Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for
the Air Cargo System (20-DEC-02, GAO-03-344).			 
                                                                 
U.S. air carriers transport billions of tons of cargo each year  
in both passenger planes and all-cargo planes. Typically, about  
one-half of the hull of each passenger aircraft is filled with	 
cargo. As a result, any vulnerabilities in the air cargo security
system potentially threaten the entire air transport system. GAO 
agreed to determine the security vulnerabilities that have been  
identified in the air cargo system, the status of key		 
recommendations that have been made since 1990 to improve air	 
cargo security, and ways in which air cargo security can be	 
improved in the near-and long-term.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-344 					        
    ACCNO:   A05762						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential	      
Improvements for the Air Cargo System				 
     DATE:   12/20/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Air transportation operations			 
	     Airport security					 
	     Freight transportation facilities			 
	     Risk management					 
	     Safety standards					 
	     Shipping industry					 
	     Pan Am Flight 103					 
	     TWA Flight 800					 
	     Valujet Flight 592 				 
	     FAA Computer Assisted Passenger			 
	     Screening System					 
                                                                 

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GAO-03-344

Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

December 2002 AVIATION SECURITY Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements
for the Air Cargo System

GAO- 03- 344

Numerous government and industry studies have identified vulnerabilities
in the air cargo system. These vulnerabilities occur in the security
procedures of some air carriers and freight forwarders and in possible
tampering with freight at various handoffs that occur from the point when
cargo leaves a shipper to the point when it is loaded onto an aircraft. As
a result, any weaknesses in this program could create security risks.

FAA or the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which now has
responsibility for ensuring air cargo security, has implemented a number
of key recommendations and mandates to improve air cargo security made
since 1990 by numerous government organizations. For example, FAA and the
air cargo industry developed security training guides for air carriers and
ground personnel who handle air cargo. However, a few recommendations by
those groups, such as conducting research and operational tests of
technology to screen cargo for explosives, are ongoing and not yet
completed by TSA, or have not been implemented.

Federal reports, industry groups, and security experts have identified
operational and technological measures that have the potential to improve
air cargo security in the near- term. Examples of the measures include
checking the identity of individuals making cargo deliveries and
implementing a computerized cargo profiling system. In addition, long-
term improvements, such as developing a comprehensive cargo- security
plan, have been recommended by the above sources, but not implemented by
TSA. Each potential improvement measure, however, needs to be weighed
against other issues, such as costs and the effects on the flow of cargo.
Without a comprehensive plan that incorporates a risk management approach
and sets deadlines and performance targets, TSA and other federal
decisionmakers cannot know whether resources are being deployed as
effectively and efficiently as possible in implementing measures to reduce
the risk and mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack.

Cargo Being Loaded on an Airplane

AVIATION SECURITY

Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 344.

To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on the
link above. For more information, contact Gerald Dillingham, Ph. D., at
(202) 512- 2834 or dillinghamg@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 344, a
report to the

Ranking Minority Member, Aviation Subcommittee, Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation; and another requester

December 2002

U. S. air carriers transport billions of tons of cargo each year in both
passenger planes and all- cargo planes. Typically, about one- half of the
hull of each passenger aircraft is filled with cargo. As a result, any
vulnerabilities in the air cargo security system potentially threaten the
entire air transport system.

GAO agreed to determine the security vulnerabilities that have been
identified in the air cargo system, the status of key recommendations that
have been made since 1990 to improve air cargo security, and ways in which
air cargo security can be improved in the near- and long- term.

GAO recommends that TSA develop a comprehensive plan for air cargo
security that identifies priority actions on the basis of risk, costs, and
performance targets, and establishes deadlines for completing those
actions.

Source: Cargo King, Ltd.

Page i GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Vulnerabilities Exist in Air Cargo
Security 8 Progress Has Been Made in Implementing Key Recommendations

on Air Cargo Security 9 Near- Term Actions to Enhance Cargo Security Have
Been

Identified 10 A Comprehensive Plan and Risk Management Approach Have Been

Identified As Ways to Improve Air Cargo Security in the Long Term 18
Conclusion 20 Recommendation for Executive Action 21 Agency Comments 21

Appendix I Air Cargo Incidents and Follow- Up Actions 22

Appendix II Proposed Legislation on Air Cargo Security 24

Appendix III Key Recommendations on Air Cargo Security 25

Tables

Table 1: Information on Technologies to Enhance Air Cargo Security 11
Table 2: Information on Operational Practices to Enhance Air

Cargo Security 15 Table 3: Status of Key Recommendations on Air Cargo
Security 25

Figures

Figure 1: Flow of Cargo from Shipper to Air Carrier 4 Figure 2: Amount of
Air Cargo Transported (Actual and Projected)

on Passenger and Cargo Planes in the United States, 1996* 2012 6 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

Figure 3: Amount of U. S. Mail Transported (Actual and Projected) on
Passenger and Cargo Planes in the United States, 1996* 2012 7 Figure 4:
Summary Information on the Status of Key

Recommendations for Air Cargo Security 10 Figure 5: Elements of a Risk
Management Approach 19 Figure 6: Time Line of Key Changes in Air Cargo
Security 23

Abbreviations

DOT Department of Transportation FAA Federal Aviation Administration OIG
Office of Inspector General TSA Transportation Security Administration

Page 1 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

December 20, 2002 The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison Ranking Minority
Member Aviation Subcommittee Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation United States Senate

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein United States Senate

U. S. air carriers transport billions of tons of cargo each year in both
passenger planes and all- cargo planes. Keeping that cargo secure is the
responsibility of the Department of Transportation*s (DOT) Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), which was created in November 2001 by the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act. Prior to that date, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) had this responsibility. To ensure air cargo
security, the act requires the screening of all cargo carried aboard
commercial passenger aircraft and requires TSA to have a system in place
as soon as practicable to screen or otherwise ensure the security of cargo
on all- cargo aircraft. To date, TSA has focused much effort and funding
on ensuring that bombs and other threat items are not carried onto planes
by passengers or in their carry- on or checked luggage. However, about
one- half of the hull of each passenger aircraft is typically filled with
cargo. If vulnerabilities exist in the transport of air cargo, they
potentially threaten the air transport system. You asked us to examine the
security of air cargo. In doing so, we addressed the following research
questions:

 What security vulnerabilities have been identified in the air cargo
system?

 What is the status of key recommendations that have been made within the
past 12 years to improve air cargo security?

 How can air cargo security be improved in the near- and long- term? To
answer our research questions, we conducted a comprehensive assessment of
pertinent literature, including reports from TSA, FAA, DOT*s Volpe
Transportation Center, the U. S. Customs Service, federal commissions and
working groups, aviation industry groups, and DOT*s Office of Inspector
General (OIG). We also interviewed TSA officials, industry officials
representing passenger and cargo airlines and consolidators of air
freight, and aviation security experts. In addition, to determine possible
ways in which the security of air cargo can be

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

improved in the long- term, we reviewed our previous reports on risk
management techniques and compared the risk management approach outlined
in those reports with TSA*s current procedures and plans for air cargo
security. We performed our work from August to December 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Vulnerabilities in the air cargo system have been identified by numerous
government and industry studies. TSA inspectors have identified
vulnerabilities in the security procedures of some air carriers and
freight forwarders. Further vulnerabilities have been identified by the
aviation industry and government agencies, including possible tampering
with freight at various handoffs that occur from the point when it leaves
a shipper to the point when it is loaded onto an aircraft and the adequacy
of background investigations for all persons handling cargo. In addition,
the

*known shipper* program, TSA*s primary approach for ensuring air cargo
security and complying with the cargo- screening requirements of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, has been reviewed by DOT*s
Inspector General for possible security weaknesses.

FAA or TSA has implemented a number of the key recommendations and
mandates to improve air cargo security made since 1990 by the Aviation
Security Improvement Act of 1990, the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security (also called the Gore Commission), the Cargo Working
Group (an FAA- industry partnership), and DOT*s Office of Inspector
General. For example, in 1999, FAA, in cooperation with the air cargo
industry, developed security training guides for air carriers and ground
personnel who handle air cargo. However, a few recommendations made by
those groups, such as conducting research and operational tests of
technology to screen cargo for explosives, are either ongoing and not yet
completed by TSA or have not been implemented.

Federal reports, industry groups, and security experts have identified
operational and technological measures that have the potential to improve
air cargo security in the near- term. The measures incorporate some of the
key recommendations made since 1990, as well as best practices for cargo
security identified in government reports. Examples of the measures
include checking the identity of individuals making cargo deliveries and
implementing a computerized cargo profiling system. Each potential
improvement, however, needs to be weighed against other issues, such as
costs and the effects on the flow of cargo. TSA has been developing some
of these measures, such as conducting research on blast- hardened cargo
containers; however, other potential measures have not been fully Results
in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

implemented. In addition, long- term improvements, such as developing a
comprehensive cargo security plan, have been recommended by the above
sources but have not been implemented by TSA. Moreover, we have
recommended that the federal government adopt a risk management approach
to combat terrorism. Although TSA has undertaken two elements of the
approach we describe* it has assessed some of the threats and
vulnerabilities of air cargo* it has not undertaken a third element*
assessing the criticality of deploying resources to address the
vulnerabilities. Criticality is assessed by evaluating and prioritizing
actions in terms of specific criteria. Without a comprehensive plan that
incorporates a risk management approach, TSA and other federal
decisionmakers cannot know whether resources are being deployed as
effectively and efficiently as possible to reduce the risk and mitigate
the consequences of a terrorist attack. This report recommends that the
Under Secretary of Transportation for Security develop a comprehensive
plan for air cargo security that incorporates a risk management approach,
includes a list of security priorities, and sets deadlines for completing
the actions. DOT agreed with our report and stated that TSA will consider
implementing our recommendation as the agency moves forward with its
cargo- security program.

Transporting cargo by air involves many participants, including
manufacturers and shippers who make routine or occasional shipments,
freight forwarders who consolidate shipments and deliver them to air
carriers, and cargo facilities of passenger and all- cargo air carriers
that store cargo until it is placed aboard an aircraft. Figure 1 depicts
these participants and the two primary ways in which a shipper can send
cargo by air. Background

Page 4 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

Figure 1: Flow of Cargo from Shipper to Air Carrier

A shipper may take its packages to a freight forwarder, which consolidates
cargo from many shippers and delivers it to air carriers, as illustrated
in the top portion of figure 1. The freight forwarder usually has cargo
facilities in or near airports and uses trucks to deliver bulk freight to
commercial air carriers* either to a cargo facility or to a small- package
receiving area at the ticket counter. Freight forwarders operate about
10,000 facilities nationwide. According to TSA, about 80 percent of
shippers use freight forwarders. Another way for a shipper to send freight
is to directly package and deliver it to an air carrier*s airport sorting
center, as pictured in the bottom half of figure 1. Many large companies,
including some that produce and distribute perishable goods, have direct
accounts with either all- cargo or passenger air carriers.

Page 5 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

During fiscal year 2000, about 12.2 billion revenue ton miles of freight
were shipped in the United States by air. 1 About 22 percent of that total
was carried on passenger aircraft; the remainder was carried on all- cargo
aircraft. 2 Freight is a significant source of income to airlines,
accounting for about 10 percent of scheduled passenger airlines* revenue
and bringing in about $13 billion in 2001. DOT*s projections indicate,
moreover, that the amount of freight transported by air will increase
faster than the number of passengers in the coming years, thus adding to
its importance. 3 Figure 2 shows the amount of air cargo actually
transported from fiscal years 1996 through 2001 and the amount that DOT
projects will be transported from fiscal years 2002 through 2012.

1 A revenue ton mile is one ton of cargo transported one mile. 2 In this
report, *passenger aircraft* refers to both commercial passenger aircraft
and

*combination aircraft,* in which the fuselage is configured to accommodate
both passengers and cargo. The term *cargo aircraft* refers to all- cargo
aircraft.

3 According to DOT, air cargo (measured in revenue ton miles) carried by
U. S. commercial air carriers is expected to grow annually by about one
percentage point more than that forecasted for passenger travel (measured
in revenue passenger miles) for the 12- year period 2002* 2013.

Page 6 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

Figure 2: Amount of Air Cargo Transported (Actual and Projected) on
Passenger and Cargo Planes in the United States, 1996* 2012

Notes: DOT*s data show actual amounts of cargo for fiscal years 1996
through 2001 and projected amounts for fiscal years 2002 through 2013. Our
analysis includes only the even- numbered years. a A revenue ton mile
(RTM) equates to one ton of mail transported one mile.

In addition to freight, air carriers also transport mail. In fiscal year
2000, about 2.5 billion revenue ton miles of mail were shipped in the
United States by air and transported predominantly on passenger aircraft
(about 70 percent of the total). In September 2001, the amount of domestic
mail transported by air decreased significantly* down about 68 percent
from the revenue ton miles of mail transported in September 2000. DOT*s
forecast through 2013 indicates that the amount of domestic mail will
resume growth in fiscal year 2004. However, the amount of mail transported
by air is not expected to return to 2001 levels during the entire forecast
period, in part because of security directives issued by TSA in the
aftermath of the September 11th attacks. Figure 3 shows the amount of U.
S. mail actually transported by air from fiscal years 1996 through 2001
and the amount that DOT projects will be transported from fiscal years
2002 through 2012.

Page 7 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

Figure 3: Amount of U. S. Mail Transported (Actual and Projected) on
Passenger and Cargo Planes in the United States, 1996* 2012

Notes: DOT*s data show actual amounts of mail for fiscal years 1996
through 2001 and projected amounts for fiscal years 2002 through 2013. Our
analysis includes only the even- numbered years. a A revenue ton mile
(RTM) equates to one ton of mail transported one mile.

The December 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103, along with the crashes in
1996 of ValuJet flight 592 and TWA flight 800, led to increased national
concerns about air cargo security. The federal government responded to
these incidents with studies of the vulnerabilities in the civil aviation
system and recommendations to enhance many aspects of the system,
including air cargo security. (See app. I for a chronology of the
incidents and the federal response.) For example, the Pan Am bombing led
to the passage of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, which
required FAA to begin an accelerated 18- month research and development
effort to find an effective explosives detection system to screen baggage
and cargo. Following the 1996 crashes, the White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security (known as the Gore Commission) was created.
The Commission recommended, among other things, that FAA implement a
comprehensive plan to address the threat of explosives and other threat
objects in cargo and work with industry to develop new initiatives in this

Page 8 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

area. After the 1996 crashes, FAA established the Baseline Working Group
and, later, the Cargo Working Group* federal- industry partnerships* to
find ways to enhance air cargo security.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, renewed national concern with
cargo security. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in
November 2001, requires the screening of all passengers and property,
including cargo, U. S. mail, and carry- on and checked baggage, that is
carried aboard commercial passenger aircraft. It also requires having a
system in place as soon as practicable to screen, inspect, or otherwise
ensure the security of cargo on all- cargo aircraft. The act transferred
responsibility for aviation security from FAA to the newly established
TSA. In November 2002, the Senate passed proposed legislation on air cargo
security.

Vulnerabilities have been identified in the air cargo system by the 1996
Gore Commission, DOT*s OIG, TSA, experts with whom we spoke, and other
government and industry studies. Specifically, vulnerabilities have been
identified in the security procedures of some air carriers and freight
forwarders, including the adequacy of background investigations for all
persons handling cargo. For example, TSA inspectors have found numerous
security violations made by freight forwarders and air carriers during
routine inspections of their facilities. Freight forwarders and air
carriers are required to have TSA- approved cargo- security programs, and
only freight forwarders with an approved security program are permitted to
ship freight on passenger aircraft. In addition, DOT*s OIG has reviewed
TSA*s known shipper program* which allows shippers that have established
business histories with air carriers or freight forwarders to ship cargo
on planes* and TSA*s procedures for approving freight forwarders, checking
for possible security weaknesses. The known shipper program is TSA*s
primary approach for ensuring air cargo security and complying with the
cargo- screening requirements of the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act.

Other security vulnerabilities include possible tampering with cargo
during land transport to the airport or at the cargo- handling facilities
of air carriers and freight forwarders. The amount of cargo theft that
occurs in these locations indicates the security problem. The National
Cargo Security Council, a coalition of public and private transportation
organizations, estimates that cargo theft among all modes of
transportation accounts for more than $10 billion in merchandise losses
each year. Furthermore, the Federal Bureau of Investigation estimates that
Vulnerabilities Exist

in Air Cargo Security

Page 9 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

the majority of cargo theft in the United States occurs in cargo
terminals, transfer facilities, and cargo- consolidation areas. This type
of theft also occurs in other parts of the world. For example, during a
series of robberies that took place at the Brussels airport in 2001,
robbers stole $160 million in diamonds from the holds of Lufthansa jets.
DOT has reported that thefts are often committed by employees or with
employee cooperation, and provided examples of thefts perpetrated at the
Port of New York/ New Jersey (which includes Kennedy International
Airport) and the Port of Boston (which includes Logan International
Airport).

FAA or TSA has implemented a number of key recommendations or mandates to
improve air cargo security made over the past 12 years by the Aviation
Security Improvement Act of 1990, the Gore Commission, the Cargo Working
Group, and DOT*s OIG. (See fig. 4.) For example, in 1999, FAA, in
cooperation with the air cargo industry, developed security training
guides for air carriers and ground personnel who handle air cargo.
However, other recommendations by those groups, such as conducting
research and operational tests of technology to screen cargo for
explosives, are ongoing and not yet completed by TSA or have not been
implemented. According to TSA officials, in 1999 FAA requested funds to
conduct a feasibility study on a system of third- party inspections, but
the study was not funded by the Congress. Additional information on the
key recommendations is provided in appendix III and in the subsequent
section of this report. Progress Has Been

Made in Implementing Key Recommendations on Air Cargo Security

Page 10 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

Figure 4: Summary Information on the Status of Key Recommendations for Air
Cargo Security

Our research identified numerous actions that would enhance air cargo
security in the near- term. These actions include and expand upon some of
the key recommendations made since 1990, as well as best practices
identified for cargo security in government reports. These actions include
using existing technologies, such as explosives detection devices, which
are currently used to screen baggage, and conducting further research and
development of new technologies, such as blast- hardened cargo containers,
that have the potential to improve air cargo security. These actions also
include instituting additional security procedures and best practices,
such as developing an industrywide cargo profiling system and conducting
background checks on all individuals who convey and handle air cargo.

Our research identified a number of technologies, such as electronic
seals, 4 that have the potential to strengthen air cargo security by
making it more difficult for freight to be tampered with during transport
by truck from the shipper to the aircraft and in cargo- handling
facilities. Other

4 An electronic seal is a radio frequency device that transmits shipment
information as it passes reader devices and transmits an alarm if a
container has been compromised. Near- Term Actions to

Enhance Cargo Security Have Been Identified

Technologies to Enhance Air Cargo Security

Page 11 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

technologies, such as x- ray machines and explosives detection equipment,
could be used to screen cargo before it is loaded on aircraft. While each
technology has security- enhancing benefits, each one also has potential
limitations to implementation that need to be weighed. Table 1 describes
these technologies as well as the potential cost, benefits, and drawbacks
associated with each. Some of the technologies are discussed in greater
detail after the table.

Table 1: Information on Technologies to Enhance Air Cargo Security Type of
technology Description Cost, benefits, and drawbacks

Technology to screen for threat objects Technologies that are capable of
detecting

explosives and weapons of mass destruction, including radiological,
chemical, and biological agents. They include:

 gamma- ray

 pulsed fast neutron analysis

 thermal neutron activation

 x- ray, including bulk explosives detection systems (EDS)

 radiation detection

 trace detection

 vapor detection

 canine use

Cost: Ranges from under $50,000 per unit for trace/ vapor detection and
canine use to over $10 million per unit for pulsed fast neutron analysis
and certain xray.

Benefit: Can indicate potential presence of threat objects without opening
packages and containers; canines are considered best means to screen air
cargo because they have fewest drawbacks.

Drawback: Some technologies (pulsed fast neutron analysis, thermal neutron
activation) can take an hour or more per object to screen; some
technologies (pulsed fast neutron analysis, bulk EDS) are very costly;
some technologies (x- ray, gamma- ray) do not identify specific threat;
some technologies (x- ray, gamma- ray) cannot discriminate different
materials in high density cargo; some technologies (bulk EDS, pulsed fast
neutron analysis) require building modifications in order to accommodate
the equipment; all technologies have difficulty identifying biological
threats. Seals and other intrusiondetection technology Technology that can
be used to determine

whether a container or conveyance has been tampered with by visual
inspection, or that emits an alarm or notifies a central control station.
Includes tamper- evident tape that shows *void* when tampered with,
tamperevident seals and locking devices, and electronic seals that emit a
radio signal when tampered with.

Cost: Ranges from under $1 per unit for tamper- evident tape to $2, 500
per unit for electronic seals.

Benefit: Easy and inexpensive way to verify tampering within a container
or other conveyance.

Drawback: All types of seals are known to be vulnerable to tampering,
given the appropriate tools, time, and opportunity.

Blast- hardened containers Technology to harden cargo containers to

control the damage caused by an explosion by confining it to a container.

Cost: At least $15, 000 per unit.

Benefit: Designed to protect aircraft from catastrophic structural damage
or critical system failure caused by an in- flight explosion.

Drawback: Containers are expensive and heavy, which results in increased
fuel costs.

Page 12 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

Type of technology Description Cost, benefits, and drawbacks

Access control and authentication Technologies to identify and
authenticate

individuals or vehicles allowed into a restricted area, or to authenticate
a driver or individual loading goods. This technology includes picture
badges, biometrics, and *smart cards.*

Cost: About $100 per unit for card reader devices; cards are a few cents
each.

Benefit: Ensures that only authorized persons are handling cargo; creates
a record of access to controlled areas.

Drawback: Does not protect cargo shipments from tampering by persons who
are authorized access to cargo and cargo- handling areas. Tracking systems
Technology such as global positioning systems

and bar codes that can be placed on cargo and used to identify freight
being shipped or to track the shipment.

Cost: Ranges from about $. 50 per unit for bar coding to about $3,000 per
unit for some radio frequency tags.

Benefit: Tracks the cargo throughout transport.

Drawback: Does not protect cargo shipments from tampering; technology only
tracks the location of cargo. Closed circuit television (CCTV) Video
camera to monitor and store video

images. CCTV can be used to record the loading of a container into the
aircraft and the container can be inspected by viewing the archived video.

Cost: Ranges from about $50 per camera to about $1,000 per camera; cost of
additional components (switching and recording devices) vary greatly.

Benefit: Improves cargo surveillance by reducing time and costs.

Drawback: Video screens require continuous monitoring; does not protect
cargo shipments from tampering.

Sources: 1. U. S. Treasury Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations of
the U. S. Customs Service,

Technology Report (Washington, D. C.: June 14, 2002). 2. U. S. DOT, John
A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Intermodal Cargo
Transportation: Industry Best Security Practices (Cambridge, Mass.: May
1999).

3. FAA; Air Transport Association, Airforwarders Association; Telair,
International.

Screening Technologies. Both the Gore Commission and the Cargo Working
Group recommended using existing technology to screen cargo for explosives
and developing new technologies to screen cargo for explosives. Trace
explosives detection devices and bulk explosives detection systems, which
are currently used to screen passenger baggage for explosive material,
could also be used to screen cargo containers. According to TSA, the use
of trace devices to screen cargo has shown few problems.

Canines have been identified as one of the most effective ways to screen
cargo and their use has expanded significantly in recent years, based upon
recommendations from the Gore Commission and others. In addition to
screening cargo, canine teams are used at airports to respond to
suspicious events, such as bomb threats. According to TSA, security
experts, and industry officials, canine teams have proven successful at
detecting explosives and are the most promising method for screening
cargo. As a result, TSA has requested additional funding in its fiscal
year

Page 13 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

2003 budget to expand the use of canine screening for certain classes of
U. S. mail.

FAA and the National Academy of Sciences have examined another method for
screening cargo for explosives. Pulsed fast neutron analysis uses gamma
rays to identify the chemical composition of items in the container by
measuring their density. This analysis, however, takes 1 hour per
container, and each machine costs about $10 million. As a result,
according to an FAA official and an aviation security expert, the
financial cost and the time needed to screen a container make this option
not viable for current use.

Additionally, decompression chambers are used in some countries to screen
cargo for bombs. Items to be loaded on a plane are placed in a chamber
that simulates the pressures acting on aircraft during takeoff, normal
flight, and landing. These conditions will cause explosives that are
attached to barometric fuses to detonate.

Intrusion- detection technology. Several technologies, including
electronic seals and tamper evident tape, could be used to help indicate
whether cargo has been tampered with during its chain- of- custody from
the point at which a package is sealed by a known shipper to its placement
on an aircraft. For example, an electronic seal (also known as a radio
seal) is a radio frequency device that transmits shipment information as
it passes reader devices and indicates whether a container has been
compromised. Once security staff are alerted to a possible problem, they
can physically inspect the cargo. Seals range in cost from less than $1
per unit for tamperevident tape to $2, 500 per unit for electronic seals.
Within the industry, it is recognized that seals can easily be tampered
with, either by entering the cargo without breaking the seal or by
removing and replacing the seal. As a result, security experts recommend
that seals be used in conjunction with other security procedures as part
of a more comprehensive security plan. Additionally, in tests conducted
during the fall of 2001, FAA found that electronic seals have limited
signal strength and must be read at relatively short, line- of- sight
distances. Finally, industry officials have indicated their concern about
the use of electronic seals on aircraft because of their potential to
interfere with aircraft electronics.

Blast- hardened cargo containers. Hardening cargo containers that are
loaded onto aircraft has the potential to reduce damage from explosions,
according to experts with whom we spoke. These containers are designed to
protect aircraft from catastrophic structural damage or critical system
failure caused by an in- flight explosion. TSA continues to conduct

Page 14 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

research in this area, which FAA began in 1991 based on requirements in
the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. TSA has tested and approved
containers made by two manufacturers for use on aircraft. According to
industry representatives, air carriers have resisted using the containers
because they are significantly more expensive than standard containers.
Specifically, a blast- hardened container costs approximately $15,000, as
compared with about $1,000 for a standard container, according to air
carrier representatives. Blast- hardened containers also weigh
approximately 150 pounds more than standard containers, which adds to the
airplane*s fuel costs, according to air carrier representatives. For
example, if a Boeing 747 aircraft traveling from New York to Tokyo had
blast- hardened containers, the extra weight would result in $5,000 in
additional fuel costs, according to an industry official. Furthermore, as
blast- hardened containers are bumped and scratched during shipping, their
blast- resistant capabilities are reduced and their lifespan may be
shortened to less than 1 year, according to an industry official. By
comparison, a standard container lasts as long as 8 years, according to
industry officials. Industry officials said that the containers have been
used by very few air carriers. 5 TSA has also conducted research on
hardened hulls* that is, placing blast- resistant liners in the cargo hold
to protect the aircraft if an explosion occurs* but liners did not
successfully resist explosions in initial testing, according to a TSA
official. FAA continues to conduct testing on aircraft hardening (both
containers and hulls) at a cost of approximately $3 million per year.

Industry and government officials, security experts, and studies we
reviewed also identified procedures and best practices to strengthen air
cargo security. Some of these activities, such as developing an
industrywide cargo profiling system, were recommendations to FAA by the
Gore Commission and others; other activities were identified as best
practices for companies that transport and handle cargo. (See table 2.)
Some of the practices are discussed in greater detail after the table.

5 El Al Airline, Israel*s national airline, uses some blast- resistant
containers to transport cargo. Operational Practices to

Enhance Air Cargo Security

Page 15 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

Table 2: Information on Operational Practices to Enhance Air Cargo
Security Practice Comments

Develop an industrywide computer- assisted cargo profiling system that can
be integrated into air carriers* and freight forwarders* reservation and
operating systems.

 TSA has developed a known shipper database. As of October 10, 2002,
information on the known shippers of 250 participating air carriers and
freight forwarders had been entered in the data base.

 TSA began making the database available to participating air carriers
and freight forwarders in October 2002.

 Participation is voluntary. Improve the oversight and enforcement of air
carriers and freight forwarders.

 TSA estimates that it will need additional cargo inspectors for fiscal
year 2003, especially because some cargo inspectors will remain with FAA
when TSA is transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.

Use identification card systems to verify individuals authorized to enter
cargo- handling facilities.

 TSA requires identity checks for individuals entering certain areas of
airports.

 Requirements for identity checks at cargo facilities that are located
off airport property are determined by the individual facilities in
accordance with their security plan. Conduct background checks on all
individuals who convey and handle air cargo and have access to cargo areas
and documentation.

 TSA requires background checks for certain airport workers.

 Requirements for background checks on other individuals who convey and
handle air cargo are determined by individual employers in accordance with
their security plan. Collect and disseminate information concerning cargo
security, including threat- related information, among air carriers,
forwarders, and government agencies.

 TSA disseminates general threat information to the industry in security
directives and information circulars.

 Industry officials state that specific threat information is not getting
to the airline workers who handle cargo. Establish written policies and
procedures and training programs for the employees of companies that
convey and handle cargo.

 TSA requires air carriers that transport passengers to have security
programs.

Employ a sufficient number of qualified security officers at cargo
facilities to provide physical security and access control.

 Use of security officers at cargo facilities is determined by the
individual facilities in accordance with their security plan.

Use physical barriers (walls, fences) to guard against unauthorized access
to cargo areas.

 Use of physical barriers at cargo facilities is determined by the
individual facilities in accordance with their security plan.

Sources: 1. U. S. DOT, John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems
Center, Intermodal Cargo Transportation: Industry Best Security Practices
(Cambridge, Mass.: May 1999).

2. U. S. Treasury Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations of the U. S.
Customs Service,

Technology Report (Washington, D. C.: June 14, 2002). 3. TSA; final report
by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security; Cargo
Working Group; Air Transport Association; Airforwarders Association; Cargo
Airlines Association.

Cargo profiling. The Gore Commission recommended that FAA work with
industry to develop a computer- assisted cargo profiling system that could
be integrated into airlines* and freight forwarders* reservations and
operating systems. Since 1997, FAA and now TSA have been working to
develop a cargo profiling system that is similar to the Computer Assisted

Page 16 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

Passenger Prescreening System. 6 The first phase of developing the cargo
profiling system is the nationwide deployment of a database of known
shippers. TSA began field- testing a computerized known shipper database
in October 2002. About 250 air carriers and freight forwarders have
provided information on their known shippers for TSA*s database, which
contains about 165,000 shipping companies, according to TSA officials. In
addition, the database includes the names of restricted entities from the
Department of the Treasury*s Office of Foreign Assets Control.
Participants in the field test have the opportunity to query a TSA
Internet site to ascertain the status of shippers unknown to them. An
electronic message is provided, indicating whether the shipper is known or
unknown. If the shipper is known, a unique identification number is
electronically provided to the participant and the cargo can be accepted
from that shipper as *known shipper cargo.* If the shipper is a restricted
entity, the participant receives a warning against receiving shipments
from that entity. According to security experts and industry association
officials, this system would enhance air cargo security by allowing
freight forwarders to quickly determine whether a company is a known
shipper. In addition, this system would allow a shipper that is known to
one freight forwarder to become known to all freight forwarders. However,
during the pilot phase the use of this system is voluntary, and its
success will depend, in part, upon widespread participation. According to
TSA officials, the agency has made no decision about whether participation
will be voluntary after the pilot is completed, at the end of December
2002. According to industry representatives, some freight forwarders are
reluctant to participate because of concerns about placing themselves at a
competitive disadvantage by including their customers in the database.

Oversight and enforcement. To enhance its oversight of freight forwarders
and air carriers, TSA conducts routine inspections. According to TSA
officials, the agency is considering increasing the frequency of these
inspections. To achieve targeted increases in the number of inspections,
TSA estimates that it needs to hire several hundred additional cargo
inspectors in fiscal year 2003, especially since some of its current
inspector workforce will remain with FAA when TSA is transferred to the
Department of Homeland Security.

6 This system identifies passengers as greater security risks based on
characteristics of their travel and targets these individuals for
additional screening.

Page 17 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

Identification checks. Identification checks of individuals making
deliveries to freight forwarders and airline cargo facilities would help
to ensure the identities of employees of known shippers and has been
recommended as a best practice for cargo security by DOT. Freight
forwarders and air carriers are not required to check and record
identification information for employees of known shippers. TSA
regulations require identification checks of individuals who enter
restricted areas of airports, which include cargo- handling areas. That
information is usually recorded manually, according to industry officials.
However, the use of technology such as smart cards can make this process
more efficient and reliable, according to security experts. For example,
Chicago*s O*Hare Airport, with a $1.5 million research grant provided by
FAA in 1997, developed and operationally tested a smart card/
biometricbased security access system. This system uses fingerprint
biometrics to verify the identity of truck drivers delivering cargo to the
airport and information encoded on a smart card to match the driver with
the cargo being delivered. The results of the operational tests, completed
in July 1999, indicated that fingerprints provide a highly reliable means
of confirming driver identity, and that having the cargo manifests and
related information on the smart card dramatically reduces the time
required to process cargo deliveries. According to TSA officials, the
agency does not have plans to further deploy such identification
verification technology to airports.

Threat information. Dissemination of security- related information,
including threat information, to carriers and freight forwarders has been
recommended by DOT as a best practice for cargo security across the
transportation modes. 7 According to TSA, it provides such information to
the aviation industry by means of security directives and information
circulars. Since September 2001, TSA has issued three directives related
to air cargo. However, industry officials told us that the threat
information provided is usually not sufficiently specific to be acted upon
by the workers who handle the cargo. Air carrier officials stated that
more specific information about threats would allow them to conduct
targeted inspections of cargo, which they believe would be more effective
than the random inspections that have been proposed in legislation and
suggested by some, including DOT*s OIG. However, according to TSA
officials, the agency provides the best threat information that is
generally available.

7 U. S. DOT, John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center,
Intermodal Cargo Transportation: Industry Best Security Practices
(Cambridge, Mass.: May 1999).

Page 18 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

The Gore Commission and aviation industry representatives have suggested
that FAA implement a comprehensive plan to address the threat of
explosives and other dangerous objects in cargo. In addition, we have
recommended that the federal government adopt a risk management approach
to combat terrorism. Without a comprehensive plan for air cargo security
that incorporates a risk management approach, TSA and other federal
decisionmakers cannot know whether resources are being deployed as
effectively and efficiently as possible to reduce the risk and mitigate
the consequences of a terrorist attack. Moreover, as air cargo security is
viewed in the larger context of transportation and homeland security, the
lack of a risk management approach hinders efforts to set strategic
priorities.

Neither FAA nor TSA has developed a comprehensive plan for air cargo
security as recommended by the Gore Commission, which would provide a
first step toward meeting the requirement of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act to have a system in place to ensure the
security of cargo. TSA officials have told us that the agency intends to
issue a long- term plan for cargo security, but they were unsure when that
would occur. Meanwhile, according to agency officials, TSA is in the early
stages of developing an agencywide strategic plan that is to include the
air cargo security program. As of April 2002, the draft strategic plan had
identified one performance measure concerning air cargo security. Our
analysis indicated that this measure* the progress of federalization of
the cargo- screening process* focused more on process than on results.
However, TSA has stated that it intends to further develop measures in the
future. TSA also said that it would include these measures and their
associated goals in its fiscal year 2003 performance plan.

Over the past year, we have determined that a risk management approach
used by the Department of Defense to defend against terrorism also has A
Comprehensive

Plan and Risk Management Approach Have Been Identified As Ways to Improve
Air Cargo Security in the Long Term

Developing a Comprehensive Plan for Air Cargo Security

Implementing a Risk Management Approach

Page 19 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

relevance for other organizations responsible for security. 8 This
approach can provide those organizations with a process for enhancing
their preparedness to respond to terrorist attacks and to support
decisionmaking to manage security risks in a cost- effective manner.
Figure 5 describes this approach.

Figure 5: Elements of a Risk Management Approach

TSA has partially developed a risk management approach. In the fall of
2001, FAA completed an assessment of the threats to and vulnerabilities of
air cargo. The assessment examined a single scenario* a terrorist
attempting to place a bomb on a commercial passenger aircraft. The
assessment did not examine the vulnerabilities associated with the
pathways by which shipments are transported by truck or other means from
the shipper to the aircraft (see fig. 1 above). According to TSA
officials, the agency does not have plans to conduct further threat
assessments for air cargo.

8 U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk Management
Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO- 02- 208T (Washington, D. C.:
Oct. 31, 2001).

Page 20 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

TSA has not undertaken a criticality assessment* the third element we
identified in a risk management approach* and therefore has no explicit
criteria for determining the priority of actions to enhance air cargo
security. However, according to TSA officials, passenger aircraft security
is a higher priority than all- cargo aircraft security. According to TSA
officials, their priorities are spelled out in the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, which has laid out specific deadlines dealing
primarily with passenger and baggage screening for TSA to address over the
past year. As we have reported, TSA has faced an extraordinary challenge
in meeting some of those deadlines, such as hiring and training 33,000
employees to conduct passenger security screening by November 19, 2002. 9
The act provides no specific deadlines for enhancing air cargo security
but requires having a system in place as soon as practicable to screen
cargo on all- cargo aircraft or otherwise ensure its security.

Over the past year, with the passage of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, our nation has placed new emphasis on aviation security.
However, few changes have been made to air cargo security, as TSA has
focused its efforts on improving passenger and baggage security to meet
specific legislative deadlines. The act requires the screening of all
cargo aboard commercial passenger aircraft and requires TSA to have a
system in place as soon as practicable to screen or otherwise ensure the
security of cargo on all- cargo aircraft. The large volume of air cargo
and the fact that its delivery is generally considered time- critical
result in a limited amount of cargo being screened. Other means to ensure
air cargo security include technological and operational improvements that
have been identified or recommended by various government and industry
groups over the past decade. While TSA has been developing some of these
measures, such as blast- hardened containers and a cargo profiling system,
it has not implemented other identified improvements. Moreover, TSA lacks
a comprehensive plan with long- term goals and performance targets for
cargo security, time frames for completing security improvements, and
risk- based criteria for prioritizing actions to achieve those goals. A
comprehensive plan for air cargo security that incorporates a risk
management approach could provide a framework for systematically
evaluating and prioritizing the various technological and operational

9 U. S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Transportation
Security Administration Faces Immediate and Long- Term Challenges, GAO-
02- 971T (Washington, D. C.: July 25, 2002). Conclusion

Page 21 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

improvements that have already been identified, and for identifying and
implementing additional improvements. Such a plan would also provide a
framework for developing a system to ensure air cargo security, as
required by the act.

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
develop a comprehensive plan for air cargo security that includes priority
actions identified on the basis of risk, costs of these actions, deadlines
for completing those actions, and performance targets.

We provided DOT with a draft of this report for review and comment. DOT
provided oral comments. FAA*s Deputy Director, Office of Security and
Investigations, and agency officials from TSA with responsibility for
cargosecurity issues generally agreed with the information presented in
the report. TSA officials stated that the recommendation was reasonable
and that they will consider implementing it as the agency moves forward
with its cargo- security program. These officials provided a number of
clarifying comments, which we have incorporated where appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you announce the contents of this
report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the
report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and
the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security. Copies will also be
made available to others upon request and this report will be available
for no charge on GAO*s Web site at www. gao. gov. If you or your staff
have any questions, please call me at (202) 512- 2834. Individuals making
key contributions to this report included Wayne A. Ekblad, Elizabeth
Eisenstadt, Colin J. Fallon, Bert Japikse, Maren McAvoy, John W. Shumann,
Teresa F. Spisak, and Cindy M. Steinfink. In addition, we would like to
acknowledge, in memoriam, the contributions to this report made by Angela
Davis.

Gerald L. Dillingham Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
Recommendation for

Executive Action Agency Comments

Appendix I: Air Cargo Incidents and FollowUp Actions

Page 22 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

Agency actions and the introduction of new legislation to improve security
and safety have often come in reaction to aviation tragedies. The
following time line (fig. 6) reflects key changes in air cargo security
following the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland; the
crashes of ValuJet flight 592 in the Florida Everglades and TWA flight 800
over Long Island; and the terrorist attacks in the United States involving
four jet airliners on September 11, 2001. Appendix I: Air Cargo Incidents
and FollowUp

Actions

Appendix I: Air Cargo Incidents and FollowUp Actions

Page 23 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

Figure 6: Time Line of Key Changes in Air Cargo Security

Appendix II: Proposed Legislation on Air Cargo Security

Page 24 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

In November 2002, the Senate approved S. 2949. The bill, comprising seven
sections, includes clauses affecting air cargo security under Title II.

Title II of S. 2949 would instruct TSA to develop a strategic plan to
establish systems to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of
all cargo transported through the nation's air transportation system. It
also imposes measures that would require TSA to increase inspections of
air cargo shippers and their facilities and to work with foreign countries
to conduct regular inspections at facilities transporting air cargo to the
United States. Title II would require the creation of an industrywide
pilot database of known shippers of cargo in passenger aircraft. TSA would
also be required to conduct random inspections of freight forwarder
facilities, perform an assessment of the current Indirect Air Carrier
Program, 10 and report to Congress on the random audit system. Upon the
recommendation of the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, the
Secretary of Transportation would be required to suspend or revoke the
certificate of a noncompliant freight forwarder.

Title II would direct TSA to develop a training program for air cargo
handlers. TSA would also be required to create a program for all- cargo
air carriers to develop an approved plan for the security of their
facilities, operations, cargo, and personnel. Any plan would need to
address the security of the carrier*s property at each airport it serves,
the background checks for all employees with access to operations, the
training for all employees and contractors with security responsibilities,
the screening of all flight crews and others aboard flights, the security
procedures for cargo, and other necessary measures.

10 An indirect air carrier is another term for a freight forwarder.
Appendix II: Proposed Legislation on Air

Cargo Security

Appendix III: Key Recommendations on Air Cargo Security

Page 25 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

Since 1990, recommendations have been made or mandates issued to improve
air cargo security by the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, the
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (also called the
Gore Commission), the Cargo Working Group (an FAA- industry partnership),
and DOT*s Office of Inspector General (OIG). Table 3 summarizes key
recommendations. The left column describes the recommendation, the group(
s) that made the recommendation, and the date it was made; the right
column shows the status of the recommendation.

Table 3: Status of Key Recommendations on Air Cargo Security
Recommendation Status

Tighten the definition of *known shipper* to ensure a greater measure of
security in the transportation of cargo on passenger aircraft. (Cargo
Working Group, 1996)

FAA changed the definition of known shipper in September 1999. The change
required that a known shipper must have an established business history
with the air carrier or freight forwarder.

Conduct a feasibility study on the establishment of a third party
inspection and compliance program for the Indirect Air Carrier Program, a
and distribute inspection results to the industry. (Cargo Working Group,
1996)

Not conducted by FAA. Cooperate with industry to explore technologies to
develop a profile to be applied to cargo shipments. (Gore Commission,
1997)

FAA issued a final report on how to develop a computer- assisted cargo
profiling system. TSA began field testing the system in October 2002 and
expects to issue a progress report in December 2002. Establish, in
cooperation with the air cargo industry, a training program directed at
passenger air carriers, freight forwarders, and contract ground personnel.
The training program will: 1) include cargo acceptance and ground
transport measures, 2) require initial and recurrent participation and
documentation, and 3) be incorporated in the Air Carrier Standard Security
Program and the Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program. (Cargo
Working Group, 1996)

FAA worked with the air cargo industry to develop a training tape and
guidance for understanding and implementing program requirements.

Improve the line of communication between FAA field, principal security
inspectors, and regional cargo- security coordinators through a training
program coordinated with the industry. (Cargo Working Group, 1996)

In September 1999, FAA developed a Cargo Security Basic Course to
familiarize newly hired FAA cargo security inspectors with the regulatory
requirements placed on domestic and international shippers, and on air
carriers who submit and accept freight for air carriage. Conduct research
and development to find an effective explosives detection system to screen
baggage and cargo; institute interim screening measures until this system
is developed. (Aviation Security Improvement Act, 1990)

Deploy advanced technology on a test- and- evaluation for use in screening
cargo in an operational environment. (Cargo Working Group, 1997)

TSA conducted operational tests of trace explosives detection devices to
screen air cargo, and it considered the test successful. The agency also
conducted research on Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis to screen cargo for
explosives and found it not viable because of cost ($ 10 million per unit)
and time (screens one container per hour). TSA budgeted $7 million in
fiscal year 2002 to conduct research on new technologies to screen air
cargo, and budgeted $13 million in fiscal year 2003 for that purpose.

Appendix III: Key Recommendations on Air Cargo Security

Appendix III: Key Recommendations on Air Cargo Security

Page 26 GAO- 03- 344 Air Cargo Vulnerabilities and Improvements

Recommendation Status

Implement a comprehensive plan to address the threat of explosives and
other threat objects in cargo, and work with industry to develop new
initiatives in this area. (Gore Commission, 1997)

Not implemented. Conduct regularly scheduled assessments of air carrier
and freight forwarder operations. (OIG, 1998)

FAA inspections were expanded to include shippers and freight forwarders,
and a database was established to record assessment information. a An
indirect air carrier is a freight forwarder.

Sources: GAO analysis of reports by the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security (Gore Commission), Cargo Working Group, and DOT*s
Office of Inspector General; the Aviation Security Improvement Act of
1990; and information provided by TSA.

(540046)

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