Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials,
New Initiatives, and Challenges (18-NOV-02, GAO-03-297T).
After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, concerns intensified
over the vulnerability of U.S. ports to acts of terrorism. One
particular concern involves the possibility that terrorists would
attempt to smuggle illegal fissile material or a tactical nuclear
weapon into the country through a cargo container shipped from
overseas. This testimony discusses the programs already in place
to counter such attempts, new initiatives now under way to
enhance the nation's security against such attempts, and the key
challenges faced in implementing these various efforts.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-297T
ACCNO: A05545
TITLE: Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear
Materials, New Initiatives, and Challenges
DATE: 11/18/2002
SUBJECT: Hazardous substances
Inspection
Nuclear weapons
Smuggling
Terrorism
National preparedness
Customs Service Container Security
Initiative Program
Customs Service Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism Program
DOE Second Line of Defense Program
******************************************************************
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GAO-03-297T
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs,
and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform
United States General Accounting Office
GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 11: 00 a. m. EST in New York, New
York, Monday, November 18, 2002 CONTAINER SECURITY
Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and
Challenges
Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
GAO- 03- 297T
U. S. ports have programs in place to detect illegal fissile material or
nuclear weapons, but these programs are limited in several respects. They
focus on screening a small portion of total cargo as it enters the
country, and they are carried out without the use of adequate detection
aids, such as equipment that can scan entire containers for radiation.
Efforts to target cargo for screening are hampered by the quality of
information regarding which cargo poses the greatest risk.
New initiatives are under way to supplement these programs. The
predominant focus of these initiatives has been to establish additional
lines of security in the supply chain of international commerce. In
essence, this means moving part of the security effort overseas, where
goods are prepared for shipment into this country. These initiatives
include such efforts as establishing international standards for ports,
carriers, and maritime workers; stationing Customs personnel overseas;
reducing security vulnerabilities all the way back to points of
manufacture; and using new technology to monitor the contents and movement
of containers from their point of origin.
The nation faces three key challenges to implementing efforts to improve
the security of ports and containers: creating and enforcing a set of
security standards, ensuring the cooperation of diverse groups with
competing interests when it comes to the specifics of how things are to be
done, and paying the increased security bill. Such challenges exist both
for strengthening domestic efforts and for developing new initiatives that
expand security on an international basis. GAO is currently reviewing
several aspects of port and container security, and will report as those
efforts are completed.
Overview of Supply Chain for Cargo Containers Key parties involved:
Exporter Freight consolidator Inland carrier (truck/ rail) Terminal
operator Freight forwarder
Export side Containerized goods ready for shipment Shipment aboard ocean
carrier Delivery at receiving port
Key parties involved:
Customs broker Customs inspection Terminal operator Inland carrier (truck/
rail) Importer
Import side
Source: GAO, (c) Nova Development Corporation and Corbis Images
(DigitalStock).
CONTAINER SECURITY
Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and
Challenges
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 297T. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact JayEtta Hecker at (202) 512- 2834 or heckerj@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 297T, a testimony
before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform
November 2002
After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, concerns intensified over the
vulnerability of U. S. ports to acts of terrorism. One particular concern
involves the possibility that terrorists would attempt to smuggle illegal
fissile material or a tactical nuclear weapon into the country through a
cargo container shipped from overseas. This testimony discusses the
programs already in place to counter such attempts, new initiatives now
under way to enhance the nation*s security against such attempts, and the
key challenges faced in implementing these various efforts.
Page 1 GAO- 03- 297T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity
to be here in New York City to discuss our work on efforts to address
security risks related to U. S. ports. These risks are clearly serious
ones that pose national security concerns. We have issued several reports
and testimony statements related to nuclear smuggling and port security in
general.
My testimony focuses on (1) the programs in place to prevent illegal
fissile material or a tactical nuclear weapon from being smuggled into the
United States through our ports; (2) new efforts under way to counter such
smuggling, both domestically and abroad; and (3) the key challenges faced
in implementing these various efforts. We have excluded information on
these topics that has been deemed law- enforcement sensitive by the U. S.
Customs Service (Customs), which precludes us from discussing it in an
open hearing such as this. My remarks are based on completed GAO work on
Customs efforts to detect hazardous materials at U. S. ports and federal
efforts to secure U. S. seaports, as well as challenges involved in
implementing these initiatives. 1 We are also presenting information based
on ongoing work regarding new initiatives that address overseas supply
chain security. See the appendix for a more detailed explanation of our
scope and methodology.
In summary: * The programs already in place at U. S. ports for detecting
illegal fissile
material or nuclear weapons are limited in a number of respects. They
focus on screening a small portion of total cargo as it enters U. S.
ports, and they are carried out without the use of adequate detection
aids, such as radiation- detection equipment that can scan the entire
contents of cargo containers. Instead, Customs personnel rely on small,
handheld radiation pagers that have a limited range and capability. Other
screening programs designed more broadly to identify any illegal or
hazardous cargoes could potentially help identify such nuclear material as
well, but these programs
1 Previous GAO reports and testimony statements on these issues include
Nuclear Proliferation: U. S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need
Strengthened Coordination and Planning, GAO- 02- 426 (Washington, D. C.:
May 16, 2002); Nuclear Proliferation: U. S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear
Smuggling, GAO- 02- 989T (Washington, D. C.: July 30, 2002); Port
Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives
Successful, GAO- 02- 993T (Tampa, FL: August 5, 2002); and Customs
Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment, GAO-
03- 235T (Washington, D. C.: October 17, 2002).
Page 2 GAO- 03- 297T
rely heavily on the availability of quality information for targeting
those cargoes posing the greatest risk. The Customs Service acknowledges
that the accuracy of such information still needs improvement.
The predominant focus of most new initiatives has been to establish
additional lines of security in the supply chain of international
commerce. In essence, this means moving part of the effort overseas, where
goods are prepared for shipment into this country. These initiatives
include such efforts as establishing international standards for ports,
carriers, and maritime workers; stationing Customs personnel overseas to
identify highrisk containers before inspection in foreign ports; reducing
security vulnerabilities along the overseas portion of the supply chain;
and using new technology to monitor the contents and movement of
containers from their points of origin. Because the United States
functions in a global economy where international organizations are
addressing similar issues, current U. S.- led efforts are evolving within
that context.
The United States faces considerable challenges to successfully
implement these existing and new efforts, both at home and abroad. Our
reviews of port security programs have shown that even on the domestic
front, the federal government faces challenges in creating and enforcing a
set of security standards, ensuring the cooperation of diverse groups with
competing interests when it comes to the specifics of how things are to be
done, and paying the increased security bill. Our preliminary work
indicates that these same challenges are likely to exist in efforts to
extend strong measures of security elsewhere. To make its programs work,
the United States is participating in and seeking to achieve consensus
through a variety of international organizations, across many countries.
Seaports are critical gateways for the movement of international commerce.
More than 95 percent of our non* North American foreign trade arrives by
ship. In 2001, approximately 5,400 ships carrying multinational crews and
cargoes from around the globe made more than 60,000 U. S. port calls. More
than 6 million containers (suitable for truck- trailers) enter the country
annually. Particularly with *just- in- time* deliveries of goods, the
expeditious flow of commerce through these ports is so essential that the
Coast Guard Commandant stated after September 11th, *even slowing the
Background
Page 3 GAO- 03- 297T
flow long enough to inspect either all or a statistically significant
random selection of imports would be economically intolerable.* 2
As indispensable as the rapid flow of commerce is, the terrorist attacks
of September 11th have served to heighten awareness about the supply
system*s vulnerability to terrorist actions. Drugs and illegal aliens are
routinely smuggled into this country, not only in small boats but also
hidden among otherwise legitimate cargoes on large commercial ships. These
same pathways are available for exploitation by a terrorist organization
or any nation or person wishing to attack us surreptitiously. The
Brookings Institution reported in 2002 that a weapon of mass destruction
shipped by container or mail could cause damage and disruption costing the
economy as much as $1 trillion. 3 Port vulnerabilities stem from
inadequate security measures as well as from the challenge of monitoring
the vast and rapidly increasing volume of cargo, persons, and vessels
passing through the ports. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising
that various assessments of national security have concluded that the
nation*s ports are far more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than the
nation*s aviation system, where most of the nation*s efforts and resources
have been placed since September 11th. 4
Guarding against the introduction of nuclear or other dangerous cargo into
the United States involves having effective security measures at numerous
points along the supply chain. Transporting a shipping container from its
international point of origin to its final destination is a complex
process that involves many different participants and many points of
transfer. Many of these participants carry out their roles in the
exporting country (see fig. 1). The actual materials in a container can
potentially be affected not just by the manufacturer or supplier of the
material being shipped, but also by carriers who are responsible for
getting the material to a port and by personnel who load containers onto
the ships. Others who interact with the cargo or have access to the
records of the goods being shipped include exporters who make arrangements
for shipping and loading, freight
2 Admiral James M. Loy and Captain Robert G. Ross, U. S. Coast Guard,
Global Trade: America*s Achilles* Heel (February 2002); and Meeting the
Homeland Security Challenge: A Principled Strategy for a Balanced and
Practical Response (September 2001).
3 Michael E. O*Hanlon et al., Protecting the American Homeland: A
Preliminary Analysis,
Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002. 4 Independent Task
Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, America Still
Unprepared* America Still in Danger, October 2002.
Page 4 GAO- 03- 297T
consolidators who package disparate shipments into containers, and
forwarders who manage and process the information about what is being
loaded onto the ship. Review by the Customs Service, which traditionally
comes once the ship arrives at its destination, is likewise just one step
in the transportation chain on the domestic side.
Figure 1: Overview of Supply Chain for Cargo Containers
Detecting smuggled fissile material that could be used to make a nuclear
weapon is a difficult task not just because it is a potential needle in
this vast haystack of international trade. It is also difficult because
one of the materials that is of greatest concern* highly enriched uranium*
has a relatively low level of radioactivity and is therefore very
difficult to find with radiation- detection equipment. By contrast,
radioactive materials that could be used in conjunction with conventional
explosives to create a socalled dirty bomb are somewhat easier to detect,
because they have much higher levels of radioactivity. Because of the
complexity of detecting nuclear material, the Customs officers or border
guards who are
Key parties involved:
Exporter Freight consolidator Inland carrier (truck/ rail) Terminal
operator Freight forwarder
Export side Containerized goods ready for shipment Shipment aboard ocean
carrier Delivery at receiving port
Key parties involved:
Customs broker Customs inspection Terminal operator Inland carrier (truck/
rail) Importer
Import side
Source: GAO, (c) Nova Development Corporation and Corbis Images
(DigitalStock).
Page 5 GAO- 03- 297T
responsible for operating the equipment must also be trained in using
handheld radiation detectors to pinpoint the source of an alarm,
identifying false alarms, and responding to cases of illicit nuclear
smuggling.
Existing programs for detecting the smuggling of nuclear materials are
spearheaded by the Customs Service and are directed mainly at the import
side of the transportation chain. Some of these efforts focus specifically
on detecting nuclear materials, while others are directed at the wider
range of hazardous and illegal shipments. In addition, several other
federal agencies have efforts under way that are directed at the export
side of the transportation chain* that is, at detecting and stopping
shipments of nuclear materials before they leave the country of origin. We
and others have pointed out that these programs lack many components, such
as the best detection technology, for providing a more effective
deterrent.
The Customs Service currently has some equipment in place for detecting
radioactive or nuclear materials in the nation*s ports and has begun
training its agents to recognize and respond to radioactive materials.
However, this equipment has limited effectiveness, and the agency*s
training programs, among other things, have not been integrated into a
comprehensive plan. 5
Customs* current screening program is based on several types of
radiationscreening technology, only some of which are up and running:
Radiation- detection pagers. Customs acquired radiation- detection
pagers, which are worn on a belt, have limited range, and were not
designed to detect weapons- usable radioactive material. Customs has
deployed about 4,200 pagers among its 7,500 inspectors and expects every
inspector to have a pager by September 2003. According to experts with
whom we have spoken, these pagers are more effectively used in conjunction
with other detection equipment rather than as a primary means of
detection.
5 Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection
Equipment,
GAO- 03- 235T (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 17, 2002). We are continuing to
conduct work on this issue. Existing Programs for
Countering Nuclear Smuggling at Domestic and International Ports Are
Limited
Efforts Aimed Specifically at Detecting Nuclear Cargo Entering U. S. Ports
Page 6 GAO- 03- 297T
X- ray* compatible detectors. These radiation detectors are installed on
X- ray machines that screen small packages. Customs has installed about
200 such detectors nationwide at border crossings and ports of entry.
These detectors are not large enough to screen entire containers or other
large cargo, however.
Portal monitors. These detectors, which are not yet in place in ports or
other points of entry, are larger than those on X- ray machines and are
capable of screening the entire contents of containers, cars, or trucks.
Customs is now completing a pilot test of such a monitor at one border
crossing, and Customs officials told us that they plan to purchase up to
400 portal monitors by the end of fiscal year 2003.
According to Customs, about 5,000 of its approximately 7,500 inspectors
have been trained to identify materials and components associated with the
development and deployment of nuclear weapons. Customs also plans to give
specialized training in the detection of nuclear material to as many as
140 of its inspectors, in cooperation with the Department of Energy*s
national laboratories. However, Customs has not yet developed an overall
plan that coordinates equipment purchases and personnel training. Such a
plan would also address such things as vulnerabilities and risks; identify
the complement of radiation- detection equipment that should be used at
each type of border entry point* air, rail, land, and sea* and determine
whether equipment could be immediately deployed; identify longer- term
radiation- detection needs; and develop measures to ensure that the
equipment is adequately maintained.
Customs has methods and machines that, although directed more broadly at
various types of hazardous or illegal cargoes, can be useful in finding
radioactive and nuclear materials. These efforts are based largely on an
approach of targeting a small percentage of containers for in- depth
screening. With more than 6 million containers a year entering U. S.
ports, examining them all has not been possible. Instead, Customs has
acknowledged that its approach relies on reviewing shipping manifests,
invoices and other commercial documents, and intelligence leads to target
approximately 2 percent of the containers that enter the country
nationwide for physical inspection, though the actual percentage varies
from port to port. To better address terrorist threats, Customs is
modifying its targeting approach, which was originally designed for
counter- narcotics efforts. Customs officials told us that one of their
greatest needs was for better information to more accurately target
shipments. In a separate effort, GAO is conducting a review of Customs*
processing of sea- borne Efforts Focused More
Broadly on Detecting All Hazardous Cargoes in U. S. Ports
Page 7 GAO- 03- 297T
containerized, bulk, and break- bulk cargo bound for the United States, 6
focusing on targeting criteria, procedures, and the use of screening
technology. On the basis of our preliminary work, GAO has identified a
number of challenges related to the implementation and effectiveness of
Customs* initiatives to ensure the security of cargo entering U. S.
seaports. Customs has deemed the information we are collecting about that
work as law- enforcement sensitive, which precludes our discussing it in
an open hearing such as this.
To inspect the containers they target for closer scrutiny, Customs
inspectors use gamma ray and X- ray machines that are capable of scanning
the interior of a 40- foot container in less than a minute. The Port of
Newark has four such machines, called VACIS machines. 7 Starting in the
summer of 2002, Customs began deploying an additional 20 mobile gamma ray
imaging devices at U. S. ports to help inspectors examine the contents of
cargo containers and vehicles. 8 If necessary, containers can also be
opened and unloaded for a lengthy, more thorough item- by- item
inspection.
Aside from Customs* efforts, the Coast Guard and other agencies are
undertaking a number of other fundamental actions domestically to improve
our line of defense. For example:
The Coast Guard has its own screening process for identifying and
boarding vessels of special interest or concern. Shortly after the
September 11th terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard modified its ship
arrival notification requirement. The modification requires all vessels
over 300 gross tons to contact the Coast Guard 96 hours* up from 24 hours*
before they are scheduled to arrive at a U. S. port. Each vessel must
provide information on its destination, its scheduled arrival, the cargo
it is carrying, and a roster of its crew members. The information, which
is
6 Bulk and break- bulk cargoes include liquid bulk (such as petroleum),
dry bulk (such as grain), and iron ore or steel. 7 VACIS is a gamma ray
imaging system that uses radiographic images to help inspectors examine
the contents of trucks, containers, cargo, and passenger vehicles for
hidden contraband. Gamma ray systems are regarded as state- of- the- art
for such applications.
8 Major ports are scheduled to receive additional VACIS systems, Mobile
Truck Gamma Systems, Mobile Truck X- ray systems, High Energy Sea
Container X- ray systems, and Pallet Inspections Systems. Additional
deployments of equipment are planned over the next several years. Efforts
in Nation*s Ports
Remain a Key Line of Defense
Page 8 GAO- 03- 297T
processed and reviewed by the Coast Guard*s National Vessel Movement
Center, is used in conjunction with data from various intelligence
agencies to identify *high- interest* vessels. Decisions on appropriate
actions to be taken with respect to such vessels, such as whether to
board, escort, or deny entry to them, are made based on established
criteria and procedures.
Coast Guard officials are continuing to conduct vulnerability
assessments of the nation*s ports. These assessments help identify where
local ports are most susceptible to security weaknesses and provide a
blueprint of actions that need to be taken to make the ports more secure.
Individual ports are taking a number of actions, often using newly
provided federal funding to help pay for them. Three Department of
Transportation (DOT) agencies* the Maritime Administration, the Coast
Guard, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)* recently
awarded grants to 51 U. S. ports for security enhancements and
assessments. For example, in 2002, the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey received $3.5 million for such activities as developing devices for
scanning containerized cargo for radioactivity, conducting preparedness
training, and installing camera surveillance systems. 9
But actions such as these and the systems now in place at local ports to
effectively identify, intercept, examine, and deal with ships and cargoes
that arouse suspicion, or otherwise do not meet established standards,
remain a work in progress. The recent incidents at the Port of New York
and New Jersey involving the Palermo Senator and the Mayview Maersk
illustrate that basic questions remain about how actions should be carried
out at domestic ports. In both cases, the Coast Guard had concerns about
the vessels but allowed them to enter the port. In the case of the Palermo
Senator, the ship remained at the dock for 18 hours after testing showed
high levels of radioactivity. 10 For the Mayview Maersk, the ship remained
at the dock for 6 hours while the Coast Guard checked for explosives. 11
9 More recently, Congress passed legislation authorizing an additional
$125 million for port security grants, including $20 million for port
incident training and exercises. According to a Maritime Administration
official, the grant application process has not begun, but he expects that
grant awards will be made in the April 2003 time frame.
10 The ship was subsequently towed to a security zone 6 miles offshore,
where inspectors found that the radiation was natural radiation emanating
from the ceramic cargo. 11 The inspection showed that containers had
previously held explosive cargo, but no explosives were found aboard the
ship.
Page 9 GAO- 03- 297T
These incidents illustrate the need for clearer definitions of
responsibility and procedure. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
officials, for example, cited a need for clearer guidance on the
conditions under which ships can be denied entry into U. S. ports and the
protocols for where and how to examine and unload ships suspected of
carrying explosives or weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, turning to efforts outside U. S. borders, our ongoing work
indicates that U. S. agencies have taken steps to address nuclear
smuggling by attempting to ensure that nuclear materials do not leave some
other countries, especially the former Soviet Union. Under its Second Line
of Defense program, the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) has installed 70
portal monitors at 8 border crossings in Russia since fiscal year 1997.
These 8 crossings are the first of about 60 sites in Russia where DOE
plans to install such portal monitors. According to DOE officials, the
monitors provided to Russia have resulted in more than 275 cases involving
radioactive material, including contaminated scrap metal, irradiated
cargo, and other materials. The State Department and Department of Defense
(DOD) have also provided detection equipment and other assistance
primarily to former Soviet countries.
In our July 2002 report, we noted a lack of effective coordination among
the overseas assistance programs. 12 That is, DOE, DOD, and the State
Department have pursued separate approaches to installing radiation
detection at border crossings, leaving some crossings more vulnerable than
others to nuclear smuggling. Moreover, according to agency officials, U.
S. assistance has sometimes lacked effective follow- up to ensure that the
equipment delivered was properly maintained and used. Some equipment has
sat idle for months or years for want of final agreements, reliable power
supplies, or appropriate placement. For example, some equipment given to
Estonia sat in an embassy garage for 7 months while an agreement governing
its release was finalized; portal monitors sat in the U. S. embassy in
Lithuania for 2 years because officials disagreed about whether a new
$12,600 power supply was needed to run them; and one portal monitor
delivered to Bulgaria was installed on an unused road. In many cases,
countries that have received U. S. radiation- detection equipment were not
systematically providing information to U. S. agencies
12 Nuclear Nonproliferation: U. S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling,
GAO- 02- 989T (Washington, D. C.: July 30, 2002). Efforts Aimed at
Intercepting Shipments before They Leave the Export Country
Page 10 GAO- 03- 297T
about the nuclear materials they detect, making it difficult to determine
the equipment*s impact and effectiveness. DOE and other agencies providing
the equipment have identified these and other problems and are taking
actions to address them.
In responding to the ongoing challenges of preventing radioactive and
nuclear materials from entering the United States, the federal government
has recognized that it must take a multi- pronged approach, including
changes on the domestic as well as the international front. Concentrating
on a small percentage of all containers, even with efforts to target
highrisk cargoes, may not provide sufficient coverage. To widen coverage
without bringing international commerce to a virtual halt, federal
agencies are beginning to address those parts of the overseas supply chain
that have received relatively limited attention, including country of
origin. The main thrust of several new initiatives has been to create
multiple lines of defense by pushing security beyond U. S. docks to
include points of departure and, ultimately, places of manufacture. This
is a fundamental change that involves viewing cargo security as an
international effort rather than a national effort. Recognizing the
important role that international organizations play in setting standards
and procedures to facilitate international trade and enhance the security
of the global supply chain, the United States is participating in these
forums to help achieve these dual goals. To develop such international
efforts, part of the federal government*s effort must be on the diplomatic
front as it seeks to forge security- related agreements in international
forums, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO). As the
federal government is engaged in this new approach, it is also attempting
to improve the lines of defense inside our nation*s ports. Although
various efforts to do so are under way, these efforts are in their
preliminary stages. Currently, we are conducting a separate review for the
Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Ways and Means of
Customs* Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Customs Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (CTPAT) programs, focusing on their efforts to address
concerns about the vulnerabilities of the international supply chain
without impeding global commerce. We have obtained data from Customs*
headquarters and have begun foreign fieldwork. New Efforts Are
Under Way to Address the Entire Supply Chain
Page 11 GAO- 03- 297T
The fundamental shift in the approach to cargo security means that a
program must be developed to put in place the additional checkpoints and
procedures needed in the supply chain. The Customs Commissioner has
emphasized the importance of such an effort in testing for the cargoes,
stating, *If a cargo container has been used to smuggle a weapon of mass
destruction set to go off upon arrival in the United States, it may be too
late to save American lives and the infrastructure of a great seaport.
Accordingly, we must change our focus and alter our practice to the new
reality.*
On this front, three primary initiatives are under way. Although all three
initiatives focus on activities that affect the overseas supply chain,
they differ somewhat in their focus and application. 13
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) focuses on placing U. S. Customs
inspectors at the ports of embarkation to target containers for
inspection.
The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C- TPAT) focuses on
efforts by importers and others to enhance security procedures along their
supply chains.
The Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) focuses more heavily on using new
technology, such as container seals, to help shippers ensure the integrity
of the cargo included in containers being sent to the United States.
The CSI program that was announced in January 2002 is a new initiative
intended to detect and deter terrorists from smuggling weapons of mass
destruction via containers on ocean- going vessels before they reach the
13 An additional effort, the outcome of which is classified as law-
enforcement sensitive, is an interagency Container Working Group
established by the Secretary of Transportation to address the security
issues surrounding the movement of marine cargo containers through the
international and intermodal transportation system. This effort is co-
chaired by the Departments of Transportation and of the Treasury.
According to DOT officials, the Container Working Group*s activities are
focused on information technology, security, business practices, and
international affairs. On February 1, 2002, the group made recommendations
to the Office of Homeland Security on ensuring the security of cargo
container transportation. The recommendations addressed improving the
coordination of government and business container security activities,
enhancing cargo data collection, and improving the physical security of
containers. The recommendations also support international container
security efforts and the increased use of advanced technologies to improve
the profiling of containers. In August 2002, a status report was forwarded
to the Office of Homeland Security that detailed the progress on the
twenty- four action items that were recommended in the original report.
New Initiatives Focus on
Enhancing Security of Overseas Supply Chain
CSI Places U. S. Customs Personnel in Foreign Ports
Page 12 GAO- 03- 297T
United States. The United States is attempting to enter into bilateral
agreements with foreign governments to place U. S. Customs personnel at
key foreign seaports where, based on U. S. and foreign data, they will
work with their foreign counterparts to target and inspect high- risk
containers bound for the United States. By working at foreign ports with
local customs, this program is designed to facilitate the early detection
and examination of containers that are considered high- risk. Other key
elements of CSI include developing criteria intended to enable Customs
inspectors to better target high- risk containers suspected of
transporting weapons of mass destruction, using technology to quickly
screen high- risk containers at foreign ports, and developing and using
smart and secure containers.
Customs is currently working to put such agreements in place. Customs has
placed inspectors at 3 ports in Canada (Vancouver, Montreal, and Halifax)
and is now focusing on efforts to cover the 20 ports with the highest
volume of containers arriving into the United States. To date, eight
governments, representing 13 of the top 20 ports, have entered into CSI
agreements, 14 and Customs has placed inspectors in the Netherlands. 15
Agreements are currently under negotiation with six other governments,
representing the remaining 7 ports. Customs also plans to expand the
program to other ports deemed to be strategically important.
Another Customs initiative is the C- TPAT program, a partnership between
the business community and Customs designed to enhance the security of
international supply chains. Through this initiative, which began in April
2002, importing businesses, freight forwarders, carriers, and other
logistics providers enter into agreements with Customs to voluntarily
undertake measures that will reduce security vulnerabilities. Companies
participating in the program must complete a self- assessment of their
supply chain and submit to Customs a profile that describes their current
security practices. Customs then reviews these profiles, certifies
applicants, and provides them with feedback about security- related issues
that need to be resolved.
14 These ports are: Rotterdam in the Netherlands; Antwerp in Belgium; Le
Havre in France; Bremerhaven and Hamburg in Germany; La Spezia and Genoa
in Italy; Singapore; and Hong Kong. Japan has sealed the declaration of
principles to participate in CSI by stationing, on a pilot basis, U. S.
Customs officers at the ports of Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe, and Yokohama. In
addition, the Customs Service announced on October 25, 2002, that China is
joining CSI, in principle.
15 In December 2001, the Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and the U. S.
Homeland Security Director signed the *Smart Border Declaration.* C- TPAT
Seeks to Improve
Security Measures along the International Supply Chain
Page 13 GAO- 03- 297T
Once they are certified, C- TPAT members must still address Customs
concerns on these issues. Customs plans to work jointly with companies to
track their progress in making security improvements along their supply
chains, but the emphasis is on self- policing rather than Customs
verifications. Overall, Customs views the C- TPAT program as an
incremental means to strengthen the international supply chain.
According to Customs, by participating in C- TPAT, certified importers and
their supply chain partners could benefit from a reduced likelihood that
Customs officials looking for weapons of mass destruction will delay the
movement of their containers for inspection. Furthermore, in the event of
an incident, C- TPAT members would likely be among the first allowed to
resume their import operations.
As of early November 2002, approximately 1,100 companies had agreed to
participate in C- TPAT, and Customs had certified 197 importers, 16
brokers, and 22 carriers. C- TPAT is currently open to all importers,
brokers, freight forwarders, and non- vessel* owning common carriers, as
well as most other types of carriers. 16 Customs, in consultation with
private- sector partners, plans to expand the program to port authorities,
terminal operators, warehouse operators, and foreign manufacturers.
OSC was initiated by the private sector as an attempt to make the supply
chain more secure. OSC is administered by TSA within DOT and is funded by
$28 million appropriated by the Congress in July 2002. Like the two
Customs initiatives, OSC seeks to move the primary reliance away from
control systems at U. S. ports of entry and toward improved controls at
points of origin and along the way. OSC relies on using new technology
such as electronic container seals to strengthen the security of cargo as
it moves along the international supply chain. Efforts center on the
following:
ensuring that containers are loaded in a secure environment at the point
of product origin, with 100 percent verification of their contents;
16 C- TPAT is open to carriers involved in air, rail, and sea
transportation as well as to U. S. Canadian border highway carriers. OSC
Applies New Technology
to Provide Greater Assurance That Cargoes Are Safe
Page 14 GAO- 03- 297T
using such technology as pressure, light, or temperature sensors to
continually monitor containers throughout their overseas voyage to the
point of distribution in the United States; and
using cargo- tracking technology to keep accurate track of containers at
all points in the supply chain, including distribution to their ultimate
destinations.
The nation*s three largest container port regions (Los Angeles/ Long
Beach, New York/ New Jersey, and Seattle/ Tacoma) are involved in the OSC
pilot project, which will address the security vulnerabilities posed by
containers entering these U. S. port regions. According to the port
officials, they are working together with federal agencies to determine
which procedures and technologies constitute the best practices in supply
chain security. According to TSA, the OSC final grant award criteria will
be contained in the Request for Applications, which is expected to be
released in December 2002. 17
According to the Associate Deputy Secretary of DOT, who serves as the
principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Transportation as well as
cochair of the Operation Safe Commerce Executive Steering Committee,
meaningful improvement in global transportation security will involve
actions of many international organizations and governments. The
Administration, including various federal agencies, is working with
regional and global leaders and international organizations to further
this critically important transportation security agenda. Key initiatives
are being pursued in the International Maritime Organization, the World
Customs Organization, the International Organization for Standardization,
the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations SubCommittee
of Experts on the Transportation of Dangerous Goods.
To encourage the broadest possible international consensus regarding the
importance of enhancing transportation security on a global basis, the
17 Separately from the OSC effort, the world*s three largest seaport
operators, representing 70 percent of the world*s container traffic, are
collaborating to demonstrate and deploy automated tracking detection and
security technology for containers entering U. S. ports. Driven and
initially funded by industry, this initiative, called Smart and Secure
Tradelanes, is focused on container security and tracking and will be
built on existing infrastructure and technologies that are proven,
available for immediate deployment, and adaptable to emerging new
technologies. International Approach
Requires ConsensusBuilding Efforts
Seeking Consensus with Regional and Global Leaders
Page 15 GAO- 03- 297T
Administration has promoted a transport security agenda both at the most
recent G8 Summit in Canada (June 2002) 18 and the recent meeting of Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders in Los Cabos, Mexico (October 2002).
DOT officials report that in both forums, participants endorsed the
importance of adopting aggressive measures to combat the terrorist threat
to transportation on a global basis* notably, through the work of
international organizations* and to accelerate, where possible, the
deadlines for implementation of important new requirements.
The International Maritime Organization is responsible for improving
maritime safety, including combating acts of violence or crime at sea. The
Coast Guard and DOT spearhead U. S. involvement in the IMO. Ninetyeight
percent of the world*s international shipping fleet operates under the
agreements it promulgates. Following the September 11th attacks, IMO
started determining new regulations needed to enhance ship and port
security and to prevent shipping from becoming a target of international
terrorism. Consideration of these new regulations is expected at a
diplomatic conference scheduled for December of this year. According to
Coast Guard officials, the new regulations will contain mandatory
requirements for ships engaged in international voyages and for port
facilities that serve such ships. The structure of the measures includes a
family of plans. Port facilities and ships will assess their
vulnerabilities and then develop security plans to address those
vulnerabilities at specified threat levels. Port facilities and ships will
also assign personnel as security officers to ensure development and
implementation of these security plans.
According to a Coast Guard official participating in the IMO negotiations,
IMO*s work is central to much of the international strategy propounded by
the administration and the Congress. For example, the Port and Maritime
Security Act of 2001, 19 which is being finalized in conference committee
action, calls for the Secretary of Transportation to assess the
acceptability of foreign port security *based on the standards for port
security and
18 The G8 includes representatives from the governments of Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
the European Union. 19 S. 1214, a bill introduced by Senator Ernest F.
Hollings, was aimed at amending the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to
establish a program to ensure greater security for U. S. seaports; it
passed in the Senate on December 20, 2001. The House version of S. 1214,
the Maritime Antiterrorism Act of 2002, does not contain a similar
requirement. Forming New Security
Consensus through the International Maritime Organization
Page 16 GAO- 03- 297T
recommended practices of the IMO and other appropriate international
organizations.*
The World Customs Organization (WCO) is an independent intergovernmental
body whose mission is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of
customs administrations. Among other things, WCO establishes and maintains
international instruments to make customs procedures more uniform. In
September 2002, WCO organized a task force that is expected to be the
first step in developing new guidelines for supply chain security. The
task force, which plans to complete its work by June 2003, will examine
numerous security- related topics, including enhancement of import,
export, and in- transit controls; improvement of technology; and
development of better data and techniques for selecting which cargoes to
inspect. The Customs Service is a participant on this task force.
Although much of the framework for port security is established by these
first two agencies, the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) is another important international body involved in improving
international supply- chain security. ISO, a worldwide nongovernmental
federation of national standards bodies from more than 140 countries,
attempts to standardize various activities and products with a view toward
facilitating the international exchange of goods and services. In this
role, ISO would be responsible for developing standards for devices such
as electronic container seals. ISO is currently participating in a pilot
project dealing with these electronic seals.
The International Labor Organization (ILO), a United Nations agency, is
the agency that determines the requirements to be included in
identification documents for seafarers. Still another aspect of the
expanded security system involves checking on the background of crew
members aboard ships transporting cargo destined for the United States.
ILO and IMO have been working on the issue of seafarer documents since
February 2002. Also, ILO may consider standards for port worker
identification documentation.
A senior DOT official reports that based on the G8 consensus of June 2002,
the United Nations Sub- Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous
Goods (U. N. Sub- Committee) considered steps it could take to enhance
security through international regulations on the transport of dangerous
goods (hazardous materials). At its July 2002 meeting, the U. N. Sub-
Committee agreed to consider specific measures for inclusion in the United
Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods Establishing
Stronger Customs
Procedures through the World Customs Organization
Developing New SecurityRelated Standards through the International
Organization for Standardization
International Labor Organization Sets Requirements for Persons Working
Aboard Ships
U. N. Sub- Committee of Experts on Transportation of Dangerous Materials
Page 17 GAO- 03- 297T
at its meeting in early December 2002. In preparation for the December
meeting, the DOT Research and Special Programs Administration, which leads
the U. S. delegation to the U. N. Sub- Committee, worked collaboratively
with other governments to gain consensus on security requirements that
could be accepted at the December meeting. These proposed amendments have
now been formally proposed to the U. N. SubCommittee through a United
Kingdom submission.
The proposed amendments call for hazardous- materials employees to be
trained in security at a level commensurate with their responsibilities,
and it requires shippers and carriers of high- hazard materials to assess
their security vulnerabilities and develop a security plan to address
vulnerabilities identified. These requirements mirror those proposed by
the Research and Special Programs Administration for inclusion in U. S.
DOT Hazardous Materials Transportation Regulations, which are expected to
be finalized later this year.
In our August 2002 testimony on security actions being taken to improve
security within domestic ports, we found indications that there could be
considerable challenges. 20 These include implementation of standards
defining what safeguards should be in place and how they should operate,
difficulties in establishing effective coordination among the many
entities that have a stake in port security, and availability of
sufficient funding to carry out the full range of actions that may be
needed. The attempts to improve existing nuclear- detection programs and
to implement the new initiatives now under way could face challenges
domestically and internationally in these three areas as well. The United
States is working through a variety of international organizations, each
with a certain set of responsibilities, to establish consensus and to
encourage compliance on security issues.
Adequate standards, consistently applied, are important because lax
security at even a handful of ports could make them attractive targets for
terrorists interested in smuggling dangerous cargo, damaging port
infrastructure, or otherwise disrupting the flow of goods. On the domestic
front, development of a set of national standards that would apply to all
20 Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful, GAO- 02- 993T (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 5, 2002)
Key Challenges
Include Creating and Implementing Standards, Ensuring Cooperation of
Diverse Groups, and Securing Resources
Implementing Security Standards Could Prove Difficult
Page 18 GAO- 03- 297T
ports and all public and private facilities is well under way. The Coast
Guard, through a contractor, has been developing a set of standards since
May 2002 as part of its efforts to conduct vulnerability assessments at 55
major U. S. ports. The standards will cover such things as preventing
unauthorized persons from accessing sensitive areas, detecting and
intercepting intrusions, checking backgrounds of those whose jobs require
access to port facilities, and screening travelers and other visitors to
port facilities. In the past, the level of security has largely been a
local issue, and practices have varied greatly. The standards are to be
performancebased, meaning that they describe the desired outcome and leave
the ports considerable discretion in how to accomplish the task.
In our earlier work, we reported that effectively implementing such
standards in U. S. ports, even with the authority of the federal
government behind them, poses challenges. For example, at the Port of
Tampa some major employers, such as ship repair companies, hire hundreds
of workers for short- term projects as needs arise. Historically,
according to port authority officials, these workers have included people
with criminal records. However, new state requirements for background
checks, as part of the credentialing process, could deny such persons
access to restricted areas of the port. 21 From a security standpoint,
excluding such persons may be advisable; but from an economic standpoint,
a company may have difficulty filling jobs if it cannot include such
people in the labor pool. Around the country, ports will face many such
issues, ranging from these credentialing questions to deciding where
employees and visitors may park their cars. To the degree that
stakeholders disagree on specific methods, or believe that specific
security actions are unnecessary or conflict with other goals and
interests, achieving consensus about what to do will be difficult.
Developing and implementing standards across international lines is likely
to present a formidable challenge as well, but doing so is essential to
protecting the integrity of the international supply chain. Efforts to
develop international standards are under way on several fronts, but much
21 The House- passed version of S. 1214, the Maritime Transportation
Antiterrorism Act, contains a provision that requires transportation
security cards for entry to any secure area of a vessel or facility. The
bill requires the Secretary of Transportation to issue a card to an
individual who applies for one unless, after a background check, it is
found that this individual poses a terrorism security risk. The Senate-
passed version of this bill does not contain a similar provision, and it
is unclear how the conference committee will decide this issue.
Page 19 GAO- 03- 297T
still remains to do. For example, security procedures for loading and
sealing a container at the manufacturer*s or consolidator*s warehouse, or
for transferring cargo from one mode of conveyance to another, are still
under development. Likewise, international standards covering
documentation on the contents of cargo containers and the credentialing of
cargo handlers and port workers are still being discussed. Because of the
number and diversity of nations and stakeholders involved in the
international supply chain, achieving consensus on these and other
standards could be difficult and time consuming.
Effective cooperation is essential* and not ensured* even at the domestic
level. As we have reported, one challenge to achieving national
preparedness and response goals hinges on the federal government*s ability
to form effective partnerships among many entities. 22 If such
partnerships are not in place* and equally important, if they do not work
effectively* those who are ultimately in charge cannot gain the resources,
expertise, and cooperation of the people who must implement security
measures.
Our reviews of domestic seaports have found that such partnerships can
break down even when procedures are supposedly in place. For example, at
the Port of Honolulu, a security plan exists that calls for notifying the
Coast Guard and local law enforcement authorities about serious incidents.
One such incident took place in April 2002 when, as cargo was being loaded
onto a cruise ship, specially trained dogs reacted to possible explosives
in one of the loads, and the identified pallet was set aside. Despite the
notification policy, personnel working for the shipping agent and the
private company providing security at the dock failed to notify either
local law enforcement officials or the Coast Guard about the incident. A
few hours after the incident took place, Coast Guard officials conducting
a foot patrol found the pallet, and, when told about the dogs* reaction,
immediately notified local emergency response agencies. Once again,
however, the procedure was less than successful because the various
organizations were all using radios that operated on different
frequencies, making coordination between agencies much more difficult.
Fortunately, the Honolulu incident did not result in any injuries or loss.
22 U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Intergovernmental
Coordination and Partnership Will Be Critical to Success, GAO- 02- 899T
(Washington D. C.: July 1, 2002); GAO- 02- 900T (Washington D. C.: July 2,
2002); and GAO- 02- 901T (Washington D. C.: July 3, 2002). Shared
Responsibilities
Place a Premium on Effective Cooperation
Page 20 GAO- 03- 297T
Just as efforts to enhance port security in the domestic environment
require the collaboration of many public and private parties, the
challenges internationally require cooperation and collaboration by a wide
array of stakeholders. Clearly, there are important initiatives moving
forward in the four major international institutions outlined above* on
port and carrier standards in the IMO, on customs procedures in the WCO,
on seafarer and port worker documentation in the ILO, and on standards for
electronic container seals in the ISO. Each organization is made up of
individual nations contributing different levels of development, maritime
activity, and economic capacity. Admiral James M. Loy, former Commandant
of the Coast Guard and current Acting Director of TSA, has emphasized that
reaching global agreements is critical, noting that
*international and domestic cooperation, both civil and military, is
essential* because we can*t hope to ensure our security by working alone
or by waiting until the threats have already crossed the thresholds of our
ports.* 23 Although many cooperative efforts are under way to address
supply chain security, achieving consensus among the diverse parties on a
number of matters in this area and forging comprehensive agreements to
address them will be challenging.
Many of the planned security improvements at seaports will require costly
outlays for infrastructure, technology, and personnel. Even before
September 11th, the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U. S.
Seaports 24 estimated that the costs for upgrading security infrastructure
at U. S. ports will range from $10 million to $50 million per port. 25
Officials at the Port of New York and New Jersey estimate their capital
costs for bringing the port*s security into compliance with the port*s
vulnerability assessment at $73 million. The federal government has
already stepped in with additional funding for port security, but demand
has far outstripped the additional amounts made available.
International ports also may face funding challenges similar to those
faced by ports in the United States. Recently, at an Asia Pacific Economic
23 *The Unique Challenges of Maritime Security,* speech by Admiral James
M. Loy, Propeller Club of the United States, Washington, D. C., October
31, 2001. 24 On April 27, 1999, the President established the Interagency
Commission on Crime and Security in U. S. Seaports. The Commission issued
its report on August 28, 2000. 25 Estimated range varies on the basis of
port size and cost of the technology component of the security upgrade.
Funding Issues Are Pivotal
Page 21 GAO- 03- 297T
Cooperation conference, Secretary of Transportation Norman Y. Mineta
echoed this sentiment, saying that implementation of security measures to
ensure safety of passengers and goods may challenge the resources of
foreign economies. However, the extent of any fiscal challenges faced by
specific foreign ports is unknown at this point.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, the nation*s approach to dealing with nuclear
smuggling is both to develop entirely new lines of defense overseas and to
shore up those defenses that are already in place in the nation*s ports.
The challenges domestically are well known and well chronicled: ports
remain susceptible to weapons of mass destruction, with neither our best
technology nor a set of clear standards and procedures in place. The
challenges overseas could be much the same. Just as inconsistent standards
and security vulnerabilities among domestic ports could lead terrorists to
seek the path of least resistance, overseas ports that do not adopt strong
security standards may attract the attention of those hoping to inflict
harm on America. At the domestic level, the challenges faced can be
mitigated somewhat by the fact that stakeholders ultimately share the same
goals of national security. Although all countries involved in
international commerce may share the basic goal of secure trade and may
share commitment, foreign countries may vary greatly in their
understanding of, vulnerabilities to, and capabilities to address the
threats involved.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may
have.
For information about this testimony, please contact JayEtta Z. Hecker,
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, at (202) 512- 2834. Individuals
making key contributions to this testimony include Gene Aloise, Jonathan
Bachman, Seto Bagdoyan, Christine Broderick, Steven Calvo, Howard Cott,
Laurie E. Ekstrand, Etana Finkler, Gary Jones, Stan Stenersen, Eric
Wenner, Randy Williamson, and Loren Yager.
To determine the programs in place to prevent illegal fissile material or
a tactical nuclear weapon from being smuggled into the United States
through our ports, we relied on issues raised in a number of GAO- issued
products, as indicated in footnote 1. Contacts and
Acknowledgments Scope and Methodology
Page 22 GAO- 03- 297T
To determine new efforts under way to improve port and container security,
both domestically and abroad, we talked with senior DOT, TSA, and Coast
Guard officials, including the Coast Guard representative to the IMO on
international initiatives, a senior TSA official regarding the status of
rulemaking to govern the Operation Safe Commerce pilot program, and the
Deputy Undersecretary of DOT who co- chairs the Container Security Group
on international initiatives to advance U. S. recommendations for
enhancing port and container security. We also met with representatives
from the Ports of Los Angeles, New York and New Jersey, and Seattle* the
three ports that are participating in the Operation Safe Commerce pilot
program* and discussed the new international and domestic initiatives. We
also obtained key documents and *white papers* on initiatives from Coast
Guard and DOT officials and from the Coast Guard, Customs, IMO, WCO, ILO,
and ISO Internet Web sites.
To determine the key challenges to implementing these initiatives and
efforts, we met with senior DOT, TSA, and Coast Guard officials, including
the Coast Guard representative to the IMO on international initiatives and
the Deputy Undersecretary of DOT who co- chairs the Container Security
Group on international initiatives to advance U. S. recommendations for
enhancing port and container security. We also met with representatives
from the Ports of Los Angeles, New York and New Jersey, and Seattle and
discussed the new international and domestic initiatives. We obtained key
documents and *white papers* on initiatives from Coast Guard and DOT
officials and from the Coast Guard, Customs, IMO, WCO, ILO, and ISO
Internet Web sites. We also relied on our previously issued product on
port security, GAO- 02- 993T, August 5, 2002.
(544060)
*** End of document. ***