Foreign Assistance: U.S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin American
Countries Have Yielded Modest Results (18-MAR-03, GAO-03-358).	 
                                                                 
Supporting democracy abroad is a major U.S. foreign policy	 
objective. To better understand how this assistance has been	 
implemented in Latin America, GAO was asked to review programs in
six countries--Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala,	 
Nicaragua, and Peru--that have been of particular importance to  
U.S. interests in Central and South America. Between fiscal years
1992 and 2002, U.S. agencies have funded more than $580 million  
in democracy-related programs in these countries. This report	 
discusses the impact of and factors affecting this assistance and
the overarching management issues that have affected program	 
planning and implementation.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-358 					        
    ACCNO:   A06353						        
  TITLE:     Foreign Assistance: U.S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin 
American Countries Have Yielded Modest Results			 
     DATE:   03/18/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign aid programs				 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     International relations				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Regional development programs			 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Bolivia						 
	     Columbia						 
	     DOJ International Criminal Investigative		 
	     Training Assistance Program			 
                                                                 
	     El Salvador					 
	     Guatemala						 
	     Nicaragua						 
	     Peru						 

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GAO-03-358

                                       A

Report to Congressional Requesters

March 2003 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE U. S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin
American Countries Have Yielded Modest Results

GAO- 03- 358

Letter 1 3 Purpose 3 Results in Brief 4 Background 6 GAO*s Analysis 6
Recommendations for Executive Action 13 Agency Comments 14

Chapter 1 15

Introduction Background 15

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 23 Chapter 2

26 Rule of Law Assistance

Criminal Justice Reforms Were Established but Not Fully Implemented;
Sustainability Will Require Stronger Host Government Commitment 27 USAID
Has Helped Increase Citizen Access to Justice, but

Sustainability and Expansion of Services Will Require Greater Host Country
Support 33 U. S. Police Assistance Supporting Criminal Investigations and

Management of Police Operations Has Had Mixed Results 38 Conclusions 45

Chapter 3 46

Governance Legislatures Initially Increased Their Planning,
Infrastructure,

Analytical, and Outreach Capacities, but Gains Have Eroded over
Assistance: Time 47

Legislatures, Local Local Governance and Citizen Participation Were
Enhanced in

Government, and Target Municipalities, but Broader Impacts Are More
Difficult to

Achieve 52 Anticorruption

Anticorruption Policies and Procedures Have Been Implemented in Some
Countries, but the Long- term Impact Is Not Yet Evident 59 Conclusions 62

Chapter 4 64

Human Rights U. S. Human Rights Assistance Has Increased Awareness and
Government Accountability 65

Conclusions 72

Chapter 5 73

Elections The United States Has Primarily Targeted Three Countries with
Assistance in Election Administration, Voter Access, and

Electoral Observation 73 U. S. Assistance Has Helped Ensure Free and Fair
Elections, but

Nicaragua May Still Need Additional Assistance 76 Conclusions 78

Chapter 6 79

Management Issues Poorly Coordinated Program Management Limits
Effectiveness of

U. S. Democracy Assistance 79 Hinder Impact and

Limited Evaluation and Sharing of Lessons Learned among Program
Sustainability of U. S.

Implementers 83 Democracy Assistance

Conclusions 85 Recommendations for Executive Action 86 Agency Comments and
Our Evaluation 86

Appendixes

Appendix I: U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries 89
Bolivia 89 Colombia 90 El Salvador 91 Guatemala 92 Nicaragua 94 Peru 95

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State 97 GAO Comment 101

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice 102

Appendix IV: Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
106 GAO Comments 115

Appendix V: Quality of Life and Economic Indicators for Selected Countries
117

Appendix VI: Freedom House Scores for Individual Countries, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002 120

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 126 GAO Contact 126

Staff Acknowledgments 126 127

Tables Table 1: Freedom House Ratings for the Six Countries Studied,
Fiscal Years 1992 and 2002 16

Table 2: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance in the Six Countries Studied 27
Table 3: USAID Legislative Strengthening Assistance 47 Table 4: USAID
Local Governance Assistance 52 Table 5: USAID Anticorruption Assistance 59
Table 6: U. S. Human Rights Assistance in Three Countries 65 Table 7:
USAID Election Assistance in the Six Countries 74 Table 8: Quality of Life
and Economic Indicators for Selected Countries 118

Figures Figure 1: Average Freedom House Democracy Scores for the Six
Countries Studied, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002 15

Figure 2: Distribution of U. S. Democracy Assistance among Six Countries,
Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002 19 Figure 3: Distribution of U. S.
Democracy Assistance to Six

Countries by Key Agencies, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002 20 Figure 4:
Four Elements of the U. S. Democracy Assistance Program 21

Figure 5: Distribution of U. S. Democracy Assistance to the Six Countries
Studied, for Fiscal Years 2000 through 2002, by Element 23

Figure 6: Public Hearing Room Constructed with U. S. Government Funding in
Manizales, Colombia 32 Figure 7: Justice House in Manizales, Colombia,
Constructed with

U. S. Government Funds 34 Figure 8: Free Legal Consultation Provided by
Colombian Official

at a Justice House Constructed with U. S. Government Funds 35 Figure 9:
Forensics Equipment Donated by the U. S. Government to

Improve Criminal Investigative Capacity of Bolivian National Police in La
Paz, Bolivia 39 Figure 10: U. S.- Funded Crime- Scene Management Training
for Law

Enforcement Officials in San Salvador, El Salvador 40 Figure 11: The
Nicaraguan Legislature*s Office of Citizen Participation, Established with
USAID Assistance 51

Figure 12: Acting Mayor of Leon, Nicaragua, One of the Municipalities That
Received USAID Assistance to Strengthen Local Governance 54 Figure 13: A
Meeting Organized by USAID's Office of Transition

Initiatives to Educate Citizens from Rural Peru about the Country's New
Decentralization Program 55 Figure 14: Nicaragua*s Integrated Financial
Management System Was Developed with Assistance from USAID Funds 60

Figure 15: USAID- supported Victims Assistance Center Managed by the
Attorney General*s Office, Guatemala City, Guatemala 69

Figure 16: Coffins used by USAID- supported Foundation for Anthropological
Forensics to Reinter Remains Exhumed from Mass Graves in Guatemala 70

Figure 17: Human Rights Units Using Forensics Equipment Provided by the
Justice Department to Investigate a Crime Scene in San Jose de Apartado,
Colombia 71 Figure 18: Poll Workers Organizing Voting Materials before
Opening

a Polling Station in Lima, Peru, during the April 2001 National Elections
76 Figure 19: Voters Waiting to Enter Polling Station in Lima, Peru,

during the April 2001 National Elections 77 Figure 20: Freedom House
Democracy Scores for Bolivia, Fiscal

Years 1992 through 2002 120 Figure 21: Freedom House Democracy Scores for
Colombia, Fiscal

Years 1992 through 2002 121 Figure 22: Freedom House Democracy Scores for
El Salvador, Fiscal

Years 1992 through 2002 122 Figure 23: Freedom House Democracy Scores for
Guatemala, Fiscal

Years 1992 through 2002 123 Figure 24: Freedom House Democracy Scores for
Nicaragua, Fiscal

Years 1992 through 2002 124 Figure 25: Freedom House Democracy Scores for
Peru, Fiscal Years

1992 through 2002 125

Abbreviations

ARI Andean Regional Initiative GDP Gross Domestic Product ICITAP
International Criminal Investigations Training and Assistance Program
(Department of Justice)

IDB Inter- American Development Bank INL Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

(Department of State) OAS Organization of American States USAID U. S.
Agency for International Development

This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
materials separately from GAO*s product.

Letter

March 18, 2003 The Honorable Henry Hyde Chairman The Honorable Tom Lantos
Ranking Minority Member Committee on International Relations House of
Representatives The Honorable Cass Ballenger Chairman The Honorable Robert
Menendez Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
Committee on International Relations House of Representatives In response
to your request, this report discusses the nature, impact, and factors
that affect U. S. democracy assistance to Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru as well as the overarching management
issues that have affected program planning and implementation. We include
recommendations to the Departments of State and Justice and the U. S.
Agency for International Development. We recommend that these agencies
develop more comprehensive strategic plans at the regional and country
level to address cooperation among agencies and other major donors;
develop a strategy to periodically evaluate democracy assistance projects;
and develop a mechanism to share information on development approaches,
methods, materials, and results among U. S. agencies and implementers.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after its date. At that time, we will provide copies to interested
congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General,
the Administrator of the U. S. Agency for International Development, and
the President of the Inter- American Foundation. We will

also provide copies to others upon request. In addition, this report will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

If you or your staff has any questions on this report, please call me on
(202) 512- 4128. Other major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix VII.

Jess T. Ford Director International Affairs and Trade

Executive Summary Purpose Nearly all countries in Latin America have seen
their systems of

government shift from dictatorships, military regimes, and other forms of
authoritarian rule to democratically elected governments. Supporting this
transition has been a formal part of the U. S. foreign aid program since
at least 1985. During fiscal years 1992 through 2002, the U. S. government
has provided more than $1 billion to help Latin American and Caribbean
nations develop sustainable democratic institutions. This assistance has

focused on promoting the rule of law, 1 transparent and accountable
government institutions, respect for human rights, and free and fair
elections. Assistance activities have been largely implemented by the U.
S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Departments of

State and Justice and have been funded primarily by appropriations
authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Since the early
1990s, GAO has assessed the implementation and

effectiveness of democracy- related programs worldwide, particularly in
Latin America and the Caribbean and the Former Soviet Union (see Related
GAO Products). In these reviews, GAO has found that helping to strengthen
democracy can be a difficult and long- term challenge that requires

sustained political support from key host country leaders. When this
political support wavers, hard- won gains can be quickly lost.

The Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House Committee on
International Relations and the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
requested that GAO assess the effectiveness of U. S. democracy assistance
programs in six Latin American countries* Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador,

Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru. These countries, which are located in both
Central and South America, have been particularly important to U. S.
interests and face persistent social, economic, and political challenges.
In response to this request, GAO (1) assessed the impact of the four main

elements of U. S. democracy assistance* rule of law, governance, human
rights, and elections* and the factors that affected the outcome of these
programs and (2) analyzed the overarching management issues that have
affected program planning and implementation. 1 According to the U. S.
Agency for International Development, the rule of law embodies the

basic principles of equal treatment of all people before the law and is
founded on a predictable and transparent legal system with fair and
effective judicial and law enforcement institutions to protect citizens
against the arbitrary use of state authority and lawless acts.

To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documentation on
democracyrelated assistance projects that were implemented from fiscal
years 1992 through 2002 and interviewed knowledgeable officials from USAID
and the

State and Justice Departments and other agencies that implement this
assistance. GAO conducted fieldwork in the six countries previously
identified, where it interviewed U. S. and senior host country officials,
representatives of many nongovernmental organizations, and project

implementers and beneficiaries. Appendix I provides an overview of the U.
S. democracy assistance programs by country.

Results in Brief Overall, U. S. programs and efforts to strengthen
democracy in the six Latin American countries GAO reviewed have had a
modest impact to date. U. S. assistance programs have supported a variety
of reforms and have

introduced innovative practices in justice, governance, human rights, and
elections. For example, GAO found that these programs have helped five of
the six countries reviewed (Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Nicaragua) adopt and begin implementing new criminal procedures codes that
allow justice to be dispensed with more efficiency and openness. In all
six countries, U. S. programs have supported improving the capacity of
some municipalities to budget and plan public expenditures more
effectively and with greater citizen participation, according to USAID
data and reports. Host country and U. S. officials stated that U. S.
programs also

have contributed to some increased government attention to protecting
human rights in countries where this assistance has been provided. U. S.
assistance has been instrumental in supporting elections that electoral
observation groups have considered to be free and fair. Despite these
successes, considerable work remains and U. S. democracy programs often
have had a limited impact due to various factors, and in the countries GAO
visited, questions remain regarding the sustainability of the gains made
with U. S. assistance. In particular, these countries still have work
remaining to fully put into practice the roles and responsibilities
contained in their new criminal procedures codes. In many cases, the size
and scope of U. S.- supported programs have been relatively limited, and
countries have not adopted them on a national scale. The inability or
unwillingness of host governments to provide the necessary financial,
human, and political capital has often negatively affected democracy
program outcomes in these countries. GAO found cases in which U. S. funded
training programs, computer systems, and police equipment had languished
for lack of resources after U. S. support ended. Political changes

in host governments have also undermined U. S.- supported programs. Of

the legislative strengthening programs begun in the 1990s in four of the
countries GAO visited (Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua),
only the program in El Salvador appears to have received sufficient host
government political support to operate as intended with a positive impact
on governance. Consolidating many of the gains that these countries have
achieved in building democratic institutions is likely to require
increased host country commitment and continued assistance from the United
States or other donors.

Since host country resources for sustaining democracy programs are
difficult to mobilize, it is crucial that the U. S. government and other
donors manage available international resources as efficiently as possible
for maximum impact and sustainability. Although promoting democracy abroad
is a strategic goal of the U. S. government, USAID and the State and
Justice Departments do not take a strategic, coordinated approach to
providing democracy assistance, disrupting the long- term planning,
implementation, and continuity of U. S. law enforcement programs in some

countries. The agencies* strategic plans also do not identify how U. S.
agencies and other foreign donors will coordinate program planning and
implementation, as required by the Government Performance and Results Act
of 1993. USAID and the State and Justice Departments have conducted few
formal evaluations on the results of these activities to inform the
ongoing debate about how to best provide and manage democracy assistance.
Information sharing among U. S.- funded program implementers also has been
limited, both within and among countries where these programs exist. These
agencies do not always take advantage of the lessons learned from their
democracy- related programs to ensure that

funds are spent in a cost- effective manner. The six chapters of this
report address background information on U. S. democracy assistance
programs; the four elements of democracy assistance, rule of law,
governance, human rights, and elections; and the overarching management
issues affecting program planning and

implementation. In this report, GAO makes recommendations to the Secretary
of State, the Attorney General, and the Administrator of USAID, who
together administer nearly all U. S. democracy assistance, to improve
program management. Specifically, GAO recommends that these officials (1)
develop more comprehensive strategic plans at the regional and country
level to address cooperation among agencies and other major donors, (2)

establish a strategy for periodically evaluating projects, and (3)
establish a

systematic mechanism to share information among U. S. agencies and project
implementers.

Background Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, since 1992, the
United States has provided about $580 million to support democracy
programs in the six

countries GAO reviewed for this report. Colombia received the largest
amount of democracy assistance ($ 149 million), followed by El Salvador ($
146 million), Nicaragua ($ 88 million), Guatemala ($ 70 million), Peru ($
65 million), and Bolivia ($ 63 million).

Democracy assistance has four major components: rule of law, governance,
human rights, and elections. USAID generally implements governance, human
rights, and elections projects and develops rule of law institutions and
processes, while the State and Justice Departments focus on the law
enforcement component of rule of law efforts. In fiscal years 2000 through
2002 in the six countries GAO reviewed, rule of law and governance
programs received 39 and 29 percent, respectively, of the $221 million
total allocated for democracy assistance by the U. S. government. In

addition to the United States, other countries and institutions provide
this type of foreign aid. The World Bank, the Inter- American Development
Bank, and the Organization of American States all provide democracyrelated
assistance to these six countries, as do several bilateral donors.

GAO*s Analysis U. S. Rule of Law Assistance

U. S. rule of law assistance encompasses support for criminal justice Has
Supported Some

reform, greater access to the justice system for poor and marginalized
Promising Reforms but

populations, and strengthened capacity of law enforcement agencies to Many
Have Not Yet Been

investigate crimes. Although U. S. programs have helped almost all of
these countries begin implementing critical justice sector reforms, it
remains Institutionalized

unclear whether the countries can and will provide the necessary political
and financial support to fully implement these reforms.

In supporting criminal justice reforms, the United States has helped
introduce fundamental changes and new roles and responsibilities for
judicial and law enforcement institutions. U. S. assistance has included
training for judges, prosecutors, and others who implement new criminal

codes and has supported computerized case management systems to increase
justice system efficiency and transparency. The countries GAO reviewed are
in different stages of carrying out reforms. El Salvador has made the most
progress in reforming its justice sector, while Nicaragua and Bolivia have
only recently enacted and begun implementing new criminal procedures
codes. Colombia and Guatemala, which enacted reforms in the early 1990s,
have made limited progress in implementing them, according to U. S.
officials GAO interviewed. For example, Colombia, which established oral
trials in 1991, has only 26 operational courtrooms to serve that nation*s
2,000 municipal, circuit, and special jurisdiction judges.

USAID*s access- to- justice programs have helped several countries
establish public defense services to assist poor criminal defendants.
USAID also has supported decentralized justice centers and alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms. In Colombia, for example, USAID has helped
establish 18 justice houses (casas de justicia) that provide dispute
resolution and other

legal services and help reinforce the presence of the Colombian government
in poor, marginalized areas. USAID plans to construct 40 justice houses in
Colombia by 2005, but the sustainability of many of the justice houses
already built is uncertain due to precarious municipal government
finances. Colombian officials also said that, due to severe funding
constraints, the government does not currently plan to build additional
justice houses.

U. S.- supported police assistance, which the Justice Department primarily
provides, has focused on developing criminal investigations capabilities
and strengthening police management, accountability, and operations. The
results and impact of this assistance have varied across the countries GAO
reviewed. Of the six countries GAO reviewed, U. S. police assistance
appears to have had the greatest impact in El Salvador, where the Justice
Department has helped implement a new policing model characterized by
active, visible police patrols in high- crime areas. In other countries,
U. S. assistance has provided extensive training and supported the
development of training centers for criminal investigators, but impact has
been more limited. In Bolivia, Justice Department officials said they have
frequently had to repeat training courses due to high turnover in the
criminal

investigations unit. Bolivian police officials also told GAO that they
lack the resources to maintain and use U. S.- donated materials, including
forensics equipment and a computerized case- tracking and management
system. USAID, State, and Justice officials also stated that section 660
of

the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 2 hampers the effectiveness of justice
sector assistance because it prohibits some types of police assistance. 3
Officials GAO interviewed in Washington, D. C., and overseas said that the
section 660 prohibition makes it difficult to plan and implement
comprehensive justice sector programs because it often precludes involving
the police fully in reform efforts. For example, in Nicaragua, USAID could
not invite police force representatives to conferences at which criminal
justice reform approaches were being discussed and

debated. Police officers were similarly excluded from human rights
training that USAID was providing to other host government agencies.

U. S. Governance Assistance U. S. governance assistance seeks to improve
the administrative, analytical, Has Had a Modest Impact

and outreach capacity of legislatures; strengthen the administrative
capacity and accountability of municipal governments and increase citizen
participation; foster greater awareness about corruption; and help
governments become more transparent and accountable. In most of the six
countries GAO visited, U. S. governance assistance has had an initial
impact on making government institutions more effective, responsive, and
accountable, according to USAID staff, contractors, and host country
officials. However, some programs have not been sustained or replicated
and have been hindered by a lack of political support from host country
governments. Elsewhere, institutional weaknesses and lack of human and
financial resources have made it difficult for government counterparts to
implement or expand U. S. programs.

In its legislative- strengthening programs, USAID- supported programs
initially increased the outreach capacities of legislatures, according to
U. S. and host country officials. For example, in Bolivia, USAID helped
create a

congressional research center and budget office to assist legislators.
With the exception of El Salvador, however, host governments have not
generally sustained these programs. Because legislative programs have been
perceived to be associated with particular parties, these programs

2 22 U. S. C. 2420. 3 This provision restricts the use of foreign
assistance funds for training and financial support for police or other
law enforcement forces of foreign governments. Specifically, the provision
states that, with a variety of exceptions, these funds may not be used *to
provide training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police,
prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any
program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign
government.*

have lost credibility when competing parties took control. In Guatemala,
for example, newly elected legislators attempted to use USAID- supported
legislative institutions for partisan ends, according to U. S. officials
working

there. Despite the difficulty in sustaining these programs, USAID funding
has helped leverage financial support from other donors for
legislativestrengthening programs in several countries, according to
bilateral and multilateral representatives.

GAO found that USAID*s programs to support local governance have had an
impact in target municipalities, but the programs have been less
successful in influencing and reforming policies and practices at the
national level. In target municipalities where USAID has worked, municipal
governments have become more effective and responsive, and citizen
participation has increased in municipal affairs, according to USAID
contract staff, host country officials, and local citizens. For example,
according to data that a USAID project implementer provided, more than
4,400 citizens in rural Colombia have participated in the development,

implementation, and oversight of 67 municipal- level social infrastructure
projects, such as building schools, bridges, and sewers. In Bolivia and El
Salvador, where these programs have been operating since 1993 and 1996,
respectively, municipalities have begun to adopt USAID- supported

practices; however, there has been less success in Guatemala and Nicaragua
disseminating these programs outside of target municipalities. Host
government and USAID officials attributed difficulties in disseminating
innovative practices to limited municipal resources and skills. For
example, local government officials in Guatemala said it was difficult to
use USAID*s participatory planning methods, since limited funds were
available to implement projects. Representatives of national municipal
associations, such as the National Association of Municipalities

in Nicaragua, said that USAID*s policy assistance has helped develop
national laws and regulations to decentralize government functions, but in
some cases, limited government support has hindered these efforts.

USAID has helped to develop and implement anticorruption policies and
procedures in five countries GAO reviewed, focusing on developing
anticorruption legislation and regulations, helping government
institutions become more transparent and accountable, and informing
citizens of the need to become more aware of the cost and consequences of
corruption. In Colombia, for example, USAID provided support for a
presidential decree to establish standards for a national system of
internal controls in ministries and other national agencies. Citizen
awareness of corruption has increased in several countries, as has citizen
oversight at the national and

municipal levels, according to USAID officials, contract staff, and
representatives of local governments and nongovernmental organizations.
For example, according to a study by a USAID contractor, 4 Nicaraguans

have become better informed about corruption issues as a result of a
national campaign supported by USAID. However, the lack of consistent
political support in host governments has impeded anticorruption projects.
In Nicaragua, according to a former high- ranking government official, in
2001 the Ministry of Finance fired experienced staff who had been working
on the USAID- assisted Integrated Financial Management System, resulting
in lost institutional memory and expertise. These efforts face long- term
challenges because these countries are in the early stages of addressing a
widespread and deeply rooted problem, and the public is skeptical about

anticorruption efforts. U. S. Human Rights Three of the countries that GAO
studied have human rights assistance Assistance in Three

programs. Host government officials and project implementers stated that
Countries Has Helped

this assistance has had a positive but limited impact in the countries GAO
Increase Public Awareness

visited. In Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru, current U. S. human rights and
Government

projects have (1) increased citizens* awareness of their rights and have
helped governments take on greater responsibility for protecting those
Accountability

rights, (2) protected threatened individuals and prevented future abuses,
and (3) helped governments address past abuses. In some instances,
political and logistical problems have hindered these projects, and
serious problems remain. Furthermore, host government officials said some
longterm projects might be difficult to sustain due to budgetary
constraints. USAID*s human rights projects have attempted to increase
citizen

awareness of human rights through education and community participation in
information networks. One such network is Colombia*s *Early Warning
System.* This system relies on citizen and nongovernmental organizations
to alert authorities to human rights threats (such as massacres and other
violent acts against civilians) from the armed groups involved in that
country*s ongoing conflict. U. S. and Colombian officials told GAO that
coordination and communication problems hinder the smooth flow of 4
Mitchell A. Seligson, Nicaraguans Talk about Corruption: A Follow- Up
Study of Public

Opinion (Arlington, Va.: Casals and Associates for USAID, 1999).

information in this project and compromise the ability of Colombian
security forces to prevent violence by insurgent groups.

GAO found that these human rights projects also have enabled host
governments to become more responsible and accountable to some degree. In
each of the six countries GAO visited, USAID has been instrumental in
supporting the creation of a Human Rights Ombudsman Office, which provides
a legal channel for complaints and allegations of human rights violations.
In some countries, this office ranks high in public opinion polls, while
in others, according to the State Department, allegations of corruption
and funding problems have eroded the office*s credibility. In addition,
USAID assistance has fostered greater justice for victims and their
families. USAID support for national reconciliation efforts, including

exhumations of clandestine cemeteries in Guatemala and Peru, has helped
resolve questions about the fate of victims and bring guilty parties to
justice, according to project officials and published reports. Justice
Department data indicate that special human rights investigative units
created in Colombia have enabled the government to prosecute 167 human
rights cases. There are currently not enough of these units to investigate
cases throughout the entire country, and the Justice Department plans to
help the Colombian government expand the number and the size of these
units in fiscal years 2003 and 2004.

Despite the positive impact of U. S. human rights projects in these
countries, serious problems remain with some governments* respect for
human rights, particularly in Guatemala and Colombia. For example, police
and military forces in these countries continue to be implicated in human
rights abuses but are rarely prosecuted, according to State Department
human rights reports.

U. S. Electoral Assistance The United States has strived to help
governments in Latin America

Has Been Instrumental in establish a tradition of free and fair elections.
U. S. electoral support efforts

Helping to Ensure Free and have been designed to help improve election
administration, enhance voter

Fair Elections access, and legitimize election results. Since 1990, this
assistance has

supported host country efforts that have resulted in elections considered
generally free and fair by the Organization of American States and other
electoral observation groups in the six countries GAO reviewed. USAID has
provided about $66 million in elections assistance. Most of this
assistance, about $60 million, went to three countries: $27 million to
Nicaragua, more than $20 million to Peru, and about $13 million to El
Salvador. Assistance

projects have strengthened the capacity of electoral authorities, improved
voter access through voter registration and education and electoral
reforms, and supported electoral observation by domestic and international
groups. According to U. S. officials, Nicaragua is the only

country GAO visited that is expected to require significant international
support before it holds its next major election because it continues to
experience problems in election administration and voter registration.
Program Planning and

The effectiveness of U. S. democracy assistance programs in the six
Coordination Are Lacking

countries GAO reviewed has been limited by the lack of a strategic
interagency management approach.

Without a strategic plan that coordinates and leverages U. S. government
resources and those of multilateral donors that receive U. S. funds,
opportunities to sustain or expand democracy assistance gains may be
missed. Furthermore, organizations implementing U. S. assistance projects
have not routinely evaluated the results of their efforts or widely shared
reports, materials, and other important information.

The State Department and USAID identify the promotion of democracy abroad
as a strategic goal for their agencies. The Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 requires U. S. government agencies to develop

annual plans for achieving their goals. As GAO has previously reported in
its work relating to this act, such plans should identify how similar
programs that different U. S. government agencies conduct will be
coordinated to achieve their common objectives. 5 However, neither USAID*s
or State*s plans nor the subordinate regional or country- level planning
documents GAO reviewed specifically address the role of other U. S.
agencies and donors in ensuring that U. S.- funded democracy programs
leverage and coordinate domestic and international resources.

Not addressing the role of other organizations in their strategic plans is
a significant oversight, since it represents the risk that the U. S.
government is not maximizing the use of available resources. Interagency
coordination on rule of law assistance has been a long- standing problem,
as GAO noted in a

5 U. S. General Accounting Office, The Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide
to Assessing Annual Agency Performance Plans, GGD- 10.1.20 (Washington, D.
C.: Apr. 1, 1998).

1999 report. 6 According to U. S. officials, the relationship among
implementing agencies has often been characterized more by competition
than by cooperation, which has led to fragmented programs that are not
always mutually supportive in achieving common goals. For example, in
Bolivia, poor communication and disagreement among USAID, State, and
Justice on their respective roles disrupted efforts to assist the
development of that country*s national police. Furthermore, by not
addressing and building on potentially complementary programs of other
international donors* some of which receive considerable funding from the
United States* agencies risk overlooking critical resources that can be
used to meet the strategic goal of democracy promotion. U. S. agencies
implementing democracy assistance projects have also not

consistently evaluated project results, thus missing opportunities to
highlight lessons learned and to share best practices and information.
Although USAID has conducted evaluations on an ad hoc basis, the State

and Justice Departments have sponsored few formal reviews of their
projects. Consequently, GAO found few project reviews that were useful for
transferring knowledge about the impact and sustainability of projects in
different countries.

USAID also has not taken steps to compile and disseminate detailed
information on the results of its various projects. Although U. S.
democracy assistance activities across the six countries GAO visited were
often very similar, USAID has no centralized documentation on these
activities to determine whether some approaches and materials were more
effective

than others. For example, although USAID missions fund projects to educate
local municipal officials in the six countries, the comprehensive set of
handbooks and manuals developed in Bolivia are not part of any central
repository at USAID or at the USAID intranet site. Lessons learned are a
potentially powerful method of sharing ideas for improving work processes,
program design and implementation, and cost- effectiveness.

Recommendations for To ensure that key U. S. agencies that implement
programs to support and

Executive Action strengthen democracies in Latin America make better use
of available

resources, GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, the Attorney
General, and the Administrator of USAID

6 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Status of Rule of
Law Program Coordination, NSIAD- 00- 8R (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 13,
1999).

 develop comprehensive strategic plans for democracy assistance at the
regional and country level that address how U. S. agencies will cooperate
with each other and other major donors to achieve greater impact and
sustainability in these programs;

 establish a strategy for periodically evaluating democracy assistance
projects that is consistent across agencies, countries, and types of
programs; and  establish a systematic mechanism to share information on
development

approaches, methods, materials, and results from democracy assistance
projects among U. S. agencies and implementers.

Agency Comments GAO received comments on a draft of this report from the
State and Justice Departments and USAID, which are reprinted in appendixes
II to IV. These

appendixes also contain GAO responses to the agencies* comments. Overall,
the agencies generally agreed with the thrust of our recommendations for
how the management of program assistance could be improved. They also
noted that in some cases activities are either planned or under way that
would address our recommendations.

Chapt er 1

Introduction Background The countries of Latin America have a long history
of political change, including dictatorships, autocratic rule, military
juntas, and various forms of democracy. According to Freedom House, a U.
S. research organization that tracks political developments around the
world, these countries have, since the 1980s, gradually progressed toward
stronger democracies, as measured by the extent to which the citizens of
these countries enjoy political rights and civil liberties (see fig. 1).
Of the six countries in our study (Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru), all but Colombia and Nicaragua
experienced a strengthening of democracy by these standards between 1992
and 2002 (see table 1 and app. VI for more information). Appendix V
provides further information on the quality of life and selected
indicators for the selected countries.

Figure 1: Average Freedom House Democracy Scores for the Six Countries
Studied, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002

Tabl e 1: Freedom House Ratings for the Six Countries Studied, Fiscal
Years 1992 and 2002

1992 Freedom 2002 Freedom Country House score House score Change

Bolivia 2.5 2 Better Colombia 3 4 Worse El Salvador 3.5 2.5 Better
Guatemala 4 3.5 Better Nicaragua 3 3 Same Peru 4 2 Better

Average for all six countries 3.3 2.8 Better

Source: Freedom House. Note: Freedom House scores are ranked from 1 (more
free) to 7 (less free).

In September 2001, the 34 democratic members of the Organization of
American States (OAS) 1 unanimously adopted the Inter- American Democratic
Charter, declaring that *the peoples of the Americas have a right to
democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend
it.* This commitment goes beyond preserving elections to ensuring the
defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms, popular participation in
government, the rule of law, 2 the separation of powers, and transparent
and accountable government institutions. Despite this commitment, many
Latin American nations have yet to fully achieve these conditions.
According to the OAS charter, the hallmarks of democracy include

1 Active member countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. Cuba is not active and is the only nondemocratic member.

2 The U. S. Agency for International Development defines the rule of law
as embodying the basic principles of equal treatment of all people before
the law; it is founded on a predictable and transparent legal system with
fair and effective judicial and law enforcement institutions to protect
citizens against the arbitrary use of state authority and lawless acts.

 respect for the rule of law on the part of all institutions and sectors
of society;

 constitutional subordination of all state institutions to the legally
constituted civilian authority;

 access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law;
 transparency in government activities and probity, responsible public

administration on the part of governments;  participation of citizens in
decisions relating to their own development;  separation of powers and
independence of the branches of government;  a pluralistic system of
political parties and organizations;  freedom of expression and of the
press;  respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and 
periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal

suffrage. Although the national governments of all six countries we
visited have been democratically elected since the 1990s, they face
serious social, economic, and political challenges that have made
strengthening key democratic institutions a difficult and long- term
endeavor. 3 In South America, Colombia continues to struggle with the
escalation of a nearly 40- year campaign to overthrow the government, with
attendant economic and social disruptions that affect thousands of its
citizens each year, while Peru is emerging from the shadow of
authoritarian rule and the violent actions of insurgent guerillas.
Bolivia, which has had a relatively more stable political environment,
must now deal with a host of economic challenges and an increasingly
disillusioned and vocal indigenous class. In Central America,

El Salvador*s and Guatemala*s Peace Accords were signed in 1992 and 1996,
respectively, providing a framework for rebuilding those societies after
decades of civil war. Nicaragua, one of the poorest nations in the

3 Appendix VI provides a statistical overview of selected social and
economic indicators for the six countries we visited and comparative data
for Latin America and the United States.

hemisphere, still confronts political polarization and corruption,
according to U. S. officials.

The United States has provided assistance to many of the countries of
Latin America and the Caribbean to aid in strengthening democracies. From
fiscal years 1992 to 2002, the six countries in our study, Bolivia,
Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru, received about $580
million in assistance (see fig. 2 for distribution of funding among these
six countries). Almost all U. S. funding for democracy assistance,
authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, is appropriated to
the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department
of State. A significant amount of assistance has been allocated to the
Department of Justice through interagency fund transfers from USAID and
State. From fiscal years 1992 through 2002, USAID has administered $479. 3
million of program funding for democracy activities in this region, while
the Justice Department has administered $101.3 million. The State
Department also administered democracy- related programs during this time
period. However, the department could not readily provide disaggregated
data on the bulk of its democracy- related programs, such as funding
provided by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (INL). Figure 3 shows the distribution among the major
implementing agencies of democracy assistance funding to the six countries
we reviewed. Other organizations with democracy- related assistance
activities funded by the U. S. government include the National Endowment
for Democracy, the Inter- American Foundation, and the Department of the
Treasury.

Figure 2: Distribution of U. S. Democracy Assistance among Six Countries,
Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002

11% 

Bolivia

$63.3 million 26%

11% 

Peru

$64.6 million 12% 

Guatemala

$69.5 million 25% 

15% 

Nicaragua

$88.3 million

El Salvador

$145.8 million

Colombia

$149.1 million

Sources: GAO (analysis) and U. S. Agency for International Development and
Department of Justice (data).

Figure 3: Distribution of U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Countries by
Key Agencies, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002 Dollars in millions 150

37.9 38.2

120 111.2

107.6 90

1.7 86.6

13.6 0.03

60 9.9 64.6

53.4 55.9

30 0

Bolivia Colombia

Salvador Guatemala

Nicaragua Peru

El Latin American recipients

Department of Justice U. S. Agency for International Development

Sources: GAO (analysis) and U. S. Agency for International Development and
Department of Justice (data).

These agencies provide assistance through a variety of means, primarily in
the form of goods and services to governmental and nongovernmental
organizations and individuals. For some projects, such as law enforcement
training, U. S. government agencies provide the assistance directly, or
with contract assistance, as needed. For other projects, such as
institutional development projects, the agencies distribute aid to
beneficiaries primarily through grants, cooperative agreements, and
contracts with nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary
organizations, and firms located in the United States or overseas. Cash
disbursements are generally not provided directly to foreign governments.

Democracy assistance efforts, if successful, can influence political
stability and economic growth. Economists have long demonstrated that
countries with stronger democratic institutions are more likely to
experience sustained economic growth. For example, the positive
relationship between the respect for property and contractual rights and
the rate of economic growth has been found to be especially strong. Law-
respecting, accountable governments tend to provide conditions that
encourage longterm investments and innovation. As the standard of living
improves, the probability of further democratization of political
institutions over time increases substantially.

Many other foreign donors have also provided democracy assistance to the
countries covered in our review. Multilateral donors, including the
InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, the United Nations,
and OAS have been active in funding democracy- related activities. In
addition, many Western European countries, the European Union, and

private international donors have also financed projects similar to those
funded by the United States. We did not attempt to determine the total
amounts of funding and the outcomes associated with this assistance, given
the difficulty in identifying many different efforts, their costs, and the
paucity of studies documenting program outcomes.

The United States has taken a broad approach to providing democracy
assistance. The assistance approach generally incorporates four elements:
(1) rule of law, (2) governance (3) human rights, and (4) elections. (See
fig. 4 for an illustration of these elements.)

Figure 4: Four Elements of the U. S. Democracy Assistance Program

Rule of Law: These projects support constitutional and criminal code
reforms to make criminal justice more swift, transparent, and
participatory; establish new institutions and enhance existing ones to
improve management of the justice sector and to help safeguard the legal
rights of citizens; provide technical assistance, training, and management
information systems for judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and law
enforcement agencies to improve their capabilities and increase their
efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness; increase access to justice
through mediation, alternative dispute resolution, and other mechanisms;
and reform law school curricula to reflect modern methods and necessary
skills for practicing law.

Governance: These projects seek to improve the administrative, analytical,
and outreach capacity of legislatures; strengthen the administrative
capacity and accountability of municipalities and increase citizen

participation in local government; and foster a greater public awareness
about corruption and implement strategies to enable government
institutions to become more transparent and accountable.

Human Rights: These projects are intended to prevent human rights abuses
through greater public awareness, protect citizens against abuses, and
respond to past violations through legal action and public reconciliation
processes.

Elections: These projects are designed to improve election administration,
enhance voter access, and legitimize election results by supporting
domestic and international observers.

USAID and the State and Justice Departments have not traditionally
accounted for funding data according to the four elements previously
described but have provided this information for fiscal years 2000 through
2002, as shown in figure 5. While assistance to civil society appears to
be relatively small in figure 5, important civil society support is also
included

through the four programmatic areas we focus on in this report. 4 4 Civil
society includes the general population and nongovernmental organizations,
such as associations, trade unions, and interest groups.

Figure 5: Distribution of U. S. Democracy Assistance to the Six Countries
Studied, for Fiscal Years 2000 through 2002, by Element 3%

Civil society/ general Other

5%

Elections

.

7% 39%

17%

Human rights

29%

Governance Rule of law Sources: GAO (analysis) and U. S. Agency for
International Development and Department of Justice (data).

While USAID funds and implements assistance projects in all areas covered
by this report, the State Department provides funding to the Justice
Department for law enforcement assistance. The State Department*s Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor also provided a relatively

small amount of democracy- related assistance to some of the six countries
covered in our review, as did the department*s Western Hemisphere public
diplomacy program.

Objectives, Scope, and To assess the nature, impact, and sustainability of
U. S. assistance programs

Methodology to strengthen democratic institutions in Bolivia, Colombia, El
Salvador,

Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru, we first interviewed headquarters
officials in Washington, D. C., at the departments and agencies providing
rule of law, governance, human rights, and election assistance, including
USAID, the State and Justice Departments, the National Endowment for
Democracy, and the Inter- American Foundation. We also interviewed

experts at nongovernmental organizations, including the National
Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the
Washington Office on Latin America, and Human Rights Watch. For all six
countries, we reviewed Mission Performance Plans, USAID country and

regional strategic plans and other planning documents, funding agreements,
contracts, and project evaluations. We obtained funding information for
fiscal years 1992 through 2002 from USAID headquarters and country staff
and the Justice Department (the Justice Department administers funding
provided by the State Department). The State Department could not readily
differentiate most of its democracy- related assistance funding during
this period from counternarcotics- related

funding, which we did not include in the scope of our review. We also
reviewed our prior reports on democracy assistance to Latin America. 5 We
conducted fieldwork in each of the previously identified six countries

between March and September 2002. In each of these countries, we met with
the U. S. Ambassador; the USAID Chief of Mission; political and economic
officers; senior U. S. officials representing agencies with rule of law,
governance, human rights, or elections programs; and numerous program
staff, including contractors responsible for implementing the projects. We
interviewed host country officials at supreme courts; law enforcement
organizations; legislatures; national ombudsmen; and ministries covering
justice, police, local governments, government oversight, and elections.
We visited training schools for judges, prosecutors, and police; local
justice centers; local government pilot projects; and legislative outreach
offices, as appropriate. We also met with numerous representatives from
nongovernmental organizations and other groups representing a broad
spectrum of civil society, including local citizen groups involved with
rule of law, governance, human rights, and elections programs.

To analyze the overarching management issues that have affected program
outcomes, we analyzed project documentation, interviewed knowledgeable
officials, and reviewed assistance activities on field visits to the six
countries. We then analyzed and synthesized information across the six
countries. To look for broader themes, we also interviewed experts in the
field, including those from nongovernmental organizations and academia,
and attended USAID*s annual democracy officers* conference in 2001. 5 See
Related GAO Products at the end of this report.

We performed our work from August 2001 through December 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Chapt er 2

Rule of Law Assistance Reforming the criminal justice sector has been a
critical area of concern in Latin America. Nontransparent legal processes,
corruption, and incarceration of prisoners for months or years before
trials can undermine confidence that justice is being dispensed fairly.
Surveys done in the region have shown that high levels of crime and
citizens* lack of trust in justice

institutions are positively correlated with reduced public support of
democracy. In the six countries we reviewed, USAID and the State and
Justice Departments have sought to (1) reform criminal justice systems by

helping establish new legal frameworks to make criminal procedures more
efficient and transparent and by strengthening the capabilities of justice
sector institutions, (2) increase the public*s access to the justice
system by establishing public defense services for poor defendants and by
supporting construction of justice centers in poor communities, and (3)
help law enforcement institutions conduct criminal investigations and
manage their operations more efficiently and effectively. We found that
although the U. S. assistance had contributed to noteworthy progress in
these areas in most of the countries we reviewed, concerns remain about
whether gains will be sustained. Due to resource constraints and other
implementation difficulties, judicial and law enforcement institutions in
these countries continue to rely to a large degree on U. S. and other
international assistance for implementing justice sector reforms. U. S.
officials also stated that legislative restrictions on law enforcement
assistance restrict their ability to plan and carry out comprehensive
justice sector reform programs because they prohibit many types of police
assistance.

As seen in table 2, U. S. rule of law assistance has been provided to five
of the six countries we visited since the mid- 1980s, beginning first with
El Salvador in 1984. Tabl e 2: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance in the Six
Countries Studied

Country Assistance dates

Bolivia 1986 - present Colombia 1986 - present El Salvador 1984 - present
Guatemala 1986 - present Nicaragua 1993 - present Peru 1986 - present
Sources: USAID and Justice Department.

Criminal Justice A key component of U. S. rule of law assistance in five
of the six countries

Reforms Were we reviewed has been support for criminal justice sector
reforms

establishing new roles and responsibilities for judicial and law
enforcement Established but Not

institutions and introducing oral procedures and public trials. 1 Support
for Fully Implemented;

criminal justice reforms has been provided primarily by USAID and the
Sustainability Will

Justice Department and has focused on Require Stronger Host

 facilitating constitutional and criminal code reforms, Government

 helping to create and strengthen justice sector institutions, and
Commitment  improving legal training for justice sector professionals and
reforming

law school curricula. 1 While Peru adopted a new criminal procedures code
in 1991, it has still not entered into force. Peru has yet to initiate
similar reforms of its criminal justice system. Following then President
Fujimori*s 1992 unconstitutional takeover of political power from the
legislature and judiciary, USAID devoted most rule of law assistance to
civil society and access- tojustice programs in the mid- 1990s.

Constitutional and Criminal The United States has helped five of the
countries we reviewed establish

Code Reforms Have Been new legal frameworks for their criminal justice
systems, supporting the

Enacted but Not Fully drafting of new criminal codes and developing
political consensus for

Implemented criminal justice reform, both within the government and among
civil

society. Although the reforms each country has enacted have varied, U. S.
assistance has supported the necessary legal frameworks for oral,
adversarial criminal procedures and training for justice sector actors to
implement these procedures. The United States has assisted Latin American
countries* transitions from inquisitorial to adversarial systems to help
increase the transparency and efficiency of the judicial process.

Benefits of the adversarial system include shortened pretrial detentions,
the presumption of innocence, and the right to a defense. Host country
officials commented that U. S. support has been critical to

building consensus for the development and enactment of these reforms.
USAID has supported constitutional and criminal procedures code reforms
that went into effect in Colombia (1991), Guatemala (1994), El Salvador
(1998), Bolivia (2001), and Nicaragua (2002). 2 In Bolivia, for example,
USAID*s rule of law assistance since 1997 has focused primarily on support
for the passage and implementation of a new criminal procedures code.
USAID*s assistance, provided in close coordination with the German
government, has supported reforms that provide the basis for oral,
accusatory procedures and public trials, which significantly changed the
roles and responsibilities of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
the police. In addition, U. S. and German assistance has supported
disseminating information on the code to the public, mainly through
nongovernmental organizations. 3 Despite achievements in passing criminal
justice reforms, these countries have had varying degrees of success in
implementing the reforms in

practice, and each has work remaining to fully put into practice the new
roles and responsibilities contained in the reforms. For example,
Nicaragua and Bolivia have only recently begun implementing newly enacted
criminal procedures codes, while reforms for criminal sentencing codes
have not

2 In Nicaragua, the new criminal procedures code went into effect for
felonies in December 2002 and will go into effect for misdemeanors in
December 2003. 3 For cases carrying a sentence of more than 4 years,
Bolivian citizens are required to participate in criminal trials, as
*citizen judges,* in a role similar to that of jurors in the United
States. Sentencing courts include a panel of three citizen judges and two

professional judges.

yet been enacted. The Nicaraguan legislature also passed an administrative
litigation code in 2000, which created a mechanism for citizens to bring
legal cases against the government. 4 This code has not been implemented
because, according to a USAID official, the Supreme Court has raised
constitutional objections to them. Colombia and Guatemala enacted criminal
justice reforms in the early

1990s but have made limited progress in implementing them. Colombia, for
example, has made little progress in establishing an adversarial criminal
justice system, including oral trials, despite enacting its constitutional
reform in 1991. Colombia*s reforms established a legal structure for oral
trials and modernized criminal investigation and prosecutorial functions,
and the reforms were developed through a coordinated approach that
involved key justice sector institutions. 5 Following this promising
start, however, political support for these reforms waned during the
1990s, and oral, adversarial procedures are still rare in Colombia,
according to USAID

officials. Although Guatemala*s reforms provided the basis for
transitioning to an adversarial criminal justice system in 1994, and
Guatemala reorganized and created the necessary justice institutions for
implementing the reforms, the Guatemalan justice system is still plagued
by problems, particularly the courts, prosecutor*s office, and the police.
During our visit to Guatemala, the prosecutor*s office and the police were
still trying to resolve profound differences in the roles that their
respective institutions would have in carrying out criminal
investigations. U. S. assistance provided by the State and Justice
Departments and USAID has helped justice institutions introduce important
enhancements to their organizations and operations.

4 Before the passage of this law, the only option for citizens to bring a
case against the government was to submit a case directly to the Supreme
Court. 5 In a 1992 report, Foreign Assistance: Promising Approach to
Judicial Reform in Colombia, GAO/ NSIAD- 92- 269 (Washington, D. C.: Sept.
24, 1992), we commented positively on the commitment of Colombian justice
sector officials for reform. An interagency working group, led by the
Minister of Justice, agreed to and designed a constitutional revision that
included provisions to increase the judiciary*s independence and
established an independent prosecutor*s office to investigate and
prosecute criminal cases. In a 1999 report, Foreign Assistance: U. S. Rule
of Law Assistance to Five Latin American Countries, GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 195
(Washington, D. C.: Aug. 4, 1999), we found that Colombia had not fully
implemented many of its criminal justice reforms and, despite the training
and assistance provided to justice officials, few of these officials were
implementing new procedures for conducting investigations or holding
trials.

Despite these improvements, the Guatemalan criminal justice system still
faces serious challenges in its efforts to fully implement these reforms.
El Salvador appears to have made the most progress in reforming its
justice

sector; for example, the Attorney General has instituted sweeping
personnel changes in the prosecutor*s office to improve the quality and
integrity of its workforce. However, the judiciary in El Salvador has yet
to

institute similar reforms, according to U. S. officials. According to the
State Department*s most recent human reports, the judiciaries in each of
the six countries we reviewed are continuing to face problems, including
inefficiency, corruption, and a climate of impunity. In Bolivia, for
example, State reported that judicial corruption and inadequate case-
tracking mechanisms are contributing to the incarcerations of persons for
months or years before their trials. In Colombia, State reported that
Colombia*s large backlog of over 3 million cases has overburdened the
judicial system, and that prosecutors and judges are struggling to
transition from traditional, written procedures, to an oral, adversarial
system. Justice Sector Institutions

U. S. assistance also has supported the creation and strengthening of new
Were Established and

institutions to implement the new codes and other reforms, such as
judicial Strengthened, but Pilot

councils that participate in selecting, training, and disciplining judges
and Programs Have Not Been independent prosecutor*s offices to manage
investigations and bring criminal cases to trial. For example: Widely
Replicated

 In Bolivia, USAID assistance supported creating a judicial council in
1998 that reviews the qualifications of judicial candidates, evaluates the
performance of sitting judges, and manages a training center for judges.

 In Nicaragua, USAID has supported establishing a prosecutor*s office
that is independent of the executive branch that will implement the new
criminal procedures code.

The United States also has provided assistance to strengthen and modernize
justice sector institutions* operational capabilities. For example, USAID
support helped establish a clerk of courts office in Guatemala City that
centralized case intake and management in one location for the city*s 11
criminal courts. A USAID study showed that after this office was

established in 1999, the annual number of cases that were unaccounted for
decreased from more than 1,000 to 2. USAID and the Justice Department also
have assisted in the publication of operations manuals for judges,

prosecutors, and other legal operators to help clarify roles and
responsibilities and ensure uniform implementation of legal codes.

Judicial and law enforcement institutions that the United States has
assisted face resource constraints that make it difficult to sustain or
expand U. S- supported pilot projects. For example, in Bolivia, the
government lacked the resources to maintain or replicate a U. S.- funded
model prosecutor*s office, and the project ended with little impact. Also
in Bolivia, USAID supported a pilot case intake and management system for
judges. This system was designed to provide information on case
assignments and their progress through the judicial system. Originally
implemented in 1996, use of this system continues to be uneven due to
resource constraints, and the system has not been implemented on a

national level. In Colombia, USAID had funded 13 oral trial courtrooms, in
addition to 13 such courtrooms opened by Colombia*s judicial council.
However, these are the only oral trial courtrooms currently operating in
the country, and a major challenge will be to build similar courtrooms for
the country*s more than 2,000 municipal, circuit, and special jurisdiction
judges. In one regional court we visited in Colombia, USAID had built an
oral hearing room and equipped it with new recording equipment to
facilitate this transition. Although judges were holding regular oral
hearings in this room, this equipment was not used because the court could
not afford audiotapes (see fig. 6).

Figure 6: Public Hearing Room Constructed with U. S. Government Funding in
Manizales, Colombia

New Legal Training Was In five of the six countries we visited, USAID and
the Justice Department Introduced but Has Not

have provided extensive legal training to judges, prosecutors,
investigators, Been Institutionalized and public defenders on new criminal
procedures codes, either directly or through support to training centers
in host government institutions. For example:

 In Bolivia, these agencies trained more than 5,000 justice operators on
the country*s new code through a variety of courses, seminars, and *train-
the- trainer* activities.

 In Colombia, USAID has assisted a training academy for judges by
supporting restructuring the school and its curriculum. The school has
trained 600 judges to be trainers, allowing the training to be replicated

throughout the country. The Justice Department also has provided extensive
training to prosecutors and law enforcement personnel.

However, training centers for judges, prosecutors, and public defenders
have faced severe budgetary constraints, and in most cases do not operate
independent of U. S. assistance. For example, in Colombia, the director of
the judges training academy told us that its budget has been eliminated,
and the future operation of this center is uncertain. Similarly, a
USAIDsupported training center within Colombia*s Public Defender*s Office
lacks a training budget. In Bolivia, the Attorney General told us that,
without international assistance, he could not afford to staff and
adequately equip his academy to train prosecutors to implement the
country*s new criminal procedures code.

USAID also has worked with some law schools in Bolivia, Colombia, El
Salvador, and Guatemala to revise their curricula to reflect new reforms
and provide more practical training in oral, public trials. For example,
USAID helped Guatemala*s National University implement a revised
curriculum for new law students with greater emphasis on ethics and

including courses on constitutional law and human rights. Nonetheless, U.
S. and host country officials in the countries we visited also stated that
legal education remains a major concern. Although law schools in these
countries have proliferated, officials stated that many schools do not
provide adequate legal training. In El Salvador, the validity of the
degrees and academic credentials of judges and attorneys has come into
question, as the Supreme Court has initiated an extensive review of
justice officials* academic backgrounds. Host country officials in El
Salvador commented that poor quality legal education requires that lawyers
and judges be retrained once they enter the justice sector. USAID Has
Helped

USAID has supported efforts to increase citizens* access to justice
through Increase Citizen

programs to provide legal services to poor citizens and communities (see
figs. 7 and 8). USAID*s access- to- justice assistance has focused on
Access to Justice, but Sustainability and

 establishing and strengthening public defender*s offices and Expansion
of Services

 supporting decentralized justice centers and alternative dispute Will
Require Greater

resolution mechanisms. Host Country Support

Figure 7: Justice House in Manizales, Colombia, Constructed with U. S.
Government Funds

Figure 8: Free Legal Consultation Provided by Colombian Official at a
Justice House Constructed with U. S. Government Funds

Public Defenders USAID has assisted in establishing or strengthening
professional Public

Established for Poor, but Defender*s Offices in five of the six countries
we reviewed by helping build

Availability and Quality of political consensus for the creation of these
offices and by providing

Legal Defense Are Still operational support. USAID also has provided
training and operation

manuals and has supported computerized information systems for Public
Limited

Defender*s Offices. The number of public defenders and the services they
provided has also increased, due in part to USAID contributions. For
example:

 In El Salvador, the number of public defenders increased from 25 in 1991
to over 300 in 2002, and USAID contributed to this increase by initially
paying public defender salaries. El Salvador*s Public Defender*s

Office now also has local and national coordinators, investigators, and
legal aids. This office handles an average of 35, 000 cases per year,
which is approximately 95 percent of El Salvador*s criminal cases.  In
Guatemala, USAID supported creating an independent public

defender*s institute, as called for in the 1996 Peace Accords. In 2001,
the institute provided services to approximately 20,000 Guatemalans. These
newly created Public Defender*s Offices have faced severe budgetary
constraints and in some cases are not able to provide adequate services to
poor defendants nationwide. For example:

 In Nicaragua, the Public Defender*s Office, created in 1999, had only 13
attorneys when we visited, all of whom were located in the capital,
Managua. Since then, according to USAID 23 additional offices have been
established throughout Nicaragua, and the total number of public defenders
has increased to 47.

 Colombia*s public defenders work on a part- time contractual basis.
According to USAID*s justice contractor, these defenders have large
caseloads and are paid a low, fixed salary. Furthermore, Colombia*s
approximately 1,200 public defenders handle less than 10 percent of the

cases involving poor defendants. Private attorneys appointed by the court
to work on a pro bono basis handle the rest of the cases.

 In Bolivia, host country officials told us that the USAID- supported
Office of Public Defense, established in 1995, has not been adequately
funded. The office depends on external financing to fund the relatively
low public defender salaries. Bolivian officials stated that they have not
been able to adequately replace staff who left for higher salaries, and
that in

criminal trials, public defenders are at a substantial disadvantage to
prosecutors because they lack resources and support services.

The State Department*s most recent reports on human rights cited the
Public Defender*s Offices in four of the six countries as being
overburdened by large caseloads and not always able to provide qualified
attorneys for indigent defendants. In Nicaragua, State also cited public
defenders* complaints that judges were continuing to sentence poor
defendants without the presence of a public defender, despite these
defendants* right to legal counsel.

Justice Houses and Centers In four of the six countries we reviewed, USAID
has provided funds to Bring Legal Services to Poor

support the creation of decentralized, community- based houses and
Communities, but It Is Not

centers to provide greater access to the justice system and mediation to
Clear How the Centers Will resolve domestic disputes. Be Sustained or
Expanded

 In Colombia, *justice houses* (casas de justicia) have been built in
poor, marginalized areas to provide dispute resolution and other legal
services and help reinforce the presence of the Colombian government.
Since 1995, 18 justice houses have been built, and USAID plans to expand
this number to 40 by 2005. National institutions provide the staff,
including prosecutors, public defenders, police inspectors, social
workers, and mediators, while municipalities are expected to maintain the
facilities.

 In Guatemala, 11 justice centers were built outside the capital along
with 16 complementary mediation centers to serve indigenous communities
near these centers. U. S. and Guatemalan officials stated that the centers
have facilitated coordination of services and have

improved local citizens* experiences with the justice system.  In Peru,
the Ministry of Justice has established 32 conciliation centers and 31
legal aid clinics in poor communities.  In El Salvador, a pilot project
plans to open 6 justice houses by the end

of 2003. These justice houses will focus on providing mediation services.
Despite the positive impact that the justice houses and centers appear to
have had, it is not clear how these projects will be supported by host

governments or whether they will be able to operate without U. S.
assistance. Greater host country commitment of resources will be required
to make them more sustainable and to have a wider impact. For example: 
While Colombia*s Ministry of Justice and Interior has supported the

justice houses, it has not made a commitment to build more or take over
existing ones from USAID. Further, many Colombian municipalities face
severe resource constraints and may not be able to maintain and support
existing justice houses.

 Guatemala has had some success in expanding an aspect of the justice
center model from secondary cities to its capitol, Guatemala City,
improving officials* ability to track criminal cases. However, Guatemala*s
justice centers are not currently sustainable without U. S. or

other donor support, according to USAID and contractor officials, and the
Guatemalan government has no plans to fully expand this justice center
model to the national level.

 In Peru, USAID funded pilot conciliation and legal aid centers by
nongovernmental organizations and municipalities as well as government-
operated centers in several major cities. USAID also has helped the
Peruvian government build its capacity to train, license, and

regulate a growing number of private conciliators. However, most pilot
centers that USAID helped create are now closed for lack of funds,
according to project officials. The Minister of Justice also told us that
the government lacks the resources to expand the number of

government- operated conciliation centers or provide meaningful oversight
to privately run centers.

U. S. Police Assistance U. S. assistance to develop and strengthen the
capacities of the police in the

Supporting Criminal six countries we reviewed was provided primarily by
the Justice

Department*s International Criminal Investigations Training and Assistance
Investigations and Management of Police Operations Has Had Mixed Results

Program (ICITAP). 6 ICITAP*s assistance in these countries has focused
primarily on

 developing criminal investigations capabilities by providing training
and equipment and

 supporting police management, accountability, and operations (see figs.
9 and 10).

Figure 9: Forensics Equipment Donated by the U. S. Government to Improve
Criminal Investigative Capacity of Bolivian National Police in La Paz,
Bolivia 6 The State Department*s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs has also provided assistance to these six countries,
primarily to specialized police units focusing on counternarcotics crimes.
We did not focus on counternarcotics assistance in

this report.

Figure 10: U. S.- Funded Crime- Scene Management Training for Law
Enforcement Officials in San Salvador, El Salvador

Criminal Investigations Five of the countries we reviewed have ICITAP
police assistance Capacities Are Supported

programs. 7 A key focus of this assistance has been to strengthen police
through Training and

criminal investigations capabilities by providing direct training to
Equipment, but

investigators in crime- scene management and coordinating with
prosecutors, among other areas, and helping investigator schools prepare
Sustainability Is a Concern

to take over these functions. ICITAP also has provided equipment for
analyzing forensic evidence and has assisted in developing computerized
case management systems. In Guatemala, for example, ICITAP has

7 ICITAP is not currently operating in Peru.

provided assistance to strengthen the criminal investigations unit within
the National Civilian Police, including training in investigative,
administrative, and case management skills, and supported an automated
case- tracking system.

In Colombia, ICITAP also has focused on providing training in criminal
investigations, developing internal training capabilities, and
strengthening forensics capabilities. Currently, ICITAP is providing
assistance under Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative, which
is a more than $2 billion effort to assist the Colombian government in
fighting illicit crop production and improve its judicial and law
enforcement capabilities. ICITAP, with the Justice Department*s Office of
Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training, has helped
establish and strengthen specialized investigative units that focus on
money laundering, human rights, anticorruption, and antinarcotics. In an
effort to improve interinstitutional coordination, these units include
prosecutors, judicial police, and other investigative personnel. In
addition, ICITAP is strengthening Colombia*s forensics capabilities in the
country*s four laboratory systems through standardized procedures,
protocols, and new equipment.

In El Salvador, USAID also is working in the criminal investigations area
by providing courses on joint crime- scene management as requested by El
Salvador*s Attorney General and Chief of Police. Prosecutors, police

investigators, and forensic specialists have attended this course to
improve police- prosecutor coordination in protecting and managing
evidence.

U. S. assistance to strengthen criminal investigations capabilities has
provided extensive training and supported the development of internal
training centers. However, the impact of this assistance has been limited,
in

some cases, due to the lack of political will for change and resource
constraints. In Guatemala, for example, U. S. officials stated that
corruption, funding problems, and the lack of political will for reform
have limited the impact of U. S. assistance to strengthen criminal
investigations. According to U. S. officials, key barriers to improving
the police*s investigative capabilities have been the lack of continuity
of police leadership and coordination problems between prosecutors and
police, including an inability of these institutions to agree on their
roles. U. S. officials in Guatemala further stated that the police-
prosecutor dispute has impeded effective crime- scene management and
evidence handling, and

the two institutions developed criminal laboratories with overlapping
functions. 8 In Bolivia, ICITAP has supported training and provided
equipment for the

criminal investigation unit, but the ICITAP program manager stated that
courses had to be repeated multiple times because of a high turnover of
officers within the unit. In addition, U. S. and Bolivian officials stated
that the Bolivian police are facing significant resource constraints that
have impeded their ability to operate and expand an ICITAP- supported case
management system that would link police units and records in different
cities. Originally designed as a nationwide system when it began in 1997,

ICITAP is now supporting implementation in five cities, and even in these
locations use of the system has varied. According to ICITAP officials, in
some cases, police have not paid telephone bills, causing service to be
cut off, which has been a major obstacle. Bolivian police officials told
us that resource constraints also have prevented them from purchasing
fingerprint powder and toner for printers, thus precluding full use of
ICITAP- donated equipment. ICITAP officials stated that Bolivia*s
centralized administration and management of the police have not been
responsive to the resource

needs of departmental police units. In August 2002, the State Department*s
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs defunded ICITAP*s police assistance
program in Bolivia. A State Department official said that the decision was
made on the basis of dissatisfaction with ICITAP headquarters* management
of the program. This official also stated that future U. S. police
assistance in Bolivia would be taken over by the State Department*s INL
and USAID. A Justice Department official said that State*s decision was a

reflection of a continuing disagreement between the State and Justice
Departments over the role of each agency in implementing and managing
criminal justice programs. The official noted that ICITAP headquarters had
provided the same management assistance throughout the region, including
to the successful program in El Salvador. According to the State
Department*s most recent human rights reports, the

police in each of the six countries continue to be involved in illegal
activities and were not always investigated for these activities. In
Guatemala, for example, State reported that there were credible
allegations

8 The U. S. embassy withheld $500, 000 of assistance until the Attorney
General and Director of the Police signed an agreement that the two
institutions would develop a single, unified forensics lab. After a year*s
delay, ICITAP has begun to disperse this assistance following the signing
of this agreement in 2002. However, the two institutions have yet to agree
on which institution will house and manage this laboratory.

of the involvement of police officers in kidnappings, and that impunity
for police who commit criminal offenses remained a problem. In Bolivia,
State cited credible allegations that police were involved in abuses,
including excessive force, extortion, and improper arrests. State also
reported that investigations of these abuses were slow. Police Management,

In addition to supporting criminal investigations, ICITAP also has
provided Accountability, and

assistance in police management, accountability, and operations. This
Operations Were Supported,

assistance has included training in police administration and management
with the Most Positive

and training to strengthen internal oversight. In Bolivia, ICTAP has
supported a new disciplinary code and Office of Professional Results in El
Salvador

Responsibility. ICITAP also has supported curriculum improvements for
Bolivia*s 4- year, university- level police academy. In addition, ICITAP
has provided technical assistance to draft a new police organizational law
that would decentralize operational and administrative decision- making
authority and assign resources to operational units, rather than through a
centrally controlled budget. To date, this legislation has not been passed
into law. Among the countries we visited, ICITAP*s assistance appears to
have had

the greatest impact in El Salvador. ICITAP has helped El Salvador*s
National Civilian Police by developing a strategic plan, supporting
standardizing and centralizing record keeping and reporting, and providing
a management course to command- level officers. ICITAP also has supported
development of the Police Academy since its inception in 1993 and has been
able to scale back its assistance to the academy because Salvadorans are
now managing its operations and teaching most of its courses. In addition,
in an effort to address the country*s serious crime problem, ICITAP has
helped develop a new policing model, characterized by increased use of
crime statistics and the deployment of police patrols with greater
community visibility. Modeled on U. S. programs, this project seeks to
establish a permanent and highly visible police presence in urban areas
facing crime and involves greater community outreach. The national

police have implemented such patrols in 174 of El Salvador*s 262
municipalities, covering approximately 80 percent of the country*s
population. Police statistics show that certain crimes have been
significantly reduced in areas where these patrols have been deployed. For
example, these statistics show a 30 percent drop in overall crime, a 32
percent decrease in homicides, and a 25 percent drop in armed robberies.
The program also is being coordinated with an ICITAP- supported *9- 1- 1*
system that covers approximately 65 percent of the country*s population.

Legislative Restrictions on An additional factor related to implementation
of police assistance is

Law Enforcement section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which
restricts the use of

Assistance May Inhibit Rule foreign assistance funds for training and
financial support for police or of Law Programs

other law enforcement forces of foreign governments. Specifically, the
provision states that that these funds may not be used *to provide
training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons,
or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program
of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign
government.* This

prohibition was put in place in 1975 9 in response to human rights
violations committed by nondemocratic regimes receiving USAID public
safety assistance. USAID and the State Department have funded police
assistance programs in Latin America, implemented by the Justice
Department, under a series of exemptions that have subsequently been added
to this provision. For example, an exemption allows for U. S. assistance
to support police in the areas of investigative and forensic functions,
the development of academic instruction, and programs to improve the
administrative and

management capabilities. 10 The Justice Department*s program supporting
community- oriented police patrols in El Salvador has been permitted under
an additional exemption allowing assistance to strengthen civilian police
authority and capability in postconflict countries.

U. S. officials from the State and Justice Departments and USAID have told
us that section 660 is a barrier to developing, or planning effectively,
for a comprehensive, coordinated, and integrated justice sector assistance
program that includes the police. Under the prohibition on law enforcement
assistance, U. S. agencies may not be able to fully incorporate law
enforcement organizations into their programs supporting justice sector
reform. For example, a USAID official in Nicaragua stated that due to this
restriction, the agency could not include the police in its human rights
promotion programs or invite police officials to seminars and other forums
where their participation was considered to be critical to a productive
dialog on implementing justice sector reforms. These officials

stated that U. S. assistance providers should be able to plan their rule
of law assistance strategies on the basis of local country situations and
not on whether an exemption from the law can be justified. For example,
the USAID- funded assistance for community- oriented police patrols,
implemented by the Justice Department, was scheduled to terminate in

9 P. L. 93- 559, sec. 30 (a). 10 U. S. counternarcotics assistance is also
exempted from the section 660 prohibition.

2003 because USAID*s General Council determined that the postconflict
exemption permitting this program no longer applies in El Salvador.
Conclusions U. S. rule of law assistance to Latin America supports
criminal justice

reforms, increased access to justice, and police investigative and
management capabilities, and U. S. assistance has had an impact in each
area. Due to budgetary constraints and other implementation difficulties,
judicial and law enforcement institutions in the six countries we visited
continue to rely to a large degree on U. S. and other international
assistance to implement judicial reforms and other projects. U. S. and
Latin American officials we interviewed stated that criminal justice
reform in these countries is likely to be a long- term process, and it
will likely take a number of years before these reforms are fully
institutionalized. It is thus unclear at this time whether the initial
results of U. S. assistance will be sustained or expanded to have greater
impact. However, if U. S.- supported reforms are to become sustainable and
have a larger impact, it appears that a long- term U. S. commitment and
presence in providing rule of law assistance in these countries will be
necessary. The State Department indicated that the Executive Branch should
develop

and propose to the Congress new legislation on law enforcement assistance
that could be used to modify section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, to
provide a clear statement of authority for providing law enforcement
assistance abroad. The Justice Department stated that it would work with
the State Department and USAID to consider whether changes to section 660
would be appropriate. This could be an important step in providing the
Congress with options when considering how to

better provide police assistance abroad.

Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local

Chapt er 3

Government, and Anticorruption Latin American governments have
historically been highly centralized, and local governments have lacked
authority and resources. In addition, the legislative branch of government
has usually been weaker than the executive branch, and public sector
corruption remains a serious problem.

To address these conditions, U. S. assistance activities, implemented
primarily by USAID, have focused on (1) strengthening legislatures by
improving their planning, analytical, and citizen outreach capabilities;
(2)

improving democratic local governance by building the administrative
capabilities of municipalities and promoting effective decentralization of
government functions; and (3) combating corruption by raising citizen
awareness of this problem and establishing laws, regulations, and internal
control structures to enhance government accountability. Overall, we found
that U. S. governance assistance has enabled all six countries to develop
and adopt reforms to make government institutions more

effective, accountable, and responsive to the needs of the people. Despite
the initially positive results, the sustainability and scope of many of
these programs is uncertain because of inconsistent political support and
lack of resources.

Legislatures Initially USAID*s legislative strengthening programs have
aimed to

Increased Their  improve legislative planning and infrastructure,

Planning, Infrastructure,

 enhance legislative analytical and technical capabilities, and
Analytical, and

 increase citizen knowledge of and input into congressional activities.
Outreach Capacities, but Gains Have Eroded

As shown in table 3, U. S. legislative strengthening assistance has been
provided to five of the six countries we visited, starting in the early
1990s over Time

and continuing off and on to the present.

Tabl e 3: USAID Legislative Strengthening Assistance Country Assistance
dates

Bolivia 1992 - 1996, 2001 - present Colombia Under discussion El Salvador
1990 - present Guatemala 1997 - 2000 Nicaragua 1991 - 2001 Peru 2001 -
present Source: USAID.

Legislative Planning and USAID has provided support to help legislatures
function more effectively

Infrastructure Strengthened, and professionally by improving their
planning and infrastructure in all five

but Not All Improvements countries where there are or have been
legislative strengthening programs.

Have Lasted USAID has generally done this by supporting the formation of

modernization committees, which have developed plans to improve
legislative infrastructure and processes, to encourage reform.

 In Nicaragua, modernization committee projects included upgrading the
voting system, strengthening the legislature*s budget oversight
capabilities, and creating a Web site to publicize legislative
information. The Web site received 35, 000 hits within the first 6 months
that it was in

operation.

 In El Salvador, the legislature developed a master plan for
modernization that has helped to facilitate a consensus across political
lines regarding public participation in the legislative process.

In addition, USAID*s efforts to upgrade legislative infrastructure helped
create more professional and transparent working conditions.

 In El Salvador, semiprivate offices were constructed for all
legislators, thereby enabling some members to work more professionally and
some to increase the number of constituents they met with.

 In Nicaragua, according to USAID officials, a conference room for the
National Assembly was equipped, and an electronic voting board was also
provided to display and record individual members* votes. However, not all
of these modernization committees are functioning today, and the
infrastructure improvements have not always been well

maintained. According to USAID and host government officials, there have
been problems in three of the five countries where USAID has had
legislative strengthening programs.

 In Nicaragua, former members of the modernization committee reported a
decrease in the committee*s influence since the 2000 elections and noted
that the committee no longer has the administrative or political support
of the legislature. Also, the Nicaraguan legislature

invested its own funds to upgrade the electronic voting board, the
technician responsible for operating it told us that he no longer had
adequate funds to maintain or improve the voting board. Lastly, the
conference room that USAID had helped to equip in Nicaragua is now being
used solely by one party.  In Bolivia, the modernization committee no
longer functions.

 In Guatemala, after the 1999 elections the new majority party cut back
staffing of the modernization program, thereby causing the program*s
offices to decrease their operations.

Legislative Analytical USAID has supported efforts to establish and
strengthen analytical

Capabilities Bolstered capabilities in three of the five countries that
have legislative strengthening

Initially, but Most Gains programs, thereby enabling them to develop laws
and regulations in a more

Were Not Maintained informed fashion and to improve their oversight of the
executive branch.

 In Bolivia, USAID helped establish a congressional research center and a
budget office to analyze the executive branch*s proposed budget. This
office identified approximately $43 million in errors in 1995.

 In Guatemala, assistance was provided to the Unit for Technical Support,
which produced about 150 studies. According to the former manager of this
unit, legislators now consider such reports necessary before presenting a
proposal to the legislature.

 In El Salvador, a unit was created to provide analytical studies to
legislators, staff, and committees.

In two of these countries, USAID*s efforts to provide analytical support
to legislatures have faced challenges due to changes in political support.

 In Bolivia, despite several years of positive impact, after the 1997
elections legislative branch institutions that USAID had supported,
including the congressional research center, lost credibility as neutral
entities and became ineffective, according to a 2001 USAID- sponsored
evaluation.

 In Guatemala, after the 1999 elections, the new majority party cut 18 of
24 legislative technician positions, drastically curtailing the
legislature*s analytical capacity.

Citizen Input into Congress USAID also has assisted legislatures in
increasing their constituent

Increased, but Outreach outreach in all five countries with legislative
strengthening programs and

Efforts Were Hindered by a has worked to provide more opportunities for
citizens to have input into

Lack of Legislative Support congressional activities.

 In Peru, USAID*s Office of Transition Initiatives provided assistance
for four congressional committees to hold public hearings. To inform
people about the congress, USAID supported seminars and a play that was
performed in 45 public high schools in Lima, Peru.

 In El Salvador, three legislative outreach offices were built outside
the capital. At one center we visited, representatives from three
different political parties shared these offices. They stated that the
presence of these offices has helped decrease partisanship. According to a
USAID official, the legislature has been actively involved in setting
program priorities and has paid for the outreach offices* recurring costs.

 In Guatemala, three constituent outreach offices were established that
implemented civic education initiatives, organized public hearings, and
handled constituent casework.

In two countries, these outreach activities have not been sustained, owing
to a lack of consistent political support and in some cases politicization
of the project.  The head of the Nicaraguan Office of Citizen
Participation, which

USAID helped to create, noted that her office has received little
financial or political support from the legislature. In visiting the
office, we observed that its location on the 10th floor of an office
building in central Managua makes it less accessible and visible to
citizens outside

the capital (see fig. 11).  USAID ended its legislative strengthening
program in Guatemala after

the 1999 elections when the constituent outreach office staff came under
undue political pressure. Today the majority party runs the offices, and
opposition legislators are not permitted to work there, according to USAID
officials.

Figure 11: The Nicaraguan Legislature*s Office of Citizen Participation,
Established with USAID Assistance Some USAID Legislative

Some of USAID*s programs have helped leverage funding from other major
Programs Have Leveraged

donors for legislative strengthening programs. Funding from Other Donors

 The Salvadoran congressional modernization plan helped the legislature
secure a loan from the IDB to support new information systems and
infrastructure.

 The current USAID program in Bolivia encouraged investment from the
World Bank, the IDB, and two private German foundations.  In Peru, USAID
expects that its project will complement a planned $10

million IDB technical assistance project.

Local Governance and U. S. programs to strengthen local governance,
primarily implemented by Citizen Participation

USAID and to a lesser extent by the Inter- American Foundation, aim to
increase the effectiveness, responsiveness, and accountability of
municipal Were Enhanced in governments and to enhance citizen
participation in local government. Target Municipalities,

USAID*s local governance assistance has focused on but Broader Impacts

Are More Difficult to  strengthening municipal administrative, budgetary,
and outreach Achieve

capabilities and increasing citizen participation in local government and
 supporting national- level policy reform and institutions for

strengthening local governments. As shown in table 4, local governance
assistance has been provided in all of the six countries we visited, with
starting dates ranging from 1993 in El Salvador to 2001 in Peru and
Colombia.

Tabl e 4: USAID Local Governance Assistance Country Assistance dates

Bolivia 1996 - present Colombia 2001 - present El Salvador 1993 - present
Guatemala 1998 - present Nicaragua 1994 - 2001 Peru 2001 - present Source:
USAID.

In the late 1980s, Latin American governments began to make efforts to
decentralize their countries both fiscally and politically. Countries are
undertaking various decentralization activities, including developing a
nationwide decentralization program, addressing issues of financial
transfers and taxation, and focusing on municipal accountability and
citizen oversight.

With limited funding for local government, USAID has focused on a small
number of municipalities in each country, with the general aim that the
host country government, other donors, and other municipalities would
replicate the programs* concepts. For example, in El Salvador, USAID is

currently assisting 28 of 262 municipalities. In Colombia, USAID*s
democratic local governance program, run by several contractors, is
working intensively in 62 of 1,080 municipalities and is also providing
training to members of 226 city councils.

Administrative, Budgetary, USAID*s local governance programs have helped
many target and Outreach Capabilities of

municipalities operate more effectively and responsively (see fig. 12).
Target Municipalities

 In El Salvador, target municipalities increased financial resources by
72 Strengthened

percent between 1996 and 1999 by improving tax records and tax collection.
 Colombia*s program aims to help increase local tax resources by

improving local land records and also partially funds small- scale social
infrastructure projects, such as the installation of water meters designed
to generate revenue to make local water systems sustainable. Mayors we met
with noted that these projects helped enhance local government planning,
budgeting, project design, implementation, and evaluation.  In Bolivia,
according to yearly surveys done by a USAID contractor

between 1998 and 2000, citizens in USAID- assisted municipalities rated
their local governments more highly on responsiveness than citizens in
other municipalities.

Figure 12: Acting Mayor of Leon, Nicaragua, One of the Municipalities That
Received USAID Assistance to Strengthen Local Governance In addition,
USAID programs have helped to increase citizen participation in, and
oversight of, municipal activities in target municipalities. Some of

the municipal oversight activities are closely tied in with USAID*s
anticorruption programs.

 In Guatemala, support was provided for municipalities* efforts to
disseminate information and organize public meetings to develop municipal
plans and budgets.

 In Colombia, according to USAID data, more than 4,400 citizens have
participated in the development, implementation, and oversight of 67
municipal- level social infrastructure projects.

On a smaller scale, the work of the Inter- American Foundation also
supports local governance through small- scale, grassroots- driven
projects that often increase and strengthen participation by citizens and
civil society organizations (see fig. 13). For example, in Peru, one
Inter- American Foundation grantee organization described how they helped
raise women*s awareness of their rights, resulting in increased women*s
participation in municipal affairs. The Inter- American Foundation also
funded a Bolivian foundation that helped increase the involvement of
small- scale rural enterprises, cooperatives, and mayors in defining a
national povertyreduction

strategy. From 1997 to 2001, the Inter- American Foundation estimates it
funded $34.3 million of projects that had some effect on local governance
in the six countries we visited.

Figure 13: A Meeting Organized by USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives
to Educate Citizens from Rural Peru about the Country's New
Decentralization Program

Replication Outside Target According to our observations and discussions
with USAID and contractor Municipalities Was Mainly

staff, the impact of USAID local governance programs projects has mainly
Limited to Bolivia and El

extended outside target municipalities in Bolivia and El Salvador.
Salvador

 In Bolivia, where the government has accepted USAID*s approach to
working with local governments to replicate programs, impact has been
broad. According to USAID, 175 of 314 municipalities in Bolivia now employ
some of these participatory methods. Subnational associations of
municipalities and departmental municipal associations have also

been trained to replicate aspects of USAID*s programs. An Internet portal
has also been funded that would enable municipalities to share best
practices, have more transparent procurement, expand their financial base,
and pursue advocacy and networking.

 The Salvadoran government has made participatory municipal planning a
prerequisite for some government disbursements. The Salvadoran National
Municipal Association estimated that in 2001, 160 of 262

municipalities used some form of citizen participation. In Bolivia and El
Salvador, USAID has helped create materials that provide guidelines for
municipalities and implementers on strengthening local governance and
increasing citizen participation.

 In El Salvador, a manual on the basic criteria for participatory
municipal planning was developed, in consultation with other donors. The
Salvadoran government has begun to use this manual to measure progress in
participation and transparency in all municipalities.

 In Bolivia, the IDB has funded the publication of manuals, originally
developed with USAID support, that were made available to all 314
municipalities.

While these manuals have helped increase the scope and sustainability of
USAID*s programs in individual countries, they have not been widely or
systematically shared among USAID missions where there are local
governance programs. According to USAID officials in Washington, D. C.,
there is no central repository for these materials, which are usually
produced by contractors. USAID mission staff we spoke with agreed that
materials developed by USAID and its contractors are often not shared
across missions.

Other donors have also helped replicate USAID*s projects and expand their
impact beyond target municipalities.

 A municipal- level integrated financial management system implemented in
4 municipalities in El Salvador will be extended a $2 million IDB project
in at least 20 additional municipalities. In addition, the IDB and the
Salvadoran government are planning a joint $2 million project to replicate
USAID*s methodology of linking participatory development plans to
municipal budget support.

 In Bolivia, USAID, a German foundation, and the Dutch Embassy have
adopted a common methodology for municipal strengthening.

USAID*s Municipal- Level USAID*s efforts to assist target municipalities
have been constrained by Efforts Were Constrained by

limited municipal resources and skills and by staff turnover. Although
these Limited Municipal

conditions exist in other countries, they were most evident in our visits
to Resources and Skills and by

Nicaragua and Guatemala. Staff Turnover  According to USAID officials,
Nicaraguan municipalities do not have the

authority to set local taxes, which have been lowered in some cases by the
national government to attract foreign investment.  Representatives from
a Nicaraguan institute that works with municipalities expressed concern
that local officials may not possess

the appropriate skills to handle increased governance responsibilities.
USAID officials in Nicaragua and contractor staff in Guatemala said
municipal staff turnover has exacerbated this problem, as newly elected

mayors have fired existing staff and brought in less experienced
personnel.  Municipal staff in Guatemala also stated that they were
frustrated about

their lack of resources, noting that it was difficult to put into practice
USAID*s method of participatory planning since there were few funds to
implement projects.

Policy Reforms Adopted At the national level in all six countries, USAID
has helped develop policies

and Institutions and institutions that support municipalities, often by
working with national

Strengthened at the municipal associations.

National Level, but Results  In Peru, policy advice has been given to the
government for a

Affected by Level of nationwide decentralization program scheduled to
begin in 2003. As part

Political Support for of this support, the Prime Minister*s office
reviewed local experiences

Decentralization with decentralization and a congressional committee held
public

hearings to obtain input into its draft decentralization law.  In
Guatemala, USAID supported national- level working groups on municipal
indebtedness and tax codes.  In Colombia, USAID is helping the Colombian
Federation of Municipalities organize meetings among mayors and local
leaders at the regional level to discuss areas for policy reform.  In
Nicaragua, the National Association of Municipalities, which advises

and advocates for municipalities, was established and strengthened.
However, USAID*s work in this area has been affected by the level of
political support for decentralization, which varies by country.  In
Nicaragua, municipal officials and representatives of the national

municipal association noted that the past government had provided little
political or financial support to municipalities. Subsequent to our visit,
the current government passed three decentralization laws in May 2002,
according to a USAID official. The lack of a municipal civil service law,
for example, has posed obstacles to efforts to train local officials.

 Although the Bolivian government*s support for decentralization
decreased after the 1997 elections, USAID continued to work and have an
impact at the municipal level because the key decentralization law was
already in place.

 In El Salvador, USAID*s program has been assisted by the government*s
commitment to implement a supportive policy agenda.

Anticorruption Policies USAID anticorruption assistance has focused on

and Procedures Have  supporting reforms in anticorruption legislation and
regulations,

Been Implemented in Some Countries, but

 introducing programs to make national and municipal government the Long-
term Impact

institutions more transparent and accountable, and Is Not Yet Evident

 fostering citizen awareness and oversight. As shown in table 5, U. S.
anticorruption assistance has been provided in five of the six countries
we visited, beginning with Peru in 1995. Tabl e 5: USAID Anticorruption
Assistance

Country Assistance dates

Bolivia N/ A Colombia 2001 - present El Salvador 2000 - present Guatemala
2001 - present Nicaragua 1994 - 2001 Peru 1995 - 2000

2001 - present a Source: USAID. a Small- scale program through USAID*s
Office of Transition Initiatives.

Anticorruption Legislation USAID*s anticorruption activities have helped
countries develop

Was Developed; Some anticorruption legislation and regulations. In
Nicaragua, for example,

Institutions Are More USAID provided recommendations for the 2001 National
Budget Law and

Transparent and worked with the National Assembly*s Anticorruption
Commission to

promote civil service reform. In both Colombia and El Salvador, USAID has
Accountable; and Citizen

supported measures to increase the accountability of public servants,
Awareness Has Increased

including the development of a code of ethics. USAID also has helped
government institutions take steps to become more transparent and
accountable.

 In Nicaragua, USAID collaborated with other donors to help develop an
integrated financial management system. This system, when fully
operational, will enable the Ministry of Finance to track the spending of
13 government ministries, the National Assembly, and the courts (see fig.
14). 1  In Colombia, the government adopted regulations that will require
3,000

national and subnational entities to follow standardized internal control
processes that were recommended by USAID.

Figure 14: Nicaragua*s Integrated Financial Management System Was
Developed with Assistance from USAID Funds

1 The general model for this type of integrated financial management
system in Latin America was developed by the USAID- funded Americas*
Accountability/ Anticorruption Project. Similar systems are being
developed in other Latin American countries.

Note: When Nicaragua*s Integrated Financial Management System is fully
implemented, it will enable the Ministry of Finance to track the spending
of other ministries.

USAID- supported anticorruption programs have also helped citizens become
more aware and active regarding corruption issues.

 In Colombia, an anticorruption campaign reached 23 million people
through radio and television spots.

 According to a study by a USAID contractor, 2 Nicaraguans have become
better informed about corruption issues as a result of a USAIDsupported
national anticorruption awareness campaign.  Municipal- level public
oversight in El Salvador and Colombia has

increased as a result of local citizen watchdog groups that have been
supported by USAID.

USAID*s Programs Are Despite some initial success, the broader impact and
sustainability of Challenged by a Lack of

USAID*s anticorruption programs are still unclear. Transparency Consistent
Political Support

International, which is an international nongovernmental organization that
and by the Broad Scope of

focuses on combating corruption, concurs that although there have been
some positive developments in the region, the results of anticorruption
Corruption

programs have been modest so far. According to our observations and
discussions with USAID and host country officials, USAID*s projects have
been hindered by politicization and a lack of consistent political
support.  In Nicaragua, for example, the Comptroller General*s Office,
which

USAID had been supporting with technical assistance and training, was
reorganized. Now, a committee of political appointees runs it, impairing
its objectivity. In addition, according to a high- ranking Nicaraguan
official, in 2001 the Ministry of Finance fired experienced staff that had
been trained as part of the USAID- and World Bank- supported integrated
financial management system, resulting in lost institutional memory and
expertise.  In Peru, the Comptroller General*s Office has been unable to
fully

implement its oversight plans owing to a lack of political or financial 2
Mitchell A. Seligson, Nicaraguans Talk about Corruption: A Follow- Up
Study of Public Opinion (Arlington, Va.: Casals and Associates for USAID,
1999).

support from the government, according to USAID and Peruvian officials.
Finally, the systemic nature of corruption in Latin America, combined with
public skepticism about anticorruption efforts, poses a major challenge
for USAID*s programs. Although the political leaders of countries such as
Colombia and Nicaragua have stated that combating corruption is a high
priority, both USAID and the host countries are in the relatively early
stages of addressing a broad and deeply rooted problem in the region.
Transparency International notes that despite some progress, corruption
remains widespread in the region, and the credibility of institutions is
low. According to a 2002 study focusing on four Latin American countries,
higher levels of corruption are significantly associated with lower levels
of

support for the political system. 3 This is the case in El Salvador,
according to a 1999 study, where Salvadorans who were victims of
corruption demonstrated less support for the political system than those
who were not. 4 In Nicaragua, public sector corruption is endemic,
according to USAID, and the public has little confidence in many
government institutions, in part because of this corruption. According to
a 2001 survey by a USAID anticorruption contractor, more than 70 percent
of the Colombians surveyed considered corruption to be common in
government institutions. A work plan prepared by the same USAID contractor
cited a recent World Bank survey indicating that the same percentage of
respondents considered the Colombian Congress to be corrupt or very
corrupt. According to this USAID contractor, widespread public skepticism
exists regarding the national government*s effort to combat corruption.
USAID has noted that this lack of confidence poses challenges to its work

in Colombia. Conclusions U. S. governance- related assistance programs
have enabled the six

countries we visited to take limited steps toward more effective,
responsive, and accountable government institutions. In some cases, other
donors have taken steps to replicate or expand USAID*s programs. At the
same time, however, USAID*s governance programs have been challenged

3 Mitchell A. Seligson, *The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A
Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries,* Journal of Politics
64 (May 2002), 418, 423, 424. 4 Mitchell A. Seligson, Ricardo Cordova
Macias, and Jose Miguel Cruz, Democracy Audit: El Salvador 1999 (USAID,
1999), 96.

by inconsistent political will and resource constraints. In light of this
modest progress and the continued obstacles to reform, it is unlikely that
U. S. governance- related assistance will be able to produce sustainable
results without ongoing, long- term involvement.

Chapt er 4

Human Rights Human rights

Many Latin American countries have suffered from decades of authoritarian
rule and internal conflict. Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia in particular
have endured terrorism, massacres, and forced disappearances. While the
human rights situation in Peru and Guatemala 1 has slowly

improved over the last few years, the situation in Colombia 2 has
deteriorated even further. U. S. human rights assistance to Latin America
has supported efforts to foster greater awareness of, and respect for,
human rights.

From 1992 to 2002, Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia were among the largest
recipients of USAID human rights funding in Latin America. U. S.
assistance efforts to improve the human rights situation in these
countries have included technical assistance for the creation of
government agencies that address human rights problems, training programs,
education programs,

1 Guatemala suffered from more than 34 years of a civil war that ended in
1996; during the war, state forces and related paramilitary groups engaged
in a brutal campaign of repression against insurgent groups and civilians.
In Peru, the period between 1980 and 2000 was one of terrorism and armed
conflict, when the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru terrorist groups and

the Peruvian military killed an estimated 30,000 civilians and tortured or
forcibly *disappeared* thousands more. Under the administration of
President Fujimori, civil liberties were severely curbed and thousands of
innocent people were wrongfully detained without trial.

2 In Colombia, the current conflict between the paramilitaries; guerillas;
and, to a lesser extent, the military has continued for almost four
decades, and the longevity and the recent escalation of the violence have
adversely affected the lives of millions of civilians. More than 1.1
million people have been internally displaced from their homes, and tens
of thousands more have been murdered. Colombia also has the highest rate
of kidnappings in the world, with the guerilla and paramilitary groups
committing 3,706 kidnappings in 2000 alone.

and the provision of protection for threatened individuals. For the most
part, the impact of these projects has been positive, but they are limited
in scope and hindered by a lack of resources. Often, political and
logistical

problems must be resolved for these programs to work better. Despite some
improvements in governments* respect for human rights in these countries,
serious problems persist. In some cases, longer term project results may
be difficult for host governments to sustain owing to high recurring
costs. As shown in table 6, the U. S. government has provided human rights

assistance over the past decade to Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru.

Tabl e 6: U. S. Human Rights Assistance in Three Countries Country
Assistance dates

Colombia 1996 - present Guatemala 1993 - 1994, 2000 - present Peru 1994 -
present Source: USAID.

U. S. Human Rights U. S. human rights assistance has had a positive impact
in the three

Assistance Has countries we reviewed that have a current human rights
program. In Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia, human rights assistance has
addressed

Increased Awareness past abuses, protected threatened individuals, and
prevented future

and Government abuses. These efforts have fostered an increased awareness
among the

Accountability citizenry as to what rights the efforts have, and they have
increased

government accountability. Provided primarily by USAID, human rights
assistance in these countries has focused on

 preventing future human rights abuses by promoting greater public
awareness and mechanisms to address potential incidents;

 protecting human rights by providing physical, economic, and legal
assistance to threatened individuals and communities; and

 responding to past abuses by supporting reconciliation commissions as
well as the investigation and prosecution of human rights violations.

Mechanisms Were Put in USAID assistance programs have served to foster
greater citizen awareness

Place to Prevent Human of human rights and have provided mechanisms for
government action in

Rights Abuses support of human rights. For example, in Colombia, USAID has
supported

the creation of a national information network, called the *Early Warning
System,* for citizens, nongovernmental organizations, and local
authorities to report signs of impending massacres or other human rights
violations in their communities by any of the irregular armed groups
involved in that country*s ongoing conflict. 3 If a threat is deemed real,
the military, police, a national social service organization, or all
three, will be alerted to take appropriate action. As of August 2002,
USAID had provided $600,000 of a total planned investment of $3.1 million
to support direct technical assistance and training for the network as
well as to establish its central office. USAID also has helped establish
13 regional offices out of a planned 15, although the Early Warning System
director said even more offices would be needed. According to its
Coordinator, the Early Warning System has been publicized on the Internet
and advertised on both television and radio to inform citizens about its
existence. This project appears to have facilitated citizens* ability to
recognize and report potential human rights threats as well as allowed
them to hold the government directly responsible for taking action. From
June 2001 through August 2002, 150 alerts were emitted, of which the
military, the police, or both, responded to 107. The

Early Warning System director estimates that this response has saved
90,000 people from being victimized, although no actual results indicators
have been developed.

Although the Early Warning System is a unique tool for preventing
largescale human rights violations and has great potential for
replication, coordination problems could hinder its proper implementation
and

ultimate impact. The director admitted that smooth communication between
the regional and central offices can be problematic on the weekends,
particularly Sundays, when the central office is not staffed. The system
does not appear to have adequate backup communications methods and at
times relies on one cell phone to ensure that alerts are transmitted to
the appropriate authorities. Furthermore, government authorities have not

3 These groups include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (also
know as the *FARC*), the National Liberation Army (also known as the
*ELN*), and the right- wing paramilitary forces (known by their umbrella
organization, the United Self- Defense Groups

of Colombia, or *AUC*).

always responded consistently to alerts and have failed to avert major
human rights violations. 4 Increased Protection

The U. S. government also has supported the creation of protection
Provided for Some programs for threatened citizens in Colombia. The
Justice Department

Threatened Citizens supports both a witness and a judicial protection
program. Both of these

programs place special emphasis on operational security 5 and seek to
ensure safe participation in judicial proceedings for witnesses, judges,
investigators, and prosecutors. USAID supports a separate protection
program for human rights defenders. As of August 2002, USAID has helped
protect 2,776 individuals from irregular armed groups. 6 In response to
lobbying from the human rights community, the Colombian government

has expanded the target protected population to include criminal
witnesses, union leaders, journalists, leftist party members, mayors (all
1, 098 of Colombia*s mayors were threatened with kidnapping or death by
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia if they did not resign in
2002), council members, and municipal human rights workers. In the 5- year

period between 1997 and 2002, the Colombian government spent approximately
$25 million on the project. Resources, however, are too limited to help
all vulnerable groups of people or even to keep pace with the increasing
demand for individual protection. Nevertheless, the program demonstrates
that the Colombian government is taking some action to protect threatened
citizens. 4 For example, in May 2002, a massacre occurred in the
municipality of Bojaya. In this

instance, the Early Warning System had issued an alert ahead of time, but
the military did not respond. During the ensuing clash with
paramilitaries, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia launched a gas
cylinder bomb and hit the roof of a church where citizens had taken
refuge* killing 119 people, 40 of them children, and injuring over 100
additional people.

5 Operational security focuses on the provision of armored vehicles; the
architectural design of a *safe site* for witnesses; the purchase of
computers, radios, audio- visual equipment, etc.; and the training of
protective force personnel.

6 This assistance includes both *soft* and *hard* protection. Soft
protection refers to relocation and economic assistance, and hard
protection includes armored vehicles and offices as well as communication
devices, such as radios and cellular phones. USAID also has provided
office equipment and information systems software to the government of
Colombia to manage the protection program.

Official Response Provided USAID human rights programs also have fostered
greater government

for Some Past Abuses responsiveness to allegations of past or ongoing
human rights abuses. For

example, the Human Rights Promoters Network operated by the Colombian
government educates citizen leaders about their rights protected by law.
These leaders are expected to promote greater human rights awareness by
replicating the training in their own communities, particularly for those
groups most vulnerable to human rights violations.

USAID also has been instrumental in supporting the creation of Human
Rights Ombudsman Offices in five of the six countries by providing
technical assistance, office equipment, and salaried professionals. These
offices address citizen complaints, investigate officials accused of human
rights violations, and propose human rights legislation. The State

Department has reported that despite providing a legal channel for citizen
complaints, funding problems have undermined sustainability and
credibility of the ombudsman offices in Colombia and Nicaragua.
Furthermore, the ombudsman has at times temporarily cast the entire office
in a negative light, as in the case of Guatemala, where an

ombudsmamn was accused of corruption. Various government officials,
however, stated that, according to public opinion polls in Peru and
Bolivia, the ombudsman*s office is one of the most highly respected public
organizations.

In Guatemala, USAID helped the Attorney General*s Office design the first
Victims Assistance Office in Latin America in 1997, staffed with full-
time doctors, nurses, social workers and lawyers to provide aid to victims
of crime and gather evidence for potential prosecution (see fig. 15).
Since then, each of Guatemala*s 23 departments has established at least
one such office.

Figure 15: USAID- supported Victims Assistance Center Managed by the
Attorney General*s Office, Guatemala City, Guatemala USAID human rights
programs have also fostered greater justice and resolution for victims and
their families. For example, the Foundation for Anthropological Forensics
of Guatemala, with funding from USAID, has been carrying out exhumations
of clandestine cemeteries created during Guatemala*s 34- year civil war
(see fig. 16). These efforts have helped to

prove that massacres occurred, put questions about loved ones to rest, and
aided in national reconciliation efforts. Peru*s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission is carrying out exhumation efforts with similar goals and also
is investigating culpability for atrocities. One of the commissioners with
whom we met stated that U. S. assistance has been critical for the
functioning of the commission, keeping it in operation when the Peruvian
government was delayed in providing promised funding. The commission*s

work is expected to culminate in a July 2003 report that will make
recommendations for government reparations.

Figure 16: Coffins used by USAID- supported Foundation for Anthropological
Forensics to Reinter Remains Exhumed from Mass Graves in Guatemala

Finally, the Justice Department has also worked to achieve justice and
resolution for victims of human rights violations in Colombia. The
department has trained special units of prosecutors and investigators to
pursue major human rights cases and high- impact crimes, such as
massacres, bombings, and kidnappings, in the criminal justice system. From
August 2001 to August 2002, special units operating out of eight cities
prosecuted 167 cases against irregular armed groups, including high-
profile

cases such as the assassination attempt on then- presidential candidate
Alvaro Uribe in 2002 and various massacres across the country (see fig.
17). According to the Justice Department, it has plans to help the
Colombian government expand the number and size of these units in fiscal
years 2003 and 2004. Figure 17: Human Rights Units Using Forensics
Equipment Provided by the Justice

Department to Investigate a Crime Scene in San Jose de Apartado, Colombia

Despite Improvements, According to the State Department*s most recent
human rights reports,

Serious Human Rights although government respect for human rights has
improved in some

Problems Persist cases, serious problems still remain. In Peru, State
reports that in recent

years the government has demonstrated greater respect for human rights
advocates and had generally improved its relationship with civil society.
In Guatemala, State reports that the government generally respects the
human rights of its citizens, but its willingness and ability to prosecute
and convict human rights violators is seriously limited, and that the
police and

military may be involved in illegal executions. In Colombia, the
government's human rights record remained poor, according to State; there
were continued efforts to improve the legal framework and institutional
mechanisms for protecting human rights, but implementation lagged, and
serious problems remained in many areas. For example, members of the

police and armed forces have committed serious human rights abuses and
have collaborated with paramilitary insurgents in doing so, but they have
rarely been brought to justice. Government security forces also often
failed to take action to prevent paramilitary attacks, according to the
State Department report.

Outlook for Human Rights The long- term outlook for many U. S. human
rights assistance projects

Assistance differs from most of the other programs we reviewed. Some human
rights

efforts that the United States is supporting, such as Peru*s Truth
Commission, are short term and are projected to end on a specific date.
Other projects, such as assistance to Colombia*s internally displaced
persons, are fundamentally humanitarian in nature and may require outside
support for as long as there is internal conflict. Funding for some longer
term projects, however, is questionable owing to potentially high
recurring costs. For example, the Colombian human rights units trained by
the Justice Department still have a very limited national presence and
depend

on U. S. support to update and expand their training and equipment. It is
not clear whether the Colombian government will expand these units on a
national basis.

Conclusions The United States has provided Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru
with some important tools to help address the human rights problems.
Nonetheless, human rights remain a major concern in Colombia and
Guatemala. Given the magnitude and political complexity of these problems
and the limited scope of U. S. assistance, the tools that the United
States has provided are likely to have only a marginal impact on these
problems.

Chapt er 5

Elections Over the last two decades, many Latin American countries have
transitioned to democracy and most countries in the region have held
elections regularly. Although U. S. election- related assistance has
supported efforts that have contributed to free and fair elections in the
six countries we reviewed, most of this assistance has gone to three of
these countries* Nicaragua, Peru, and El Salvador* to help them improve
electoral institutions and enhance voter access. U. S. officials noted
that of these three countries, only Nicaragua is likely to require
significant international support before its next major election.

The United States Has The United States has been the largest donor of
election- related assistance

in many of the six countries we visited, and USAID has provided the bulk
of Primarily Targeted

this aid, almost $66 million, during fiscal years 1990 through 2002. 1
Most of Three Countries with

this assistance went to Nicaragua ($ 27 million), Peru ($ 20 million), and
El Assistance in Election

Salvador ($ 13 million). The State Department, the National Endowment for
Administration, Voter

Democracy, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs,
and the International Republican Institute provided smaller amounts of

Access, and Electoral additional election assistance to some of these
countries. The last two

Observation organizations have also used USAID election funds in some of
these

countries, according to representatives from these institutions. As shown
in table 7, USAID provided electoral assistance to all six of the
countries visited, starting in 1990 and continuing off and on to the
present.

1 In this chapter, we report USAID assistance from fiscal years 1990
through 2002 because of the substantive amount of assistance provided to
support the 1990 Nicaraguan elections.

Tabl e 7: USAID Election Assistance in the Six Countries Country
Assistance dates

Bolivia 1991 - 1999 Colombia 2002 El Salvador 1991, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2000
Guatemala 1990 - 1992, 1994 - 1997, 1999, 2002 Nicaragua 1990, 1995, 1996,
1998, 2001, 2002 Peru 1993 - 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Sources: GAO
(analysis) and USAID (data).

Overall, U. S. election assistance activities have focused on  improving
election administration by building the institutional capacity

of electoral authorities,  enhancing voter access by improving voter
registration and education

and supporting electoral reform, and  legitimizing election results by
supporting electoral observation by

domestic and international groups. USAID also has recently helped improve
election administration in Peru and Nicaragua by strengthening the
capabilities of electoral authorities. In Peru, USAID supported staff
training, technical assistance, election planning, logistics, information
systems, and transmission of results by providing almost $3.3 million in
assistance before the 2001 national elections. The agency also provided
support at a lower level to help run Peru*s 2002 regional and local
elections. In Nicaragua, USAID has provided similar types of election
administration support since 1990, including more

than $1.8 million to the electoral authority for administrative
enhancements in planning, logistics, information technology, and
transmission of results before the 2001 national elections.

U. S. assistance also has helped enhance voter access to the electoral
system by improving voter registration and education in El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru. In El Salvador, according to USAID
officials, the agency supported the establishment of civil and voter
registries and helped issue 937,000 single identity documents, out of an
expected total of 3.2 million documents, which will be used as official
voter identification in future elections. On the basis of an electoral
reform

enacted with USAID support, the Salvadorian electoral authority plans to
use the new voter registry to assign voters to polling stations closer to
their residence for the 2004 presidential elections, thereby further
improving voter access. In Nicaragua, USAID also provided support for
registration efforts before the 2001 elections. This assistance helped
about 150,000

citizens obtain voting credentials, according to USAID. To support
Guatemala*s 2003 elections, USAID, through OAS, is providing $750,000 in
assistance to fund voter registration activities to increase the access of
the population to the electoral system. In Peru, USAID funded voter-
training activities conducted by nongovernmental groups before the 2001
national elections and the 2002 regional elections.

In Peru, El Salvador, and Guatemala, U. S. election- related assistance
also has supported electoral reform efforts to improve voter access, with
limited success. This assistance has focused on enhancing the rules and
procedures governing the electoral system in order to improve political
participation of the population. In Peru, USAID provided support for
electoral reforms that were proposed following the 2001 national
elections, but these reforms have not yet been enacted. In El Salvador and
Guatemala, following the signing of those countries* Peace Accords in 1992
and 1996, respectively, the agency supported efforts to improve electoral
rules and procedures and increase political participation of the
population, including participation of women, indigenous groups, and rural
populations. In El Salvador, USAID supported the drafting of four

proposals to reform political parties, the electoral authority, electoral
procedures, and proportional representation. In Guatemala, the agency
supported efforts to develop an electoral and political parties law and to
facilitate public discussion of various other proposals under
consideration. These reforms are still being considered in the El
Salvadoran and

Guatemalan legislatures. U. S. assistance has recently helped legitimize
election results by supporting election observation in Peru, Nicaragua,
and Colombia by domestic and international groups. In Peru*s 2001
elections, for instance, USAID provided more than $2.1 million to field
election observers from the Peruvian Ombudsman*s Office; the Organization
of American States; the National Democratic Institute; the Carter Center;
and Transparencia, which is a

local nongovernmental group (see fig. 18). USAID also provided a similar
amount to fund international and domestic observers of Nicaragua*s 2001
elections and $325,000 to support OAS observers of Colombia*s 2002

elections.

Figure 18: Poll Workers Organizing Voting Materials before Opening a
Polling Station in Lima, Peru, during the April 2001 National Elections

U. S. Assistance Has The State Department has noted in its human rights
reports, on the basis of

Helped Ensure Free reports by domestic and international observation
groups, that elections in

the six countries have been generally free and fair, with the exception of
and Fair Elections, but the seriously flawed and controversial 2000
Peruvian national elections.

Nicaragua May Still This pattern of free and fair elections is consistent
with the elections held

Need Additional in other countries in the region since many of these
countries started their

transition to democracy almost two decades ago. Assistance

Looking toward the future, USAID officials stated that Peru and El
Salvador might require significantly less international assistance to run
upcoming elections. USAID officials highlighted that these countries have
enhanced their institutional capabilities to run elections, as
demonstrated by the widely recognized legitimacy of their recent elections
and the decreasing international support required by their electoral
authorities for conducting elections. These officials noted that USAID
does not plan to fund any electoral activities in Peru and after the 2003
elections in El Salvador (see fig. 19).

Figure 19: Voters Waiting to Enter Polling Station in Lima, Peru, during
the April 2001 National Elections

On the other hand, Nicaragua, which has received the largest amount of U.
S. election assistance, will likely require significant international aid
to run its next major election, according to USAID officials. These
officials noted that the Nicaraguan electoral authority, despite efforts
to improve it, still faces major financial, planning, and organizational
problems. For example, this electoral authority is still highly
politicized and exhibits serious institutional and managerial weaknesses
that compromise its ability to run elections. Also, Nicaragua*s civil and
voter registries are outdated, and many voter documents used in the 2001
national election were temporary or will expire soon, leaving the
challenge of registering a large number of voters before the next
election. In their final 2001 election observation reports, the Carter
Center and the International Republican Institute noted that, despite
having held a free and fair election, Nicaragua still has important
shortcomings in its electoral system, particularly in election
administration and voter access. 2 2 The Carter Center, Observing the 2001
Nicaraguan Elections: Final Report (Atlanta:

2002); International Republican Institute, Nicaragua, Election Observation
Report, November 4, 2001 (Washington, D. C.: 2002).

Conclusions U. S. elections assistance has helped all six countries we
visited realize a fundamental component of democracy* free and fair
elections. While

continued improvements will be needed to achieve wider participation and
greater efficiency in elections administration, particularly in Nicaragua,
basic capabilities are in place in these countries to enable them to
continue to hold free and fair elections into the future.

Management Issues Hinder Impact and

Chapt er 6

Sustainability of U. S. Democracy Assistance Many organizations and
entities are involved in providing democracy assistance in the six
countries we reviewed, including U. S. government agencies, other
multilateral and bilateral donors, and nongovernmental organizations.
Effective coordination and cooperation among these players is critical for
achieving meaningful, long- term results from assistance efforts. U. S.
agencies have not always managed their programs in a way

that would leverage the contributions from all of these organizations,
particularly other major donors, and maximize the impact and
sustainability of U. S. funded programs. Assistance efforts are not always
well- coordinated among the agencies, and strategic plans have not defined
overarching goals and the roles that key U. S. agencies will play in these
efforts or ways to link these efforts with those of other donors to help
ensure that results are sustainable. Furthermore, evaluation of program

results and sharing lessons learned has been limited among U. S. agencies
and implementers across countries where this assistance is provided.

Poorly Coordinated Although a wide variety of U. S. government agencies
and international

Program Management donors provide democracy assistance, coordination of
this assistance was

inconsistent in the six countries we visited. We found that those Limits
Effectiveness of

organizations supporting democratic institutions did not always cooperate
U. S. Democracy

in a way that would maximize the impact and sustainability of their
efforts. Assistance

As a result, the programs they implemented were often fragmented and not
mutually supportive and failed to overcome common financial and political
obstacles. U. S. government agencies have not outlined a long- term,
strategic approach to this assistance that considers all of the major
parties and available resources and information.

Poor Coordination and The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
(the Results Act)

Strategic Planning among requires U. S. government agencies to identify
their strategic goals and

develop annual plans for achieving them. 1 Further, as we have previously
U. S. Government Agencies

reported in our work relating to this act, such plans should identify how
1 The Results Act seeks to improve the management of federal programs by
shifting the focus of decision- making from staffing and activity levels
to the results of federal programs. Under the Results Act, executive
agencies are to prepare 5- year strategic plans that set the general
direction for their efforts. Agencies then are to prepare annual
performance plans that establish the connections between the long- term
strategic goals outlined in the strategic plans and the day- to- day
activities of program managers and staff. Finally, the act requires that
each agency report annually on the extent to which it is meeting its
annual performance goals and the actions needed to achieve or modify those
goals that have not been met.

similar programs conducted by other agencies will be coordinated to ensure
that goals are consistent, and, as appropriate, program efforts are
mutually reinforcing. 2 The annual performance plans prepared by the State
Department and

USAID in accordance with the Results Act both identify promoting democracy
and human rights abroad as agency strategic goals. However, neither
USAID*s or State*s plans nor the subordinate regional or countrylevel

planning documents we reviewed specifically address the role of other U.
S. agencies and donors in ensuring that U. S.- funded democracy projects
are well coordinated and leverage domestic and international resources.
With few exceptions, these planning documents did not take into account
the unique resources that each of the various U. S. agencies has to offer
and the role each could play over what will be a long- term

effort to help countries achieve and institutionalize democratic reforms.
Although some documents mentioned that other agencies would be involved in
the assistance effort, the nature or duration of that involvement was not
discussed in detail.

The relationship among USAID and the State and Justice Departments has
frequently been difficult when it comes to rule of law programs, which has
hindered long- term joint planning in that area. As we noted in a 1999
report, interagency coordination on rule of law assistance has been a
long- standing problem. 3 At that time, the Chairman of the House
Committee on International Relations had expressed the concern that,
because funds were provided through so many channels, rule of law programs
had

become inefficient and uncoordinated. Little progress has been made to
resolve this problem. According to U. S. officials with whom we spoke, the
relationship among implementing agencies is often still characterized more
by competition than cooperation and has led to fragmented programs that
are not always mutually supportive in achieving common goals. For example,
in Bolivia, poor communication and disagreement among these agencies on
their respective roles has disrupted efforts to assist the development of
that country*s national police by casting the program*s staffing and
funding in uncertainty. Unresolved coordination issues among these
agencies have precluded efforts to establish a joint strategy on law 2 U.
S. General Accounting Office, Results Act: An Evaluator*s Guide to
Assessing Annual Performance Plans, GAO/ GGD- 10.1.20 (Washington, D. C.:
Apr. 1, 1998).

3 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Status of Rule of
Law Program Coordination, NSIAD- 00- 8R (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 13,
1999).

enforcement development on either the regional, or country- specific
level. As a result, in the countries we visited, the agencies are often
operating on parallel tracks and not developing programs that are closely
coordinated and mutually supportive. Better coordination among these
agencies could leverage the critical

resources and comparative advantage that each offers to overcome
obstacles. For example, while USAID has significant institutional
experience designing and implementing development programs, the Justice
Department has significant technical expertise in law enforcement and
criminal investigations, and the State Department has diplomatic
relationships and influence that can be helpful in resolving political
impediments to reform.

Limited Cooperation among Other international donors have major efforts to
promote democracy in the

International Donors countries we visited, and two of the largest, the
World Bank and the IDB,

are funded in part by contributions from the U. S. government. However,
the strategic plans and other related planning documents prepared by the
State and Justice Departments and USAID included very little information
on plans to cooperate with other major international donors in the six
countries we reviewed. Some plans mentioned a few successful cooperative
efforts in the past, but donor cooperation was not consistently discussed
as an integral component of the U. S. government*s approach in any of the
areas of democracy assistance we reviewed.

We observed that donors working in closer coordination, with a common
strategy and work plan, can make significant progress. In Bolivia, the U.
S. and German governments embarked on a joint program to implement the new
criminal code, each providing mutually supporting activities and
financing. As a result of this effort, a large number of legal operators
were trained on the code*s provisions, and the Bolivian government began
implementing the code on schedule. Other examples of close coordination
include the following:

 In Bolivia, USAID, a German foundation, and the government of the
Netherlands have adopted a common methodology for municipal strengthening,
expanding the impact of USAID*s initial contributions to

additional municipalities.  In El Salvador, the IDB is funding projects
to extend a USAID- supported,

municipal- level financial management system to additional localities.

 Donors and Latin American countries have been collaborating regionally
on anticorruption activities since the early 1990s. For example, the
Donors Consultative Group of the USAID- supported Americas*
Accountability/ Anticorruption Project has helped to increase the number
of anticorruption projects in the region, according to USAID. Other
multilateral initiatives, such as the Inter- American

Convention Against Corruption and ongoing United Nations negotiations for
a global anticorruption convention, are also mobilizing states to focus on
corruption.

Such donor cooperation was not always the norm in the countries we
visited, however, and donors often pursued parallel but not necessarily
mutually supporting activities. Donor coordination was generally
characterized by organizations keeping one another informed of the nature,
progress, and location of their activities. Across the six countries, the
U. S. government and other donors generally worked on different agendas in
the

area of judicial reform. In Bolivia, for example, USAID and the World Bank
divided their justice sector reform efforts between host government
agencies using different approaches. The two organizations have helped the
government develop two information systems* one to track criminal cases
and one for civil cases. At the time of our visit in June 2002, neither
system was being fully implemented on a national scale, and USAID
officials were concerned about the future compatibility of these two
systems.

Pooling financial resources and political influence could enable donor
organizations to overcome some political and financial obstacles that
limit the impact and sustainability of assistance programs. The United
States, with its on- the- ground presence and long- standing diplomatic
relationships, can offer significant technical expertise and influence to
help achieve political support. At the same time, the multilateral
development

banks, in particular, can offer significant, low- cost, long- term
financing for host governments. Better coordinated, these resources could
be combined to (1) leverage political support from host governments for
mutually

agreed- upon reform programs, (2) devise appropriate program designs, and
(3) provide long- term financing that could help ensure that the programs
are sustainable.

Donor cooperation can be difficult for a number of political and cultural
reasons. Donors may have different development priorities or policies that
may not allow them to work on the same types of programs in some cases. U.
S. government officials have also cited bureaucratic incompatibilities

between the agencies that effectively limited the ability of the agencies
to work closely together on certain projects. In one country we visited,
the working relationship between USAID and a multilateral development bank
has been difficult, according to a USAID mission official with whom we
spoke. Overcoming some of these obstacles to closer cooperation may
require a high- level commitment and impetus from the senior management of
these organizations.

Limited Evaluation and U. S. agencies and their implementing contractors
and grantees have not

Sharing of Lessons extensively compiled and shared information on program
results. Many U. S. assistance programs have not been evaluated, and
important

Learned among democracy project information, such as materials, final
reports, and

Program Implementers evaluations, are not systematically made available to
the large body of

project implementers. Inconsistent Program

The U. S. agencies implementing democracy assistance programs have not
Evaluation by U. S. Agencies

consistently evaluated the results of their activities. Our review of
project documentation and our discussions with senior U. S. government
officials at the State and Justice Departments and USAID indicate that
limited efforts have been made to review project results over time to
ensure that impact and sustainability have been achieved. In particular,
officials from the State and Justice Departments stated that those
agencies have conducted very little formal evaluation of law enforcement
assistance. Although USAID has a more extensive process for assessing its
activities, its efforts to evaluate democracy assistance have not been
consistent. Although governance programs in Latin America, in particular
legislative strengthening, have undergone considerable evaluation, we
found relatively little formal evaluation of rule of law, human rights,
and elections assistance. The level of evaluation has varied
geographically as well: While USAID sponsored a comprehensive democracy
evaluation for Bolivia, it has not conducted similar studies for the other
countries we visited. In 2002, USAID commissioned a private contractor to
complete a broad study of the agency*s achievements in its rule of law
programs around the world, including in many of the countries we visited.
This recently completed study provides information on the nature and
history of USAID rule of law

programs in individual countries but was not meant to be an evaluation of
these programs, according to a USAID official.

Furthermore, the agencies have not consistently used available survey data
to help evaluate the impact of their activities. In several of the
countries we visited, a USAID contractor had been conducting regular
*democratic values surveys* to gauge public opinion about recent and
ongoing political and government reforms, many of which the United States
has assisted. The mission in Bolivia has used the results of this survey
as a source of data

for monitoring, among other things, the impact of Bolivia*s
decentralization activities; however, the other missions or embassies we
visited did not consistently use these data as a tool for evaluating or
monitoring the impact of U. S. assistance.

Without systematic evaluations identifying lessons learned and best
practices, agencies will have difficulty making informed decisions about a
strategy to maximize impact and sustainability and planning for future
efforts. For example, USAID and the State and Justice Departments are
currently debating the U. S. government*s strategy for police assistance.
Each agency has participated in police development programs, and officials
from each agency stated that they are uniquely qualified to manage such
programs in the future. Yet, none of these agencies has conducted a
comprehensive evaluation of police assistance program results to inform

the debate about how best to provide this assistance. Evaluations or other
efforts to systematically compile lessons learned across countries could
enable a more objective comparison of agency performance to identify the
advantages of one approach over another and to inform a long- term
interagency strategy for achieving various democracy assistance goals.

Project Materials and USAID has not taken steps to pool the resources
produced by U. S.- funded

Information on Results Are democracy program implementers, including
international development

Not Widely Available firms, private voluntary organizations, and other
nongovernmental

organizations to help them achieve common and related goals more
effectively and efficiently. USAID- funded contractors often used similar
approaches to achieve democratic strengthening and reform in many of the
countries we visited. For example, support for local governments often
aimed to influence the broad policy framework in a country while directly

assisting a relatively small number of target municipalities. However, we
found little evidence that the project implementers in these countries had
shared with each other the materials they had developed. For example, in
several countries, USAID financed the printing of operational guidance for
municipal officials, ranging from handbooks on countrywide criteria for
governance to detailed, step- by- step manuals on ways to improve local
public administration. The contractors and USAID officials stated that to

their knowledge, these handbooks had not been systematically shared among
USAID missions or contractors. Although mission officials and implementers
told us they frequently shared information on an informal basis, the
agency*s attempts to systematically compile information about democracy
program implementation and results

to establish an agency wide *institutional knowledge base* are incomplete.
USAID has a very decentralized organizational structure, and, according to
USAID officials, the agency has no central repository of implementation
reports and other program documents that can be accessed by the various

democracy program implementers to determine, among other things, which
activities have been more successful than others. Although USAID maintains
some documentation from its democracy programs, such as scopes of work for
projects, at its intranet site, the agency does not compile

contractors* technical manuals and final reports with information on
implementation and results. Such information could be very instrumental in
identifying approaches that are most appropriate for replication, while
avoiding developing similar materials in different countries at additional
expense. As we have previously reported, use of lessons learned is a
principal component of an organizational culture committed to continuous
improvement. Lessons learned mechanisms serve to communicate acquired
knowledge more effectively and to ensure that beneficial information is
factored into planning, work processes, and activities. Lessons learned
provide a powerful method of sharing good ideas for improving work
processes, program design and implementation, and costeffectiveness. 4
USAID mission directors and other agency officials stated

that future assistance efforts would be more effective if they were
designed on the basis of concrete information and lessons learned from
similar programs in other countries.

Conclusions Local resources for sustaining democracy programs are
difficult to mobilize given the serious economic problems in the countries
we visited,

and funding shortages were often cited by program implementers and
beneficiaries as major obstacles to long- term program success. Therefore,
it is crucial that the U. S. government and other international donors

manage available international resources as efficiently as possible.
Achieving greater impact and responsibility in democracy assistance

4 U. S. General Accounting Office, NASA: Better Mechanisms Needed for
Sharing Lessons Learned, GAO- 02- 195 (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 30, 2002).

projects may be more likely with a more strategic approach, including
closer coordination, and greater information sharing among U. S. agencies,
international donors, and other program implementers. Recommendations for

To ensure that U. S. assistance activities designed to support and
strengthen Executive Action

democracies in Latin America have the maximum impact and sustainability,
we recommend that the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the
Administrator of USAID  develop more comprehensive interagency strategic
plans at the regional

and country level for democracy assistance addressing how U. S. agencies
will cooperate with each other and other major donors to achieve greater
impact and sustainability in democracy programs;

 establish a strategy for periodically evaluating democracy assistance
projects that is consistent across agencies, countries, and types of
programs; and  establish a systematic mechanism to share information on
development

approaches, methods, materials, and results from all democracy assistance
projects among U. S. agencies and implementers.

Agency Comments and We provided a draft of this report to the Departments
of State and Justice,

Our Evaluation the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and
the InterAmerican

Foundation for their comment. The Inter- American Foundation did not
comment on this report. The comments of the State and Justice Departments
and USAID, along with our responses to specific points, are reprinted in
appendixes II, III, and IV, respectively.

In general, the State and Justice Departments and USAID acknowledged that
democracy assistance is a long- term challenge that requires host country
commitment and support for reforms, and that U. S.- supported institutions
and programs must ultimately be sustainable, as we discuss in this report.
Overall, the agencies basically agreed with the thrust of our
recommendations regarding how the management of program assistance could
be improved. They also noted that in some cases, activities are either
planned or under way that would address our recommendations.

The State Department concurred with our recommendation that it work with
other agencies to develop comprehensive strategic plans for democracy
assistance at the regional and country levels. State agreed with our
recommendation that democracy assistance programs should be evaluated but
said that our recommendation was a *broad brush* approach that is not
appropriate for the diversity of activities covered in the report. State
said that it is taking steps with USAID and the Justice Department to

improve evaluation, including recently agreeing to undertake joint
evaluations of justice programs. Such actions appear to meet the intent of
our recommendation. However, our recommendation is intended to establish a
basis for periodic overall assessments of democracy programs as well as
regular evaluations of specific components of democracy assistance, such
as rule of law, governance, and elections.

While the State Department agreed that it would be desirable to have
better access to project information across the board, they noted that the
recommendation goes too far in suggesting the need for a centralized
record system containing all project materials. State also said that much
useful information is currently shared among programs on an informal

basis. Our recommendation is designed to address an important problem we
identified in this report, namely that much information is currently not
being shared among agencies or programs with similar goals, approaches,
and methods. The thinking behind this recommendation is the State
Department and other agencies that fund and implement democracy assistance
programs should maintain key program documents and evaluations along with
examples of materials used for core activities (e. g., training manuals so
that groups implementing similar programs can benefit from lessons
learned). Given the advances in Web- based technology as a way of sharing
information, we believe this recommendation is not unreasonable. The State
Department also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in
this report, where appropriate.

The Justice Department endorsed our recommendation for better coordination
and planning among State, USAID, and Justice; agreed that objective,
regularized evaluation of assistance programs is needed to consistently
obtain useful information on program outcomes; and supported the
recommendation that agencies involved in democracy assistance should
establish effective information- sharing mechanisms. The Justice
Department also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in
this report, where appropriate.

USAID also agreed with our recommendations. Regarding our recommendation
on strategic planning, USAID said that it participates in a number of
planning activities but that such planning systems can always be upgraded.
It also agreed that periodic evaluations of program outcomes and results
are important, noting that evaluating democracy programs is a challenge
made difficult by the complexities and subtleties of local political
situations that influence democracy program implementation and outcomes.
USAID also agreed with our recommendation that agencies need to do a
better job of sharing information on development methods, approaches, and
materials, noting that a new bureau within the agency should respond to
these concerns. USAID also provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated throughout this report, where appropriate.

The State and Justice Departments both commented on our discussion of a
provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that restricts the use of
foreign assistance funds for training and financial support for police and
other law enforcement forces of foreign governments (section 660). In its

comments, State said that the Executive Branch should develop and propose
to the Congress new legislation on law enforcement assistance, stating
that the Executive Branch needs a clear statement of its authority to
provide law enforcement assistance abroad, coupled with whatever specific
prohibitions the Congress may wish to consider. The Justice Department
stated that it is concerned that section 660 may in some instances
adversely impact long- range planning and the development of broad- based,
practical police assistance programs. The Justice Department

also indicated that it will work with the State Department and USAID to
consider whether changes to section 660 would be appropriate. We believe
the approach suggested by the State and Justice Departments could be an
important and useful step in providing options for the Congress to
consider regarding potential amendments to section 660.

Appendi xes U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin

Appendi x I

American Countries During fiscal years 1992 through 2002, the United
States has provided democracy assistance to Bolivia, Colombia, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru. The U. S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the Departments of State and Justice
have provided the bulk of this assistance in the areas of rule of law,
governance, human rights, and elections. Rule of law assistance has
supported the modernization of the criminal justice system and increased
the access of the local population to justice. Governance assistance has
funded efforts to strengthen legislatures and national and local
governments and to enact and implement anticorruption measures. Human
rights assistance has supported activities to improve public awareness of
and government accountability for human rights abuses. Election assistance
has helped enhance electoral institutions, increase voter registration and
education, and support electoral observation.

Bolivia USAID rule of law assistance to Bolivia began in earnest in 1991
when USAID sponsored a United Nations diagnostic study of Bolivia*s
judicial

system to determine priorities and build consensus for reform. Since then
USAID has been closely involved in a fundamental revamping of Bolivia*s
criminal justice system. USAID supported a number of justice sector

reforms, including drafting and promoting laws establishing new justice
sector institutions. These institutions included the Constitutional
Tribunal, the Judicial Council, the Ombudsman, and the Office of Public
Defense. In 1993, USAID initiated the Bolivian Administration of Justice
Program, focusing primarily on the drafting and passage of a new Criminal
Procedures Code. This code, which introduced an oral, accusatory trial
system to increase the efficiency, transparency, and fairness of the
criminal justice system, was enacted in 1999 and went into effect in 2001.
Since its enactment, USAID rule of law assistance has primarily focused on
providing training and technical assistance to institutions concerning
implementation of the code and also on disseminating public education
about the new code. During the late 1990s, USAID and the Justice

Department also assisted the Bolivian National Police and the Attorney
General*s Office (Fiscalia) to enhance investigative capabilities. The
departments did this primarily through supplementing training and
forensics equipment and technology to manage and track criminal cases
electronically. From 1992 to 2002, USAID provided $18.5 million and the
Justice Department administered $9.9 million in rule of law assistance to
Bolivia.

U. S. governance assistance to Bolivia started in 1992, when USAID
provided funds to establish and strengthen the congressional research
center and budget office. After the 1997 elections, the institutions that
USAID had supported in the legislature lost credibility as neutral
entities and became less effective, according to a USAID- sponsored
evaluation. In 2001, USAID began a new program aimed at strengthening the
representative function of the Bolivian Congress by helping deputies from
single- member districts, who are elected directly by citizens in a given
district, increase their outreach to their constituencies. USAID*s local
governance program in Bolivia began in 1996, soon after the passage of the
Popular Participation Law. This law divided Bolivia into self- governing
municipalities with popularly elected local leaders for the first time in
the country*s history. The program has aimed to make local governments
more responsive to citizen needs and demands and to strengthen
municipalities* administrative and financial capacities. The program*s
methods are now being implemented in about 175 municipalities. USAID also
is using Webbased technology to expand its local governance program. USAID
provided at least $14.6 million on governance assistance to Bolivia
between 1992 and 2002.

USAID began providing electoral support to Bolivia in 1988, primarily to
institutionalize a politically neutral National Electoral Court. Between
1991 and 1999, USAID provided Bolivia with $2.4 million in election
assistance to

increase voter registration and education and ensure that the elections
held during this period were free and fair.

Colombia USAID*s rule of law assistance to Colombia began in 1986,
primarily focusing on restructuring and improving Colombia*s justice
sector and

providing protection for judicial figures and institutions. This program
culminated in the enactment of a new constitution in 1991, which created
new justice sector institutions (e. g., the Judicial Council,
Constitutional Court, and Prosecutor*s Office) and procedures, including
oral trials. USAID assistance from 1991 to 1995 focused on implementing
the reforms, including support for the development of these new
institutions. In 1995,

the program expanded to support improved access to justice, including the
creation of justice houses to provide legal services in poor and
marginalized communities. USAID has continued to support the transition to
a more transparent accusatorial system, primarily through training

judges, prosecutors, and public defenders. The Justice Department has
provided an array of training for prosecutors and law enforcement
officials, focusing mainly on specialized criminal investigations units,
human rights,

counternarcotics, money laundering, and other specific types of crimes.
Between 1992 and 2002, USAID provided $48.3 million and the Justice
Department administered $37.9 million in rule of law assistance to
Colombia.

The U. S. governance assistance program in Colombia, which began in 2001,
has aimed to strengthen municipal governments, increase citizen
participation, and combat corruption. Local officials and citizens have
played a central role in planning and overseeing social infrastructure
projects cofinanced by USAID, such as the construction of schools and
sewage systems. USAID*s anticorruption program in Colombia, also initiated
in 2001, has focused on improving internal control systems, strengthening
citizen participation, and training local officials on oversight

and transparency. USAID reports that it has provided at least $54.6
million for these programs.

USAID human rights assistance in Colombia began with technical and
financial support for the Human Rights Ombudsman Office, which was created
by the new constitution in 1991. The Justice Department began training
special human rights units within the Attorney General*s Office in 1996.
Assistance for both of these projects is ongoing. USAID funded the
majority of its human rights assistance projects after 2000, including the
development of an Early Warning System to alert authorities of potential
human rights violations, a protection program for threatened individuals,
training for community human rights promoters, and post emergency

assistance to people who have been internally displaced by the nearly 40-
year- old internal conflict. In addition, USAID has supported efforts to
foster reconciliation and provide assistance to victims and excluded
groups.

USAID provided $325,000 in election assistance to Colombia in 2002. This
assistance focused on supporting a mission of the Organization of American
States to observe the 2002 national elections, which were declared to be
generally free and fair.

El Salvador USAID*s rule of law assistance to El Salvador started in 1984
with a focus on enhancing criminal investigative capabilities and
modernizing the

justice system. Following the 1992 Peace Accords, USAID supported efforts
to restructure the justice sector, reduce criminal case backlogs, and
draft new criminal codes. El Salvador began implementing the new codes in
1998, and USAID and the Justice Department have supported these
implementation efforts. USAID has focused on training judges,

prosecutors, and public defenders to help them transition to an oral,
adversarial system. The Justice Department has focused on building and
strengthening a new police force* particularly, its criminal
investigations capabilities. Most recently, the department has supported a
new policing model characterized by active community- oriented patrols.
From 1992 to 2002, USAID provided $27.8 million and the Justice Department
administered $38.2 million to support these efforts. USAID*s governance
assistance to El Salvador began in 1990, when it set up

a legislative assistance program to help develop a master plan for
legislative modernization, establish a mentoring program for which
students complete studies of interest to legislators, and open three
legislative outreach offices outside the capital. These projects are still
ongoing. In 1993, USAID initiated its local governance program in El
Salvador, which helped to strengthen municipal management and increase
citizen participation in 28 target municipalities and assisted national-
level organizations that support municipalities. Together with other
donors, USAID helped create a manual on basic criteria for participatory
municipal development that is now available to municipalities across the
country. USAID anticorruption assistance in El Salvador, which began in
2000, has focused on institutional strengthening, anticorruption reforms,
public awareness, and municipal- level anticorruption activities. USAID
has provided at least $23 million for these programs.

Since 1991, USAID has provided about $13 million to support four national
elections in El Salvador. After the Peace Accords were signed in 1992, the
agency supported reintegrating former guerrilla groups into the political
system. Elections assistance in the 1990s also helped create a new,
impartial electoral authority and supported the establishment of a new

civil/ voter registry. Because El Salvador has significantly improved
election administration and voter access and had run free and fair
elections during the 1990s, USAID does not intend to provide additional
election support to this country after the 2003 elections.

Guatemala USAID rule of law assistance to Guatemala started in 1986, with
an early focus on training judges, prosecutors, and public defenders and
promoting legal reforms. USAID supported the enactment and implementation
of criminal code reforms in the mid- 1990s to improve the functioning of
the criminal justice system. Following the enactment of a new criminal
procedures code in 1994, USAID*s assistance focused on preparing justice
sector officials to carry out new roles and responsibilities under the
code

for conducting investigations and holding oral trials. Following the
signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, this assistance expanded to building
the capabilities of justice institutions in the capital and supporting
justice centers in other cities to improve the delivery of justice
services. These justice centers integrate various justice institutions,
modernize case tracking and administration, and increase access to
justice. The State and Justice Departments have also provided assistance
to law enforcement

institutions, focused mainly on improving criminal investigations under
the new codes. From 1992 to 2002, USAID has provided $23.8 million and the
Justice Department has administered $13.6 million in rule of law
assistance to Guatemala. USAID*s governance- related assistance to
Guatemala began with a legislative strengthening program in 1997. The
program focused on

improving the legislature*s research and analytical capabilities and
strengthening constituent outreach. Although USAID*s legislative
assistance had some initial positive results, the agency ended its support
after the 1999 elections when it became clear that the new congressional
leadership was not willing to support the program. USAID*s local
governance program in Guatemala, which began in 1998, has helped increase
participatory planning and community outreach in about 40

municipalities. USAID has also provided support and advice to the
government of Guatemala on national- level policy affecting municipal
indebtedness, reforms to the municipal law, and the municipal tax code.
USAID has provided more than $9.4 million for these programs.

In the early 1990s, USAID provided training and program development
support to the Human Rights Ombudsman Office. Recent USAID human rights
projects in Guatemala have focused on supporting national reconciliation
efforts. Since 2000, USAID has supported the exhumation of clandestine
cemeteries to identify victims of human rights atrocities during the 1962
to 1996 civil war and to help family members achieve a measure of closure.
USAID began the Human Rights and Reconciliation Program in 2001 to
coordinate human rights groups; mobilize citizens to defend their rights;
and disseminate information about the civil war for remembrance purposes,
among other activities.

USAID has provided $3.2 million in election assistance to Guatemala since
1990. This assistance has focused on improving voter registration and
education and promoting electoral reforms. In 1995, USAID focused on
broadening electoral participation throughout the country, especially in
rural and indigenous areas. In 1999, USAID supported increased

participation in two electoral events* the constitutional reform
referendum and the general elections. USAID is currently providing a small
amount of assistance to support electoral reform efforts, with limited
success.

Nicaragua USAID and the State and Justice Departments have provided most
of the rule of law assistance to Nicaragua since the 1990s. This
assistance has

focused on supporting the modernization of the criminal justice system. It
has supported the enactment of criminal codes and helped prepare Nicaragua
for the implementation of these codes starting in December 2002 by
supporting the creation and strengthening of justice institutions,
including the courts, Public Prosecutor*s Office, and Public Defender*s

Office, and by building the capabilities and various law enforcement
organizations for conducting criminal investigations. From 1992 to 2002,
USAID has provided $11.3 million and the Justice Department has
administered $1.7 million to support these efforts.

USAID has provided the bulk of U. S. governance assistance to Nicaragua
since 1991. This assistance has focused on strengthening the legislature
and local governments and supporting anticorruption efforts. USAID*s
legislative strengthening program, which lasted from 1991 to 2001, focused
on strengthening infrastructure, improving planning and administration,
and increasing outreach to constituents. Although there was initial
progress, USAID ended its support in 2001 in part because of a lack of
political will in the legislature to cofinance USAID programs. The local
governance program organized by USAID worked in 25 municipalities to
strengthen municipal administration and increase citizen participation in
municipal affairs. USAID also helped establish and strengthen the national
association of municipalities, which is now self- sustaining. This program
ended in 2001, and USAID has indicated that it will consider once again
focus on strengthening local governance as part of its new 5- year
strategy. USAID*s anticorruption program in Nicaragua, which ran from 1998
to 2001, aimed to make institutions more accountable and transparent and
to increase public awareness of corruption. USAID provided about $6
million for these programs.

USAID has provided about $27 million in election assistance to Nicaragua
since 1990. This assistance has focused on improving the institutional
capacity of Nicaragua*s electoral authority, improving voter registration
and education, and legitimizing election results by supporting domestic
and

international electoral observation groups. Although this assistance has

helped Nicaragua run three national elections that were determined to be
free and fair since 1990, that country still faces major election
administration and voter access problems. Nicaragua is likely to require
additional international support before holding its next national
election.

Peru USAID rule of law assistance to Peru began in 1986 working with key
public sector institutions on justice sector reform. Due to the actions of

President Alberto Fujimori to weaken the independence and accountability
of the justice sector, USAID discontinued direct assistance to most public
institutions in the sector in 1994. Funding was diverted from rule of law
to human rights and civil society activities, with the exception of a
small amount of funding for free legal and conciliation services. In 2002,
USAID initiated a new rule of law program centered on building support and
consensus for justice sector reforms through civil society coalitions. The

Justice Department has sponsored some small- scale training efforts in the
1990s but has no ongoing assistance effort. From 1992 through 2002, USAID
provided $13.2 million and the Justice Department administered $27,000 to
support these efforts.

USAID has provided the bulk of U. S. governance assistance to Peru. From
2001 to 2003, USAID*s Office of Transition Initiatives focused on
providing small- scale, governance- related grants in the areas of
legislative strengthening, decentralization, anticorruption, and civil-
military relations. The office estimates that it will spend $11 million by
the time the program ends. In mid- 2002, USAID began providing legislative
strengthening assistance to enable a civil society coalition to conduct
citizen outreach on legislative issues, and in fall 2002, USAID began a 4-
year project to increase

congressional transparency, outreach, and oversight. In the area of local
governance, USAID has been providing policy advice to the government for a
nationwide decentralization program scheduled to begin in 2003. USAID also
has begun to provide support to a civil society coalition to share
decentralization- related information with civil society, promote citizen
participation in governance, communicate citizens* opinions to the
government, and promote oversight of regional and local authorities. In
2003, USAID plans to fund an $18 million, 5- year *Pro- Decentralization*
project to strengthen municipal government and increase citizen
participation.

From 1992 to 1996, USAID helped the Peruvian Attorney General*s Office
establish 12 detainee registry centers to document the location and legal
status of all people detained by the authorities on charges of terrorism.
Using the registry, people have been able to find information on their
missing loved ones. Also, since 1997, USAID has supported the activities
of a Peruvian nongovernmental organization in its investigations and
attempts to release prisoners being held on illegitimate terrorism
charges. USAID also has supported the operation of the Truth Commission,
which the President of Peru created in 2000 with a mandate to investigate
allegations of human rights violations during 1980 to 2000. Finally, USAID
has provided continuous technical and financial support to the Human
Rights Ombudsman since its inception in 1994.

USAID has provided over $20 million in election assistance to Peru for
supporting national and local elections in 1995, 1998, 2000, 2001, and
2002. This assistance included technical assistance to the electoral
institutions and support for voter education and international
observations of the elections. Because this assistance, following the
departure of President Fujimori, helped the electoral authorities run free
and fair elections in 2001 and 2002, USAID does not plan to provide
additional election support to Peru.

Appendi x II

Comments from the Department of State Note: GAO comments supplementing
those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

The following is GAO*s comment on the Department of State*s letter dated
March 5, 2003.

GAO Comment 1. We disagree with the statement that we implied that
independent evaluations have not been done on ICITAP programs. On page 83
of our

report, we stated that the Departments of State and Justice have done very
little formal evaluation of law enforcement assistance. We modified the
text on page 84 to indicate that none of the agencies

involved in the debate about how to best provide police assistance have
done a comprehensive evaluation of police assistance program results. Such
an evaluation could inform this debate.

Appendi x III Comments from the Department of Justice

Comments from the U. S. Agency for

Appendi x IV

International Development Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the
report text appear at the end of this appendix.

See comment 1. Now on pp. 7 and 29- 30.

See comment 2. Now on p. 9.

See comment 3. See comment 4. Now on pp. 29- 30.

See comment 5. Now on p. 36.

Now on pp. 48 and 50. See comment 6.

See comment 7. Now on p. 83.

The following are GAO*s comments on the U. S. Agency for International
Development*s letter dated March 5, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. We disagree and believe that despite some success, much
work still remains at the national and local levels to implement
Guatemala*s

criminal procedures code. We modified the text on pages 29 and 30 to add
additional information on the challenges faced by Guatemala in fully
implementing criminal justice reforms.

2. We revised the text on page 9 to indicate that programs in Guatemala
and Nicaragua have had less success in disseminating programs outside of
target municipalities.

3. On the basis of additional information provided, we removed this
reference from the text. However, it should be noted that the draft
referred to USAID*s support for conciliation and legal aid centers and did
not in any way suggest or infer that USAID should have supported Fujimori-
era justice institutions. As stated in the draft report on page 64 and on
page 95 in this report, we noted that USAID discontinued direct assistance
to Peru*s public sector institutions in 1994.

4. The 1998 article in the Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the
Americas was written by a USAID employee who was the justice program
manager in Guatemala. In our view, this does not constitute an independent
program evaluation. Also, see comment 1.

5. We modified the text on page 36. 6. On the basis of additional
information provided, we removed this

reference from the text. 7. As noted in this report, limited efforts have
been made to review

project results over time to ensure that impact and sustainability of
results has been achieved. We stated that although USAID has a more
extensive process for assessing its activities, its efforts to evaluate
democracy assistance have not been consistent, and we found relatively
little formal evaluation of rule of law, human rights, and elections
assistance. As discussed in the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation Section
of this report, our recommendation regarding evaluation is intended to
establish the basis for periodic overall assessments of democracy programs
as well as regular evaluations of

specific components of democracy assistance. Systematic evaluations that
identify lessons learned and best practices are crucial in facilitating
congressional oversight of democracy programs and providing the basis for
informed decisions about how to maximize program impact and plan future
efforts.

Quality of Life and Economic Indicators for

Appendi x V

Selected Countries U. S. democracy programs are designed to help address
serious social, political, and economic problems many of these countries
face. Over the years, the World Bank, United Nations, and other
organizations have devised indicators to attempt to measure the general
quality of life within a country. This appendix provides a statistical
overview of selected social and economic indicators for the six countries
we visited and comparative data for Latin America and the United States
(see table 8).

A few of the social indicators illustrate the challenges some of these
countries face. In Bolivia, for example, the infant mortality rate in 2000
was still over 57 deaths per 1,000 births. Even in Colombia, which has the
lowest rate among the six countries we reviewed, the infant mortality rate
was 275 percent of that in the United States. In addition, life expectancy
at birth in 2000 was 14. 5 years less in Bolivia than it was in the United
States. Furthermore, although adult illiteracy decreased in all six
countries

between 1990 and 2000, about one- third of Guatemala and Nicaragua*s adult
population still cannot read.

In terms of economic and political impediments to democracy, the gross
national income average for the six countries we reviewed fell from 61
percent of the Latin American average in 1990 to 55 percent in 2000. While
the gross national income for five of the six countries increased slightly
over the decade, Colombia*s decreased. In terms of general government
expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), all six
countries spend less than 20 percent of their GDP, with the Guatemalan
government spending the least, just under 7 percent. Finally, foreign
domestic investment as a percentage of gross capital formation varies
considerably among the six countries. In the 1990 through 2000 period, it
has increased as high as 44. 2 percentage points in Bolivia and as little
as 2.6 in Guatemala.

Table 8: Quality of Life and Economic Indicators for Selected Countries
Six-

Latin country American United Indicator Year Bolivia Colombia El Salvador
Guatemala Nicaragua Peru average

average States

Gross 1990 $1, 740 $6,820 $2, 920 $2,770 $1,680 $3, 150 $3, 180 $5, 190
$23, 440 national income per capita (purchasing

1995 $2, 140 $6,050 $4, 040 $3,400 $1,780 $4, 290 $3, 617 $6, 240 $28, 260
power parity in current international dollars)

2000 $2, 360 $6,060 $4, 410 $3,770 $2,080 $4, 660 $3, 890 $7, 080 $34, 100
Human 1990

0.597 0.724

0.644 0.579

0.592 0.704

0.640 0.823 a

0.914 Development Index b

1995 0.630

0.750 0.682

0.609 0.615

0.730 0.669

0.925 2000

0.653 0.772

0.706 0.631

0.635 0.747

0.691 0.767

0.939 Infant

1990 80.0

30. 4 45. 6

56. 2 51. 0

54. 0 52.9

41. 3 9.4 mortality (per 1,000 births)

1995 67.0

24. 4 35. 0

45. 6 39. 5

43. 0 42.4

34. 1 7.5 2000

57.2 19. 5

29. 1 38. 8

33. 0 31. 8

34.9 29. 0

7.1 Adult

1990 21.8% 11. 5% 27. 5% 38. 9% 37.2%

14. 5% 25. 2%

15. 2% illiteracy (percentage

1995 17.8% 9.8%

24. 0% 34. 9% 35.3% 12. 1%

22. 3% 13. 3% of people age 15 and

2000 14. 5% 8.3% 21.3% 31. 4%

33. 5% 10.1% 19. 9%

11.6% above) Life 1990

58.3 68. 3

65. 6 61. 4

64. 5 65. 8

64.0 67. 9

75.2 expectancy at birth

1995 60.6

69. 8 68. 5

63. 6 67. 3

67. 8 66.3

69. 2 75.6 (years)

2000 62.6

71. 6 70. 1

65. 2 68. 9

69. 3 68.0

70. 4 77.1 Percentage

1990 41.2% 36. 0% 40. 8% 46. 0% 46.4%

38. 3% 41. 5%

36. 0% 21.9% of population under age 15 1995 40.6% 34. 4% 37. 4% 45. 1%
45.0%

35. 9% 39. 7%

33. 8% 22.2% 2000 39. 6% 32. 8% 35.6% 43. 6% 42. 7% 33.4%

38. 0% 31.5% 21. 7%

(Continued From Previous Page)

Six- Latin country American

United Indicator Year Bolivia Colombia El Salvador Guatemala Nicaragua
Peru average

average States

General 1990

11.8% 9.4% 9.9% 6.6%

43.5% 7.9% 14. 9%

13. 3% 17.0% government expenditures

1995 13.6% 14. 9%

8.6% 5.4% 15.7%

9.8% 11. 3% 15. 5%

15.3% as a percentage

2000 15. 7% 19. 0% 10. 2% 6.6% 18. 9% 11.2%

13. 6% 15.3% of Gross Domestic Product

Net Foreign 1990

4.4% 6.7% 0.3% 4.6%

0% 0.9% 2.8%

3.8% 4.8% Direct Investment

1995 38.5% 4.0%

2.0% 3.4% 16.4%

15. 4% 13. 3%

8.5% 4.3% as a percentage

2000 48. 6% 23. 9% 8.2% 7.2% 30. 8% 6.3%

20. 8% 19.1% of Gross Capital Formation

Top three 2002 soybeans,

petroleum, offshore

coffee, coffee,

fish and n/ a n/ a n/ a exports c natural

coffee, coal assembly sugar, shrimp and

fish gas, zinc

exports, bananas lobster, products, coffee, sugar

cotton gold, copper

Economic 1998

2.60 3.00

2.40 2.70

3.50 2.85

2.80 2.98

1.80 Freedom Index d

2003 2.65

3.00 2.25

2.80 3.00

2.80 2.80

2.94 1.85 Sources: World Bank, United Nations, CIA World Factbook, and The
Heritage Foundation.

Note: Economic and social data are from the World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2002 CDROM. a 1992 figure. b The Human Development Index is
produced by the United Nations and is compiled from several demographic
and economic statistics; it ranges in value from Norway (. 939) to Sierra
Leone (. 258). A higher Human Development Index score means a country with
more advanced degree of human development. c The listing of the top three
exports for each country comes from the CIA World Factbook. The listing

provides a rank ordering of exported products starting with the most
important; it sometimes includes the percentage of total dollar value. d
These figures come from The Heritage Foundation, which works in
conjunction with The Wall Street

Journal to produce the Index of Economic Freedom. To measure economic
freedom and rate each country, the authors of the index study 50
independent economic variables. These variables (1) fall into 10 broad
categories, or factors, of economic freedom and (2) include, trade policy,
fiscal burden of government, government intervention in the economy,
monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and
finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and black market
activity. Each country receives its overall economic freedom score on the
basis of the average of the 10 individual factor scores. Each factor is
scored according to a grading scale that is unique for that factor.

The scales run from 1 to 5: A score of 1 signifies an institutional or
consistent set of policies that are most conducive to economic freedom,
while a score of 5 signifies a set of policies that are least conducive.

Freedom House Scores for Individual

Appendi x VI

Countries, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002 Figures 20 to 25 show the change
in the political rights and civil liberties in the six countries examined
in this report (Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and
Peru), according to Freedom House, a U. S. research organization that
tracks political developments around the world.

Note that the trend in these two categories is in a generally positive
direction for all of the countries except Colombia.

Figure 20: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Bolivia, Fiscal Years 1992
through 2002

Bolivia More

free 1

Political rights

2 3 4 5

Civil liberties

6 Less

7 free

1992 1993

1994 1995

1996 1997

1998 1999

2000 2001

2002 Fiscal year

Source: Freedom House.

Figure 21: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Colombia, Fiscal Years 1992
through 2002

Figure 22: Freedom House Democracy Scores for El Salvador, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002

Figure 23: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Guatemala, Fiscal Years 1992
through 2002

Figure 24: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Nicaragua, Fiscal Years 1992
through 2002

Figure 25: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Peru, Fiscal Years 1992
through 2002

Appendi x VII

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Phillip Herr (202) 512-
8509 Staff

In addition to the persons listed above, Jeremy Latimer, James Michels,
Acknowledgments

Juan Tapia- Videla, Rhonda Horried, Eve Weisberg, Judith Williams, and
Lynn Cothern made key contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products Latin America and the

Foreign Assistance: Peru on Track for Free and Fair Elections but Faces
Caribbean

Major Challenges. GAO- 01- 496T. Washington, D. C.: March 14, 2001.

Foreign Assistance: Any Further Aid to Haitian Justice System Should be
Linked to Performance- Related Conditions. GAO- 01- 24. Washington, D. C.:
October 17, 2000.

Foreign Assistance: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance to Five Latin American
Countries. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 195. Washington, D. C.: August 4, 1999.

Aid to El Salvador: Slow Progress in Developing a National Civilian
Police. GAO/ NSIAD- 92- 338. Washington, D. C.: September 22, 1992.

Foreign Assistance: Promising Approach to Judicial Reform in Colombia.
GAO/ NSIAD- 92- 269. Washington, D. C.: September 24, 1992.

Central America: Assistance to Promote Democracy and National
Reconciliation in Nicaragua. NSIAD- 90- 245. Washington, D. C.: September
24, 1990.

Foreign Aid: Efforts to Improve the Judicial System in El Salvador. NSIAD-
90- 81. Washington, D. C.: May 29, 1990. Former Soviet Union Former Soviet
Union: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited

Impact and Sustainability. GAO- 01- 740T. Washington, D. C.: May 17, 2001.

Former Soviet Union: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited Impact.
GAO- 01- 354. Washington, D. C.: April 17, 2001.

Foreign Assistance: International Efforts to Aid Russia*s Transition Have
Had Mixed Results. GAO- 01- 08. Washington, D. C.: November 1, 2000.

Foreign Assistance: Harvard Institute for International Development*s Work
in Russia and Ukraine. GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 27. Washington, D. C.: November 27,
1996.

Promoting Democracy: Progress Report on U. S. Democratic Development
Assistance to Russia. GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 40. Washington, D. C.: February 29,
1996.

Other Rule of Law Foreign Assistance: Status of Rule of Law Program
Coordination.

GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 8R. Washington, D. C.: October 13, 1999.

Foreign Assistance: Rule of Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years 1993-
1998. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 158. Washington, D. C.: June 30, 1999.

Other Governance Cambodia: Governance Reform Progressing, But Key Efforts
Are Lagging. GAO- 02- 569. Washington, D. C.: June 13, 2002.

Other Elections/ Human

Cambodia: Limited Progress on Free Elections, Human Rights, and Mine
Rights

Clearing. NSIAD- 96- 15BR. Washington, D. C.: February 29, 1996. U. S.
Government Planning

Results Act: An Evaluator*s Guide to Assessing Annual Performance

and Coordination

Plans. GAO/ GGD- 10. 1. 20. Washington, D. C.: April 1, 1998.

NASA: Better Mechanisms Needed for Sharing Lessons Learned. GAO- 02- 195.
Washington, D. C.: January 30, 2002.

Other Foreign Affairs: Internally Displaced Persons Lack Effective
Protection.

GAO- 01- 803. Washington, D. C.: August 17, 2001.

(320127)

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a

GAO United States General Accounting Office

Page i GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

Contents

Contents

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Chapter 1

Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 2

Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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Chapter 3

Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
Anticorruption

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Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
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Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
Anticorruption

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Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
Anticorruption

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Chapter 4

Chapter 4 Human Rights

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Chapter 4 Human Rights

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Chapter 4 Human Rights

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Chapter 4 Human Rights

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Chapter 4 Human Rights

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Chapter 4 Human Rights

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Chapter 4 Human Rights

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Chapter 4 Human Rights

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Chapter 5

Chapter 5 Elections

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Chapter 5 Elections

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Chapter 5 Elections

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Chapter 5 Elections

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Chapter 5 Elections

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Chapter 6

Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
Democracy Assistance

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Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
Democracy Assistance

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Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
Democracy Assistance

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Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
Democracy Assistance

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Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
Democracy Assistance

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Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
Democracy Assistance

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Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
Democracy Assistance

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Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
Democracy Assistance

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Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
Democracy Assistance

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Appendix I

Appendix I U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries

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Appendix I U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries

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Appendix I U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries

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Appendix I U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries

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Appendix I U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries

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Appendix I U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries

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Appendix I U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries

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Appendix II

Appendix II Comments from the Department of State Page 98 GAO- 03- 358
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Appendix II Comments from the Department of State

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Appendix II Comments from the Department of State Page 100 GAO- 03- 358
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Appendix II Comments from the Department of State

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Appendix III

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Justice Page 103 GAO- 03- 358
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Appendix III Comments from the Department of Justice Page 104 GAO- 03- 358
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Appendix III Comments from the Department of Justice Page 105 GAO- 03- 358
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Appendix IV

Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
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Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
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Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
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Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
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Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development

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Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development

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Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development

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Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
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Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development

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Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development

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Appendix V

Appendix V Quality of Life and Economic Indicators for Selected Countries

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Appendix V Quality of Life and Economic Indicators for Selected Countries

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Appendix VI

Appendix VI Freedom House Scores for Individual Countries, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002

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Appendix VI Freedom House Scores for Individual Countries, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002

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Appendix VI Freedom House Scores for Individual Countries, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002

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Appendix VI Freedom House Scores for Individual Countries, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002

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Appendix VI Freedom House Scores for Individual Countries, Fiscal Years
1992 through 2002

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Appendix VII

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