Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address 
Security Challenges (13-DEC-02, GAO-03-263).			 
                                                                 
About one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target		 
transportation systems, and transit systems are the mode most	 
commonly attacked. In light of the history of terrorism against  
mass transit and the terrorist attacks on September 11, GAO was  
asked to examine challenges in securing transit systems, steps	 
transit agencies have taken to improve safety and security, and  
the federal role in transit safety and security. To address these
objectives, GAO visited 10 transit agencies and surveyed a	 
representative sample of transit agencies, among other things.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-263 					        
    ACCNO:   A05658						        
  TITLE:     Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies 
Address Security Challenges					 
     DATE:   12/13/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Federal funds					 
	     Funds management					 
	     Mass transit funding				 
	     Mass transit operations				 
	     Physical security					 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Transportation safety				 
	     Urban transportation operations			 
	     National preparedness				 

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GAO-03-263

                                       A

Report to Congressional Requesters

December 2002 MASS TRANSIT Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies
Address Security Challenges

GAO- 03- 263

Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Transit Agencies Face Challenges
in Making Transit Systems

Secure 10 Transit Agencies Are Taking Steps to Enhance Security 16 Federal
Government*s Role in Transit Security Is Evolving 21 Conclusions 33
Recommendations for Executive Action 34 Agency Comments 35

Appendixes

Appendix I: GAO*s Survey Instrument and Overall Results 37

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 63

Appendix III: Selected Survey Results 68 Services Provided by Transit
Agencies Surveyed 68 Ridership of Transit Agencies Surveyed 69 Operating
and Capital Budgets of Transit Agencies Surveyed 71 Security of Transit
Agencies Surveyed 72 Funding Sources for Transit Safety and Security Needs
of Transit

Agencies Surveyed 73 Acts of Extreme Violence against Transit Agencies
Surveyed 75 Surveyed Transit Agencies* Safety and Security Assessments 78
Emergency Plans of Transit Agencies Surveyed 78

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 82 GAO Contacts 82
Acknowledgments 82

Table Table 1: Profiles of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited, 2000 65
Figures Figure 1: Ridership by Transit Mode, 2000 5

Figure 2: Sources of Funding for Transit Operating and Capital Expenses,
2000 7 Figure 3: Funding Authorized by TEA- 21 for the Urbanized Area

Formula Program and All Other Federal Transit Programs, 1998- 2003 8
Figure 4: Targets of Attacks on Public Surface Transportation

Systems Worldwide, 1997- 2000 10

Figure 5: Most Significant Challenge to Securing Transit Systems as
Reported by Surveyed Agencies 12 Figure 6: Emergency Drill in Progress 18
Figure 7: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority*s

Training Tunnel 20 Figure 8: FTA*s Expenditures on Safety and Security
Activities,

2000- 2003 24 Figure 9: Diagram of a Risk Management Approach 31 Figure
10: Location of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited 64 Figure 11: Types of
Transit Services Offered by Surveyed Transit Agencies 69

Figure 12: Distribution of Transit Agencies by the Number of Unlinked
Passenger Trips in Fiscal Years 2000 - 2001 70 Figure 13: Distribution of
Transit Agencies by the Size of Their Operating and Capital Budgets,
Fiscal Year 2001 72

Figure 14: Types of Security Used by Transit Agencies in Large and Small
Urbanized Areas 73 Figure 15: Sources of Funds for Operating Expenses Used
by Transit Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas 74

Figure 16: Sources of Funds for Capital Expenses Used by Transit Agencies
in Large and Small Urbanized Areas 75 Figure 17: Acts of Extreme Violence
during the Past 5 Years at Transit Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized
Areas 77

Figure 18: Types of Assessments Performed by Transit Agencies 78 Figure
19: Types of Coordination Specified in Transit Agencies* Emergency Plans
80

Figure 20: Types of Emergency Situations Addressed in Transit Agencies*
Emergency Plans 81

Abbreviations

APTA American Public Transportation Association DOD Department of Defense
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FTA Federal Transit Administration GAO
General Accounting Office ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 TSA Transportation Security Administration TEA- 21
Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century

Lett er

December 13, 2002 The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes Chairman, Committee on
Banking,

Housing, and Urban Affairs United States Senate The Honorable Jack Reed

Chairman, Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation Committee on Banking,
Housing,

and Urban Affairs United States Senate Over a year has passed since the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,

realigned our national priorities. While most of the early attention
following these attacks focused on airport security, emphasis on the other
modes of transportation has since grown. Moreover, terrorist events around
the world have shown that mass transit systems, like other modes

of transportation, are often targets of attack. For example, roughly
onethird of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation systems, and
transit systems are the mode most commonly attacked. 1 In May 2002, the
Department of Transportation issued a terrorist threat advisory to the
transit industry indicating that subway systems were a possible target.
The industry remains in a heightened state of alert.

Addressing transit safety and security concerns is complicated by the
nature and scope of transit in the United States. About 6,000 agencies
provide transit services, such as buses, subways, ferries, and light rail,
in the United States. Each workday, about 14 million Americans ride on
some

form of transit. Because the effectiveness of transit systems depends on
their accessibility, security measures common in aviation are difficult to
apply. Furthermore, government agencies at the federal, state, and local

levels and private companies share responsibility for transit safety and
security and are involved in making transit decisions.

This report examines transit safety and security at the federal and local
levels. In particular, the report describes (1) challenges in securing
mass 1 Congressional Research Service, Transportation Issues in the 107th
Congress, (Washington, D. C.: July 16, 2002).

transit systems, (2) steps transit agencies have taken to enhance safety
and security, and (3) the federal role in transit safety and security. To
address these issues, we visited 10 transit agencies across the country,
including the Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority in Austin;
Chicago Transit Authority; Central Florida Regional Transit Authority in
Orlando; Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority;
Minneapolis- St.

Paul Metropolitan Council; New York City Transit; Regional Transportation
District in Denver; San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit; San Francisco
Municipal Railway; and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority in
the District of Columbia. We selected these agencies because they
represent different geographical areas and operate transit systems of
different sizes and modes. In addition, we surveyed a random sample of all
transit agencies throughout the nation that are eligible to receive
federal urbanized area formula funds 2 to obtain additional information on
safety and security issues. We received responses to our survey from 155
of 200

transit agencies, for an overall response rate of 78 percent. Our survey
results are generalizable to our sample population. The survey instrument
and overall results are included in appendix I. (See app. II for a more
detailed discussion of our report*s scope and methodology.) Results in
Brief Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems
secure

because, in part, certain characteristics make them both vulnerable and
difficult to secure. For example, the high ridership of some transit
agencies makes them attractive targets for terrorists but also makes
certain security measures, like metal detectors, impractical. The high
cost of transit security improvements also creates challenges for transit
agencies. Although some security improvements, such as closing bus doors
at night, have little or no cost, most improvements require substantial
funding. For example, the total estimated cost of the identified security
improvements at 8 of the 10 transit agencies we visited is over $700
million. According to our survey results and our interviews with transit
agency officials,

insufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making their
transit systems as safe and secure as possible. Funding security
improvements is challenging for a number of reasons including tight budget
environments,

competing budget priorities, and a prohibition on transit agencies that
serve areas with populations of 200,000 or more from using federal 2 The
federal urbanized area formula program provides federal funds to urbanized
areas (jurisdictions with populations of 50, 000 or more) for transit
capital investments, operating expenses, and transportation- related
planning.

urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses. This prohibition
prevents transit agencies that serve large urbanized areas from using
federal funds for security- related operating expenses, such as security
personnel. Finally, our site visits and survey results show that
coordination

among all transit stakeholders pose challenges. Our discussions with
transit agency and local government officials and our survey revealed
substantial coordination on emergency planning among transit agencies and
local governments; however, transit agencies reported some challenges,
such as limited awareness of terrorist threats to transit and lack

of coordination among various local agencies. Furthermore, coordination of
emergency planning among transit agencies and governments at the regional,
state, and federal levels appears to be minimal.

Despite the formidable challenges in securing transit systems, transit
agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of their
systems. The transit agencies we visited were implementing strategies to
improve both safety and security before September 11; however, the
terrorist attacks on September 11 elevated the importance of
securityrelated activities. As a result, the transit agencies we visited
and surveyed have implemented new security initiatives or increased the
frequency of

existing activities since last September. For example, many agencies have
assessed vulnerabilities, provided additional training on emergency
preparedness, revised emergency plans, and conducted multiple emergency
drills. Several agencies we visited have also implemented

innovative practices to enhance safety and security, such as training
police officers to drive buses and implementing an employee suggestion
program to solicit ideas for improving security. The federal government*s
role in transit security is evolving. For example, although the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA) has limited authority to oversee and regulate
transit security, it launched a multipart security initiative after
September 11. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation

Security Act created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
within the Department of Transportation and gave it responsibility for all
modes of transportation; however, TSA has yet to exert full responsibility
for the security of any transportation mode other than aviation. TSA and

FTA are currently developing a memorandum of agreement that will define
each agency*s roles and responsibilities for transit security. TSA will
also be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security as part of
the recently passed Homeland Security Act (HR 5005). Although most of the
transit agencies we visited said FTA*s security initiative has been
useful, they would like the federal government to provide more assistance
to

support transit security, such as more information, help in obtaining
security clearances, increased funding, and more security- related
research and development. When considering the federal government*s role
in funding transit safety and security initiatives, policymakers will need
to address several issues, including (1) determining the roles of
stakeholders in funding transit security; (2) developing federal funding
criteria; (3) establishing goals and performance indicators for federal
efforts in transit security; and (4) selecting the appropriate federal
policy instruments (e. g., grants and regulations) to deliver assistance
that may be deemed necessary by policymakers.

To give transit agencies greater flexibility in paying for transit
security improvements, we are recommending that the Secretary of
Transportation consider seeking a legislative change to allow all transit
agencies, regardless of the size of the urbanized area that they serve, to
use urbanized area formula funds for security- related operating expenses.
We are also making several other recommendations that are designed to
promote accountability, direct finite federal resources to the areas of
highest priority, and help transit agencies obtain intelligence
information.

We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this report
for their review and comment. Department of Transportation officials
generally agreed with the report*s findings and conclusions and agreed to
carefully consider the report*s recommendations as the Department
continues working to improve transit security around the country.

Background In 2000, mass transit systems provided over 9 billion passenger
trips and employed about 350,000 people in the United States. 3 The
nation*s transit

systems include all multiple- occupancy- vehicle services designed to
transport customers on local and regional routes, such as bus, trolley
bus, commuter rail, vanpool, ferry boat, and light rail services, and are
valued at a trillion dollars. As figure 1 shows, buses are the most widely
used form of transit, providing almost two- thirds of all passenger trips.

3 According to the American Public Transportation Association, its 2000
ridership data are preliminary.

Figure 1: Ridership by Transit Mode, 2000

Note: Ridership data for 2000 are preliminary. Percentages do not add to
100 percent because of rounding. a Heavy rail is an electric railway that
can carry a heavy volume of traffic. It is characterized by high speed and
rapid acceleration, passenger rail cars operating singly or in multicar
trains on fixed rails, separate rights- of- way from which all other
vehicular and foot traffic are excluded, sophisticated

signaling, and high- platform loading. Most subway systems are considered
heavy rail. b *Other* includes a variety of transit modes such as
ferryboat, vanpool, and demand response (i. e., paratransit).

A number of organizations are involved in the delivery of transit services
in the United States, including federal, state, and local governments and
the private sector:

 FTA provides financial assistance to transit agencies to plan and
develop new transit systems and operate, maintain, and improve existing
systems. FTA is responsible for ensuring that the recipients of federal
transit funds follow federal mandates and administrative requirements.
FTA*s Office of Safety and Security is the agency*s focal

point for transit safety (freedom from unintentional danger) and security
(freedom from intentional danger).

 State and local governments also provide a significant amount of funding
for transit services. As figure 2 shows, state and local governments
provide funding for over 40 percent of transit agencies* operating
expenses and about a quarter of their capital expenses. According to
statute, 4 states are also responsible for establishing State Safety
Oversight Agencies to oversee the safety of transit agencies* rail
systems.

 Transit agencies, which can be public or private entities, are
responsible for administering and managing transit activities and
services. Transit agencies can directly operate transit service or
contract for all or part of the total transit service provided. About
6,000 agencies provide transit services in the United States, and the
majority of these agencies provide more than one mode of service. Although
all levels of government are involved in transit security, the primary
responsibility

for securing transit systems has rested with the transit agencies. 4 49 U.
S. C. Sec. 5330.

Figure 2: Sources of Funding for Transit Operating and Capital Expenses,
2000

Note: Operating and capital expense data for 2000 are preliminary. a
*Other* includes taxes levied directly by transit agencies and other
dedicated funds, such as tolls and

advertising. b Directly generated expenses include nongovernmental
funding, subsidies from the nontransit sectors of a transit agency's
operations, taxes levied directly by a transit agency, and bridge and
tunnel tolls.

FTA administers a number of programs, both discretionary and formula
based, that provide federal funding support to transit agencies. The
largest of these programs is the urbanized area formula grant program,
which provides federal funds to urbanized areas (jurisdictions with
populations of 50, 000 or more) for transit capital investments, operating
expenses, and transportation- related planning. As figure 3 shows, the
urbanized area formula grant program accounts for almost one- half of the
total authorized funds for all transit programs under the Transportation
Equity Act for the

21 st Century (TEA- 21). 5 Recipients of urbanized area formula funds are
required to spend at least 1 percent of these funds to improve the
security of existing or planned mass transportation systems unless the
transit agencies certify that such expenditures are unnecessary. 6 Figure
3: Funding Authorized by TEA- 21 for the Urbanized Area Formula Program

and All Other Federal Transit Programs, 1998- 2003

Note: Totals represent guaranteed and nonguaranteed funding.

Restrictions on the use of urbanized area formula funds for operating
expenses have changed over the years. When the urbanized area formula
program was created in 1982, 7 funds could be used by transit agencies,
regardless of an area*s population, for operating expenses with certain 5
P. L. No. 105- 178 (1998). TEA- 21 is the current authorizing legislation
for federal transit programs.

6 49 U. S. C. Sec. 5307 (d)( 1)( J)( i) and (ii). 7 Surface Transportation
Assistance Act of 1982, P. L. 97- 424.

limitations. 8 However, during fiscal years 1995 to 1997, an overall cap
was placed on the total amount of these formula grants that could be used
for operating expenses. In fiscal year 1995, the cap was $710 million, and
in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 it was $400 million. With the passage of
TEA- 21

in 1998, the restrictions on urbanized area formula funds were again
changed. Specifically, TEA- 21 prohibits transit agencies that serve
urbanized areas with populations of 200,000 or more from using urbanized
area formula funding for operating expenses. According to FTA officials,
the prohibition was instituted because policymakers believed the federal

government should only pay for the construction of mass transit systems,
not their operations. The legislative history of TEA- 21 indicates that
the Congress allowed transit agencies serving urban areas with populations
of less than 200,000 to continue to use urbanized area formula funds for
operating expenses so that they would have sufficient funding
flexibilities. Throughout the world, public surface transportation systems
have been targets of terrorist attacks. For example, the first large-
scale terrorist use of a chemical weapon occurred in 1995 in the Tokyo
subway system. In this

attack, a terrorist group released sarin gas on a subway train, killing 11
people and injuring about 5,500. In addition, according to the Mineta
Transportation Institute, 9 surface transportation systems were the target
of more than 195 terrorist attacks from 1997 through 2000. As figure 4
illustrates, buses were the most common target during this period.

8 Specifically, urbanized areas with populations over 1 million could use
up to 80 percent of their urbanized area formula funds for operating
expenses; urbanized areas with populations between 200,000 and 1 million
could use up to 90 percent; and urbanized areas with populations of less
than 200,000 could use up to 95 percent. 9 Congress, as part of the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA),
established the Mineta Transportation Institute. The Institute focuses on
international surface transportation policy issues as related to three
primary responsibilities: research,

education, and technology transfer.

Figure 4: Targets of Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Systems
Worldwide, 1997- 2000

Transit Agencies Face Transit agencies face significant challenges in
making their systems secure. Challenges in Making Certain characteristics
of transit systems, such as their high ridership and

open access, make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure.
Transit Systems Secure

The high cost of transit security improvements, coupled with tight
budgets, competing needs, and a restriction on using federal funds for
operating expenses (including security- related operating expenses such as
additional security patrols) in large urban areas creates an even greater
challenge for transit agencies. Moreover, because of the numerous
stakeholders involved in transit security, coordination can become a
problem.

Characteristics of Transit According to transit officials and transit
security experts, certain

Systems Pose Security characteristics of mass transit systems make them
inherently vulnerable to

Challenges terrorist attacks and difficult to secure. By design, mass
transit systems are open (i. e., have multiple access points and, in some
cases, no barriers) so

that they can move large numbers of people quickly. In contrast, the
aviation system is housed in closed and controlled locations with few
entry points. The openness of mass transit systems can leave them
vulnerable because transit officials cannot monitor or control who enters
or leaves the

systems. In addition, other characteristics of some transit systems* high
ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance, and location (e.
g., large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)* also make them
attractive targets because of the potential for mass casualties and

economic damage. Moreover, some of these same characteristics make transit
agencies difficult to secure. For example, the number of riders that pass
through a mass transit system* especially during peak hours* make some
security measures, such as metal detectors, impractical. In addition,

the multiple access points along extended routes make the costs of
securing each location prohibitive.

Further complicating transit security is the need for transit agencies to
balance security concerns with accessibility, convenience, and
affordability. Because transit riders often could choose another means of
transportation, such as a personal automobile, transit agencies must
compete for riders. To remain competitive, transit agencies must offer
convenient, inexpensive, and quality service. Therefore, security measures
that limit accessibility, cause delays, increase fares, or otherwise cause
inconvenience could push people away from transit and back into their

cars. Our discussions with transit agency officials and our survey results
indicate that striking the right balance between security and these other
needs is difficult. For example, as shown in figure 5, 9 percent of survey

respondents reported that the most significant barrier to making their
transit systems as safe and secure as possible is balancing riders* need
for accessibility with security measures.

Figure 5: Most Significant Challenge to Securing Transit Systems as
Reported by Surveyed Agencies

Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

Funding Security Funding security improvements is a key challenge for
transit agencies. Our

Improvements Is a Key survey results and our interviews with transit
agency officials indicate that Challenge

insufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making transit
systems as safe and secure as possible. Moreover, our survey results
indicate that the most common reason for not addressing items identified
as needing attention through safety and security assessments is
insufficient funding. Factors contributing to funding challenges include
high security costs, tight budgets, competing budget priorities, and a
provision prohibiting transit agencies in large urbanized areas from using
federal urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses, such as
security training.

Transit security investments can be quite expensive. While some security
improvements are inexpensive, such as removing trash cans from subway
platforms, most require substantial funding. For example, one transit
agency estimated that an intrusion alarm and closed circuit television

system for only one of its portals would cost approximately $250,000* an
amount equal to at least a quarter of the capital budgets of more than
half the transit agencies we surveyed. According to our survey results,
the top

three safety and security funding priorities of transit agencies
regardless of size are enhanced communication systems, surveillance
equipment, and additional training. The transit agencies we visited have
identified or are

identifying needed security improvements, such as upgraded communication
systems, additional fencing, surveillance equipment, and redundant or
mobile command centers. Of the 10 transit agencies we visited, 8 had
developed cost estimates of their identified improvements.

The total estimated cost of the identified security improvements at the 8
agencies is about $711 million. The total cost of all needed transit
security improvements throughout the country is unknown; 10 however, given
the scope of the nation*s transit systems and the cost estimate for 8
agencies, it could amount to billions of dollars.

Transit agency officials told us that they are facing tight budgets, which
make it more difficult for their agencies to pay for expensive security
improvements. According to most of the agencies we visited, the weakened
economy has negatively affected their revenue base by lowering ridership,
tax revenues dedicated to transit, or both. In particular, 8 of the 10
agencies

10 Because about 40 percent of the transit agencies we surveyed could not
provide cost estimates for their identified safety and security needs, we
cannot provide an aggregated estimate for the surveyed transit agencies.

we visited reported that ridership has dropped this year, primarily
because of the slow economy. The decreased ridership levels have lowered
fare box revenue. In addition, state and local sales taxes, which provide
revenue for many transit agencies, have declined with the weakened economy
and reduced the transit agencies* revenue, according to a number of
transit agency officials.

Other competing funding needs also present a challenge for transit
agencies. Given the tight budget environment, transit agencies must make
difficult trade- offs between security investments and other needs, such
as service expansion and equipment upgrades. For example, an official at
one transit agency stated that budget shortfalls and expenditures for
security improvements have delayed some needed capital projects and
reduced the

budgets for all departments* except the safety and security budget.
Similarly, an official at another agency reported that his agency is
funding security improvements with money that was budgeted for nonsecurity
projects. According to our analysis, 16 percent of the agencies we
surveyed

view balancing safety and security priorities against other priorities as
the most significant challenge to making their systems as safe and secure
as possible. Officials from some transit agencies we visited also reported
that the funding challenges are exacerbated by the current statutory
limitation on using urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses.
The urbanized area formula program provides federal funds to urbanized
areas (jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more) for transit
capital investments, operating expenses, and transportation- related
planning. The program is the largest source of federal transit funding. As
mentioned

earlier, TEA- 21 prohibits transit agencies in large urbanized areas
(jurisdictions with populations of 200,000 or more) from using urbanized
area formula funding for most operating expenses. This prohibition limits
many agencies* ability to use FTA funds for security- related operating
expenses. For example, transit agencies in large urbanized areas cannot
use their urbanized area formula funds to pay for security training or
salaries for security personnel, among other uses. Officials from a number
of agencies we visited said this prohibition was a significant barrier to
funding needed security improvements, although several agency officials

also noted that the elimination of this prohibition would be helpful only
if additional funding were provided. Given the declining revenue base of
some transit agencies, however, the prohibition compounds the budgetary
challenges of securing transit systems.

Coordination Is Key to Coordination among all stakeholders is integral to
enhancing transit

Transit Security but security, but it can create additional challenges.
Numerous stakeholders

Presents Challenges are typically involved in decisions that affect
transit security, such as

decisions about its operations and funding. As we noted in our testimony
before the Subcommittee on Transit and Housing in September and in
previous reports, coordination among all levels of government and the

private sector is critical to homeland security efforts, and a lack of
coordination can create problems, such as duplication of effort. 11 In
addition, the national strategy for homeland security recognizes the
challenges associated with intergovernmental coordination but emphasizes
the need for such coordination. According to our site visits and our
survey results, coordination of emergency planning is generally taking
place between transit agencies and local governments, despite some
challenges; however, such coordination appears to be minimal between
transit agencies and governments at the regional, state, and federal
levels.

We found that transit agencies and local governments are coordinating
their emergency planning efforts. Our survey results indicate that 77
percent of transit agencies have directly coordinated emergency planning
at the local level; moreover, 65 percent of agencies surveyed believe they
have been sufficiently integrated into their local government*s emergency
plans. Likewise, 9 of the 10 transit agencies we visited said they are

integrated to at least a moderate extent into their local government*s
emergency planning. Officials from these 9 transit agencies noted that
their agencies are included in their local government*s emergency planning

activities, such as emergency drills, tabletop exercises, planning
meetings, and task forces. For example, when Minneapolis held an emergency
drill that simulated a biological attack on the city, Metro Transit
transported

*victims* to hospitals, even taking some victims to out- of- state
hospitals because the local hospitals were at capacity. Transit agency and
local government officials said their past experiences with weather
emergencies

and special events, like Super Bowl celebrations, had helped establish
good working relationships. According to the officials, these past
experiences have demonstrated the types of support services transit
agencies can

11 U. S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing
Transit Systems,

GAO- 02- 1075T (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 18, 2002); U. S. General
Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental
Coordination Is Key to Success, GAO- 021011T (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 20,
2002); and U. S. General Accounting Office, National Preparedness:
Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts Is
Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO- 02-
621T (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 11, 2002).

provide during emergencies, including evacuations, triage centers, victim
transport, and shelters. However, officials said these working
relationships are usually informal and undocumented. For example, the
majority of the

transit agencies we visited did not have a memorandum of understanding
with their local government.

Although transit agencies are generally active participants in emergency
planning at the local level, they nevertheless face some coordination
challenges. According to our survey results, some of the most significant
challenges in coordinating emergency planning at the local level are
insufficient funding, limited awareness of terrorist threats to transit,
and lack of time. Similar concerns were often raised during our meetings
with transit agencies. For example, one agency official noted that his
agency

operates in over 40 jurisdictions and that coordinating with all of these
local governments is very time consuming.

In contrast to the local level, coordination of emergency planning among
transit agencies and governments at the regional, state, and federal
levels appears to be minimal. Most of the transit agencies we visited
reported limited coordination with governments other than their local
government. Our survey results reveal a similar pattern. For example, 68
percent of transit agencies we surveyed have not directly coordinated
emergency planning at the regional level; 84 percent have not directly
coordinated

emergency planning at the state level; and 87 percent have not directly
coordinated emergency planning at the federal level. As we have noted in
past reports on homeland security, the lack of coordination among
stakeholders could result in communication problems, duplication, and
fragmentation. Without coordination, transit agencies and governments also
miss opportunities to systematically identify the unique resources and

capacities that each can provide in emergencies. Transit Agencies Are

Prior to September 11, all 10 transit agencies we visited and many of the
Taking Steps to transit agencies we surveyed were implementing measures to
enhance

transit safety and security, such as revising emergency plans and training
Enhance Security employees on emergency preparedness. Transit agency
officials we interviewed often noted that the 1995 sarin gas attack on the
Tokyo subway system or their agency*s experiences during natural disasters
had served as catalysts for focusing on safety and security. Although
safety and security

were both priorities, the terrorist attacks on September 11 elevated the
importance of security. (See app. III for select survey results, which
includes information on the emergency planning and preparedness of the

transit agencies we surveyed. Differences and similarities of transit
agencies in large urbanized areas to those in small urbanized areas are
also presented.)

Since September 11, transit agencies have taken additional steps to
improve transit safety and security. Officials from the agencies we
visited told us their agencies have been operating at a heightened state
of security since September 11. According to agency officials and our
survey results,

many transit agencies in large and small urbanized areas have implemented
new safety and security measures or increased the frequency or intensity
of existing activities, including the following:

 Vulnerability or security assessments: Many transit agencies have
conducted vulnerability or security assessments. For example, all 10 of
the agencies we visited and 54 percent of the agencies we surveyed said
they had conducted a vulnerability or security assessment since September
11. The purpose of these assessments is to identify potential
vulnerabilities and corrective actions or needed security improvements.

Improved communication systems, more controlled access to facilities, and
additional training were some of the needs identified in the assessments
of the agencies we visited.

 Fast- track security improvements: Security improvements planned or in
process prior to September 11 were moved up on the agenda or finished
early. For example, one agency, which was putting alarms on access points
to the subway ventilation system before September 11, completed the
process early.

 Immediate, inexpensive security improvements: Removing bike lockers and
trash cans from populated areas, locking underground restrooms, and
closing bus doors at night were among the immediate and inexpensive
improvements that agencies made.

 Intensified security presence: Many agencies have increased the number
of police or security personnel who patrol their systems. Surveillance
equipment, alarms, or security personnel have been placed

at access points to subway tunnels, bus yards, and other nonpublic places.
Employees have also been required to wear identification cards or brightly
colored vests for increased visibility. For example, 41 percent of the
transit agencies we surveyed have required their personnel to wear photo
identification cards at all times since September 11.

 Increased emergency drills: Many agencies have increased the frequency
of emergency drilling* both full- scale drills and tabletop exercises. For
example, one agency we visited has conducted four drills since September
11. Agencies stressed the importance of emergency

drilling as a means to test their emergency plans, identify problems, and
develop corrective actions. Figure 6 is a photograph from an annual
emergency drill conducted by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority.

Figure 6: Emergency Drill in Progress

 Revised emergency plans: Agencies reviewed their emergency plans to
determine what changes, if any, needed to be made. For example, 48 percent
of the agencies we surveyed, regardless of the size of urbanized area
served, created or revised their emergency plans after September 11. In
addition, some agencies we visited updated their emergency plans to
include terrorist incident protocols and response plans.

 Additional training: Agencies participated in and conducted additional
training on antiterrorism. For example, all 10 of the agencies we visited
had participated in the antiterrorism seminars sponsored by FTA or the
American Public Transportation Association. Similarly, 59 percent of all
transit agencies we surveyed reported having attended security seminars or
conferences since September 11.

Transit Agencies Also Adopt Some of the agencies we visited have also
implemented innovative

Innovative Practices to practices in recent years to increase their
safety, security, and preparedness in emergency situations. 12 Through our
discussions with Enhance Safety and

transit agencies, we identified some innovative safety and security
Security

measures, including the following:

 Police officers trained to drive buses: Capital Metro in Austin, Texas,
trained some of the city police officers to drive transit buses during
emergencies. The police officers received driver training and

were licensed to drive the buses. If emergencies require buses to enter a
dangerous environment, these trained police officers, instead of transit
agency employees, will drive the buses.

 Training tunnel constructed: The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority constructed an off- site duplicate tunnel, complete with
railcars, tracks, and switches, to simulate an emergency environment for
training purposes. (See fig. 7.)

 Employee suggestion program implemented: New York City Transit
implemented an employee suggestion program to solicit security improvement
ideas. If an employee*s suggestion is adopted, he or she receives a day of
paid leave.

12 All of these practices, except for New York*s program, were implemented
before September 11, 2001.

Figure 7: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority*s Training Tunnel

Federal Government*s The federal government*s role in transit security is
evolving. FTA has

Role in Transit Security expanded its role in transit security since
September 11 by launching a

multipart security initiative and increasing the funding for its safety
and Is Evolving

security activities. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act gave TSA responsibility for transit security; however, TSA*s role and
responsibilities have not yet been defined. Although the transit agencies
we visited were generally pleased with FTA*s assistance since September
11,

they would like the federal government to provide more assistance,
including more information and funding. As the federal government*s role
in transit safety and security initiatives evolves, policymakers will need
to

address several issues, including (1) the roles of stakeholders in funding
transit security, (2) federal funding criteria, (3) goals and performance
indicators for the federal government*s efforts, and (4) the appropriate
federal policy instrument to deliver assistance deemed appropriate.

FTA Has Limited Authority FTA has limited authority to regulate and
oversee safety and security at but Has Initiated a Variety of

transit agencies. According to statute, FTA cannot regulate safety and
security operations at transit agencies. 13 FTA may, however, institute
Transit Safety and Security

nonregulatory safety and security activities, including safety- and
securityrelated Activities

training, research, and demonstration projects. In addition, FTA may
promote safety and security through its grant- making authority.
Specifically, FTA may stipulate conditions of grants, such as certain
safety and security statutory and regulatory requirements, and FTA may
withhold funds for noncompliance with the conditions of a grant. 14 For
example, transit agencies must spend 1 percent of their urbanized area
formula funds on security improvements. 15 FTA is to verify that agencies
comply with this requirement and may withhold funding from agencies that
it finds are not in compliance. 16 FTA officials stated that FTA*s
authority to sponsor 13 49 U. S. C. sec. 5324( c).

14 49 U. S. C. sec. 5324( c) and 49 U. S. C. sec. 5330. 15 49 U. S. C.
sec. 5307( d) (1)( J)( i) and (ii). 16 According to FTA officials, FTA
verifies that agencies spend at least 1 percent of their urbanized area
formula funds on security improvements during its triennial review. FTA*s
triennial review is a full review and evaluation of grantees* performance
in carrying out projects, including specific references to compliance with
statutory and administration requirements.

nonregulatory activities and to stipulate the conditions of grants is
sufficient for the safety and security work they need to accomplish. 17
Despite its limited authority, FTA had established a number of safety and
security programs before September 11. For example, FTA offered voluntary
security assessments, sponsored training at the Transportation Safety
Institute, issued written guidelines to improve emergency response
planning, and partially funded a chemical detection demonstration project,
called PROTECT, at the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.
Although FTA maintained both safety and security programs before September
11, its primary focus was on the safety rather than the security

programs. This focus changed after September 11. In response to the
terrorist attacks on September 11, FTA launched a multipart transit
security initiative last fall. The initiative includes security
assessments, planning, drilling, training, and technology:

 Security assessments: FTA deployed teams to assess security at 36
transit agencies. FTA chose the 36 agencies on the basis of their
ridership, vulnerability, and the potential consequences of an attack. 18
Each assessment included a threat and vulnerability analysis, an
evaluation of security and emergency plans, and a focused review of the

agency*s unified command structure with external emergency responders. FTA
completed the assessments in late summer 2002.

 Emergency response planning: FTA is providing technical assistance to 60
transit agencies on security and emergency plans and emergency response
drills.

 Emergency response drills: FTA offered transit agencies grants up to
$50,000 for organizing and conducting emergency preparedness drills.
According to FTA officials, FTA has awarded $3. 4 million to over 80
transit

agencies through these grants.

17 FTA also has authority to enter into *other agreements* with transit
agencies to introduce innovative methods for safety and security on
negotiated terms and conditions more favorable to nonfederal participants
than are authorized under FTA contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements
under 49 U. S. C. sec. 5312( d), and FTA may work with other federal
agencies in developing defenses and responses to terrorist incidents. 18 A
professional team of antiterrorism, transit operations, and emergency
response experts conducted each assessment.

Security training: FTA is offering free emergency preparedness and
security training to transit agencies through its Connecting Communities
Forums. These forums are being offered throughout the country and are
designed to bring together small- and medium- sized transit agency
personnel with their local emergency responders, like local firefighters
and police officers. The purpose of the forums is to give the participants
a

better understanding of the roles played by transit agencies and emergency
responders and to allow the participants to begin developing the plans,
tools, and relationships necessary to respond effectively in an emergency.
In addition, FTA is working with the National Transit Institute and the
Transportation Safety Institute to expand safety and security course
offerings. For example, the National Transit Institute is now offering a
security awareness course to front line transit employees free of charge.

Research and development: FTA increased the funding for its safety- and
security- related technology research and has accelerated the deployment
of the PROTECT system.

FTA also increased expenditures on its safety and security activities
after the attacks of September 11. To pay for its multipart security
initiative, FTA reprioritized fiscal year 2002 funds from its other
programs and used a portion of the Department of Defense and Emergency
Supplemental

Appropriations Act of 2002 (DOD supplemental), which provided $23.5
million for transit security purposes. 19 Specifically, FTA will put about
$18.7 million of the DOD supplemental toward its multipart security
initiative. 20 As a result of these actions, FTA*s expenditures on its
safety and security activities has increased significantly in recent
years. As figure 8 shows, if FTA receives the amount of funding it
requested for fiscal year 2003, FTA*s

19 Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act
2002 (P. L. 107- 117, H. R. Conference Report 107- 350). The DOD
supplemental also provided $39. 1 million to the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority for region- wide security requirements, including
$5 million for protective clothing and breathing apparatus, $2. 2 million
for completion of the fiber optic network project, $15 million for a
chemical emergency sensor program, and $16. 9 million for increased
employee and facility security. On August 2, 2002, the President signed
into law the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery
from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States (P. L. 107-
206, H. R. 4775), which set aside $15 million for grants to enhance
security for intercity bus operations. 20 The remaining $4. 8 million of
the DOD supplemental was dedicated to the replacement of buses and kiosks
in New York destroyed in the terrorist attacks.

expenditures on safety and security activities will more than double since
fiscal year 2000* increasing from $8. 1 million to $17. 9 million. 21

Figure 8: FTA*s Expenditures on Safety and Security Activities, 2000- 2003

Note: Data include actual and planned expenditures on program activities
and oversight. It does not include funding for grant programs.

TSA*s Role in Transit

TSA is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation,
including

Security Is Evolving

transit. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created TSA within
the Department of Transportation and defined its primary responsibility as
ensuring security in all modes of transportation. 22 The act also gives
TSA regulatory authority over transit security, which FTA does not
possess. Since its creation last November, TSA has primarily focused on
improving aviation security in order to meet the deadlines established in
the Aviation and Transportation Security

21 Budget data include FTA*s actual and planned expenditures on program
activities and oversight. It does not include funding for grant programs.
22 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

Act. As a result, TSA has not yet exerted full responsibility for security
in other modes of transportation, such as transit. TSA*s role in transit
security is evolving. For transit security, the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act does not specify TSA*s role and
responsibilities as it did for aviation security. 23 For example, the act
does not set deadlines for TSA to implement certain transit security
requirements. Similarly, although the President*s National Strategy for
Homeland Security states that the federal government will work with the

private sector to upgrade security in all modes of transportation and
utilize existing modal relationships and systems to implement unified,
national standards for transportation security, it does not outline TSA*s
or the Department of Homeland Security*s role in transit security. 24 TSA
will be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security as part of
the recently passed Homeland Security Act (HR 5005).

To define its roles and responsibilities in transit security, TSA is
currently working with FTA to develop a memorandum of agreement. 25
According to FTA and TSA officials, the memorandum of agreement will
define the roles

and responsibilities of each agency as they relate to transit security and
address a variety of issues, including separating safety and security
activities, establishing national standards, interfacing with transit
agencies, and establishing funding priorities. For example, TSA officials
said they expect to mandate a set of national standards for transit
security.

Consequently, the memorandum of agreement would articulate the roles and
responsibilities of TSA and FTA in establishing these standards. TSA and
FTA have not finalized the timetable for issuing the memorandum of
agreement. TSA and FTA officials originally planned to issue the
memorandum of agreement in September 2002. However, according to FTA
officials, the issuance was delayed so that the memorandum could

incorporate and reflect the administration*s fiscal year 2004 budget
request. According to TSA officials, FTA and TSA would like to issue the
23 For more information on TSA*s role in aviation security, see U. S.
General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Transportation Security
Administration Faces Immediate and Long- Term Challenges, GAO- 02- 971T(
Washington, D. C.: July 25, 2002). 24 The strategy states that the
Department of Homeland Security will coordinate closely with the
Department of Transportation, which will remain responsible for
transportation safety. 25 TSA is developing memorandums of agreement with
all modal administrations in the Department of Transportation.

memorandum of agreement by January 2003. Although TSA and FTA are
informally coordinating transit security issues, the memorandum of
agreement will formalize their relationship, help prevent duplication of
effort, and help TSA manage the shared responsibilities involved in
securing the nation*s transportation system.

Transit Agencies Said the The transit agencies we visited were generally
pleased with the assistance Federal Government Should FTA has provided
since September 11. Officials from these agencies added,

Provide More Information however, that the federal government could do
more in helping them and Assistance

secure their transit systems. They suggested, for example, that the
federal government provide additional information on a number of issues,
invest more in security- related research and development, help obtain
security clearances, and supply increased funding for security
improvements.

Officials from the transit agencies we visited reported a need for the
federal government to disseminate additional information on topics ranging
from available federal grants to appropriate security levels for
individual agencies. A recurring theme was for the federal government to
establish a

clearinghouse or similar mechanism that maintains and disseminates this
type of information. Specifically, officials expressed a need for the
federal government to provide additional information on the following
topics:

 Intelligence: Transit officials from a number of agencies stated that
the federal government should provide additional information on threats to
their transit agencies or cities. Officials also commented that *real
time* information on attacks against other transit agencies would be
useful.

 Best practices: A number of officials said that information on transit
security best practices would be beneficial. According to FTA officials,
the assessments of the 36 transit agencies are helping them identify best
practices.

 Federal grants: Officials from several transit agencies suggested that
information on available grants that can be used for transit safety and
security improvements would be useful, noting that locating these grants
is challenging and time consuming. For example, an assistant general
manager stated that she spends too much of her time searching the Internet
for grants available for transit.

 Level of security: Transit officials from a few agencies told us that it
would be helpful for the federal government to provide information on

the appropriate level of security for their agencies. For example,
officials at one agency questioned whether they needed to continue to post
guards* 24 hours a day, 7 days a week* at the entrance and exit of their
tunnel, a practice instituted when the Department of Transportation issued
a threat advisory to the transit industry in May 2002. Similarly, our
survey results indicate that determining the appropriate level of security
is a challenge for transit agencies.

 Cutting- edge technology: Officials from a number of agencies said that
the federal government should provide information on the latest security
technologies. For example, officials from one agency said that such
information is needed because they have been bombarded by vendors selling
security technology since September 11; however, the officials said they
were unsure about the quality of the products, whether the products were
needed, or whether the products would be

outdated next year.

 Decontamination practices: Several transit agency officials expressed a
need for information on decontamination protocols. For example, one agency
official noted that information is needed on how to determine if the
system is *clean* after a chemical or biological attack.

According to FTA officials, FTA is developing two mechanisms to better
disseminate information on intelligence, best practices, and
securityrelated issues to transit agencies. First, FTA is launching a new
secure Web site to post best practices and allow for the exchange of
security- related information. In September 2002, FTA invited 100 transit
agencies to register to use this Web site, which utilizes the Federal
Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) secure Web site technology called Infragard. Second, FTA is funding
the transit Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which will
disseminate intelligence information to transit agencies. The Center will
initially be available for the largest 50 agencies. The schedules for
launching or

expanding the Center to other transit agencies have not been established.
Officials from several of the agencies we met with also said that the
federal government should be investing more in security- related research
and development. Agency officials noted that individual transit agencies
do not have the resources to devote to research and development. Moreover,
the officials said this is an appropriate role for the federal government,
since the products of research and development endeavors should benefit
the entire transit community, not just individual agencies. FTA*s Office
of Technology is currently the agency*s focal point for research and

development and is responsible for identifying and supporting
technological innovations, including safety and security innovations.
According to FTA documents, the Office of Technology*s obligations for
safety and security technologies have increased from $680, 000 in fiscal
year

2000 to an estimated $1.1 million in fiscal year 2002. FTA*s fiscal year
2003 budget request includes about $4.2 million for the Office of
Technology*s safety and security technologies, representing a 272- percent
increase from fiscal year 2002. FTA is also conducting 13 research
projects on a variety of security- related issues, such as updating its
guide for security planning,

developing material for a security awareness campaign, and working on
decontamination procedures for public transportation.

A number of transit officials also expressed a need for the federal
government to help them obtain security clearances. As we have reported in
our previous work on homeland security, state and local officials have
characterized their lack of security clearances as a barrier to obtaining
critical intelligence information. 26 The inability to receive any
classified threat information could hamper transit agencies* emergency
preparedness capability as it apparently did at one of the transit
agencies we visited. In

this agency*s city, a bomb threat was made against a major building, but
because the transit agency officials did not have the necessary security
clearances, the FBI did not inform them of this threat until about 40
minutes before the agency was asked to help evacuate the building.
According to transit agency officials, the lack of advance notice
negatively affected their agency*s ability to respond, even though, in
this case, the threat was not carried out. Proposed legislation (H. R.
3483) provides that the Attorney General expeditiously grant security
clearances to governors

who apply for them and to state and local officials who participate in
federal counterterrorism working groups or regional task forces. FTA has
offered to help transit agencies join their local FBI Joint Terrorism Task
Force to better access intelligence information, but it has not made 26 U.
S. General Accounting Office, Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable
Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful, GAO- 02- 993T
(Washington, D. C.: Aug. 5, 2002); and U. S. General Accounting Office,
Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership Sought,
GAO- 02- 490T (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 12, 2002).

assisting transit agencies with security clearances part of their security
activities. 27

Officials from the transit agencies we visited also said that additional
federal funding is needed. As noted earlier, many of the transit agencies
we visited are experiencing tightened budgets, which make it more
difficult for them to fund safety and security needs. Moreover, according
to our survey results, insufficient funding is the most significant
obstacle agencies face in trying to make their systems more safe and
secure. The Congress has

already made additional funding available for transit security purposes*
about $23.5 million through the fiscal year 2002 DOD supplemental. FTA*s
fiscal year 2003 budget request also includes $17. 9 million for safety
and security expenditures.

Critical Decisions Remain Important funding decisions for transit safety
and security initiatives

about the Federal remain. Due to the expense of security enhancements and
transit agencies* Government*s Role in tight budget environments, the
federal government is likely to be viewed as Funding Transit Security a
source of funding for at least some of these enhancements. These
improvements join the growing list of security initiatives competing for
Improvements federal assistance. Based on our past work on homeland
security issues, site visits to transit agencies, and survey results, we
believe that several issues will need to be addressed when the federal
government*s role in

funding transit safety and security initiatives is considered. These
issues include (1) determining the roles of stakeholders in funding
transit security, (2) developing an approach to distribute federal funds,
(3) establishing goals and performance indicators for the federal
government*s efforts, and (4) selecting the appropriate federal policy
instrument to deliver assistance.

The roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in funding transit safety
and security need to be determined. Since all levels of government and the
private sector are concerned about transit safety and security,
determining who should finance security activities may be difficult. Some
of the benefits of transit systems, such as employment and reduced
congestion,

remain within the locality or region. In addition, private companies that
27 According to the Department of Transportation, the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act gives TSA the authority to disclose sensitive
security information to approved officials from federal, state, and local
governments and the private sector on a *need to know* basis, even if the
officials do not have clearances.

own transit systems could directly benefit from security measures because
steps designed to thwart terrorists could also prevent others from
stealing goods or causing other kinds of economic damage. Given the
importance of transit to our nation*s economic infrastructure, some have
argued that the federal government should help pay for protective measures
for transit. Transit officials we spoke with said that the federal
government should provide additional funding for security needs. Fifty-
nine percent of transit agencies in large- and small- urbanized areas
responding to our survey said they plan to use federal funds to pay for
their top three security priorities.

Additionally, TSA and FTA officials said they would seek additional
resources for transit security. 28 The current authorizing legislation for
federal surface transportation programs, TEA- 21, expires on September 30,
2003. The reauthorization of TEA- 21 provides an opportunity to examine

stakeholders* roles and responsibilities for transit security, including
federal funding responsibilities. Since requests for funding transit
security improvements will likely exceed available resources, an approach
for distributing the federal dollars is needed. Transit agency officials
we met with identified a number of possible federal funding criteria,
including ridership levels, the population

of the city the transit agency serves, identified vulnerabilities of the
agency, the potential for mass casualties, and assets of the agency (e.
g., tunnels and bridges). In general, the transit agency officials we
spoke with believed the federal government should direct its dollars to
agencies that are most at risk or most vulnerable to a terrorist attack* a
criterion consistent with a

risk management approach. A risk management approach is a systematic
process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the criticality (or
relative importance) of assets to better support key decisions linking
resources

with prioritized efforts for results. Figure 9 illustrates that the
highest risks and priorities emerge where the three parts of a risk
management approach overlap. For example, transit infrastructure that is
determined to be a critical asset, vulnerable to attack, and a likely
target would be at most risk and therefore would be a higher priority for
funding compared with infrastructure that was only vulnerable to attack.

28 TSA will be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security as
part of the recently enacted Homeland Security Act (HR 5005).

Figure 9: Diagram of a Risk Management Approach We have advocated using a
risk management approach to guide federal programs and responses to better
prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite
national resources to areas of highest

priority. 29 FTA and TSA have not developed funding criteria or an
approach to distribute funding for transit security. However, the agencies
have the needed information to apply a risk management approach. For
example, FTA obtains threat information from a variety of sources,
including the FBI, and is in the process of identifying the most critical
transit infrastructure. In addition, FTA has vulnerability information
from the security assessments it recently performed. Moreover, according
to TSA officials,

TSA used a risk management approach to recently distribute grants to
seaports and is researching best practices for using risk management
assessments.

In addition to a funding approach, goals and performance indicators need
to be established to guide the federal government*s efforts in transit
security. These critical components can influence all decisions* from
launching new initiatives to allocating resources* as well as measure
progress and ensure accountability. The Congress has long recognized the

need to objectively assess the results of federal programs, passing the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (commonly referred to as
the Results Act). The Results Act required agencies to set strategic and

annual goals, measure performance, and report on the degree to which goals
are met. However, goals or outcomes of where the nation should be in terms
of transit security or other national security programs have yet to be
defined. For example, as we reported this summer, the National Strategy

for Homeland Security does not establish a baseline set of performance
goals and measures for assessing and improving preparedness. 30 Moreover,
the goals and measures for transit safety and security in the Department
of

Transportation*s current strategic plan were developed before September 11
and focus more on safety and crime than on terrorism. Consequently, they
do not reflect today*s realities or the changing role of the federal
government in transit security. Given the recent and proposed increases in

security funding, such as the DOD supplemental that provided about $23.5
million for transit security, as well as the need for real and meaningful
improvements in preparedness, establishing clear goals is critical to
ensuring both a successful and a fiscally responsible effort. Moreover,

29 U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk Management
Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO- 02- 208T (Washington, D. C.:
October 31, 2001); and U. S. General Accounting Office, Combating
Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target
Program Investments, GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 74. (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 9,
1998). 30 GAO- 02- 1011T.

performance indicators are needed to track progress toward these
established goals. Another important consideration is the design of policy
instruments to deliver assistance. Our previous work on federal programs
suggests that the choice and design of policy instruments have important
consequences for performance and accountability. The federal government
has a variety

of policy tools, including grants, loan guarantees, regulations, tax
incentives, and partnerships, to motivate or mandate state and local
governments or the private sector to help address security concerns. The
choice and design of policy tools can enhance the government*s capacity to
(1) target the areas of highest risk to better ensure that scarce federal
resources address the most pressing needs, (2) promote the sharing of
responsibilities among all parties, and (3) track and assess progress
toward

achieving national goals. Regardless of the tool selected, specific
safeguards and clear accountability requirements, such as documentation of
the terms and conditions of federal participation, are needed to protect
federal interests.

Conclusions Securing the nation*s transit system is not a short- term or
easy task. Many challenges must be overcome. FTA and the transit agencies
we visited have made a good start in enhancing transit security, but more
work is needed. Transit agencies* calls for increased federal funding for
security needs join the list of competing claims for federal dollars and,
as a result, difficult trade- offs will have to be made. Since requests
for federal assistance will undoubtedly exceed available resources,
criteria will be needed for determining

which transit security improvements merit any additional federal funds. To
ensure that finite resources are directed to the areas of highest
priority, the criteria should be in line with a risk management approach.
In addition to helping distribute funds, establishing a risk- based
funding approach would inform congressional decision making and
demonstrate to the Congress that the funds will be managed efficiently.
Moreover, as the federal government*s role in transit security expands*
whether through additional funding or the setting of national standards by
TSA* it is important that goals and performance indicators are established
to guide the government*s efforts in transit security. 31 These components
are needed to ensure accountability and results. 31 TSA will be
transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security as part of the
recently enacted Homeland Security Act (HR 5005).

The upcoming reauthorization of the surface transportation authorizing
legislation provides an opportunity to examine the role of the federal
government, including its funding responsibilities, in transit security.
However, transit agencies cannot wait for the new authorizing legislation
to implement transit security improvements and are moving forward with
improvements to enhance the security of their system and passengers. The

federal government could assist transit agencies as they press forward
with their security initiatives by allowing all transit agencies,
regardless of the size of the population it serves, to use urbanized area
formula funds for security- related operating expenses. Although
eliminating the prohibition on urbanized area funds would not provide
additional funding, it would give agencies increased flexibility in
financing transit security enhancements so that they could decide, for
example, to use their federal dollars to pay for additional security
patrols instead of a new rail car. This additional flexibility would be
especially helpful given the high costs of transit security improvements
and the declining revenues of many

agencies. Additionally, the Department of Transportation could help
transit agency officials obtain timely intelligence information so that
they can make better informed decisions about their agency*s emergency
planning and response. The transit Information Sharing and Analysis Center
is a positive step in providing some transit agencies timely intelligence
information. The Department of Transportation could take other steps as

well, including helping transit agency officials obtain security
clearances, to further enhance the sharing of critical intelligence
information to transit agencies.

Recommendations for To provide transit agencies greater flexibility in
paying for transit security

Executive Action improvements, we recommend that the Secretary of
Transportation

consider seeking a legislative change to allow all transit agencies,
regardless of the size of the urbanized area they serve, to use federal
urbanized area formula funds for security- related operating expenses. To
discourage the replacement of state and local funds with federal funds,
any

legislative change should include a requirement that transit agencies
maintain their level of previous funding.

To help transit agencies enhance transit security, to guide federal
dollars to the highest priority, and to ensure accountability and results
of the federal government*s efforts in transit security, we also recommend
that the

Secretary of Transportation take the following actions:

 Develop and implement strategies to help transit agency officials obtain
timely intelligence information, including helping transit agency
officials obtain security clearances.

 Develop clear, concise, transparent criteria for distributing federal
funds to transit agencies for security improvements. The criteria should
correspond to a risk management approach so that federal dollars are
directed to the areas of highest priority.

 Establish goals and performance indicators for the department*s transit
security efforts in order to promote accountability and ensure results.

Agency Comments We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft
of this report for review and comment. Department of Transportation
officials, including the Deputy Administrator of the Federal Transit
Administration, provided oral comments on the draft on November 22, 2002.
The officials generally concurred with the report*s findings and
conclusions. Moreover, they stated that the Department of Transportation
will carefully consider our

recommendations as it continues working to improve transit security. The
officials also provided two minor clarifications on TSA*s authority over
transit security and the expected issuance date of the memorandum of
agreement between TSA and FTA, which we incorporated into the report.

We conducted our review from May through October 2002 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report
to the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the Federal
Transit Administration, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, and

interested congressional committees. We will make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no
charge on our Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me on (202) 512- 2834. Individuals making key contributions to this report
are listed in appendix IV.

Peter Guerrero Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

Appendi Appendi xes x I

GAO*s Survey Instrument and Overall Results This appendix presents our
survey instrument and overall results. Unless otherwise noted, we report
the number of respondents for each question and the weighted percentage of
respondents who selected each answer for each question.

United States Genera Accounting Office Survey of Transit Safety and
Security

Introduction The U. S. General Accounting Office, an agency of

If you have any questions, please contact Karin Congress, has been asked
to examine transit safety

Bolwahnn in Washington, D. C. , at ( 202) 512- 8515 or and security in the
United States. As part of our

bolwahnnk@ gao. gov or Michelle Dresben in Los review, we are surveying a
representative sample of

Angeles at ( 213) 830- 1039 or dresbenm@ gao. gov. transit agencies as
well as conducting site visits at selected agencies.

Should the enclosed envelope be misplaced, please mail the questionnaire
to: Results from this survey will help inform Congress about transit
agencies safety and security efforts,

, U. S. General Accounting Office

challenges agencies face in making their systems as Attn: Michelle Dresben

safe and secure as possible, and funding needs. This 350 South Figueroa
Street, Suite 1010

information will be critical as Congress considers the Los Angeles, CA
90071

reauthorization of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century. We
are collecting data solely for

We recognize that there are great demands on your statistical purposes,
and our report will present

time; however, your cooperation is critical to our results in summary
form.

ability to provide current and complete information to Congress. The
questionnaire should be completed by the person( s) most knowledgeable
about your transit

Thank you in advance for your cooperation. property s safety and security
activities and needs. Please complete and mail your questionnaire by July
25, 2002. A pre- addressed postage- paid return envelope has been
included.

Instructions This questionnaire asks for information about your transit
property s safety and security activities.

Please use the following definitions for terms used throughout this
questionnaire.

Acts of extreme violence: Sabotage; the use of bombs, chemical or
biological agents, or nuclear or radiological materials; or armed assault
with firearms or other weapons by a terrorist or another actor that causes
or may cause substantial damage or injury to persons or property in any
manner.

Emergency plan: Document that details an organization s operating
procedures, including the responsibilities of professionals for any event,
human- caused or natural, that requires responsive action to protect life
or property.

Transit property: Also known as a transit agency, transit system, or
transit authority. Includes all transit assets such as facilities,
stations, and rolling stock.

Total number of unlinked passenger trips: The number of passengers who
board public transportation vehicles. Passengers are counted each time
they board a vehicle no matter how many vehicles they use to travel from
their origin to their destination.

2

Section: Transit Property Characteristics

1. What transit services does your agency provide?

( Check all that apply. ) N= 146

1. [ 5% ] Subway 2. [ 11% ] Rail other than subway ( e. g. , commuter or
light rail) 3. [ 90% ] Bus 4. [ 3% ] Ferryboat 5. [ 62% ] Customized
Community Transport ( e. g. , demand response or paratransit) 6. [ 10% ]
Other- Please specify: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

2. Please provide the total number of unlinked passenger trips your
transit property provided ( for all modes) in FY 2000 and FY 2001. ( Enter
number of trips. See definition of total number of unlinked passenger
trips on page 1. )

FY 2000 ( Oct. 1, 1999 - Sept. 30, 2000) : N= 141

0- 999,999: 45% 1,000, 000- 9, 999, 999: 38% 10, 000, 000- 99, 999, 999:
13% 100,000, 000 and above: 5% _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ trips

FY 2001 ( Oct. 1, 2000 - Sept 30, 2001) : N= 140

0- 999,999: 44% 1,000, 000- 9, 999, 999: 38% 10, 000, 000- 99, 999, 999:
14% 100,000, 000 and above: 4%

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ trips

3. Who provides security for your transit property? ( Check all that
apply. ) N= 146

1. [ 8% ] Transit police department ( i. e. , sworn officers) 2. [ 34% ]
Established agreement/ understanding with local or state police ( beyond
routine city

services) 3. [ 35% ] Contract with security service ( i. e. , nonsworn
officers) 4. [ 19% ] Other - Please describe: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5. [ 33%
] No security personnel

3

4. 5. 6. Section: Transit Properties and Acts of Extreme Violence

Which of the following, if any, has your transit property experienced in
the past 5 years? ( Check all that apply. ) 10. 12. 1. ) [ 66% ] N= 145

6. [ 25% ] N= 146

1. [ 22% ] Reported bomb threat on transit property 2. [ 19% ] Reported
chemical or biological substance on transit property 3. [ 4% ] Explosive
device on transit property 4. [ 2% ] Chemical or biological substance on
transit property 5. [ 1% ] Nuclear device on transit property

6. [ 1% ] Detonation of explosive on transit property 7. [ 5% ] Vehicle
hijacking 8. [ 7% ] Attempted or actual sabotage by employee or
nonemployee 9. [ 1% ] Breach of essential computer system

[ 2% ] Shooting with multiple victims on transit property 11. [ 8% ] Other
- Please specify: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Experienced none of the above

In your opinion, what is the likelihood of an act of extreme violence
occurring on your transit property in the next 5 years? ( Check one. See
definition of acts of extreme violence on page

1. [ 2% ] Very likely 2. [ 5% ] Likely 3. [ 31% ] As likely as not 4. [
37% ] Unlikely 5. [ 25% ] Very unlikely

Which of the following assessments of safety and security, if any, has
been carried out for your transit property during the last 5 years? (
Check all that apply. ) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -

Have not assessed safety and security .: N= 146

1. [ 23% ] Assessment of transit system s vulnerabilities to an act of
extreme violence 2. [ 19% ] Assessment of system s ability to sustain
operations during an act of extreme violence 3. [ 21% ] Assessment of
threat of extreme violence to key transit infrastructure ( i. e. stations,

power stations, bridges, tunnels, control centers, vehicles) 4. [ 66% ]
Assessment of safety and security but not specifically for acts of extreme
violence 5. [ 5% ] Other - Please specify: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Please skip to Question 9.

4

7. 8. 9. Have the safety and security assessments identified items needing
action? ( Check one. ) 1. [ 77% ] Yes .: 2. [ 23% ] No .: - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - 11. Continue.

Skip to Question 10.

items identified by the assessment( s) ? 7. [ 23% ] Limited staff
knowledge 9. [ 64% ] Insufficient funding

5. [ * ] Limited staff knowledge 6. [ * ] Lack of staff time or
availability 7. [ * ] Insufficient funding

provide representative data for this question. ( Check all that apply. )
2. [ 14% ] Inadequate information on terrorist threats

4. [ 36% ] Insufficient staff time or availability to complete 5. [ 15% ]
Insufficient time since assessment

8. [ 10% ] Lengthy process to gain approval for action 10. [ 6% ] Other -
Please specify: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

If a safety and security assessment has been carried out, skip to question
10; if not, answer question 9.

security assessment? ( Check all that apply. ) N= 37

1. [ * ] Do not think the transit system is at risk 2. [ * ] Did not think
the transit system was at risk in the past 3. [ * ] Low priority given to
assessments

8. [ * ] Limited availability of consultants

N= 82*

1. [ 15% ] Lack of available technology or information on technology 3. [
53% ] Balancing security and safety priorities against other priorities

6. [ 28% ] Balancing riders needs for accessibility with safety and
security measures

[ 13% ] No limiting factors, all action items are completed or resolved

questions. For this question, sampling errors are less than plus or minus
12 percent.

4. [ * ] Inadequate information on how to assess safety and security 9. [
* ] Other - Please describe: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

N= 107

Which of the following factors, if any, have limited your ability to
complete or resolve action

* Because not all respondents answered this question, the estimates have
larger sampling errors than for other

For which of the following reasons has your transit property not yet
conducted a safety and

* Because only 25 percent of respondents had not yet conducted a safety
and security assessment, we cannot

5

10. 11. 12. In your opinion, what is the most significant challenge in
making your transit property as safe and secure as possible? 4. [ 4% ] 11.
[ 4% ] N= 146

1. [ 77% ] Yes .: 2. [ 23% ] No .: ( Check one. ) 8. [ 44% ] Insufficient
funding - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1. [ 15% ] Very great extent 2. [ 21% ] Great extent 3. [ 29% ] Moderate
extent 4. [ 21% ] Some extent 5. [ 8% ] Little or no extent

Continue.

N= 142

1. [ 1% ] Lack of available technology or information on technology 2. [
4% ] Inadequate information on terrorist threats

3. [ 16% ] Balancing security and safety priorities against other
priorities Insufficient staff time or availability to devote to safety and
security 5. [ 9% ] Balancing riders need for accessibility with safety and
security measures 6. [ 4% ] Limited staff knowledge

7. [ 1% ] Lengthy process to gain approval for safety and security
measures 9. [ 12% ] Unsure about what level of security is appropriate 10.
[ 2% ] Other - Please specify: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

No challenges to making system safe and secure

Section: Coordination with Local, State and Federal Entities

To what extent, if at all, have the local governments you serve
incorporated your agency into their emergency plan( s) ? ( Check one. See
definition of emergency plan on page 1. . ) 6. [ 6% ] No basis to judge/
Don t know

Has your agency directly coordinated emergency planning at the loca Skip
to question 14.

N= 146 leve ( e. g. , coordinated with local government emergency
management agency or local law enforcement) ? ( Check one. )

6

13. To what extent, if at all, has your transit property encountered the
following challenges when trying to coordinate emergency planning at the
loca evel , including with law enforcement?

( Check one box in each row. )

Very Great

Moderate Some

Little or great

challenge challenge

challenge no challenge

challenge ( 1)

( 2) ( 3)

( 4) ( 5) Lack of information sharing ( N= 111) 1% 9% 22% 30% 39%
Difficulty establishing joint emergency protocol

1% 7% 18% 26% 49% ( N= 111)

Inadequate information to identify appropriate counterparts 1% 2% 16% 17%
65%

( N= 111) Lack of interest to coordinate ( N= 112) 0% 4% 10% 18% 68% Lack
of time to coordinate ( N= 111) 1% 11% 21% 26% 42% Disagreement on funding
priorities ( N= 111) 1% 5% 17% 20% 57% Limited awareness of terrorist
threat to transit ( N= 112) 5% 10% 22% 23% 40% Lack of coordination among
various local agencies

2% 11% 12% 24% 51% ( N= 111) Insufficient funding ( N= 110) 9% 27% 24% 15%
24% Other - Please describe: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

7

14. 15. Has your agency directly coordinated emergency planning at the
state leve ( e. g. , coordinated with state emergency management agency or
state law enforcement) ? ( Check one. ) 1. [ 16% ] Yes .: 2. [ 84% ] No .:
( N= 22)

( N= 22) Insufficient funding Continue.

Skip to question 16.

( Check one box in each row. )

Lack of information sharing Inadequate information to identify appropriate
counterparts Lack of interest to coordinate Lack of time to coordinate
Lack of coordination among various state agencies

Other - Please describe: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _

representative data for this question

Very great challenge

( 1) Great challenge

( 2)

N= 146

To what extent, if at all, has your transit property encountered the
following challenges when trying to coordinate emergency planning at the
state level , including with law enforcement?

Moderate challenge

( 3)

* Because most respondents had not coordinated emergency planning at the
state level, we cannot provide

Some challenge

( 4) ( N= 21) * * * * * Difficulty establishing joint emergency protocol (
N= 22) * * * * *

* * * * * ( N= 22) * * * * * ( N= 22) * * * * * Disagreement on funding
priorities ( N= 22) * * * * * Limited awareness of terrorist threat to
transit ( N= 22) * * * * *

* * * * * ( N= 21) * * * * *

8

Little or no

challenge ( 5)

16. 17. Has your agency directly coordinated emergency planning at the
regional level ( e. g. , coordinated with government entities or law
enforcement agencies in your region) ? ( Check one. ) 1. [ 31% ] Yes .: 2.
[ 63% ] No .: ( N= 43)

( N= 43)

Continue. Skip to question 18.

3. [ 6% ] Not applicable .: ( Check one box in each row. )

Lack of information sharing Lack of interest to coordinate Lack of time to
coordinate representative data for this question

Skip to question 18.

Difficulty establishing joint emergency protocol Inadequate information to
identify appropriate counterparts Lack of coordination among various
regional agencies Other - Please describe: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Very great challenge

( 1) Great

challenge ( 2)

N= 146

To what extent, if at all, has your transit property encountered the
following challenges when trying to coordinate emergency planning at the
regional level , including with law enforcement?

Moderate challenge

( 3)

* Because most respondents had not coordinated emergency planning at the
regional level, we cannot provide

Some challenge

( N= 43) * * * * * ( N= 43) * * * * *

* * * * * ( N= 43) * * * * * ( N= 43) * * * * * Disagreement on funding
priorities ( N= 43) * * * * * Limited awareness of terrorist threat to
transit ( N= 43) * * * * *

* * * * * Insufficient funding ( N= 43) * * * * *

9

( 4) Little or

no challenge

( 5)

18. 19. Has your agency directly coordinated emergency planning at the
federal level ( e. g. , coordinated with federal emergency management
agency or federal law enforcement) ? ( Check one. ) 1. [ 13% ] Yes .: 2. [
87% ] No .: ( N= 18)

counterparts ( N= 18) ( N= 17)

Continue. Skip to question 20.

( Check one box in each row. )

Lack of information sharing Difficulty establishing joint emergency
protocol Inadequate information to identify appropriate

( N= 18) Lack of interest to coordinate Lack of time to coordinate
Disagreement on funding priorities Limited awareness of terrorist threat
to transit

Lack of coordination among various federal agencies Other - Please
describe: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

representative data for this question

Very great

challenge ( 1)

Great challenge

( 2) ( 3)

* Because most respondents had not coordinated emergency planning at the
federal level, we cannot provide

N= 146

To what extent, if at all, has your transit property encountered the
following challenges when trying to coordinate emergency planning at the
federal level , including with law enforcement?

Some challenge

Moderate challenge

( 4) ( N= 18) * * * * *

* * * * * * * * * * ( N= 18) * * * * * ( N= 18) * * * * *

( N= 18) * * * * * * * * * *

* * * * * Insufficient funding ( N= 17) * * * * *

10

Little or no

challenge ( 5)

20. 21. 22. Section: Your Transit Property*s Emergency Planning

Does your transit property have an emergency plan( s) or emergency
operating procedures?

( Check one. See definition of emergency plan on page 1. . ) 1. [ 66% ]
Yes .: 2. [ 34% ] No .: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 12. 13. 14. ( N=
96) * ( N= 95) *

Continue. Skip to Question 26.

address? ( Check all that apply. ) [ 16% ] Control center defense

[ 46% ] Vehicle hijacking

[ 85% ] Natural disaster training, on the emergency plan? a. Security/
safety personnel

b. All other personnel

N= 96* [ 27 % ] Hostage barricade situation

[ 75% ] Reported bomb threat on transit property

[ 61% ] Explosive device on transit property

[ 11% ] Nuclear device on transit property

[ 23% ] Detonation of explosive on transit property 11. [ 16% ] Breach of
essential computer system

[ 25% ] Shooting with multiple victims on transit property All have
received

formal training

( 1) Most have

received formal

training ( 2)

N= 146

Which of the following situations does your transit property s emergency
plan( s) specifically

[ 53% ] Reported chemical or biological substance on transit property

[ 38% ] Chemical or biological substance on transit property

[ 23% ] Attempted or actual sabotage by employee or nonemployee

[ 13% ] Other - Please describe: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

* Because not all respondents answered this question, the estimates have
larger sampling errors than for other questions. For this question,
sampling errors are less than plus or minus 11 percent.

About what proportion of your agency s personnel have received formal
training, such as in- class

( Check one box in each row. )

Some have received

formal training

( 3)

questions. For this question, sampling errors are less than plus or minus
11 percent.

Few or none have

received formal

training ( 4)

Not applicable

26% 21% 15% 18% 19% 7% 17% 34% 38% 3%

* Because not all respondents answered this question, the estimates have
larger sampling errors than for other

11

( 5)

23. In general, about how often do agency personnel receive refresher
training or updates on new procedures concerning your emergency plan? (
Check one box in each row. )

Every 2 Annually

Semi- On as- needed

Never Not applicable years

annually basis ( 1)

( 2) ( 3)

( 4) ( 5)

( 6) a. Security/ safety personnel

2% 20% 3% 49% 7% 18%

( N= 96) b. All other personnel

3% 16% 2% 61% 10% 9%

( N= 95) 24. Does your transit property s emergency plan specify
coordination with any of the following

agencies?

( Check all that apply. ) N= 96*

1. [ 91% ] Local police departments 2. [ 88% ] Local fire/ emergency
medical service 3. [ 74% ] Local government ( e. g. , mayor s or city
administrator s office) 4. [ 42% ] Local hospitals 5. [ 22% ] Local
support/ charity services 6. [ 36% ] Other transit agencies 7. [ 38% ]
Other local transportation providers 8. [ 21% ] State law enforcement 9. [
59% ] State/ local emergency management agencies 10. [ 28% ] State/ local
environmental protection agencies 11. [ 17% ] Federal law enforcement ( e.
g. , FBI) 12. [ 20% ] Federal emergency management agencies 13. [ 28% ]
Federal transportation agencies ( e. g. , Federal Railroad Administration,
Federal Transit

Administration) 14. [ 47% ] Media

15. [ 5% ] Other - Please describe: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

16. [ 5% ] As of this date, have not specified coordination with other
agencies

* Because not all respondents answered this question, the estimates have
larger sampling errors than for other questions. For this question,
sampling errors are less than plus or minus 11 percent.

12

25. Have you shared your transit property s emergency plans with any of
the following entities? ( Check all that apply. ) N= 96

1. [ 51% ] Local police departments 2. [ 54% ] Local fire/ emergency
medical service 3. [ 47% ] Local government ( e. g. , mayor s or city
administrator s office) 4. [ 13% ] Local hospitals 5. [ 6% ] Local
support/ charity services 6. [ 25% ] Other transit agencies 7. [ 14% ]
Other local transportation providers 8. [ 9% ] State law enforcement 9. [
29% ] State/ local emergency management agencies 10. [ 12% ] State/ local
environmental protection agencies 11. [ 7% ] Federal law enforcement ( e.
g. , FBI) 12. [ 9% ] Federal emergency management agencies 13. [ 24% ]
Federal transportation agencies ( e. g. , Federal Railroad Administration,
Federal Transit

Administration) 14. [ 5% ] Media

15. [ 8% ] Other - Please describe: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

16. [ 23% ] As of this date, , have not shared plans with any other
entities

If your transit property has an emergency plan, skip to question 27; if
not, answer question 26.

26. For which of the following reasons has your transit property not yet
developed an emergency plan?

( Check all that apply. ) N= 50*

1. [ 22% ] Do not think the transit system is at risk 2. [ 52% ] Did not
think transit system was at risk in the past 3. [ 16% ] Low priority given
to emergency planning 4. [ 36% ] Inadequate information on how to do an

emergency plan 5. [ 46% ] Limited staff knowledge 6. [ 57% ] Lack of staff
time or availability 7. [ 43% ] Insufficient funding 8. [ 2% ] Limited
availability of consultants 9. [ 30% ] Transit agency covered by local
government plan 10. [ 10% ] Other - Please describe: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

*Because not all respondents answered this question, the estimates for
this question have larger sampling errors than for other questions. For
this question, sampling errors are less than plus or minus 15 percent.

13

Section: Funding Sources for Safety and Security Activities

27. Is your transit property allowed to use Federal Transit Administration
( FTA) funds for operations?

( Check one. ) N= 145

1. [ 68% ] Yes 2. [ 32% ] No

28. Please indicate the cycle of your agency s fiscal year. ( Check one. )
N= 146

1. [ 26% ] January 1 to December 31 2. [ 2% ] April 1 to March 31 3. [ 49%
] July 1 to June 30 4. [ 20% ] October 1 to September 30 5. [ 3% ] Other -
Specify: _ _ _ _ _ _ / _ _ _ _ _ _ _ to _ _ _ _ _ _ / _ _ _ _ _ _ _

( MM/ DD) ( MM/ DD)

14

29. Please provide the following information about your total operating
expenses and total operating funds spent on safety and security activities
( e. g. , administrative costs and personnel) . ( Round amount to the
nearest dollar. If an estimate is provided, please check box. )

Fiscal Year Total operating expenses Total operating funds spent on safety
and security activities

1999 N= 123 N= 121

$ 0- 1,000, 000: 15% $ 1,000,000- 10, 000,000: 52%

$ * $ 10,000,000- 25, 000,000: 15% $ 25,000,000- 100, 000,000: 10% $
100,000,000- 1, 000,000, 000: 7%

[ 40% ] Estimate $ 1,000,000, 000 and above: 1%

[ 22% ] Estimate 2000 N= 128

N= 122 $ 0- 1,000, 000: 15% $ 1,000,000- 10, 000,000: 51%

$ * $ 10,000,000- 25, 000,000: 15% $ 25,000,000- 100, 000,000: 11% $
100,000,000- 1, 000,000, 000: 7%

[ 40% ] Estimate $ 1,000,000, 000 and above: 1%

[ 22% ] Estimate N= 130 2001

N= 124 $ 0- 1,000, 000: 13% $ 1,000,000- 10, 000,000: 52% $ 10,000,000-
25, 000,000: 14%

$ * $ 25,000,000- 100, 000,000: 13% $ 100,000,000- 1, 000,000, 000: 7% $
1,000,000, 000 and above: 2%

[ 40% ] Estimate [ 21% ] Estimate 2002 N= 128

N= 126 $ *

$ * [ 70% ] Estimate

[ 65% ] Estimate 2003 ( projected) N= 120

N= 120 $ *

$ * [ 79% ] Estimate

[ 73% ] Estimate

* Because 40 percent or more of respondents were only able to provide
estimates, we are unable to present reliable data for these questions. In
addition, subsequent analyses raised other questions about data
reliability.

15

30. What sources does your transit agency use to fund your safety and
security operating expenses ?

( Check all that apply. ) N= 146

1. [ 40% ] FTA funds 2. [ 1% ] Other federal funds ( i. e. , non- FTA
funds) 3. [ 48% ] State funds 4. [ 70% ] Local funds 5. [ 41% ] Other ( e.
g. , fare box revenue, loans) - Specify: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

31. What FTA programs, if any, does your transit property currently use to
fund safety and security

operating expenses? ( Check all that apply. ) N= 144

1. [ 62% ] Do not use FTA programs for safety and security operating
expenses

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. [ 32% ]
Urbanized Area Formula Program 3. [ 6% ] Nonurbanized Area Formula Program
4. [ 1% ] Elderly and Persons with Disabilities Program 5. [ 0% ] Clean
Fuels Formula Program 6. [ 0% ] Over the Road Bus Accessibility Program 7.
[ 0% ] Alaska Railroad Program 8. [ 2% ] Bus and Bus- Related Program 9. [
0% ] Fixed Guideway Modernization Program 10. [ 1% ] New Starts Program
11. [ 5% ] Job Access and Reverse Commute Program 12. [ 2% ] Metropolitan
Planning Program 13. [ 0% ] State Planning and Research Program 14. [ 0% ]
National Planning and Research Program 15. [ 4% ] Rural Transit Assistance
Program 16. [ 1% ] Other - Please describe: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

16

32. Please provide the following information about your total capital
expenses and total capital funds spent on safety and security activities (
e. g. , surveillance equipment and fencing) . ( Round amount to the
nearest dollar. If an estimate is provided, please check box. )

Fiscal Year Total capital expenses Total capital funds spent on safety and
security activities

1999 N= 109 N= 113

$ 0- 100,000: 25% $ 100,000- 1,000, 000: 28%

$ * $ 1,000,000- 10, 000,000: 32% $ 10,000,000- 100, 000,000: 8% $
100,000,000- 1, 000,000, 000: 5%

[ 27% ] Estimate $ 1,000,000, 000 and above: 1%

[ 19% ] Estimate 2000 N= 114

N= 117 $ 0- 100,000: 25% $ 100,000- 1,000, 000: 29%

$ * $ 1,000,000- 10, 000,000: 27% $ 10,000,000- 100, 000,000: 12% $
100,000,000- 1, 000,000, 000: 6%

[ 28% ] Estimate $ 1,000,000, 000 and above: 1%

[ 16% ] Estimate 2001 N= 115

N= 117 $ 0- 100,000: 25% $ 100,000- 1,000, 000: 27%

$ * $ 1,000,000- 10, 000,000: 31% $ 10,000,000- 100, 000,000: 10% $
100,000,000- 1, 000,000, 000: 6%

[ 30% ] Estimate $ 1,000,000, 000 and above: 1%

[ 16% ] Estimate 2002 N= 112

N= 115 $ *

$ * [ 56% ] Estimate

[ 43% ] Estimate 2003 ( projected) N= 108

N= 111 $ * $ * [ 73% ] Estimate

[ 54% ] Estimate

* Because about 30 percent or more of respondents were only able to
provide estimates, we are unable to provide reliable data for these
questions. In addition, subsequent analyses raised questions about data
reliability.

17

33. What sources does your transit agency use to fund your safety and
security capital expenses ?

N= 143

1. [ 63% ] FTA funds 2. [ 7% ] Other federal funds ( i. e. , non- FTA
funds) 3. [ 40% ] State funds 4. [ 51% ] Local funds 5. [ 15% ] Other ( e.
g. , fare box revenue, loans) - Specify: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

18

34 35. 36. What FTA programs, if any, does your transit property currently
use to fund safety and security capital expenses? ( Check all that apply.
) 1. [ 39% ] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2. [ 53% ] Urbanized Area Formula Program 3. [ 4% ] Nonurbanized Area
Formula Program

5. [ 0% ] Clean Fuels Formula Program 6. [ 0% ] Over the Road Bus
Accessibility Program 7. [ 0% ] Alaska Railroad Program 8. [ 11% ] Bus and
Bus- Related Program 9. [ 5% ] Fixed Guideway Modernization Program 10.
11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. [ 4% ] New Starts Program

[ 1% ] Job Access and Reverse Commute Program

[ 2% ] Metropolitan Planning Program

[ 0% ] State Planning and Research Program

[ 0% ] National Planning and Research Program

[ 3% ] Rural Transit Assistance Program future? $ * ( Check one. ) 1. [
51% ] Yes .: 2. [ 49% ] No .: or N= 146

Continue. Skip to Question 37.

[ 41% ] Do not know* *

we cannot provide representative data for this question.

N= 144 Do not use FTA programs for safety and security capital expenses

4. [ 1% ] Elderly and Persons with Disabilities Program

[ 5% ] Other - Please describe: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Has your transit property identified
funding needed for safety and security projects in the near

What is the estimated total dollar amount of these identified needs over
the next 3 years? questions. For this question, sampling errors are less
than plus or minus 12 percent.

N= 73

* Because about 40 percent of the respondents could not estimate a total
dollar amount for their identified needs, * * Because not all respondents
answered this question, the estimates have larger sampling errors than for
other

19

37. Currently, how much of a funding priority is each of the following
safety and security needs?

( Check one box in each row. )

Very Somewhat

Neither Somewhat

Very Not

high high

high nor low

low Applicable

low or Not sure

( 1) ( 2)

( 3) ( 4)

( 5) ( 6)

a. Enhanced communication system( s) ( e. g. , 2- way radios) 35 29 16 4 9
8

N= 146

b. Surveillance equipment N= 145 29 37 11 8 11 4 c. Chemical, biological,
or radiological detection systems

4 4 11 15 47 19

N= 144

d. Clear, impact- resistant sheeting for transit vehicle windows 0 7 18 21
36 18

N= 145

e. Trespasser intrusion detection systems for tunnel environments 4 2 3 4
12 76

N= 145

f. Application of Crime Prevention Through Environmental 7192151434

Design ( CPTED) engineering concepts into new facilities and retrofitting
existing facilities N= 145

g. Additional fencing N= 145 13 24 21 4 23 15 h. Additional lighting N=
145 17 32 21 5 13 12 i. Security system or security card entrance system
at facilities

24 31 15 8 14 8

N= 145

j. Employee and vendor/ contractor identification cards 23 20 23 8 19 8

N= 145

k. Disposable gas masks/ respirators for employees N= 145 1 5 18 14 45 16
l. Auxiliary operations control centers in the event of emergency

10 16 16 15 26 17

N= 144

m. Emergency generator N= 145 17 20 25 8 16 14 n. Additional or enhanced
training N= 145 26 37 23 6 3 5 o. Emergency drills N= 145 23 30 25 10 7 5
p. Additional personnel N= 145 10 18 30 11 19 12 q. K- 9 dogs trained to
detect bombs or other devices N= 145 3 4 5 4 43 40 r. Development of
emergency plans N= 145 26 29 22 7 5 10 s. Assessing vulnerabilities N= 145
28 33 21 7 6 6 t. Back- up computer system N= 145 14 20 32 3 17 15 u.
Regional crime mapping N= 144 1 4 20 11 31 33 v. Other - Please describe:

Other - Please describe:

20

38. If you had to select three of the above safety and security needs as
your top funding priorities , which three would they be? ( Please enter
the letter designation, a through x, of the need from question 37. )

1 st priority: A ( 31% ) ( N= 142) 2 nd priority: B ( 16% ) ( N= 142) 3 rd
priority: N ( 17% ) ( N= 141)

39. What is the approximate total dollar amount of the top three safety
and security funding priorities that you indicated above?

1 st priority : $ * or [ 47% ] Do not know ( N= 140) 2 nd priority : $ *
or [ 53% ] Do not know ( N= 142) 3 rd priority : $ * or [ 55% ] Do not
know ( N= 142)

* Because about half of the respondents could not estimate the total
dollar amount for their top three safety and security funding priorities,
we cannot provide representative dollar amounts.

40. Considering your transit property s current funding situation, what
sources ( e. g. , federal, state, or local) do you think you will use to
fund the top safety and security priorities that you identified in
question 38? ( Check all that apply. ) N= 144

1. [ 59% ] Federal funds 2. [ 39% ] State funds 3. [ 42% ] Local funds 4.
[ 10% ] Other ( e. g. , fare box revenue, loans) - Specify: _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 5. [ 24% ] Will probably
not fund because of inadequate funds from above sources 6. [ 25% ] Have
not determined

21

Section: Transit Agency Preparation

41. Please provide an answer in each column: a. Prior to September 11,
2001, what steps had your transit property taken to improve its safety and
security?

b. Since September 11, 2001, what steps has your transit property taken to
improve its safety and security?

( Check yes or no in each column. )

Column A Column B Step was taken

Step has been prior to

taken since September 11

September 11 Emergency planning and assessments

Revised/ created emergency plans, including acts of extreme

[ 40% ] Yes

[ 48% ] Yes violence

[ 60% ] No

[ 52% ] No

N= 146 N= 146

Had outside entity ( i. e. , FTA, FBI, state police, professional Yes
organization) review your emergency plans [ 24% ] [ 32% ] Yes

[ 76% ] No

[ 68% ] No

N= 145 N= 146

Reviewed city or regional plans to ensure integration of transit

[ 46% ] Yes

[ 50% ] Yes property

[ 54% ] No

[ 50% ] No

N= 146 N= 145

Conducted security vulnerability assessments [ 33% ] Yes

[ 54% ] Yes

[ 67% ] No

[ 46% ] No

N= 145 N= 146

Developed levels of threat [ 12% ] Yes

[ 25% ] Yes

[ 88% ] No

[ 75% ] No

N= 146 N= 146

Participated in FTA s security audits [ 15% ] Yes

[ 20% ] Yes

[ 85% ] No

[ 80% ] No

N= 145 N= 145

Participated in the American Public Transportation Association s ( APTA)
safety audits [ 17% ] Yes

[ 15% ] Yes

[ 83% ] No

[ 85% ] No

N= 144 N= 145

Training

Conducted or participated in emergency drills [ 58% ] Yes

[ 59% ] Yes

[ 42% ] No

[ 41% ] No

N= 145 N= 146

22

Conducted or participated in table top exercises [ 39% ] Yes

[ 42% ] Yes

[ 61% ] No

[ 58% ] No

N= 145 N= 146

Trained personnel on emergency plans or procedures [ 66% ] Yes

[ 64% ] Yes

[ 34% ] No

[ 36% ] No

N= 145 N= 145

Participated in seminars/ conferences on security [ 42% ] Yes

[ 59% ] Yes

[ 58% ] No

[ 41% ] No

N= 145 N= 146

Reviewed reports on transit security and terrorism [ 44% ] Yes

[ 73% ] Yes

[ 56% ] No

[ 27% ] No

N= 144 N= 145

Created special operations response teams [ 14% ] Yes

[ 23% ] Yes

[ 86% ] No

[ 77% ] No

N= 145 N= 146

Coordination with local, state, and federal entities

Participated in antiterrorism taskforces [ 8% ] Yes

[ 21% ] Yes

[ 93% ] No

[ 79% ] No

N= 145 N= 146

Developed procedures with local, state, and federal agencies regarding
emergency response [ 51% ] Yes

[ 59% ] Yes

[ 49% ] No

[ 41% ] No

N= 146 N= 145

Coordinated with federal agencies [ 16% ] Yes

[ 24% ] Yes

[ 84% ] No

[ 76% ] No

N= 145 N= 146

Coordinated with local and state government entities, including

[ 65% ] Yes

[ 71% ] Yes law enforcement [ 35% ] No

[ 29% ] No

N= 146 N= 146

Coordinated with other transit agencies [ 25% ] Yes

[ 29% ] Yes

[ 75% ] No

[ 71% ] No

N= 145 N= 146

Activities involving staff

Conducted background checks on all employees [ 74% ] Yes

[ 74% ] Yes

[ 26% ] No

[ 26% ] No

N= 146 N= 145

Increased visibility of facility personnel ( e. g. , personnel wear

[ 18% ] Yes

[ 25% ] Yes brightly colored vests) [ 82% ] No

[ 75% ] No

N= 146 N= 145

23

Required staff to display photo ID at all times [ 21% ] Yes

[ 41% ] Yes

[ 79% ] No

[ 59% ] No

N= 146 N= 144

Tracked employee sick days as an indicator of potential hazards [ 18% ]
Yes

[ 19% ] Yes

[ 82% ] No

[ 81% ] No

N= 144 N= 144

Other activities

Purchased security technology ( e. g. , surveillance equipment) [ 50% ]
Yes

[ 44% ] Yes

[ 50% ] No

[ 56% ] No

N= 146 N= 145

Purchased security infrastructure ( e. g. , fencing, lighting) [ 54% ] Yes

[ 41% ] Yes

[ 46% ] No

[ 59% ] No

N= 145 N= 145

Made computer system more secure ( hardened computer

[ 49% ] Yes

[ 44% ] Yes system)

[ 51% ] No

[ 56% ] No

N= 144 N= 145

Conducted public education/ awareness campaign for transit

[ 18% ] Yes

[ 23% ] Yes safety/ security

[ 82% ] No

[ 77% ] No

N= 146 N= 146

Developed after- event media relations protocol [ 34% ] Yes

[ 37% ] Yes

[ 66% ] No

[ 64% ] No

N= 145 N= 146

Tracked reports of sick riders as an indicator of potential

[ 4% ] Yes

[ 6% ] Yes hazards

[ 96% ] No

[ 94% ] No

N= 145 N= 145

Other( s) - Please describe: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

24

42. Please use the space below to provide any additional comments
regarding the survey or your system s transit safety and security.

Thank you very much for your assistance.

25

Appendi x II

Scope and Methodology To address our objectives, we visited 10 transit
agencies across the country, including the Capital Metropolitan
Transportation Authority in Austin; Chicago Transit Authority; Central
Florida Regional Transit Authority in Orlando; Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority; Minneapolis- St. Paul Metropolitan
Council; New York City Transit; Regional

Transportation District in Denver; San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit;
San Francisco Municipal Railway; and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority in the District of Columbia. We selected these agencies because
they represent different geographical areas and operate transit systems of
different sizes and modes. (See fig. 10 and table 1.) During our site
visits, we interviewed key officials from the transit agencies and the
respective city governments and reviewed the transit agencies* emergency
plans.

Figure 10: Location of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited

San Francisco Oakland

Minneapolis Chicago

New York City

Denver Washington

D. C. Los Angeles

Austin Orlando

Source: GAO presentation.

Table 1: Profiles of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited, 2000 Services
provided Urban area

Population Service area

Average weekday Transit agency served served a (sq. miles) Heavy rail
Light rail Bus Other b unlinked trips c

Capital Metropolitan Austin, TX 604, 621 572 x x 130, 640

Transportation Authority (CMTA) Central Florida

Orlando, FL 1,357, 852 2,538 x x 70, 546 RegionalTransportation Authority
(LYNX)

Chicago Transit Chicago, IL- 3,708, 773 356 x x x 1, 562, 105

Authority (CTA) Northwestern IN Los Angeles County Los Angeles, CA 8,450,
001 1,423 x x x 1, 281, 375 Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA)

Minneapolis- St. Paul Minneapolis-- St. 2,265, 788 1,105 x 243, 987

Metropolitan Council Paul, MN (Metro Transit) New York City Transit

New York, NY- 7,322, 000 322 x x x 8, 206, 391

(NYCT) Northeastern NJ RegionalTransportation Denver, CO 2,400, 000 2,406
x x x 259, 703 District (RTD) San Francisco Bay

San Francisco- 829, 156 103 x 310, 268

Area Rapid Transit Oakland, CA District (BART)

San Francisco San Francisco- 792, 049 49 x x x 713, 266

Municipal Railway Oakland, CA (MUNI)

Washington Washington, D. C.- 3,363, 031 945 x x x 1, 169, 806

Metropolitan Area MD-- VA Transit Authority (WMATA) a Population
information comes from 1990 census data. b *Other* includes trolleybus,
cable car, demand response, and vanpool. c Unlinked trips are the number
of passengers who board public transportation vehicles. Passengers are
counted each time they board vehicles no matter how many vehicles they use
to travel from their origin to their destination. Source: National Transit
Database.

In addition to our site visits, we surveyed a sample of 200 transit
agencies. The sample from which we drew our population consisted of all
transit agencies throughout the nation that are eligible to receive
federal urbanized area formula funding, according to the most up- to- date
list of

eligible agencies provided by the National Transit Database. The results
of our mail survey are generalizable to this population, which we refer to
as our sample population. We stratified our sample population into two
groups* agencies that serve urbanized areas with a population of 200,000
or more (large urbanized areas); and agencies that serve urbanized areas
with a population of 50,000 to 199, 999 (small urbanized areas). We
distinguished between these two strata because agencies that operate in
large urbanized areas are prohibited

from using federal urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses,
whereas agencies in small urbanized areas are not prohibited from using
FTA funds for operating expenses. We randomly selected 100 agencies from
each stratum to survey.

Our overall survey response rate was 78 percent. However, we excluded 9
surveys from our analysis after determining that these transit agencies
were outside the scope of our review for one of the following reasons:
they had gone out of business (3); they were subsidiaries of other
agencies

included in our sample (2); or they did not provide bus, customized
community transport, rail, subway, or ferryboat services (e. g., they only
provide vanpool service) (4). The reported survey results are based on the
responses of the subpopulation of 146 agencies within the scope of our
review.

To help design our survey instrument, we reviewed surveys on transit
safety and security conducted by FTA, the American Public Transportation
Association (APTA), and the Transportation Cooperative Research Program.
We also obtained input from Department of Transportation, FTA, and transit
agency officials; and representatives from APTA and the Mineta
Transportation Institute. After developing the survey instrument, we
pretested the content and format of the survey with officials from several
transit agencies and made necessary revisions. All returned

questionnaires were reviewed, and we called respondents to obtain
information when questions were not answered or clarification was needed.
All data were double- keyed and verified during data entry, and

computer analyses were performed to identify any inconsistencies or other
indications of error. A copy of the mail questionnaire is included in
appendix I.

All sample surveys are subject to sampling error* that is, the extent to
which the survey results differ from what would have been obtained if the
whole population had been observed. Measures of sampling error are

defined by two elements, the width of the confidence intervals around the
estimate (sometimes called the precision of the estimate) and the
confidence level at which the intervals are computed. Because we followed
a probability procedure based on random selections, our sample is only one
of a large number of samples that we might have drawn. Moreover, because
each sample could have provided different estimates, we express our
confidence in the precision of our particular sample*s results as a
95percent

confidence interval (e. g., plus or minus 5 percentage points). This is
the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent
of the samples we could have drawn. As a result, we are 95- percent
confident that the confidence intervals for each of the mail survey
questions includes the true values in the sample population.

All percentage estimates from the mail survey have sampling errors of plus
or minus 10 percentage points or less, unless otherwise noted. In
addition, other potential sources of error associated with surveys, such
as misinterpretation of a question and nonresponse, may be present,
although nonresponse errors should be minimal.

Finally, in addition to our site visits and survey, we analyzed agency
documents and interviewed transit agency officials, industry
representatives, and academic experts. We analyzed FTA budget data, safety
and security documents, and applicable statutes and regulations. We
reviewed research on terrorism and attended transit security forums

sponsored by APTA and FTA. Finally, we interviewed FTA, TSA, and
Department of Transportation officials and representatives from APTA, the
National Governors Association, the Mineta Transportation Institute, RAND
Corporation, the University of California at Los Angeles, and the
Amalgamated Transit Union.

We conducted our review from May through October 2002 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendi x II I Selected Survey Results This appendix provides our analysis
of the responses we received to selected questions from our survey of 200
transit agencies in the United States. (See app. I for the overall survey
results and our survey instrument.) This analysis provides information
about the characteristics, including

both general and safety- and security- related characteristics, of the
transit agencies surveyed. Differences in the characteristics of transit
agencies in large urbanized areas (populations of 200,000 or more) and
transit agencies in small urbanized areas (populations between 50,0000 to
199,999) are also presented. 32 Services Provided by

The transit agencies we surveyed provide a variety of transit services,
Transit Agencies

including bus, rail, and ferryboat. Although a mix of services is provided
by the surveyed transit agencies, bus is by far the most common transit
Surveyed service provided. (See fig. 11.) Our survey results also indicate
that there are some differences between transit agencies in large
urbanized areas and transit agencies in small urbanized areas. For
example, transit agencies in large urbanized areas offer more types of
services than transit agencies in

small urbanized areas. Additionally, transit agencies in large urbanized
areas were more likely to provide rail services than transit agencies in
small urbanized areas and were the only agencies to provide subway

service. 32 Unless otherwise noted, all estimates by size of agency have
sampling errors of plus or minus 13 percentage points or less.

Figure 11: Types of Transit Services Offered by Surveyed Transit Agencies

a Customized community transport is characterized by (1) vehicles that do
not usually operate over a fixed route or on a fixed schedule and (2)
vehicles that may be dispatched to pick up several passengers at different
pick- up points before taking them to their respective destinations and
may even be interrupted en route to these destinations to pick up other
passengers. For our survey, we classified paratransit and demand response
as forms of customized community transport. b *Other* includes inclined
plane service, connecting shuttle service, vanpools, and special events
service.

Ridership of Transit The transit agencies we surveyed reported that they
provided almost 10

billion unlinked passenger trips 33 in fiscal years 2000 and 2001.
Specifically, Agencies Surveyed

according to the agencies, they provided a total of 4. 7 billion unlinked
passenger trips in fiscal year 2000 and 4. 9 billion trips in fiscal year
2001. Our survey results also indicate that transit agencies in large
urbanized areas carry more passengers than transit agencies in small
urbanized areas. For example, the majority of transit agencies in small
urbanized areas

33 Unlinked passenger trips are the number of passengers who board public
transportation vehicles. Passengers are counted each time they board
vehicles no matter how many vehicles they use to travel from their origin
to their destination.

reported that they provided fewer than 1 million passenger trips in fiscal
year 2001, while the majority of transit agencies in large urbanized areas
provided more than 1 million passenger trips. Moreover, 7 percent of the
transit agencies in large urbanized areas stated that they provided more
than 100 million passenger trips in fiscal year 2001. No transit agency
that we surveyed in a small urbanized area served that number of
passengers. (See fig. 12.) Figure 12: Distribution of Transit Agencies by
the Number of Unlinked Passenger Trips in Fiscal Years 2000 - 2001

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding.

Operating and Capital According to our survey results, transit agencies in
large urbanized areas Budgets of Transit

typically have bigger operating and capital budgets than transit agencies
in small urbanized areas. (See fig. 13.) In particular, 57 percent of the
transit Agencies Surveyed agencies in large urbanized areas have operating
budgets of more than $10 million, while 10 percent of transit agencies in
small urbanized areas have operating budgets of comparable size.
Additionally, 32 percent of the

transit agencies in large urbanized areas have capital budgets of more
than $10 million. In comparison, none of the transit agencies in small
urbanized areas that we surveyed had capital budgets of that magnitude. 34
34 Depending on the fiscal year, between about one- third and two- thirds
of the agencies we surveyed could only provide estimates of the amount of
their total operating and capital funds that were spent on safety and
security activities. Furthermore, additional analysis raised questions
about data reliability. Therefore, we cannot reliably determine the
percentage of the agencies* capital and operating budgets that are used
for safety and security activities.

Figure 13: Distribution of Transit Agencies by the Size of Their Operating
and Capital Budgets, Fiscal Year 2001

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

Security of Transit Most transit agencies we surveyed either contract with
a security service Agencies Surveyed

(35 percent) and/ or have established agreements with local or state
police (34 percent) to provide security for their property. However, our
survey did reveal some differences between transit agencies in large and
small urbanized areas in terms of their transit properties* security, as
shown in

figure 14. For example, of the transit agencies we surveyed, only those
agencies in large urbanized areas had their own transit police officers.

Figure 14: Types of Security Used by Transit Agencies in Large and Small
Urbanized Areas

Funding Sources for Our survey results show that all transit agencies we
surveyed rely on a

Transit Safety and variety of federal, state, and local sources to fund
safety and security expenses. As figure 15 shows, transit agencies in
large and small urbanized

Security Needs of areas identified local funds as the most common source
of funding for Transit Agencies

safety and security operating expenses. A notable difference between
Surveyed

transit agencies in large and small urbanized areas appears in their use
of FTA funds. In particular, 62 percent of agencies in small urbanized
areas identified FTA funds as a source of funds for safety and security
operating expenses, while 23 percent of agencies in large urbanized areas
identified this as a source. In contrast to safety and security operating
expenses, we

found that the most common source of funds for safety and security capital
expenses is FTA funds. (See fig. 16.)

Figure 15: Sources of Funds for Operating Expenses Used by Transit
Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas

Figure 16: Sources of Funds for Capital Expenses Used by Transit Agencies
in Large and Small Urbanized Areas

Acts of Extreme The majority of the transit agencies we surveyed do not
believe they are

Violence against likely targets for acts of extreme violence. In
particular, 62 percent of

transit agencies we surveyed believe they are unlikely or very unlikely to
be Transit Agencies the target of an act of extreme violence in the next 5
years. By contrast, 6

Surveyed percent of the transit agencies we surveyed consider the
likelihood of an act of extreme violence on their property likely or very
likely. Thirty- one

percent of the transit agencies we surveyed believe they are as likely as
not to experience an act of extreme violence on their property in the next
5 years.

In addition, the majority of the transit agencies we surveyed have not
experienced an act of extreme violence on their property in the past 5
years. Specifically, 66 percent of the transit agencies we surveyed said
that they have not experienced acts of extreme violence on their systems.
However, the agencies that have experienced acts of extreme violence have
encountered a variety of situations. (See fig. 17.)

Figure 17: Acts of Extreme Violence during the Past 5 Years at Transit
Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas

Surveyed Transit Seventy- five percent of the transit agencies we surveyed
have conducted an

Agencies* Safety and assessment of their transit system. As figure 18
shows, the majority of the

assessments have focused on general safety and security issues, not
Security Assessments necessarily on the transit systems vulnerability to a
terrorist threat or act of extreme violence. Seventy- seven percent of the
agencies reported that their

assessments have identified items needing action; however, the majority of
these agencies indicated that a variety of factors have limited their
ability to resolve the identified problems. According to these transit
agencies, insufficient funding, the need to balance security and safety
priorities with other priorities, and insufficient staff time or
availability to complete action items were the top reasons why identified
needs have not been addressed.

Figure 18: Types of Assessments Performed by Transit Agencies

Emergency Plans of Sixty- six percent of all surveyed agencies have
emergency plans. In Transit Agencies general, our survey results indicate
that the majority of the agencies* emergency plans describe protocols for
a number of emergency situations,

Surveyed such as natural disasters, reported bomb threats, and explosive
devices. Moreover, our survey results also indicate that the majority of
all agencies*

plans specify coordination with other entities, such as local police
departments, and most agencies have shared their plans with other
entities. However, our survey results reveal that transit agencies in
large urbanized areas have more comprehensive emergency plans than
agencies in small urbanized areas, in terms of both the level of
coordination with other entities and the number of scenarios addressed by
the plans. 35 For example,

as figure 19 shows, the emergency plans of agencies in large urbanized
areas specify coordination with the media more often than plans of
agencies in small urbanized areas. Furthermore, as figure 20 shows, the
emergency plans of agencies in large urbanized areas address more
emergency situations* such as an explosive device on the transit property*
than the emergency plans of agencies in small urbanized areas. 35 In this
section, estimates by size of agency have sampling errors of plus or minus
16 percentage points or less.

Figure 19: Types of Coordination Specified in Transit Agencies* Emergency
Plans

Figure 20: Types of Emergency Situations Addressed in Transit Agencies*
Emergency Plans

Appendi x V I GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Peter
Guerrero, (202) 512- 2834 Susan Fleming, (202) 512- 4431 Acknowledgments
In addition to those named above, Karin Bolwahnn, Nikki Clowers, Michelle
Dresben, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Michele Fejfar, David Hooper, Wyatt R.
Hundrup, Hiroshi Ishikawa, and Sara Ann Moessbauer made key contributions
to this report.

(545022)

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GAO United States General Accounting Office

Transit agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of
their systems since September 11, such as conducting vulnerability
assessments, revising emergency plans, and training employees. Formidable
challenges, however, remain in securing transit systems. Obtaining
sufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making transit
systems as safe and secure as possible, according to GAO survey results
and interviews with transit agency officials. Funding security
improvements is problematic because of high security costs, competing
budget priorities, tight budget environments, and a provision precluding
transit agencies that serve areas with populations of 200,000 or more from
using federal urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses. In
addition to funding challenges, certain characteristics of transit
agencies make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure. For
example, the high ridership and open access of some transit systems makes
them attractive for terrorists but also makes certain security measures,
like metal detectors, impractical. Moreover, because all levels of the
government and the private sector are involved in transit decisions,
coordination among all the stakeholders can pose challenges.

While transit agencies are pursuing security improvements, the federal
government*s role in transit security is expanding. For example, the
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) launched a multipart security
initiative and increased funding of its safety and security activities
after September 11. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act gave the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) responsibility
for the security of all transportation modes, including transit. TSA
anticipates issuing national standards for transit security. As the
federal government*s role expands, goals, performance indicators, and
funding criteria need to be established to ensure accountability and
results for the government*s efforts.

MASS TRANSIT

Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 263. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Peter Guerrero, at (202) 512- 2834 or guerrerop@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 263, a report to

Congressional Requesters

December 2002

About one- third of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation
systems, and transit systems are the mode most commonly attacked. In light
of the history of terrorism against mass transit and the terrorist attacks
on September 11, GAO was asked to examine challenges in securing transit
systems, steps transit agencies have taken to improve safety and security,
and the federal role in transit safety and security. To address these
objectives, GAO visited 10 transit agencies and surveyed a representative
sample of transit agencies, among other things.

To provide transit agencies greater flexibility in paying for transit
security enhancements, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation
consider seeking a legislative change to allow all transit agencies to use
federal urbanized area formula funds for security- related operating
expenses. GAO also makes several other recommendations to the Secretary of
Transportation.

The Department of Transportation generally agreed with the report*s
findings and agreed to carefully consider GAO*s recommendations.

Page i GAO- 03- 263 Mass Transit

Contents

Contents Page ii GAO- 03- 263 Mass Transit

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Appendix I

Appendix I GAO*s Survey Instrument and Overall Results

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Appendix I GAO*s Survey Instrument and Overall Results

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Appendix I GAO*s Survey Instrument and Overall Results

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Appendix II

Appendix II Scope and Methodology

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Appendix II Scope and Methodology

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Appendix II Scope and Methodology

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Appendix III

Appendix III Selected Survey Results

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Appendix IV

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