    Foreign Assistance: U.S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin American
    Countries Have Yielded Modest Results (18-MAR-03, GAO-03-358).

    Supporting democracy abroad is a major U.S. foreign policy
    objective. To better understand how this assistance has been
    implemented in Latin America, GAO was asked to review programs in
    six countries--Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala,
    Nicaragua, and Peru--that have been of particular importance to
    U.S. interests in Central and South America. Between fiscal years
    1992 and 2002, U.S. agencies have funded more than $580 million
    in democracy-related programs in these countries. This report
    discusses the impact of and factors affecting this assistance and
    the overarching management issues that have affected program
    planning and implementation.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-358
        ACCNO:   A06353
      TITLE:     Foreign Assistance: U.S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin
    American Countries Have Yielded Modest Results
         DATE:   03/18/2003
      SUBJECT:   Federal aid to foreign countries
    	     Foreign aid programs
    	     Foreign governments
    	     International relations
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Regional development programs
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Program management
    	     Bolivia
    	     Columbia
    	     DOJ International Criminal Investigative
    	     Training Assistance Program

    	     El Salvador
    	     Guatemala
    	     Nicaragua
    	     Peru

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    GAO-03-358

                                           A

    Report to Congressional Requesters

    March 2003 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE U. S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin
    American Countries Have Yielded Modest Results

    GAO- 03- 358

    Letter 1 3 Purpose 3 Results in Brief 4 Background 6 GAO*s Analysis 6
    Recommendations for Executive Action 13 Agency Comments 14

    Chapter 1 15

    Introduction Background 15

    Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 23 Chapter 2

    26 Rule of Law Assistance

    Criminal Justice Reforms Were Established but Not Fully Implemented;
    Sustainability Will Require Stronger Host Government Commitment 27 USAID
    Has Helped Increase Citizen Access to Justice, but

    Sustainability and Expansion of Services Will Require Greater Host Country
    Support 33 U. S. Police Assistance Supporting Criminal Investigations and

    Management of Police Operations Has Had Mixed Results 38 Conclusions 45

    Chapter 3 46

    Governance Legislatures Initially Increased Their Planning,
    Infrastructure,

    Analytical, and Outreach Capacities, but Gains Have Eroded over
    Assistance: Time 47

    Legislatures, Local Local Governance and Citizen Participation Were
    Enhanced in

    Government, and Target Municipalities, but Broader Impacts Are More
    Difficult to

    Achieve 52 Anticorruption

    Anticorruption Policies and Procedures Have Been Implemented in Some
    Countries, but the Long- term Impact Is Not Yet Evident 59 Conclusions 62

    Chapter 4 64

    Human Rights U. S. Human Rights Assistance Has Increased Awareness and
    Government Accountability 65

    Conclusions 72

    Chapter 5 73

    Elections The United States Has Primarily Targeted Three Countries with
    Assistance in Election Administration, Voter Access, and

    Electoral Observation 73 U. S. Assistance Has Helped Ensure Free and Fair
    Elections, but

    Nicaragua May Still Need Additional Assistance 76 Conclusions 78

    Chapter 6 79

    Management Issues Poorly Coordinated Program Management Limits
    Effectiveness of

    U. S. Democracy Assistance 79 Hinder Impact and

    Limited Evaluation and Sharing of Lessons Learned among Program
    Sustainability of U. S.

    Implementers 83 Democracy Assistance

    Conclusions 85 Recommendations for Executive Action 86 Agency Comments and
    Our Evaluation 86

    Appendixes

    Appendix I: U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries 89
    Bolivia 89 Colombia 90 El Salvador 91 Guatemala 92 Nicaragua 94 Peru 95

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State 97 GAO Comment 101

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice 102

    Appendix IV: Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
    106 GAO Comments 115

    Appendix V: Quality of Life and Economic Indicators for Selected Countries
    117

    Appendix VI: Freedom House Scores for Individual Countries, Fiscal Years
    1992 through 2002 120

    Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 126 GAO Contact 126

    Staff Acknowledgments 126 127

    Tables Table 1: Freedom House Ratings for the Six Countries Studied,
    Fiscal Years 1992 and 2002 16

    Table 2: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance in the Six Countries Studied 27
    Table 3: USAID Legislative Strengthening Assistance 47 Table 4: USAID
    Local Governance Assistance 52 Table 5: USAID Anticorruption Assistance 59
    Table 6: U. S. Human Rights Assistance in Three Countries 65 Table 7:
    USAID Election Assistance in the Six Countries 74 Table 8: Quality of Life
    and Economic Indicators for Selected Countries 118

    Figures Figure 1: Average Freedom House Democracy Scores for the Six
    Countries Studied, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002 15

    Figure 2: Distribution of U. S. Democracy Assistance among Six Countries,
    Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002 19 Figure 3: Distribution of U. S.
    Democracy Assistance to Six

    Countries by Key Agencies, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002 20 Figure 4:
    Four Elements of the U. S. Democracy Assistance Program 21

    Figure 5: Distribution of U. S. Democracy Assistance to the Six Countries
    Studied, for Fiscal Years 2000 through 2002, by Element 23

    Figure 6: Public Hearing Room Constructed with U. S. Government Funding in
    Manizales, Colombia 32 Figure 7: Justice House in Manizales, Colombia,
    Constructed with

    U. S. Government Funds 34 Figure 8: Free Legal Consultation Provided by
    Colombian Official

    at a Justice House Constructed with U. S. Government Funds 35 Figure 9:
    Forensics Equipment Donated by the U. S. Government to

    Improve Criminal Investigative Capacity of Bolivian National Police in La
    Paz, Bolivia 39 Figure 10: U. S.- Funded Crime- Scene Management Training
    for Law

    Enforcement Officials in San Salvador, El Salvador 40 Figure 11: The
    Nicaraguan Legislature*s Office of Citizen Participation, Established with
    USAID Assistance 51

    Figure 12: Acting Mayor of Leon, Nicaragua, One of the Municipalities That
    Received USAID Assistance to Strengthen Local Governance 54 Figure 13: A
    Meeting Organized by USAID's Office of Transition

    Initiatives to Educate Citizens from Rural Peru about the Country's New
    Decentralization Program 55 Figure 14: Nicaragua*s Integrated Financial
    Management System Was Developed with Assistance from USAID Funds 60

    Figure 15: USAID- supported Victims Assistance Center Managed by the
    Attorney General*s Office, Guatemala City, Guatemala 69

    Figure 16: Coffins used by USAID- supported Foundation for Anthropological
    Forensics to Reinter Remains Exhumed from Mass Graves in Guatemala 70

    Figure 17: Human Rights Units Using Forensics Equipment Provided by the
    Justice Department to Investigate a Crime Scene in San Jose de Apartado,
    Colombia 71 Figure 18: Poll Workers Organizing Voting Materials before
    Opening

    a Polling Station in Lima, Peru, during the April 2001 National Elections
    76 Figure 19: Voters Waiting to Enter Polling Station in Lima, Peru,

    during the April 2001 National Elections 77 Figure 20: Freedom House
    Democracy Scores for Bolivia, Fiscal

    Years 1992 through 2002 120 Figure 21: Freedom House Democracy Scores for
    Colombia, Fiscal

    Years 1992 through 2002 121 Figure 22: Freedom House Democracy Scores for
    El Salvador, Fiscal

    Years 1992 through 2002 122 Figure 23: Freedom House Democracy Scores for
    Guatemala, Fiscal

    Years 1992 through 2002 123 Figure 24: Freedom House Democracy Scores for
    Nicaragua, Fiscal

    Years 1992 through 2002 124 Figure 25: Freedom House Democracy Scores for
    Peru, Fiscal Years

    1992 through 2002 125

    Abbreviations

    ARI Andean Regional Initiative GDP Gross Domestic Product ICITAP
    International Criminal Investigations Training and Assistance Program
    (Department of Justice)

    IDB Inter- American Development Bank INL Bureau for International
    Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

    (Department of State) OAS Organization of American States USAID U. S.
    Agency for International Development

    This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
    copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
    materials separately from GAO*s product.

    Letter

    March 18, 2003 The Honorable Henry Hyde Chairman The Honorable Tom Lantos
    Ranking Minority Member Committee on International Relations House of
    Representatives The Honorable Cass Ballenger Chairman The Honorable Robert
    Menendez Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
    Committee on International Relations House of Representatives In response
    to your request, this report discusses the nature, impact, and factors
    that affect U. S. democracy assistance to Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador,
    Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru as well as the overarching management
    issues that have affected program planning and implementation. We include
    recommendations to the Departments of State and Justice and the U. S.
    Agency for International Development. We recommend that these agencies
    develop more comprehensive strategic plans at the regional and country
    level to address cooperation among agencies and other major donors;
    develop a strategy to periodically evaluate democracy assistance projects;
    and develop a mechanism to share information on development approaches,
    methods, materials, and results among U. S. agencies and implementers.

    As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its contents
    earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
    after its date. At that time, we will provide copies to interested
    congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General,
    the Administrator of the U. S. Agency for International Development, and
    the President of the Inter- American Foundation. We will

    also provide copies to others upon request. In addition, this report will
    be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

    If you or your staff has any questions on this report, please call me on
    (202) 512- 4128. Other major contributors to this report are listed in
    appendix VII.

    Jess T. Ford Director International Affairs and Trade

    Executive Summary Purpose Nearly all countries in Latin America have seen
    their systems of

    government shift from dictatorships, military regimes, and other forms of
    authoritarian rule to democratically elected governments. Supporting this
    transition has been a formal part of the U. S. foreign aid program since
    at least 1985. During fiscal years 1992 through 2002, the U. S. government
    has provided more than $1 billion to help Latin American and Caribbean
    nations develop sustainable democratic institutions. This assistance has

    focused on promoting the rule of law, 1 transparent and accountable
    government institutions, respect for human rights, and free and fair
    elections. Assistance activities have been largely implemented by the U.
    S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Departments of

    State and Justice and have been funded primarily by appropriations
    authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Since the early
    1990s, GAO has assessed the implementation and

    effectiveness of democracy- related programs worldwide, particularly in
    Latin America and the Caribbean and the Former Soviet Union (see Related
    GAO Products). In these reviews, GAO has found that helping to strengthen
    democracy can be a difficult and long- term challenge that requires

    sustained political support from key host country leaders. When this
    political support wavers, hard- won gains can be quickly lost.

    The Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House Committee on
    International Relations and the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
    requested that GAO assess the effectiveness of U. S. democracy assistance
    programs in six Latin American countries* Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador,

    Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru. These countries, which are located in both
    Central and South America, have been particularly important to U. S.
    interests and face persistent social, economic, and political challenges.
    In response to this request, GAO (1) assessed the impact of the four main

    elements of U. S. democracy assistance* rule of law, governance, human
    rights, and elections* and the factors that affected the outcome of these
    programs and (2) analyzed the overarching management issues that have
    affected program planning and implementation. 1 According to the U. S.
    Agency for International Development, the rule of law embodies the

    basic principles of equal treatment of all people before the law and is
    founded on a predictable and transparent legal system with fair and
    effective judicial and law enforcement institutions to protect citizens
    against the arbitrary use of state authority and lawless acts.

    To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documentation on
    democracyrelated assistance projects that were implemented from fiscal
    years 1992 through 2002 and interviewed knowledgeable officials from USAID
    and the

    State and Justice Departments and other agencies that implement this
    assistance. GAO conducted fieldwork in the six countries previously
    identified, where it interviewed U. S. and senior host country officials,
    representatives of many nongovernmental organizations, and project

    implementers and beneficiaries. Appendix I provides an overview of the U.
    S. democracy assistance programs by country.

    Results in Brief Overall, U. S. programs and efforts to strengthen
    democracy in the six Latin American countries GAO reviewed have had a
    modest impact to date. U. S. assistance programs have supported a variety
    of reforms and have

    introduced innovative practices in justice, governance, human rights, and
    elections. For example, GAO found that these programs have helped five of
    the six countries reviewed (Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
    Nicaragua) adopt and begin implementing new criminal procedures codes that
    allow justice to be dispensed with more efficiency and openness. In all
    six countries, U. S. programs have supported improving the capacity of
    some municipalities to budget and plan public expenditures more
    effectively and with greater citizen participation, according to USAID
    data and reports. Host country and U. S. officials stated that U. S.
    programs also

    have contributed to some increased government attention to protecting
    human rights in countries where this assistance has been provided. U. S.
    assistance has been instrumental in supporting elections that electoral
    observation groups have considered to be free and fair. Despite these
    successes, considerable work remains and U. S. democracy programs often
    have had a limited impact due to various factors, and in the countries GAO
    visited, questions remain regarding the sustainability of the gains made
    with U. S. assistance. In particular, these countries still have work
    remaining to fully put into practice the roles and responsibilities
    contained in their new criminal procedures codes. In many cases, the size
    and scope of U. S.- supported programs have been relatively limited, and
    countries have not adopted them on a national scale. The inability or
    unwillingness of host governments to provide the necessary financial,
    human, and political capital has often negatively affected democracy
    program outcomes in these countries. GAO found cases in which U. S. funded
    training programs, computer systems, and police equipment had languished
    for lack of resources after U. S. support ended. Political changes

    in host governments have also undermined U. S.- supported programs. Of

    the legislative strengthening programs begun in the 1990s in four of the
    countries GAO visited (Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua),
    only the program in El Salvador appears to have received sufficient host
    government political support to operate as intended with a positive impact
    on governance. Consolidating many of the gains that these countries have
    achieved in building democratic institutions is likely to require
    increased host country commitment and continued assistance from the United
    States or other donors.

    Since host country resources for sustaining democracy programs are
    difficult to mobilize, it is crucial that the U. S. government and other
    donors manage available international resources as efficiently as possible
    for maximum impact and sustainability. Although promoting democracy abroad
    is a strategic goal of the U. S. government, USAID and the State and
    Justice Departments do not take a strategic, coordinated approach to
    providing democracy assistance, disrupting the long- term planning,
    implementation, and continuity of U. S. law enforcement programs in some

    countries. The agencies* strategic plans also do not identify how U. S.
    agencies and other foreign donors will coordinate program planning and
    implementation, as required by the Government Performance and Results Act
    of 1993. USAID and the State and Justice Departments have conducted few
    formal evaluations on the results of these activities to inform the
    ongoing debate about how to best provide and manage democracy assistance.
    Information sharing among U. S.- funded program implementers also has been
    limited, both within and among countries where these programs exist. These
    agencies do not always take advantage of the lessons learned from their
    democracy- related programs to ensure that

    funds are spent in a cost- effective manner. The six chapters of this
    report address background information on U. S. democracy assistance
    programs; the four elements of democracy assistance, rule of law,
    governance, human rights, and elections; and the overarching management
    issues affecting program planning and

    implementation. In this report, GAO makes recommendations to the Secretary
    of State, the Attorney General, and the Administrator of USAID, who
    together administer nearly all U. S. democracy assistance, to improve
    program management. Specifically, GAO recommends that these officials (1)
    develop more comprehensive strategic plans at the regional and country
    level to address cooperation among agencies and other major donors, (2)

    establish a strategy for periodically evaluating projects, and (3)
    establish a

    systematic mechanism to share information among U. S. agencies and project
    implementers.

    Background Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, since 1992, the
    United States has provided about $580 million to support democracy
    programs in the six

    countries GAO reviewed for this report. Colombia received the largest
    amount of democracy assistance ($ 149 million), followed by El Salvador ($
    146 million), Nicaragua ($ 88 million), Guatemala ($ 70 million), Peru ($
    65 million), and Bolivia ($ 63 million).

    Democracy assistance has four major components: rule of law, governance,
    human rights, and elections. USAID generally implements governance, human
    rights, and elections projects and develops rule of law institutions and
    processes, while the State and Justice Departments focus on the law
    enforcement component of rule of law efforts. In fiscal years 2000 through
    2002 in the six countries GAO reviewed, rule of law and governance
    programs received 39 and 29 percent, respectively, of the $221 million
    total allocated for democracy assistance by the U. S. government. In

    addition to the United States, other countries and institutions provide
    this type of foreign aid. The World Bank, the Inter- American Development
    Bank, and the Organization of American States all provide democracyrelated
    assistance to these six countries, as do several bilateral donors.

    GAO*s Analysis U. S. Rule of Law Assistance

    U. S. rule of law assistance encompasses support for criminal justice Has
    Supported Some

    reform, greater access to the justice system for poor and marginalized
    Promising Reforms but

    populations, and strengthened capacity of law enforcement agencies to Many
    Have Not Yet Been

    investigate crimes. Although U. S. programs have helped almost all of
    these countries begin implementing critical justice sector reforms, it
    remains Institutionalized

    unclear whether the countries can and will provide the necessary political
    and financial support to fully implement these reforms.

    In supporting criminal justice reforms, the United States has helped
    introduce fundamental changes and new roles and responsibilities for
    judicial and law enforcement institutions. U. S. assistance has included
    training for judges, prosecutors, and others who implement new criminal

    codes and has supported computerized case management systems to increase
    justice system efficiency and transparency. The countries GAO reviewed are
    in different stages of carrying out reforms. El Salvador has made the most
    progress in reforming its justice sector, while Nicaragua and Bolivia have
    only recently enacted and begun implementing new criminal procedures
    codes. Colombia and Guatemala, which enacted reforms in the early 1990s,
    have made limited progress in implementing them, according to U. S.
    officials GAO interviewed. For example, Colombia, which established oral
    trials in 1991, has only 26 operational courtrooms to serve that nation*s
    2,000 municipal, circuit, and special jurisdiction judges.

    USAID*s access- to- justice programs have helped several countries
    establish public defense services to assist poor criminal defendants.
    USAID also has supported decentralized justice centers and alternative
    dispute resolution mechanisms. In Colombia, for example, USAID has helped
    establish 18 justice houses (casas de justicia) that provide dispute
    resolution and other

    legal services and help reinforce the presence of the Colombian government
    in poor, marginalized areas. USAID plans to construct 40 justice houses in
    Colombia by 2005, but the sustainability of many of the justice houses
    already built is uncertain due to precarious municipal government
    finances. Colombian officials also said that, due to severe funding
    constraints, the government does not currently plan to build additional
    justice houses.

    U. S.- supported police assistance, which the Justice Department primarily
    provides, has focused on developing criminal investigations capabilities
    and strengthening police management, accountability, and operations. The
    results and impact of this assistance have varied across the countries GAO
    reviewed. Of the six countries GAO reviewed, U. S. police assistance
    appears to have had the greatest impact in El Salvador, where the Justice
    Department has helped implement a new policing model characterized by
    active, visible police patrols in high- crime areas. In other countries,
    U. S. assistance has provided extensive training and supported the
    development of training centers for criminal investigators, but impact has
    been more limited. In Bolivia, Justice Department officials said they have
    frequently had to repeat training courses due to high turnover in the
    criminal

    investigations unit. Bolivian police officials also told GAO that they
    lack the resources to maintain and use U. S.- donated materials, including
    forensics equipment and a computerized case- tracking and management
    system. USAID, State, and Justice officials also stated that section 660
    of

    the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 2 hampers the effectiveness of justice
    sector assistance because it prohibits some types of police assistance. 3
    Officials GAO interviewed in Washington, D. C., and overseas said that the
    section 660 prohibition makes it difficult to plan and implement
    comprehensive justice sector programs because it often precludes involving
    the police fully in reform efforts. For example, in Nicaragua, USAID could
    not invite police force representatives to conferences at which criminal
    justice reform approaches were being discussed and

    debated. Police officers were similarly excluded from human rights
    training that USAID was providing to other host government agencies.

    U. S. Governance Assistance U. S. governance assistance seeks to improve
    the administrative, analytical, Has Had a Modest Impact

    and outreach capacity of legislatures; strengthen the administrative
    capacity and accountability of municipal governments and increase citizen
    participation; foster greater awareness about corruption; and help
    governments become more transparent and accountable. In most of the six
    countries GAO visited, U. S. governance assistance has had an initial
    impact on making government institutions more effective, responsive, and
    accountable, according to USAID staff, contractors, and host country
    officials. However, some programs have not been sustained or replicated
    and have been hindered by a lack of political support from host country
    governments. Elsewhere, institutional weaknesses and lack of human and
    financial resources have made it difficult for government counterparts to
    implement or expand U. S. programs.

    In its legislative- strengthening programs, USAID- supported programs
    initially increased the outreach capacities of legislatures, according to
    U. S. and host country officials. For example, in Bolivia, USAID helped
    create a

    congressional research center and budget office to assist legislators.
    With the exception of El Salvador, however, host governments have not
    generally sustained these programs. Because legislative programs have been
    perceived to be associated with particular parties, these programs

    2 22 U. S. C. 2420. 3 This provision restricts the use of foreign
    assistance funds for training and financial support for police or other
    law enforcement forces of foreign governments. Specifically, the provision
    states that, with a variety of exceptions, these funds may not be used *to
    provide training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police,
    prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any
    program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign
    government.*

    have lost credibility when competing parties took control. In Guatemala,
    for example, newly elected legislators attempted to use USAID- supported
    legislative institutions for partisan ends, according to U. S. officials
    working

    there. Despite the difficulty in sustaining these programs, USAID funding
    has helped leverage financial support from other donors for
    legislativestrengthening programs in several countries, according to
    bilateral and multilateral representatives.

    GAO found that USAID*s programs to support local governance have had an
    impact in target municipalities, but the programs have been less
    successful in influencing and reforming policies and practices at the
    national level. In target municipalities where USAID has worked, municipal
    governments have become more effective and responsive, and citizen
    participation has increased in municipal affairs, according to USAID
    contract staff, host country officials, and local citizens. For example,
    according to data that a USAID project implementer provided, more than
    4,400 citizens in rural Colombia have participated in the development,

    implementation, and oversight of 67 municipal- level social infrastructure
    projects, such as building schools, bridges, and sewers. In Bolivia and El
    Salvador, where these programs have been operating since 1993 and 1996,
    respectively, municipalities have begun to adopt USAID- supported

    practices; however, there has been less success in Guatemala and Nicaragua
    disseminating these programs outside of target municipalities. Host
    government and USAID officials attributed difficulties in disseminating
    innovative practices to limited municipal resources and skills. For
    example, local government officials in Guatemala said it was difficult to
    use USAID*s participatory planning methods, since limited funds were
    available to implement projects. Representatives of national municipal
    associations, such as the National Association of Municipalities

    in Nicaragua, said that USAID*s policy assistance has helped develop
    national laws and regulations to decentralize government functions, but in
    some cases, limited government support has hindered these efforts.

    USAID has helped to develop and implement anticorruption policies and
    procedures in five countries GAO reviewed, focusing on developing
    anticorruption legislation and regulations, helping government
    institutions become more transparent and accountable, and informing
    citizens of the need to become more aware of the cost and consequences of
    corruption. In Colombia, for example, USAID provided support for a
    presidential decree to establish standards for a national system of
    internal controls in ministries and other national agencies. Citizen
    awareness of corruption has increased in several countries, as has citizen
    oversight at the national and

    municipal levels, according to USAID officials, contract staff, and
    representatives of local governments and nongovernmental organizations.
    For example, according to a study by a USAID contractor, 4 Nicaraguans

    have become better informed about corruption issues as a result of a
    national campaign supported by USAID. However, the lack of consistent
    political support in host governments has impeded anticorruption projects.
    In Nicaragua, according to a former high- ranking government official, in
    2001 the Ministry of Finance fired experienced staff who had been working
    on the USAID- assisted Integrated Financial Management System, resulting
    in lost institutional memory and expertise. These efforts face long- term
    challenges because these countries are in the early stages of addressing a
    widespread and deeply rooted problem, and the public is skeptical about

    anticorruption efforts. U. S. Human Rights Three of the countries that GAO
    studied have human rights assistance Assistance in Three

    programs. Host government officials and project implementers stated that
    Countries Has Helped

    this assistance has had a positive but limited impact in the countries GAO
    Increase Public Awareness

    visited. In Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru, current U. S. human rights and
    Government

    projects have (1) increased citizens* awareness of their rights and have
    helped governments take on greater responsibility for protecting those
    Accountability

    rights, (2) protected threatened individuals and prevented future abuses,
    and (3) helped governments address past abuses. In some instances,
    political and logistical problems have hindered these projects, and
    serious problems remain. Furthermore, host government officials said some
    longterm projects might be difficult to sustain due to budgetary
    constraints. USAID*s human rights projects have attempted to increase
    citizen

    awareness of human rights through education and community participation in
    information networks. One such network is Colombia*s *Early Warning
    System.* This system relies on citizen and nongovernmental organizations
    to alert authorities to human rights threats (such as massacres and other
    violent acts against civilians) from the armed groups involved in that
    country*s ongoing conflict. U. S. and Colombian officials told GAO that
    coordination and communication problems hinder the smooth flow of 4
    Mitchell A. Seligson, Nicaraguans Talk about Corruption: A Follow- Up
    Study of Public

    Opinion (Arlington, Va.: Casals and Associates for USAID, 1999).

    information in this project and compromise the ability of Colombian
    security forces to prevent violence by insurgent groups.

    GAO found that these human rights projects also have enabled host
    governments to become more responsible and accountable to some degree. In
    each of the six countries GAO visited, USAID has been instrumental in
    supporting the creation of a Human Rights Ombudsman Office, which provides
    a legal channel for complaints and allegations of human rights violations.
    In some countries, this office ranks high in public opinion polls, while
    in others, according to the State Department, allegations of corruption
    and funding problems have eroded the office*s credibility. In addition,
    USAID assistance has fostered greater justice for victims and their
    families. USAID support for national reconciliation efforts, including

    exhumations of clandestine cemeteries in Guatemala and Peru, has helped
    resolve questions about the fate of victims and bring guilty parties to
    justice, according to project officials and published reports. Justice
    Department data indicate that special human rights investigative units
    created in Colombia have enabled the government to prosecute 167 human
    rights cases. There are currently not enough of these units to investigate
    cases throughout the entire country, and the Justice Department plans to
    help the Colombian government expand the number and the size of these
    units in fiscal years 2003 and 2004.

    Despite the positive impact of U. S. human rights projects in these
    countries, serious problems remain with some governments* respect for
    human rights, particularly in Guatemala and Colombia. For example, police
    and military forces in these countries continue to be implicated in human
    rights abuses but are rarely prosecuted, according to State Department
    human rights reports.

    U. S. Electoral Assistance The United States has strived to help
    governments in Latin America

    Has Been Instrumental in establish a tradition of free and fair elections.
    U. S. electoral support efforts

    Helping to Ensure Free and have been designed to help improve election
    administration, enhance voter

    Fair Elections access, and legitimize election results. Since 1990, this
    assistance has

    supported host country efforts that have resulted in elections considered
    generally free and fair by the Organization of American States and other
    electoral observation groups in the six countries GAO reviewed. USAID has
    provided about $66 million in elections assistance. Most of this
    assistance, about $60 million, went to three countries: $27 million to
    Nicaragua, more than $20 million to Peru, and about $13 million to El
    Salvador. Assistance

    projects have strengthened the capacity of electoral authorities, improved
    voter access through voter registration and education and electoral
    reforms, and supported electoral observation by domestic and international
    groups. According to U. S. officials, Nicaragua is the only

    country GAO visited that is expected to require significant international
    support before it holds its next major election because it continues to
    experience problems in election administration and voter registration.
    Program Planning and

    The effectiveness of U. S. democracy assistance programs in the six
    Coordination Are Lacking

    countries GAO reviewed has been limited by the lack of a strategic
    interagency management approach.

    Without a strategic plan that coordinates and leverages U. S. government
    resources and those of multilateral donors that receive U. S. funds,
    opportunities to sustain or expand democracy assistance gains may be
    missed. Furthermore, organizations implementing U. S. assistance projects
    have not routinely evaluated the results of their efforts or widely shared
    reports, materials, and other important information.

    The State Department and USAID identify the promotion of democracy abroad
    as a strategic goal for their agencies. The Government Performance and
    Results Act of 1993 requires U. S. government agencies to develop

    annual plans for achieving their goals. As GAO has previously reported in
    its work relating to this act, such plans should identify how similar
    programs that different U. S. government agencies conduct will be
    coordinated to achieve their common objectives. 5 However, neither USAID*s
    or State*s plans nor the subordinate regional or country- level planning
    documents GAO reviewed specifically address the role of other U. S.
    agencies and donors in ensuring that U. S.- funded democracy programs
    leverage and coordinate domestic and international resources.

    Not addressing the role of other organizations in their strategic plans is
    a significant oversight, since it represents the risk that the U. S.
    government is not maximizing the use of available resources. Interagency
    coordination on rule of law assistance has been a long- standing problem,
    as GAO noted in a

    5 U. S. General Accounting Office, The Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide
    to Assessing Annual Agency Performance Plans, GGD- 10.1.20 (Washington, D.
    C.: Apr. 1, 1998).

    1999 report. 6 According to U. S. officials, the relationship among
    implementing agencies has often been characterized more by competition
    than by cooperation, which has led to fragmented programs that are not
    always mutually supportive in achieving common goals. For example, in
    Bolivia, poor communication and disagreement among USAID, State, and
    Justice on their respective roles disrupted efforts to assist the
    development of that country*s national police. Furthermore, by not
    addressing and building on potentially complementary programs of other
    international donors* some of which receive considerable funding from the
    United States* agencies risk overlooking critical resources that can be
    used to meet the strategic goal of democracy promotion. U. S. agencies
    implementing democracy assistance projects have also not

    consistently evaluated project results, thus missing opportunities to
    highlight lessons learned and to share best practices and information.
    Although USAID has conducted evaluations on an ad hoc basis, the State

    and Justice Departments have sponsored few formal reviews of their
    projects. Consequently, GAO found few project reviews that were useful for
    transferring knowledge about the impact and sustainability of projects in
    different countries.

    USAID also has not taken steps to compile and disseminate detailed
    information on the results of its various projects. Although U. S.
    democracy assistance activities across the six countries GAO visited were
    often very similar, USAID has no centralized documentation on these
    activities to determine whether some approaches and materials were more
    effective

    than others. For example, although USAID missions fund projects to educate
    local municipal officials in the six countries, the comprehensive set of
    handbooks and manuals developed in Bolivia are not part of any central
    repository at USAID or at the USAID intranet site. Lessons learned are a
    potentially powerful method of sharing ideas for improving work processes,
    program design and implementation, and cost- effectiveness.

    Recommendations for To ensure that key U. S. agencies that implement
    programs to support and

    Executive Action strengthen democracies in Latin America make better use
    of available

    resources, GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, the Attorney
    General, and the Administrator of USAID

    6 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Status of Rule of
    Law Program Coordination, NSIAD- 00- 8R (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 13,
    1999).

     develop comprehensive strategic plans for democracy assistance at the
    regional and country level that address how U. S. agencies will cooperate
    with each other and other major donors to achieve greater impact and
    sustainability in these programs;

     establish a strategy for periodically evaluating democracy assistance
    projects that is consistent across agencies, countries, and types of
    programs; and  establish a systematic mechanism to share information on
    development

    approaches, methods, materials, and results from democracy assistance
    projects among U. S. agencies and implementers.

    Agency Comments GAO received comments on a draft of this report from the
    State and Justice Departments and USAID, which are reprinted in appendixes
    II to IV. These

    appendixes also contain GAO responses to the agencies* comments. Overall,
    the agencies generally agreed with the thrust of our recommendations for
    how the management of program assistance could be improved. They also
    noted that in some cases activities are either planned or under way that
    would address our recommendations.

    Chapt er 1

    Introduction Background The countries of Latin America have a long history
    of political change, including dictatorships, autocratic rule, military
    juntas, and various forms of democracy. According to Freedom House, a U.
    S. research organization that tracks political developments around the
    world, these countries have, since the 1980s, gradually progressed toward
    stronger democracies, as measured by the extent to which the citizens of
    these countries enjoy political rights and civil liberties (see fig. 1).
    Of the six countries in our study (Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador,
    Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru), all but Colombia and Nicaragua
    experienced a strengthening of democracy by these standards between 1992
    and 2002 (see table 1 and app. VI for more information). Appendix V
    provides further information on the quality of life and selected
    indicators for the selected countries.

    Figure 1: Average Freedom House Democracy Scores for the Six Countries
    Studied, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002

    Tabl e 1: Freedom House Ratings for the Six Countries Studied, Fiscal
    Years 1992 and 2002

    1992 Freedom 2002 Freedom Country House score House score Change

    Bolivia 2.5 2 Better Colombia 3 4 Worse El Salvador 3.5 2.5 Better
    Guatemala 4 3.5 Better Nicaragua 3 3 Same Peru 4 2 Better

    Average for all six countries 3.3 2.8 Better

    Source: Freedom House. Note: Freedom House scores are ranked from 1 (more
    free) to 7 (less free).

    In September 2001, the 34 democratic members of the Organization of
    American States (OAS) 1 unanimously adopted the Inter- American Democratic
    Charter, declaring that *the peoples of the Americas have a right to
    democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend
    it.* This commitment goes beyond preserving elections to ensuring the
    defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms, popular participation in
    government, the rule of law, 2 the separation of powers, and transparent
    and accountable government institutions. Despite this commitment, many
    Latin American nations have yet to fully achieve these conditions.
    According to the OAS charter, the hallmarks of democracy include

    1 Active member countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas,
    Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
    Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada,
    Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
    Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
    Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay, and
    Venezuela. Cuba is not active and is the only nondemocratic member.

    2 The U. S. Agency for International Development defines the rule of law
    as embodying the basic principles of equal treatment of all people before
    the law; it is founded on a predictable and transparent legal system with
    fair and effective judicial and law enforcement institutions to protect
    citizens against the arbitrary use of state authority and lawless acts.

     respect for the rule of law on the part of all institutions and sectors
    of society;

     constitutional subordination of all state institutions to the legally
    constituted civilian authority;

     access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law;
     transparency in government activities and probity, responsible public

    administration on the part of governments;  participation of citizens in
    decisions relating to their own development;  separation of powers and
    independence of the branches of government;  a pluralistic system of
    political parties and organizations;  freedom of expression and of the
    press;  respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and
    periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal

    suffrage. Although the national governments of all six countries we
    visited have been democratically elected since the 1990s, they face
    serious social, economic, and political challenges that have made
    strengthening key democratic institutions a difficult and long- term
    endeavor. 3 In South America, Colombia continues to struggle with the
    escalation of a nearly 40- year campaign to overthrow the government, with
    attendant economic and social disruptions that affect thousands of its
    citizens each year, while Peru is emerging from the shadow of
    authoritarian rule and the violent actions of insurgent guerillas.
    Bolivia, which has had a relatively more stable political environment,
    must now deal with a host of economic challenges and an increasingly
    disillusioned and vocal indigenous class. In Central America,

    El Salvador*s and Guatemala*s Peace Accords were signed in 1992 and 1996,
    respectively, providing a framework for rebuilding those societies after
    decades of civil war. Nicaragua, one of the poorest nations in the

    3 Appendix VI provides a statistical overview of selected social and
    economic indicators for the six countries we visited and comparative data
    for Latin America and the United States.

    hemisphere, still confronts political polarization and corruption,
    according to U. S. officials.

    The United States has provided assistance to many of the countries of
    Latin America and the Caribbean to aid in strengthening democracies. From
    fiscal years 1992 to 2002, the six countries in our study, Bolivia,
    Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru, received about $580
    million in assistance (see fig. 2 for distribution of funding among these
    six countries). Almost all U. S. funding for democracy assistance,
    authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, is appropriated to
    the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department
    of State. A significant amount of assistance has been allocated to the
    Department of Justice through interagency fund transfers from USAID and
    State. From fiscal years 1992 through 2002, USAID has administered $479. 3
    million of program funding for democracy activities in this region, while
    the Justice Department has administered $101.3 million. The State
    Department also administered democracy- related programs during this time
    period. However, the department could not readily provide disaggregated
    data on the bulk of its democracy- related programs, such as funding
    provided by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
    Affairs (INL). Figure 3 shows the distribution among the major
    implementing agencies of democracy assistance funding to the six countries
    we reviewed. Other organizations with democracy- related assistance
    activities funded by the U. S. government include the National Endowment
    for Democracy, the Inter- American Foundation, and the Department of the
    Treasury.

    Figure 2: Distribution of U. S. Democracy Assistance among Six Countries,
    Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002

    11%

    Bolivia

    $63.3 million 26%

    11%

    Peru

    $64.6 million 12%

    Guatemala

    $69.5 million 25%

    15%

    Nicaragua

    $88.3 million

    El Salvador

    $145.8 million

    Colombia

    $149.1 million

    Sources: GAO (analysis) and U. S. Agency for International Development and
    Department of Justice (data).

    Figure 3: Distribution of U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Countries by
    Key Agencies, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002 Dollars in millions 150

    37.9 38.2

    120 111.2

    107.6 90

    1.7 86.6

    13.6 0.03

    60 9.9 64.6

    53.4 55.9

    30 0

    Bolivia Colombia

    Salvador Guatemala

    Nicaragua Peru

    El Latin American recipients

    Department of Justice U. S. Agency for International Development

    Sources: GAO (analysis) and U. S. Agency for International Development and
    Department of Justice (data).

    These agencies provide assistance through a variety of means, primarily in
    the form of goods and services to governmental and nongovernmental
    organizations and individuals. For some projects, such as law enforcement
    training, U. S. government agencies provide the assistance directly, or
    with contract assistance, as needed. For other projects, such as
    institutional development projects, the agencies distribute aid to
    beneficiaries primarily through grants, cooperative agreements, and
    contracts with nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary
    organizations, and firms located in the United States or overseas. Cash
    disbursements are generally not provided directly to foreign governments.

    Democracy assistance efforts, if successful, can influence political
    stability and economic growth. Economists have long demonstrated that
    countries with stronger democratic institutions are more likely to
    experience sustained economic growth. For example, the positive
    relationship between the respect for property and contractual rights and
    the rate of economic growth has been found to be especially strong. Law-
    respecting, accountable governments tend to provide conditions that
    encourage longterm investments and innovation. As the standard of living
    improves, the probability of further democratization of political
    institutions over time increases substantially.

    Many other foreign donors have also provided democracy assistance to the
    countries covered in our review. Multilateral donors, including the
    InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, the United Nations,
    and OAS have been active in funding democracy- related activities. In
    addition, many Western European countries, the European Union, and

    private international donors have also financed projects similar to those
    funded by the United States. We did not attempt to determine the total
    amounts of funding and the outcomes associated with this assistance, given
    the difficulty in identifying many different efforts, their costs, and the
    paucity of studies documenting program outcomes.

    The United States has taken a broad approach to providing democracy
    assistance. The assistance approach generally incorporates four elements:
    (1) rule of law, (2) governance (3) human rights, and (4) elections. (See
    fig. 4 for an illustration of these elements.)

    Figure 4: Four Elements of the U. S. Democracy Assistance Program

    Rule of Law: These projects support constitutional and criminal code
    reforms to make criminal justice more swift, transparent, and
    participatory; establish new institutions and enhance existing ones to
    improve management of the justice sector and to help safeguard the legal
    rights of citizens; provide technical assistance, training, and management
    information systems for judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and law
    enforcement agencies to improve their capabilities and increase their
    efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness; increase access to justice
    through mediation, alternative dispute resolution, and other mechanisms;
    and reform law school curricula to reflect modern methods and necessary
    skills for practicing law.

    Governance: These projects seek to improve the administrative, analytical,
    and outreach capacity of legislatures; strengthen the administrative
    capacity and accountability of municipalities and increase citizen

    participation in local government; and foster a greater public awareness
    about corruption and implement strategies to enable government
    institutions to become more transparent and accountable.

    Human Rights: These projects are intended to prevent human rights abuses
    through greater public awareness, protect citizens against abuses, and
    respond to past violations through legal action and public reconciliation
    processes.

    Elections: These projects are designed to improve election administration,
    enhance voter access, and legitimize election results by supporting
    domestic and international observers.

    USAID and the State and Justice Departments have not traditionally
    accounted for funding data according to the four elements previously
    described but have provided this information for fiscal years 2000 through
    2002, as shown in figure 5. While assistance to civil society appears to
    be relatively small in figure 5, important civil society support is also
    included

    through the four programmatic areas we focus on in this report. 4 4 Civil
    society includes the general population and nongovernmental organizations,
    such as associations, trade unions, and interest groups.

    Figure 5: Distribution of U. S. Democracy Assistance to the Six Countries
    Studied, for Fiscal Years 2000 through 2002, by Element 3%

    Civil society/ general Other

    5%

    Elections

    .

    7% 39%

    17%

    Human rights

    29%

    Governance Rule of law Sources: GAO (analysis) and U. S. Agency for
    International Development and Department of Justice (data).

    While USAID funds and implements assistance projects in all areas covered
    by this report, the State Department provides funding to the Justice
    Department for law enforcement assistance. The State Department*s Bureau
    of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor also provided a relatively

    small amount of democracy- related assistance to some of the six countries
    covered in our review, as did the department*s Western Hemisphere public
    diplomacy program.

    Objectives, Scope, and To assess the nature, impact, and sustainability of
    U. S. assistance programs

    Methodology to strengthen democratic institutions in Bolivia, Colombia, El
    Salvador,

    Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru, we first interviewed headquarters
    officials in Washington, D. C., at the departments and agencies providing
    rule of law, governance, human rights, and election assistance, including
    USAID, the State and Justice Departments, the National Endowment for
    Democracy, and the Inter- American Foundation. We also interviewed

    experts at nongovernmental organizations, including the National
    Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the
    Washington Office on Latin America, and Human Rights Watch. For all six
    countries, we reviewed Mission Performance Plans, USAID country and

    regional strategic plans and other planning documents, funding agreements,
    contracts, and project evaluations. We obtained funding information for
    fiscal years 1992 through 2002 from USAID headquarters and country staff
    and the Justice Department (the Justice Department administers funding
    provided by the State Department). The State Department could not readily
    differentiate most of its democracy- related assistance funding during
    this period from counternarcotics- related

    funding, which we did not include in the scope of our review. We also
    reviewed our prior reports on democracy assistance to Latin America. 5 We
    conducted fieldwork in each of the previously identified six countries

    between March and September 2002. In each of these countries, we met with
    the U. S. Ambassador; the USAID Chief of Mission; political and economic
    officers; senior U. S. officials representing agencies with rule of law,
    governance, human rights, or elections programs; and numerous program
    staff, including contractors responsible for implementing the projects. We
    interviewed host country officials at supreme courts; law enforcement
    organizations; legislatures; national ombudsmen; and ministries covering
    justice, police, local governments, government oversight, and elections.
    We visited training schools for judges, prosecutors, and police; local
    justice centers; local government pilot projects; and legislative outreach
    offices, as appropriate. We also met with numerous representatives from
    nongovernmental organizations and other groups representing a broad
    spectrum of civil society, including local citizen groups involved with
    rule of law, governance, human rights, and elections programs.

    To analyze the overarching management issues that have affected program
    outcomes, we analyzed project documentation, interviewed knowledgeable
    officials, and reviewed assistance activities on field visits to the six
    countries. We then analyzed and synthesized information across the six
    countries. To look for broader themes, we also interviewed experts in the
    field, including those from nongovernmental organizations and academia,
    and attended USAID*s annual democracy officers* conference in 2001. 5 See
    Related GAO Products at the end of this report.

    We performed our work from August 2001 through December 2002 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Chapt er 2

    Rule of Law Assistance Reforming the criminal justice sector has been a
    critical area of concern in Latin America. Nontransparent legal processes,
    corruption, and incarceration of prisoners for months or years before
    trials can undermine confidence that justice is being dispensed fairly.
    Surveys done in the region have shown that high levels of crime and
    citizens* lack of trust in justice

    institutions are positively correlated with reduced public support of
    democracy. In the six countries we reviewed, USAID and the State and
    Justice Departments have sought to (1) reform criminal justice systems by

    helping establish new legal frameworks to make criminal procedures more
    efficient and transparent and by strengthening the capabilities of justice
    sector institutions, (2) increase the public*s access to the justice
    system by establishing public defense services for poor defendants and by
    supporting construction of justice centers in poor communities, and (3)
    help law enforcement institutions conduct criminal investigations and
    manage their operations more efficiently and effectively. We found that
    although the U. S. assistance had contributed to noteworthy progress in
    these areas in most of the countries we reviewed, concerns remain about
    whether gains will be sustained. Due to resource constraints and other
    implementation difficulties, judicial and law enforcement institutions in
    these countries continue to rely to a large degree on U. S. and other
    international assistance for implementing justice sector reforms. U. S.
    officials also stated that legislative restrictions on law enforcement
    assistance restrict their ability to plan and carry out comprehensive
    justice sector reform programs because they prohibit many types of police
    assistance.

    As seen in table 2, U. S. rule of law assistance has been provided to five
    of the six countries we visited since the mid- 1980s, beginning first with
    El Salvador in 1984. Tabl e 2: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance in the Six
    Countries Studied

    Country Assistance dates

    Bolivia 1986 - present Colombia 1986 - present El Salvador 1984 - present
    Guatemala 1986 - present Nicaragua 1993 - present Peru 1986 - present
    Sources: USAID and Justice Department.

    Criminal Justice A key component of U. S. rule of law assistance in five
    of the six countries

    Reforms Were we reviewed has been support for criminal justice sector
    reforms

    establishing new roles and responsibilities for judicial and law
    enforcement Established but Not

    institutions and introducing oral procedures and public trials. 1 Support
    for Fully Implemented;

    criminal justice reforms has been provided primarily by USAID and the
    Sustainability Will

    Justice Department and has focused on Require Stronger Host

     facilitating constitutional and criminal code reforms, Government

     helping to create and strengthen justice sector institutions, and
    Commitment  improving legal training for justice sector professionals and
    reforming

    law school curricula. 1 While Peru adopted a new criminal procedures code
    in 1991, it has still not entered into force. Peru has yet to initiate
    similar reforms of its criminal justice system. Following then President
    Fujimori*s 1992 unconstitutional takeover of political power from the
    legislature and judiciary, USAID devoted most rule of law assistance to
    civil society and access- tojustice programs in the mid- 1990s.

    Constitutional and Criminal The United States has helped five of the
    countries we reviewed establish

    Code Reforms Have Been new legal frameworks for their criminal justice
    systems, supporting the

    Enacted but Not Fully drafting of new criminal codes and developing
    political consensus for

    Implemented criminal justice reform, both within the government and among
    civil

    society. Although the reforms each country has enacted have varied, U. S.
    assistance has supported the necessary legal frameworks for oral,
    adversarial criminal procedures and training for justice sector actors to
    implement these procedures. The United States has assisted Latin American
    countries* transitions from inquisitorial to adversarial systems to help
    increase the transparency and efficiency of the judicial process.

    Benefits of the adversarial system include shortened pretrial detentions,
    the presumption of innocence, and the right to a defense. Host country
    officials commented that U. S. support has been critical to

    building consensus for the development and enactment of these reforms.
    USAID has supported constitutional and criminal procedures code reforms
    that went into effect in Colombia (1991), Guatemala (1994), El Salvador
    (1998), Bolivia (2001), and Nicaragua (2002). 2 In Bolivia, for example,
    USAID*s rule of law assistance since 1997 has focused primarily on support
    for the passage and implementation of a new criminal procedures code.
    USAID*s assistance, provided in close coordination with the German
    government, has supported reforms that provide the basis for oral,
    accusatory procedures and public trials, which significantly changed the
    roles and responsibilities of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
    the police. In addition, U. S. and German assistance has supported
    disseminating information on the code to the public, mainly through
    nongovernmental organizations. 3 Despite achievements in passing criminal
    justice reforms, these countries have had varying degrees of success in
    implementing the reforms in

    practice, and each has work remaining to fully put into practice the new
    roles and responsibilities contained in the reforms. For example,
    Nicaragua and Bolivia have only recently begun implementing newly enacted
    criminal procedures codes, while reforms for criminal sentencing codes
    have not

    2 In Nicaragua, the new criminal procedures code went into effect for
    felonies in December 2002 and will go into effect for misdemeanors in
    December 2003. 3 For cases carrying a sentence of more than 4 years,
    Bolivian citizens are required to participate in criminal trials, as
    *citizen judges,* in a role similar to that of jurors in the United
    States. Sentencing courts include a panel of three citizen judges and two

    professional judges.

    yet been enacted. The Nicaraguan legislature also passed an administrative
    litigation code in 2000, which created a mechanism for citizens to bring
    legal cases against the government. 4 This code has not been implemented
    because, according to a USAID official, the Supreme Court has raised
    constitutional objections to them. Colombia and Guatemala enacted criminal
    justice reforms in the early

    1990s but have made limited progress in implementing them. Colombia, for
    example, has made little progress in establishing an adversarial criminal
    justice system, including oral trials, despite enacting its constitutional
    reform in 1991. Colombia*s reforms established a legal structure for oral
    trials and modernized criminal investigation and prosecutorial functions,
    and the reforms were developed through a coordinated approach that
    involved key justice sector institutions. 5 Following this promising
    start, however, political support for these reforms waned during the
    1990s, and oral, adversarial procedures are still rare in Colombia,
    according to USAID

    officials. Although Guatemala*s reforms provided the basis for
    transitioning to an adversarial criminal justice system in 1994, and
    Guatemala reorganized and created the necessary justice institutions for
    implementing the reforms, the Guatemalan justice system is still plagued
    by problems, particularly the courts, prosecutor*s office, and the police.
    During our visit to Guatemala, the prosecutor*s office and the police were
    still trying to resolve profound differences in the roles that their
    respective institutions would have in carrying out criminal
    investigations. U. S. assistance provided by the State and Justice
    Departments and USAID has helped justice institutions introduce important
    enhancements to their organizations and operations.

    4 Before the passage of this law, the only option for citizens to bring a
    case against the government was to submit a case directly to the Supreme
    Court. 5 In a 1992 report, Foreign Assistance: Promising Approach to
    Judicial Reform in Colombia, GAO/ NSIAD- 92- 269 (Washington, D. C.: Sept.
    24, 1992), we commented positively on the commitment of Colombian justice
    sector officials for reform. An interagency working group, led by the
    Minister of Justice, agreed to and designed a constitutional revision that
    included provisions to increase the judiciary*s independence and
    established an independent prosecutor*s office to investigate and
    prosecute criminal cases. In a 1999 report, Foreign Assistance: U. S. Rule
    of Law Assistance to Five Latin American Countries, GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 195
    (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 4, 1999), we found that Colombia had not fully
    implemented many of its criminal justice reforms and, despite the training
    and assistance provided to justice officials, few of these officials were
    implementing new procedures for conducting investigations or holding
    trials.

    Despite these improvements, the Guatemalan criminal justice system still
    faces serious challenges in its efforts to fully implement these reforms.
    El Salvador appears to have made the most progress in reforming its
    justice

    sector; for example, the Attorney General has instituted sweeping
    personnel changes in the prosecutor*s office to improve the quality and
    integrity of its workforce. However, the judiciary in El Salvador has yet
    to

    institute similar reforms, according to U. S. officials. According to the
    State Department*s most recent human reports, the judiciaries in each of
    the six countries we reviewed are continuing to face problems, including
    inefficiency, corruption, and a climate of impunity. In Bolivia, for
    example, State reported that judicial corruption and inadequate case-
    tracking mechanisms are contributing to the incarcerations of persons for
    months or years before their trials. In Colombia, State reported that
    Colombia*s large backlog of over 3 million cases has overburdened the
    judicial system, and that prosecutors and judges are struggling to
    transition from traditional, written procedures, to an oral, adversarial
    system. Justice Sector Institutions

    U. S. assistance also has supported the creation and strengthening of new
    Were Established and

    institutions to implement the new codes and other reforms, such as
    judicial Strengthened, but Pilot

    councils that participate in selecting, training, and disciplining judges
    and Programs Have Not Been independent prosecutor*s offices to manage
    investigations and bring criminal cases to trial. For example: Widely
    Replicated

     In Bolivia, USAID assistance supported creating a judicial council in
    1998 that reviews the qualifications of judicial candidates, evaluates the
    performance of sitting judges, and manages a training center for judges.

     In Nicaragua, USAID has supported establishing a prosecutor*s office
    that is independent of the executive branch that will implement the new
    criminal procedures code.

    The United States also has provided assistance to strengthen and modernize
    justice sector institutions* operational capabilities. For example, USAID
    support helped establish a clerk of courts office in Guatemala City that
    centralized case intake and management in one location for the city*s 11
    criminal courts. A USAID study showed that after this office was

    established in 1999, the annual number of cases that were unaccounted for
    decreased from more than 1,000 to 2. USAID and the Justice Department also
    have assisted in the publication of operations manuals for judges,

    prosecutors, and other legal operators to help clarify roles and
    responsibilities and ensure uniform implementation of legal codes.

    Judicial and law enforcement institutions that the United States has
    assisted face resource constraints that make it difficult to sustain or
    expand U. S- supported pilot projects. For example, in Bolivia, the
    government lacked the resources to maintain or replicate a U. S.- funded
    model prosecutor*s office, and the project ended with little impact. Also
    in Bolivia, USAID supported a pilot case intake and management system for
    judges. This system was designed to provide information on case
    assignments and their progress through the judicial system. Originally
    implemented in 1996, use of this system continues to be uneven due to
    resource constraints, and the system has not been implemented on a

    national level. In Colombia, USAID had funded 13 oral trial courtrooms, in
    addition to 13 such courtrooms opened by Colombia*s judicial council.
    However, these are the only oral trial courtrooms currently operating in
    the country, and a major challenge will be to build similar courtrooms for
    the country*s more than 2,000 municipal, circuit, and special jurisdiction
    judges. In one regional court we visited in Colombia, USAID had built an
    oral hearing room and equipped it with new recording equipment to
    facilitate this transition. Although judges were holding regular oral
    hearings in this room, this equipment was not used because the court could
    not afford audiotapes (see fig. 6).

    Figure 6: Public Hearing Room Constructed with U. S. Government Funding in
    Manizales, Colombia

    New Legal Training Was In five of the six countries we visited, USAID and
    the Justice Department Introduced but Has Not

    have provided extensive legal training to judges, prosecutors,
    investigators, Been Institutionalized and public defenders on new criminal
    procedures codes, either directly or through support to training centers
    in host government institutions. For example:

     In Bolivia, these agencies trained more than 5,000 justice operators on
    the country*s new code through a variety of courses, seminars, and *train-
    the- trainer* activities.

     In Colombia, USAID has assisted a training academy for judges by
    supporting restructuring the school and its curriculum. The school has
    trained 600 judges to be trainers, allowing the training to be replicated

    throughout the country. The Justice Department also has provided extensive
    training to prosecutors and law enforcement personnel.

    However, training centers for judges, prosecutors, and public defenders
    have faced severe budgetary constraints, and in most cases do not operate
    independent of U. S. assistance. For example, in Colombia, the director of
    the judges training academy told us that its budget has been eliminated,
    and the future operation of this center is uncertain. Similarly, a
    USAIDsupported training center within Colombia*s Public Defender*s Office
    lacks a training budget. In Bolivia, the Attorney General told us that,
    without international assistance, he could not afford to staff and
    adequately equip his academy to train prosecutors to implement the
    country*s new criminal procedures code.

    USAID also has worked with some law schools in Bolivia, Colombia, El
    Salvador, and Guatemala to revise their curricula to reflect new reforms
    and provide more practical training in oral, public trials. For example,
    USAID helped Guatemala*s National University implement a revised
    curriculum for new law students with greater emphasis on ethics and

    including courses on constitutional law and human rights. Nonetheless, U.
    S. and host country officials in the countries we visited also stated that
    legal education remains a major concern. Although law schools in these
    countries have proliferated, officials stated that many schools do not
    provide adequate legal training. In El Salvador, the validity of the
    degrees and academic credentials of judges and attorneys has come into
    question, as the Supreme Court has initiated an extensive review of
    justice officials* academic backgrounds. Host country officials in El
    Salvador commented that poor quality legal education requires that lawyers
    and judges be retrained once they enter the justice sector. USAID Has
    Helped

    USAID has supported efforts to increase citizens* access to justice
    through Increase Citizen

    programs to provide legal services to poor citizens and communities (see
    figs. 7 and 8). USAID*s access- to- justice assistance has focused on
    Access to Justice, but Sustainability and

     establishing and strengthening public defender*s offices and Expansion
    of Services

     supporting decentralized justice centers and alternative dispute Will
    Require Greater

    resolution mechanisms. Host Country Support

    Figure 7: Justice House in Manizales, Colombia, Constructed with U. S.
    Government Funds

    Figure 8: Free Legal Consultation Provided by Colombian Official at a
    Justice House Constructed with U. S. Government Funds

    Public Defenders USAID has assisted in establishing or strengthening
    professional Public

    Established for Poor, but Defender*s Offices in five of the six countries
    we reviewed by helping build

    Availability and Quality of political consensus for the creation of these
    offices and by providing

    Legal Defense Are Still operational support. USAID also has provided
    training and operation

    manuals and has supported computerized information systems for Public
    Limited

    Defender*s Offices. The number of public defenders and the services they
    provided has also increased, due in part to USAID contributions. For
    example:

     In El Salvador, the number of public defenders increased from 25 in 1991
    to over 300 in 2002, and USAID contributed to this increase by initially
    paying public defender salaries. El Salvador*s Public Defender*s

    Office now also has local and national coordinators, investigators, and
    legal aids. This office handles an average of 35, 000 cases per year,
    which is approximately 95 percent of El Salvador*s criminal cases.  In
    Guatemala, USAID supported creating an independent public

    defender*s institute, as called for in the 1996 Peace Accords. In 2001,
    the institute provided services to approximately 20,000 Guatemalans. These
    newly created Public Defender*s Offices have faced severe budgetary
    constraints and in some cases are not able to provide adequate services to
    poor defendants nationwide. For example:

     In Nicaragua, the Public Defender*s Office, created in 1999, had only 13
    attorneys when we visited, all of whom were located in the capital,
    Managua. Since then, according to USAID 23 additional offices have been
    established throughout Nicaragua, and the total number of public defenders
    has increased to 47.

     Colombia*s public defenders work on a part- time contractual basis.
    According to USAID*s justice contractor, these defenders have large
    caseloads and are paid a low, fixed salary. Furthermore, Colombia*s
    approximately 1,200 public defenders handle less than 10 percent of the

    cases involving poor defendants. Private attorneys appointed by the court
    to work on a pro bono basis handle the rest of the cases.

     In Bolivia, host country officials told us that the USAID- supported
    Office of Public Defense, established in 1995, has not been adequately
    funded. The office depends on external financing to fund the relatively
    low public defender salaries. Bolivian officials stated that they have not
    been able to adequately replace staff who left for higher salaries, and
    that in

    criminal trials, public defenders are at a substantial disadvantage to
    prosecutors because they lack resources and support services.

    The State Department*s most recent reports on human rights cited the
    Public Defender*s Offices in four of the six countries as being
    overburdened by large caseloads and not always able to provide qualified
    attorneys for indigent defendants. In Nicaragua, State also cited public
    defenders* complaints that judges were continuing to sentence poor
    defendants without the presence of a public defender, despite these
    defendants* right to legal counsel.

    Justice Houses and Centers In four of the six countries we reviewed, USAID
    has provided funds to Bring Legal Services to Poor

    support the creation of decentralized, community- based houses and
    Communities, but It Is Not

    centers to provide greater access to the justice system and mediation to
    Clear How the Centers Will resolve domestic disputes. Be Sustained or
    Expanded

     In Colombia, *justice houses* (casas de justicia) have been built in
    poor, marginalized areas to provide dispute resolution and other legal
    services and help reinforce the presence of the Colombian government.
    Since 1995, 18 justice houses have been built, and USAID plans to expand
    this number to 40 by 2005. National institutions provide the staff,
    including prosecutors, public defenders, police inspectors, social
    workers, and mediators, while municipalities are expected to maintain the
    facilities.

     In Guatemala, 11 justice centers were built outside the capital along
    with 16 complementary mediation centers to serve indigenous communities
    near these centers. U. S. and Guatemalan officials stated that the centers
    have facilitated coordination of services and have

    improved local citizens* experiences with the justice system.  In Peru,
    the Ministry of Justice has established 32 conciliation centers and 31
    legal aid clinics in poor communities.  In El Salvador, a pilot project
    plans to open 6 justice houses by the end

    of 2003. These justice houses will focus on providing mediation services.
    Despite the positive impact that the justice houses and centers appear to
    have had, it is not clear how these projects will be supported by host

    governments or whether they will be able to operate without U. S.
    assistance. Greater host country commitment of resources will be required
    to make them more sustainable and to have a wider impact. For example:
    While Colombia*s Ministry of Justice and Interior has supported the

    justice houses, it has not made a commitment to build more or take over
    existing ones from USAID. Further, many Colombian municipalities face
    severe resource constraints and may not be able to maintain and support
    existing justice houses.

     Guatemala has had some success in expanding an aspect of the justice
    center model from secondary cities to its capitol, Guatemala City,
    improving officials* ability to track criminal cases. However, Guatemala*s
    justice centers are not currently sustainable without U. S. or

    other donor support, according to USAID and contractor officials, and the
    Guatemalan government has no plans to fully expand this justice center
    model to the national level.

     In Peru, USAID funded pilot conciliation and legal aid centers by
    nongovernmental organizations and municipalities as well as government-
    operated centers in several major cities. USAID also has helped the
    Peruvian government build its capacity to train, license, and

    regulate a growing number of private conciliators. However, most pilot
    centers that USAID helped create are now closed for lack of funds,
    according to project officials. The Minister of Justice also told us that
    the government lacks the resources to expand the number of

    government- operated conciliation centers or provide meaningful oversight
    to privately run centers.

    U. S. Police Assistance U. S. assistance to develop and strengthen the
    capacities of the police in the

    Supporting Criminal six countries we reviewed was provided primarily by
    the Justice

    Department*s International Criminal Investigations Training and Assistance
    Investigations and Management of Police Operations Has Had Mixed Results

    Program (ICITAP). 6 ICITAP*s assistance in these countries has focused
    primarily on

     developing criminal investigations capabilities by providing training
    and equipment and

     supporting police management, accountability, and operations (see figs.
    9 and 10).

    Figure 9: Forensics Equipment Donated by the U. S. Government to Improve
    Criminal Investigative Capacity of Bolivian National Police in La Paz,
    Bolivia 6 The State Department*s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
    Enforcement Affairs has also provided assistance to these six countries,
    primarily to specialized police units focusing on counternarcotics crimes.
    We did not focus on counternarcotics assistance in

    this report.

    Figure 10: U. S.- Funded Crime- Scene Management Training for Law
    Enforcement Officials in San Salvador, El Salvador

    Criminal Investigations Five of the countries we reviewed have ICITAP
    police assistance Capacities Are Supported

    programs. 7 A key focus of this assistance has been to strengthen police
    through Training and

    criminal investigations capabilities by providing direct training to
    Equipment, but

    investigators in crime- scene management and coordinating with
    prosecutors, among other areas, and helping investigator schools prepare
    Sustainability Is a Concern

    to take over these functions. ICITAP also has provided equipment for
    analyzing forensic evidence and has assisted in developing computerized
    case management systems. In Guatemala, for example, ICITAP has

    7 ICITAP is not currently operating in Peru.

    provided assistance to strengthen the criminal investigations unit within
    the National Civilian Police, including training in investigative,
    administrative, and case management skills, and supported an automated
    case- tracking system.

    In Colombia, ICITAP also has focused on providing training in criminal
    investigations, developing internal training capabilities, and
    strengthening forensics capabilities. Currently, ICITAP is providing
    assistance under Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative, which
    is a more than $2 billion effort to assist the Colombian government in
    fighting illicit crop production and improve its judicial and law
    enforcement capabilities. ICITAP, with the Justice Department*s Office of
    Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training, has helped
    establish and strengthen specialized investigative units that focus on
    money laundering, human rights, anticorruption, and antinarcotics. In an
    effort to improve interinstitutional coordination, these units include
    prosecutors, judicial police, and other investigative personnel. In
    addition, ICITAP is strengthening Colombia*s forensics capabilities in the
    country*s four laboratory systems through standardized procedures,
    protocols, and new equipment.

    In El Salvador, USAID also is working in the criminal investigations area
    by providing courses on joint crime- scene management as requested by El
    Salvador*s Attorney General and Chief of Police. Prosecutors, police

    investigators, and forensic specialists have attended this course to
    improve police- prosecutor coordination in protecting and managing
    evidence.

    U. S. assistance to strengthen criminal investigations capabilities has
    provided extensive training and supported the development of internal
    training centers. However, the impact of this assistance has been limited,
    in

    some cases, due to the lack of political will for change and resource
    constraints. In Guatemala, for example, U. S. officials stated that
    corruption, funding problems, and the lack of political will for reform
    have limited the impact of U. S. assistance to strengthen criminal
    investigations. According to U. S. officials, key barriers to improving
    the police*s investigative capabilities have been the lack of continuity
    of police leadership and coordination problems between prosecutors and
    police, including an inability of these institutions to agree on their
    roles. U. S. officials in Guatemala further stated that the police-
    prosecutor dispute has impeded effective crime- scene management and
    evidence handling, and

    the two institutions developed criminal laboratories with overlapping
    functions. 8 In Bolivia, ICITAP has supported training and provided
    equipment for the

    criminal investigation unit, but the ICITAP program manager stated that
    courses had to be repeated multiple times because of a high turnover of
    officers within the unit. In addition, U. S. and Bolivian officials stated
    that the Bolivian police are facing significant resource constraints that
    have impeded their ability to operate and expand an ICITAP- supported case
    management system that would link police units and records in different
    cities. Originally designed as a nationwide system when it began in 1997,

    ICITAP is now supporting implementation in five cities, and even in these
    locations use of the system has varied. According to ICITAP officials, in
    some cases, police have not paid telephone bills, causing service to be
    cut off, which has been a major obstacle. Bolivian police officials told
    us that resource constraints also have prevented them from purchasing
    fingerprint powder and toner for printers, thus precluding full use of
    ICITAP- donated equipment. ICITAP officials stated that Bolivia*s
    centralized administration and management of the police have not been
    responsive to the resource

    needs of departmental police units. In August 2002, the State Department*s
    Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs defunded ICITAP*s police assistance
    program in Bolivia. A State Department official said that the decision was
    made on the basis of dissatisfaction with ICITAP headquarters* management
    of the program. This official also stated that future U. S. police
    assistance in Bolivia would be taken over by the State Department*s INL
    and USAID. A Justice Department official said that State*s decision was a

    reflection of a continuing disagreement between the State and Justice
    Departments over the role of each agency in implementing and managing
    criminal justice programs. The official noted that ICITAP headquarters had
    provided the same management assistance throughout the region, including
    to the successful program in El Salvador. According to the State
    Department*s most recent human rights reports, the

    police in each of the six countries continue to be involved in illegal
    activities and were not always investigated for these activities. In
    Guatemala, for example, State reported that there were credible
    allegations

    8 The U. S. embassy withheld $500, 000 of assistance until the Attorney
    General and Director of the Police signed an agreement that the two
    institutions would develop a single, unified forensics lab. After a year*s
    delay, ICITAP has begun to disperse this assistance following the signing
    of this agreement in 2002. However, the two institutions have yet to agree
    on which institution will house and manage this laboratory.

    of the involvement of police officers in kidnappings, and that impunity
    for police who commit criminal offenses remained a problem. In Bolivia,
    State cited credible allegations that police were involved in abuses,
    including excessive force, extortion, and improper arrests. State also
    reported that investigations of these abuses were slow. Police Management,

    In addition to supporting criminal investigations, ICITAP also has
    provided Accountability, and

    assistance in police management, accountability, and operations. This
    Operations Were Supported,

    assistance has included training in police administration and management
    with the Most Positive

    and training to strengthen internal oversight. In Bolivia, ICTAP has
    supported a new disciplinary code and Office of Professional Results in El
    Salvador

    Responsibility. ICITAP also has supported curriculum improvements for
    Bolivia*s 4- year, university- level police academy. In addition, ICITAP
    has provided technical assistance to draft a new police organizational law
    that would decentralize operational and administrative decision- making
    authority and assign resources to operational units, rather than through a
    centrally controlled budget. To date, this legislation has not been passed
    into law. Among the countries we visited, ICITAP*s assistance appears to
    have had

    the greatest impact in El Salvador. ICITAP has helped El Salvador*s
    National Civilian Police by developing a strategic plan, supporting
    standardizing and centralizing record keeping and reporting, and providing
    a management course to command- level officers. ICITAP also has supported
    development of the Police Academy since its inception in 1993 and has been
    able to scale back its assistance to the academy because Salvadorans are
    now managing its operations and teaching most of its courses. In addition,
    in an effort to address the country*s serious crime problem, ICITAP has
    helped develop a new policing model, characterized by increased use of
    crime statistics and the deployment of police patrols with greater
    community visibility. Modeled on U. S. programs, this project seeks to
    establish a permanent and highly visible police presence in urban areas
    facing crime and involves greater community outreach. The national

    police have implemented such patrols in 174 of El Salvador*s 262
    municipalities, covering approximately 80 percent of the country*s
    population. Police statistics show that certain crimes have been
    significantly reduced in areas where these patrols have been deployed. For
    example, these statistics show a 30 percent drop in overall crime, a 32
    percent decrease in homicides, and a 25 percent drop in armed robberies.
    The program also is being coordinated with an ICITAP- supported *9- 1- 1*
    system that covers approximately 65 percent of the country*s population.

    Legislative Restrictions on An additional factor related to implementation
    of police assistance is

    Law Enforcement section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which
    restricts the use of

    Assistance May Inhibit Rule foreign assistance funds for training and
    financial support for police or of Law Programs

    other law enforcement forces of foreign governments. Specifically, the
    provision states that that these funds may not be used *to provide
    training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons,
    or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program
    of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign
    government.* This

    prohibition was put in place in 1975 9 in response to human rights
    violations committed by nondemocratic regimes receiving USAID public
    safety assistance. USAID and the State Department have funded police
    assistance programs in Latin America, implemented by the Justice
    Department, under a series of exemptions that have subsequently been added
    to this provision. For example, an exemption allows for U. S. assistance
    to support police in the areas of investigative and forensic functions,
    the development of academic instruction, and programs to improve the
    administrative and

    management capabilities. 10 The Justice Department*s program supporting
    community- oriented police patrols in El Salvador has been permitted under
    an additional exemption allowing assistance to strengthen civilian police
    authority and capability in postconflict countries.

    U. S. officials from the State and Justice Departments and USAID have told
    us that section 660 is a barrier to developing, or planning effectively,
    for a comprehensive, coordinated, and integrated justice sector assistance
    program that includes the police. Under the prohibition on law enforcement
    assistance, U. S. agencies may not be able to fully incorporate law
    enforcement organizations into their programs supporting justice sector
    reform. For example, a USAID official in Nicaragua stated that due to this
    restriction, the agency could not include the police in its human rights
    promotion programs or invite police officials to seminars and other forums
    where their participation was considered to be critical to a productive
    dialog on implementing justice sector reforms. These officials

    stated that U. S. assistance providers should be able to plan their rule
    of law assistance strategies on the basis of local country situations and
    not on whether an exemption from the law can be justified. For example,
    the USAID- funded assistance for community- oriented police patrols,
    implemented by the Justice Department, was scheduled to terminate in

    9 P. L. 93- 559, sec. 30 (a). 10 U. S. counternarcotics assistance is also
    exempted from the section 660 prohibition.

    2003 because USAID*s General Council determined that the postconflict
    exemption permitting this program no longer applies in El Salvador.
    Conclusions U. S. rule of law assistance to Latin America supports
    criminal justice

    reforms, increased access to justice, and police investigative and
    management capabilities, and U. S. assistance has had an impact in each
    area. Due to budgetary constraints and other implementation difficulties,
    judicial and law enforcement institutions in the six countries we visited
    continue to rely to a large degree on U. S. and other international
    assistance to implement judicial reforms and other projects. U. S. and
    Latin American officials we interviewed stated that criminal justice
    reform in these countries is likely to be a long- term process, and it
    will likely take a number of years before these reforms are fully
    institutionalized. It is thus unclear at this time whether the initial
    results of U. S. assistance will be sustained or expanded to have greater
    impact. However, if U. S.- supported reforms are to become sustainable and
    have a larger impact, it appears that a long- term U. S. commitment and
    presence in providing rule of law assistance in these countries will be
    necessary. The State Department indicated that the Executive Branch should
    develop

    and propose to the Congress new legislation on law enforcement assistance
    that could be used to modify section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, to
    provide a clear statement of authority for providing law enforcement
    assistance abroad. The Justice Department stated that it would work with
    the State Department and USAID to consider whether changes to section 660
    would be appropriate. This could be an important step in providing the
    Congress with options when considering how to

    better provide police assistance abroad.

    Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local

    Chapt er 3

    Government, and Anticorruption Latin American governments have
    historically been highly centralized, and local governments have lacked
    authority and resources. In addition, the legislative branch of government
    has usually been weaker than the executive branch, and public sector
    corruption remains a serious problem.

    To address these conditions, U. S. assistance activities, implemented
    primarily by USAID, have focused on (1) strengthening legislatures by
    improving their planning, analytical, and citizen outreach capabilities;
    (2)

    improving democratic local governance by building the administrative
    capabilities of municipalities and promoting effective decentralization of
    government functions; and (3) combating corruption by raising citizen
    awareness of this problem and establishing laws, regulations, and internal
    control structures to enhance government accountability. Overall, we found
    that U. S. governance assistance has enabled all six countries to develop
    and adopt reforms to make government institutions more

    effective, accountable, and responsive to the needs of the people. Despite
    the initially positive results, the sustainability and scope of many of
    these programs is uncertain because of inconsistent political support and
    lack of resources.

    Legislatures Initially USAID*s legislative strengthening programs have
    aimed to

    Increased Their  improve legislative planning and infrastructure,

    Planning, Infrastructure,

     enhance legislative analytical and technical capabilities, and
    Analytical, and

     increase citizen knowledge of and input into congressional activities.
    Outreach Capacities, but Gains Have Eroded

    As shown in table 3, U. S. legislative strengthening assistance has been
    provided to five of the six countries we visited, starting in the early
    1990s over Time

    and continuing off and on to the present.

    Tabl e 3: USAID Legislative Strengthening Assistance Country Assistance
    dates

    Bolivia 1992 - 1996, 2001 - present Colombia Under discussion El Salvador
    1990 - present Guatemala 1997 - 2000 Nicaragua 1991 - 2001 Peru 2001 -
    present Source: USAID.

    Legislative Planning and USAID has provided support to help legislatures
    function more effectively

    Infrastructure Strengthened, and professionally by improving their
    planning and infrastructure in all five

    but Not All Improvements countries where there are or have been
    legislative strengthening programs.

    Have Lasted USAID has generally done this by supporting the formation of

    modernization committees, which have developed plans to improve
    legislative infrastructure and processes, to encourage reform.

     In Nicaragua, modernization committee projects included upgrading the
    voting system, strengthening the legislature*s budget oversight
    capabilities, and creating a Web site to publicize legislative
    information. The Web site received 35, 000 hits within the first 6 months
    that it was in

    operation.

     In El Salvador, the legislature developed a master plan for
    modernization that has helped to facilitate a consensus across political
    lines regarding public participation in the legislative process.

    In addition, USAID*s efforts to upgrade legislative infrastructure helped
    create more professional and transparent working conditions.

     In El Salvador, semiprivate offices were constructed for all
    legislators, thereby enabling some members to work more professionally and
    some to increase the number of constituents they met with.

     In Nicaragua, according to USAID officials, a conference room for the
    National Assembly was equipped, and an electronic voting board was also
    provided to display and record individual members* votes. However, not all
    of these modernization committees are functioning today, and the
    infrastructure improvements have not always been well

    maintained. According to USAID and host government officials, there have
    been problems in three of the five countries where USAID has had
    legislative strengthening programs.

     In Nicaragua, former members of the modernization committee reported a
    decrease in the committee*s influence since the 2000 elections and noted
    that the committee no longer has the administrative or political support
    of the legislature. Also, the Nicaraguan legislature

    invested its own funds to upgrade the electronic voting board, the
    technician responsible for operating it told us that he no longer had
    adequate funds to maintain or improve the voting board. Lastly, the
    conference room that USAID had helped to equip in Nicaragua is now being
    used solely by one party.  In Bolivia, the modernization committee no
    longer functions.

     In Guatemala, after the 1999 elections the new majority party cut back
    staffing of the modernization program, thereby causing the program*s
    offices to decrease their operations.

    Legislative Analytical USAID has supported efforts to establish and
    strengthen analytical

    Capabilities Bolstered capabilities in three of the five countries that
    have legislative strengthening

    Initially, but Most Gains programs, thereby enabling them to develop laws
    and regulations in a more

    Were Not Maintained informed fashion and to improve their oversight of the
    executive branch.

     In Bolivia, USAID helped establish a congressional research center and a
    budget office to analyze the executive branch*s proposed budget. This
    office identified approximately $43 million in errors in 1995.

     In Guatemala, assistance was provided to the Unit for Technical Support,
    which produced about 150 studies. According to the former manager of this
    unit, legislators now consider such reports necessary before presenting a
    proposal to the legislature.

     In El Salvador, a unit was created to provide analytical studies to
    legislators, staff, and committees.

    In two of these countries, USAID*s efforts to provide analytical support
    to legislatures have faced challenges due to changes in political support.

     In Bolivia, despite several years of positive impact, after the 1997
    elections legislative branch institutions that USAID had supported,
    including the congressional research center, lost credibility as neutral
    entities and became ineffective, according to a 2001 USAID- sponsored
    evaluation.

     In Guatemala, after the 1999 elections, the new majority party cut 18 of
    24 legislative technician positions, drastically curtailing the
    legislature*s analytical capacity.

    Citizen Input into Congress USAID also has assisted legislatures in
    increasing their constituent

    Increased, but Outreach outreach in all five countries with legislative
    strengthening programs and

    Efforts Were Hindered by a has worked to provide more opportunities for
    citizens to have input into

    Lack of Legislative Support congressional activities.

     In Peru, USAID*s Office of Transition Initiatives provided assistance
    for four congressional committees to hold public hearings. To inform
    people about the congress, USAID supported seminars and a play that was
    performed in 45 public high schools in Lima, Peru.

     In El Salvador, three legislative outreach offices were built outside
    the capital. At one center we visited, representatives from three
    different political parties shared these offices. They stated that the
    presence of these offices has helped decrease partisanship. According to a
    USAID official, the legislature has been actively involved in setting
    program priorities and has paid for the outreach offices* recurring costs.

     In Guatemala, three constituent outreach offices were established that
    implemented civic education initiatives, organized public hearings, and
    handled constituent casework.

    In two countries, these outreach activities have not been sustained, owing
    to a lack of consistent political support and in some cases politicization
    of the project.  The head of the Nicaraguan Office of Citizen
    Participation, which

    USAID helped to create, noted that her office has received little
    financial or political support from the legislature. In visiting the
    office, we observed that its location on the 10th floor of an office
    building in central Managua makes it less accessible and visible to
    citizens outside

    the capital (see fig. 11).  USAID ended its legislative strengthening
    program in Guatemala after

    the 1999 elections when the constituent outreach office staff came under
    undue political pressure. Today the majority party runs the offices, and
    opposition legislators are not permitted to work there, according to USAID
    officials.

    Figure 11: The Nicaraguan Legislature*s Office of Citizen Participation,
    Established with USAID Assistance Some USAID Legislative

    Some of USAID*s programs have helped leverage funding from other major
    Programs Have Leveraged

    donors for legislative strengthening programs. Funding from Other Donors

     The Salvadoran congressional modernization plan helped the legislature
    secure a loan from the IDB to support new information systems and
    infrastructure.

     The current USAID program in Bolivia encouraged investment from the
    World Bank, the IDB, and two private German foundations.  In Peru, USAID
    expects that its project will complement a planned $10

    million IDB technical assistance project.

    Local Governance and U. S. programs to strengthen local governance,
    primarily implemented by Citizen Participation

    USAID and to a lesser extent by the Inter- American Foundation, aim to
    increase the effectiveness, responsiveness, and accountability of
    municipal Were Enhanced in governments and to enhance citizen
    participation in local government. Target Municipalities,

    USAID*s local governance assistance has focused on but Broader Impacts

    Are More Difficult to  strengthening municipal administrative, budgetary,
    and outreach Achieve

    capabilities and increasing citizen participation in local government and
     supporting national- level policy reform and institutions for

    strengthening local governments. As shown in table 4, local governance
    assistance has been provided in all of the six countries we visited, with
    starting dates ranging from 1993 in El Salvador to 2001 in Peru and
    Colombia.

    Tabl e 4: USAID Local Governance Assistance Country Assistance dates

    Bolivia 1996 - present Colombia 2001 - present El Salvador 1993 - present
    Guatemala 1998 - present Nicaragua 1994 - 2001 Peru 2001 - present Source:
    USAID.

    In the late 1980s, Latin American governments began to make efforts to
    decentralize their countries both fiscally and politically. Countries are
    undertaking various decentralization activities, including developing a
    nationwide decentralization program, addressing issues of financial
    transfers and taxation, and focusing on municipal accountability and
    citizen oversight.

    With limited funding for local government, USAID has focused on a small
    number of municipalities in each country, with the general aim that the
    host country government, other donors, and other municipalities would
    replicate the programs* concepts. For example, in El Salvador, USAID is

    currently assisting 28 of 262 municipalities. In Colombia, USAID*s
    democratic local governance program, run by several contractors, is
    working intensively in 62 of 1,080 municipalities and is also providing
    training to members of 226 city councils.

    Administrative, Budgetary, USAID*s local governance programs have helped
    many target and Outreach Capabilities of

    municipalities operate more effectively and responsively (see fig. 12).
    Target Municipalities

     In El Salvador, target municipalities increased financial resources by
    72 Strengthened

    percent between 1996 and 1999 by improving tax records and tax collection.
     Colombia*s program aims to help increase local tax resources by

    improving local land records and also partially funds small- scale social
    infrastructure projects, such as the installation of water meters designed
    to generate revenue to make local water systems sustainable. Mayors we met
    with noted that these projects helped enhance local government planning,
    budgeting, project design, implementation, and evaluation.  In Bolivia,
    according to yearly surveys done by a USAID contractor

    between 1998 and 2000, citizens in USAID- assisted municipalities rated
    their local governments more highly on responsiveness than citizens in
    other municipalities.

    Figure 12: Acting Mayor of Leon, Nicaragua, One of the Municipalities That
    Received USAID Assistance to Strengthen Local Governance In addition,
    USAID programs have helped to increase citizen participation in, and
    oversight of, municipal activities in target municipalities. Some of

    the municipal oversight activities are closely tied in with USAID*s
    anticorruption programs.

     In Guatemala, support was provided for municipalities* efforts to
    disseminate information and organize public meetings to develop municipal
    plans and budgets.

     In Colombia, according to USAID data, more than 4,400 citizens have
    participated in the development, implementation, and oversight of 67
    municipal- level social infrastructure projects.

    On a smaller scale, the work of the Inter- American Foundation also
    supports local governance through small- scale, grassroots- driven
    projects that often increase and strengthen participation by citizens and
    civil society organizations (see fig. 13). For example, in Peru, one
    Inter- American Foundation grantee organization described how they helped
    raise women*s awareness of their rights, resulting in increased women*s
    participation in municipal affairs. The Inter- American Foundation also
    funded a Bolivian foundation that helped increase the involvement of
    small- scale rural enterprises, cooperatives, and mayors in defining a
    national povertyreduction

    strategy. From 1997 to 2001, the Inter- American Foundation estimates it
    funded $34.3 million of projects that had some effect on local governance
    in the six countries we visited.

    Figure 13: A Meeting Organized by USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives
    to Educate Citizens from Rural Peru about the Country's New
    Decentralization Program

    Replication Outside Target According to our observations and discussions
    with USAID and contractor Municipalities Was Mainly

    staff, the impact of USAID local governance programs projects has mainly
    Limited to Bolivia and El

    extended outside target municipalities in Bolivia and El Salvador.
    Salvador

     In Bolivia, where the government has accepted USAID*s approach to
    working with local governments to replicate programs, impact has been
    broad. According to USAID, 175 of 314 municipalities in Bolivia now employ
    some of these participatory methods. Subnational associations of
    municipalities and departmental municipal associations have also

    been trained to replicate aspects of USAID*s programs. An Internet portal
    has also been funded that would enable municipalities to share best
    practices, have more transparent procurement, expand their financial base,
    and pursue advocacy and networking.

     The Salvadoran government has made participatory municipal planning a
    prerequisite for some government disbursements. The Salvadoran National
    Municipal Association estimated that in 2001, 160 of 262

    municipalities used some form of citizen participation. In Bolivia and El
    Salvador, USAID has helped create materials that provide guidelines for
    municipalities and implementers on strengthening local governance and
    increasing citizen participation.

     In El Salvador, a manual on the basic criteria for participatory
    municipal planning was developed, in consultation with other donors. The
    Salvadoran government has begun to use this manual to measure progress in
    participation and transparency in all municipalities.

     In Bolivia, the IDB has funded the publication of manuals, originally
    developed with USAID support, that were made available to all 314
    municipalities.

    While these manuals have helped increase the scope and sustainability of
    USAID*s programs in individual countries, they have not been widely or
    systematically shared among USAID missions where there are local
    governance programs. According to USAID officials in Washington, D. C.,
    there is no central repository for these materials, which are usually
    produced by contractors. USAID mission staff we spoke with agreed that
    materials developed by USAID and its contractors are often not shared
    across missions.

    Other donors have also helped replicate USAID*s projects and expand their
    impact beyond target municipalities.

     A municipal- level integrated financial management system implemented in
    4 municipalities in El Salvador will be extended a $2 million IDB project
    in at least 20 additional municipalities. In addition, the IDB and the
    Salvadoran government are planning a joint $2 million project to replicate
    USAID*s methodology of linking participatory development plans to
    municipal budget support.

     In Bolivia, USAID, a German foundation, and the Dutch Embassy have
    adopted a common methodology for municipal strengthening.

    USAID*s Municipal- Level USAID*s efforts to assist target municipalities
    have been constrained by Efforts Were Constrained by

    limited municipal resources and skills and by staff turnover. Although
    these Limited Municipal

    conditions exist in other countries, they were most evident in our visits
    to Resources and Skills and by

    Nicaragua and Guatemala. Staff Turnover  According to USAID officials,
    Nicaraguan municipalities do not have the

    authority to set local taxes, which have been lowered in some cases by the
    national government to attract foreign investment.  Representatives from
    a Nicaraguan institute that works with municipalities expressed concern
    that local officials may not possess

    the appropriate skills to handle increased governance responsibilities.
    USAID officials in Nicaragua and contractor staff in Guatemala said
    municipal staff turnover has exacerbated this problem, as newly elected

    mayors have fired existing staff and brought in less experienced
    personnel.  Municipal staff in Guatemala also stated that they were
    frustrated about

    their lack of resources, noting that it was difficult to put into practice
    USAID*s method of participatory planning since there were few funds to
    implement projects.

    Policy Reforms Adopted At the national level in all six countries, USAID
    has helped develop policies

    and Institutions and institutions that support municipalities, often by
    working with national

    Strengthened at the municipal associations.

    National Level, but Results  In Peru, policy advice has been given to the
    government for a

    Affected by Level of nationwide decentralization program scheduled to
    begin in 2003. As part

    Political Support for of this support, the Prime Minister*s office
    reviewed local experiences

    Decentralization with decentralization and a congressional committee held
    public

    hearings to obtain input into its draft decentralization law.  In
    Guatemala, USAID supported national- level working groups on municipal
    indebtedness and tax codes.  In Colombia, USAID is helping the Colombian
    Federation of Municipalities organize meetings among mayors and local
    leaders at the regional level to discuss areas for policy reform.  In
    Nicaragua, the National Association of Municipalities, which advises

    and advocates for municipalities, was established and strengthened.
    However, USAID*s work in this area has been affected by the level of
    political support for decentralization, which varies by country.  In
    Nicaragua, municipal officials and representatives of the national

    municipal association noted that the past government had provided little
    political or financial support to municipalities. Subsequent to our visit,
    the current government passed three decentralization laws in May 2002,
    according to a USAID official. The lack of a municipal civil service law,
    for example, has posed obstacles to efforts to train local officials.

     Although the Bolivian government*s support for decentralization
    decreased after the 1997 elections, USAID continued to work and have an
    impact at the municipal level because the key decentralization law was
    already in place.

     In El Salvador, USAID*s program has been assisted by the government*s
    commitment to implement a supportive policy agenda.

    Anticorruption Policies USAID anticorruption assistance has focused on

    and Procedures Have  supporting reforms in anticorruption legislation and
    regulations,

    Been Implemented in Some Countries, but

     introducing programs to make national and municipal government the Long-
    term Impact

    institutions more transparent and accountable, and Is Not Yet Evident

     fostering citizen awareness and oversight. As shown in table 5, U. S.
    anticorruption assistance has been provided in five of the six countries
    we visited, beginning with Peru in 1995. Tabl e 5: USAID Anticorruption
    Assistance

    Country Assistance dates

    Bolivia N/ A Colombia 2001 - present El Salvador 2000 - present Guatemala
    2001 - present Nicaragua 1994 - 2001 Peru 1995 - 2000

    2001 - present a Source: USAID. a Small- scale program through USAID*s
    Office of Transition Initiatives.

    Anticorruption Legislation USAID*s anticorruption activities have helped
    countries develop

    Was Developed; Some anticorruption legislation and regulations. In
    Nicaragua, for example,

    Institutions Are More USAID provided recommendations for the 2001 National
    Budget Law and

    Transparent and worked with the National Assembly*s Anticorruption
    Commission to

    promote civil service reform. In both Colombia and El Salvador, USAID has
    Accountable; and Citizen

    supported measures to increase the accountability of public servants,
    Awareness Has Increased

    including the development of a code of ethics. USAID also has helped
    government institutions take steps to become more transparent and
    accountable.

     In Nicaragua, USAID collaborated with other donors to help develop an
    integrated financial management system. This system, when fully
    operational, will enable the Ministry of Finance to track the spending of
    13 government ministries, the National Assembly, and the courts (see fig.
    14). 1  In Colombia, the government adopted regulations that will require
    3,000

    national and subnational entities to follow standardized internal control
    processes that were recommended by USAID.

    Figure 14: Nicaragua*s Integrated Financial Management System Was
    Developed with Assistance from USAID Funds

    1 The general model for this type of integrated financial management
    system in Latin America was developed by the USAID- funded Americas*
    Accountability/ Anticorruption Project. Similar systems are being
    developed in other Latin American countries.

    Note: When Nicaragua*s Integrated Financial Management System is fully
    implemented, it will enable the Ministry of Finance to track the spending
    of other ministries.

    USAID- supported anticorruption programs have also helped citizens become
    more aware and active regarding corruption issues.

     In Colombia, an anticorruption campaign reached 23 million people
    through radio and television spots.

     According to a study by a USAID contractor, 2 Nicaraguans have become
    better informed about corruption issues as a result of a USAIDsupported
    national anticorruption awareness campaign.  Municipal- level public
    oversight in El Salvador and Colombia has

    increased as a result of local citizen watchdog groups that have been
    supported by USAID.

    USAID*s Programs Are Despite some initial success, the broader impact and
    sustainability of Challenged by a Lack of

    USAID*s anticorruption programs are still unclear. Transparency Consistent
    Political Support

    International, which is an international nongovernmental organization that
    and by the Broad Scope of

    focuses on combating corruption, concurs that although there have been
    some positive developments in the region, the results of anticorruption
    Corruption

    programs have been modest so far. According to our observations and
    discussions with USAID and host country officials, USAID*s projects have
    been hindered by politicization and a lack of consistent political
    support.  In Nicaragua, for example, the Comptroller General*s Office,
    which

    USAID had been supporting with technical assistance and training, was
    reorganized. Now, a committee of political appointees runs it, impairing
    its objectivity. In addition, according to a high- ranking Nicaraguan
    official, in 2001 the Ministry of Finance fired experienced staff that had
    been trained as part of the USAID- and World Bank- supported integrated
    financial management system, resulting in lost institutional memory and
    expertise.  In Peru, the Comptroller General*s Office has been unable to
    fully

    implement its oversight plans owing to a lack of political or financial 2
    Mitchell A. Seligson, Nicaraguans Talk about Corruption: A Follow- Up
    Study of Public Opinion (Arlington, Va.: Casals and Associates for USAID,
    1999).

    support from the government, according to USAID and Peruvian officials.
    Finally, the systemic nature of corruption in Latin America, combined with
    public skepticism about anticorruption efforts, poses a major challenge
    for USAID*s programs. Although the political leaders of countries such as
    Colombia and Nicaragua have stated that combating corruption is a high
    priority, both USAID and the host countries are in the relatively early
    stages of addressing a broad and deeply rooted problem in the region.
    Transparency International notes that despite some progress, corruption
    remains widespread in the region, and the credibility of institutions is
    low. According to a 2002 study focusing on four Latin American countries,
    higher levels of corruption are significantly associated with lower levels
    of

    support for the political system. 3 This is the case in El Salvador,
    according to a 1999 study, where Salvadorans who were victims of
    corruption demonstrated less support for the political system than those
    who were not. 4 In Nicaragua, public sector corruption is endemic,
    according to USAID, and the public has little confidence in many
    government institutions, in part because of this corruption. According to
    a 2001 survey by a USAID anticorruption contractor, more than 70 percent
    of the Colombians surveyed considered corruption to be common in
    government institutions. A work plan prepared by the same USAID contractor
    cited a recent World Bank survey indicating that the same percentage of
    respondents considered the Colombian Congress to be corrupt or very
    corrupt. According to this USAID contractor, widespread public skepticism
    exists regarding the national government*s effort to combat corruption.
    USAID has noted that this lack of confidence poses challenges to its work

    in Colombia. Conclusions U. S. governance- related assistance programs
    have enabled the six

    countries we visited to take limited steps toward more effective,
    responsive, and accountable government institutions. In some cases, other
    donors have taken steps to replicate or expand USAID*s programs. At the
    same time, however, USAID*s governance programs have been challenged

    3 Mitchell A. Seligson, *The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A
    Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries,* Journal of Politics
    64 (May 2002), 418, 423, 424. 4 Mitchell A. Seligson, Ricardo Cordova
    Macias, and Jose Miguel Cruz, Democracy Audit: El Salvador 1999 (USAID,
    1999), 96.

    by inconsistent political will and resource constraints. In light of this
    modest progress and the continued obstacles to reform, it is unlikely that
    U. S. governance- related assistance will be able to produce sustainable
    results without ongoing, long- term involvement.

    Chapt er 4

    Human Rights Human rights

    Many Latin American countries have suffered from decades of authoritarian
    rule and internal conflict. Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia in particular
    have endured terrorism, massacres, and forced disappearances. While the
    human rights situation in Peru and Guatemala 1 has slowly

    improved over the last few years, the situation in Colombia 2 has
    deteriorated even further. U. S. human rights assistance to Latin America
    has supported efforts to foster greater awareness of, and respect for,
    human rights.

    From 1992 to 2002, Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia were among the largest
    recipients of USAID human rights funding in Latin America. U. S.
    assistance efforts to improve the human rights situation in these
    countries have included technical assistance for the creation of
    government agencies that address human rights problems, training programs,
    education programs,

    1 Guatemala suffered from more than 34 years of a civil war that ended in
    1996; during the war, state forces and related paramilitary groups engaged
    in a brutal campaign of repression against insurgent groups and civilians.
    In Peru, the period between 1980 and 2000 was one of terrorism and armed
    conflict, when the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru terrorist groups and

    the Peruvian military killed an estimated 30,000 civilians and tortured or
    forcibly *disappeared* thousands more. Under the administration of
    President Fujimori, civil liberties were severely curbed and thousands of
    innocent people were wrongfully detained without trial.

    2 In Colombia, the current conflict between the paramilitaries; guerillas;
    and, to a lesser extent, the military has continued for almost four
    decades, and the longevity and the recent escalation of the violence have
    adversely affected the lives of millions of civilians. More than 1.1
    million people have been internally displaced from their homes, and tens
    of thousands more have been murdered. Colombia also has the highest rate
    of kidnappings in the world, with the guerilla and paramilitary groups
    committing 3,706 kidnappings in 2000 alone.

    and the provision of protection for threatened individuals. For the most
    part, the impact of these projects has been positive, but they are limited
    in scope and hindered by a lack of resources. Often, political and
    logistical

    problems must be resolved for these programs to work better. Despite some
    improvements in governments* respect for human rights in these countries,
    serious problems persist. In some cases, longer term project results may
    be difficult for host governments to sustain owing to high recurring
    costs. As shown in table 6, the U. S. government has provided human rights

    assistance over the past decade to Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru.

    Tabl e 6: U. S. Human Rights Assistance in Three Countries Country
    Assistance dates

    Colombia 1996 - present Guatemala 1993 - 1994, 2000 - present Peru 1994 -
    present Source: USAID.

    U. S. Human Rights U. S. human rights assistance has had a positive impact
    in the three

    Assistance Has countries we reviewed that have a current human rights
    program. In Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia, human rights assistance has
    addressed

    Increased Awareness past abuses, protected threatened individuals, and
    prevented future

    and Government abuses. These efforts have fostered an increased awareness
    among the

    Accountability citizenry as to what rights the efforts have, and they have
    increased

    government accountability. Provided primarily by USAID, human rights
    assistance in these countries has focused on

     preventing future human rights abuses by promoting greater public
    awareness and mechanisms to address potential incidents;

     protecting human rights by providing physical, economic, and legal
    assistance to threatened individuals and communities; and

     responding to past abuses by supporting reconciliation commissions as
    well as the investigation and prosecution of human rights violations.

    Mechanisms Were Put in USAID assistance programs have served to foster
    greater citizen awareness

    Place to Prevent Human of human rights and have provided mechanisms for
    government action in

    Rights Abuses support of human rights. For example, in Colombia, USAID has
    supported

    the creation of a national information network, called the *Early Warning
    System,* for citizens, nongovernmental organizations, and local
    authorities to report signs of impending massacres or other human rights
    violations in their communities by any of the irregular armed groups
    involved in that country*s ongoing conflict. 3 If a threat is deemed real,
    the military, police, a national social service organization, or all
    three, will be alerted to take appropriate action. As of August 2002,
    USAID had provided $600,000 of a total planned investment of $3.1 million
    to support direct technical assistance and training for the network as
    well as to establish its central office. USAID also has helped establish
    13 regional offices out of a planned 15, although the Early Warning System
    director said even more offices would be needed. According to its
    Coordinator, the Early Warning System has been publicized on the Internet
    and advertised on both television and radio to inform citizens about its
    existence. This project appears to have facilitated citizens* ability to
    recognize and report potential human rights threats as well as allowed
    them to hold the government directly responsible for taking action. From
    June 2001 through August 2002, 150 alerts were emitted, of which the
    military, the police, or both, responded to 107. The

    Early Warning System director estimates that this response has saved
    90,000 people from being victimized, although no actual results indicators
    have been developed.

    Although the Early Warning System is a unique tool for preventing
    largescale human rights violations and has great potential for
    replication, coordination problems could hinder its proper implementation
    and

    ultimate impact. The director admitted that smooth communication between
    the regional and central offices can be problematic on the weekends,
    particularly Sundays, when the central office is not staffed. The system
    does not appear to have adequate backup communications methods and at
    times relies on one cell phone to ensure that alerts are transmitted to
    the appropriate authorities. Furthermore, government authorities have not

    3 These groups include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (also
    know as the *FARC*), the National Liberation Army (also known as the
    *ELN*), and the right- wing paramilitary forces (known by their umbrella
    organization, the United Self- Defense Groups

    of Colombia, or *AUC*).

    always responded consistently to alerts and have failed to avert major
    human rights violations. 4 Increased Protection

    The U. S. government also has supported the creation of protection
    Provided for Some programs for threatened citizens in Colombia. The
    Justice Department

    Threatened Citizens supports both a witness and a judicial protection
    program. Both of these

    programs place special emphasis on operational security 5 and seek to
    ensure safe participation in judicial proceedings for witnesses, judges,
    investigators, and prosecutors. USAID supports a separate protection
    program for human rights defenders. As of August 2002, USAID has helped
    protect 2,776 individuals from irregular armed groups. 6 In response to
    lobbying from the human rights community, the Colombian government

    has expanded the target protected population to include criminal
    witnesses, union leaders, journalists, leftist party members, mayors (all
    1, 098 of Colombia*s mayors were threatened with kidnapping or death by
    the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia if they did not resign in
    2002), council members, and municipal human rights workers. In the 5- year

    period between 1997 and 2002, the Colombian government spent approximately
    $25 million on the project. Resources, however, are too limited to help
    all vulnerable groups of people or even to keep pace with the increasing
    demand for individual protection. Nevertheless, the program demonstrates
    that the Colombian government is taking some action to protect threatened
    citizens. 4 For example, in May 2002, a massacre occurred in the
    municipality of Bojaya. In this

    instance, the Early Warning System had issued an alert ahead of time, but
    the military did not respond. During the ensuing clash with
    paramilitaries, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia launched a gas
    cylinder bomb and hit the roof of a church where citizens had taken
    refuge* killing 119 people, 40 of them children, and injuring over 100
    additional people.

    5 Operational security focuses on the provision of armored vehicles; the
    architectural design of a *safe site* for witnesses; the purchase of
    computers, radios, audio- visual equipment, etc.; and the training of
    protective force personnel.

    6 This assistance includes both *soft* and *hard* protection. Soft
    protection refers to relocation and economic assistance, and hard
    protection includes armored vehicles and offices as well as communication
    devices, such as radios and cellular phones. USAID also has provided
    office equipment and information systems software to the government of
    Colombia to manage the protection program.

    Official Response Provided USAID human rights programs also have fostered
    greater government

    for Some Past Abuses responsiveness to allegations of past or ongoing
    human rights abuses. For

    example, the Human Rights Promoters Network operated by the Colombian
    government educates citizen leaders about their rights protected by law.
    These leaders are expected to promote greater human rights awareness by
    replicating the training in their own communities, particularly for those
    groups most vulnerable to human rights violations.

    USAID also has been instrumental in supporting the creation of Human
    Rights Ombudsman Offices in five of the six countries by providing
    technical assistance, office equipment, and salaried professionals. These
    offices address citizen complaints, investigate officials accused of human
    rights violations, and propose human rights legislation. The State

    Department has reported that despite providing a legal channel for citizen
    complaints, funding problems have undermined sustainability and
    credibility of the ombudsman offices in Colombia and Nicaragua.
    Furthermore, the ombudsman has at times temporarily cast the entire office
    in a negative light, as in the case of Guatemala, where an

    ombudsmamn was accused of corruption. Various government officials,
    however, stated that, according to public opinion polls in Peru and
    Bolivia, the ombudsman*s office is one of the most highly respected public
    organizations.

    In Guatemala, USAID helped the Attorney General*s Office design the first
    Victims Assistance Office in Latin America in 1997, staffed with full-
    time doctors, nurses, social workers and lawyers to provide aid to victims
    of crime and gather evidence for potential prosecution (see fig. 15).
    Since then, each of Guatemala*s 23 departments has established at least
    one such office.

    Figure 15: USAID- supported Victims Assistance Center Managed by the
    Attorney General*s Office, Guatemala City, Guatemala USAID human rights
    programs have also fostered greater justice and resolution for victims and
    their families. For example, the Foundation for Anthropological Forensics
    of Guatemala, with funding from USAID, has been carrying out exhumations
    of clandestine cemeteries created during Guatemala*s 34- year civil war
    (see fig. 16). These efforts have helped to

    prove that massacres occurred, put questions about loved ones to rest, and
    aided in national reconciliation efforts. Peru*s Truth and Reconciliation
    Commission is carrying out exhumation efforts with similar goals and also
    is investigating culpability for atrocities. One of the commissioners with
    whom we met stated that U. S. assistance has been critical for the
    functioning of the commission, keeping it in operation when the Peruvian
    government was delayed in providing promised funding. The commission*s

    work is expected to culminate in a July 2003 report that will make
    recommendations for government reparations.

    Figure 16: Coffins used by USAID- supported Foundation for Anthropological
    Forensics to Reinter Remains Exhumed from Mass Graves in Guatemala

    Finally, the Justice Department has also worked to achieve justice and
    resolution for victims of human rights violations in Colombia. The
    department has trained special units of prosecutors and investigators to
    pursue major human rights cases and high- impact crimes, such as
    massacres, bombings, and kidnappings, in the criminal justice system. From
    August 2001 to August 2002, special units operating out of eight cities
    prosecuted 167 cases against irregular armed groups, including high-
    profile

    cases such as the assassination attempt on then- presidential candidate
    Alvaro Uribe in 2002 and various massacres across the country (see fig.
    17). According to the Justice Department, it has plans to help the
    Colombian government expand the number and size of these units in fiscal
    years 2003 and 2004. Figure 17: Human Rights Units Using Forensics
    Equipment Provided by the Justice

    Department to Investigate a Crime Scene in San Jose de Apartado, Colombia

    Despite Improvements, According to the State Department*s most recent
    human rights reports,

    Serious Human Rights although government respect for human rights has
    improved in some

    Problems Persist cases, serious problems still remain. In Peru, State
    reports that in recent

    years the government has demonstrated greater respect for human rights
    advocates and had generally improved its relationship with civil society.
    In Guatemala, State reports that the government generally respects the
    human rights of its citizens, but its willingness and ability to prosecute
    and convict human rights violators is seriously limited, and that the
    police and

    military may be involved in illegal executions. In Colombia, the
    government's human rights record remained poor, according to State; there
    were continued efforts to improve the legal framework and institutional
    mechanisms for protecting human rights, but implementation lagged, and
    serious problems remained in many areas. For example, members of the

    police and armed forces have committed serious human rights abuses and
    have collaborated with paramilitary insurgents in doing so, but they have
    rarely been brought to justice. Government security forces also often
    failed to take action to prevent paramilitary attacks, according to the
    State Department report.

    Outlook for Human Rights The long- term outlook for many U. S. human
    rights assistance projects

    Assistance differs from most of the other programs we reviewed. Some human
    rights

    efforts that the United States is supporting, such as Peru*s Truth
    Commission, are short term and are projected to end on a specific date.
    Other projects, such as assistance to Colombia*s internally displaced
    persons, are fundamentally humanitarian in nature and may require outside
    support for as long as there is internal conflict. Funding for some longer
    term projects, however, is questionable owing to potentially high
    recurring costs. For example, the Colombian human rights units trained by
    the Justice Department still have a very limited national presence and
    depend

    on U. S. support to update and expand their training and equipment. It is
    not clear whether the Colombian government will expand these units on a
    national basis.

    Conclusions The United States has provided Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru
    with some important tools to help address the human rights problems.
    Nonetheless, human rights remain a major concern in Colombia and
    Guatemala. Given the magnitude and political complexity of these problems
    and the limited scope of U. S. assistance, the tools that the United
    States has provided are likely to have only a marginal impact on these
    problems.

    Chapt er 5

    Elections Over the last two decades, many Latin American countries have
    transitioned to democracy and most countries in the region have held
    elections regularly. Although U. S. election- related assistance has
    supported efforts that have contributed to free and fair elections in the
    six countries we reviewed, most of this assistance has gone to three of
    these countries* Nicaragua, Peru, and El Salvador* to help them improve
    electoral institutions and enhance voter access. U. S. officials noted
    that of these three countries, only Nicaragua is likely to require
    significant international support before its next major election.

    The United States Has The United States has been the largest donor of
    election- related assistance

    in many of the six countries we visited, and USAID has provided the bulk
    of Primarily Targeted

    this aid, almost $66 million, during fiscal years 1990 through 2002. 1
    Most of Three Countries with

    this assistance went to Nicaragua ($ 27 million), Peru ($ 20 million), and
    El Assistance in Election

    Salvador ($ 13 million). The State Department, the National Endowment for
    Administration, Voter

    Democracy, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs,
    and the International Republican Institute provided smaller amounts of

    Access, and Electoral additional election assistance to some of these
    countries. The last two

    Observation organizations have also used USAID election funds in some of
    these

    countries, according to representatives from these institutions. As shown
    in table 7, USAID provided electoral assistance to all six of the
    countries visited, starting in 1990 and continuing off and on to the
    present.

    1 In this chapter, we report USAID assistance from fiscal years 1990
    through 2002 because of the substantive amount of assistance provided to
    support the 1990 Nicaraguan elections.

    Tabl e 7: USAID Election Assistance in the Six Countries Country
    Assistance dates

    Bolivia 1991 - 1999 Colombia 2002 El Salvador 1991, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2000
    Guatemala 1990 - 1992, 1994 - 1997, 1999, 2002 Nicaragua 1990, 1995, 1996,
    1998, 2001, 2002 Peru 1993 - 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Sources: GAO
    (analysis) and USAID (data).

    Overall, U. S. election assistance activities have focused on  improving
    election administration by building the institutional capacity

    of electoral authorities,  enhancing voter access by improving voter
    registration and education

    and supporting electoral reform, and  legitimizing election results by
    supporting electoral observation by

    domestic and international groups. USAID also has recently helped improve
    election administration in Peru and Nicaragua by strengthening the
    capabilities of electoral authorities. In Peru, USAID supported staff
    training, technical assistance, election planning, logistics, information
    systems, and transmission of results by providing almost $3.3 million in
    assistance before the 2001 national elections. The agency also provided
    support at a lower level to help run Peru*s 2002 regional and local
    elections. In Nicaragua, USAID has provided similar types of election
    administration support since 1990, including more

    than $1.8 million to the electoral authority for administrative
    enhancements in planning, logistics, information technology, and
    transmission of results before the 2001 national elections.

    U. S. assistance also has helped enhance voter access to the electoral
    system by improving voter registration and education in El Salvador,
    Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru. In El Salvador, according to USAID
    officials, the agency supported the establishment of civil and voter
    registries and helped issue 937,000 single identity documents, out of an
    expected total of 3.2 million documents, which will be used as official
    voter identification in future elections. On the basis of an electoral
    reform

    enacted with USAID support, the Salvadorian electoral authority plans to
    use the new voter registry to assign voters to polling stations closer to
    their residence for the 2004 presidential elections, thereby further
    improving voter access. In Nicaragua, USAID also provided support for
    registration efforts before the 2001 elections. This assistance helped
    about 150,000

    citizens obtain voting credentials, according to USAID. To support
    Guatemala*s 2003 elections, USAID, through OAS, is providing $750,000 in
    assistance to fund voter registration activities to increase the access of
    the population to the electoral system. In Peru, USAID funded voter-
    training activities conducted by nongovernmental groups before the 2001
    national elections and the 2002 regional elections.

    In Peru, El Salvador, and Guatemala, U. S. election- related assistance
    also has supported electoral reform efforts to improve voter access, with
    limited success. This assistance has focused on enhancing the rules and
    procedures governing the electoral system in order to improve political
    participation of the population. In Peru, USAID provided support for
    electoral reforms that were proposed following the 2001 national
    elections, but these reforms have not yet been enacted. In El Salvador and
    Guatemala, following the signing of those countries* Peace Accords in 1992
    and 1996, respectively, the agency supported efforts to improve electoral
    rules and procedures and increase political participation of the
    population, including participation of women, indigenous groups, and rural
    populations. In El Salvador, USAID supported the drafting of four

    proposals to reform political parties, the electoral authority, electoral
    procedures, and proportional representation. In Guatemala, the agency
    supported efforts to develop an electoral and political parties law and to
    facilitate public discussion of various other proposals under
    consideration. These reforms are still being considered in the El
    Salvadoran and

    Guatemalan legislatures. U. S. assistance has recently helped legitimize
    election results by supporting election observation in Peru, Nicaragua,
    and Colombia by domestic and international groups. In Peru*s 2001
    elections, for instance, USAID provided more than $2.1 million to field
    election observers from the Peruvian Ombudsman*s Office; the Organization
    of American States; the National Democratic Institute; the Carter Center;
    and Transparencia, which is a

    local nongovernmental group (see fig. 18). USAID also provided a similar
    amount to fund international and domestic observers of Nicaragua*s 2001
    elections and $325,000 to support OAS observers of Colombia*s 2002

    elections.

    Figure 18: Poll Workers Organizing Voting Materials before Opening a
    Polling Station in Lima, Peru, during the April 2001 National Elections

    U. S. Assistance Has The State Department has noted in its human rights
    reports, on the basis of

    Helped Ensure Free reports by domestic and international observation
    groups, that elections in

    the six countries have been generally free and fair, with the exception of
    and Fair Elections, but the seriously flawed and controversial 2000
    Peruvian national elections.

    Nicaragua May Still This pattern of free and fair elections is consistent
    with the elections held

    Need Additional in other countries in the region since many of these
    countries started their

    transition to democracy almost two decades ago. Assistance

    Looking toward the future, USAID officials stated that Peru and El
    Salvador might require significantly less international assistance to run
    upcoming elections. USAID officials highlighted that these countries have
    enhanced their institutional capabilities to run elections, as
    demonstrated by the widely recognized legitimacy of their recent elections
    and the decreasing international support required by their electoral
    authorities for conducting elections. These officials noted that USAID
    does not plan to fund any electoral activities in Peru and after the 2003
    elections in El Salvador (see fig. 19).

    Figure 19: Voters Waiting to Enter Polling Station in Lima, Peru, during
    the April 2001 National Elections

    On the other hand, Nicaragua, which has received the largest amount of U.
    S. election assistance, will likely require significant international aid
    to run its next major election, according to USAID officials. These
    officials noted that the Nicaraguan electoral authority, despite efforts
    to improve it, still faces major financial, planning, and organizational
    problems. For example, this electoral authority is still highly
    politicized and exhibits serious institutional and managerial weaknesses
    that compromise its ability to run elections. Also, Nicaragua*s civil and
    voter registries are outdated, and many voter documents used in the 2001
    national election were temporary or will expire soon, leaving the
    challenge of registering a large number of voters before the next
    election. In their final 2001 election observation reports, the Carter
    Center and the International Republican Institute noted that, despite
    having held a free and fair election, Nicaragua still has important
    shortcomings in its electoral system, particularly in election
    administration and voter access. 2 2 The Carter Center, Observing the 2001
    Nicaraguan Elections: Final Report (Atlanta:

    2002); International Republican Institute, Nicaragua, Election Observation
    Report, November 4, 2001 (Washington, D. C.: 2002).

    Conclusions U. S. elections assistance has helped all six countries we
    visited realize a fundamental component of democracy* free and fair
    elections. While

    continued improvements will be needed to achieve wider participation and
    greater efficiency in elections administration, particularly in Nicaragua,
    basic capabilities are in place in these countries to enable them to
    continue to hold free and fair elections into the future.

    Management Issues Hinder Impact and

    Chapt er 6

    Sustainability of U. S. Democracy Assistance Many organizations and
    entities are involved in providing democracy assistance in the six
    countries we reviewed, including U. S. government agencies, other
    multilateral and bilateral donors, and nongovernmental organizations.
    Effective coordination and cooperation among these players is critical for
    achieving meaningful, long- term results from assistance efforts. U. S.
    agencies have not always managed their programs in a way

    that would leverage the contributions from all of these organizations,
    particularly other major donors, and maximize the impact and
    sustainability of U. S. funded programs. Assistance efforts are not always
    well- coordinated among the agencies, and strategic plans have not defined
    overarching goals and the roles that key U. S. agencies will play in these
    efforts or ways to link these efforts with those of other donors to help
    ensure that results are sustainable. Furthermore, evaluation of program

    results and sharing lessons learned has been limited among U. S. agencies
    and implementers across countries where this assistance is provided.

    Poorly Coordinated Although a wide variety of U. S. government agencies
    and international

    Program Management donors provide democracy assistance, coordination of
    this assistance was

    inconsistent in the six countries we visited. We found that those Limits
    Effectiveness of

    organizations supporting democratic institutions did not always cooperate
    U. S. Democracy

    in a way that would maximize the impact and sustainability of their
    efforts. Assistance

    As a result, the programs they implemented were often fragmented and not
    mutually supportive and failed to overcome common financial and political
    obstacles. U. S. government agencies have not outlined a long- term,
    strategic approach to this assistance that considers all of the major
    parties and available resources and information.

    Poor Coordination and The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
    (the Results Act)

    Strategic Planning among requires U. S. government agencies to identify
    their strategic goals and

    develop annual plans for achieving them. 1 Further, as we have previously
    U. S. Government Agencies

    reported in our work relating to this act, such plans should identify how
    1 The Results Act seeks to improve the management of federal programs by
    shifting the focus of decision- making from staffing and activity levels
    to the results of federal programs. Under the Results Act, executive
    agencies are to prepare 5- year strategic plans that set the general
    direction for their efforts. Agencies then are to prepare annual
    performance plans that establish the connections between the long- term
    strategic goals outlined in the strategic plans and the day- to- day
    activities of program managers and staff. Finally, the act requires that
    each agency report annually on the extent to which it is meeting its
    annual performance goals and the actions needed to achieve or modify those
    goals that have not been met.

    similar programs conducted by other agencies will be coordinated to ensure
    that goals are consistent, and, as appropriate, program efforts are
    mutually reinforcing. 2 The annual performance plans prepared by the State
    Department and

    USAID in accordance with the Results Act both identify promoting democracy
    and human rights abroad as agency strategic goals. However, neither
    USAID*s or State*s plans nor the subordinate regional or countrylevel

    planning documents we reviewed specifically address the role of other U.
    S. agencies and donors in ensuring that U. S.- funded democracy projects
    are well coordinated and leverage domestic and international resources.
    With few exceptions, these planning documents did not take into account
    the unique resources that each of the various U. S. agencies has to offer
    and the role each could play over what will be a long- term

    effort to help countries achieve and institutionalize democratic reforms.
    Although some documents mentioned that other agencies would be involved in
    the assistance effort, the nature or duration of that involvement was not
    discussed in detail.

    The relationship among USAID and the State and Justice Departments has
    frequently been difficult when it comes to rule of law programs, which has
    hindered long- term joint planning in that area. As we noted in a 1999
    report, interagency coordination on rule of law assistance has been a
    long- standing problem. 3 At that time, the Chairman of the House
    Committee on International Relations had expressed the concern that,
    because funds were provided through so many channels, rule of law programs
    had

    become inefficient and uncoordinated. Little progress has been made to
    resolve this problem. According to U. S. officials with whom we spoke, the
    relationship among implementing agencies is often still characterized more
    by competition than cooperation and has led to fragmented programs that
    are not always mutually supportive in achieving common goals. For example,
    in Bolivia, poor communication and disagreement among these agencies on
    their respective roles has disrupted efforts to assist the development of
    that country*s national police by casting the program*s staffing and
    funding in uncertainty. Unresolved coordination issues among these
    agencies have precluded efforts to establish a joint strategy on law 2 U.
    S. General Accounting Office, Results Act: An Evaluator*s Guide to
    Assessing Annual Performance Plans, GAO/ GGD- 10.1.20 (Washington, D. C.:
    Apr. 1, 1998).

    3 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Status of Rule of
    Law Program Coordination, NSIAD- 00- 8R (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 13,
    1999).

    enforcement development on either the regional, or country- specific
    level. As a result, in the countries we visited, the agencies are often
    operating on parallel tracks and not developing programs that are closely
    coordinated and mutually supportive. Better coordination among these
    agencies could leverage the critical

    resources and comparative advantage that each offers to overcome
    obstacles. For example, while USAID has significant institutional
    experience designing and implementing development programs, the Justice
    Department has significant technical expertise in law enforcement and
    criminal investigations, and the State Department has diplomatic
    relationships and influence that can be helpful in resolving political
    impediments to reform.

    Limited Cooperation among Other international donors have major efforts to
    promote democracy in the

    International Donors countries we visited, and two of the largest, the
    World Bank and the IDB,

    are funded in part by contributions from the U. S. government. However,
    the strategic plans and other related planning documents prepared by the
    State and Justice Departments and USAID included very little information
    on plans to cooperate with other major international donors in the six
    countries we reviewed. Some plans mentioned a few successful cooperative
    efforts in the past, but donor cooperation was not consistently discussed
    as an integral component of the U. S. government*s approach in any of the
    areas of democracy assistance we reviewed.

    We observed that donors working in closer coordination, with a common
    strategy and work plan, can make significant progress. In Bolivia, the U.
    S. and German governments embarked on a joint program to implement the new
    criminal code, each providing mutually supporting activities and
    financing. As a result of this effort, a large number of legal operators
    were trained on the code*s provisions, and the Bolivian government began
    implementing the code on schedule. Other examples of close coordination
    include the following:

     In Bolivia, USAID, a German foundation, and the government of the
    Netherlands have adopted a common methodology for municipal strengthening,
    expanding the impact of USAID*s initial contributions to

    additional municipalities.  In El Salvador, the IDB is funding projects
    to extend a USAID- supported,

    municipal- level financial management system to additional localities.

     Donors and Latin American countries have been collaborating regionally
    on anticorruption activities since the early 1990s. For example, the
    Donors Consultative Group of the USAID- supported Americas*
    Accountability/ Anticorruption Project has helped to increase the number
    of anticorruption projects in the region, according to USAID. Other
    multilateral initiatives, such as the Inter- American

    Convention Against Corruption and ongoing United Nations negotiations for
    a global anticorruption convention, are also mobilizing states to focus on
    corruption.

    Such donor cooperation was not always the norm in the countries we
    visited, however, and donors often pursued parallel but not necessarily
    mutually supporting activities. Donor coordination was generally
    characterized by organizations keeping one another informed of the nature,
    progress, and location of their activities. Across the six countries, the
    U. S. government and other donors generally worked on different agendas in
    the

    area of judicial reform. In Bolivia, for example, USAID and the World Bank
    divided their justice sector reform efforts between host government
    agencies using different approaches. The two organizations have helped the
    government develop two information systems* one to track criminal cases
    and one for civil cases. At the time of our visit in June 2002, neither
    system was being fully implemented on a national scale, and USAID
    officials were concerned about the future compatibility of these two
    systems.

    Pooling financial resources and political influence could enable donor
    organizations to overcome some political and financial obstacles that
    limit the impact and sustainability of assistance programs. The United
    States, with its on- the- ground presence and long- standing diplomatic
    relationships, can offer significant technical expertise and influence to
    help achieve political support. At the same time, the multilateral
    development

    banks, in particular, can offer significant, low- cost, long- term
    financing for host governments. Better coordinated, these resources could
    be combined to (1) leverage political support from host governments for
    mutually

    agreed- upon reform programs, (2) devise appropriate program designs, and
    (3) provide long- term financing that could help ensure that the programs
    are sustainable.

    Donor cooperation can be difficult for a number of political and cultural
    reasons. Donors may have different development priorities or policies that
    may not allow them to work on the same types of programs in some cases. U.
    S. government officials have also cited bureaucratic incompatibilities

    between the agencies that effectively limited the ability of the agencies
    to work closely together on certain projects. In one country we visited,
    the working relationship between USAID and a multilateral development bank
    has been difficult, according to a USAID mission official with whom we
    spoke. Overcoming some of these obstacles to closer cooperation may
    require a high- level commitment and impetus from the senior management of
    these organizations.

    Limited Evaluation and U. S. agencies and their implementing contractors
    and grantees have not

    Sharing of Lessons extensively compiled and shared information on program
    results. Many U. S. assistance programs have not been evaluated, and
    important

    Learned among democracy project information, such as materials, final
    reports, and

    Program Implementers evaluations, are not systematically made available to
    the large body of

    project implementers. Inconsistent Program

    The U. S. agencies implementing democracy assistance programs have not
    Evaluation by U. S. Agencies

    consistently evaluated the results of their activities. Our review of
    project documentation and our discussions with senior U. S. government
    officials at the State and Justice Departments and USAID indicate that
    limited efforts have been made to review project results over time to
    ensure that impact and sustainability have been achieved. In particular,
    officials from the State and Justice Departments stated that those
    agencies have conducted very little formal evaluation of law enforcement
    assistance. Although USAID has a more extensive process for assessing its
    activities, its efforts to evaluate democracy assistance have not been
    consistent. Although governance programs in Latin America, in particular
    legislative strengthening, have undergone considerable evaluation, we
    found relatively little formal evaluation of rule of law, human rights,
    and elections assistance. The level of evaluation has varied
    geographically as well: While USAID sponsored a comprehensive democracy
    evaluation for Bolivia, it has not conducted similar studies for the other
    countries we visited. In 2002, USAID commissioned a private contractor to
    complete a broad study of the agency*s achievements in its rule of law
    programs around the world, including in many of the countries we visited.
    This recently completed study provides information on the nature and
    history of USAID rule of law

    programs in individual countries but was not meant to be an evaluation of
    these programs, according to a USAID official.

    Furthermore, the agencies have not consistently used available survey data
    to help evaluate the impact of their activities. In several of the
    countries we visited, a USAID contractor had been conducting regular
    *democratic values surveys* to gauge public opinion about recent and
    ongoing political and government reforms, many of which the United States
    has assisted. The mission in Bolivia has used the results of this survey
    as a source of data

    for monitoring, among other things, the impact of Bolivia*s
    decentralization activities; however, the other missions or embassies we
    visited did not consistently use these data as a tool for evaluating or
    monitoring the impact of U. S. assistance.

    Without systematic evaluations identifying lessons learned and best
    practices, agencies will have difficulty making informed decisions about a
    strategy to maximize impact and sustainability and planning for future
    efforts. For example, USAID and the State and Justice Departments are
    currently debating the U. S. government*s strategy for police assistance.
    Each agency has participated in police development programs, and officials
    from each agency stated that they are uniquely qualified to manage such
    programs in the future. Yet, none of these agencies has conducted a
    comprehensive evaluation of police assistance program results to inform

    the debate about how best to provide this assistance. Evaluations or other
    efforts to systematically compile lessons learned across countries could
    enable a more objective comparison of agency performance to identify the
    advantages of one approach over another and to inform a long- term
    interagency strategy for achieving various democracy assistance goals.

    Project Materials and USAID has not taken steps to pool the resources
    produced by U. S.- funded

    Information on Results Are democracy program implementers, including
    international development

    Not Widely Available firms, private voluntary organizations, and other
    nongovernmental

    organizations to help them achieve common and related goals more
    effectively and efficiently. USAID- funded contractors often used similar
    approaches to achieve democratic strengthening and reform in many of the
    countries we visited. For example, support for local governments often
    aimed to influence the broad policy framework in a country while directly

    assisting a relatively small number of target municipalities. However, we
    found little evidence that the project implementers in these countries had
    shared with each other the materials they had developed. For example, in
    several countries, USAID financed the printing of operational guidance for
    municipal officials, ranging from handbooks on countrywide criteria for
    governance to detailed, step- by- step manuals on ways to improve local
    public administration. The contractors and USAID officials stated that to

    their knowledge, these handbooks had not been systematically shared among
    USAID missions or contractors. Although mission officials and implementers
    told us they frequently shared information on an informal basis, the
    agency*s attempts to systematically compile information about democracy
    program implementation and results

    to establish an agency wide *institutional knowledge base* are incomplete.
    USAID has a very decentralized organizational structure, and, according to
    USAID officials, the agency has no central repository of implementation
    reports and other program documents that can be accessed by the various

    democracy program implementers to determine, among other things, which
    activities have been more successful than others. Although USAID maintains
    some documentation from its democracy programs, such as scopes of work for
    projects, at its intranet site, the agency does not compile

    contractors* technical manuals and final reports with information on
    implementation and results. Such information could be very instrumental in
    identifying approaches that are most appropriate for replication, while
    avoiding developing similar materials in different countries at additional
    expense. As we have previously reported, use of lessons learned is a
    principal component of an organizational culture committed to continuous
    improvement. Lessons learned mechanisms serve to communicate acquired
    knowledge more effectively and to ensure that beneficial information is
    factored into planning, work processes, and activities. Lessons learned
    provide a powerful method of sharing good ideas for improving work
    processes, program design and implementation, and costeffectiveness. 4
    USAID mission directors and other agency officials stated

    that future assistance efforts would be more effective if they were
    designed on the basis of concrete information and lessons learned from
    similar programs in other countries.

    Conclusions Local resources for sustaining democracy programs are
    difficult to mobilize given the serious economic problems in the countries
    we visited,

    and funding shortages were often cited by program implementers and
    beneficiaries as major obstacles to long- term program success. Therefore,
    it is crucial that the U. S. government and other international donors

    manage available international resources as efficiently as possible.
    Achieving greater impact and responsibility in democracy assistance

    4 U. S. General Accounting Office, NASA: Better Mechanisms Needed for
    Sharing Lessons Learned, GAO- 02- 195 (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 30, 2002).

    projects may be more likely with a more strategic approach, including
    closer coordination, and greater information sharing among U. S. agencies,
    international donors, and other program implementers. Recommendations for

    To ensure that U. S. assistance activities designed to support and
    strengthen Executive Action

    democracies in Latin America have the maximum impact and sustainability,
    we recommend that the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the
    Administrator of USAID  develop more comprehensive interagency strategic
    plans at the regional

    and country level for democracy assistance addressing how U. S. agencies
    will cooperate with each other and other major donors to achieve greater
    impact and sustainability in democracy programs;

     establish a strategy for periodically evaluating democracy assistance
    projects that is consistent across agencies, countries, and types of
    programs; and  establish a systematic mechanism to share information on
    development

    approaches, methods, materials, and results from all democracy assistance
    projects among U. S. agencies and implementers.

    Agency Comments and We provided a draft of this report to the Departments
    of State and Justice,

    Our Evaluation the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and
    the InterAmerican

    Foundation for their comment. The Inter- American Foundation did not
    comment on this report. The comments of the State and Justice Departments
    and USAID, along with our responses to specific points, are reprinted in
    appendixes II, III, and IV, respectively.

    In general, the State and Justice Departments and USAID acknowledged that
    democracy assistance is a long- term challenge that requires host country
    commitment and support for reforms, and that U. S.- supported institutions
    and programs must ultimately be sustainable, as we discuss in this report.
    Overall, the agencies basically agreed with the thrust of our
    recommendations regarding how the management of program assistance could
    be improved. They also noted that in some cases, activities are either
    planned or under way that would address our recommendations.

    The State Department concurred with our recommendation that it work with
    other agencies to develop comprehensive strategic plans for democracy
    assistance at the regional and country levels. State agreed with our
    recommendation that democracy assistance programs should be evaluated but
    said that our recommendation was a *broad brush* approach that is not
    appropriate for the diversity of activities covered in the report. State
    said that it is taking steps with USAID and the Justice Department to

    improve evaluation, including recently agreeing to undertake joint
    evaluations of justice programs. Such actions appear to meet the intent of
    our recommendation. However, our recommendation is intended to establish a
    basis for periodic overall assessments of democracy programs as well as
    regular evaluations of specific components of democracy assistance, such
    as rule of law, governance, and elections.

    While the State Department agreed that it would be desirable to have
    better access to project information across the board, they noted that the
    recommendation goes too far in suggesting the need for a centralized
    record system containing all project materials. State also said that much
    useful information is currently shared among programs on an informal

    basis. Our recommendation is designed to address an important problem we
    identified in this report, namely that much information is currently not
    being shared among agencies or programs with similar goals, approaches,
    and methods. The thinking behind this recommendation is the State
    Department and other agencies that fund and implement democracy assistance
    programs should maintain key program documents and evaluations along with
    examples of materials used for core activities (e. g., training manuals so
    that groups implementing similar programs can benefit from lessons
    learned). Given the advances in Web- based technology as a way of sharing
    information, we believe this recommendation is not unreasonable. The State
    Department also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in
    this report, where appropriate.

    The Justice Department endorsed our recommendation for better coordination
    and planning among State, USAID, and Justice; agreed that objective,
    regularized evaluation of assistance programs is needed to consistently
    obtain useful information on program outcomes; and supported the
    recommendation that agencies involved in democracy assistance should
    establish effective information- sharing mechanisms. The Justice
    Department also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in
    this report, where appropriate.

    USAID also agreed with our recommendations. Regarding our recommendation
    on strategic planning, USAID said that it participates in a number of
    planning activities but that such planning systems can always be upgraded.
    It also agreed that periodic evaluations of program outcomes and results
    are important, noting that evaluating democracy programs is a challenge
    made difficult by the complexities and subtleties of local political
    situations that influence democracy program implementation and outcomes.
    USAID also agreed with our recommendation that agencies need to do a
    better job of sharing information on development methods, approaches, and
    materials, noting that a new bureau within the agency should respond to
    these concerns. USAID also provided technical comments, which we have
    incorporated throughout this report, where appropriate.

    The State and Justice Departments both commented on our discussion of a
    provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that restricts the use of
    foreign assistance funds for training and financial support for police and
    other law enforcement forces of foreign governments (section 660). In its

    comments, State said that the Executive Branch should develop and propose
    to the Congress new legislation on law enforcement assistance, stating
    that the Executive Branch needs a clear statement of its authority to
    provide law enforcement assistance abroad, coupled with whatever specific
    prohibitions the Congress may wish to consider. The Justice Department
    stated that it is concerned that section 660 may in some instances
    adversely impact long- range planning and the development of broad- based,
    practical police assistance programs. The Justice Department

    also indicated that it will work with the State Department and USAID to
    consider whether changes to section 660 would be appropriate. We believe
    the approach suggested by the State and Justice Departments could be an
    important and useful step in providing options for the Congress to
    consider regarding potential amendments to section 660.

    Appendi xes U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin

    Appendi x I

    American Countries During fiscal years 1992 through 2002, the United
    States has provided democracy assistance to Bolivia, Colombia, El
    Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru. The U. S. Agency for
    International Development (USAID) and the Departments of State and Justice
    have provided the bulk of this assistance in the areas of rule of law,
    governance, human rights, and elections. Rule of law assistance has
    supported the modernization of the criminal justice system and increased
    the access of the local population to justice. Governance assistance has
    funded efforts to strengthen legislatures and national and local
    governments and to enact and implement anticorruption measures. Human
    rights assistance has supported activities to improve public awareness of
    and government accountability for human rights abuses. Election assistance
    has helped enhance electoral institutions, increase voter registration and
    education, and support electoral observation.

    Bolivia USAID rule of law assistance to Bolivia began in earnest in 1991
    when USAID sponsored a United Nations diagnostic study of Bolivia*s
    judicial

    system to determine priorities and build consensus for reform. Since then
    USAID has been closely involved in a fundamental revamping of Bolivia*s
    criminal justice system. USAID supported a number of justice sector

    reforms, including drafting and promoting laws establishing new justice
    sector institutions. These institutions included the Constitutional
    Tribunal, the Judicial Council, the Ombudsman, and the Office of Public
    Defense. In 1993, USAID initiated the Bolivian Administration of Justice
    Program, focusing primarily on the drafting and passage of a new Criminal
    Procedures Code. This code, which introduced an oral, accusatory trial
    system to increase the efficiency, transparency, and fairness of the
    criminal justice system, was enacted in 1999 and went into effect in 2001.
    Since its enactment, USAID rule of law assistance has primarily focused on
    providing training and technical assistance to institutions concerning
    implementation of the code and also on disseminating public education
    about the new code. During the late 1990s, USAID and the Justice

    Department also assisted the Bolivian National Police and the Attorney
    General*s Office (Fiscalia) to enhance investigative capabilities. The
    departments did this primarily through supplementing training and
    forensics equipment and technology to manage and track criminal cases
    electronically. From 1992 to 2002, USAID provided $18.5 million and the
    Justice Department administered $9.9 million in rule of law assistance to
    Bolivia.

    U. S. governance assistance to Bolivia started in 1992, when USAID
    provided funds to establish and strengthen the congressional research
    center and budget office. After the 1997 elections, the institutions that
    USAID had supported in the legislature lost credibility as neutral
    entities and became less effective, according to a USAID- sponsored
    evaluation. In 2001, USAID began a new program aimed at strengthening the
    representative function of the Bolivian Congress by helping deputies from
    single- member districts, who are elected directly by citizens in a given
    district, increase their outreach to their constituencies. USAID*s local
    governance program in Bolivia began in 1996, soon after the passage of the
    Popular Participation Law. This law divided Bolivia into self- governing
    municipalities with popularly elected local leaders for the first time in
    the country*s history. The program has aimed to make local governments
    more responsive to citizen needs and demands and to strengthen
    municipalities* administrative and financial capacities. The program*s
    methods are now being implemented in about 175 municipalities. USAID also
    is using Webbased technology to expand its local governance program. USAID
    provided at least $14.6 million on governance assistance to Bolivia
    between 1992 and 2002.

    USAID began providing electoral support to Bolivia in 1988, primarily to
    institutionalize a politically neutral National Electoral Court. Between
    1991 and 1999, USAID provided Bolivia with $2.4 million in election
    assistance to

    increase voter registration and education and ensure that the elections
    held during this period were free and fair.

    Colombia USAID*s rule of law assistance to Colombia began in 1986,
    primarily focusing on restructuring and improving Colombia*s justice
    sector and

    providing protection for judicial figures and institutions. This program
    culminated in the enactment of a new constitution in 1991, which created
    new justice sector institutions (e. g., the Judicial Council,
    Constitutional Court, and Prosecutor*s Office) and procedures, including
    oral trials. USAID assistance from 1991 to 1995 focused on implementing
    the reforms, including support for the development of these new
    institutions. In 1995,

    the program expanded to support improved access to justice, including the
    creation of justice houses to provide legal services in poor and
    marginalized communities. USAID has continued to support the transition to
    a more transparent accusatorial system, primarily through training

    judges, prosecutors, and public defenders. The Justice Department has
    provided an array of training for prosecutors and law enforcement
    officials, focusing mainly on specialized criminal investigations units,
    human rights,

    counternarcotics, money laundering, and other specific types of crimes.
    Between 1992 and 2002, USAID provided $48.3 million and the Justice
    Department administered $37.9 million in rule of law assistance to
    Colombia.

    The U. S. governance assistance program in Colombia, which began in 2001,
    has aimed to strengthen municipal governments, increase citizen
    participation, and combat corruption. Local officials and citizens have
    played a central role in planning and overseeing social infrastructure
    projects cofinanced by USAID, such as the construction of schools and
    sewage systems. USAID*s anticorruption program in Colombia, also initiated
    in 2001, has focused on improving internal control systems, strengthening
    citizen participation, and training local officials on oversight

    and transparency. USAID reports that it has provided at least $54.6
    million for these programs.

    USAID human rights assistance in Colombia began with technical and
    financial support for the Human Rights Ombudsman Office, which was created
    by the new constitution in 1991. The Justice Department began training
    special human rights units within the Attorney General*s Office in 1996.
    Assistance for both of these projects is ongoing. USAID funded the
    majority of its human rights assistance projects after 2000, including the
    development of an Early Warning System to alert authorities of potential
    human rights violations, a protection program for threatened individuals,
    training for community human rights promoters, and post emergency

    assistance to people who have been internally displaced by the nearly 40-
    year- old internal conflict. In addition, USAID has supported efforts to
    foster reconciliation and provide assistance to victims and excluded
    groups.

    USAID provided $325,000 in election assistance to Colombia in 2002. This
    assistance focused on supporting a mission of the Organization of American
    States to observe the 2002 national elections, which were declared to be
    generally free and fair.

    El Salvador USAID*s rule of law assistance to El Salvador started in 1984
    with a focus on enhancing criminal investigative capabilities and
    modernizing the

    justice system. Following the 1992 Peace Accords, USAID supported efforts
    to restructure the justice sector, reduce criminal case backlogs, and
    draft new criminal codes. El Salvador began implementing the new codes in
    1998, and USAID and the Justice Department have supported these
    implementation efforts. USAID has focused on training judges,

    prosecutors, and public defenders to help them transition to an oral,
    adversarial system. The Justice Department has focused on building and
    strengthening a new police force* particularly, its criminal
    investigations capabilities. Most recently, the department has supported a
    new policing model characterized by active community- oriented patrols.
    From 1992 to 2002, USAID provided $27.8 million and the Justice Department
    administered $38.2 million to support these efforts. USAID*s governance
    assistance to El Salvador began in 1990, when it set up

    a legislative assistance program to help develop a master plan for
    legislative modernization, establish a mentoring program for which
    students complete studies of interest to legislators, and open three
    legislative outreach offices outside the capital. These projects are still
    ongoing. In 1993, USAID initiated its local governance program in El
    Salvador, which helped to strengthen municipal management and increase
    citizen participation in 28 target municipalities and assisted national-
    level organizations that support municipalities. Together with other
    donors, USAID helped create a manual on basic criteria for participatory
    municipal development that is now available to municipalities across the
    country. USAID anticorruption assistance in El Salvador, which began in
    2000, has focused on institutional strengthening, anticorruption reforms,
    public awareness, and municipal- level anticorruption activities. USAID
    has provided at least $23 million for these programs.

    Since 1991, USAID has provided about $13 million to support four national
    elections in El Salvador. After the Peace Accords were signed in 1992, the
    agency supported reintegrating former guerrilla groups into the political
    system. Elections assistance in the 1990s also helped create a new,
    impartial electoral authority and supported the establishment of a new

    civil/ voter registry. Because El Salvador has significantly improved
    election administration and voter access and had run free and fair
    elections during the 1990s, USAID does not intend to provide additional
    election support to this country after the 2003 elections.

    Guatemala USAID rule of law assistance to Guatemala started in 1986, with
    an early focus on training judges, prosecutors, and public defenders and
    promoting legal reforms. USAID supported the enactment and implementation
    of criminal code reforms in the mid- 1990s to improve the functioning of
    the criminal justice system. Following the enactment of a new criminal
    procedures code in 1994, USAID*s assistance focused on preparing justice
    sector officials to carry out new roles and responsibilities under the
    code

    for conducting investigations and holding oral trials. Following the
    signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, this assistance expanded to building
    the capabilities of justice institutions in the capital and supporting
    justice centers in other cities to improve the delivery of justice
    services. These justice centers integrate various justice institutions,
    modernize case tracking and administration, and increase access to
    justice. The State and Justice Departments have also provided assistance
    to law enforcement

    institutions, focused mainly on improving criminal investigations under
    the new codes. From 1992 to 2002, USAID has provided $23.8 million and the
    Justice Department has administered $13.6 million in rule of law
    assistance to Guatemala. USAID*s governance- related assistance to
    Guatemala began with a legislative strengthening program in 1997. The
    program focused on

    improving the legislature*s research and analytical capabilities and
    strengthening constituent outreach. Although USAID*s legislative
    assistance had some initial positive results, the agency ended its support
    after the 1999 elections when it became clear that the new congressional
    leadership was not willing to support the program. USAID*s local
    governance program in Guatemala, which began in 1998, has helped increase
    participatory planning and community outreach in about 40

    municipalities. USAID has also provided support and advice to the
    government of Guatemala on national- level policy affecting municipal
    indebtedness, reforms to the municipal law, and the municipal tax code.
    USAID has provided more than $9.4 million for these programs.

    In the early 1990s, USAID provided training and program development
    support to the Human Rights Ombudsman Office. Recent USAID human rights
    projects in Guatemala have focused on supporting national reconciliation
    efforts. Since 2000, USAID has supported the exhumation of clandestine
    cemeteries to identify victims of human rights atrocities during the 1962
    to 1996 civil war and to help family members achieve a measure of closure.
    USAID began the Human Rights and Reconciliation Program in 2001 to
    coordinate human rights groups; mobilize citizens to defend their rights;
    and disseminate information about the civil war for remembrance purposes,
    among other activities.

    USAID has provided $3.2 million in election assistance to Guatemala since
    1990. This assistance has focused on improving voter registration and
    education and promoting electoral reforms. In 1995, USAID focused on
    broadening electoral participation throughout the country, especially in
    rural and indigenous areas. In 1999, USAID supported increased

    participation in two electoral events* the constitutional reform
    referendum and the general elections. USAID is currently providing a small
    amount of assistance to support electoral reform efforts, with limited
    success.

    Nicaragua USAID and the State and Justice Departments have provided most
    of the rule of law assistance to Nicaragua since the 1990s. This
    assistance has

    focused on supporting the modernization of the criminal justice system. It
    has supported the enactment of criminal codes and helped prepare Nicaragua
    for the implementation of these codes starting in December 2002 by
    supporting the creation and strengthening of justice institutions,
    including the courts, Public Prosecutor*s Office, and Public Defender*s

    Office, and by building the capabilities and various law enforcement
    organizations for conducting criminal investigations. From 1992 to 2002,
    USAID has provided $11.3 million and the Justice Department has
    administered $1.7 million to support these efforts.

    USAID has provided the bulk of U. S. governance assistance to Nicaragua
    since 1991. This assistance has focused on strengthening the legislature
    and local governments and supporting anticorruption efforts. USAID*s
    legislative strengthening program, which lasted from 1991 to 2001, focused
    on strengthening infrastructure, improving planning and administration,
    and increasing outreach to constituents. Although there was initial
    progress, USAID ended its support in 2001 in part because of a lack of
    political will in the legislature to cofinance USAID programs. The local
    governance program organized by USAID worked in 25 municipalities to
    strengthen municipal administration and increase citizen participation in
    municipal affairs. USAID also helped establish and strengthen the national
    association of municipalities, which is now self- sustaining. This program
    ended in 2001, and USAID has indicated that it will consider once again
    focus on strengthening local governance as part of its new 5- year
    strategy. USAID*s anticorruption program in Nicaragua, which ran from 1998
    to 2001, aimed to make institutions more accountable and transparent and
    to increase public awareness of corruption. USAID provided about $6
    million for these programs.

    USAID has provided about $27 million in election assistance to Nicaragua
    since 1990. This assistance has focused on improving the institutional
    capacity of Nicaragua*s electoral authority, improving voter registration
    and education, and legitimizing election results by supporting domestic
    and

    international electoral observation groups. Although this assistance has

    helped Nicaragua run three national elections that were determined to be
    free and fair since 1990, that country still faces major election
    administration and voter access problems. Nicaragua is likely to require
    additional international support before holding its next national
    election.

    Peru USAID rule of law assistance to Peru began in 1986 working with key
    public sector institutions on justice sector reform. Due to the actions of

    President Alberto Fujimori to weaken the independence and accountability
    of the justice sector, USAID discontinued direct assistance to most public
    institutions in the sector in 1994. Funding was diverted from rule of law
    to human rights and civil society activities, with the exception of a
    small amount of funding for free legal and conciliation services. In 2002,
    USAID initiated a new rule of law program centered on building support and
    consensus for justice sector reforms through civil society coalitions. The

    Justice Department has sponsored some small- scale training efforts in the
    1990s but has no ongoing assistance effort. From 1992 through 2002, USAID
    provided $13.2 million and the Justice Department administered $27,000 to
    support these efforts.

    USAID has provided the bulk of U. S. governance assistance to Peru. From
    2001 to 2003, USAID*s Office of Transition Initiatives focused on
    providing small- scale, governance- related grants in the areas of
    legislative strengthening, decentralization, anticorruption, and civil-
    military relations. The office estimates that it will spend $11 million by
    the time the program ends. In mid- 2002, USAID began providing legislative
    strengthening assistance to enable a civil society coalition to conduct
    citizen outreach on legislative issues, and in fall 2002, USAID began a 4-
    year project to increase

    congressional transparency, outreach, and oversight. In the area of local
    governance, USAID has been providing policy advice to the government for a
    nationwide decentralization program scheduled to begin in 2003. USAID also
    has begun to provide support to a civil society coalition to share
    decentralization- related information with civil society, promote citizen
    participation in governance, communicate citizens* opinions to the
    government, and promote oversight of regional and local authorities. In
    2003, USAID plans to fund an $18 million, 5- year *Pro- Decentralization*
    project to strengthen municipal government and increase citizen
    participation.

    From 1992 to 1996, USAID helped the Peruvian Attorney General*s Office
    establish 12 detainee registry centers to document the location and legal
    status of all people detained by the authorities on charges of terrorism.
    Using the registry, people have been able to find information on their
    missing loved ones. Also, since 1997, USAID has supported the activities
    of a Peruvian nongovernmental organization in its investigations and
    attempts to release prisoners being held on illegitimate terrorism
    charges. USAID also has supported the operation of the Truth Commission,
    which the President of Peru created in 2000 with a mandate to investigate
    allegations of human rights violations during 1980 to 2000. Finally, USAID
    has provided continuous technical and financial support to the Human
    Rights Ombudsman since its inception in 1994.

    USAID has provided over $20 million in election assistance to Peru for
    supporting national and local elections in 1995, 1998, 2000, 2001, and
    2002. This assistance included technical assistance to the electoral
    institutions and support for voter education and international
    observations of the elections. Because this assistance, following the
    departure of President Fujimori, helped the electoral authorities run free
    and fair elections in 2001 and 2002, USAID does not plan to provide
    additional election support to Peru.

    Appendi x II

    Comments from the Department of State Note: GAO comments supplementing
    those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

    See comment 1.

    The following is GAO*s comment on the Department of State*s letter dated
    March 5, 2003.

    GAO Comment 1. We disagree with the statement that we implied that
    independent evaluations have not been done on ICITAP programs. On page 83
    of our

    report, we stated that the Departments of State and Justice have done very
    little formal evaluation of law enforcement assistance. We modified the
    text on page 84 to indicate that none of the agencies

    involved in the debate about how to best provide police assistance have
    done a comprehensive evaluation of police assistance program results. Such
    an evaluation could inform this debate.

    Appendi x III Comments from the Department of Justice

    Comments from the U. S. Agency for

    Appendi x IV

    International Development Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the
    report text appear at the end of this appendix.

    See comment 1. Now on pp. 7 and 29- 30.

    See comment 2. Now on p. 9.

    See comment 3. See comment 4. Now on pp. 29- 30.

    See comment 5. Now on p. 36.

    Now on pp. 48 and 50. See comment 6.

    See comment 7. Now on p. 83.

    The following are GAO*s comments on the U. S. Agency for International
    Development*s letter dated March 5, 2003.

    GAO Comments 1. We disagree and believe that despite some success, much
    work still remains at the national and local levels to implement
    Guatemala*s

    criminal procedures code. We modified the text on pages 29 and 30 to add
    additional information on the challenges faced by Guatemala in fully
    implementing criminal justice reforms.

    2. We revised the text on page 9 to indicate that programs in Guatemala
    and Nicaragua have had less success in disseminating programs outside of
    target municipalities.

    3. On the basis of additional information provided, we removed this
    reference from the text. However, it should be noted that the draft
    referred to USAID*s support for conciliation and legal aid centers and did
    not in any way suggest or infer that USAID should have supported Fujimori-
    era justice institutions. As stated in the draft report on page 64 and on
    page 95 in this report, we noted that USAID discontinued direct assistance
    to Peru*s public sector institutions in 1994.

    4. The 1998 article in the Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the
    Americas was written by a USAID employee who was the justice program
    manager in Guatemala. In our view, this does not constitute an independent
    program evaluation. Also, see comment 1.

    5. We modified the text on page 36. 6. On the basis of additional
    information provided, we removed this

    reference from the text. 7. As noted in this report, limited efforts have
    been made to review

    project results over time to ensure that impact and sustainability of
    results has been achieved. We stated that although USAID has a more
    extensive process for assessing its activities, its efforts to evaluate
    democracy assistance have not been consistent, and we found relatively
    little formal evaluation of rule of law, human rights, and elections
    assistance. As discussed in the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation Section
    of this report, our recommendation regarding evaluation is intended to
    establish the basis for periodic overall assessments of democracy programs
    as well as regular evaluations of

    specific components of democracy assistance. Systematic evaluations that
    identify lessons learned and best practices are crucial in facilitating
    congressional oversight of democracy programs and providing the basis for
    informed decisions about how to maximize program impact and plan future
    efforts.

    Quality of Life and Economic Indicators for

    Appendi x V

    Selected Countries U. S. democracy programs are designed to help address
    serious social, political, and economic problems many of these countries
    face. Over the years, the World Bank, United Nations, and other
    organizations have devised indicators to attempt to measure the general
    quality of life within a country. This appendix provides a statistical
    overview of selected social and economic indicators for the six countries
    we visited and comparative data for Latin America and the United States
    (see table 8).

    A few of the social indicators illustrate the challenges some of these
    countries face. In Bolivia, for example, the infant mortality rate in 2000
    was still over 57 deaths per 1,000 births. Even in Colombia, which has the
    lowest rate among the six countries we reviewed, the infant mortality rate
    was 275 percent of that in the United States. In addition, life expectancy
    at birth in 2000 was 14. 5 years less in Bolivia than it was in the United
    States. Furthermore, although adult illiteracy decreased in all six
    countries

    between 1990 and 2000, about one- third of Guatemala and Nicaragua*s adult
    population still cannot read.

    In terms of economic and political impediments to democracy, the gross
    national income average for the six countries we reviewed fell from 61
    percent of the Latin American average in 1990 to 55 percent in 2000. While
    the gross national income for five of the six countries increased slightly
    over the decade, Colombia*s decreased. In terms of general government
    expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), all six
    countries spend less than 20 percent of their GDP, with the Guatemalan
    government spending the least, just under 7 percent. Finally, foreign
    domestic investment as a percentage of gross capital formation varies
    considerably among the six countries. In the 1990 through 2000 period, it
    has increased as high as 44. 2 percentage points in Bolivia and as little
    as 2.6 in Guatemala.

    Table 8: Quality of Life and Economic Indicators for Selected Countries
    Six-

    Latin country American United Indicator Year Bolivia Colombia El Salvador
    Guatemala Nicaragua Peru average

    average States

    Gross 1990 $1, 740 $6,820 $2, 920 $2,770 $1,680 $3, 150 $3, 180 $5, 190
    $23, 440 national income per capita (purchasing

    1995 $2, 140 $6,050 $4, 040 $3,400 $1,780 $4, 290 $3, 617 $6, 240 $28, 260
    power parity in current international dollars)

    2000 $2, 360 $6,060 $4, 410 $3,770 $2,080 $4, 660 $3, 890 $7, 080 $34, 100
    Human 1990

    0.597 0.724

    0.644 0.579

    0.592 0.704

    0.640 0.823 a

    0.914 Development Index b

    1995 0.630

    0.750 0.682

    0.609 0.615

    0.730 0.669

    0.925 2000

    0.653 0.772

    0.706 0.631

    0.635 0.747

    0.691 0.767

    0.939 Infant

    1990 80.0

    30. 4 45. 6

    56. 2 51. 0

    54. 0 52.9

    41. 3 9.4 mortality (per 1,000 births)

    1995 67.0

    24. 4 35. 0

    45. 6 39. 5

    43. 0 42.4

    34. 1 7.5 2000

    57.2 19. 5

    29. 1 38. 8

    33. 0 31. 8

    34.9 29. 0

    7.1 Adult

    1990 21.8% 11. 5% 27. 5% 38. 9% 37.2%

    14. 5% 25. 2%

    15. 2% illiteracy (percentage

    1995 17.8% 9.8%

    24. 0% 34. 9% 35.3% 12. 1%

    22. 3% 13. 3% of people age 15 and

    2000 14. 5% 8.3% 21.3% 31. 4%

    33. 5% 10.1% 19. 9%

    11.6% above) Life 1990

    58.3 68. 3

    65. 6 61. 4

    64. 5 65. 8

    64.0 67. 9

    75.2 expectancy at birth

    1995 60.6

    69. 8 68. 5

    63. 6 67. 3

    67. 8 66.3

    69. 2 75.6 (years)

    2000 62.6

    71. 6 70. 1

    65. 2 68. 9

    69. 3 68.0

    70. 4 77.1 Percentage

    1990 41.2% 36. 0% 40. 8% 46. 0% 46.4%

    38. 3% 41. 5%

    36. 0% 21.9% of population under age 15 1995 40.6% 34. 4% 37. 4% 45. 1%
    45.0%

    35. 9% 39. 7%

    33. 8% 22.2% 2000 39. 6% 32. 8% 35.6% 43. 6% 42. 7% 33.4%

    38. 0% 31.5% 21. 7%

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Six- Latin country American

    United Indicator Year Bolivia Colombia El Salvador Guatemala Nicaragua
    Peru average

    average States

    General 1990

    11.8% 9.4% 9.9% 6.6%

    43.5% 7.9% 14. 9%

    13. 3% 17.0% government expenditures

    1995 13.6% 14. 9%

    8.6% 5.4% 15.7%

    9.8% 11. 3% 15. 5%

    15.3% as a percentage

    2000 15. 7% 19. 0% 10. 2% 6.6% 18. 9% 11.2%

    13. 6% 15.3% of Gross Domestic Product

    Net Foreign 1990

    4.4% 6.7% 0.3% 4.6%

    0% 0.9% 2.8%

    3.8% 4.8% Direct Investment

    1995 38.5% 4.0%

    2.0% 3.4% 16.4%

    15. 4% 13. 3%

    8.5% 4.3% as a percentage

    2000 48. 6% 23. 9% 8.2% 7.2% 30. 8% 6.3%

    20. 8% 19.1% of Gross Capital Formation

    Top three 2002 soybeans,

    petroleum, offshore

    coffee, coffee,

    fish and n/ a n/ a n/ a exports c natural

    coffee, coal assembly sugar, shrimp and

    fish gas, zinc

    exports, bananas lobster, products, coffee, sugar

    cotton gold, copper

    Economic 1998

    2.60 3.00

    2.40 2.70

    3.50 2.85

    2.80 2.98

    1.80 Freedom Index d

    2003 2.65

    3.00 2.25

    2.80 3.00

    2.80 2.80

    2.94 1.85 Sources: World Bank, United Nations, CIA World Factbook, and The
    Heritage Foundation.

    Note: Economic and social data are from the World Bank, World Development
    Indicators 2002 CDROM. a 1992 figure. b The Human Development Index is
    produced by the United Nations and is compiled from several demographic
    and economic statistics; it ranges in value from Norway (. 939) to Sierra
    Leone (. 258). A higher Human Development Index score means a country with
    more advanced degree of human development. c The listing of the top three
    exports for each country comes from the CIA World Factbook. The listing

    provides a rank ordering of exported products starting with the most
    important; it sometimes includes the percentage of total dollar value. d
    These figures come from The Heritage Foundation, which works in
    conjunction with The Wall Street

    Journal to produce the Index of Economic Freedom. To measure economic
    freedom and rate each country, the authors of the index study 50
    independent economic variables. These variables (1) fall into 10 broad
    categories, or factors, of economic freedom and (2) include, trade policy,
    fiscal burden of government, government intervention in the economy,
    monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and
    finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and black market
    activity. Each country receives its overall economic freedom score on the
    basis of the average of the 10 individual factor scores. Each factor is
    scored according to a grading scale that is unique for that factor.

    The scales run from 1 to 5: A score of 1 signifies an institutional or
    consistent set of policies that are most conducive to economic freedom,
    while a score of 5 signifies a set of policies that are least conducive.

    Freedom House Scores for Individual

    Appendi x VI

    Countries, Fiscal Years 1992 through 2002 Figures 20 to 25 show the change
    in the political rights and civil liberties in the six countries examined
    in this report (Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and
    Peru), according to Freedom House, a U. S. research organization that
    tracks political developments around the world.

    Note that the trend in these two categories is in a generally positive
    direction for all of the countries except Colombia.

    Figure 20: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Bolivia, Fiscal Years 1992
    through 2002

    Bolivia More

    free 1

    Political rights

    2 3 4 5

    Civil liberties

    6 Less

    7 free

    1992 1993

    1994 1995

    1996 1997

    1998 1999

    2000 2001

    2002 Fiscal year

    Source: Freedom House.

    Figure 21: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Colombia, Fiscal Years 1992
    through 2002

    Figure 22: Freedom House Democracy Scores for El Salvador, Fiscal Years
    1992 through 2002

    Figure 23: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Guatemala, Fiscal Years 1992
    through 2002

    Figure 24: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Nicaragua, Fiscal Years 1992
    through 2002

    Figure 25: Freedom House Democracy Scores for Peru, Fiscal Years 1992
    through 2002

    Appendi x VII

    GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Phillip Herr (202) 512-
    8509 Staff

    In addition to the persons listed above, Jeremy Latimer, James Michels,
    Acknowledgments

    Juan Tapia- Videla, Rhonda Horried, Eve Weisberg, Judith Williams, and
    Lynn Cothern made key contributions to this report.

    Related GAO Products Latin America and the

    Foreign Assistance: Peru on Track for Free and Fair Elections but Faces
    Caribbean

    Major Challenges. GAO- 01- 496T. Washington, D. C.: March 14, 2001.

    Foreign Assistance: Any Further Aid to Haitian Justice System Should be
    Linked to Performance- Related Conditions. GAO- 01- 24. Washington, D. C.:
    October 17, 2000.

    Foreign Assistance: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance to Five Latin American
    Countries. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 195. Washington, D. C.: August 4, 1999.

    Aid to El Salvador: Slow Progress in Developing a National Civilian
    Police. GAO/ NSIAD- 92- 338. Washington, D. C.: September 22, 1992.

    Foreign Assistance: Promising Approach to Judicial Reform in Colombia.
    GAO/ NSIAD- 92- 269. Washington, D. C.: September 24, 1992.

    Central America: Assistance to Promote Democracy and National
    Reconciliation in Nicaragua. NSIAD- 90- 245. Washington, D. C.: September
    24, 1990.

    Foreign Aid: Efforts to Improve the Judicial System in El Salvador. NSIAD-
    90- 81. Washington, D. C.: May 29, 1990. Former Soviet Union Former Soviet
    Union: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited

    Impact and Sustainability. GAO- 01- 740T. Washington, D. C.: May 17, 2001.

    Former Soviet Union: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited Impact.
    GAO- 01- 354. Washington, D. C.: April 17, 2001.

    Foreign Assistance: International Efforts to Aid Russia*s Transition Have
    Had Mixed Results. GAO- 01- 08. Washington, D. C.: November 1, 2000.

    Foreign Assistance: Harvard Institute for International Development*s Work
    in Russia and Ukraine. GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 27. Washington, D. C.: November 27,
    1996.

    Promoting Democracy: Progress Report on U. S. Democratic Development
    Assistance to Russia. GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 40. Washington, D. C.: February 29,
    1996.

    Other Rule of Law Foreign Assistance: Status of Rule of Law Program
    Coordination.

    GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 8R. Washington, D. C.: October 13, 1999.

    Foreign Assistance: Rule of Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years 1993-
    1998. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 158. Washington, D. C.: June 30, 1999.

    Other Governance Cambodia: Governance Reform Progressing, But Key Efforts
    Are Lagging. GAO- 02- 569. Washington, D. C.: June 13, 2002.

    Other Elections/ Human

    Cambodia: Limited Progress on Free Elections, Human Rights, and Mine
    Rights

    Clearing. NSIAD- 96- 15BR. Washington, D. C.: February 29, 1996. U. S.
    Government Planning

    Results Act: An Evaluator*s Guide to Assessing Annual Performance

    and Coordination

    Plans. GAO/ GGD- 10. 1. 20. Washington, D. C.: April 1, 1998.

    NASA: Better Mechanisms Needed for Sharing Lessons Learned. GAO- 02- 195.
    Washington, D. C.: January 30, 2002.

    Other Foreign Affairs: Internally Displaced Persons Lack Effective
    Protection.

    GAO- 01- 803. Washington, D. C.: August 17, 2001.

    (320127)

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    a

    GAO United States General Accounting Office

    Page i GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Contents

    Contents

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    Contents

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    Contents

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    Contents

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    Contents Page vi GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

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    A

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    Chapter 1

    Chapter 1 Introduction

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    Chapter 1 Introduction

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    Chapter 1 Introduction

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    Chapter 1 Introduction

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    Chapter 1 Introduction

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    Chapter 1 Introduction

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    Chapter 1 Introduction

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    Chapter 1 Introduction

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    Chapter 1 Introduction

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    Chapter 1 Introduction

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    Chapter 2

    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 2 Rule of Law Assistance

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    Chapter 3

    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 3 Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and
    Anticorruption

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    Chapter 4

    Chapter 4 Human Rights

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    Chapter 4 Human Rights

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    Chapter 4 Human Rights

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    Chapter 4 Human Rights

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    Chapter 4 Human Rights

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    Chapter 4 Human Rights

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    Chapter 4 Human Rights

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    Chapter 4 Human Rights

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    Chapter 5

    Chapter 5 Elections

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    Chapter 5 Elections

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    Chapter 5 Elections

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    Chapter 5 Elections

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    Chapter 5 Elections

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    Page 79 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Chapter 6

    Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
    Democracy Assistance

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    Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
    Democracy Assistance

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    Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
    Democracy Assistance

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    Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
    Democracy Assistance

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    Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
    Democracy Assistance

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    Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
    Democracy Assistance

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    Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
    Democracy Assistance

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    Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
    Democracy Assistance

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    Chapter 6 Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U. S.
    Democracy Assistance

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    Page 89 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix I

    Appendix I U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries

    Page 90 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix I U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries

    Page 91 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix I U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries

    Page 92 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix I U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries

    Page 93 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix I U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries

    Page 94 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix I U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries

    Page 95 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix I U. S. Democracy Assistance to Six Latin American Countries

    Page 96 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Page 97 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix II

    Appendix II Comments from the Department of State Page 98 GAO- 03- 358
    Democracy Assistance

    Appendix II Comments from the Department of State

    Page 99 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix II Comments from the Department of State Page 100 GAO- 03- 358
    Democracy Assistance

    Appendix II Comments from the Department of State

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    Page 102 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix III

    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Justice Page 103 GAO- 03- 358
    Democracy Assistance

    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Justice Page 104 GAO- 03- 358
    Democracy Assistance

    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Justice Page 105 GAO- 03- 358
    Democracy Assistance

    Page 106 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix IV

    Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
    Page 107 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
    Page 108 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
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    Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
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    Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development

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    Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development

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    Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development

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    Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
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    Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development

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    Appendix IV Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development

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    Appendix V

    Appendix V Quality of Life and Economic Indicators for Selected Countries

    Page 118 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix V Quality of Life and Economic Indicators for Selected Countries

    Page 119 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Page 120 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix VI

    Appendix VI Freedom House Scores for Individual Countries, Fiscal Years
    1992 through 2002

    Page 121 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix VI Freedom House Scores for Individual Countries, Fiscal Years
    1992 through 2002

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    Appendix VI Freedom House Scores for Individual Countries, Fiscal Years
    1992 through 2002

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    Appendix VI Freedom House Scores for Individual Countries, Fiscal Years
    1992 through 2002

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    Appendix VI Freedom House Scores for Individual Countries, Fiscal Years
    1992 through 2002

    Page 125 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Page 126 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Appendix VII

    Page 127 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

    Page 128 GAO- 03- 358 Democracy Assistance

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