness of their
telecommunications diversity arrangements.* 10 This concern was validated
following the September 11 attacks when firms

that thought they had achieved redundancy in their communications systems
learned that their network services were still disrupted. According to
regulators and financial market participants with whom we spoke, some
firms that made arrangements with multiple service providers to obtain
redundant service discovered that the lines used by their providers were

10 The President*s National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee, Financial Services Risk Assessment Report (Washington, D. C.:
December 1997).

not diverse because they routed through the same Verizon switching
facility. Other firms that had mapped out their communications lines to
ensure that their lines flowed through physically diverse paths at the
time those services were first acquired found that their service providers
had rerouted some of those lines over time without their knowledge,

eliminating that assurance of diversity in the process. Observations The
attacks demonstrated that the ability of U. S. financial markets to

remain operational after disasters depends to a great extent on the
preparedness of not only the exchanges and clearing organizations but also
the major broker- dealers and banks that participate in these markets. The
various financial markets were severely affected and the stock and options

exchanges were closed in the days following the attacks for various
reasons, including the need to conduct rescue operations. However, the
markets also remained closed because of the time required for several
major broker- dealers that normally provide the bulk of the liquidity for
trading in the stock, options, and government securities markets to become
operational. Although the attacks were of a nature and magnitude beyond
that previously imagined, they revealed the need to address limitations in
the business continuity capabilities of many organizations and to mitigate

the concentration of critical operations in a limited geographic area.
Many organizations will have to further assess how vulnerable their
operations are to disruptions and determine what capabilities they will
need to increase the likelihood of being able to resume operations after
such events.

Financial Market Participants Have Taken Actions to Reduce Risks of
Disruption, but

Chapt er 3

Some Limitations Remain Since the attacks, exchanges, clearing
organizations, ECNs, and payment system processors implemented various
physical and information security measures and business continuity
capabilities to reduce the risk that their operations would be disrupted
by attacks, but some organizations continued to have limitations in their
preparedness that increases their risk of disruption. With threats to the
financial markets potentially increasing, organizations must choose how
best to use their resources to reduce risks by investing in protection
against physical and electronic attacks for facilities, personnel, and
information systems and developing capabilities for continuing operations.
To reduce the risk of operations disruptions, the 15 financial market
organizations* including the 7 critical ones* we reviewed in 2002 had
taken many steps since the attacks to protect their physical facilities or
information systems from attacks and had developed plans for recovering
from such disruptions. However, at the time we conducted our review, 9 of
the 15 organizations, including 2 we considered critical to the
functioning of the financial markets, had not taken steps to ensure that
they would have the staff necessary to conduct their critical operations
if the staff at their primary site were incapacitated* including 8
organizations that also had physical vulnerabilities at their primary
sites. Ten of the 15 organizations, including 4 of the critical
organizations, also faced increased risk of being unable to operate after
a wide- scale disruption because they either lacked backup facilities or
had backup facilities near their primary sites. Finally, although many of
the 15 organizations had attempted to reduce their risks by testing some
of their risk reduction measures, only 3 were testing their physical
security measures, only 8 had recently assessed the vulnerabilities of
their key information systems, and only 7 had fully tested their BCPs.

In Climate of Faced with varying and potentially increasing threats that
could disrupt

Increasing Risk, their operations, organizations must make choices about
how to best use

their resources to both protect their facilities and systems and develop
Organizations Often

business continuity capabilities. September 11, 2001, illustrated that
such Have to Choose How to attacks can have a large- scale impact on
market participants. Law

Best Use Resources enforcement and other government officials are
concerned that public and

private sectors important to the U. S. economy, including the financial
markets, may be increasingly targeted by hostile entities that may have
increasing abilities to conduct such attacks. For example, the leader of
the al Qaeda organization was quoted as urging that attacks be carried out
against the *pillars of the economy* of the United States. Press accounts
of captured al Qaeda documents indicated that members of this organization
may be increasing their awareness and knowledge of electronic security

techniques and how to compromise and damage information networks and
systems, although the extent to which they could successfully conduct
sophisticated attacks has been subject to debate. A recent report on U. S.
foreign relations also notes that some foreign countries are accelerating

their efforts to be able to attack U. S. civilian communications systems
and networks used by institutions important to the U. S. economy,
including those operated by stock exchanges. 1

The physical threats that individual organizations could reasonably be
expected to face vary by type and likelihood of occurrence. For example,
events around the world demonstrate that individuals carrying explosive
devices near or inside facilities can be a common threat. More powerful
explosive attacks by vehicle are less common but still have been used to
devastating effect in recent years. Other less likely, but potentially
devastating, physical threats include attacks involving biological or
chemical agents such as the anthrax letter mailings that occurred in the
United States in 2001 and the release of a nerve agent in the Tokyo subway
in 1995.

Faced with the potential for such attacks, organizations can choose to
invest in a range of physical security protection measures to help manage
their risks. The Department of Justice has developed standards that
identify measures for protecting federal buildings from physical threats.
2 To reduce the likelihood of incurring damage from individuals or

explosives, organizations can physically secure perimeters by controlling
vehicle movement around a facility, using video monitoring cameras,
increasing lighting, and installing barriers. Organizations can also
prevent unauthorized persons or dangerous devices from entering their
facilities by screening people and objects, restricting lobby access, and
only allowing employees or authorized visitors inside. Organizations could
also take steps to prevent biological or chemical agents from
contaminating facilities

by opening and inspecting mail and deliveries off- site. To protect
sensitive 1 U. S.- China Security Review Commission, Report to Congress of
the U. S.- China Security Review Commission: The National Security
Implications of the Economic Relationships Between the United States and
China (July 2002). 2 See Department of Justice, Vulnerability Assessment
of Federal Facilities (Washington, D. C.: Jun. 28, 1995). This document
presented security standards to be applied to all federal

facilities. Each facility is to be placed in five categories depending on
its level of risk, with Level 1 facilities having the least need for
physical security and Level 5 facilities having the highest need. Based on
its risk level, a facility would be expected to implement increasingly
stringent measures in 52 security areas.

data, equipment, and personnel, organizations can also take steps to
secure facility interiors by using employee and visitor identification
systems and restricting access to critical equipment and utilities such as
power and telecommunications equipment.

Organizations can also reduce the risk of operations disruptions by
investing in measures to protect information systems. Information system
threats include hackers, who are individuals or groups attempting to gain
unauthorized access to networks or systems to steal, alter, or destroy
information. Another threat* known as a denial of service attack* involves
flooding a system with messages that consume its resources and prevent
authorized users from accessing it. Information systems can also be
disrupted by computer viruses that damage data directly or degrade system
performance by taking over system resources. Information security guidance
used for reviews of federal organizations recommend that organizations
develop policies and procedures that cover all major systems and
facilities and outline the duties of those responsible for security. 3 To
prevent unauthorized access to networks and information systems,

organizations can identify and authenticate users by using software and
hardware techniques such as passwords, firewalls, and other filtering
devices. Organizations can also use monitoring systems to detect
unauthorized attempts to gain access to networks and information systems
and develop response capabilities for electronic attacks or breaches.

Investing in business continuity capabilities is another way that
organizations can reduce the risk that their operations will be disrupted.
According to guidance used by private organizations and financial

regulators, developing a sound BCP requires organizations to determine
which departments, business units, or functions are critical to
operations. 4 The organizations should then prepare a BCP that identifies
capabilities

that have to be in place, resources required, and procedures to be
followed for the organization to resume operations. Such capabilities can
include backup facilities equipped with the information technology
hardware and software that the organization needs to conduct operations.
Alternatively, organizations can replace physical locations or processes,
such as trading

3 U. S. General Accounting Office, Federal Information System Controls
Audit Manual,

GAO/ AIMD- 12. 19.6 (Washington, D. C.: January 1999). 4 Among the sources
we consulted were our own 1999 Federal Information System Controls Audit
Manual (FISCAM), the FFIEC Information Systems Handbook: Volume 1, and the
Business Continuity Institute*s 2001 Business Guide to Continuity
Management.

floors, with electronic systems that perform the same core functions. Many
organizations active in the financial markets are critically dependent on
telecommunications services for transmitting the data or voice traffic

necessary to operate. As a result, organizations would have to identify
their critical telecommunications needs and take steps to ensure that
services needed to support critical operations will be available after a
disaster. Finally, BCP guidance such as FISCAM, which provides standards
for audits of federal information systems, also recommends that
organizations have backup staff that can implement BCP procedures. To the
extent that an organization*s ability to resume operations depends on the
availability of staff with specific expertise, the organization has to
maintain staff capable of conducting its critical functions elsewhere.

Given that most organizations have limited resources, effectively managing
the risk of operations disruptions involves making trade- offs between
investing in protection of facilities, personnel, and systems or
development

of business continuity capabilities. For example, organizations must weigh
the expected costs of operations disruptions against the expected cost of
implementing security protections, developing facilities, or implementing
other business continuity capabilities to ensure that they would be able
to resume operations after a disaster. Risk management guidance directs
organizations to identify how costly various types of temporary or
extended outages or disruptions would be to parts or all of their
operations. Such costs stem not only from revenues actually lost during
the outage, but also from potential lost income because of damage to the
organization*s reputation stemming from its inability to resume
operations. In addition to estimating the potential costs of disruptions,
organizations are advised to identify potential threats that could cause
such disruptions and estimate the likelihood of these events. By
quantifying the costs and

probabilities of occurrence of various disruptions, an organization can
then better evaluate the amount and how to allocate the resources that it
should expend on either implementing particular protection measures or
attaining various business continuity capabilities. For example, an
organization whose primary site is located in a highly trafficked, public
area may have limited ability to reduce all of its physical security
risks. However, such an organization could reduce the risk of its
operations being disrupted by having a backup facility manned by staff
capable of supporting its critical operations or by cross- training other
staff.

All Financial Market The 15 exchanges, clearing organizations, ECNs, and
payment system Organizations Were

processors we reviewed in 2002 had invested in various physical and
information protections and business continuity capabilities to reduce the
Taking Steps to Reduce

risk that their operations would be disrupted. Each of these 15 the Risks
of Operations

organizations had implemented physical security measures to protect
Disruptions

facilities and personnel. To establish or increase perimeter security,
some organizations had erected physical barriers around their facilities
such as concrete barriers, large flowerpots, or boulders. To reduce the
likelihood that its operations would be disrupted by vehicle- borne
explosives, one organization had closed off streets adjacent to its
building and had guards inspect all vehicles entering the perimeter. Some
organizations were also using electronic surveillance to monitor their
facilities, with some organizations having 24- hour closed circuit
monitoring by armed guards. Others had guards patrolling both the interior
and exterior of their facilities on a 24- hour basis. In addition, all of
these organizations had taken measures to protect the security of their
interiors. For example, the organizations required employee
identification, electronic proximity cards, or visitor screening.

All 15 organizations had taken measures to reduce the risk that electronic
threats would disrupt their operations. The securities markets already use
networks and information systems that reduce their vulnerability to
external intrusion in several ways. First, the securities exchanges and
clearing organizations have established private networks that transmit
traffic only to and from their members* systems, which are therefore more
secure than the Internet or public telephone networks. Second, traffic on
the exchange and clearing organization networks uses proprietary message

protocols or formats, which are less vulnerable to the insertion of
malicious messages or computer viruses. Although rendering the securities
market networks generally less vulnerable, these features do not
completely protect them and the prominence of securities market
participants* role in the U. S. economy means that their networks are more
likely to be targeted for electronic attack than some other sectors. The
15 organizations we reviewed in 2002 had generally implemented the
elements of a sound information security program, including policies and
procedures and access controls. Thirteen of the 15 organizations were also
using intrusion detection systems, and the remaining 2 had plans to
implement or were considering implementing such systems. All 15 of the
organizations also had procedures that they would implement in the event
of systems breaches, although the comprehensiveness of the incident
response procedures varied. For example, 2 organizations* incident
response plans

involved shutting down any breached systems, but lacked documented
procedures for taking further actions such as gathering evidence on the
source of the breach.

Developing business continuity capabilities is another way to reduce the
risk of operations disruptions, and all 15 of the organizations we
reviewed in 2002 had plans for continuing operations. These plans had a
variety of contingency measures to facilitate the resumption of
operations. For example, 11 organizations had backup facilities to which
their staff could relocate if disruptions occurred at the primary
facility. One of these

organizations had three fully equipped and staffed facilities that could
independently absorb all operations in an emergency or disruption. In some
cases, organizations did not have backup facilities that could

accommodate their operations but had taken steps to ensure that key
business functions could be transferred to other organizations. For
example, staff at one exchange that lacked a backup facility said that
most of the products it traded were already traded on other exchanges, so
trading of those products would continue if its primary site was not
available. In addition, this exchange has had discussions with other
exchanges about transferring trading of proprietary products to the other
exchanges in an emergency situation. These organizations all had
inventoried critical telecommunications and had made arrangements to
ensure that they would continue to have service if primary lines were
damaged.

Some Financial Although all 15 organizations we reviewed had taken steps
to address

Organizations Had physical and electronic threats and had BCPs to respond
to disruptive

events, but at the time of our review many had limitations in their
Preparedness

preparedness that increased the risk of an operations disruption. Nine of
Limitations That

the 15 organizations, including 2 critical organizations, were at greater
risk Increased Their Risk of

of experiencing an operations disruption because their BCPs did not
address how they would recover if a physical attack on their primary an
Operations

facility left a large percentage of their staff incapacitated. Although 5
of Disruption

these 9 organizations had backup facilities, they did not maintain staff
outside of their primary facility that could conduct all their critical
operations. Eight of the 9 organizations also had physical security
vulnerabilities at their primary sites that they either had not or could
not mitigate. For example, these organizations were unable to control
vehicular traffic around their facilities and thus were more exposed to
damage than those that did have such controls.

Most of the organizations we reviewed also had faced increased risk that
their operations would be disrupted by a wide- scale disaster. As of
August 2002, all 7 of the critical organizations we reviewed had backup
facilities, including 3 whose facilities were hundreds of miles from their
primary facilities. For example, 1 organization had two data centers
located about 500 miles apart, each capable of conducting the
organization*s full scope of operations in the event that one site failed.
The organization also has a third site that can take over the processing
needed for daily operations on a next- day basis. However, the backup
facilities of the other four organizations were located 2 to 5 miles from
their primary sites. If a widescale disaster caused damage or made a
region greater than these distances inaccessible, these 4 organizations
would be at greater risk for not being able to resume operations promptly.

Many of the other 8 organizations also had faced increased risk that their
operations would be disrupted by wide- scale disasters. At the time we
conducted our review, 2 of the 8 organizations had backup facilities that
were hundreds of miles from their primary operations. The remaining 6
organizations faced increased risk of being disrupted by a wide- scale
disaster because 4 lacked backup facilities, while 2 organizations had
backup facilities that were located 4 to 10 miles from their primary
operations facilities. 5 Of the 4 organizations that lacked a backup
facility, one had begun constructing a facility near its primary site.

Four of the organizations that lacked regionally dispersed backup
facilities told us that they had begun efforts to become capable of
conducting their operations at locations many miles from their current
primary and backup sites. For example, NYSE has announced that it is
exploring the possibility of creating a second active trading floor some
miles from its current location. In contrast to the backup trading
location NYSE built in the months following the attack, which would only
be active should its current primary facility become unusable, the
exchange plans to move the trading of some securities currently traded at
its primary site to this new facility and have both sites active each
trading day. However, if the primary site were damaged, the new site would
be equipped to be capable of conducting all trading. In December 2002,
NYSE staff told us that they were still evaluating the creation of this
second active trading floor.

5 In total, 4 of the 15 organizations had backup sites 5 miles or less
from their primary sites.

For the organizations that lacked backup facilities, cost was the primary
obstacle to establishing such capabilities. For example, staff at one
organization told us that creating a backup location for its operations
would cost about $25 million, or as much as 25 percent of the
organization*s total annual revenue. Officials at the 3 organizations
without backup sites noted that the products and services they provide to
the markets are largely duplicated by other organizations, so their
inability to operate would have minimal impact on the overall market*s
ability to function.

Although cost can be a limiting factor, financial market organizations
have some options for creating backup locations that could be cost-
effective. At least one of the organizations we reviewed has created the
capability of conducting its trading operations at a site that is
currently used for administrative functions. By having a dual- use
facility, the organization has saved the cost of creating a completely
separate backup facility. This option also would seem well suited to
broker- dealers, banks, and other financial institutions because they
frequently maintain customer service call centers that have large numbers
of staff that could potentially be equipped with all or some of the
systems and equipment needed for the

firm*s trading or clearing activities. Some Financial Market

Organizations can also minimize operations risk by testing their physical
Organizations Not Fully

and information security measures and business continuity plans, but we
Testing Security Measures

found the 15 exchanges, clearing organizations, ECNs, and payment system
or Business Continuity processors were not fully testing all these areas.
In the case of physical security, such assessments can include attempting
to infiltrate a building or Capabilities

other key facility such as a data processing center or assessing the
integrity of automated intrusion detection systems. In the case of
information security, such assessments can involve attempts to access
internal systems

or data from outside the organization*s network or by using software
programs that identify, probe, and test systems for known vulnerabilities.
For both physical and information security, these assessments can be done
by the organization*s own staff, its internal auditors, or by outside
organizations, such as security or consulting firms. The extent to which
the 15 exchanges, clearing organizations, ECNs, and

payment system providers that we reviewed had tested their physical
security measures varied. Only 3 of the 7 critical financial organizations
routinely tested their physical security; the tests included efforts to
gain unauthorized access to facilities or smuggle fake weapons into
buildings.

None of the remaining 8 organizations routinely tested the physical
security of their facilities. To test their information security measures,
all 7 of the critical organizations had assessed network and systems
vulnerabilities. We considered an organization*s assessment current if it
had occurred within the 2 years prior to our visit, because system changes
over time can create security weaknesses, and advances in hacking tools
can create new means

of penetrating systems. 6 According to the assessments provided to us by
the 7 critical organizations, all had performed vulnerability assessments
of the information security controls they implemented over some of their
key trading or clearing systems within the last 2 years. However, these
tests were not usually done in these organizations* operating environment
but instead were done on test systems or during nontrading hours. Seven of
the remaining 8 organizations we reviewed also had not generally had
vulnerability assessments of their key trading or clearing networks
performed with the 2 years prior to our review. However, in the last 2
years, all 15 organizations had some form of vulnerability assessments
performed for their corporate or administrative systems, which they use to
manage their organization or operate their informational Web sites.

Most of the 7 organizations critical to overall market functioning were
conducting regular tests of their business continuity capabilities. Based
on our review, 5 of the 7 critical organizations had conducted tests of
all

systems and procedures critical to business continuity. However, these
tests were not usually done in these organizations* real- time
environments. Staff at one organization told us that they have not
recently conducted live trading from their backup site because of the
risks, expense, and difficulty involved. Instead, some tested their
capabilities by switching over to alternate facilities for operations
simulations on nontrading days. One organization tested all components
critical to their operations separately and over time, but it had not
tested all aspects simultaneously. Of the 8 other financial market
organizations we reviewed, only 2 had conducted regular BCP tests. One
organization, however, had an extensive disaster

recovery testing regimen that involved using three different scenarios:
simulating a disaster at the primary site and running its systems and
network from the backup site; simulating a disaster at the backup site and

running the systems and network from the primary site; and running its 6
We conducted our reviews at the premises of these organizations from
February to June 2002.

systems and network from the consoles at the backup site with no staff in
the control room at the primary site.

Organizations also discovered the benefits of conducting such tests. For
example, because of lessons learned through testing, one organization
learned vital information about the capabilities of third- party
applications,

identified the need to configure certain in- house applications to work at
the recovery site, installed needed peripheral equipment at the backup
site, placed technical documentation regarding third- party application
installation procedures at the backup site, and increased instruction on
how to get to the backup site if normal transportation routes were
unavailable. An official at this organization told us that with every
test, they expected to learn something about the performance of their BCP
and

identify ways to improve it. Observations The exchanges, clearing
organizations, ECNs, and payment system providers that we reviewed had all
taken various steps to reduce the risk

that their operations would be disrupted by physical or electronic
attacks. In general, the organizations we considered more critical to the
overall ability of the markets to function had implemented the most
comprehensive physical and information security measures and BCPs.
However, limitations in some organizations* preparedness appeared to
increase the risks that their operations could be disrupted because they

had physical security vulnerabilities not mitigated with business
continuity capabilities. The extent to which these organizations had also
reduced the risk posed by a wide- scale disruption also varied. Because
the importance of these organizations* operations to the overall markets
varies, regulators are faced with the challenge of determining the extent
to which these organizations should take additional actions to address
these limitations to reduce risks to the overall markets.

Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and Could
Strengthen Their

Chapt er 4

Operations Risk Oversight Although banking and securities regulators have
begun to take steps to prevent future disasters from causing widespread
payment defaults, they have not taken important actions that would better
ensure that trading in critical U. S. financial markets could resume
smoothly and in a timely manner after a major disaster. The three
regulators for major market participants, the Federal Reserve, OCC, and
SEC are working jointly with market participants to develop recovery goals
and sound business continuity practices that will apply to a limited
number of financial market organizations to ensure that these entities can
clear and settle transactions and meet their financial obligations after
future disasters. However, the regulators* recovery goals and sound
practices do not extend to organizations* trading activities or to the
stock exchanges. The regulators

also had not developed complete strategies that identify where trading
could be resumed or which organizations would have to be ready to conduct
trading if a major exchange or multiple broker- dealers were unlikely to
be operational for an extended period. Individually, these three
regulators have overseen operations risks in the past. SEC has a program*
the Automation Review Policy (ARP)* for reviewing exchanges and clearing
organizations efforts to reduce operations risks, but this program faces
several limitations. Compliance with the program is voluntary, and some
organizations have not always implemented important ARP recommendations.
In addition, market participants raised concerns over the inexperience and
insufficient technical expertise of SEC staff, and the resources committed
to the program limit the frequency of examinations. Lacking specific
requirements in the securities laws, SEC has not generally examined
operations risk measures in place at broker- dealers. The Federal Reserve
and OCC are tasked with overseeing the safety and soundness of banks*
operations and had issued and were updating guidance that covered
information system security and business continuity planning. They also
reported annually examining information security and business continuity
at the entities they oversee, but these reviews did not generally assess
banks* measures against physical attacks.

Regulators Are Treasury and the financial regulators have various
initiatives under way to

Developing Recovery improve the financial markets* ability to respond to
future crises (we

discuss these in app. II) and assess how well the critical assets of the
Goals and Sound

financial sector are being protected. 1 As part of these initiatives,
certain Business Continuity

financial market regulators have begun to identify business continuity
goals for the clearing and settling organizations for government and
Practices for Clearing

corporate securities. 2 On August 30, 2002, the Federal Reserve, OCC, SEC,
Functions but Not for

and the New York State Banking Department issued the Draft Interagency
White Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U. S.
Trading Activities

Financial System. 3 The paper presents sound practices to better ensure
that clearance and settlement organizations will be able to resume
operations promptly after a wide- scale, regional disruption. 4 The paper
proposes these organizations adopt certain practices such as

 identifying the activities they perform that support these critical
markets;

 developing plans to recover these activities on the same business day;
and 1 As part of national efforts to address critical infrastructure
protection, an interagency group of financial regulators was formed in
October 2001. This group* the Financial and Banking Information
Infrastructure Committee* includes SEC, the five depository institution
regulators, and the regulators for futures, insurance, and government-
sponsored

enterprises. The group began efforts to identify critical assets in the
financial sector, improve communication among regulators, and ensure that
financial market organizations receive appropriate priority in
telecommunications restoration. We discuss these efforts in more detail in
appendix II of this report. A more complete description of the United
States* efforts to ensure that its critical infrastructure is protected
and how the financial sector has been included is contained in our report
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Efforts of Financial Services Sector
to Address Cyber Threats, GAO- 03- 173 (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 30, 2003).

2 These markets include those for federal funds, foreign currencies,
commercial paper, government securities, stocks, and mortgage- backed
securities. 3 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, OCC, and SEC,
Draft Interagency White Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the
Resilience of the U. S. Financial System (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 30,
2002). The New York State Banking Department also contributed to this
paper and issued it separately.

4 A wide- scale, regional disruption is one that causes a severe
disruption of transportation, telecommunications, power, or other critical
infrastructure components across a metropolitan or other geographic area
and its adjacent communities that are economically integrated with it.

 having out- of- region resources sufficient to recover these operations
that are not dependent on the same labor pool or transportation,
telecommunications, water, and power.

The regulators plan to apply the sound practices to a limited number of
financial market organizations whose inability to perform certain critical
functions could result in a systemic crisis that threatens the stability
of the financial markets. If these organizations were unable to
sufficiently recover and meet their financial obligations, other market
participants could similarly default on their obligations and create
liquidity or credit problems. According to the white paper, the sound
practices apply to *core clearing and settlement organizations,* which
include market utilities that

clear and settle transactions on behalf of market participants and the two
clearing banks in the government securities market. 5 In addition, the
regulators expect firms that play significant roles in these critical
financial markets also to comply with sound practices that are somewhat
less rigorous. The white paper indicates that probably 15 to 20 banks and
5 to 10 broker- dealers have volume or value of activity in these markets
sufficient

to present a systemic risk if they were unable to recover their clearing
functions and settle all their transactions by the end of the business
day.

The regulators also sought comment on the appropriate scope and
application of the white paper, including whether they should address the
duration of disruption that should be planned for, the geographic
concentration of backup sites, and the minimum distance between primary
and backup facilities. After considering the comments they receive, the
regulators intend to issue a final version in 2003 of the white paper that
will present the practices to be adopted by clearance and settlement
organizations for these markets.

Based on our analysis of the comment letters that have been sent to the
regulators as of December 2002, market participants and other commenters
have raised concerns over the feasibility and cost of the practices
advocated by the white paper. The organizations that have

commented on the paper include banks, broker- dealers, industry 5 In
addition to the effort to develop sound practices for the organizations
involved in clearing, the Federal Reserve and SEC issued a paper that
discusses and seeks comment on several potential alternatives for
conducting clearing services in these markets. See Board

of Governors of the Federal Reserve and SEC, Interagency White Paper on
Structural Change in the Settlement of Government Securities: Issues and
Options (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 30, 2002).

associations, information technology companies and consultants, and many
of these organizations complimented the regulators for focusing attention
on a critical area. However, many commenters have urged the regulators to
ensure that any practices issued balance the cost of

implementing improved business continuity capabilities against the
likelihood of various types of disruptions occurring. For example, a joint
letter from seven broker- dealers and banks stated that requiring
organizations to make costly changes to meet remote possibilities is not
practical. Other commenters urged regulators not to mandate minimum
distances between primary sites and backup locations for several reasons.
For example, some commenters noted that beyond certain distances, firms

cannot simultaneously process data at both locations, which the regulators
acknowledged could be between 60 to 100 kilometers. Rather than specify a
minimum distance, others stated that the practices should provide criteria
that firms should consider in determining where to locate their backup
facilities. One broker- dealer commented that it had chosen the locations
of its two operating sites to minimize the likelihood that both would be
affected by the same disaster or disruption. It noted that its two sites
were served by separate water treatment plants and power grids and

different telecommunication facilities support each. A third commonly
cited concern was that the regulators should implement the practices as
guidelines, rather than rules. For example, one industry association
stated, *Regulators should not impose prescriptive requirements, unless
absolutely necessary, in order to enhance the firms* ability to remain
competitive in the global market.* Ensuring that organizations recover
their clearing functions would help ensure that settlement failures do not
create a broader financial crisis, but regulators have not begun a similar
effort to develop recovery goals and business continuity practices to
ensure that trading activities can resume promptly in various financial
markets. Trading activities are important to the U. S. economy because
they facilitate many important economic functions, including providing
means to productively invest savings and allowing businesses to fund
operations. The securities markets also allow companies to raise capital
for new ventures. Ensuring that trading activities resume in a smooth and
timely manner would appear to be a regulatory goal for SEC, which is
specifically charged with maintaining fair and orderly markets. However,
Treasury and SEC staff told us that the white paper practices would be
applied to clearing functions because such activities are concentrated in
single entities for some markets or in very few organizations for others,
and thus pose a greater potential for disruption. In contrast, they did
not include trading activities or

organizations that conduct only trading functions, such as the securities
exchanges, because these activities are performed by many organizations
that could substitute for each other. For example, SEC staff said that if
one of the exchanges was unable to operate, other exchanges or the ECNs
could trade their products. Similarly, they said that individual
brokerdealers are not critical to the markets because others firms can
perform their roles.

Although regulators have begun to determine which organizations are
critical for accomplishing clearing functions, identifying the
organizations that would have to be ready for trading in U. S. financial
markets to resume within a given period of time is also important. If key
market participants are not identified and do not adopt sound business
continuity practices, the markets may not have sufficient liquidity for
fair and orderly trading. For example, in the past when NYSE experienced
operations disruptions, the regional exchanges usually have also chosen to
suspend trading until NYSE could resume. SEC staff have also previously
told us that the regional exchanges may not have sufficient processing
capacity to process the full volume usually traded on NYSE. If the primary
exchanges are not

operational, trading could be transferred to the ECNs, but regulators have
not assessed whether such organizations have sufficient capacity to
conduct such trading or whether other operational issues would hinder

such trading. SEC has begun efforts to develop a strategy for resuming
stock trading for some exchanges, but the plan is not yet complete and
does not address all exchanges and all securities. To provide some
assurance that stock trading could resume if either NYSE or NASDAQ was
unable to operate after a disaster, SEC has asked these exchanges to take
steps to ensure their information systems can conduct transactions in the
securities that the other organization normally trades. SEC staff told us
each organization will have to ensure that its systems can properly
process the varying number of characters in the symbols that each uses to
represent securities. However, as of December 2002, SEC had not identified
the specific capabilities that

the exchanges should implement. For example, NASDAQ staff said that
various alternatives are being proposed for conducting this trading and
each would involve varying amounts of system changes or processing
capacity considerations. In addition, although each exchange trades
thousands of securities, NYSE staff told us that they are proposing to
accommodate only the top 250 securities, and the remainder of NASDAQ*s
securities, which have smaller trading volumes, would have to be traded by

the ECNs or other markets. NASDAQ staff said they planned to trade all

NYSE securities if necessary. NYSE staff also said that their members have
been asked to ensure that the systems used to route orders to NYSE be
ready to accept NASDAQ securities by June 2003. Furthermore, although some
testing is under way, neither exchange has completely tested its ability
to trade the other*s securities. Strategies for other exchanges and
products also have not been developed.

As noted in chapter 2 of this report, trading was not resumed in U. S.
stock and options markets after the attacks until several key broker-
dealers were able to sufficiently recover their operations. Resuming
operations after disruptions can be challenging because large broker-
dealers* trading operations can require thousands of staff and
telecommunications lines. In some cases, organizations that may not appear
critical to the markets in

ordinary circumstances could become so if a disaster affects other
participants more severely. For example, in the days following the
attacks, one of the IDBs that previously had not been one of the most
active firms was one of the few firms able to resume trading promptly.

Program, Staff, and Lacking specific requirements under the securities
laws, SEC uses a

Resource Issues voluntary program to oversee exchange, clearing
organization, and ECN

information systems operations. U. S. securities laws, rules, and
regulations Hamper SEC Oversight

primarily seek to ensure that investors are protected. For example, of
Market Participants* securities laws require that companies issuing
securities disclose material

Operations Risks financial information, and SRO rules require broker-
dealers to determine

the suitability of products before recommending them to their customers.
The regulations did not generally contain specific requirements applicable
to physical or information system security measures or business continuity
capabilities. However, as part of its charge to ensure fair and orderly
markets and to address information system and operational problems
experienced by some markets during the 1980s, SEC created a voluntary
program* ARP* that covered information technology issues at the exchanges,
clearing organizations and, eventually, ECNs. 6 SEC*s 1989 ARP statement
called for the exchanges and clearing organizations to establish

6 Initially applied only to exchanges and clearing organizations, SEC
extended these ARP guidance expectations under a rule issued in 1998 to
any ECN that accounted for more than 20 percent of the trading volume of a
particular security; as of September 2002, SEC staff reported that 10 ECNs
were subject to all the ARP expectations. Other ECNs must comply with a
varying number of the ARP expectations, such as submitting systems change
notifications to SEC, depending on their trading volume.

comprehensive planning and assessment programs to test system capacities,
develop contingency protocols and backup facilities, periodically assess
the vulnerability of their information systems to external or internal
threats, and report the results to SEC. SEC issued an additional ARP
statement in 1991 that called for exchanges and clearing organizations to
obtain independent reviews* done by external

organizations or internal auditors* of their general controls in several
information system areas.

SEC ARP Reviews Address SEC*s ARP staff conducted examinations of
exchanges, clearing

Some Operations Risks but organizations, and ECNs that addressed their
information security and

Some Key business continuity. The examinations are based on ARP policy
statements

Recommendations Not that cover information system security, business
continuity planning, and

physical security at data and information systems centers, but do not
Addressed

address how organizations should protect their entire operations from
physical attacks. SEC*s ARP program staff explained that they analyze the
risks faced by each organization to determine which are the most important
to review. As a result, the staff is not expected to review every issue
specific to the information systems or operations of each exchange,
clearing organization, and ECN during each examination. We found that SEC
ARP staff were reviewing important operations risks at the organizations
they examined. Based on our review of the 10 most recent

ARP examinations completed between January 2001 and July 2002, 9 covered
information system security policies and procedures, and 7 examinations
covered business continuity planning. 7 Only one examination* done after
the September 11, 2001, attacks* included descriptions of the overall
physical security improvements. SEC ARP staff told us that
telecommunications resiliency was a part of normal examinations, but none
of the examination reports we reviewed specifically discussed these
organizations* business continuity measures for ensuring that their
telecommunications services would be available after disasters. However,
ARP staff said that all of these operations risk issues would be addressed
as part of future reviews. Although SEC*s voluntary ARP program provides
some assurance that

securities markets are being operated soundly, some of the organizations
subject to ARP have not taken action on some important

7 The 10 examinations covered 9 organizations reviewed once and an
organization reviewed twice during this period.

recommendations. Since its inception, ARP program staff recommendations
have prompted numerous improvements in the operations of exchanges,
clearing organizations, and ECNs. ARP staff also reviewed exchange and
clearing organization readiness for the Year 2000

date change and decimal trading, and market participants implemented both
industrywide initiatives successfully. However, because the ARP program
was not implemented under SEC*s rulemaking authority, compliance with the
ARP guidance is voluntary. Although SEC staff said that they were
satisfied with the cooperation they received from the organizations
covered by the ARP program, in some cases, organizations did not take
actions to correct significant weaknesses ARP staff identified. 8 For
example, as we reported in 2001, three organizations had not

established backup facilities, which SEC ARP staff had raised as
significant weaknesses. Our report noted, *Securities trading in the
United States could be severely limited if a terrorist attack or a natural
disaster damaged one of these exchange*s trading floor.* In addition, for
years, SEC*s ARP

staff raised concerns and made recommendations relating to inadequacies in
NASDAQ*s capacity planning efforts, and NASDAQ*s weaknesses in this area
delayed the entire industry*s transition to decimal pricing for several
months. 9 NASDAQ staff told us they have implemented systems with
sufficient capacity, and SEC staff said they are continuing to monitor the
performance of these systems. We also reported that exchanges and clearing
organizations sometimes failed to submit notifications to SEC regarding
systems changes and outages as expected under the ARP policy statement,
and we again saw this issue being cited in 2 of 10 recent ARP examination
reports we reviewed.

ARP staff continue to find significant operational weaknesses at the
organizations they oversee. In the 10 examinations we reviewed, SEC staff
found weaknesses at all 9 organizations and made 74 recommendations for
improvement. We compared these weaknesses to the operational elements we
used in our analysis of financial market organizations (as discussed in
ch. 3 of this report). 10 Our analysis showed that the ARP staff made at
least 22 recommendations to address significant weaknesses in the 9
organizations* physical or information system security or business

8 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Systems: Opportunities
Exist to Strengthen SEC*s Oversight of Capacity and Security, GAO- 01- 863
(Washington, D. C.: Jul. 25, 2001). 9 See U. S. General Accounting Office,
Securities Pricing: Trading Volumes and NASD System Limitations Led to
Decimal- Trading Delay, GGD/ AIMD- 00- 319 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 20,
2000).

continuity planning efforts* including 10 recommendations to address
significant weaknesses at organizations critical to the functioning of the
markets. For example, in an examination conducted in 2000, ARP staff found
that personnel at one exchange did not have consistent information system
security practices across the organization and lacked a centrally
administered, consolidated information system security policy. 11 In

addition, although SEC recommends that organizations subject to ARP have
vulnerability assessments performed on their information systems, ARP
staff found that this exchange had not assessed its information systems.
In three other reviews, the ARP staff found that the organizations

had not complied with ARP policy expectations to fully test their
contingency plans. ARP staff noted other significant weaknesses, including
inadequate BCPs or backup facilities. ARP staff said that they considered
all the recommendations they make to be significant, including the 74
recommendations made in these 10 reports. These recommendations will
remain open until the next time the ARP staff review the organization and
can assess whether they have been acted upon.

Because the ARP program was established through a policy statement and
compliance is voluntary, SEC lacks specific rules that it can use to gain
improved responsiveness to recommendations to the exchanges and clearing
organizations subject to APP. SEC staff explained that they chose not to
use a rule to implement ARP because rules can become obsolete and

having voluntary guidance provides them with flexibility. SEC staff also
told us that an organization*s failure to follow ARP expectations could
represent a violation of the general requirement that exchanges maintain

the ability to operate, and therefore they could take action under that
authority. However, they noted that the use of such authority is rare.
However, SEC has issued a rule requiring the most active ECNs to comply
with all the ARP program*s standards. In 1998, SEC issued a regulation
that

subjected alternative trading systems such as ECNs to increased regulatory
scrutiny because of their increasing importance to U. S. securities
markets. Included in this regulation was a rule that required ECNs whose
trading volumes exceeded certain thresholds to comply with the same
practices as

10 For our analysis, we classified the weaknesses that SEC identified as
significant when the organization had not implemented adequate procedures
or capabilities in the key elements we used to evaluate the 15
organizations included in this report, as discussed in chapter 3.

11 This exchange was not among the organizations we considered critical to
the functioning of the markets in our analysis.

those contained in the ARP policy statements. 12 In its explanation of the
regulation, SEC noted that its ARP guidelines are intended to ensure that
short- term cost cutting by registered exchanges does not jeopardize the
operation of the securities markets, and therefore it was extending these
requirements to the ECNs because of their potential to disrupt the

securities markets. We previously recommended that SEC develop formal
criteria for assessing exchange and clearing organization cooperation with
the ARP program and perform an assessment to determine whether the
voluntary status of the ARP program is appropriate. 13 Although they were
generally satisfied with the level of cooperation, SEC staff told us that
they were reviewing the extent to which exchanges and clearing
organizations complied with the ARP program and planned to submit the
analysis to SEC commissioners in 2003. In addition to possibly changing
the status of the program for the 22 exchanges and clearing organizations
subject to ARP, SEC staff also told us that they were considering the need
to extend the ARP program to those broker- dealers for whom it would be
appropriate to adopt the sound business continuity practices that will
result from the joint regulatory white

paper. SEC ARP Program Faces

Limited resources and challenges in retaining experienced ARP staff have
Resource and Staff Limitations affected SEC*s ability to oversee an
increasing number of organizations and more technically complex market
operations. Along with industrywide initiatives discussed earlier, ARP
staff workload has expanded to cover 32 organizations with more complex
technology and communications networks. However, SEC has problems
retaining qualified staff, and market participants have raised concerns
about the experience and expertise of ARP staff. As SEC has experienced
considerable staff losses overall, the ARP program also has had high
turnover. As of October 2002, ARP had 10 staff, but SEC staff told us that
staff levels had fluctuated and had been as low as 4 in some years. 14 As
a result, some ARP program staff had limited experience, with 4 of the 10
current staff having less than 3.5 years* experience, including 3 with
less than 2 years* experience. During our work

on SEC resource issues in 2001, market participants and former SEC staff
12 SEC, Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: Final
Rules, Release No. 34- 40760 (Dec. 8 1998). 13 GAO- 01- 863. 14 GAO- 01-
863.

raised concerns that the level of resources and staff expertise SEC has
committed to review technology issues is inadequate to address complex
market participant operations. 15 For example, officials from several
market participants we interviewed in 2001 told us that high turnover
resulted in

inexperienced SEC staff, who lacked in- depth knowledge, doing reviews of
their organizations. SEC staff told us that they continue to emphasize
training for their staff to ensure that they have the proper expertise to
conduct effective reviews.

Resource limitations also affect the frequency of ARP reviews. With
current staffing levels, SEC staff said that they are able to conduct
examinations of only about 7 of the 32 organizations they oversee as part
of the ARP program each year. 16 Although standards for federal
organizations* information systems require security reviews to be
performed at least once every 3 years, these standards recommend that
reviews of high- risk

systems or those undergoing significant systems modifications be done more
frequently. 17 Although our analysis of SEC ARP examination data found
that SEC had conducted recent reviews of almost all the organizations we
considered critical to the financial markets, long periods of time often
elapsed between ARP examinations of these organizations. 18 Between
September 1999 and September 2002, SEC examined 6 of the 7

critical organizations under its purview. 19 However, as shown in figure
12, the intervals between the most recent examinations exceeded 3 years
for 5

15 U. S. General Accounting Office, SEC Operations: Increased Workload
Creates Challenges, GAO- 02- 302 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 5, 2002). 16 In
addition to examinations, the SEC ARP staff also monitor the organizations
subject to ARP by conducting a risk analysis of each organization each
year, reviewing internal and external audits performed of these
organizations* systems, and receiving notices of systems changes and
systems outages from these organizations.

17 Office of Management and Budget, Appendix III to OMB Circular A- 130:
Security of Federal Automated Information Resources.

18 Of the 7 organizations that we considered critical to the overall
functioning of the markets for purposes of chapter 3, 5 are subject to the
ARP program. Because of the way they are organized, these 5 organizations
actually are 7 distinct entities that the SEC ARP staff reviews
separately. SEC staff agreed that these organizations were important to
the markets.

19 SEC ARP staff told us that they had not reviewed one organization since
1994 because its operations, although critical to the markets, had not
presented issues that warranted a highrisk desigation. However, they said
they planned to conduct a review of this organization within the next 6
months.

of the 7 critical organizations, including an organization that was not
reviewed during this period.

Figure 12: Intervals between Most Recent SEC ARP Examinations of Critical
Exchanges and Clearing Organizations Our analysis of ARP report data
showed that the intervals between reviews of critical organizations
averaged 39 months, with the shortest interval being 12 months and the
longest 72 months. Since September 1999, the SEC ARP staff had reviewed 7
of the 8 less critical exchanges, clearing organizations, and ECNs that we
visited during this review. However, SEC

staff told us that the ARP program also may be tasked with reviewing the
extent to which broker- dealers important to clearing and trading in U. S.

securities markets are adhering to sound business continuity practices.
Such an expansion in the ARP program staff*s workload would likely further
reduce the ability of the SEC staff to frequently review all the important
organizations under its authority. Increased Appropriations Could

The potential increase in SEC*s appropriations could provide the agency an
Provide SEC an Opportunity to

opportunity to increase the level and quality of the resources it has
Improve ARP Program

committed to the ARP program. The Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002, which
Resources

mandated various accounting reforms, also authorized increased
appropriations for SEC for fiscal year 2003. 20 Specifically, the act
authorized $776 million in 2003, an increase of about 51 percent over the
nearly $514 million SEC received for fiscal year 2002. 21 The act directs
SEC

to devote $103 million of the newly authorized amount to personnel and
$108 million to information technology. If appropriated, these additional
funds could allow SEC to increase resources devoted to the ARP program.
Increased staffing levels also could allow SEC to conduct more frequent

examinations and better ensure that significant weaknesses are identified
and addressed in a timely manner. The additional resources could also be
used to increase the technical expertise of its staff, further enhancing
SEC*s

ability to review complex information technology issues. SEC and SROs
Generally

SEC and the securities market SROs generally have not examined
brokerdealers* Did Not Review Physical

physical and information system security and business continuity and
Information System

efforts, but planned to increase their focus on these issues in the
future. Security and Business

SEC*s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) examines
broker- dealers, mutual funds, and other securities market Continuity at
BrokerDealers participants. 22 However, for the most part, OCIE
examinations focus on broker- dealers* compliance with the securities laws
and not on physical

and electronic security and business continuity, which these laws do not
generally address. After some broker- dealers that specialized in on- line
trading experienced systems outages, OCIE staff told us that they began
addressing information system capacity, security, and contingency
capabilities at these firms. SEC predicated its reviews of these issues on

20 Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107- 204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002). 21 This $514 million includes an original appropriation of $438
million, a $21 million supplemental appropriation for September 11-
related disaster recovery, $25 million to implement pay parity, and over
$30 million in additional supplemental appropriations.

22 SEC also oversees investment advisers and transfer agents.

the fact that these firms, as a condition of conducting a securities
business, would need to have sufficient operational capacity to enter,
execute, and settle orders, and deliver funds and securities promptly and
accurately. In addition, the Gramm- Leach- Bliley Act (GLBA) required SEC
to establish

standards for the entities it oversees to safeguard the privacy and
integrity of customer information and prevent unauthorized disclosure. 23
As a result, in some reviews done since July 2001, OCIE staff discussed
the controls and policies that firms have implemented to protect customer
information from unauthorized access. However, SEC OCIE staff acknowledged
that

their expertise in these areas is limited. OCIE staff told us that few of
the approximately 600 examiners they employ had information technology
backgrounds. During the work we conducted for our report on SEC*s staffing
and workload, staff at several broker- dealers told us that the SEC staff
that review their firms lacked adequate technology expertise. 24

SROs also generally have not addressed these issues at broker- dealers.
Under U. S. securities laws, exchanges acting as SROs have direct
responsibility for overseeing their broker- dealer members. NYSE and NASD
together oversee the majority of broker- dealers in the United States. 25
According to officials at these two SROs, staff as often as annually
conduct examinations to review adherence with capital requirements and

other securities regulations. However, staff at both organizations
acknowledged that, in the past, their oversight generally did not focus on
how members conducted their operations from physical or information

systems security or business continuity perspectives. Representatives of
the SROs told us they plan to include aspects of these issues in future
reviews. For example, they plan to examine their members* information
system security to ensure compliance with GLBA customer information
protection provisions.

NYSE and NASD plan to focus on business continuity issues in future
reviews because, in August 2002, both submitted similar rules for SEC
approval that will require all of their members to establish BCPs. The
areas the plans are to address include the following:

23 15 U. S. C. S:S: 6801, 6805. 24 GAO- 02- 302. 25 The other stock and
options exchanges and clearing organizations also have selfregulatory
responsibilities over their members, but generally are only directly
responsible for examining those members not already overseen by another
SRO.

 backup for books and records,  procedures for resuming operations of
critical systems,  alternate means for communicating with the members*
staff and their

customers, and  regulatory reporting and communications with regulators.
NYSE and NASD officials told us that once these rules were adopted, their
staff would include these matters in the scope of their examinations after
allowing sufficient time for firms to develop the required BCPs.

Bank Regulators Have As part of their mandate to oversee banks* safety and
soundness, the

Authority to Oversee banking regulators, including the Federal Reserve and
OCC, issued

guidance that directs depository institutions or banks to address
potential Operational Risk

operations risks with physical and information system security and
business continuity measures. The guidance includes recommended steps that
banks should take to reduce the risk of operations disruptions from
physical or electronic attacks and for recovering from such events with
business continuity capabilities. For example, in 1996 these regulators
jointly issued a handbook on information systems, which calls for banks to
conduct an analysis of their risks and implement measures to reduce them.
26 Banks were also to have access controls for their systems and programs.
Regarding physical security, the banking regulators expect banks to ensure
the safety of assets and to physically protect data centers used for
information systems processing. For example, the Federal Reserve*s
guidance directs banks to take security steps to protect cash and vaults
and ensure that bank facilities are protected from theft. The banking
regulators* joint 1996 handbook discussed measures to secure data centers
and information system assets. However, the bank regulators* guidance did
not specifically address measures to protect facilities from terrorist or
other physical attacks. Regarding business continuity, the joint handbook
expects banks to have plans addressing all critical services and
operations necessary to minimize disruptions in service and financial
losses and ensure timely resumption of operations in a disaster. Banks
also were to identify the critical components of their telecommunications
networks and

26 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Information Systems
Examination Handbook, Vol. 1 (Washington, D. C.: 1996).

assess whether they were subject to single points of failure that could
occur, for example, by having all lines routed to a single central
switching office, and to identify alternate routes and implement
redundancy.

The Federal Reserve and OCC, in conjunction with the other depository
regulators, are also developing expanded guidance on physical and
electronic security and business continuity planning. They are planning to
issue separate handbooks on information system security and business
continuity in early 2003. Bank regulatory staff provided us with a draft
of the information system security guidance, which expects banks to have
programs that include security policies, access controls, and intrusion

monitoring; vulnerability assessments; and incident response capabilities.
The draft guidance also covers physical security from an overall facility
perspective and suggests that banks use appropriate controls to restrict
or prevent unauthorized access and prevent damage from environmental

contaminants. Banks will also be instructed to assess their exposure risks
for fire and water damage, explosives, or other threats arising from
location, building configuration, or neighboring entities. According to
bank regulatory staff, they are also currently drafting a separate
guidance

handbook addressing business continuity issues. Bank Regulators Reported

Bank regulators reported regularly examining how banks are addressing
Reviewing Operations Risks

physical and information system security and business continuity issues.
but Not Banks* Measures

The Federal Reserve and OCC oversee over 3, 100 institutions combined,
Against Physical Attacks

including the largest U. S. banks, and are required to examine most
institutions annually. At the end of fiscal year 2002, the Federal Reserve
had over 1,200 examiners and OCC over 1, 700. As part of these staff, the
agencies each had between 70 and 110 examiners that specialized in
reviewing information systems issues. Using a risk- based approach, these

regulators* examiners tailor their examinations to the institution*s
unique risk profile. As a result, some areas would receive attention every
year, but others would be examined only periodically. Staff at the Federal
Reserve and OCC told us that their examiners consider how their
institutions are managing operations risks and review these when
appropriate. For example, Federal Reserve staff told us that under their
risk- based examination approach, information security is considered as
part of each

examination, particularly since regulations implementing section 501( b)
of GLBA require that the regulators assess how financial institutions
protect customer information. They said that the extent to which
information security is reviewed at each institution can vary, with less
detailed reviews generally done at institutions not heavily reliant on
information technology.

They also said that business recovery issues were addressed in most
examinations. Both Federal Reserve and OCC staff told us that physical
security was considered as part of information security in reviewing
protections at data centers. Both regulators also expect banks* internal
auditors to review physical security for vault and facilities protection.
However, the focus of these reviews has not generally been on the extent
to which banks are protected from terrorist or other physical attacks. In
light of the September 2001 attacks, these regulators stated that their
scrutiny of physical and information system security and business
continuity policies and procedures would be reviewed even more extensively
in future examinations. Because we did not review bank examinations as
part of our review, we were unable to independently determine how often
and how extensively these two bank regulatory agencies reviewed
information security and business continuity at the entities they oversee.

Conclusions Financial market regulators have begun to develop goals and a
strategy for resuming operations along with sound business continuity
practices for a

limited number of organizations that conduct clearing functions. The
business continuity practices that result from this effort will likely
address several important areas, including geographic separation between
primary and backup locations and the need to ensure that organizations
have provisions for separate staff and telecommunications services needed
to conduct critical operations at backup locations. If successfully
implemented, these sound practices should better ensure that clearing in
critical U. S. financial markets could resume and settlement would be
completed after a disaster, potentially avoiding a harmful systemic
crisis. However, trading on the markets for corporate securities,
government

securities, and money market instruments is also vitally important to the
economy, and the United States deserves similar assurance that trading
activities would also be able to resume when appropriate and without

excessive delay. The U. S. economy has demonstrated that it can withstand
short periods during which markets are not trading. After some events
occur, having markets closed for some time could be appropriate to allow
for disaster recovery and reduce market overreaction. However, long delays
in reopening the markets could also be harmful to the economy. Without
trading, investors lack the ability to accurately value their

securities and would be unable to adjust their holdings. The attacks
demonstrated that the ability of markets to recover could depend on the
extent to which market participants have made sound investments in
business continuity capabilities. Without identifying strategies for
recovery,

determining the sound practices needed to implement these strategies, and
identifying the organizations that would conduct trading under these
strategies, the risk that markets may not be able to resume trading in a
fair and orderly fashion and without excessive delays is increased. Goals
and strategies for recovering trading activities could be based on likely
disaster scenarios that identify the organizations that could be used to
conduct trading in the event that other organizations were unable to
recover within a reasonable time. These would provide market participants
with information to make better decisions about how to improve their

operations and provide regulators with sound criteria for ensuring that
trading on U. S. markets could resume when appropriate.

Strategies for resuming trading could involve identifying which markets
would assume the trading activities of others or identifying other venues
such as ECNs in which trading could occur. To be viable, these strategies
would also have to identify whether any operational changes at these

organizations would be necessary to allow this trading to occur. Although
SEC has begun efforts to ensure that trading can be transferred between
NYSE and NASDAQ, these efforts are not complete and not all securities are
covered. Because of the risk of operational difficulties resulting from
large- scale transfers of securities trading to organizations that
normally do not conduct such activities, testing the various scenarios
would likely reduce such problems and ensure that the envisioned
strategies are viable.

Expanding the organizations that would be required to implement sound
business continuity practices beyond those important for clearing would
better ensure that those organizations needed for the resumption of smooth
and timely trading would have developed the necessary business continuity
capabilities. As discussed in chapter 3, exchanges, clearing
organizations, and ECNs we reviewed had taken many steps to reduce the
risks that they would be disrupted by physical or electronic attacks and
have mitigated risk through business continuity planning. However, some
organizations still had limitations in their business continuity measures
that increased the risk that their operations would be disrupted,
including organizations that might need to trade if the major exchanges
were unable to resume operations. In addition, the attacks demonstrated
that organizations that were not previously considered critical to the
markets* functioning could greatly increase in importance following a
disaster.

Therefore, identifying all potential organizations that could become
important to resuming trading and ensuring they implement sound business
practices would increase the likelihood of U. S financial markets being
able to recover from future disasters. Given that the importance of

different organizations to the overall markets varies, any recovery goals
and business continuity practices that are developed could similarly vary
their expectations for different market participants but with the ultimate
goal of better ensuring that organizations take reasonable, prudent steps
in advance of any future disasters. For example, broker- dealers could be
expected to take steps to ensure that their customer records are backed up

frequently and that these backup records are maintained at considerable
distance from the firms* primary sites. This would allow customers to
transfer their accounts to other broker- dealers if the firm through which
they usually conduct trading is not operational after a major disaster.

Given the increased threats demonstrated by the September 11 attacks and
the need to ensure that key financial market organizations are following
sound practices, securities and banking regulators* oversight programs are
important mechanisms for ensuring that U. S financial markets are
resilient. However, SEC*s ARP program* which oversees the key clearing
organizations and exchanges and may be used to oversee additional
organizations* adherence to the white paper on sound practices* currently
faces several limitations. Because it is a voluntary program, SEC lacks
leverage to assure that market participants implement important
recommended improvements. An ARP program that draws its authority from an
issued rule could provide SEC additional assurance that exchanges and
clearing organizations adhere to important ARP recommendations and any new
guidance developed jointly with other regulators. To preserve the
flexibility that SEC staff see as a strength of the current ARP program,
the rule would not have to mandate specific actions but could instead
require that the exchanges and clearing organizations engage in activities
consistent with the practices and tenets of the ARP policy statements.
This would provide SEC staff with the ability to adjust their expectations
for the organizations subject to ARP as technology and industry best
practices evolve while providing clear regulatory authority to require
prudent actions when necessary. SEC already requires ECNs to comply with
ARP guidance; extending the rule to the exchanges and clearing
organizations would place

them on similar legal footing. Additional staff, including those with
technology backgrounds, could better ensure the effectiveness of the ARP
program*s oversight. SEC could conduct more frequent examinations, as
envisioned by federal information

technology standards, and more effectively review complex, large- scale
technology operations in place at the exchanges, ECNs, and clearing
organizations. If the ARP program must also begin reviewing the extent to
which broker- dealers important to clearing and trading in U. S.
securities

markets are adhering to sound business continuity practices, additional
staff resources would likely be necessary to prevent further erosion in
the ability of the SEC staff to oversee all the important organizations
under its authority. The increased appropriations authorized in the
Sarbanes- Oxley Act, if received, would present SEC a clear opportunity to
enhance its

technological resources, including the ARP program, without affecting
other important initiatives.

Recommendations So that trading in U. S. financial markets can resume
after future disruptions in as timely a manner as appropriate, we
recommend that the

Chairman, SEC, work with industry to  develop goals and strategies to
resume trading in securities;  determine sound business continuity
practices that organizations would

need to implement to meet these goals;  identify the organizations,
including broker- dealers, that would likely

need to operate for the markets to resume trading and ensure that these
entities implement sound business continuity practices that at a minimum
allow investors to readily access their cash and securities; and

 test trading resumption strategies to better assure their success. In
addition, to improve the effectiveness of the SEC*s ARP program and the
preparedness of securities trading and clearing organizations for future
disasters, we recommend that the Chairman, SEC, take the following
actions:

 Issue a rule requiring that the exchanges and clearing organizations
engage in activities consistent with the operational practices and other
tenets of the ARP program; and

 If sufficient funding is available, expand the level of staffing and
resources committed to the ARP program.

Agency Comments and We requested comments on a draft of this report from
the heads, or their

Our Evaluation designees, of the Federal Reserve, OCC, Treasury, and SEC.
The Federal Reserve and SEC provided written comments, which appear in
appendixes

III and IV, respectively. The Federal Reserve, OCC, and SEC also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

SEC generally agreed with the report and the goals of its recommendations.
The letter from SEC*s Market Regulation Division Director noted that SEC
has been working with market participants to strengthen their resiliency
and that the SEC staff agreed that the financial markets should be
prepared to resume trading in a timely, fair, and orderly fashion
following a catastrophe, which is the goal of our recommendations that SEC
work with the industry to develop business continuity goals, strategies,
and practices. SEC*s letter expressed a concern that this recommendation
expects SEC to ensure that broker- dealers implement business continuity
practices that would allow trading activities to resume after a disaster.
The SEC staff noted that broker- dealers are not required to conduct
trading or provide liquidity to markets. Instead this would be a business
decision on the part of these firms. However, SEC*s letter noted that
broker- dealers are required to be able to ensure that any completed
trades are cleared and settled and that customers have access to the funds
and securities in their accounts as soon as is physically possible. SEC*s
letter stated that the BCP expectations for these firms must reflect these
considerations. We agree with SEC that the business continuity practices
they develop with

broker- dealers should reflect that the extent to which these firms* BCPs
address trading activities is a business decision on the part of a firm*s
management. In addition, SEC would need to take into account the

business continuity capabilities implemented by broker- dealers that
normally provide significant order flow and liquidity to the markets when
it works with the exchanges and other market participants to develop goals
and strategies for recovering from various disaster scenarios. To the
extent that many of these major broker- dealers may be unable to conduct
their normal volume trading in the event of some potential disasters
without extended delays, the intent of our recommendation is that SEC
develop strategies that would allow U. S. securities markets to resume
trading, when

appropriate, through other broker- dealers such as regional firms that are
less affected by the disaster. However, to ensure that such trading is
orderly and fair to all investors, SEC will have to ensure that broker-
dealers* business continuity measures at a minimum are adequate to allow
prompt transfers of customer funds and securities to other firms so that
the customers of firms unable to resume trading are not disadvantaged.
Regarding our recommendations to ensure that SEC*s ARP program has

sufficient legal authority and resources to be an effective oversight

mechanism over exchanges, clearing organizations, and ECNs, SEC*s Market
Regulation Division Director stated that they will continue to assess
whether rulemaking is appropriate. In addition, the letter stated that, if
the agency receives additional funding, they will consider recommending to
the Chairman that ARP staffing and resources be increased.

SEC*s letter also commented that physical security beyond the protection
of information technology resources was not envisioned as a component of
ARP when the program was initiated. They indicated that they may need
additional resources and expertise to broaden their examinations to
include more on this issue.

In the letter from the Federal Reserve*s Staff Director for Management, he
noted that the Federal Reserve is working to improve the resilience of the
financial system by cooperating with banking and securities regulators to
develop sound practices to reduce the system effects of wide- scale

disruptions. They are also working with the other banking regulators to
expand the guidance for banks on information security and business
continuity.

Appendi xes Telecommunications Providers and Others Cooperated to Overcome
Damage to

Appendi x I

Telecommunications Infrastructure The September 11 attacks caused
extensive damage to telecommunications infrastructure and resulted in loss
of telecommunications services to financial market participants in lower
Manhattan. During the days that followed, the affected telecommunications
carriers worked together with financial market participants and local
government officials to overcome numerous challenges to restore key
services and reestablish the connectivity needed to reopen the nation*s
equity markets on September

17, 2001. The Terrorist Attacks

The September 11 terrorist attacks extensively damaged the Extensively
Damaged

telecommunications infrastructure serving lower Manhattan, disrupting
voice and data communications services throughout the area. The bulk of
Local

this damage occurred when 7 World Trade Center collapsed into an
Telecommunications

adjacent building* a major Verizon telecommunications center at 140 West
Infrastructure Street. Because the Verizon central office was the major
local communications hub within the public network, the collateral damage
to that facility significantly disrupted local telecommunications services
to approximately 34,000 businesses and residences in the surrounding area,

including the financial district. 1 Significant numbers of customers lost
their telecommunications services for extended periods. When the Verizon
central office was damaged, about 182,000 voice circuits, more than 1.6
million data circuits, almost 112,000 PBX trunks, and more than 11, 000
lines serving Internet service providers were lost. 2 This central office
served a large part of lower Manhattan. (The area served by this facility
is shown in fig. 8 in ch. 2.)

The attacks also damaged other Verizon facilities and affected customers
in areas beyond that served directly from 140 West Street. Three other
Verizon switches in the World Trade Center towers and in 7 World Trade
Center were also destroyed in the attacks. Additional services were
disrupted

1 A central office is a telephone company facility containing the
switching equipment that links served customers to the public voice and
data networks within and outside of the local service area.

2 A PBX (private branch exchange) is an automatic telephone switching
system that is owned, operated, and located within a private enterprise.
This system switches calls between enterprise users on local lines while
allowing all users to share a certain number of external telephone lines.
A PBX trunk line connects the PBX to the serving telecommunications
carrier*s local central office switch.

because 140 West Street also served as a transfer station on the Verizon
network for about 2.7 million circuits carrying data traffic that did not
originate or terminate in that serving area, but that nevertheless passed
through that physical location. For example, communications services
provided out of the Verizon Broad Street central office that passed
through West Street were also disrupted until new cabling could be put in
placed to physically carry those circuits around the damaged facility. As
a result, Verizon had to restore services provided by about 4.4 million
Verizon data circuits in total.

The attacks also damaged the facilities and equipment of other carriers as
well. In the 140 West Street facilities, 30 other telecommunications
providers had equipment linking their networks to the Verizon network.
Allegiance Telecom, Covad Communications, Metromedia Fiber Network,
PaeTec, XO Communications, and Winstar Communications noted the
interdependence of network services and that the cascading effect of the
Verizon network disruptions affected tens of thousands of their customers
according to outage reports filed with the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC). Other local carriers also sustained losses to their own
network facilities. For example, AT& T Local Network Service lost use of
two major network nodes in the World Trade Center complex, as well as two
switches in damaged buildings. Service provided by two other switches were
disrupted when the switches lost power. AT& T also lost use of the fiber-
optic cable that provided its own local service to lower Manhattan.
Overall, AT& T lost equipment and circuits including 200 miles of fiber-
optic cable, more than 33 thousand network trunks, and about 20, 000 other
telecommunications lines that each carried the equivalent of 24 voice
communication channels. 3 Focal Communications reported to FCC that
customers served by its switch in lower Manhattan lost service at

about 11: 00 p. m. on September 11, 2001, when commercial power to that
switch was lost, and backup power supplies (generator, then battery) were
eventually exhausted before Focal Communications technicians could gain
access to their facilities in order to restore power.

After September 11, some financial firms whose physical facilities were
not damaged learned that telecommunications services still could fail
because their supporting services were not as diverse and redundant as
expected. Diversity involves establishing different physical routes into
and out of a

3 A trunk is a telecommunications line that carries multiple voice or data
channels between two telephone exchange switching systems.

building, and using different equipment along those routes to prevent
failures if a disaster or other form of interference adversely affects one
route. Redundancy involves having extra capacity available, generally from
more than one source, and also incorporates aspects of diversity.
Therefore, users that rely on telecommunications services to support

important applications try to ensure that those services use facilities
that are diverse and redundant so that no single point in the
communications path can cause all services to fail. After the attacks,
some firms that made arrangements with multiple service

providers to obtain redundant service discovered that the lines used by
their providers were not diverse because they routed through the same
Verizon switching facility. Other firms that had mapped out their
communications lines to ensure that their lines flowed through physically
diverse paths at the time those services were first acquired found that
their service providers had rerouted some of those lines over time without
their knowledge, eliminating that assurance of diversity in the process.
Representatives of several banks and broker- dealers with major New York
operations told us that they suffered disruptions to their

telecommunications service despite their belief that they were being
served by diverse carriers, diverse facilities, or both.

Ensuring that carriers actually maintain physically redundant and diverse
telecommunications services has been a long- standing concern within the
financial industry. For example, in December 1997, the President*s
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee reported, *despite
assurances about diverse networks from the carriers, a consistent concern
among the financial services industry was the trustworthiness of their
telecommunications diversity arrangements.* 4 Obtaining physically diverse
telecommunications services and ensuring that diversity is maintained over
time is difficult. First, some customers

incorrectly assume that simply obtaining service from multiple carriers
ensures that they are receiving redundant and diverse services. However, a
competing local carrier may choose to lease or resell the *last mile*
circuits into a customer location from the incumbent local exchange
carrier rather

4 The President*s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee,
Financial Services Risk Assessment Report, December 1997.

than incur the cost to construct its own facilities into a building. 5 In
New York City for example, providing facilities in a given building and
constructing lines from network facilities running through an adjacent
street can typically cost a carrier about $150, 000. This total does not
include the time and cost associated with obtaining a building owner*s
permission to locate facilities on premise. Also, where multiple carriers
have a network presence in a given property, different carrier circuits
could possibly share the same rights- of- way and conduits to enter and
exit a building. Moreover, as was learned in the aftermath of September
11, assurances regarding diversity also could lose validity as
telecommunications carriers merge or change the paths of circuits over
time.

Telecommunications Telecommunications carriers and government entities
collaborated to

Carriers and restore telecommunications after the attacks. Before work
could begin to restore the connections supporting the financial markets,

Government Agencies telecommunications providers first had to ensure that
government

Worked Together to services, including public safety, and health care
providers had service.

Overcome Challenges Restoring service to all affected organizations
required

telecommunications providers to overcome significant challenges, including
obtaining access to the affected area and working under hazardous
conditions. Telecommunications

Although regulators and market participants were anxious to reopen the
Carriers Gave First Priority

financial markets, the immediate priority for telecommunications carriers
to Government and Health

in the aftermath of the attacks was to restore service to the government
Care Services

and health care sectors in New York City. As required by federal emergency
response protocols, telecommunications carriers* first priority was to
ensure that critical services to city, state, and federal government
entities were restored, in particular circuits that had been designated as
Telecommunications Service Priority circuits because they supported
communications relating to national security and emergency preparedness.
Carriers provided new or rerouted communications lines to support public
safety and other emergency services personnel in the affected area,

5 The specific physical segment that connects each residential or business
customer to the initial telephone company central office is referred to as
the *local loop* or *last mile* in that path.

including any health care providers or emergency services organizations
that lost service.

To begin work necessary to resume financial market operations,
telecommunications carriers then had to obtain generators and use
emergency power to support network operations and to coordinate with
financial institutions to facilitate the resumption of stock exchange
activities by September 17, 2001. For example, Verizon managers met with
representatives of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), major brokerage
houses, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the New York
Federal Reserve to plot that restoration effort. They also had to start
the

extensive switching, cabling, and network electronics restoration
activities, conduct broader customer outreach, and, where possible,
provide alternative telecommunications services in the affected area.

Telecommunications Telecommunications carriers faced two overall
challenges in restoring

Companies Overcame connectivity to financial market customers. First,
access to lower

Numerous Restoration Manhattan was restricted, with evacuation zones
established on September

Challenges 11 and in place for several weeks because of immediate rescue
and

recovery efforts at the attack site as well as continuing safety and
security concerns within the area. Therefore, telecommunications carriers
had to coordinate work crew access to the area for restoration activities.

WorldCom managers reported to us that the greatest difficulty they
encountered during the first few days of the crisis was being unable to
determine who was in charge of area access control points and who could

approve movement of needed materials. Obtaining complete clearance through
the various local, state, and federal officials, including the National
Guard, took WorldCom about 2 days. According to Verizon managers, gaining
access to the area required their most senior executives to request
resolution from the Mayor*s Office.

Safety and environmental issues also impeded initial restoration efforts.
Specifically, according to Verizon managers, their efforts to assess
damage and begin repairs on the 140 West Street facilities were initially
delayed by

concerns over the structural integrity of the facility and other buildings
nearby. Furthermore, in the immediate aftermath of the attacks,
firefighters used the Verizon facility to extinguish fires still burning
in the area and contributed to the flooding of the facility*s cable
vaults. The loss of electrical power in that area also hampered initial
restoration efforts. In

addition, Verizon*s efforts were delayed because they had to install a new
air- pressure system after the existing system was damaged. Verizon needed

this system to protect underground circuits in that area from water that
could enter cabling. The time line in figure 13 illustrates major
challenges during restoration efforts at 140 West Street. Figure 13:
Verizon Overcame Major Challenges During 140 West Street Restoration

Efforts

Restoring services from the 140 West Street facility required considerable
effort under difficult conditions. Verizon technicians were unable to
access telecommunications manholes at 140 West Street until 30- foot- high
piles of debris were removed. Because of the debris and extensive damage
within the building, Verizon staff temporarily ran cables over the ground
and around damaged cabling to quickly restore services. Because of damage
to the cable vault, a new cable vault was reconstructed on the first
floor, and cables were run up the side of the building to the fifth and
eighth floors. (See fig. 9 in ch. 2.)

AT& T*s restoration effort focused on replacing telecommunications
services that were routed through its central office in the World Trade
Center complex, which collapsed on September 11. AT& T supported and
cooperated with Federal Emergency Management Agency and local authorities
to establish emergency communications to the affected areas and with
financial institutions to facilitate resumption of NYSE operations. AT& T
established a temporary mobile central office by deploying tractortrailers

with necessary equipment to northern New Jersey. AT& T used

telecommunications lines in the tunnels to New Jersey to link service in
Manhattan to that temporary facility. City Officials Helped

New York City agencies played a key role in the restoration process,
Coordinate Carrier

collaborating with carriers, assisting in prioritizing service recovery
Restoration Efforts

requirements, and coordinating restoration efforts among carriers. To
coordinate these efforts, the New York City Department of Information
Technology and Telecommunications (DOITT) invoked the City*s Mutual Aid
and Restoration Consortium (MARC) agreement. MARC required
telecommunications franchisees in New York City to assist in the delivery
of alternative voice and data services to essential city government
offices and operations in an emergency. DOITT coordinated a series of
bridge

conference calls that included approximately 20 telecommunications service
providers and facilitated communication and coordination of restoration
efforts. These twice- daily calls allowed city officials to help set
telecommunications restoration priorities and also gave carriers an
opportunity to share information and offer assistance. Although not a
party

to the MARC agreement, wireless communications carriers and staff from the
federal National Communications System (NCS), which is responsible for
administering federal national security and emergency preparedness
telecommunications programs, also participated in these calls. 6

6 NCS, which includes representatives from 22 federal departments and
agencies, is responsible for ensuring the availability of
telecommunications infrastructure for entities with national security and
emergency preparedness responsibilities. Formed in 1962 following the
communications difficulties during the Cuban Missile Crisis, NCS provides
emergency communications for the federal government during all emergencies
and international crises.

Regulator and Market Participants Are Working to Improve Crisis Response
and

Appendi x II

Telecommunications Resiliency Financial regulators and market participants
have begun efforts to ensure that they are better able to respond to
future crises. The financial sector is one of the key sectors being
addressed by organizations responsible for ensuring that the nation*s
critical infrastructure is protected. In response to some of the problems
that occurred after September 11, government and industry are working
together to develop plans or put systems into place

for accessing affected areas and to improve communication and information
flow during crises. In response to difficulties that market participants
experienced in the aftermath of the attacks, regulators and market
participants are working to ensure that financial market

organizations receive appropriate priority for telecommunications
restoration and transmission. Market participants and telecommunications
providers are also working to facilitate access by critical personnel to
affected sites and to improve the resiliency of the telecommunications
networks serving financial markets.

New Organizations Will New organizations have been formed to further
address critical

Increase the Extent to infrastructure in the financial sector. In 1998, a
Presidential Decision

Directive described a strategy for cooperative efforts by government and
Which Critical

the private sector to protect critical, computer- dependent operations in
key Infrastructure

sectors of the U. S. economy, including banking and finance. The directive
Protection Efforts

designated the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) as the lead agency
for the banking and financial sector. Treasury was to work with the
privatesector Address the Financial

and government organizations to develop a plan to assess infrastructure
vulnerabilities and develop mitigation strategies for each of Sector

the identified vulnerabilities. 1 Treasury has taken various actions,
including establishing a committee to develop national strategy for the
sector and creating a Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis
Center in 1999 to share information about threats and incidents and
provide access to subject matter expertise and other relevant information.
Recently, additional organizations have been created to address threats to

the critical assets of the U. S. financial sector. In October 2001, the
President*s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board has formed the
Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee (FBIIC), which
includes the financial regulators responsible for securities, futures,

1 The other sectors included the nation*s water supply, transportation,
emergency and law enforcement services, public health services, electric
power, and oil and gas production and storage.

banking, insurance, and government- sponsored enterprises, to assist the
Board in ensuring that critical infrastructure in the financial markets is
addressed. FBIIC acts as the lead coordinating organization between the
financial services industry and the federal entities leading the effort to
protect the critical infrastructure and key assets of the financial
services industry. Another new organization consisting of private- sector
organizations, the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council for
Critical Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security, has also been
created to coordinate sectorwide activities to improve critical
infrastructure protection and homeland security. Its members include
representatives from the Securities Industry, Bond Market, and American
Bankers Associations, and individual market participants, including the
stock exchanges, clearing organizations, broker- dealers, and banks. The
status of efforts that address critical infrastructure protection in the
financial sector are discussed more fully in our January 2003 report. 2
Regulators and Market

In response to some of the problems that occurred in the aftermath of
Participants Are Acting September 11, government and industry are working
together to develop plans or put systems into place for accessing affected
areas and improve to Improve Crisis

communication and information flow during crises. As we described in
Response

chapter 2, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, resulted in access
restrictions over a large area of lower Manhattan. Initially only
emergency personnel, law enforcement officials, and other first responders
could

enter the area. Staff at some market participants experienced difficulties
in obtaining access to their facilities. For example, staff at one
electronic communication network (ECN) said they could not access their
offices because the authorities responsible for controlling access to the
area had not heard of their organization. Representatives of some of the
firms with whom we met that had offices in the affected area told us that
obtaining

access was sometimes difficult because different entities, such as the
local police or the National Guard, were responsible for controlling
access points during the week. Moreover, these entities did not
necessarily have identical lists showing which personnel were authorized
to enter the area. In addition, the process for gaining authorized access
to the area was unclear. In some cases, financial market organization
staff told us they relied on personal contacts with governmental officials
or the New York Police Department to gain access to their facilities.

2 U. S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Efforts of Financial Services Sector to Address Cyber Threats, GAO- 03-
173 (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 30, 2003).

To avoid or mitigate future access difficulties, New York City*s Office of
Emergency Management, the Mayor*s Office, and private- sector
organizations were developing a more structured process to control access
to the city during crises. These organizations are working on a project
started by the Business Network of Emergency Resources (BNET). BNET is a
nonprofit organization based in Buffalo, New York, that has developed
emergency management plans for businesses throughout New York State to
address snowstorms and other emergencies. The members of BNET developed
the Corporate Emergency Access System, which will assist local businesses
in entering restricted areas during emergencies. Under this system,
organizations are to designate essential employees that should have access
to their companies' facilities during emergencies if necessary. BNET will
issue photo identification cards to employees deemed essential

by participating organizations. This initiative is awaiting approval from
the New York City Mayor*s Office.

As a result of some inconsistencies in information dissemination to market
participants in the aftermath of the attacks, financial regulators and
some market participants have several efforts under way to improve
communications during crises. Following the September terrorist attacks,
some financial market participants were unsure of who was in charge and
how the decision- making process would work to reopen the markets in an

appropriate manner. For example one firm reported that it was not
initially made aware of or was unable to participate in specific
conference calls that were coordinated by federal regulators, calls in
which decisions were made

on when the markets would reopen. A few firms also reported learning of
decisions via reports televised on CNN.

Since the attacks, market participants have created new mechanisms for
communicating during crises. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
staff noted that having all interested organizations participating in all
key conference calls in which decisions are being made is not possible.
SEC staff told us that they believed that as many of the important market
participants that could be accommodated did participate in the key calls
and major meetings. SEC staff noted that new ways to ensure adequate
information dissemination have been created. For example, in future
events, the Security Industry Association*s (SIA) newly established
command center could facilitate communications between regulators and
market participants. This command center can serve as a central point for
communicating the status of participants and the markets, assist in
coordinating industry response activities, and provide for liaison to and
among city, state, and federal bodies before, during, and after a
disaster.

SIA officials told us this command center has already been successfully
used to coordinate information during a recent power outage in New York
City*s financial district. Numerous Initiatives

Financial regulators, market participants, and telecommunications Are
Under Way to

providers also have efforts under way to improve access to and the
resiliency of telecommunications services used by the markets. Financial
Strengthen the regulators are expanding outreach to financial market
participants to enroll

Resiliency of Local them in programs designed to provide priority
telecommunications

Telecommunications restoration and service during crises.
Telecommunications carriers also are

increasing customer awareness of services that can improve Services

telecommunications reliability and recoverability and improving the
physical security of their systems and continuity plans. Additionally,
financial market participants are assessing weaknesses in their
telecommunications infrastructure and designing and testing new network
configurations. Finally, other national and local government plans, such
as mutual aid agreements* designed to improve telecommunications
recoverability* are under way.

Existing Programs Already An existing federal program allows financial
market participants to receive

Can Be Used to Increase telecommunications priority in crises. Under the
Government Emergency Priority and Access to

Telecommunications Service (GETS) Program, participating staff receive a
Telecommunications card that provides them with a code that can be dialed
to increase the priority of telephone calls they place during crises. To
better ensure that Services

critical communication among financial market participants occurs, FBIIC
issued an interim policy on the GETS Card Program in July 2002 that
outlines how staff from financial institutions can obtain such cards. To
qualify for GETS sponsorship, the FBIIC policy states that organizations

must perform functions critical to the operation of key financial markets.
Another FBIIC telecommunications effort involves the Federal
Communications Commission*s (FCC) Telecommunications Service Priority
(TSP) Program, which is used to identify and prioritize telecommunication
services that support national security or emergency preparedness
missions. Under TSP, private- sector organizations, through the
sponsorship of a selected group of federal agencies, including SEC and

the Federal Reserve, can have some of their key telecommunications
circuits added to an inventory maintained by the National Communications

Service (NCS). 3 These circuits are then eligible for priority restoration
in a disaster. In the aftermath of the attacks, about 10 financial
institutions obtained prioritized restoration of 81 circuits and
provisioning of 81 new circuits under the TSP program. Although only a
small number of financial firms currently participate in TSP, these firms
are responsible for a substantial percentage of the daily funds transfer
activity in the United States. For example, Federal Reserve staff said
that financial institutions that account for about 90 percent of the total
dollar volume of Fedwire and CHIPS payments, which are used to transfer
large dollar- value payments

among banks, have TSP- sponsored circuits. However, FBIIC members have
concluded that other important financial market participants should be
included in TSP. As a result, they have initiated outreach efforts to
increase awareness of TSP and other government programs designed to
provide priority service in emergencies and are currently developing a
policy that will outline the requirements for financial firms to
participate in TSP. September 11 also illustrated that regulators would
have to be flexible in

setting telecommunications restoration priorities because the firms that
are critical to the markets after a disaster may not have been previously
identified or categorized as important. For example, staff at one of the
few inter- dealer brokers (IDB) in the government securities markets that
was capable of conducting operations after the attacks, said they had not
been aware of the TSP program and had trouble getting priority
provisioning for additional telecommunications capabilities following the
attacks. However, after the attacks, this firm*s operations became
critical to the government

securities market because so few other firms were capable of resuming
operations quickly. This IDB eventually got assistance from the White
House and SEC in obtaining the appropriate priority. Yet, prior to this
event, this firm may not have been considered a strong candidate for TSP
because it had relatively low trading volumes. To address this type of
situation in the future, regulators said that a former Federal Reserve
staff member has been placed on site at NCS, which fields requests for TSP
restoration. This person will act as a liaison with the financial
regulators and NCS.

3 NCS consists of 22 federal member departments and agencies and is
responsible for ensuring the availability of telecommunications
infrastructure for entities with national security and emergency
preparedness responsibilities. Formed in 1962 following the communications
difficulties during the Cuban Missile Crisis, NCS provides emergency
communications for the federal government during all emergencies and
international crises.

Additional efforts by regulators and market participants are under way.
Federal Reserve staff told us that they met in November 2002 with
representatives of the National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee to discuss the reliance of the financial and other critical
sectors on telecommunications infrastructure. At this meeting, they
discussed concerns over concentration and security issues relating to
telecommunications facilities. In December 2002, this group established a
working group to identify and assess telecommunication infrastructure
issues and Federal Reserve staff told us that the financial sector would
work with this group to develop recommendations.

Carriers Offer Services to Telecommunications carriers are taking steps to
improve their customers* Improve Customer

awareness of services that can improve the reliability and recoverability
of Continuity and Are

existing telecommunications, including the use of fiber- optic networks
and Improving Their Continuity

other approaches that provide more reliable access to public networks, and
Plans and Strengthening

services that help to recover failed connections. While each of these
services will protect against some outages, they may not have prevented
Local Service Infrastructure

the extensive disruptions that occurred on September 11, 2001. Carriers
also offer services that customers can use to redirect their switched
telecommunications services, such as voice calls, to another business

location, either in response to a crisis or for more general business
reasons, such as receiving after- hours calls. On the basis of customer
information stored in the carrier*s central office switching system, these
services can be used individually or in conjunction with other continuity
services to rapidly

route communications around failure points in a customer*s communications
path. However, because this service primarily protects switched
communications services, it would not protect or more rapidly restore
services delivered using dedicated, nonswitched communications lines.

Telecommunications carriers are also working to improve their basic
services in two ways: by improving their continuity planning efforts and
by strengthening the reliability of their networks. For example, AT& T had
previously made substantial investments in its contingency capability,
tested that capability on a quarterly basis, and was able to exercise that

capability to process communications traffic within 72 hours of the World
Trade Center attacks. Although Verizon reported that it also had plans in
place prior to the attacks that aided its recovery efforts, Verizon is
actively

working to strengthen its internal continuity practices. Verizon is
revising its January 1996 Central Office Disaster Recovery Plan based on
lessons learned, and, at the same time, developing business unit
continuity plans to

identify critical processes and operation support systems and harden
control centers supporting emergency management activities. Verizon
contingency managers indicated that this latter effort, which was about 75

percent complete in July 2002, would be the basis for developing
missioncritical control plans to address relocation contingencies and
building plans to address facility- specific evacuation, fire, and rescue
situations. These efforts will then feed into Verizon*s regional
preparedness plans.

Verizon and AT& T are also taking steps to improve the reliability and
resiliency of their networks as they rebuild damaged infrastructure. For
example, Verizon plans to serve the financial district with more central
offices to improve network redundancy and diversity. Verizon also plans to
build more fiber- optic rings in its local network and use more modern
synchronous optical network (SONET) technology in those networks. 4
Verizon estimates its total reconstruction costs to be more than $1.4
billion.

In support of its long- term restoration effort, AT& T has also upgraded
its fiber- optic networks and rebuilt two diverse central office
facilities.

Financial Market Financial market participants are also taking actions to
reduce their

Participants Are Also Taking vulnerability to future telecommunications
disruptions. For example, a

Steps to Promote More working group formed by senior telecommunications
executives from

Reliable major financial firms in lower Manhattan has completed an
assessment of weaknesses revealed by the September 11 attacks and outlined
ideas for

Telecommunications making the local telecommunications infrastructure more
reliable and

resilient to outages. 5 SIA has also taken the lead in designing and
scheduling industrywide testing, so that major financial institutions,
exchanges, and industry utilities can simultaneously activate work area
recovery and data center recovery plans from alternate sites and gain
confidence that their facilities work as envisioned in their plans. SIA
currently plans for two phases of testing that focus on backup
connectivity between industry participants. Phase 1 testing assumes an
outage at the participant*s primary facility. Phase 2 testing assumes that
an event has occurred in a specific geographic

4 Fiber optic cables consist of glass or plastic threads (fibers) that
transmit information using light waves. 5 Building a 21 st Century Telecom
Infrastructure, Lower Manhattan Telecommunications Users* Working Group
Findings and Recommendations, August 2002.

region causing disruption to supporting infrastructure (e. g.,
telecommunications and electrical power). In phase 1 tests, participants
are required to test communications facilities between their own backup
sites and the primary sites of critical parties. During phase 2 testing,
all test participants with primary data centers and work area sites in
designated geographic regions need to test recovery from backup or
alternate sites. 6 In addition to these actions, the financial industry
has started work on a

more resilient private networking platform that will transmit trading and
clearing information among various market participants. The Securities
Industry Automation Corporation (SIAC), which is a jointly owned
subsidiary of the New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange, is
developing the network platform, known as the Secure Financial Transaction
Infrastructure (SFTI). SFTI is intended to provide a more reliable and
survivable private communications mechanism linking the exchanges, the
clearing organization for securities, and broker- dealers.

Whereas broker- dealers currently connect to SIAC through hundreds of
individual connections, in the future they will connect to SFTI via four
access points, which will be located at switching facilities served by
multiple telecommunications providers. Figure 14 illustrates the
connections among SFTI participants.

6 Securities Industry Association Business Continuity Planning Committee
Industry Testing Workgroup, *Plan for Industry Testing: Version 1,*
September 10, 2002.

Figure 14: The SFTI Network Provides Redundant Connections Connections
from Broker- Dealers and Other Participants

Access Access

Access Access point

point point

point

In Outside

SFTI Manhattan

Manhattan

SIAC Data Center SIAC Data Center

(Trading, clearing, (Trading, clearing, and market data)

and market data)

New York American

Stock Depository Stock

Exchange Exchange

SFTI links Direct data center links Exchange trading links Clearing links

Source: Securities Industry Automation Corporation.

The traffic on SFTI will be transmitted over two high- bandwidth, fiber-
optic rings. To provide physical diversity and promote survivability, two
SFTI network access points would be located in Manhattan and two outside
the New York metropolitan area. In this way, users with more than one
operating location can connect these locations to SFTI at two distinct
points on either of the two SFTI network rings, thus reducing the
likelihood that a disaster would leave such participants unable to
transmit trading or clearing information. SFTI will initially use network
facilities provided by Con Edison Communications because that firm uses
different rights- of- way

than other carriers in Manhattan. 7 SIAC entered into service agreements
with Con Edison Communications in September 2002, and planned to begin
preliminary network testing in November 2002. After testing is complete,
SIAC plans to initiate broader implementation, hoping to have all
interested firms on the network within 2 years. SIAC plans to establish
additional SFTI access nodes in Boston, Massachusetts, and Chicago,
Illinois, to accommodate users in those cities. Other National and Local

The National Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC), a federal
Government Efforts

advisory council to the FCC, is examining ways to strengthen the
resilience Intended to Increase

and recoverability of the nation*s public telecommunications networks in
Telecommunications

light of the September 11 attacks. One NRIC subgroup will report on the
Response and Resiliency

viability of past or present mutual aid agreements and any additional
perspectives that facilitate effective telecommunications recovery
efforts. This subgroup also is preparing a template for mutual aid
agreements for carriers, and examining if telecommunications technicians
should be recognized as first responders to overcome the sort of access
obstacles that hampered initial telecommunications recovery efforts in New
York City. Additionally, the NRIC subgroup is examining how to
operationally transfer communications traffic from the damaged facilities
of one carrier to the facilities of another carrier with operating network
capacity. Although such offers were made in September, Verizon was not
able to

leverage them because carriers did not have systems and processes in place
that could facilitate inter- carrier transfers. In addition to these
recovery issues, a second NRIC subgroup is assessing physical
vulnerabilities and identifying existing and new best practices to both
mitigate the effects of physical infrastructure attacks and restore
services after such attacks. The NRIC subgroups are scheduled to complete
work by March 2003.

New York City is leading an effort to enhance cooperation among
telecommunications providers. In 1992, New York City established the
Mutual Aid and Restoration Consortium (MARC) agreement, which is intended
to ensure the continuity of services in the city under all

7 Con Edison Communications, a wholly owned subsidiary of Consolidated
Edison, Inc., builds and operates its own fiber- optic network providing
data communications services and custom network solutions to multiple
classes of customers, including telecommunications carriers, corporations,
and Internet, cable, wireless, and video companies.

reasonably foreseeable circumstances. Although this agreement expired at
the end of 1998, the New York City Department of Information Technology
and Telecommunications (DOITT) invoked it in the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks to ensure that essential city government offices and
operations would have adequate telecommunications service. DOITT
coordinated a series of conference calls that included approximately 20
telecommunications service providers; these twice- daily calls allowed
city

officials to help set telecommunications restoration priorities and also
gave carriers an opportunity to share information and offer assistance. To
ensure this agreement continues to function well, New York City

officials are revising and expanding it. The new MARC agreement will
formalize the roles of the Mayor*s Office and the Office of Emergency
Management and also will explicitly include wireless service providers who

had not been mentioned in the 1992 agreement. Finally, the new draft also
proposes using the Internet to make information more readily available to
all parties.

Appendi x III Comments from Federal Reserve System

Comments from the Securities and Exchange

Appendi x IV Commission

Appendi x V

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Davi M. D*Agostino
(202) 512- 8678 Cody J. Goebel (202) 512- 8678 Acknowledgments In addition
to the individuals named above, Edward Alexander, Ron Beers,

Lon Chin, Kevin Conway, Kirk Daubenspeck, Patrick Dugan, Edward Glagola,
Daniel Hoy, Harold Lewis, Marc Molino, Thomas Payne, Robert Pollard, Jean-
Paul Reveyoso, Barbara Roesmann, Derald Seid, Keith Slade, Eugene Stevens,
Sindy Udell, and Daniel Wexler made key contributions to this report.

(250125)

Report to the Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives

February 2003 POTENTIAL TERRORIST ATTACKS

Additional Actions Needed to Better Prepare Critical Financial Market
Participants

GAO- 03- 414

Transmittal Letter 1 Executive Summary 3

Purpose 3 Results in Brief 4 Principal Findings 9 Recommendations 16
Agency Comments and GAO Evaluation 16

Chapter 1 18

Introduction Various Organizations Participate in Stock and Options
Markets 18

Government Securities and Money Market Instruments Are Traded Differently
from Stocks 20 Payment Systems Processors Transfer Funds for Financial
Markets

and Other Transactions 22 Certain Market Participants Are Critical to
Overall Functioning of

the Securities Markets 22 Various Regulators Oversee Securities Market
Participants, but

Approaches and Regulatory Goals Vary 23 Telecommunications and Information
Technology Are Vital to

Securities Markets 24 Financial Organizations Manage Operations Risks by
Protecting

Physical and Information Security and Business Continuity Planning 25
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 25

Chapter 2 29

September 11 Attacks Attacks Caused Extensive Damage and Loss of Life and
Created Difficult Conditions That Impeded Recovery Efforts 29

Severely Disrupted Damage from Attacks Significantly Disrupted
Telecommunications

U. S. Financial Markets and Power 37

Attacks Severely Affected Financial Markets but Heroic Efforts Were Made
to Restore Operations 44 Disruptions in Government Securities and Money
Markets Severely

Affected Clearance and Settlement, Liquidity, and Trade Volumes 48 Impact
of Attacks on the Banking and Payments Systems Was Less

Severe 53

Attacks Revealed Limitations in Financial Market Participants* Business
Continuity Capabilities 55 Observations 57

Chapter 3 58

Financial Market In Climate of Increasing Risk, Organizations Often Have
to Choose

How to Best Use Resources 58 Participants Have

All Financial Market Organizations Were Taking Steps to Reduce the Taken
Actions to

Risks of Operations Disruptions 62 Reduce Risks of

Some Financial Organizations Had Preparedness Limitations That Increased
Their Risk of an Operations Disruption 63

Disruption, but Some Observations 67

Limitations Remain Chapter 4

68 Financial Market

Regulators Are Developing Recovery Goals and Sound Business Continuity
Practices for Clearing Functions but Not for Trading Regulators Lack

Activities 69 Recovery Goals for

Program, Staff, and Resource Issues Hamper SEC Oversight of Trading and
Could

Market Participants* Operations Risks 73 Bank Regulators Have Authority to
Oversee Operational Risk 82

Strengthen Their Conclusions 84

Operations Risk Recommendations 87

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 87 Oversight

Appendixes

Appendix I: Telecommunications Providers and Others Cooperated to Overcome
Damage to Telecommunications Infrastructure 90 The Terrorist Attacks
Extensively Damaged Local Telecommunications Infrastructure 90

Telecommunications Carriers and Government Agencies Worked Together to
Overcome Challenges 93

Appendix II: Regulator and Market Participants Are Working to Improve
Crisis Response and Telecommunications Resiliency 97 New Organizations
Will Increase the Extent to Which Critical

Infrastructure Protection Efforts Address the Financial Sector 97
Regulators and Market Participants Are Acting to Improve Crisis

Response 98

Numerous Initiatives Are Under Way to Strengthen the Resiliency of Local
Telecommunications Services 100

Appendix III: Comments from Federal Reserve System 108

Appendix IV: Comments from the Securities and Exchange Commission 109

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 111 GAO Contacts 111
Acknowledgments 111

Figures Figure 1: Clearance and Settlement Process for Stocks 20 Figure 2:
Buildings Destroyed or Damaged on September 11, 2001 30

Figure 3: Geographic Extent of Damage and Debris from Attacks in Lower
Manhattan 32 Figure 4: Damage to Buildings from Attacks and Resulting
Debris 33

Figure 5: Dust and Debris Resulting from Attack 34 Figure 6: Lower
Manhattan Area Subject to Access Restrictions Following September 11,
2001, Attacks 36

Figure 7: Damage to Verizon Central Office at 140 West Street 38 Figure 8:
Area Served by Verizon 140 West Street Central Office 40 Figure 9: Verizon
Used Temporary Cabling Solutions at 140 West

Street 43 Figure 10: Failed Transactions in the Government Securities

Markets During September 2001 50 Figure 11: Cash Purchases of Government
Securities and Repo Market Activity During September 2001 51

Figure 12: Intervals between Most Recent SEC ARP Examinations of Critical
Exchanges and Clearing Organizations 79 Figure 13: Verizon Overcame Major
Challenges During 140 West Street Restoration Efforts 95

Figure 14: The SFTI Network Provides Redundant Connections 105

Abbreviations

Amex American Stock Exchange ARP Automation Review Policy BCP Business
Continuity Plan BNet Business Network of Emergency Resources BONY Bank of
New York CHIPS Clearing House Inter- bank Payments System DOITT Department
of Information Technology and Telecommunications

ECN Electronic Communications Network FBIIC Financial and Banking
Information Infrastructure Committee FCC Federal Communications Commission
FISCAM Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual FRBNY Federal
Reserve Bank of New York GETS Government Emergency Telecommunications
Service GLBA Gramm- Leach- Bliley Act GSCC Government Securities Clearing
Corporation IDB Inter- Dealer Broker MARC Mutual Aid and Restoration
Consortium NCS National Communications System NRIC National Reliability
and Interoperability Council NSCC National Securities Clearing Corporation
NYSE New York Stock Exchange OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
OCIE Office of Compliance, Inspections, and Examinations PBX Private Bank
Exchange SEC Securities and Exchange Commission SFTI Secure Financial
Transaction Infrastructure SIA Securities Industry Association SIAC
Securities Industry Automation Corporation SONET Synchronous Optical
Network SRO Self- Regulatory Organization TSP Telecommunications Service
Priority

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a

GAO United States General Accounting Office

The September 11 attacks severely disrupted U. S. financial markets,
resulting in the longest closure of the stock markets since the 1930s and
severe settlement difficulties in the government securities market. While
exchange and clearing organization facilities were largely undamaged,

critical broker* dealers and bank participants had facilities and
telecommunications connections damaged or destroyed. These firms and
infrastructure providers made heroic and sometimes ad hoc and innovative
efforts to restore operations. However, the attacks revealed that many of
these organizations* business continuity plans (BCP) had not been designed
to address wide- scale events.

GAO reviewed 15 organizations that perform trading or clearing and found
that since the attacks, these organizations had improved their physical
and information security measures and BCPs to reduce the risk of
disruption from future attacks. However, many of the organizations still
had limitations in their preparedness that increased their risk of being
disrupted. For example, 9 organizations had not developed BCP procedures
to ensure that staff capable of conducting their critical operations would
be available if an attack incapacitated personnel at their primary sites.
Ten were also at greater risk for being disrupted by wide- scale events
because 4 organizations had no backup facilities and 6 had facilities
located between 2 to 10 miles from their primary sites. The financial
regulators have begun to jointly develop recovery goals and

business continuity practices for organizations important for clearing;
however, regulators have not developed strategies and practices for
exchanges, key broker- dealers, and banks to ensure that trading can
resume in a timely manner in future disasters. Individually, SEC has
reviewed

exchange and clearing organization risk reduction efforts, but had not
generally reviewed broker- dealers* efforts. The bank regulators that
oversee the major banks had guidance on information security and business
continuity and reported examining banks* risk reduction measures annually.
POTENTIAL TERRORIST ATTACKS

Additional Actions Needed to Better Prepare Critical Financial Market
Participants

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 414. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Davi M. D*Agostino (202) 512- 8678 or dagostinod@
gao. gov.

Highlights of GAO- 03- 414, a report to the Committee on Financial
Services House of Representatives

February 2003

September 11 exposed the vulnerability of U. S. financial markets to wide-
scale disasters. Because the markets are vital to the nation*s economy,
GAO assessed (1) the effects of the attacks on market participants*

facilities and telecommunications and how prepared participants were for
attacks at that time, (2) physical and information security and business
continuity plans market participants had in place after the attacks, and
(3) regulatory efforts to improve preparedness

and oversight of market participants* risk reduction efforts.

GAO recommends that the Chairman, SEC, work with industry to  develop
goals and strategies

to resume trading in securities markets,  determine sound business

continuity practices needed to meet these goals,  identify organizations
critical

to market operations and ensure they implement sound business continuity
practices, and  test strategies to resume trading.

In addition, the report contains recommendations to improve SEC*s
oversight of information technology issues.

Page i GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Contents

Contents

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Contents

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Contents

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United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548 Page 1
GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

A

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Executive Summary Page 4 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Executive Summary Page 5 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Executive Summary Page 6 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Executive Summary Page 7 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Executive Summary Page 8 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

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Executive Summary Page 10 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

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Executive Summary Page 12 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Executive Summary Page 13 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Executive Summary Page 14 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

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Chapter 1

Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 2

Chapter 2 September 11 Attacks Severely Disrupted U. S. Financial Markets

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Chapter 3

Chapter 3 Financial Market Participants Have Taken Actions to Reduce Risks
of Disruption, but

Some Limitations Remain Page 59 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Chapter 3 Financial Market Participants Have Taken Actions to Reduce Risks
of Disruption, but

Some Limitations Remain Page 60 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Chapter 3 Financial Market Participants Have Taken Actions to Reduce Risks
of Disruption, but

Some Limitations Remain Page 61 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Chapter 3 Financial Market Participants Have Taken Actions to Reduce Risks
of Disruption, but

Some Limitations Remain Page 62 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Chapter 3 Financial Market Participants Have Taken Actions to Reduce Risks
of Disruption, but

Some Limitations Remain Page 63 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Chapter 3 Financial Market Participants Have Taken Actions to Reduce Risks
of Disruption, but

Some Limitations Remain Page 64 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Chapter 3 Financial Market Participants Have Taken Actions to Reduce Risks
of Disruption, but

Some Limitations Remain Page 65 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Chapter 3 Financial Market Participants Have Taken Actions to Reduce Risks
of Disruption, but

Some Limitations Remain Page 66 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Chapter 3 Financial Market Participants Have Taken Actions to Reduce Risks
of Disruption, but

Some Limitations Remain Page 67 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Page 68 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Chapter 4

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 69 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 70 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 71 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 72 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 73 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 74 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 75 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 76 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 77 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 78 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 79 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 80 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 81 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 82 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 83 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 84 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 85 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 86 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 87 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 88 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Chapter 4 Financial Market Regulators Lack Recovery Goals for Trading and
Could Strengthen

Their Operations Risk Oversight Page 89 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Page 90 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Appendix I

Appendix I Telecommunications Providers and Others Cooperated to Overcome
Damage to

Telecommunications Infrastructure Page 91 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Appendix I Telecommunications Providers and Others Cooperated to Overcome
Damage to

Telecommunications Infrastructure Page 92 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Appendix I Telecommunications Providers and Others Cooperated to Overcome
Damage to

Telecommunications Infrastructure Page 93 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Appendix I Telecommunications Providers and Others Cooperated to Overcome
Damage to

Telecommunications Infrastructure Page 94 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Appendix I Telecommunications Providers and Others Cooperated to Overcome
Damage to

Telecommunications Infrastructure Page 95 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Appendix I Telecommunications Providers and Others Cooperated to Overcome
Damage to

Telecommunications Infrastructure Page 96 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Page 97 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Appendix II

Appendix II Regulator and Market Participants Are Working to Improve
Crisis Response and

Telecommunications Resiliency Page 98 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Appendix II Regulator and Market Participants Are Working to Improve
Crisis Response and

Telecommunications Resiliency Page 99 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Appendix II Regulator and Market Participants Are Working to Improve
Crisis Response and

Telecommunications Resiliency Page 100 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Appendix II Regulator and Market Participants Are Working to Improve
Crisis Response and

Telecommunications Resiliency Page 101 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Appendix II Regulator and Market Participants Are Working to Improve
Crisis Response and

Telecommunications Resiliency Page 102 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Appendix II Regulator and Market Participants Are Working to Improve
Crisis Response and

Telecommunications Resiliency Page 103 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Appendix II Regulator and Market Participants Are Working to Improve
Crisis Response and

Telecommunications Resiliency Page 104 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Appendix II Regulator and Market Participants Are Working to Improve
Crisis Response and

Telecommunications Resiliency Page 105 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Appendix II Regulator and Market Participants Are Working to Improve
Crisis Response and

Telecommunications Resiliency Page 106 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Appendix II Regulator and Market Participants Are Working to Improve
Crisis Response and

Telecommunications Resiliency Page 107 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist
Attacks

Page 108 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Appendix III

Page 109 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Appendix IV

Page 111 GAO- 03- 414 Potential Terrorist Attacks

Appendix V

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