Equal Employment Opportunity: Hiring, Promotion, and Discipline  
Processes at DEA (10-JUN-03, GAO-03-413).			 
                                                                 
A 1981 U.S. District Court decision found that the Drug 	 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) had discriminated against	 
African American special agents in a number of personnel	 
practices. Over the years, the plaintiffs and DEA had agreed to  
remedies in many of these areas. However, minority		 
representatives continued to raise issues in three areas--hiring,
promotion, and discipline. GAO was asked to examine DEA's current
processes for hiring, promoting, and disciplining special agents,
and provide information about racial, ethnicity, and gender	 
differences in these three areas.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-413 					        
    ACCNO:   A07120						        
  TITLE:     Equal Employment Opportunity: Hiring, Promotion, and     
Discipline Processes at DEA					 
     DATE:   06/10/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Employee promotions				 
	     Employment discrimination				 
	     Hiring policies					 
	     Personnel management				 
	     Racial discrimination				 
	     DEA Special Agent Promotion Program		 

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GAO-03-413

                                       A

June 10, 2003 Let er t The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson

House of Representatives Dear Ms. Johnson: In 1981, ruling on a class
action racial discrimination lawsuit brought by African American special
agents, a U. S. district court found that the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) 1 had discriminated against the agents

in a variety of personnel practices. Some 20 years have passed since the
initial decision, and not all areas covered by the court*s orders have
been finalized, particularly in regard to promotions. In your role as
Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, minority representatives of DEA*s
special agents continued to raise issues with you about some of the
personnel practices at DEA. Based on discussions with your office, we
agreed to (1) develop information on the diversity of DEA*s special agent
workforce and (2) examine the processes DEA has put in place to provide
for fair and

nondiscriminatory hiring, promoting, and disciplining of special agents
and provide information about racial, ethnic, and gender differences in
those three areas.

With regard to the diversity of DEA*s special agent workforce, we
developed information by race, ethnicity, and gender for each pay grade
level. To examine DEA*s processes for hiring, promoting, and disciplining
special agents, we reviewed policies and procedures and discussed them
with knowledgeable officials and representatives of groups representing
minority special agents. To identify the results that have been achieved,
we analyzed data by race, ethnicity, and gender generally for fiscal years
1997 through 2001, the 5 most recent fiscal years for which data were
available,

with regard to how applicants fared at each step of DEA*s hiring process,
promotions of special agents to the General Schedule (GS) grade 14 and 15
levels, and disciplinary actions taken. Our analyses were not designed to
prove or disprove discrimination; rather, they were designed to provide
information about race, ethnicity, and gender differences in personnel

actions. In analyzing hiring actions, we used the 80 percent rule set out
in the federal government*s Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection

1 DEA, an agency within the Department of Justice, enforces the nation*s
controlled substances laws and regulations in the United States and
worldwide. DEA has 21 domestic field divisions with more than 200 offices
and 79 foreign field offices in 50 countries.

Procedures. Under the 80 percent rule, a selection rate for a racial,
ethnic, or gender group that is less than 80 percent of the selection rate
for the group with the highest rate is considered a substantially
different rate of selection that usually requires an employer to study the
job relatedness of selection procedures. To analyze differences in
promotion and disciplinary actions, we used standard statistical
techniques. We did our work from September 2001 through February 2003 in
accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards. Further details about our
methodology are discussed in appendix I.

Results in Brief The diversity of DEA*s special agent (criminal
investigator) workforce was below overall government workforce percentages
but generally

comparable with the governmentwide population of criminal investigators,
except for women. In September 2002, whites made up 80.3 percent, African
Americans 8.2 percent, Hispanics 8.8 percent, Asian/ Pacific

Islanders 2.2 percent, and Native Americans 0. 5 percent of DEA*s special
agents. These percentages compared with governmentwide criminal
investigator levels of 80. 3 percent white, 7.1 percent African American,
8.9

percent Hispanic, 2. 7 percent Asian/ Pacific Islanders, and 1 percent
Native American. Women were 8.3 percent of special agents in DEA but 16. 4
percent of criminal investigators governmentwide. Minority representation
in DEA*s special agent workforce resembles an inverted pyramid, with
proportional representation of minority special agents in senior executive
service (SES) and supervisory special agent positions higher than in
nonsupervisory positions. In September 2002, minorities represented 36.7

percent of SES special agents, 23.2 percent of supervisory special agents,
and 18.4 percent of the nonsupervisory agents. Women, on the other hand,
were 8.8 percent of the nonsupervisory special agents, which was more than
their representation among supervisory special agents (6.6 percent) but
less than their representation among SES special agents (10.2 percent).
Because of the relatively low representation of minorities and women in
the lower ranks of special agents, DEA could face problems in enhancing,
or even maintaining, diversity in the upper ranks in the near future as
attrition occurs, especially if DEA experiences a high level of
retirements like that expected governmentwide. However, DEA does not have
a clear picture of future workforce trends because the agency has not
prepared a workforce analysis that takes into account the demographics of
the

workforce, including age, grade, retirement eligibility, and expected
retirements over the next 5- year or longer period.

Our analysis of DEA*s hiring decisions showed that a higher proportion of
minority applicants did not meet the requirements to become a special
agent at some steps in the hiring process. We found that in applying the
80

percent rule, African American men, Hispanic men, and Hispanic women had
substantially lower passing rates on the written test intended to measure
the ability to observe and recall details and write. In addition, African
Americans (men and women) had substantially lower rates of being found
suitable for hiring as a special agent, based on the results of background
investigations, psychological evaluations, and polygraph tests. Overall,
DEA hired 13.7 percent of African American applicants, 15.8 percent of
Hispanic applicants, and 22. 9 percent of white applicants. The

proportion of white applicants hired was substantially higher than that of
the two minority groups. The Uniform Guidelines require employers to study
the job- relatedness of selection procedures when there are substantial
differences in the selection rate for any race, ethnic, and gender group.
Although DEA*s hiring procedures are based on criteria in federal
regulations, professional standards, or standards established by subject
matter experts, the agency had not studied why its procedures resulted in
different selection rates and whether they could be modified to reduce
differences while maintaining high standards.

Our analysis showed no statistically significant differences in promotion
rates among the various racial, ethnic, and gender groups. However, issues
regarding promotions of African Americans to GS- 14 and GS- 15 special
agent positions remain in litigation because the court found in 1999 that
DEA*s promotion process did not fully comply with title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. Although DEA has a validated process to assess special agents*
promotion potential, the 1999 court decision found that a subsequent step
involving recommendations to the selecting authority by the office heads

with vacancies of specific special agents on the best- qualified lists had
resulted in an underrepresentation of African American special agents
compared with whites, and that this step had not been validated. Interim
measures modifying the recommendation process had not eliminated this
situation. Although DEA*s monitoring and reporting of promotion process
results gave particular attention to African American special agents, our
analysis also showed that Hispanics were recommended at statistically
significant lower rates than white special agents, particularly applicants
for GS- 14 positions. Although DEA has developed a recommendation process,
the agency and the plaintiffs need to resolve issues about implementation
and procedures for monitoring the results before the proposed process can

be put in place. In addition, the court must approve the process.

Our analysis of disciplinary data for fiscal years 1997 through 2001
showed that the proportion of African American, Hispanic, and women
special agents disciplined for misconduct was substantially higher than
their representation in the DEA special agent workforce and that this
difference was statistically significant. During fiscal years 1997 through
2001, African Americans made up 8.3 percent of the special agent workforce
but accounted for about 16 percent of the agents disciplined. Similarly,
Hispanics, while making up 8.9 percent of the special agent workforce

during the same time period, accounted for about 15 percent of agents
disciplined. Women, who made up 7.8 percent of special agents during
fiscal years 1997 through 2001, accounted for about 13 percent of agents
disciplined. These higher rates reflect that African American, Hispanic,
and women special agents had a proportionately higher number of
allegations of misconduct lodged against them and that a higher proportion
of these allegations were substantiated by investigations and resulted in
disciplinary actions. DEA does not know why these differences exist nor
does any study offer a reason for them. However, the results of two
studies by outside contractors, approved by an oversight group and which
we found methodologically sound, found DEA*s disciplinary process to be
fair

and nondiscriminatory. The most recent of these studies, however, compared
only disciplinary actions of African American and white special agents.
Disciplinary actions related to other minorities and women have not been
studied since 1986.

Although there were no statistically significant differences in the
promotion rates among the racial, ethnic, and gender groups and studies
found DEA*s disciplinary process to be fair and nondiscriminatory,
minority and women special agents perceived that these processes were not
fair and had a disparate effect on minorities. The perceptions may have
been driven in part by a lack of data and other information because DEA
did not widely share analyses of its promotion and discipline processes
with the special agent workforce. Sharing such data could help special
agents formulate informed views about the fairness and equity of the
promotion and discipline processes.

We recommend that DEA (1) prepare a workforce analysis that takes into
account expected attrition to guide DEA*s recruiting and hiring, (2)
initiate a process to monitor hiring process results, (3) monitor
promotion recommendation rates among the racial, ethnic, and gender
groups,

(4) expand the study of disciplinary actions to include all racial,
ethnic, and gender groups, and (5) share information about promotion and
discipline processes with its special agent workforce.

In commenting on this report, the Acting Administrator of DEA agreed with
our recommendations and listed a number of actions DEA was taking to
implement them.

Background Under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 2
it is unlawful for employers to discriminate against employees or job
applicants on the basis

of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Other civil rights
statutes prohibit discrimination based on age or disability. 3 Under these
laws, it is illegal to discriminate in any aspect of the terms and
conditions of employment, including hiring, firing, disciplinary actions,
promotion, pay assignments, and training. In addition, for federal
civilian employees, Executive Order 13087 prohibits discrimination based
on sexual orientation and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has
interpreted the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 4 to prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination in the federal workplace. 5

Intentionally treating people differently on account of their race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability is called *disparate
treatment.* 6 Title VII prohibits not only intentional discrimination, but
also practices that have the effect of discriminating against individuals
because of their race, color, national origin, religion, or sex. Personnel
policies that are neutral on their face but have a substantially different
though unintended affect on a group are said to have a *disparate impact*
or

2 42 U. S. C. S:S: 2000e et seq. 3 The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 prohibits discrimination against individuals who are 40 years
of age or older (29 U. S. C. S:S: 621 et seq.), the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibits employment discrimination against
qualified individuals with disabilities in the private sector and in state
and local governments (42 U. S. C. S:S: 12111 et seq.), and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against qualified
individuals with disabilities by the federal government (29 U. S. C. S:
791).

4 5 U. S. C. 2302( b)( 10). 5 An employee or applicant may not file a
complaint or lawsuit based on sexual orientation discrimination under
title VII because that statute does not prohibit this form of
discrimination. However, an aggrieved person may seek redress through
administrative processes available to federal employees.

6 Although proof of disparate treatment requires a showing that an
employer acted with discriminatory motive or intent, discriminatory motive
may be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.

*adverse impact.* In general, the use of any procedure that has an adverse
impact on the hiring, promotion, or other employment actions of members of
any race, gender, or ethnic group is considered to be discriminatory
unless the procedure is shown to be job related and consistent with
business necessity. 7 Uniform Guidelines on

The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 8 adopted in
Employee Selection

1978 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Civil
Procedures

Service Commission (the predecessor agency to OPM), and the departments of
Justice and Labor, provide a uniform set of principles governing use of
employee selection procedures and identifying adverse impact. The
guidelines apply to tests and other selection procedures that

are used to make employment decisions, including hiring, promotion, and
discipline. Under the guidelines, adverse impact is a substantially
different rate of selection in hiring, promotion, or other employment
decisions that works to the disadvantage of a race, ethnic, or gender
group. Specifically, a selection rate for any group that is less than 80
percent of the selection rate for the group with the highest rate is
generally regarded as evidence of adverse impact. This is not a legal
definition of discrimination; rather, it is a rule of thumb or guideline
that is a practical means of keeping an agency*s attention on different
selection rates in personnel actions and on the

procedures they use. Tests of statistical significance may be used in lieu
of the 80 percent rule. The guidelines call for adverse impact
determinations to be made for each racial, ethnic, or gender group. When
adverse impact is identified, the Uniform Guidelines generally

require employers to conduct validity studies to determine the
jobrelatedness of a procedure or its business necessity. The guidelines
also call for an employer to make a reasonable effort to become aware of
suitable alternative selection procedures and methods that have as little
adverse impact as possible and to investigate those that are suitable. The
guidelines recognize validation strategies of the American Psychological
Association, and the validation provisions of the guidelines are designed
to

be consistent with the generally accepted standards of the psychological 7
42 U. S. C. S: 2000e- 2( k). 8 29 C. F. R. Part 1607.

profession. One approach is *content validity,* which determines whether
the selection tests and measures used are representative of the knowledge,
skills, and abilities necessary for a job.

Litigation History In February 1981, the U. S. District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled on a class action lawsuit, commonly known as
the Segar case, 9 finding that DEA had discriminated against African
American special agents. 10 The court found that DEA*s personnel practices
had an adverse impact on African American special agents in terms of
salary, grade at entry, supervisory evaluations, discipline, and
promotions. In addition, the court

found evidence of disparate treatment in work assignments because of the
way in which DEA used African American special agents for undercover
operations. The court found no discrimination in the type of appointments
or in training of special agents, and found that allegations of harassment
and reprisal were unsubstantiated. The court did not rule on issues
relating to hiring that DEA and the plaintiff class had already settled.

The court ordered DEA to change its procedures and conduct validity
studies on those changes in order to provide for effective,
nondiscriminatory supervisory evaluation, discipline, and promotion
systems. To oversee the implementation of its orders, two groups were
established. One is called the *Working Group.* Its mission is to help
ensure that the orders of the court requiring DEA to develop and validate
nondiscriminatory personnel practices are carried out. The Working Group
is made up of three industrial psychologists* two from OPM and one
representing the plaintiff class members. The other group is called the
*Equal Employment Opportunity Monitoring Committee* or Monitoring

9 Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690 (D. D. C. 1981), aff*d in relevant
part subnom. Segar v. Smith, 738 F. 2d 1249 (D. C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied subnom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U. S. 1115 (1985). 10 In 1992, DEA
settled a class action lawsuit that Hispanic special agents brought
alleging discrimination in promotion and assignment practices, as well as
other terms of employment (Muniz, et al. v. Barr). Terms of the
settlement, which expired in 1996, included adding an additional SES
voting member to DEA*s Career Board, DEA*s commitment to the objective of
having Hispanic special agents fill this position in approximate
proportion to their representation in the SES workforce, and putting
procedures in place regarding wiretap, undercover, and temporary
assignments. In addition, the settlement recognized that since 1984 DEA
had promoted Hispanic special agents consistent with their representation
in the relevant applicant pool and that DEA was committed to the objective
of promoting Hispanics in rates roughly equal to the promotion rates of
similarly situated and qualified non- Hispanics.

Committee. Made up of eight African American special agents representing
plaintiff class members, this committee monitors DEA*s compliance with the
court*s orders. The committee also is to help facilitate informal
resolutions of disputes.

Over the years, all issues raised in the court*s findings, except with
regard to the process for promoting special agents to the GS- 14 and GS-
15 levels and creating a career development program, have been resolved
through court- approved agreements between the plaintiff class and DEA. In
September 1999, the district court ruled on a motion for compliance
brought by the plaintiff class that claimed adverse impact in promotions
of African American special agents to managerial GS- 14 and GS- 15
positions. 11 The plaintiffs argued that there were disparities in two
steps of the multistep promotion process. They alleged that one step in
the process,

called the Special Agent Promotion Program (SAPP), which involves
assessing candidates* job- related knowledge and skills through job
simulations, had an adverse impact on African Americans, thereby
decreasing their opportunities to be placed on best- qualified lists for
promotion. The plaintiffs further argued that they were adversely impacted
by another step in the process, whereby DEA senior executives* special
agents in charge (SAC) and other office heads* for the offices advertising
promotion opportunities, recommended a select few from a best qualified

candidate list to DEA*s Career Board, the head of which ultimately makes
promotion decisions. However, the plaintiffs did not claim that there was
adverse impact in the ultimate number of promotions. According to the
court decision, the plaintiffs stated that *some of the expected effect of
denying African American agents spots on the [SAC/ office head lists] is
not visible in the ultimate number of promotions because the Career Board
tends to *overselect* African American agents when they appear on [SAC/
office head lists], and also when the Career Board bypasses the [SAC/
office head list].*

In its ruling, the court noted that the use of the SAPP caused an adverse
impact despite its having been validated. Although the court did not
conclude that the use of the SAPP violated title VII, it ordered DEA to
implement a career development program to reduce the acknowledged

11 Segar, et al. v. Reno, et al., C. A. No. 77- 81 (D. D. C. Sept. 14,
1999).

disparate impact of the SAPP. 12 The court found that the process for
recommendations made by SACs and office heads did have an adverse impact
on African American special agents. In its analysis, the court said that
*the fact that some of the discriminatory effect of the use of [SAC/
office head recommendations] may not appear in ultimate hiring decisions,
because the Career Board appears to be more likely to select African
Americans when they do appear, does not excuse the use of a discriminatory
device earlier in the process.* The court concluded that the SAC/ office
head recommendation process violated title VII, and enjoined DEA from
using such recommendations in making promotion decisions until their use
had been validated as job related. As a result, DEA suspended promotions
to GS- 14 and GS- 15 special agent positions. DEA and the plaintiffs
subsequently entered into a court- approved agreement in January 2000
allowing DEA to temporarily use SAC/ office head recommendations for
promotion decisions in accordance with certain terms and conditions, until
DEA created a permanent, validated process for using SAC/ office head
recommendations.

At the time of our review, DEA, working with the plaintiff class and other
employees, had developed a recommendation process. The Working Group
approved this process, which met the requirements of content validity as
described in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. 13 A
diverse six- person panel of senior managers appointed by the DEA

Administrator and under the direction of an industrial psychologist
accomplished validation. In terms of job- relatedness, panel members first
individually reviewed descriptions of each competency to be assessed in
the SAC/ office head recommendation process and the weight each competency
would receive. The panel then analyzed the knowledge, skills, and
abilities required for GS- 14 and GS- 15 special agent positions; rated

their importance to these positions; and individually linked the
knowledge, 12 DEA has since developed training and career development
manuals for GS- 13, GS- 14, and GS- 15 special agents, which the Working
Group and the Equal Employment Opportunity Monitoring Committee approved
for issuance.

13 Uniform Guidelines* standards for content validity include (1)
conducting a job analysis that identifies the important work behaviors
required for successful performance of the job in question and their
relative importance, and also identifies the knowledges, skills, and
abilities used in work behaviors and the relationship between each
knowledge, skill, or ability and each work behavior, (2) describing the
selection procedure, (3) providing evidence showing that the content of
the selection procedure is representative of important aspects of
performance on the job for which the candidates are to be evaluated, and
(4) considering alternative procedures.

skills, and abilities to the competencies. 14 The panel members followed
the same process for tasks required of GS- 14 and GS- 15 special agents.
Final agreement between the plaintiffs and DEA, particularly with regard
to procedures for monitoring the implementation of the recommendation

process, and approval by the court remained to be accomplished as of March
2003. The Diversity of DEA*s

In September 2002, 4,481 (about 51 percent) of DEA*s 8, 726 employees were
Special Agent

criminal investigators (in the 1811 occupational series), better known as
special agents. Special agents conduct investigations, perform
surveillance, Workforce

infiltrate drug trafficking organizations, confiscate illegal drugs,
arrest violators, collect and prepare evidence, and testify in criminal
court cases.

Data from DEA showed that in September 2002, whites made up 80.3 percent,
African Americans 8.2 percent, Hispanics 8.8 percent, Asian/ Pacific
Islanders 2. 2 percent, and Native Americans 0.5 percent of the agency*s
special agents. Women made up 8.3 percent of DEA*s special agents. The
diversity of DEA*s special agent workforce was below overall government
workforce percentages but generally comparable with the governmentwide
population of criminal investigators, except for women whose
representation was about half that of criminal investigators
governmentwide. (See table 1.)

14 The knowledge, skills, abilities, and tasks were developed by an
outside contractor that performed a job analysis of the special agent
position.

Table 1: Demographic Distribution of the Federal Workforce and Criminal
Investigators (Special Agents) in DEA, Governmentwide, and the Nonfederal
Workforce

Asian/ Pacific African

Native Islander American Hispanic American White Women

Overall federal workforce (September 2002) 4. 5% 17.6% 6.9% 2. 0% 69. 0%
44.0%

Criminal Investigators

DEA (September 2002) 2. 2% 8. 2% 8. 8% 0. 5% 80. 3% 8.3% Governmentwide
(September 2002) 2. 7% 7.1% 8.9% 1. 0% 80. 3% 16.4% Nonfederal (1990
census) a 1. 0% 11.4% 6.5% 0. 8% 80. 3% 12.0% Source: OPM and DEA.

Note: Racial and ethnic categories include men and women; the women
category includes women of all races and ethnicities. a Includes accident
investigators, police officers, traffic officers, police department
chauffers, private

investigators, detectives, criminal investigators, and narcotics
investigators. Table 1 is not a measure of the appropriateness of DEA*s
diversity but rather a comparison of it with other law enforcement groups.
The table includes another common measure of diversity* the nonfederal law
enforcement labor force* that is derived from the decennial census and
includes individuals working in nonfederal law enforcement and
securityrelated occupations that OPM, EEOC, and the Department of Labor
consider comparable to the 1811 occupational series. In addition to the
governmentwide criminal investigator workforce, DEA compares its special
agent workforce to the nonfederal law enforcement labor force. The overall
minority representation in DEA*s special agent workforce is comparable to
the nonfederal law enforcement labor force, although there is some
variation in the representation of the various minority groups. DEA

has a lower representation of Native Americans and African Americans while
having a higher representation of Asian/ Pacific Islanders and Hispanics.
Representation of DEA*s women special agents is lower, compared with the
nonfederal law enforcement labor force. However, there are several
limitations to these data. First, these figures are dated in

that they are based on the 1990 census. Figures based on the 2000 census
will not be available until the fall of 2003, according to an official
with OPM*s Office of Diversity. Additionally, the data are based on a wide
variety of police, detective, and public service occupations that include
traffic officers and police department chauffeurs as well as criminal
investigators and narcotics officers. A further problem with the
nonfederal law enforcement labor force data is that they do not
distinguish educational attainment of those working in comparable 1811
occupations* DEA requires a 4- year college degree.

Workforce Trends* 1980- Over the last two decades, the overall
representation of minorities in DEA

2002 special agent positions hardly changed, increasing from 19.1 percent
in 1980 to 19. 7 percent in 2002, while the representation of women
increased,

from 2.3 percent in 1980 to 8.3 percent in 2002. While minority
representation in DEA*s special agent workforce showed increases during
the 1980s, it decreased after 1990. Only Asian/ Pacific Islanders
continued to increase throughout the 1980- 2002 time frame. (See table 2.)

Table 2: Demographics of DEA*s Special Agent Workforce, 1980- 2002 Asian/
Pacific

African Native

Tot al Year a Islander American Hispanic American minorities White Women

1980 1. 1% 7. 9% 9. 5% 0. 6% 19. 1% 80.9% 2.3% 1985 1. 2% 9. 2% 9. 9% 0.
8% 21. 1% 78.9% 7.2% 1990 1. 4% 10. 0% 10. 0% 0. 8% 22. 2% 77.8% 7.1% 1995
1. 9% 9. 5% 9. 7% 0. 6% 21. 7% 78.3% 7.6% 2000 2. 1% 8. 2% 8. 9% 0. 6% 19.
8% 80.2% 8.0% 2002 2. 2% 8. 2% 8. 8% 0. 5% 19. 7% 80.3% 8.3% Source:
Fiscal years 1980- 2000, OPM. Fiscal year 2002, DEA.

Note: Racial and ethnic categories include men and women; the women
category includes women of all races and ethnicities. a As of September
for each year indicated.

When looked at from a grade standpoint, minority representation in DEA*s
special agent workforce resembles an inverted pyramid. Representation of
minority special agents in Senior Executive Service (SES) and supervisory
special agent (GS- 14 and GS- 15) positions is higher than in
nonsupervisory (GS- 7 to GS- 13) ranks. (See table 3.) In September 2002,
36.7 percent of DEA*s SES special agents, 23.2 percent of supervisors, and
18.4 percent of

nonsupervisory special agents were members of minority groups. This was
particularly noticeable for African American and Hispanic special agents.
African Americans were 12. 2 percent of SES special agents, 10. 4 percent
of supervisors, and 7.5 percent of nonsupervisory special agents, while
Hispanics were 22.4 percent of SES special agents, 10 percent of
supervisors, and 8.2 percent of nonsupervisory special agents. For women,
the situation was similar in that women made up 10.2 percent of SES
special agents, which was higher than their representation in the
nonsupervisory and supervisory ranks. However, their representation in the
nonsupervisory ranks (8.8 percent) was higher than their representation
among supervisors (6. 6 percent). Table 3 shows the

distribution of DEA special agents in nonsupervisory, supervisory, and SES
positions by equal employment opportunity (EEO) group in September 2002.

Table 3: Distribution of DEA Special Agents in Nonsupervisory,
Supervisory, and SES Positions by EEO Group, September 2002 Asian/ Pacific

African Native

Tot al Positions Total Islander American Hispanic American minorities
White Women

SES

Number 49 0 611118315 Percentage 100% 0.0% 12.2% 22. 4% 2. 0% 36.7% 63. 3%
10.2%

Supervisory-- GS- 14 and 15

Number 1,009 19 105 101 9 234 775 67 Percentage 100% 1.9% 10.4% 10. 0% 0.
9% 23.2% 76. 8% 6. 6%

Nonsupervisory-- GS- 7 to 13

Number 3,423 78 256 282 13 629 2794 301 Percentage 100% 2.3% 7.5% 8. 2% 0.
4% 18.4% 81. 6% 8. 8% Source: GAO analysis of DEA data. Note: Racial and
ethnic categories include men and women; the women category includes women
of

all races and ethnicities.

The implication of the inverted pyramid is that DEA could face problems in
enhancing, or even maintaining, diversity in the agency*s upper ranks in
the near future as supervisory and SES special agents retire or otherwise
leave DEA. The extent of future attrition in DEA*s upper ranks (and at all
levels) is unclear because DEA has not performed a sufficient workforce
analysis. However, if governmentwide estimates are any indication, DEA
could be facing high levels of attrition. According to our estimates, 27
percent of federal criminal investigators on board in fiscal year 1998
were expected to retire from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2006. 15
Our work in the human capital area, as discussed in A Model of Strategic

Human Capital Management, found that high- performing organizations
identify their current and future human capital needs and then create

15 U. S. General Accounting Office, Federal Employee Retirements: Expected
Increase Over the Next 5 Years Illustrates the Need for Workforce
Planning, GAO- 01- 509 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 27, 2001).

strategies for filling these needs. 16 In May 2001, the Office of
Management and Budget instructed each federal agency to provide
information on the demographics of its workforce, including age, grade,
retirement eligibility, and expected retirements over the next 5 years,
and attrition, including trends in recent retirements over the past 5
years. 17 Such an analysis could guide the development of DEA*s recruiting
and hiring plans and strategies for a diverse special agent workforce.
However, DEA*s workforce analysis is limited to examining attrition data
for the previous 24 months to estimate the coming year*s hiring needs. The
agency has not developed estimates on the number of its special agents who
are or will become eligible for retirement or reach mandatory retirement
age 18 over the next 5 years or longer and how this could affect the
diversity of the special agent

workforce at the supervisory and SES levels and future recruiting needs.
DEA has faced challenges in meeting its special agent workforce needs. As
we will discuss later in this report, in addition to the high percentage
of applicants failing to meet DEA*s hiring standards during the 1997- 2002
time frame covered by our review, a large number of applicants dropped out
of

the hiring process. DEA officials said that many of them dropped out
because of the lengthy hiring process, which, the officials said, was
averaging about 2 years. As a result, DEA was left with a relatively small
pool of candidates meeting its hiring standards from which the agency
could hire. In fact, virtually everyone who made it through all the steps
in the hiring process was offered employment. DEA officials said that it
would be preferable to have a larger pool of suitable candidates from
which the agency could select. Because the agency is concerned about
having lost quality candidates that could have enhanced the agency*s
skills base and diversity due to the long hiring process and not having a
larger pool of suitable candidates from which to choose, DEA implemented
hiring process changes in December 2002 in an attempt to reduce the time
to hire

a special agent. In February 2003, the coordinator of the hiring project
said it was too early to tell the extent to which time efficiencies were
being realized.

16 U. S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital
Management, GAO02- 373SP (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 15, 2002). 17 OMB
Bulletin No. 01- 07, May 8, 2001.

18 Special agents can retire at any age with 25 years of service or at age
50 with 20 years of service and reach mandatory retirement at age 57.

A Higher Proportion of DEA*s multistep recruitment and hiring process is
intended to assess

Minority Applicants whether an applicant demonstrates the competencies,
physical and

psychological fitness, and personal integrity and character required of a
Did Not Meet Hiring DEA special agent. Following an initial qualifications
review for basic

Requirements requirements like education and citizenship, an applicant
must pass a

written assessment, interview, medical examination, and physical task
test. An applicant is also subject to psychological testing, a polygraph
examination, and a background examination, which are used to make a
suitability determination. 19 Using the 80 percent rule, we found that a
higher proportion of minorities, particularly African Americans and
Hispanics, did not meet the requirements to become a special agent in all
the steps in DEA*s hiring process except for the interview and medical
examination steps. Overall, minority special agent applicants were
selected at lower rates, compared with white applicants. The Uniform
Guidelines require an employer to study the job- relatedness of selection
procedures

when there are substantial differences in the selection rate for any race,
ethnic, or gender group. DEA*s hiring procedures appear job related and
consistent with the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection

Procedures in that they are based on criteria in regulations, professional
standards, or standards established by subject matter experts. However,
the agency had not studied the effects of these procedures on minorities

and women and whether the procedures could be modified to lessen the
differences without compromising the high standards necessary to perform
the job successfully.

Qualifications Review As the first step in the special agent hiring
process, DEA reviews and rates applications 20 to determine whether an
applicant meets minimum

requirements for the special agent position* a bachelor*s degree and 19
Applicants meeting minimum eligibility requirements receive conditional
offers of employment. Applicants passing all phases of the hiring process
receive final offers of employment.

20 DEA solicits applicants by recruiting at colleges, including colleges
with high minority and women enrollments; placing ads in publications
targeting minority audiences; and reaching out to law enforcement
organizations, professional associations (e. g., Asian American Police
Officers Association, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement
Executives,

Hispanic American Police Command Officers Association, and Women in
Federal Law Enforcement), and advocacy groups (e. g., Blacks in
Government). In addition, DEA*s special agent vacancy announcement is
posted on USAJOBS, the Web site for federal jobs (http:// www. usajobs.
opm. gov/).

specialized skills or substantive experience, especially in law
enforcement. 21 DEA officials said that the experience requirement was a
barrier to recruiting minority and women college graduates with
diversified skills. 22 As a result, in May 2000, DEA changed its policy so
that applicants with bachelor*s degrees in special skills areas*
economics, accounting, computer science/ information systems, certain
foreign languages, 23 finance, mechanical/ electrical/ telecommunications
engineering, or

criminal justice* would meet minimum requirements without having
additional experience.

We reviewed DEA's actions on applications received under the two most
recent vacancy announcements* BA- 98- 01 and BA- 20- 00. 24 The proportion
of minority applicants increased from 27 percent for BA- 98- 01 to 31
percent

for BA- 20- 00. Similarly, the proportion of women applicants increased,
from 12.7 percent under BA- 98- 01 to 16.4 percent under BA- 20- 00. Table
4 shows the demographic distribution of applicants reviewed and rated
under both vacancy announcements. We show the results separately for

BA- 98- 01 and BA- 20- 00 because of the revised qualifications under BA-
20- 00.

Table 4: Demographic Profile of Applicants under BA- 98- 01 and BA- 20-
00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002 Asian/ Pacific Islander African
American Hispanic Native American White Total Women Men Women Men Women
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men

BA- 98- 01 0. 4% 3. 2% 2. 4% 10.7% 1.3% 8.2% 0.1% 0. 7% 8. 5% 64.5% 12.7%
87. 3%

BA- 20- 00 0. 6% 3. 6% 3. 6% 11.0% 2.6% 8.4% 0.1% 0. 8% 9. 5% 59.8% 16.4%
83. 6%

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

21 DEA also determines whether an applicant meets other eligibility
requirements (e. g., must be a U. S. citizen) and has no disqualifying
criminal or drug use history disclosed on the application form.

22 In rating applications, DEA had awarded points for education and
experience. The number of points awarded for a bachelor*s degree alone did
not enable an applicant to meet minimum requirements. Points awarded for
experience varied based on the type and length of experience. For example,
more points were awarded for law enforcement narcotics and investigative
experience, compared with professional/ administrative experience.

23 The languages are Spanish, Russian, Hebrew, Arabic, Nigerian, Chinese,
and Japanese, with fluency verified. 24 BA- 98- 01 was open from October
15, 1997, through March 7, 2000, and BA- 20- 00 opened on May 8, 2000, and
remained open during our review.

The extent to which DEA found that applicants met its minimum requirements
was uneven. Applications from African American women, in particular, were
much less likely to meet DEA*s minimum education and experience
requirements, even after BA- 20- 00 changed the criteria for awarding
credit for special skills. We show the results separately for BA- 98- 01
and BA- 20- 00 in table 5 below because of the revised qualifications
under BA- 20- 00.

Table 5: Percentage of Applicants Meeting Minimum Requirements under BA-
98- 01 and BA- 20- 00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002

Asian/ Pacific Islander African American Hispanic Native American White
Total Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men

BA- 98- 01 62.5% 82.7% 56. 6% 73.6% 79.1% 86.9% 70. 0% 77.6% 66.9% 75. 6%
66.1% 76. 7%

BA- 20- 00 75.8% 85.0% 56. 0% 65.3% 74.7% 79.8% 75. 0% 72.1% 72.7% 78. 4%
69.4% 77. 0%

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

Written Assessment Applicants who meet DEA*s minimum qualifications
requirements must then pass a written assessment of their ability to (1)
observe and recall details, (2) organize the details in a writing sample,
and (3) write in a

grammatically correct manner. The assessment, which consists of showing
applicants a videotape of a simulated *drug bust* and asking them to write
a narrative describing what was observed, was developed by subject matter
experts and tested to help ensure job- relatedness. The written assessment
is administered, and applicants* narratives are first reviewed and rated,
in a field division. Later, headquarters staff review the narratives, in
order to help assure DEA- wide consistency with established rating
standards.

Because of concerns about low passing rates of African American and
Hispanic applicants, based on the recommendation of an advisory panel of
subject matter experts, DEA changed scoring criteria under BA- 20- 00 by
reducing the number of details from the videotape that applicants were
expected to recall and identify. At the same time, however, responding to
senior special agents* concerns that newer special agents lacked the
writing skills necessary for preparing investigation reports and other
documents, DEA required that applicants pass all three parts of the
written assessment, not two, as had been the policy under BA- 98- 01.
These changes resulted in lower passing rates for all applicant groups.
However, the passing rates for African American men, Hispanic men, and
Hispanic

women under BA- 20- 00 were substantially lower compared with white women,
who had the highest passing rate. In table 6 below, we show the passing
rates separately for BA- 98- 01 and BA- 20- 00 because of the changes to
the written assessment under BA- 20- 00.

Table 6: Percentage of Applicants Passing Written Assessment under BA- 98-
01 and BA- 20- 00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002

Asian/ Pacific Islander African American Hispanic Native American White
Total Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men

BA- 98- 01 a 89.0% 93.5% 84. 6% 87.5% 80. 3% a a 94. 5% 91. 9% 93.7% 89.
5%

BA- 20- 00 a 76.4% 78.9% 71. 3% 64.5% 63. 4% a a 91. 8% 82. 9% 84.2% 79.
2%

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data. a Small number of applicants precluded
meaningful application of the 80 percent rule.

DEA officials had not studied the effects of the changes to the written
assessment and were unaware of the lower pass rates. However, they said
the lower pass rates might be an unintended result of requiring applicants
to pass all three parts.

Interview A panel of three special agents at a field division office
interviews applicants who pass the written assessment. The interview
follows a structured format of 21 questions to elicit responses to
evaluate an applicant*s abilities in (1) structuring work activities, (2)
demonstrating interpersonal skills, (3) tolerating stress, (4) evaluating
information, and (5) communicating orally. Special agents and Office of
Personnel staff involved in recruiting developed the interview questions
and pilot tested them to help assure their job- relatedness. 25 The
interview panel rates applicants in accordance with established standards
and the Special Agent Recruitment Unit staff in headquarters later reviews
ratings to check that panelists adequately documented their assessment and
adhered to the rating standards.

As table 7 shows, interview- passing rates showed relatively little
variation, with about 90 percent of all applicants passing. 25 The
questions are modified periodically to protect the integrity of the
testing process.

Table 7: Applicant Interview Passing Rates under BA- 98- 01 and BA- 20-
00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002 Asian/ Pacific Islander African
American Hispanic Native American White Total

Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men

BA- 98- 01 a 87.7% a 92.5% a 89.9% a a 90. 8% 91.6% 90.6% 91. 3%

BA- 20- 00 a 91.4% 85. 7% 89.0% a 82.6% a a 90. 1% 90.1% 88.9% 89. 3%

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data. a Small number of applicants precluded
meaningful application of the 80 percent rule.

Medical Examination Applicants who pass the written assessment and
interview are scheduled for a medical examination and, if they pass, are
scheduled for the physical task test. According to DEA*s Chief Medical
Officer, the medical examination follows standards developed by the
Federal Law Enforcement Medical Program Division of the Public Health
Service, based on a 1999 survey of the physical demands of a special
agent*s job. Prior to 1999, DEA followed OPM- prescribed medical
standards. About 95 percent of applicants passed the medical exam and
there was little difference in the pass rates among the applicant groups,
as table 8 shows.

Table 8: Applicant Medical Examination Passing Rates under BA- 98- 01 and
BA- 20- 00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002 Asian/ Pacific Islander
African American Hispanic Native American White Total

Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men

BA- 98- 01 a 92. 2% a 96.0% a 97.0% a a 96. 1% 93.6% 96. 1% 94.2%

BA- 20- 00 a 97. 8% 96.8% 98.0% a 96.4% a a 99. 0% 96.4% 98. 1% 96.5%

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data. a Small number of applicants precluded
meaningful application of the 80 percent rule.

Physical Task Test The physical task test is the next step for applicants
who have passed the interview and medical examination. This test, intended
to measure an

applicant*s ability to participate in physical activity during Basic Agent
Training, consists of six tasks* pull- ups, sit- ups, push- ups, shuttle
run, 26 26 The shuttle requires the applicant to start from a resting
position on his/ her back and jump up and run 60 yards up and back around
traffic cones set on the floor.

2- mile run, and, until March 2003, the handgun trigger pull. 27 (See app.
II for physical task test minimum requirements.) According to the Chief of
DEA*s Health Services Unit and the unit*s Health Fitness Specialist, the
physical task test format (except for the trigger pull test) is based on
standards developed by the Cooper Institute, 28 which reports that the
fitness tests it recommends for law enforcement have been validated
through scientific research to be job related. With regard to the handgun
trigger pull, a DEA official formerly with DEA*s Firearms Training Unit
said that the unit developed the trigger pull standard based on tests of
Basic Agent Training students.

Overall, men had a higher passing rate on the physical task test than
women. 29 African American applicants passed the physical task test at
rates lower than other groups. In fact, African American applicants had a
significantly lower passing rate under BA- 20- 00, as table 9 shows. 30
Table 9: Percentage of Applicants Passing the Physical Task Test under BA-
98- 01 and BA- 20- 00, October 15, 1997, to March 31,

2002 Asian/ Pacific

African Native

Islander American Hispanic American White Women Men

BA- 98- 01 73.9% 66. 9% 77. 7% a 81. 9% 73.2% 79. 8% BA- 20- 00 78.3% 64.
6% 70. 9% a 81. 2% 64.2% 80. 5% Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

a Small number of applicants precluded meaningful application of the 80
percent rule.

DEA officials had not studied physical task test trends and did not know
which test tasks accounted for lower pass rates. The Chief of DEA*s Health
Services Unit and the unit*s Health Fitness Specialist said that they
would 27 DEA eliminated the trigger pull test based on recommendations
from the DEA Firearms

Training Unit. 28 The Cooper Institute is nationally recognized for
aerobics research and work with fitness programs for law enforcement,
public safety, and the military. 29 Failure of the initial physical task
test is not automatically disqualifying. Applicants are given 30 days to
retake and pass the test. Data we analyzed reflect the latest physical
task test results. 30 For this analysis, we combined men and women of each
race because of the small number

of minority women.

examine test results for the physical task test components as they look
into updating the physical task test to be consistent with contemporary
standards.

Suitability Applicants passing the physical task test are scheduled for
polygraph and psychological tests and a background investigation to assess
their character and conduct. DEA special agents trained as polygraphists
administer the polygraph test in accordance with standardized techniques
and procedures for conducting polygraph examinations established by the
Department of Defense Polygraph Institute. 31 For quality assurance,
senior polygraphists in DEA headquarters review test results, including
the audiotape made during each polygraph session. For the psychological
assessment, a licensed psychologist under contract with DEA reviews two
validated written psychological tests 32 and DEA*s Life Experiences
Inventory completed by the applicant, interviews the applicant, and
prepares an overall assessment, which a DEA psychologist reviews. DEA
contracts with OPM to do full- field background investigations on special
agent applicants in accordance with federal regulations. 33 The
investigation

develops information through interviews with coworkers, employers,
friends, educators, neighbors, and other individuals; a personal interview
with the applicant; and records checks of investigative files and other
records held by federal agencies, and state and local law enforcement and
court records. In addition, an applicant is subject to a financial review,
including a credit bureau check.

The results of the polygraph and psychological tests and the background
investigation are considered together for a suitability determination.
Suitability determinations are made in accordance with federal

31 This institute establishes standards for federal agency polygraph
programs and trains all federal polygraph examiners. In addition, the
institute conducts ongoing evaluations of the validity of polygraph
techniques used by federal examiners and inspects federal polygraph

programs to ensure compliance with both those techniques and procedures.
The institute last inspected DEA*s polygraph program in January 2001 and
found the program*s policies and procedures were in compliance with the
standards for a federal government polygraph program.

32 The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory- 2, a test of adult
psychopathology, and the 16 Personality Factor Questionnaire, a
personality assessment instrument. 33 5 C. F. R. parts 731, 732, and 736.

regulations 34 by the approving official in the Office of Personnel or,
where there is a question about an applicant*s suitability, 35 by a three-
person panel called the *1811- hiring panel.* 36 DEA officials said that
the panel approach helps to assure consistency in applying criteria in
cases in which there is some question about an applicant*s suitability. To
come to a determination about an applicant*s suitability, the three panel
members must be in agreement. If the approving official or the panel
approves an applicant, he or she is offered employment.

Our analysis of suitability determinations showed that, overall, DEA found
67 percent of applicants, for whom a suitability determination was made,
suitable to be special agents, with women found suitable at higher rates
than men. However, the approval rate for African Americans* 55. 2 percent*
was substantially lower. (See table 10.) 37

Table 10: Percentage of Applicants Found Suitable under BA- 98- 01 and BA-
20- 00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002 Asian/ Pacific African

Native Islander American Hispanic American White Women Men Total

73.9% 55. 2% 66.4% a 68.6% 74. 8% 66.2% 67. 0%

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data. a Small number of applicants precluded
meaningful application of the 80 percent rule.

The approving official and current and former 1811 panel members said that
they had not examined the results of their decisions and could not 34 5 C.
F. R. 731.202. 35 According to the criteria, factors that may be
considered a basis in finding an individual unsuitable include misconduct
or negligence in employment; criminal or dishonest conduct; alcohol abuse;
and illegal use of narcotics, drugs, or other controlled substances.

36 The approving official in the Office of Personnel and the two permanent
members of the 1811- hiring panel have received training in making
suitability determinations, as have some rotating panel members. In
addition, during 2002, field division staff began to receive

suitability determination training. Field divisions make suitability
recommendations to the Office of Personnel.

37 For this analysis, we combined men and women for each race because of
the small numbers of minority women. We also combined the results under
both announcements because only about 2 percent of the applicants who
underwent a suitability review were applicants under BA- 20- 00.

explain why African Americans fared worse than other applicants or whether
specific disqualifying factors predominate among one group. They also said
that, generally, they were not aware of an applicant*s race when making
their determinations. Since the panel was established in 1997, at

least one and sometimes two of the three panel members have been
minorities. Because the 1811 hiring panel makes about 80 percent of the
suitability determinations, we developed information about the panel*s
decisions. Our analysis of the panel*s data found that the panel approved
about 49 percent of applicants it reviewed, while finding about 36 percent
of African Americans suitable. (See table 11.)

Table 11: Percentage of Applicants Found Suitable by the 1811 Hiring
Panel, September 29, 2000, to May 7, 2002 Asian/ Pacific African

Native Islander American Hispanic American White Women Men Total

50. 0% 36. 2% 55.3% a 50.9% 57.8% 48.1% 49. 1%

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data. a Small number of applicants precluded
meaningful application of the 80 percent rule.

Data showed that most (82.7 percent) of the applicants whose suitability
was adjudicated by the panel presented multiple issues for adjudication.
The most frequently identified issues related to an applicant*s
psychological assessment (60.6 percent of referred files), polygraph
examination (36. 4 percent), driving record (27 percent), not being

recommended by a SAC (26.5 percent), admissions such as drug use on the
Life Experiences Inventory (22.4 percent), and credit issues (17 percent).
Among African American applicants, the most frequently identified reasons
related to the psychological assessment (69.6 percent), not being
recommended by a SAC (34. 8 percent), driving record (30.4 percent),
credit issues (21.7 percent), and admissions on the Life Experiences
Inventory (17.4 percent). The panel*s database did not show the basis for
its decisions.

Final Hiring Results As of March 31, 2002, from the 10,748 applications
found to meet its minimum requirements under announcements BA- 98- 01 and
BA- 20- 00, DEA hired 793 applicants, while rejecting 3,038 applicants who
did not pass the written assessment, interview, medical or physical task
test, or were found

unsuitable. The remaining 6,917 applicants had opted out or were still in
process. Overall, we found that about 20 percent of applicants on whom DEA
made a final eligibility determination met the special agent hiring
standards and were selected for training. However, we found that
minorities met DEA*s hiring standards at lower rates than white
applicants, with African American and Hispanic applicants meeting the
standards and

being selected at substantially lower rates. (See table 12.)

Table 12: Overall Selection Rates for Applicants for Whom DEA Made Hiring
Eligibility Determinations under BA- 98- 01 and BA20- 00, by EEO Group,
October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002

Asian/ Pacific African Native

Islander American Hispanic American White Women Men Total

18. 7% 13. 7% 15.8% a 22.9% 20.0% 20.3% 20. 3%

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data. a Small number of applicants precluded
meaningful application of the 80 percent rule.

DEA*s hiring decisions were somewhat less diverse, compared with the pool
of applicants that met DEA*s minimum education, skills, and experience
requirements. As table 13 shows, African Americans, Hispanics, and women
represented a smaller proportion of the special agents hired under BA- 98-
01 and BA- 20- 00, compared with applicants who initially met minimum
requirements, while the proportion of whites increased. Table 13:
Demographic Profile of Applicants Who Met Minimum Requirements and
Applicants Hired under BA- 98- 01 and BA- 20-

00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002 Asian/ Pacific Islander African
American Hispanic Native American White Total

Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Meeting
minimum requirements

Number 45 405 232 1,080 200 992 13 76 876 6,829 1,366 9, 382

Percent 0. 4% 3. 8% 2. 2% 10.0% 1.9% 9.2% 0.1% 0.7% 8. 2% 63. 5% 12.7% 87.
3% Hired

Number 3 31 7 72 12 71 2 1 62 532 86 707

Percent 0. 4% 3. 9% 0. 9% 9. 1% 1. 5% 9. 0% 0. 3% 0. 1% 7. 8% 67.1% 10.8%
89. 2%

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

DEA offers employment to virtually all applicants who make it all the way
through its hiring process. Because the agency is concerned about having
lost quality candidates that could have enhanced the agency*s skills base

and diversity due to the long hiring process (which had been averaging
about 2 years) and not having a larger pool of suitable candidates from
which to choose, DEA made reforms to its recruiting and hiring process
that had been implemented agencywide by December 2002. The reforms include
giving the field more responsibility for managing the hiring process and
avoiding time- consuming back- and- forth actions between the field and
headquarters. For example, field recruiters are to conduct criminal
history

and credit records checks to identify unqualified applicants before,
rather than after, an application package is forwarded to headquarters, in
order to reduce the number of application packages reviewed. These
preliminary records checks will also help eliminate the need for costly
background

investigations when an applicant is identified as unqualified, according
to DEA. In addition, background investigations are to be initiated earlier
in the process and by field offices, which also are to review the
investigation

results, perform necessary follow- up, and make preliminary suitability
recommendations. Previously, background investigations had been managed by
headquarters, which referred follow- up questions to the field. In
addition, suitability determinations will be made before security
clearance reviews are conducted. This will help reduce the security
clearance backlog, which had been a major contributor to delays in the
hiring process, and reduce the need to update stale applicant information
when suitability determinations are made.

No Statistically DEA*s process for promoting special agents to GS- 14 and
GS- 15 positions Significant Differences

has been in place since 1992. The first step is the Special Agent
Promotion Program (SAPP), which uses a supervisor*s performance rating and
job in Promotion Rates simulation exercises at an assessment center to
measure the candidate*s knowledge and abilities to perform at the next
grade level and determine which applicants for promotion are placed on a
best- qualified list. The SAC or head of an office with a vacancy is asked
to review the qualifications of best- qualified applicants and recommend
his or her top choices to DEA*s Career Board, the head of which ultimately
makes promotion decisions. Our analysis showed that although African
American and Hispanic special agents received promotion recommendations at
lower rates than white agents, particularly for promotions to GS- 14,
there were no statistically significant differences in promotion rates
among the various race, ethnic, and gender groups.

Special Agent Promotion The SAPP establishes which GS- 13 and GS- 14
special agents can compete Program

for promotions. The SAPP is an annual process that was developed by an
outside consultant in response to the 1981 Segar decision. The Working
Group reviewed and approved its development. From 1997 to 2001, 1,355 GS-
13 and 423 GS- 14 special agents participated in the SAPP. 38 Of the GS13s
participating in the SAPP, 25.5 percent were minorities* mostly African
American and Hispanic* and 7.4 percent were women. Among the GS- 14s,

28. 4 percent were minorities* mostly African American and Hispanic* and
8.5 percent were women. Table 14 shows the demographics of the GS- 13 and
GS- 14 special agent SAPP participants for 1997 through 2001. 39 In our

analysis of promotion- related results, we combine men and women for each
race because of the small number of minority women.

Table 14: Special Agents Participating in the SAPP, 1997- 2001 Asian/
Pacific

African Native

Islander American Hispanic American White Total Women Men GS- 13

Participants 24 152 161 9 999 1,355 100 1, 255 Percentage of total 1.8%
11. 2 11. 9 0.7 73. 7 100.0 7. 4 92.6 participants GS- 14

Participants 10 56 51 3 303 423 36 387 Percentage of total 2.4% 13. 2 12.
1 0.7 71. 6 100.0 8. 5 91.5 participants Source: SAPP reports for 1997
through 2001.

The SAPP has two components: the performance rating on the competencies
needed at the next higher grade level and testing at an assessment center
in which job simulations are used to measure a special agent*s knowledge
and abilities needed at the next level.

38 To participate in the SAPP, a GS- 13 must have 3 years in grade while a
GS- 14 is required to have 4 years in grade. 39 Included in these totals
are retest candidates. A special agent is eligible to take the SAPP again
2 years after his or her last participation. Of the 1,355 GS- 13 SAPP
participants, 406 (30 percent) were retest candidates, while 103 (24
percent) of the 423 GS- 14 SAPP participants were retest candidates.

In the performance rating, special agents are evaluated on job- related
competencies (see app. III) on a scale from 1 (unacceptable) to 5
(exceptional). An agent*s most recent supervisor prepares the rating,
which

is reviewed by a SAC or office head to help ensure that performance
standards are uniformly applied. Data for 1997 through 2001 show that
average performance rating scale scores for SAPP participants were nearly
uniformly exceptional* almost a perfect 5* for all groups, with no
statistically significant differences in the scores among the various
groups.

In this regard, the 2001 SAPP report 40 found that the rating scores did
not differentiate between highly effective and less effective performers
and showed little if any correlation to assessment center tests of similar
competencies. Because performance rating scores for those who participate
in the assessment center are uniformly high and do little to differentiate
among candidates, a candidate*s assessment center score is the primary
determinant of promotion competitiveness.

The assessment center replicates a day in the life of a special agent
through exercises simulating the job at the next higher level. DEA
conducts two assessment centers each year, one for GS- 13s aspiring to GS-
14 level positions and another for GS- 14s aspiring to become GS- 15s,
which are administered under a contract DEA awards annually. 41 The
assessment centers consist of role- play, in- basket, 42 and, for GS- 14s,
oral presentation exercises simulating the job at the next higher level to
measure a candidate*s performance in a variety of competencies. In 2001,
GS- 13 special agents were evaluated on 12 competencies in assessment
center simulations while GS- 14 special agents were evaluated on 9
competencies.

(See app. III.) The original job simulations were developed following a
content- oriented validation strategy consistent with the Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures and the Principles for
Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures. 43 This was done by

40 2001 DEA Special Agent Promotional Programs (SAPPs) for Grades 14 and
15: Revision and Administration. Prepared for the Drug Enforcement
Administration by Fields Consulting Group, Inc. (McLean, Va.: Sept. 2001).

41 The same contractor was involved in the administration of the 1998-
2002 SAPPs. 42 The in- basket contains contents similar to those that are
found in the in- basket for the job that is being tested. 43 Principles
for Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures was adopted by
the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, a division of
the American Psychological Association, to provide guidelines for the
evaluation, development, and use of testing instruments.

detailing special agents* job tasks and the knowledge and abilities
required to perform those tasks, establishing linkages between job tasks
and the knowledge and abilities required, and demonstrating linkages
between the required knowledge and abilities and selection procedures. 44
The 2001 SAPP report noted that there is extensive literature documenting
the

validity of job simulations for predicting supervisory and managerial
performance and that simulation measures are viewed as having a
potentially high degree of content validity, thereby reducing the
possibility

of discrimination. DEA special agents trained by the contractor serve as
assessors. To minimize the degree of candidate/ assessor familiarity and
partiality when assigning candidates to assessors, the assessment centers
director collects familiarity and partiality ratings from assessors to
determine the extent to which assessors know a promotion candidate and how
impartially the assessors believe they could evaluate the candidate.
Another way of fostering fairness is through the representation of
minorities and women among the assessors. Overall, during the 1997- 2001
period, the proportion

of minority and women assessors for both the GS- 14 and GS- 15 assessment
centers exceeded the proportion of minorities and women participating in
the GS- 14 and GS- 15 SAPPs. 45 As a check on how assessors carry out
exercises and developed scores, the assessment centers director reviews
videotapes of exercises, evaluates assessors* notes, and independently
scores candidates* performances. In addition, the director surveys
candidates and prepares a report on the results of each assessment center.
The report analyzes overall scores for each assessment center and scores
by competency and exercise, comparing the scores of African Americans and
whites and, to a lesser extent, Hispanics and whites, 46 to identify

44 An updated job analysis was completed in June 2002 and will be
considered in revising the SAPP for 2003. 45 Minorities accounted for
about 35 percent of assessors in the GS- 14 SAPP, while approximately 26
percent of participants were minorities. Women were 8.4 percent of GS- 14
SAPP assessors, while 7.4 percent of participants were women. For the GS-
15 SAPP, minorities accounted for about 38 percent of assessors versus
about 28 percent of participants, while women were 9.7 percent of
assessors versus 8.5 percent of participants.

46 The scores of Asian/ Pacific Islanders and Native Americans are not
analyzed because their small numbers are insufficient for reliable
statistical analysis, according to Working Group members. The Validation
and Analysis Unit Chief and Working Group members said gender analysis is
not performed because early analysis found no statistically significant

differences between women and men. A Working Group member said, however,
that analysis of assessment center results should include women.

competencies in which larger and smaller race/ national origin effects
were observed and suggest possible areas for concentrating test
improvement, training, and developmental efforts. In this regard, the
contractor made a number of revisions each year from 1997 through 2001 to
the assessment centers exercises in an attempt to reduce differences. 47
The Working Group plays an integral role in the assessment centers.

Working Group members said that they oversee the development of the
exercises, approve the design of the annual assessment centers, monitor
the proceedings, and review and approve the overall results. As part of
their oversight, they said that they meet with participants to get their
feedback and review videotapes of the role- play exercises to determine if
they were conducted fairly and properly. They described the assessment
centers as first- class operations that meet standards for fair treatment
and valid procedures. They also said that differences in scores among
groups have not been statistically significant and that differences in
scores among the candidates are due to factors other than the testing
procedures. The Working Group members said that the strengths of the
assessment centers are that the exercises appropriately reflect results of
job analysis, the assessors are well trained, the assessors* ratings and
the rating measures are reliable, and the process is checked for adverse
impact using statistical tests. Overall, they said that the assessment
center process is a valid way of selecting a supervisor because it asks
candidates to perform supervisory tasks. Moreover, OPM has described the
SAPP as a *success story* in its use of leadership competencies in making
supervisory selections. 48

The performance rating and assessment center scores each account for half
in developing an overall SAPP score for each candidate. As table 15 shows,
white participants generally had somewhat higher SAPP scores,

although the differences from the other groups were not statistically
significant, according to the Working Group. Men tended to have higher
scores in the GS- 14 assessment center, but women tended to have higher
scores in the GS- 15 assessment center.

47 For example, because race/ national origin score differences were
attributed to the inbasket exercises of both assessment centers, the in-
basket exercises were revised over the 1997- 2001 period for both
assessment centers. Among the revisions were reducing the number of items
in the in- basket, strengthening the relationship of in- basket items to
dimensions measured, and increasing the time allowed for the exercise.

48 U. S. Office of Personnel Management, Supervisors in the Federal
Government: A WakeUp Call (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 2001).

Table 15: Average SAPP Scores, 1997- 2001 Asian/ Pacific

African Native

Year Islander American Hispanic American White Women Men

GS- 14 assessment center

1997 87.33 83. 92 80.57 87. 50 86.20 86. 18 85.12 1998 81.67 82. 88 83.74
91. 00 86.14 84. 11 85.36 1999 85.67 82. 85 85.51 83. 00 85.36 84. 44
85.17 2000 85.71 82. 85 81.83 81. 00 85.96 84. 13 85.35 2001 82.20 83. 53
82.75 a 86. 13 85.06 85. 28

GS- 15 assessment center

1997 a 81. 08 85.32 a 86. 57 86.88 85. 32 1998 84.50 81. 75 84.80 a 86. 63
88.00 84. 81 1999 82.50 80. 45 84.50 93. 00 86.29 81. 75 85.41 2000 92.00
83. 90 82.75 a 85. 63 87.50 84. 82 2001 81.40 84. 87 80.09 86. 00 85.99
87. 20 85.14 Source: DEA.

a No member of group participated.

The SAPP scores are used to establish score bands that determine which
special agents make the best- qualified list for GS- 14 and GS- 15
vacancies. 49 Under the SAPP, the size of the score band for GS- 14
positions is 10 points, while the score band for GS- 15 positions is 11
points. The actual score band for a particular vacancy is determined by
the applicant with the highest SAPP score. For GS- 14 positions, for
example, if the highest- scoring applicant has a SAPP score of 95, the
score band for that vacancy is 86 to 95; and applicants with scores of at
least 86 would be placed on the bestqualified list. Similarly, if the
highest- scoring applicant for a GS- 15 vacancy has a SAPP score of 95,
the score band for that vacancy is 85 to 95, and

applicants with scores of at least 85 would be placed on the best-
qualified list.

49 The score bands are designed to help ensure that candidates having
similar levels of knowledge and abilities are not penalized because of
errors of measurement. The use of score bands is based on the rationale
that the measurement of abilities using predictor tests results in some
error with each candidate. The measurement error associated with tests
means that small differences in scores do not allow one to definitively
say that one candidate will do better than another on a job.

SAC/ Office Head Once a best- qualified list is assembled for a particular
vacancy, it is sent to

Recommendations the office with the vacancy to obtain the SAC*s (or office
head*s)

recommendations for promotion. The SAC*s recommendation is solicited
because DEA believes that he or she is more familiar with the requirements
of the position to be filled and is in a better position to assess
candidates* qualifications from their biographical and other information.
A SAC typically recommends three individuals. The SAC/ office head
recommendation process was at the heart of the September 1999 district

court decision that found that the process had not been validated and
resulted in African American applicants receiving recommendations at
statistically significant lower rates that whites. In addition to not
having been validated, there was no format in place at the time of the
1999

decision to assure that SACs evaluated candidates using knowledge, skills,
and abilities relevant to the vacant job. Following the court decision,
which required DEA to either drop the SAC/ office head recommendation
process or stop making promotions to GS- 14 and GS- 15 special agent
positions until the use of the recommendations could be validated as job
related, DEA and the plaintiffs reached a court- approved agreement
allowing SAC/ office head recommendations and promotions under certain
terms and

conditions until a permanent, validated process could be implemented. The
interim process, which was implemented in January 2000 and was still in
place as of March 2003, requires that a SAC provide information about why
a candidate is better suited for the position under consideration,
including his or her experience and success in job- related competencies
(see app. III), when making recommendations.

Despite the changes to the process, differences in SAC/ office head
recommendation rates for applicants seeking promotion to GS- 14 and GS15
positions continued. For GS- 14 and GS- 15 vacancy announcements that
resulted in a promotion during fiscal years 2000 and 2001, we analyzed the
number of times applicants on the best- qualified list received SAC/
office head recommendations, compared with the number of times applicants
appeared on best- qualified lists. (An applicant can apply for multiple
positions and appear on multiple best- qualified lists.) We found that for
promotions to GS- 14, African American and Hispanic special agents
received SAC/ office head recommendations at statistically significant
lower rates than white special agents. For GS- 15 positions, African
American special agents received SAC/ office head recommendations at
statistically significant lower rates than whites. Table 16 shows the
frequency of applicants on best- qualified lists being recommended by
SACs, 2000- 2001.

Table 16: Frequency of Applicants Appearing on Best- Qualified Lists Being
Recommended by SACs, 2000- 01 Asian/ Pacific

African Native

Recommended for Islander American Hispanic American White Women Men

GS- 14 promotions 28.2% 6.0% 6.8% 16. 7% 15.2% 11. 7% 12.9% GS- 15
promotions 33.3% 5.5% 8.2% a 10.8% 12. 6% 9. 6% Source: GAO analysis of
DEA data.

a Small numbers of applicants do not allow for statistical analysis.

At the time of our review, DEA, working with members of the Monitoring
Committee and other special agents, had developed a revised recommendation
process. The Working Group approved the revised process and said that it
met the requirements of content validity as described in the Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. A

major change under this process requires that a panel of three GS- 14,
GS15, or SES special agents at the location with a vacancy review and rank
applicants on a best- qualified list based on job- related competencies
(see app. III) and any special requirements of the position. The SAC would
make

his or her promotion recommendations from this list, providing a
comprehensive justification in recommending an individual not ranked among
the top three applicants. As part of its review and evaluation of the
proposed process, DEA*s plan for oversight of the SAC/ office head
recommendation process included tracking the race of each person (1)
appearing on a best qualified list, (2) recommended by a SAC, and (3)
selected for promotion, and report these results periodically to the

Segar plaintiffs* counsel. However, the plan did not specifically include
tracking results by gender. At the end of our fieldwork, the plaintiffs
and DEA were involved in mediation efforts in order to reach final
agreement

on the recommendation process, particularly with regard to procedures for
monitoring the implementation of the process. Approval by the court is
required to complete settlement on this issue.

Career Board Selections Promotion decisions for GS- 14 and GS- 15 special
agent positions are made following deliberations by DEA*s Career Board.
The Career Board*s 11

voting members, who are DEA senior executives, make promotion
recommendations by majority vote to the Career Board Chair, who

ultimately has responsibility and authority to make the selection
decision. 50 DEA makes promotion decisions on a position- by- position
basis when vacancies become available, with a best- qualified list
assembled for each vacancy based on applicants* SAPP scores. However,
minorities and women do not appear on a substantial portion of best-
qualified lists because they do not apply for particular vacancies or
because their SAPP scores are not high enough to place them among the best
qualified. 51 We analyzed the results of 641 promotions to GS- 14
positions and 204

promotions to GS- 15 during fiscal years 1997 through 2001 and found that,
despite differences in SAC/ office head recommendation rates, there were
no statistically significant differences in the rates at which the Career

Board selected minorities and women for promotion. Our analysis showed
only small differences in the rates at which African American, Hispanic,
and white special agents were selected for promotion to GS- 14 and GS- 15
positions. The numbers of Asian/ Pacific Islanders and Native Americans
eligible for promotion were too small for statistical analysis. Although
women were somewhat less likely than men to be selected for promotion,
this difference was not statistically significant. Table 17 shows the
number of individuals on best qualified lists from which promotions were
made and the number selected for promotion by EEO group for fiscal years
1997- 2001.

50 In November 2002, the Career Board was increased from 10 to 11 voting
members. At the same time, the number of SACs sitting on the board
increased from 4 to 6, each serving timelimited tenures. The Administrator
said that he made these changes to achieve rotation, greater
participation, and transparency.

51 African Americans were represented on 71.5 percent, Hispanics on 57.4
percent, and women on 58.2 percent of GS- 14 best- qualified lists from
which promotions were made during fiscal years 1997 through 2001. In
addition, African Americans were represented on 87.3 percent, Hispanics on
81.9 percent, and women on 65.2 percent of GS- 15 best- qualified lists
from which promotions were made during this period.

Table 17: Individuals on at Least One Best- Qualified List from Which
Promotions Were Made and Individuals Selected for Promotion, by EEO Group,
Fiscal Years 1997- 2001

Asian/ Pacific

African Native

Islander American Hispanic American White Women Men Promotions to GS- 14

Individuals on best- qualified lists 20 98 95 10 740 73 890 Number
selected 14 64 65 7 491 44 597 Percentage selected 70.0% 65. 3% 68.4%
70.0% 66.4% 60. 3% 67.1%

Promotions to GS- 15

Individuals on best- qualified lists 4 33 41 2 241 25 296 Number selected
1 20 26 1 156 14 190 Percentage selected 25.0% 60. 6% 63.4% 50.0% 64.7%
56. 0% 64.2% Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

DEA*s Discipline DEA*s centralized disciplinary system was put in place in
1984 and, in 1988,

was found to meet the court*s requirements for being effective and Process
Has Been

nondiscriminatory. 52 The three- tiered system separates the
responsibilities Found to Be

for investigating an allegation, proposing disposition, and making a final
Nondiscriminatory

agency decision. Our analysis of disciplinary data for fiscal years 1997
through 2001 showed that the proportion of African American, Hispanic, and
women special agents disciplined was substantially higher than their
representation in the DEA special agent workforce. This situation reflects
that African American, Hispanic, and women special agents had a
proportionately higher number of allegations of misconduct lodged against
them and that a higher proportion of these allegations were substantiated
by investigations and resulted in disciplinary action. Nonetheless, the
results of two studies by outside contractors, approved by the Working
Group, found DEA*s disciplinary process to be fair and nondiscriminatory.
DEA*s Validated Discipline

DEA*s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) is responsible for
System

investigating all allegations of integrity violations (illegal or improper
52 The court approved a stipulation between the parties that the
disciplinary system met the court*s requirements.

conduct) and the vast majority of allegations of misconduct involving
violations of DEA*s Standards of Conduct. 53 OPR investigations are
findings of fact and do not contain conclusions or recommendations.

The Board of Professional Conduct reviews investigation files in order to
propose a disposition for a matter. 54 In each case, 55 two board members
independently review the investigation report, the employee*s official
personnel record, and how similar cases have been handled, and propose a
disposition using the preponderance of the evidence standard. 56 Board
members are also to consider mitigating and aggravating factors known as
the Douglas factors* derived from a Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
57 decision* in determining the appropriateness of a disciplinary action.
58 The board*s chairman reviews their recommendations and the
investigative file and issues the board*s proposed disposition. The board
can propose that a special agent be cleared of alleged charges, receive a
letter of caution, 59 or be disciplined (receive a letter of reprimand, or
be

suspended, demoted, or removed). The final agency decision is made by one
of two deciding officials in headquarters using the preponderance of the
evidence standard, after independently reviewing the proposed action and
the investigation file and

53 The Department of Justice Inspector General reviews all complaints OPR
receives and can decide to take the investigative lead. 54 Investigations
involving senior executives are forwarded to the Department of Justice for
disposition. 55 The board also reviews investigations of shooting
incidents, accidents involving official

government vehicles, and damage or loss of government property. 56 The
degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the
record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested
fact is more likely to be true than untrue.

57 MSPB hears and decides appeals by federal employees of actions taken
against them by their agencies. 58 Curtis Douglas v. Veterans
Administration, 5 MSPR 280, 5 MSPB 313 (1981). The factors include the
nature, seriousness, and notoriety of the offense; the position of the
employee; past work and disciplinary record; effect of an offense on the
employee*s ability to perform his or her job; and consistency with the
agency*s penalty guide.

59 A letter of caution is nondisciplinary in nature and issued in
situations in which a charge is not sustained but the employee needs to be
warned about the appearance of impropriety or situations in which a charge
is sustained but does not warrant disciplinary action.

consulting with employee relations specialists and the DEA Chief Counsel*s
office. The deciding officials also apply the Douglas factors and other
legal precedents. As part of the final decision process, an employee is
provided the opportunity to review all evidence and make written and/ or
oral responses to the disciplinary charges. Higher Proportion of

Our analysis of disciplinary data for fiscal years 1997 to 2001 showed
that African American, Hispanic,

the proportion of African American, Hispanic, and women special agents and
Women Special Agents

disciplined was substantially higher than their representation in the DEA
Disciplined

special agent workforce and that this difference was statistically
significant. During this period, African American special agents accounted
for 16.2 percent of the agents disciplined, while making up 8.3 percent of
the special agent workforce; Hispanics were 15.2 percent of agents
disciplined, while making up 8.9 percent of the special agent workforce;
and women were 12.7 percent of special agents disciplined but 7.8 percent
of the special agent workforce. Table 18 shows special agents disciplined,
compared with special agent population, by EEO group for fiscal years
1997- 2001.

Table 18: Special Agents Disciplined Compared with Special Agent
Population, by EEO Group, Fiscal Years 1997- 2001 Asian/ Pacific

African Native

Islander American Hispanic American White Women Men Total

Total disciplined 9 66 62 0 271 52 356 408

Percentage of total 2. 2% 16. 2% 15.2% 0. 0% 66.4% 12.7% 87. 3% 100.0%

disciplined Representation in special 2. 0% 8.3% 8.9% 0. 6% 80.3% 7.8% 92.
2% 100.0%

agent workforce Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

We identified two factors that help explain why a higher proportion of
African American, Hispanic, and women special agents were disciplined. One
factor is that a proportionately higher number of allegations of
misconduct were lodged against African American, Hispanic, and women,
compared with their representation in the special agent workforce. These
differences, shown in table 19, were statistically significant.

Table 19: Distribution of Cases of Alleged Misconduct Involving Special
Agents, by EEO Group, Compared with Workforce Representation, Fiscal Years
1997- 2001

Asian/ Pacific

African Islander American Hispanic Native American White Women Men

Percentage of allegations 1.5% 12.8% 13. 3% 0. 1% 72.3% 10.5% 89. 5%
Representation in special 2.0% 8.3% 8.9% 0.6% 80.3% 7.8% 92. 2% agent
workforce Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

The second factor that helps explain why a higher proportion of African
American, Hispanic, and women special agents are disciplined is that a
higher proportion of allegations levied against them are found after
investigation to have merit and lead to disciplinary action. These
differences, shown in table 20, were statistically significant.

Table 20: Cases of Alleged Misconduct Involving Special Agents That
Resulted in Disciplinary Action, by EEO Group, Fiscal Years 1997- 2001

Asian/ Pacific

African Native

Tot al Islander American Hispanic American White Women Men

Percentage of cases resulting in discipline 47.0% 64.3% a 59. 5% 53. 4% b
43. 2% 57.1% 45. 8%

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data. Note: Does not include cases
administratively closed without a final decision. a Although the
percentage of cases involving Asian/ Pacific Islanders resulting in
disciplinary action is

larger than the figures for African Americans, Hispanics, and women, this
percentage is not statistically different from the percentage for whites.
b Small numbers prevented statistical analysis of allegations and
disciplinary actions.

DEA does not know why nor does any study offer a reason why African
American, Hispanic, and women special agents had proportionately higher
numbers of allegations of misconduct lodged against them or why a higher
proportion of these allegations were substantiated by investigations and
resulted in disciplinary actions. Concerns with DEA*s In performing our
analysis, we found discrepancies between the Disciplinary Data

disciplinary data maintained by the DEA Chief Counsel*s office that were

reported to us and data the DEA Office of Equal Opportunity reported to
the Monitoring Committee. We brought these discrepancies to DEA*s
attention, and significant time was needed to develop corrected data. The
corrected data showed that data reported by the Chief Counsel*s office
were incomplete while data reported by the Office of Equal Opportunity
counted some cases twice. Accurate and reliable data are important to DEA
monitoring its disciplinary process. At the time of our review, DEA

was looking into but had not developed a process to help ensure accurate
and reliable reporting of disciplinary data.

Studies Have Found DEA*s Two studies done by outside contractors, which we
found to be

Disciplinary Process to Be methodologically sound, have found DEA*s
disciplinary process to be fair

Fair and Nondiscriminatory and nondiscriminatory. The first study, done
under a contract awarded by

the Working Group in order for DEA to comply with the court order in the

Segar case, analyzed 318 disciplinary cases for the period September 1982
through June 1986 to determine whether disciplinary action taken was
consistent with the offense or offenses committed and whether special
agents were treated alike regardless of race. 60 Of the 318 cases, 239
cases (75. 2 percent) involved white special agents, 32 (10.1 percent)
involved African Americans, 36 (11. 3 percent) involved Hispanics, and 11
(3. 5 percent) involved other racial/ ethnic groups. The percentage of
African

American and Hispanic special agents disciplined was higher than their
representation in the special agent workforce. African Americans, who were
10.1 percent of the agents disciplined, made up about 8.5 percent of the
special agent workforce during the period, and Hispanics, who were 11.3
percent of the agents disciplined, made up 10.2 percent of the special
agent workforce. Women were 3. 2 percent of agents disciplined while
making up 7.6 percent of the special agent workforce.

The study*s results, issued in April 1987 and approved by the Working
Group, concluded that, based on statistical analysis, there appeared to be
no discrimination against minorities in general, and African Americans in
particular, with regard to the number of individuals recommended for

discipline, the severity of the proposed punishment, or the severity of
the actual punishment carried out as related to the severity of the
offense. The study also found a strong relationship between the severity
of the charge and the discipline ultimately meted out. The study found
that although

60 A Study of the Drug Enforcement Administration*s Current Conduct and
Discipline System, Advanced Research Resources Organization, Bethesda,
Md.: Apr. 1987.

African American special agents were charged on average with more serious
offenses than white special agents, there were no statistically
significant differences in the discipline decisions as a function of the
severity of the charges. Although the study did not identify the cause for
African Americans being charged with more serious offenses, it raised but
did not examine whether, race, type of assignment, or small sample size of
the study could have been factors.

The second study, done at the request of the Monitoring Committee and
Working Group, examined whether there were differences in the discipline
administered to white versus African American special agents during
calendar years 1994- 2000. 61 Of 365 disciplinary cases of special agents
during this period, 237 (64.9 percent) involved whites, 58 (15.9 percent)

involved African Americans, 58 (15.9 percent) involved Hispanics, 6 (1. 6
percent) involved Asian/ Pacific Islanders, and 3 (0.8 percent) involved
Native Americans. There was no race information in 3 cases. In addition,
no

breakout by gender was reported. The study methodology was developed so
that the results could be applied to any protected group, but because the
study was done in the context of the Segar case, only discipline
administered to African American and white special agents was analyzed.
According to the report, issued in August 2001 and approved by the

Working Group, there were no statistically significant differences in the
imposition of discipline between African American and white special agents
for any offense or violation category. The study also concluded that the
data *decisively and unequivocally* showed no differences between African
American and white special agents in terms of the severity of the
punishment administered, which the study said confirmed the integrity of
the discipline process. Although the data reported by the study showed
that the percentage of African American special agents disciplined (15.9
percent of agents disciplined) was higher than the group*s representation
in the workforce (less than 9 percent), the study did not analyze the
relationship between the number of African Americans disciplined and their
representation in the special agent workforce. 62

61 Frank J. Landy, Drug Enforcement Administration Discipline System
Study, SHL Landy Jacobs: Litigation Support Group, Boulder, Colo.: Aug. 8,
2001. 62 The situation was similar for Hispanic special agents. Although
less than 9 percent of the special agent workforce, Hispanics accounted
for 15.9 percent of the agents disciplined during the study period.

The integrity of DEA*s discipline process from a legal perspective was
also evident in MSPB decisions. Employees can appeal removals, demotions,
and suspensions of more than 14 days to MSPB and, during, fiscal years
1997- 2001, MSPB decided the cases of 28 DEA special agents. 63 Of the 28
cases, MSPB affirmed DEA*s actions in 24 cases (85. 7 percent), affirmed
some or all of the charges and mitigated the penalty in 2 cases (7. 1
percent), and reversed DEA*s actions in 2 cases (7.1 percent). In

comparison, governmentwide, MSPB reversed 22 percent of agency decisions
in fiscal year 2001. A Justice Department review of fiscal year 1997
Justice cases before MSPB found that, among department components, DEA had
the highest affirmation rate, which was attributed to the quality of
documentation and evidence supporting charges. The report said that DEA*s
centralized disciplinary system provides for impartiality and consistency
in developing defensible disciplinary actions.

Employee Views on As agreed with your office, during our review, we spoke
with minority and

Promotion and women special agents, including members of the Monitoring
Committee as

well as members of the Hispanic Advisory and Asian- American Advisory
Discipline Committees, to obtain their views on promotion and discipline
issues. 64 Our work has found that high- performing organizations promote
a diverse and inclusive workforce and have workplaces in which perceptions
of unfairness are minimized. 65 However, comments of many of the minority
and female special agents with whom we spoke indicated that they believed
trust and fairness were lacking with regard to the promotion and
discipline processes. For example, members of these committees said they
perceived that their groups were underrepresented in promotions to GS- 14
and GS- 15 and that selection outcomes were frequently based on *who you
63 Includes initial appeals and Board reviews of initial decisions
regarding the same individual.

64 We recognize that the views of the members of the committees may not
necessarily represent the views of their constituents. Also, there was no
group of nonminority special agents to which we could speak. We recognize
that the views of nonminority special agents could be different from the
views of the minority agents.

65 For a discussion of this and other attributes of high performing
organizations, see U. S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic
Human Capital Management, GAO- 02- 373SP (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 15,
2002); Human Capital: Practices That Empowered Employees, GAO- 01- 1070
(Washington, D. C.: Sept. 14, 2001); and Human Capital: Key Principles
from Nine Private Sector Organizations, GAO/ GGD- 00- 28 (Washington, D.
C.: Jan. 31, 2000).

know.* These special agents said that candidates, especially in field
divisions, may have been disadvantaged because of a lack of personal
knowledge of an agent among the board members. The November 2002 change to
increase the number of SACs serving as rotating members was

made to address this concern. Another concern the minority special agents
expressed was about the board*s racial, ethnic, and gender representation.
However, in January 2003, the Career Board included two African Americans,
two Hispanics, one Native American, and six whites; one of the members was
a woman. During the 1997- 2002 time frame, the board had a similar makeup.

One additional concern of many of the minority special agents with whom we
spoke was the perceived unfairness in the discipline process. These agents
said that they believed that minorities were subject to more scrutiny and,
as a result, were disproportionately investigated for misconduct. A number
of the agents also said that they perceived that there were
inconsistencies in punishment meted out, with minorities receiving harsher

punishment. Our work showed that African American, Hispanic, and women
special agents had a proportionately higher number of allegations of
misconduct lodged against them and that a higher proportion of these
allegations were substantiated by investigations and resulted in
disciplinary actions. However, the results of two studies by outside
contractors, approved by an oversight group and which we found
methodologically sound, found DEA*s disciplinary process to be fair and
nondiscriminatory.

The perceptions minority and women special agents have with regard to
fairness in promotions and discipline may be driven by an absence of data
and other information. For example, DEA had not shared the racial analysis
of its promotion actions or SAC/ office head recommendations with its
special agent workforce, except the Monitoring Committee. 66 Our analysis
of promotions to GS- 14 and GS- 15 special agent positions for fiscal
years 1997 through 2001 showed no statistically significant differences in
the promotion rates among the racial, ethnic, and gender groups. In
addition, DEA only shared the results of the 2001 discipline study, which
found no statistically significant differences in the imposition of
discipline between

African American and white special agents, with the Monitoring 66 Because
the Segar case had remained under court supervision, DEA provided the
Monitoring Committee with the results of promotion decisions, breaking out
the data by African American, white, and other, though not by gender.

Committee. On the other hand, although the study methodology was developed
so that the results could be applied to any protected group, the study was
done in the context of the Segar case and examined only discipline
administered to African American and white special agents. However, it
appears that discipline actions taken against Hispanics were to have been
included in the study, according to a memo from a former DEA

Administrator to the Hispanic Advisory Council. Neither council members
nor DEA officials could explain why this did not occur. As we discuss in
our exposure draft A Model of Strategic Human Capital

Management, our work in the human capital area has shown that leading
organizations promote an inclusive workforce by seeking employee input and
using that input to adjust their human capital approaches. 67 DEA has
taken, or plans to take, some steps in this regard. One step was that, as
DEA*s study of a valid SAC/ office head recommendation process progressed,
the agency involved minorities, in addition to Monitoring Committee
representatives that had been involved, and women. Also, the November 2002
changes to the structure of the Career Board were based on input from the
Monitoring Committee and other special agents, and, according to the
Administrator*s memo announcing the change, were

intended to bring transparency and greater participation to the promotion
process. Furthermore, in March 2002, the Administrator established an
ombudsman office 68 to address workplace conflicts, facilitate fair and
equitable resolutions to concerns, and serve as an advisor and information
and communications resource. The ombudsperson said that she had handled a
variety of matters, mostly involving special agents, including issues
concerning performance appraisals and Career Board decisions to reassign
agents.

Conclusions At some steps of DEA*s hiring process, a higher percentage of
minorities do not meet the requirements to become a special agent, with
African American and Hispanic applicants hired at substantially lower
rates compared with white applicants. DEA has not analyzed why some groups
of applicants have lower passing rates and whether alternative procedures

67 GAO- 02- 373SP. 68 For additional information about ombudsmen in the
federal workplace, see U. S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: The
Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution, GAO01- 466 (Washington, D. C.:
Apr. 13, 2001).

could lessen these differences without compromising the high standards
necessary to perform the job successfully. Furthermore, because a large
number of applicants drop out or do not meet hiring standards, DEA offers
employment to virtually all applicants it finds suitable, leaving the
agency with little choice in whom it hires. DEA has not performed a
workforce analysis that takes into account expected attrition of the
special agent workforce, especially due to retirements, that could help
the agency plan for a sufficiently large pool of suitable special agent
candidates with diverse cultural and skills backgrounds from which it
could selectively

hire. Promotions of special agents to supervisory GS- 14 and GS- 15
positions have not shown statistically significant differences among
groups. However, DEA*s rigorous promotion process has been subject to
litigation surrounding the SAC/ office head recommendation process, the
step in the

overall promotion process that had not been validated. DEA has since
developed a revised recommendation process and proposed a monitoring
process that the agency and the plaintiffs are discussing to reach
agreement about and which still must be court approved. However, the
proposed monitoring process does not take gender into account.

The proportion of African American, Hispanic, and women special agents
disciplined for misconduct was substantially higher than their
representation in the DEA special agent workforce. However, two studies
have found DEA*s discipline process to be valid and fair, but neither of
the studies addressed differences in the rates at which different groups
were disciplined, and the second study compared only disciplinary actions
involving African American and white special agents. Reliable data would
be necessary to carry out a study covering all race, ethnic, and gender
groups, and our analysis of disciplinary actions was delayed by the lack
of reliable data. Although DEA eventually developed corrected data, the
agency has not developed a process to maintain accurate and reliable
disciplinary data.

Finally, minority and female special agents with whom we spoke generally
perceived that the promotion and discipline processes lacked fairness.
Perceptions of unfairness can be almost as corrosive to the workplace as
actual instances of unfair treatment and can undermine trust. Because DEA

did not widely share analyses of promotion and disciplinary actions with
its special agent workforce, agents were hindered in formulating informed
views about the fairness and equity of the promotion and discipline
processes. This situation would continue under DEA*s proposal for

monitoring the promotion process because reporting of outcomes would be
limited to the African American special agents plaintiff group.

Recommendations for We recommend that the Administrator of DEA direct that

Executive Action  a process be initiated to monitor the results of
decisions at the various

steps in the hiring process to identify differences in selection rates
among groups, and where substantial differences are found, determine why
they occur and what, if anything, can be done to reduce the differences
while maintaining the high standards necessary for the job of special
agent;

 a workforce analysis be done, which takes into account retirement
eligibility, expected retirements, and other attrition, to guide the
development of DEA*s recruiting and hiring plans and strategies;

 the plans to monitor the results of the SAC/ office head recommendation
process by race and ethnicity be expanded to include monitoring by gender;
 steps be taken to develop, maintain, and ensure the reliability of a

discipline database and that the study of disciplinary actions taken
against African American and white special agents be expanded to analyze
disciplinary actions against all racial, ethnic, and gender groups of
special agents; and

 appropriate, aggregate statistical data on the outcomes of the promotion
and discipline processes for all racial, ethnic, and gender groups are
available to its special agent workforce to help special agents formulate
informed views about the fairness and equity of the agency*s promotion and
discipline processes.

Agency Comments and In commenting on a draft of this report, the Acting
Administrator of DEA

Our Evaluation agreed with our recommendations and said that DEA was
acting to

implement them. (See app. IV for the text of the comments.) Regarding
hiring of special agents, DEA said it will monitor the results of
decisions at the various steps in the hiring process to identify
differences in selection rates. DEA*s response said that it would identify
differences

among minority groups but did not specifically mention gender differences.
DEA should examine differences in selection rates among all groups,
including gender groups. DEA also said that it will conduct a study to
review each part of the special agent hiring process. The study will
include analysis of processes used by other law enforcement agencies to
identify alternative strategies that might lessen differences in selection
rates.

DEA agreed with our recommendation that a workforce analysis be done to
guide the development of recruiting and hiring plans and strategies. DEA
said that it will analyze its workforce to determine the portion eligible
for, or who anticipates, retirement, and to identify other attrition
concerns for

the agency and use the results to guide the development of its recruiting
and hiring plans and strategies.

DEA also agreed with our recommendation to monitor the SAC/ office head
recommendation process for all EEO groups, including by gender. DEA said
that, if it is put in place, its monitoring plan will include evaluating
results for all demographics of the workforce, including race, ethnicity,
and gender. Regarding the reliability of discipline data, DEA said that it
agreed with our

recommendation and had begun an effort to consolidate multiple discipline
databases. With regard to our recommendation that DEA expand the study of
disciplinary actions taken against African American and white special
agents to analyze disciplinary actions against all racial, ethnic, and
gender groups of special agents, DEA said that it will do so.

Finally, DEA concurred with our recommendation to make statistical data on
the outcomes of the promotion and discipline processes for all racial,
gender, and ethnic groups available to its special agent workforce. DEA
said that it will make available aggregate statistical data concerning
promotion selections and types of misconduct found.

Overall, the actions DEA describes, when fully implemented, should meet
our recommendations. DEA also provided technical comments, which we
incorporated in the report where appropriate. As agreed with your office,
unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after its date. We will then send copies of this report to the Attorney
General, the Administrator of DEA, and interested congressional
committees. We will

also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on GAO*s Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please call me at
(202) 512- 6806 or Thomas Dowdal, Assistant Director, on (202) 512- 6588.
Key contributors to this assignment were Anthony Lofaro, Domingo Nieves,
and

Gregory Wilmoth. Sincerely yours,

Victor S. Rezendes Managing Director, Strategic Issues

Appendi Appendi xes I x Objectives, Scope, and Methodology In her letter
of May 25, 2001, Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson expressed concerns
about discrimination in the Drug Enforcement Administration*s (DEA)
hiring, promotion, and discipline processes. Based on discussions with her
office, we agreed to (1) develop information on the diversity of DEA*s
special agent workforce and (2) examine the processes DEA has put in place
to provide for fair and nondiscriminatory hiring, promotion, and
disciplining of special agents and the results that have been achieved.

DEA Special Agent With regard to the diversity of DEA*s special agent
workforce, we Workforce Diversity

developed information by race, ethnicity, and gender for each pay grade,
using data from the Office of Personnel Management*s (OPM) Central
Personnel Data File (CPDF) as of September 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and
2000, and data from DEA as of September 2002. We selected these dates to
show changes, if any, that had occurred in DEA*s special agent workforce
from around the initial decision of the U. S. District Court for the
District of Columbia in 1981 with regard to a class action racial
discrimination lawsuit brought against DEA by the agency*s African
American special agents 1 through the end of fiscal year 2002. To compare
the racial, ethnic, and

gender composition of the DEA special agent (criminal investigator job
occupation series 1811) workforce with other criminal investigator
workforces, we used data OPM provided for criminal investigators
governmentwide and the nonfederal law enforcement labor force, a measure
that includes nonfederal law enforcement and security- related occupations
that are considered comparable to the 1811 occupational series by the OPM,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Department of Labor.
In addition, we obtained overall federal workforce diversity data as of
September 2002 from OPM. We determined based on our past work 2 that the
CPDF data are sufficiently reliable for the purpose used in this report.

1 Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690 (D. D. C. 1981), aff*d in relevant
part subnom. Segar v. Smith, 738 F. 2d 1249 (D. C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied subnom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U. S. 1115 (1985).

2 U. S. General Accounting Office, OPM*s Central Personnel Data File: Data
Appear Sufficiently Reliable to Meet Most Customer Needs, GAO/ GGD- 98-
199 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 30, 1998).

DEA*s Hiring, To determine the DEA processes for hiring, promoting, and
disciplining

Promotion, and special agents and the results that have been achieved, we
reviewed

relevant DEA policies and procedures and interviewed knowledgeable
Discipline Processes

DEA officials. In addition, we spoke with employee representatives,
including members of the Monitoring Committee, a court- established group
of African American special agents representing plaintiff class members;
the Hispanic Advisory Council; and the Asian- American Advisory Counsel.
Further, we spoke with the members of the Working Group that was

established to help ensure that the orders of the court are carried out
and that DEA*s personnel practices are nondiscriminatory. With regard to
developing information about the job- relatedness of DEA*s hiring,
promotion, and discipline processes, we spoke with DEA officials, Working
Group members, and contractors who had studied the processes and reviewed
available studies and other documentation.

In analyzing results, we compared each racial and ethnic group and
compared men of all races/ ethnicities with women of all races/
ethnicities. In addition to this level of analysis, where there were a
sufficient number of individuals, we analyzed data for men and women
within each race and ethnic group. In analyzing differences in how racial,
ethnic, and gender groups fared in DEA*s hiring process, we used the 80
percent rule set out in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures. 3 Under this rule, a selection rate for any race, ethnic, or
gender group that is less than 80 percent of the selection rate for the
group with the highest rate is generally considered a substantially
different rate of selection. In analyzing promotion and disciplinary
actions, we applied standard statistical tests to determine if there were
statistically significant differences among the racial, ethnic, and gender
groups. We used statistical techniques in these analyses to be consistent
with how other studies of DEA*s promotion and discipline process were
conducted. Our analyses generally covered fiscal years 1997- 2001, except
as noted below, and were not designed to prove or disprove discrimination.
Rather, they were designed to provide information

about race, ethnicity, and gender differences in DEA*s hiring, promotion,
and disciplinary actions.

3 The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, adopted in 1978
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Civil Service
Commission (the predecessor agency to OPM), and the departments of Justice
and Labor, provide a uniform set of principles governing use of employee
selection procedures and identifying adverse impact (29 C. F. R. Part
1607).

Hiring Results We analyzed the results of DEA*s screening of special agent
applicants at each step of the hiring process on applications received
under two vacancy announcements* BA- 98- 01, which was open from October
15, 1997, through March 7, 2000, and BA- 20- 00, which opened on May 8,
2000, and remained open during our review. We selected these two
announcements to facilitate an analysis of (1) the effect of changes to
eligibility criteria and written assessment scoring beginning with BA- 20-
00 and (2) final hiring rates. We examined DEA*s screening actions on
applicants from October 15, 1997, through March 31, 2002, analyzing the
data by race, ethnicity, and

gender. Data we analyzed were provided by DEA from the agency*s Agent
Recruiting and Tracking System (ARTS), which tracks applications received,
the status of applicants, decisions on applicant eligibility at each step
of the hiring process, and final hiring decision. We examined ARTS data
and concluded that the data were reliable for our purposes because the
disposition of applications reconciled with applications processed.

With regard to suitability determinations DEA made on applicants based on
the results of psychological and polygraph examinations and background
investigations, we reviewed two sets of data. First, we reviewed data
recorded in ARTS to provide an overall picture on the outcomes of
suitability determinations. Because about 80 percent of suitability
determinations are made by a three- person panel, we reviewed data
maintained by the panel on its decisions. However, because the panel*s
database had only been initiated for decisions on or after September 29,
2000, we only reviewed panel decisions from September 29, 2000, through
May 7, 2002. To gain an understanding of materials the panel considers in

making its determinations, we reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of
applicant suitability determination case files. Promotion Results Our
analysis of promotions focused on competitive promotions to General

Schedule grade levels 14 and 15 special agent positions. We reviewed three
elements of the promotion process: the Special Agent Promotion Program
(SAPP), which uses performance ratings and job simulation exercises to
measure knowledge and abilities to perform at the next grade level;
promotion recommendations that Special Agents in Charge or other office

heads make to the Career Board, the body that makes final promotion
recommendations and whose chair makes the final selections; and the final
selections. We analyzed data by race, ethnicity, and gender. With regard
to the SAPP, we analyzed data contained in annual reports on the SAPP for

1997 through 2001. SAPP results and the reports had been reviewed and

approved by the Working Group. For recommendations and selections, we
examined actions related to best- qualified certificates for vacancies
from which promotions were made for fiscal years 1997 through 2001. 4 We
obtained data from DEA on the number and demographic profile of

applicants on the best- qualified lists, the number of them who received
recommendations, and the number selected. Because applicants can appear on
multiple best- qualified lists, we also obtained an unduplicated count of
the number of applicants on the best- qualified lists and the number who
received recommendations. To check the reliability of the data DEA
provided to us, we compared the minutes of Career Board deliberations on
promotion decisions to data reported to the Monitoring Committee.

Discipline Results With regard to disciplinary actions, we analyzed data
by race, ethnicity, and gender for cases resolved during fiscal years 1997
through 2001. For these

cases, we determined the number and demographic profile of special agents
against whom allegations of misconduct were made, the disposition of their
cases, and the nature of disciplinary actions taken. However, in
performing our analysis, we found discrepancies between the data

maintained by DEA*s Chief Counsel*s office that were reported to us and
the data the Office of Equal Opportunity reported to the Monitoring
Committee. We brought these discrepancies to DEA*s attention. After some
delay, DEA provided us with corrected data. We performed a limited
verification of the corrected data and found them to be reliable. In
addition

to our analysis of disciplinary data, we reviewed the two studies of DEA*s
disciplinary process performed by contractors as well as a report prepared
by the Justice Department. In addition, we reviewed the disposition of

appeals by special agents to the Merit Systems Protection Board. We
performed our work from September 2001 through February 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

4 The promotion fiscal year begins October 22 of each year.

Appendi I I x Physical Task Test Minimum Requirements The minimum
requirements in each of the six tasks that applicants for Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) special agent positions must meet to pass the
physical task test are shown in table 21.

Tabl e 21: DEA Physical Task Test Minimum Performance Requirements Task
Women Men

Trigger pull a 29 pulls of a handgun trigger in same 30 seconds with
stronger hand Pull- ups (number) b 10 2

Sit- ups (number 46 46 within 2 minutes) Push- ups (number) 14 25

120- yard shuttle run No longer than 29 seconds No longer than 26 seconds
2- mile run No longer than 18: 45 minutes No longer than 16: 30 minutes
Source: DEA. a Eliminated in March 2003.

b The pull- up test for women is performed using a horizontal bar mounted
3 feet from the floor and 2 feet from the wall. A woman begins the pull-
up lying on her back. The pull- up test for men is performed using a
horizontal bar mounted above the floor and out- of- reach of the subject.
A man begins the pullup hanging from the horizontal bar.

Competencies in Assessing GS- 13 and GS- 14

Appendi I I I x Special Agents for Promotion Performance Rating In the
Special Agent Promotion Program (SAPP) performance rating, Competencies
for General Schedule (GS) grade 13 special agents are evaluated on seven

competencies and GS- 14 special agents are evaluated on eight GS- 13 and
GS- 14

competencies, as table 22 shows. Special Agents

Table 22: Performance Rating Competencies for GS- 13 and GS- 14 Special
Agents Competencies rated Competency

GS- 13 GS- 14

Written communication X Acting as a model X X Gathering information and
making judgments/ decisions X X Interacting with others X X Monitoring and
guiding X X Oral communication X X Planning and coordinating X X
Mentoring, developing, and evaluating others X Persuading X Source: DEA
Promotion Ratings Scales Booklets for GS- 13 and GS- 14 special agents.

Competencies In 2001, GS- 13 special agents were evaluated on 12
competencies in SAPP

assessment center simulations, while GS- 14 special agents were evaluated
Measured by

on 9 competencies, as table 23 shows. 1 Assessment Center Job Simulations

1 Competencies were unchanged during the 1997- 2001 period, except for the
1997 GS- 15 SAPP, which included the competency *ability to allocate
resources.*

Tabl e 23: Competencies Measured by Assessment Center Job Simulations in
2001 Competency GS- 13 GS- 14

Ability to communicate in writing X X Ability to communicate orally X X
Ability to expand case to fullest potential X

Ability to evaluate and develop subordinates X X Ability to integrate
information and draw conclusions X X Ability to delegate X X Ability to
recognize and establish evidence X Ability to effectively utilize
cooperating sources X Ability to organize, plan, and prioritize activities
X X Ability to coordinate and monitor work X Ability to plan and
coordinate enforcement operations X Ability to relate effectively with
others X X Knowledge of DEA manuals, policies, and procedures X X Source:
2001 SAPP report.

Interim Special Agent The interim recommendation process, which was
implemented in January

in Charge/ Office Head 2000 and was still in place as of December 2002,
requires that a special

agent in charge (SAC) or office head, when making promotion Recommendation

recommendations to the Career Board, provide information about the Process

personal characteristics, traits, or attributes that make a candidate
better suited to the position under consideration and how a candidate*s
past or present experiences or demonstrated success makes him or her a top
candidate. The latter requirement covers seven specific areas:

 directing enforcement and/ or investigative- related programs; 
managing, motivating, and mentoring subordinates;  working in a team
environment;  working individually;  managing agency resources; 
building and maintaining coalitions; and

 acquiring or possessing technical knowledge, education, and special
skills, or training peculiar to or required by the position.

Proposed SAC/ Office Among the changes under a proposed recommendation
process are that

Head Recommendation applicants for promotions would be asked to provide a
summary of their

major accomplishments and how they are best qualified for the position
Process applied for, including technical knowledge, education, special
skills, or training specified in the vacancy announcement, and provide a
narrative describing their achievements in the following competencies:

 directing enforcement and/ or investigative- related programs or other
appropriate managerial experience in a law enforcement setting;

 managing, motivating, mentoring, and/ or training personnel;  working
in a team environment of mutual cooperation and assistance;  building and
maintaining coalitions with other personnel and entities internal and
external to the agency; and

 for applicants for GS- 15 positions, managing agency resources.

Comments from the Drug Enforcement

Appendi V I x Administration

(450059)

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Report to the Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson, House of Representatives

June 2003 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

Hiring, Promotion, and Discipline Processes at DEA

GAO- 03- 413

Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 5 The Diversity of DEA*s Special
Agent Workforce 10 A Higher Proportion of Minority Applicants Did Not Meet
Hiring Requirements 15

No Statistically Significant Differences in Promotion Rates 25 DEA*s
Discipline Process Has Been Found to Be

Nondiscriminatory 34 Employee Views on Promotion and Discipline 40
Conclusions 42 Recommendations for Executive Action 44 Agency Comments and
Our Evaluation 44

Appendixes

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 47 DEA Special Agent
Workforce Diversity 47 DEA*s Hiring, Promotion, and Discipline Processes
48

Appendix II: Physical Task Test Minimum Requirements 51

Appendix III: Competencies in Assessing GS- 13 and GS- 14 Special Agents
for Promotion 52 Performance Rating Competencies for

GS- 13 and GS- 14 Special Agents 52 Competencies Measured by Assessment
Center Job Simulations 52 Interim Special Agent in Charge/ Office Head
Recommendation

Process 53 Proposed SAC/ Office Head Recommendation Process 54

Appendix IV: Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration 55 Tables
Table 1: Demographic Distribution of the Federal Workforce and

Criminal Investigators (Special Agents) in DEA, Governmentwide, and the
Nonfederal Workforce 11 Table 2: Demographics of DEA*s Special Agent
Workforce,

1980- 2002 12 Table 3: Distribution of DEA Special Agents in
Nonsupervisory,

Supervisory, and SES Positions by EEO Group, September 2002 13

Table 4: Demographic Profile of Applicants under BA- 98- 01 and BA- 20-
00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002 16 Table 5: Percentage of
Applicants Meeting Minimum Requirements

under BA- 98- 01 and BA- 20- 00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002 17
Table 6: Percentage of Applicants Passing Written Assessment

under BA- 98- 01 and BA- 20- 00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002 18
Table 7: Applicant Interview Passing Rates under BA- 98- 01 and

BA- 20- 00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002 19 Table 8: Applicant
Medical Examination Passing Rates under

BA- 98- 01 and BA- 20- 00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002 19 Table 9:
Percentage of Applicants Passing the Physical Task Test

under BA- 98- 01 and BA- 20- 00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002 20
Table 10: Percentage of Applicants Found Suitable under BA- 98- 01

and BA- 20- 00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002 22 Table 11:
Percentage of Applicants Found Suitable by the 1811

Hiring Panel, September 29, 2000, to May 7, 2002 23 Table 12: Overall
Selection Rates for Applicants for Whom DEA

Made Hiring Eligibility Determinations under BA- 98- 01 and BA- 20- 00, by
EEO Group, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002 24 Table 13: Demographic
Profile of Applicants Who Met Minimum

Requirements and Applicants Hired under BA- 98- 01 and BA- 20- 00, October
15, 1997, to March 31, 2002 24 Table 14: Special Agents Participating in
the SAPP, 1997- 2001 26 Table 15: Average SAPP Scores, 1997- 2001 30 Table
16: Frequency of Applicants Appearing on Best- Qualified Lists

Being Recommended by SACs, 2000- 01 32 Table 17: Individuals on at Least
One Best- Qualified List from Which

Promotions Were Made and Individuals Selected for Promotion, by EEO Group,
Fiscal Years 1997- 2001 34 Table 18: Special Agents Disciplined Compared
with Special Agent

Population, by EEO Group, Fiscal Years 1997- 2001 36 Table 19:
Distribution of Cases of Alleged Misconduct Involving

Special Agents, by EEO Group, Compared with Workforce Representation,
Fiscal Years 1997- 2001 37 Table 20: Cases of Alleged Misconduct Involving
Special Agents That

Resulted in Disciplinary Action, by EEO Group, Fiscal Years 1997- 2001 37

Table 21: DEA Physical Task Test Minimum Performance Requirements 51 Table
22: Performance Rating Competencies for GS- 13 and GS- 14

Special Agents 52 Table 23: Competencies Measured by Assessment Center Job

Simulations in 2001 53

Abbreviations

ARTS Agent Recruiting and Tracking System EEO equal employment opportunity
EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission GS General Schedule DEA Drug
Enforcement Administration MSPB Merit Systems Protection Board OPM Office
of Personnel Management OPR Office of Professional Responsibility SAC
Special Agent in Charge SAPP Special Agent Promotion Program SES senior
executive service

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a

GAO United States General Accounting Office

During the October 1997 through March 2002 period, African American,
Hispanic, and white applicants to be special agents passed DEA*s medical
requirements and interview process at about the same rates. However,
African American and Hispanic applicants had lower passing rates on (1)
the test of an applicant*s ability to recall and write about a video of a
drugrelated enforcement action and (2) suitability requirements measured
through a background investigation and other tests. DEA*s hiring
procedures are based on criteria in federal regulations, professional
standards, and standards established by subject matter experts. However,

DEA had not studied its hiring requirements to see why its procedures
resulted in different selection rates and whether they could be modified
to reduce differences while maintaining the high standards necessary for
special agents.

There were no statistically significant differences in promotion rates
among the various racial, ethnic, and gender groups during fiscal years
1997 through 2001. DEA has a rigorous and validated competency- based
process that uses job simulations to assess capabilities at the target
grade level. However, the job- relatedness of a key step involving
recommending special agents for promotion had not been established and our
analysis showed that African American and Hispanic special agents were
recommended for promotion at significantly lower rates. Despite
differences in recommendation rates, DEA*s promotion decisions mirrored
the race, ethnic, and gender makeup of the agency*s special agent
workforce. Additionally, the agency, working with a diverse panel of
special agents, subsequently developed a revised recommendation process.
At the time of GAO*s review, DEA and the African American representatives
were involved in mediation to reach final agreement. Disciplinary data for
fiscal years 1997 to 2001 showed that the proportion of

African American, Hispanic, and women special agents disciplined for
misconduct was significantly higher than their representation in the DEA
special agent workforce. These higher rates reflect that African
Americans, Hispanics, and women had a significantly higher percentage of
allegations of

misconduct lodged against them and that a significantly higher percentage
of these allegations were substantiated by investigations and resulted in
disciplinary action. A recent study by an outside contractor found DEA*s
disciplinary process to be fair and nondiscriminatory, but that study only
considered African Americans and whites and not women or other minority
groups. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

Hiring, Promotion, and Discipline Processes at DEA

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 413. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Victor S. Rezendes at (202) 512- 6808. Highlights of
GAO- 03- 413, a report to the

Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson, House of Representatives

June 2003

A 1981 U. S. District Court decision found that the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) had discriminated against African American special
agents in a number of personnel practices. Over the years, the plaintiffs
and DEA had agreed to remedies in many of these areas. However, minority
representatives continued to raise issues in three areas* hiring,
promotion, and discipline. GAO was asked to examine DEA*s

current processes for hiring, promoting, and disciplining special agents,
and provide information about racial, ethnicity, and gender differences in
these three areas. GAO recommendations to DEA include

 initiating a process to monitor hiring results to identify differences
in selection rates among groups, determine why they occur, and what, if
anything, can be done to reduce the differences while maintaining high
standards

and  expanding the study of disciplinary actions taken against African
American versus white special agents to determine whether discipline

is administered fairly to all racial, ethnic, and gender groups of special
agents. In commenting on this report, the

Acting Administrator of DEA agreed with our recommendations and listed a
number of actions being taken to implement them.

Page i GAO- 03- 413 EEO Issues at DEA

Contents

Contents

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Contents

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Appendix I

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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Appendix II

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Appendix III

Appendix III Competencies in Assessing GS- 13 and GS- 14 Special Agents
for Promotion

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Appendix III Competencies in Assessing GS- 13 and GS- 14 Special Agents
for Promotion

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Appendix IV

Appendix IV Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration Page 56 GAO-
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Appendix IV Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration Page 57 GAO-
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Appendix IV Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration Page 58 GAO-
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Appendix IV Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration Page 59 GAO-
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Appendix IV Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration Page 60 GAO-
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Appendix IV Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration Page 61 GAO-
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Appendix IV Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration Page 62 GAO-
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Appendix IV Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration Page 63 GAO-
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Appendix IV Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration

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