Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal 	 
Leadership (20-DEC-02, GAO-03-260).				 
                                                                 
To understand the federal government's response since the	 
September 11 terrorist attacks, GAO was asked to review 	 
governmentwide changes and challenges prevalent in the missions  
and activities of agencies involved in homeland security,	 
including the coordination and collaboration required to meet	 
overall goals and needs, and government's efforts in planning and
implementing strategic, transitional, and human capital 	 
activities designed to reorganize and strengthen homeland	 
security.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-260 					        
    ACCNO:   A05772						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal  
Leadership							 
     DATE:   12/20/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Federal agency reorganization			 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     CDC Bioterrorism Preparedness and			 
	     Reponse Program					 
                                                                 
	     Customs Service Trade Partnership			 
	     Against Terrorism Program				 
                                                                 
	     DOJ InfraGard Information-Sharing			 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     Homeland Security Advisory System			 
	     HRSA Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     JCS Unified Command Plan				 
	     United States Interagency Domestic 		 
	     Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan		 
                                                                 

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GAO-03-260

                                       A

Report to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U. S. Senate

December 2002 HOMELAND SECURITY Management Challenges Facing Federal
Leadership

GAO- 03- 260

Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 6
Background 9 New Homeland Security Emphasis Underway, but Incomplete 12
Addressing Homeland Security Mission through a Results- Oriented

Approach 34 Effective Oversight Critical to Success 52 Conclusion 52
Recommendations for Executive Action 55 Agency Comments 57

Appendixes

Appendix I: Homeland Security Funding by Department or Agency, Fiscal
Years 2001 to 2003 58

Appendix II: Critical Success Factors for New Organizations 60

Appendix III: Comments from the Office of Personnel Management 62 Related
GAO Products 65 Tables Table 1: Federal Departments, Agencies, and Offices
Included in

Our Review 7 Table 2: List of Policy Coordinating Committees 20 Table 3:
DHS Organizational Elements 22 Table 4: Lessons Learned about Mergers and
Transformations for

DHS and Other Federal Agencies 43 Figures Figure 1: Key Events Occurring
after the September 11 Terrorist

Attacks 10 Figure 2: Organizational Structure of the Office of Homeland

Security as of April 2002 18 Figure 3: National Strategy Components 36
Figure 4: GAO*s Model of Strategic Human Capital Management 49

Abbreviations

ABA American Bankers Association ACC American Chemistry Council APHIS
Animal and Plant Inspection Service BOR Bureau of Reclamation BSPC Border
Station Partnership Council CBO Congressional Budget Office CDC Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention CIA Central Intelligence Agency C- TPAT
Customs- Trade Partnership against Terrorism DHS Department of Homeland
Security DOE Department of Energy DOI Department of the Interior DOJ
Department of Justice DOT Department of Transportation EPA Environmental
Protection Agency FAA Federal Aviation Administration FBI Federal Bureau
of Investigation FDA Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency
Management Agency FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission GSA General
Services Administration HHS Department of Health and Human Services HRSA
Health Resources and Services Administration HSC Homeland Security Council
IMRA International Mass Retail Association INS Immigration and
Naturalization Service ISAC information sharing and analysis center ISC
Interagency Security Committee JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Forces NACCHO
National Association of County and City Health Officials NACo National
Association of Counties NAM National Association of Manufacturers NGA
National Governors Association NIPC National Infrastructure Protection
Center NLC National League of Cities NORTHCOM U. S. Northern Command NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission OASPHEP Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Public Health

Emergency Preparedness OHS Office of Homeland Security

OMB Office of Management and Budget OPM Office of Personnel Management PCC
Policy Coordination Committee TSA Transportation Security Administration
USDA Department of Agriculture

This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
materials separately from GAO*s product.

Letter

December 20, 2002 The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman Chairman Committee on
Governmental Affairs United States Senate Dear Mr. Chairman: While
significant progress has occurred over the past year in addressing the
demands of its homeland security mission, the federal government still
faces numerous challenges, including the implementation of the newly
created Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the implementation of the
National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the coordination of roles and
responsibilities of many entities in the public and private sectors. The
Congress, state and local governments, the private sector, and the
American people all have a shared responsibility for ensuring our homeland
security, but the leadership of the federal government in achieving this
goal is critical. The federal government will need to effectively respond
to significant management and coordination challenges if it is to provide
this leadership and be successful in preventing and responding to any
future acts of terrorism.

To better understand the federal government*s response since the September
11 terrorist attacks, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs requested that we conduct a governmentwide review of changes to
the missions and activities of agencies involved in homeland

security. Our objectives included (1) describing changes and challenges
prevalent in the missions and activities of the various agencies involved
in homeland security, as well as the nature of coordination and
collaboration required to meet overall goals and needs, and (2) describing
governmentwide efforts in planning and implementing strategic, transition,
human capital, and other management activities designed to reorganize,
strengthen, and support homeland security.

In describing homeland security efforts, we used the definition employed
by the administration in its National Strategy for Homeland Security,

issued in July 2002. We also focused on those agencies and entities listed
in the Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), as well as other agencies that a review of
government budget documents and supporting literature indicated had
significant involvement in homeland security activities.

Our work is based on the review of documents and interviews conducted at
more than two dozen federal departments and agencies, including central
management agencies such as OMB, the General Services Administration (GSA)
and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Additionally, due to the
dynamic and evolving nature of the government*s homeland security
activities, some of our work described in this report has already appeared
in congressional testimony in order to assist the Congress with its

consideration of DHS legislation and other homeland security issues.
Although we continue to examine a variety of specific homeland security
activities and implications for the Congress, this report is also
consistent with, and summarizes, work we have recently done in the general
management areas of government transformation, strategic planning, and
human capital planning.

Results in Brief Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
federal government has invigorated the homeland security activities of
many departments and agencies, more than doubled the amount of federal
funds devoted to homeland security, enacted new legislation to integrate
some homeland security agencies and strengthen transportation security and
law enforcement activities, leveraged existing and new relationships with
state

and local governments and the private sector, and begun to establish a
framework for planning the multiplicity of activities existing within the
nation's homeland security goals. While a new homeland security emphasis
is under way throughout the

federal government, the response is still evolving. Additional actions to
clarify missions and activities will be necessary, and some agencies will
need to determine how best to support both homeland security and
nonhomeland security missions. For instance, of the more than two dozen
federal agencies we contacted, many reported a new emphasis on homeland
security activities; however, the type of response differed depending on
the individual agencies' roles and responsibilities. Some departments and
agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the U. S.
Customs Service, have accelerated their implementation of existing
homeland security activities or increased efforts to coordinate activities
with other government agencies or the private sector. Legislation such as
the USA Patriot Act, enacted to strengthen law enforcement activities
related to homeland security, has provided agencies with new tools to help
fight terrorism. At the same time, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and the U. S. Coast Guard are significantly increasing
the priority of and resources allocated to homeland security

missions while balancing the demands of their traditional missions, such
as maritime safety. A number of agencies will be challenged in meeting
dual or unrelated missions while maintaining and strengthening their
homeland security operations. The legislation authorizing DHS requires
that DHS ensure that agency functions not directly related to homeland
security are not diminished or neglected.

Federal coordination and collaboration efforts in homeland security also
have been invigorated, as information- sharing activities between and
among federal agencies have increased. In the aftermath of September 11,
the President established the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and the
Homeland Security Council (HSC) as the mechanisms for coordinating
agencies* homeland security activities and developing a national homeland
security strategy. These efforts can be built upon further to increase
coordination and collaboration. Furthermore, the newly created DHS will
have the responsibility for consolidating many homeland security
activities and coordinating the efforts of federal, state, and local
governments and the private sector. The legislation also authorizes HSC
and establishes an Office of International Affairs.

Although collaboration with state and local governments is increasing,
more needs to be done in order to enhance its effectiveness. Collaboration
with the private sector also needs greater emphasis. Prior to September
11, the public and private sectors collaborated on homeland security
activities but the catastrophic events heightened the recognition that
more concrete and long- term approaches to improving homeland security
were necessary. Our work indicated that the federal government, state and
local governments, and certain parts of the private sector are engaging in
important projects to improve homeland security, but that a greater

emphasis on coordination and collaboration is necessary among some sectors
in order to meet long- term goals. DHS*s Office of State and Local
Coordination will manage this coordination, along with a liaison official
for the private sector. Moreover, the federal government*s effort to
improve homeland security will require a results- oriented approach to
ensure mission accountability and sustainability over time. The various
planning activities now under way, including the national strategy, DHS
transition planning, agencies' strategic planning efforts, and human
capital planning, have started, but their implementation has just begun
and will necessitate sustained management and oversight to ensure success.
The legislation authorizing DHS includes provisions addressing human
capital planning,

comprehensive transition planning, and the development of multiyear budget
plans for DHS.

A key component in integrating homeland security missions and activities
is the President*s National Strategy for Homeland Security, which
articulates the activities that must be accomplished or coordinated to

improve the nation*s actions to prevent terrorism. The national strategy
provides a definition of homeland security and outlines a framework for
agencies* activities by setting forth overarching goals, but much of the
implementation and mechanisms for achieving these goals have not been
developed, such as establishing meaningful performance measures and clear
roles and responsibilities. In some instances, the DHS legislation

specifically calls for performance goals and measures. Our prior work has
indicated that consolidating and transforming activities into a more
resultsoriented organization will require adherence to certain management
practices and key success factors. A recent mergers and transformation
forum we held indicated that transforming organizational cultures required

such practices as ensuring that top leadership drives change, establishing
a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals, and focusing on a key
set of principles and priorities. Furthermore, we have indicated in recent
testimony to the Congress that certain key factors, such as strategic
planning, risk management, human capital management, financial management,
and information technology management are necessary to achieve the
government*s homeland security objectives. A comprehensive planning and
management focus will also be critical to efforts to transition

transportation, border security and other specific agencies into a new
department. The government's efforts in these areas, while under way, are
neither complete nor comprehensive; additional work will be necessary to
ensure that these activities fully contribute to homeland security goals.
Transitioning agencies into a new department will be challenging, with the
implementation of a fully integrated department expected to take 5 to 10
years. The President has taken an important first step by establishing a
transition office within OMB to design and coordinate this transition so
that agencies are incorporated into DHS as smoothly as possible while
maintaining their readiness to protect the nation.

As the federal government clearly faces a number of leadership and
management challenges in achieving its homeland security mission, we
recommend the following:  Given the scope of homeland security objectives
across the public and

private sector, it is important for OHS, in conjunction with OMB and

DHS, to set priorities, to help guide and support the development of
performance measures and time frames, and to assess and oversee progress
in implementing the national homeland security strategy. Through the
national strategy, OHS should also lead efforts to ensure clarity in the
roles and responsibilities of all parties * OHS, OMB, DHS, and others * to
leverage collaboration among them, and to establish effective
accountability to meet national goals. Moreover, these entities will need
to balance and reconcile program objectives and priorities, and make
realistic resource allocations, within and among homeland security and
non- homeland security missions across government.

 OMB in developing an effective transition plan for DHS, should ensure
that the plan incorporates the practices identified in our mergers and
transformation forum discussed in this report, as well as the key factors
for successful organizations listed in appendix II in helping lay the
foundation for a cohesive, world- class organization capable of protecting
the nation from terrorism.  Over the coming years, OMB, in conjunction
with DHS, should help

ensure the implementation of broad- based management practices and
principles that will improve the sustainability of DHS and other homeland
security activities, consistent with statutory and regulatory requirements
as well as the President*s Management Agenda. They should, in part, direct
the establishment of appropriate plans and management systems to ensure
the needed management capacity, people, partnerships, and accountability
to achieve national homeland security goals. This includes an effective
strategic planning system that articulates meaningful performance goals,
objectives, and measures; an

effective human capital strategy; and a process for reporting and
oversight. Strong financial and information technology systems and
internal controls will also be critical to the success of DHS and other

organizations with homeland security missions.  OPM, in conjunction with
OMB and the agencies, should develop and oversee the implementation of a
long- term human capital strategy that

can support the capacity building across government required to meet the
objectives of the nation's efforts to strengthen homeland security. With
respect to DHS, in particular, this strategy should

 establish an effective performance management system, which incorporates
the practices that reinforce a *line of sight* that shows

how unit and individual performance can contribute to overall organization
goals;  provide for the appropriate utilization of the human capital

flexibilities granted to DHS to effectively manage its workforce; and 
foster an environment that promotes employee involvement and

empowerment, as well as constructive and cooperative labormanagement
employee relations.

OMB, OHS, and OPM were provided a draft of this report for their review.
OPM concurred with the recommendations relevant to them and noted that
they were actively involved in accomplishing them. OPM also provided
technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate. OMB and

OHS did not provide official comments. However, OMB staff members did
provide technical comments to our draft, which we incorporated as
appropriated.

Objectives, Scope, and To better understand the federal government*s
response since the

Methodology September 11 terrorist attacks, the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs requested that we conduct a
governmentwide review of changes to the missions and activities of
agencies involved in homeland

security. As part of our review, we used the definition of homeland
security in the President*s February 2002 document, Securing the Homeland,
Strengthening the Nation. It said homeland security encompasses those
activities that are focused on combating terrorism and occur within the
United States and its territories. Such activities include efforts to
detect, deter, protect against, and, if needed, respond to terrorist
attacks. As our work progressed, we used the homeland security definition
within the

National Strategy for Homeland Security* a concerted national effort to
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from
attacks that do occur. Our objectives included (1) describing changes and
challenges prevalent in the missions and activities of agencies involved
in homeland security, as well as the nature of coordination and
collaboration required to meet overall goals and needs, and (2) describing
government efforts in planning and implementing strategic, transition, and
human capital management activities designed to reorganize, strengthen,
and support homeland security.

To identify federal agency mission and organizational changes, and the
development and implementation of results management approaches, we
obtained available documents and interviewed officials from over two dozen
federal departments, agencies, and offices. Table 1 details the specific
departments, agencies, and offices we reviewed.

Tabl e 1: Federal Departments, Agencies, and Offices Included in Our
Review Department or independent agency Agencies or offices

Department of Agriculture Agricultural Research Service Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service Food Safety Inspection Service Office of the
Secretary Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security

National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

National Guard Office of the Secretary Department of Energy Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission

National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Security Department of
Health and Human

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Services Food and Drug
Administration

Health Resources and Services Administration

National Institutes of Health Office of Emergency Preparedness Office of
Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness

Department of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation National Park Service
Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation

Immigration and Naturalization Service U. S. Marshals Service Department
of Transportation U. S. Coast Guard

Transportation Security Administration

(Continued From Previous Page)

Department or independent agency Agencies or offices

Department of the Treasury U. S. Customs Service Financial Crimes and
Enforcement Network U. S. Secret Service Federal Emergency Management
Agency General Services Administration Environmental Protection Agency U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Personnel Management Office of
Management and Budget Office of Homeland Security Source: GAO.

We selected these departments and agencies according to the following
criteria: (1) homeland security importance based on past combating
terrorism activities and funding as shown in OMB*s Annual Report to
Congress on Combating Terrorism, (2) homeland security priorities
discussed in the President*s Fiscal Year 2003 budget, and (3) related GAO
work. In addition, we examined publicly available documents from state and
local government and private sector organizations, and we interviewed

officials of the National League of Cities and the National Association of
Counties to obtain information regarding the coordination of federal
homeland security efforts with states and localities. We also reviewed
external reports, studies, and literature on homeland security. To
identify homeland security activities on budgeting and funding priorities,
we interviewed officials from OMB and other respective

department and agency officials. We analyzed the budget documents and
budget development process for the 2002 emergency supplemental funding
legislation and the President*s proposed fiscal year 2003 budget. Although
OHS met with us for initial discussions about the scope of our

engagement, it did not respond to our numerous requests for subsequent
meetings. As a result, our report's description of OHS' role in homeland
security management is incomplete. In addition, we did not verify the
accuracy or reliability of the documentation or data provided to us by the
agencies and departments or other organizations, nor did we evaluate the
effectiveness of the activities described.

We conducted our review at agency and department headquarters in
Washington, D. C., and CDC*s headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, from
February 2002 through November 2002 in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards. On November 26, 2002, we requested
comments on a draft of this report from the Directors of OMB, OHS, and
OPM. OHS stated that they had no comments. OMB did not provide official
comments, but OMB staff members did provide technical comments. The
Director of OPM provided written comments on December 19, 2002, which have
been summarized at the end of this report and reproduced in appendix III.
On December 7,

2002, we provided excerpts of our draft report to those agencies that were
mentioned within the report. We received technical comments from USDA,
DOJ, DOT, Treasury, FEMA, FERC, and NRC, and we have incorporated them as
appropriate.

Background Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the President and
the Congress have responded with important and aggressive actions to
protect the

nation. Funding for homeland security increased dramatically immediately
following the terrorist attacks, beginning with the $40 billion emergency
supplemental appropriations act (Public Law 107- 38), passed by the
Congress on September 18, 2001, $10.7 billion of which was appropriated
for homeland security initiatives. 1 On October 11, 2001, Senator Joseph
I. Lieberman introduced a bill in Congress to establish a Department of

National Homeland Security. The President issued Executive Order 13228
establishing OHS with the broad responsibility for coordinating efforts to
secure the United States from terrorist attacks. The President also signed
into law the USA Patriot Act on October 26, 2001 (Public Law 107- 56),

which enhanced law enforcement agencies* ability to investigate financial
counterfeiting, smuggling, and money laundering and to share vital
information to combat terrorism. In November 2001, the Congress enacted
legislation to address transportation- related homeland security needs,
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107- 71), which
created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the
Department of Transportation (DOT) to ensure security in the nation*s 1
The remainder of the emergency supplemental funded military actions
overseas and onetime

costs for rebuilding and recovery at the attack sites. Neither of these
activities* direct military action and immediate response and recovery*
are included in the definition of homeland security.

transportation system, including the security of passengers and baggage in
commercial aviation. Figure 1 presents a timeline of significant events
since September 11. Figure 1: Key Events Occurring after the September 11
Terrorist Attacks

10/ 11/ 02

Senator Lieberman

10/ 8/ 01

introduces homeland OHS

security legislation established

10/ 4/ 01 10/ 26/ 01

6/ 2/ 02 7/ 16/ 02

First known USA Patriot Act

President proposes President issues

9/ 11/ 01

victim of becomes law

DHS

National Strategy

Terrorist Anthrax

5/ 2/ 02

legislation for Homeland

attacks attack dies

The Congress introduces

Security

11/ 2/ 02 11/ 19/ 01

DHS The Congress passes

TSA legislation

DHS established

legislation Sep 01 Oct Nov Dec Jan 02 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct
Nov Dec

Late Nov 01 2/ 4/ 02

6/ 24/ 02

OMB *passback* to President submits

OMB issues annual

8/ 2/ 02

agencies on policy, FY 03 budget

report on combating $24 billion

priorities, and request

terrorism emergency

9/ 18/ 01 9/ 30/ 01

funding levels supplemental $40 billion

FY 01

4/ 24/ 02

signed a emergency

ends OMB issues guidance

supplemental to agencies to

signed prepare FY 04 budget

Source: GAO analysis. a As enacted, the emergency supplemental (P. L. 107-
206) included $5. 1 billion in contingent emergency spending. The
President had 30 days after enactment to decide whether to submit a budget
amendment to the Congress that designated either all or none of that $5.1
billion of contingent spending as emergency funding. On August 13, the
President announced that he would not utilize the $5.1 billion contingent
emergency spending. Hence, the total amount of available funds is
approximately $24 billion.

Due to the timing of the attacks, the President*s fiscal year 2003 budget
proposal was the administration*s first opportunity to define in policy
and funding terms the scope and nature of homeland security activities.
For purposes of developing the fiscal year 2003 budget, OMB, together with
OHS, defined homeland security, as *those activities that are focused on
combating and protecting against terrorism and occurring within the U. S.
and its territories.* According to OMB officials, OHS was involved in
providing guidance and setting priorities in the development of the fiscal
year 2003 budget proposal.

In the end, total federal homeland security funding was approximately
$37.7 billion in the President*s fiscal year 2003 budget request, later
revised to $37.8 to include some programs that initially were not included
in the definition (mainly some spending for the Department of Veterans
Affairs). Appendix I list homeland security funding by department and
agency.

In the spring of 2002, OMB issued planning guidance to executive agencies
for the fiscal year 2004 budget request. Departments and agencies were
directed to develop budget requests that constrained growth in all areas
except those designated by the administration as high priority, including
homeland security.

On May 2, 2002, Senator Lieberman and Representative William M. *Mac*
Thornberry both introduced legislation, and in June 2002 the President
transmitted draft legislation to the Congress, to establish DHS. During
the summer of 2002, the legislative branch began debating proposals for
the new department. As part of the Congress* consideration of the
legislation, we provided testimony to several committees about the
proposal for a new department. 2 We outlined a number of factors that
would be critical to the new DHS, organizational issues for homeland
security, and the sustainability of the government*s efforts over the long
term. Some of these

issues are discussed later in this report. In November 2002, the Congress
passed and the President signed legislation to create DHS. Several weeks
after the President*s legislative proposal was sent to the Congress, OHS
issued the administration*s National Strategy for

Homeland Security, which defined homeland security and outlined three
strategic homeland security objectives. On August 2, 2002, President Bush
signed a $29 billion emergency supplemental appropriations act (Public Law
107- 296), $5.1 billion of which was contingency funding that was never
made available. Of the remaining $24 billion in available funds, according
to our analysis, approximately $4.6 billion, or 19 percent, was
appropriated for homeland security activities. 2 U. S. General Accounting
Office, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation

Issues, GAO- 01- 957T (Washington, D. C.: July 17, 2002).

New Homeland Many federal agencies have made commitments of planning,
funding, and

Security Emphasis resources to meet homeland security missions since
September 11. Although many agencies we reviewed reported a new emphasis
on Underway, but

homeland security activities, the responses differed depending on the
Incomplete

individual roles and responsibilities of specific agencies. Some entities,
such as the Department of Health and Human Service*s (HHS) CDC, the
Department of the Treasury, and TSA, provided greater vigilance to
existing homeland security missions, such as improving the response to
bioterrorism or blocking terrorist financing. Other agencies needed to

expand their homeland security missions, at times confronting challenges
to balancing their expanded homeland missions with important nonhomeland
security missions, such as the Coast Guard*s maritime safety and fisheries
enforcement activities. Still other organizations, including the National
Guard, were asked to take on new duties. Many agencies have also
revitalized policy groups or other coordinating mechanisms that, after the
events of September 11, have become even more critical.

Moreover, earlier this year the President approved the latest Department
of Defense Unified Command Plan (Plan). Defense has said the Plan will
realign and streamline the U. S. military structure to better address 21st
century threats. It is characterized as the most significant reform of the
nation's military command structure since the first command plan was
issued shortly after World War II. The Plan, among other things,
established the U. S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). The new NORTHCOM
commander will be responsible for land, aerospace, and sea defenses of the
United States. Its geographic area will include the continental United
States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, portions of the Caribbean, and the
contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

NORTHCOM will assume the homeland defense duties now held by the Joint
Forces Command, such as responsibility to civil authorities for chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and major conventional explosives
events. NORTHCOM will also help Defense deal with natural disasters,
attacks on U. S. soil, or other civil difficulties. It is also intended to
provide a more coordinated military support to civil authorities such as
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), and state and local governments.

Meanwhile, the government has engaged in significant reorganization of its
policy and other operations activities in order to prevent or improve
protection of the United States against terrorism. As mentioned, the

President ordered the creation of OHS to coordinate governmentwide
homeland security activities and to ensure collaborative partnerships and
effective information sharing between all levels of government and the
private sector. A number of new laws were passed designed to enhance
security and improve law enforcement activities related to terrorism. A
new cabinet department, DHS, was created to consolidate some homeland
security functions and to help strengthen coordination among the many
other homeland security functions that are not included in DHS.

Federal departments and agencies have recognized that the successful
achievement of homeland security goals will require more formal and
intensive coordination. As a result, some agencies created new high- level
policy offices to centralize communication and decision making while
others established new interagency councils or task forces to address
needs, gaps, and overlap. A few agencies consolidated existing dispersed
homeland security offices and others determined that existing arrangements
were appropriate and required little or no changes. Federal agencies have
also taken some steps to provide assistance to state and local
governments, especially in such areas as emergency management.
Nevertheless, state and local government organizations indicate that even
as interaction between and among levels of government has increased, more
needs to be done in order to enhance its effectiveness. Furthermore,
although federal agencies and certain parts of the private sector are
engaging in important projects to improve homeland security, a greater
emphasis on coordination is necessary among some sectors in order to meet
long- term goals.

Agencies Emphasize Most agency officials reported that their homeland
security activities had

Homeland Security been expanded since the September 11 terrorist attacks,
with some

Activities officials reporting a new emphasis on their existing homeland
security

missions. Officials reported that agencies* expanded or accelerated
existing homeland security activities because of recent legislation and
substantial emergency supplemental funding. For example, CDC has
emphasized approaches to protecting individuals against infectious
diseases caused by bioterrorism as part of its overall mission of
preventing and controlling diseases. In addition, CDC has recently revised
its

Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines to include operational and
logistical considerations associated with implementing a large- scale
voluntary vaccination program in response to a confirmed smallpox
outbreak. 3 Likewise, FEMA is awarding grants to help States modify their

emergency operations plans, expand and train community emergency response
teams, and make enhancements to emergency operations centers and
communications capabilities. These efforts will lay the groundwork to
implement the President*s First Responders Initiative, which, once

approved by Congress, will assist local responders such as firefighters,
police officers, and emergency medical teams in developing comprehensive
response plans for terrorist attacks, purchasing equipment, training for
response to terrorist incidents, and coordinating regular exercise
programs with other first responders. According to an official of the
USDA*s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), it has
increased its inspection staff by 50 percent at points of entry to
intercept potential threats to the nation*s food supply and agriculture
industry. The Department of Energy (DOE) has focused on safeguarding and

securing its nuclear weapons complex and stored stockpile materials. DOE
has accelerated the deployment of the Biological Aerosol Sentry and
Information System, which provides public health and law enforcement
authorities with information about airborne biological attacks for special
events, such as high visibility conferences and major sporting events.

3 On December 13, 2002, the President announced plans to administer the
smallpox vaccine to certain military and civilian personnel who are or may
be deployed in high threat areas, as well as to vaccinate emergency health
care workers and other critical personnel who may serve on volunteer
smallpox response teams. Although the administration is not recommending
vaccination for the general public, the administration has stated that
public health agencies will work to accommodate members of the general
public who insist on being vaccinated.

In addition to invigorating existing missions, some agencies have assumed
new homeland security activities. For example, the USA Patriot Act has
expanded the responsibilities of Treasury*s Office of Enforcement,
empowering it to use financial institutions* transaction data to
investigate a country suspected of supporting terrorist financing.
Additionally, the National Guard was deployed to improve airport security.
From September 2001 to May 2002, the National Guard mobilized
approximately 7,200 guardsmen to protect travelers at 444 commercial
airports nationwide. The new emphasis on homeland security activities has
resulted in agencies

reallocating equipment and personnel from other traditional mission
activities. For example, the Coast Guard reported the temporary deemphasis
of its maritime safety and environmental protection activities after
September 11. Coast Guard cutters and aircraft that were used mainly on
the high seas were relocated closer to major harbors and security was
strengthened at potential terrorist targets such as oil refineries, cruise
ship terminals, and other port facilities. In March 2002, the Coast Guard
Commandant issued guidance that its fleet should manage its operations and
personnel to address the Coast Guard*s non- homeland security missions
while still maintaining a heightened level of security. We have recently
recommended that the Coast Guard develop a longer- term strategy that
outlines how it sees its resources being distributed across various
missions, and a time frame for achieving it. 4 In addition, the FBI
announced the second phase of its reorganization on May 29, 2002, that it
planned to shift its mission priorities from nonhomeland

security activities such as drug investigations, white- collar crimes, and
violent crimes to homeland security activities by permanently shifting 518
field agents to counterterrorism. 5 Specifically, the FBI plans to reduce
the number of special agents involved in drug investigations by about 29
percent as well as reduce agent personnel in the areas of whitecollar and
violent crimes. It is important to note, however, that the

4 U. S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for
Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions, GAO- 03- 155
(Washington, D. C.: Nov. 12, 2002). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.
L. 107- 296, Nov. 25, 2002) requires that the Coast Guard*s non- homeland
security functions such as marine safety be maintained intact and not be
significantly reduced after being transferred to DHS, except as specified
in subsequent acts.

5 The FBI reports that of these 518 field agents, 480 agents went to the
Counterterrorism Program, 25 went to support the training of new agents at
the FBI Academy and 13 went to the Security Division to implement critical
security improvements.

majority of the FBI*s personnel will still remain focused on non- homeland
security missions. Several agencies we reviewed have developed dual-
purpose programs that serve both homeland security and non- homeland
security missions. For example, CDC has been using its Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Program to help state and local health agencies
build a communications infrastructure to improve the collection and
transmission of information related to both bioterrorist incidents and
other public health events. Similarly, HHS*s Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA) has

been using its Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program to help state
and local hospitals develop plans to respond to bioterrorism events and
other public health emergencies. Although the origin of a disease may not
be clear at the outset, the same public health resources are mobilized to
respond to the emergency and deal with any consequences, regardless of the
source. 6 Agencies outside the public health and scientific research and
development arenas also have programs or units that serve dual purposes.
For instance, the National Guard maintains its dual status as a federal
military resource (under Title 10, United States Code) and a
statecontrolled emergency and consequence management resource (under Title
32, United States Code). Many of the agencies that will be transferred to
DHS have both homeland security and non- homeland security missions and
will be challenged to balance both types of mission. The legislation
requires DHS to ensure that agency functions not directly related to
homeland security are not diminished or neglected.

OHS Charged with Broad A significant amount of federal homeland security
functions is being

Responsibilities reorganized or will likely be reorganized in the future.
We have indicated in

previous testimony that a reorganization of some homeland security
functions may help to improve efficiencies and reduce overlaps in meeting
critical objectives. 7 Although reorganization efforts have been initiated
at both the central management and department and agency level, these
efforts are incomplete and may take years to fully and effectively
implement.

6 U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: New Department Could
Improve Coordination but Transferring Control of Certain Public Health
Programs Raises Concerns, GAO- 02- 954T (Washington, D. C.: July 16,
2002). 7 GAO- 02- 954T.

OHS, established by executive order soon after the terrorist attacks, was
charged with broad responsibilities including, but not limited to working
with federal agencies, state and local government, and private entities to
develop a national homeland security strategy and to coordinate
implementation of the strategy. The Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security heads OHS, which is divided into three functional
components.

The Deputy Homeland Security Advisor is responsible for five directorates:
(1) research and development, (2) policy and plans, (3) protection and
prevention, (4) response and recovery, and (5) intelligence and detection.
A Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security is responsible
for external affairs, which includes directorates for intergovernmental

affairs, communications, and public liaison. An Executive Secretary is
responsible for administration and support. In addition, the Executive
Secretary and Deputy Homeland Security Advisor share responsibility for a
coordination center that serves as the primary contact for state and local
entities as well as the private sector and would be tasked with
coordinating the response to a domestic incident if it occurred and a
threat monitoring center, which oversees and reviews information for
federal agencies. Figure 2 provides OHS*s organizational structure.

Figure 2: Organizational Structure of the Office of Homeland Security as
of April 2002

Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace

Security Assistant to the President

General Counsel for Homeland Security

National Director and Deputy National

Special Assistant to the Security Advisor for

President for Combating

External Affairs Terrorism

Deputy Assistant to the Deputy Homeland Security President for

Advisor Executive Secretary Homeland Security

Public Communications

Research and Protection and

Coordination Administration

Liaison Directorate

Development Prevention

Center and Support Directorate

Directorate Directorate

Intergovernmental Response and

Policy and Plans Recovery

Affairs Directorate

Directorate Directorate

Intelligence and Detection Directorate Threat

Monitoring Center

Source: Office of Homeland Security, Draft (April 2002).

In addition to assisting in the coordination of homeland security efforts
on the federal, state, and local levels as well as the private sector, OHS
has been responsible for drafting and issuing the national strategy for
homeland security, designing the homeland security advisory system, 8 and
working with OMB and agencies regarding the levels and uses of funding for
homeland security activities. OHS is authorized through Executive

Order 13228 to certify that budget requests for homeland security are
necessary and appropriate. The Director of OHS certified the funding
levels for homeland security activities in the proposed fiscal year 2003
budget in a memorandum dated February 4, 2002. Along with OHS, the
President established the Homeland Security Council

(HSC) to serve as the mechanism for ensuring coordination of homeland
security- related activities of executive departments and agencies and
effective development and implementation of homeland security policies. 9
The council includes a Principals Committee, which consists of the

secretaries of the Treasury, Defense, Health and Human Services, and
Transportation, and the Attorney General; the directors of OMB, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), FEMA, and the FBI; the chiefs of staff
of the President and the Vice President, and the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security (who serves as chairman). In addition, a
Deputies Committee, including deputy officials from those departments and
agencies participating in the Principal*s Committee, serves as the senior
sub- cabinet interagency forum. HSC*s main day- to- day forums for
interagency coordination of homeland security policy are the policy
coordination committees (PCC), 11 of which were established by
Presidential Directive 1 and are listed in table 2.

8 The Homeland Security Advisory System, established through Presidential
Directive 3, is designed to provide a comprehensive and effective means to
disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to federal,
state, and local authorities. Such a system would provide warnings in the
form of a set of graduated "Threat Conditions" that would increase as the
risk of the threat increases. This system is intended to create a common

vocabulary, context, and structure about the nature of the threats that
confront the homeland and the appropriate measures that should be taken in
response.

9 The DHS legislation institutionalizes the HSC within the Executive
Office of the President to advise the President on homeland security
matters. Its members are the President, the Vice President, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and
other individuals the President may designate.

Tabl e 2: List of Policy Coordinating Committees

1. Detection, Surveillance, and Intelligence 2. Plans, Training,
Exercises, and Evaluation 3. Law Enforcement and Investigation 4. Weapons
of Mass Destruction Consequence Management 5. Key Asset, Border,
Territorial Waters, and Airspace Security 6. Domestic Transportation
Security 7. Research and Development 8. Medical and Public Health
Preparedness 9. Domestic Threat Response and Incident Management 10.
Economic Consequences 11. Public Affairs Source: Homeland Security
Presidential Directive *1, October 29, 2001.

Agencies reported varying degrees of input and coordination with this
central policy development process. Some had frequent contact with the PCC
or OHS, while others had minimal or no contact at all. For example,
Defense officials reported having specialists in various areas that
attended PCC meetings and wrote a chapter for the national homeland
security

strategy. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also reported
providing input to the national strategy. Officials from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) reported working closely with OHS staff and
assisting in the development of a critical infrastructure protection plan
and the threat advisory system. USDA had representatives in all of OHS*s
directorates and PCC and said that it played an active part in OHS*s
decision- making process. DOE officials reported being the government

lead on three PCC. An HHS official said that it was very involved in the
medical and public health preparedness PCC, the one most important to HHS.
In addition, many departments had detailees on OHS*s staff.

However, a few departments expressed concern that participation in the PCC
or contact with OHS was limited or nonexistent even though they considered
their missions to be important to homeland security. For example,
officials at GSA*s Public Building Service said they expected to work with
OHS in developing the homeland security advisory system, but they were not
involved in formulating the policies. GSA officials said they also
expected to be involved with OHS on border station security issues, but
only received feedback through OMB.

Significant Reorganization One of the most important reorganization
efforts is the creation of a new

Will Occur with the New cabinet department to consolidate a variety of
agencies or functions critical Department

to the nation's goal of strengthening homeland security. The
administration has stated that the creation of DHS would empower a single
cabinet official whose primary mission is to protect the American homeland
from

terrorism, including (1) preventing terrorist attacks within the United
States, (2) reducing America*s vulnerability to terrorism, and (3)
minimizing the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur. 10
Additionally, DHS will be responsible for homeland security coordination

with other executive branch agencies, state and local governments, and the
private sector. The legislation to create DHS will transfer some federal
entities, such as the U. S. Secret Service and the U. S. Coast Guard,
intact into the new department. For the organizations transferred to the
new department, DHS will be responsible for managing all of their
functions, including non- homeland security functions. In some instances,
these other responsibilities are substantial. Table 3 displays the major
organizational elements of the new DHS.

10 Governor Tom Ridge, The Department of Homeland Security: Making
Americans Safer,

written statement for the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U. S. Senate,
June 20, 2002.

Tabl e 3: DHS Organizational Elements Element Mission Major agencies
included

Directorate for Analyze law enforcement and intelligence information
National Infrastructure Protection Center (FBI) Information Analysis from
federal, state, and local government agencies, and

National Communications System (Defense) and Infrastructure

private sector entities to identify and assess threats and Critical
Infrastructure Assurance Office (Commerce)

Protection vulnerabilities, and identify priorities for protective and

National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis support measures. Develop
a comprehensive national

Center (Energy) plan for securing key resources and critical

Federal Computer Incident Response Center (GSA) infrastructure. Administer
the Homeland Security Advisory System.

Directorate of Science Develop a national policy and strategic plan to
identify

National Bio- weapons Defense Analysis Center and Technology and develop
countermeasures for chemical, biological,

(Defense) radiological, nuclear, and other terrorist threats. Assess

Plum Island Animal Disease Center (USDA) and test vulnerabilities and
possible threats. Conduct

Chemical and biological national security basic and applied research and
related activities.

nonproliferation program, nuclear proliferation programs, and nuclear
assessment programs (Energy) Environmental Measurements Laboratory
(Energy) Advanced scientific computing research programs and activities
(Energy)

Directorate of Border Prevent entry of terrorists and terrorist
instruments. Customs Service (Treasury) and Transportation Secure the
borders, waters, ports, terminals, waterways, Transportation Security
Administration Security

and air, land, and sea transportation systems. Carry out (Transportation)

immigration enforcement functions and provide Federal Protective Service
(GSA) citizenship and immigration services. Establish and

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (Treasury) administer rules
governing visas or other forms of entry.

Office for Domestic Preparedness (Justice) Immigration and Naturalization
Service (Justice)

Directorate of Ensure effectiveness of emergency response providers
Federal Emergency Management Agency Emergency

to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other Integrated Hazard
Information System

Preparedness and emergencies. Provide the federal response to terrorist
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Response attacks and major disasters and aid in the recovery.

National Domestic Preparedness Office (FBI) Build a national incident
management system. Develop

Domestic Emergency Support Teams (Justice) a national response plan.

Emergency preparedness, national disaster, and medical response systems
(HHS) Strategic National Stockpile (HHS)

Coast Guard These entities are transferred intact and report directly to
the DHS Secretary. They retain their current missions. Secret Service
Source: GAO.

The implementation of a new department to integrate homeland security
functions will need to recognize that many non- homeland security missions
of these agencies and functions will become part of DHS. Creating an

effective structure that is sensitive to balancing the needs of homeland
security and non- homeland security functions will be critical to the
success of the new department. For example, the legislation creating DHS
will transfer certain public health emergency preparedness programs from
various federal agencies as well as transfer the control of, but not the

operation of, certain other public health assistance programs to the new
department. In addition, the legislation transfers responsibility for
certain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear research and
development programs and activities to DHS. Although the department has
the potential to realize gains from increased coordination and
consolidation of programs, transferring control over some of these dual
use programs, such as the public health preparedness assistance programs
and research and

development initiatives, would disrupt synergies that currently exist and
could lead to duplication of existing capabilities. 11 As we have
previously stated in testimony, existing non- homeland security

missions will still require adequate funding, attention, visibility, and
support when subsumed into a department that will be under tremendous
pressure to succeed in its primary mission. In July 2002 testimony, we
suggested that the Congress consider whether the new department, as
proposed, will dedicate sufficient management capacity and accountability
to ensure the execution of non- homeland security activities. 11 GAO- 02-
954T and U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: New
Department Could Improve Biomedical R& D Coordination but May Disrupt
Dual- Purpose Efforts,

GAO- 02- 924T (Washington, D. C.: July 9, 2002).

Coordination Efforts within As part of their mission revitalization
efforts, agency officials said that they and among Federal

are increasing their attention to coordinating homeland security
activities Agencies Has Increased

within and among federal agencies through a number of existing and new
approaches. The national strategy calls for the nation to increase
collaboration and coordination activities to better align public and
private resources to secure the homeland. Some efforts to coordinate
homeland security activities were taking place prior to September 11. For
example, the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) was created through
Executive

Order 12977 after the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City to develop and oversee the implementation of
policies for protecting federal facilities. The ISC comprises 14
departmentlevel

agencies and other executive agencies, such as the CIA, EPA, and OMB. The
ISC has been working to revitalize itself to meet its responsibilities in
light of the September 11 terrorist attacks. 12 To strengthen
antiterrorism programs and to provide a single point of

contact for senior- level coordination between HHS and other departments
and agencies, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health
Emergency Preparedness (OASPHEP) 13 was established within the Office

of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. OASPHEP is responsible for
directing HHS*s efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, and
recover from acts of bioterrorism and other public health emergencies and

serves as the focal point for the department for those activities. By July
2002, OASPHEP had dispersed nearly $1.1 billion via cooperative agreements
to all 50 states, the District of Columbia, 3 selected major
municipalities (Los Angeles County, Chicago, and New York City), and the 8
U. S. territories to foster state and local preparedness for bioterrorism,
other outbreaks of infectious disease, and additional public health
threats and emergencies.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) created 93 antiterrorism task forces to
integrate the communications and activities of local, state, and federal
law 12 U. S. General Accounting Office, Building Security: Interagency
Security Committee Has

Had Limited Success in Fulfilling Its Responsibilities, GAO- 02- 1004
(Washington, D. C.: Sept. 17, 2002). 13 Recently enacted legislation,
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002 (Public Law 107- 188) created the OASPHEP. The responsibilities of
the office are, among other things, to coordinate preparedness for and
response to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies. It has been
proposed that OASPHEP be transferred to DHS.

enforcement. Building on DOJ*s antiterrorism task forces, the national
strategy calls for each governor to establish a single Homeland Security
Task Force for the state, to serve as the primary coordinating body with
the federal government. According to the national strategy, this would
realign the 93 antiterrorism task forces to serve as the law enforcement
component of the broader homeland security task forces. The homeland
security task forces would help streamline and coordinate all federal,
regional, and local programs and would provide a collaborative structure
for effectively communicating to all organizations and citizens. The FBI
increased its use of joint terrorism task forces (JTTF), which were

first established in 1980, to integrate federal, state, and local law
enforcement efforts to address terrorism. 14 FBI officials believe that
JTTF are an effective means of interacting, cooperating, and sharing
information between FBI and its federal, state, and local counterparts.
The FBI now has a JTTF in each of its 56 field offices, plus an additional
10 in satellite locations.

The Department of the Treasury created Operation Green Quest, on October
25, 2001, a multi- agency financial enforcement initiative led by the
Customs Service. According to the Department of the Treasury, the
initiative is intended to augment existing counterterrorist efforts by
bringing the full scope of the department*s financial expertise to bear
against systems, individuals, and organizations that serve as sources of
terrorist funding. In the 18 months it has existed, the Department of the

Treasury reports that the initiative has seized approximately $21.3
million in smuggled U. S. currency and $8.2 million as a result of
financial investigations of suspected terrorists.

GSA serves on the Border Station Partnership Council (BSPC) with several
federal agencies responsible for border security to plan the construction
of border facilities. BSPC*s coordination role is increasing because
homeland security efforts are focusing in part on securing the U. S.-
Canadian border, which includes constructing several new border facilities
to accommodate

the Customs Service, HHS*s Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
Department of Transportation*s (DOT) Federal Motor Carrier Safety

14 According to the FBI, among the full- time federal participants on JTTF
are the Immigration and Naturalization Service; Marshals Service; U. S.
Secret Service; Federal Aviation Administration; U. S. Customs Service;
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the State Department; the Postal
Inspection Service; the Internal Revenue Service; and the U. S. Park
Police. State and local agencies are also represented.

Administration, and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), for
example. A GSA official said that each agency requires different types of
facilities to perform its mission, and GSA is coordinating the integration
of several agencies* facility needs into one border station.

According to a senior HHS official, an OHS policy coordinating
subcommittee is working to clarify roles of agencies to better coordinate
a response to future terrorist attacks. The national strategy calls for
integrating separate federal emergency response plans into a single
incident management plan. As an example, in the recent anthrax events,
local officials complained about differing priorities between the FBI and
the public health officials in handling suspicious specimens. According to

the public health officials, FBI officials insisted on first informing FBI
managers of any test results, which delayed getting test results to
treating physicians. The public health officials viewed contacting
physicians as the first priority to ensure that effective treatment could
begin as quickly as possible. 15 According to the national strategy, the
new incident

management plan would cover all national incidents, including acts of
bioterrorism and agroterrorism and clarify roles and expected
contributions of various emergency response and law enforcement entities
at different levels of government in the wake of a terrorist attack. In
addition, DOJ reported that the United States Government Interagency

Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, signed in January 2001 by
the Director of the FBI, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of HHS,
among others, outlined that preserving life or minimizing risk to health
is the first priority of U. S. government operations in response to a
terrorist threat or incident. Furthermore, DOJ reported that increasing
the FBI*s capability to address the threat of bioterrorism will require
developing

partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies, especially USDA and
CDC for matters involving anti- animal and antiplant bioterrorism, and FDA
for threats involving the food supply. 15 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Priority Setting, GAO- 02- 893T (Washington, D. C.: June 28,
2002).

In December 2001, DOT created the Interagency Container Working Group to
improve response to security threats posed by marine, truck, and rail
containers that enter the nation*s ports or cross the Mexican and Canadian
borders into the United States. 16 The Interagency Container Working Group
is overseen by OHS. The terrorist attacks of September 11 demonstrated
that terrorists would use our transportation systems as weapons, and may
exploit vulnerabilities in our marine transportation system as well. In
February 2002, the working group issued its first report

to OHS that recommended improvements to the coordination of government and
business container security activities, enhancing cargo data collection,
and improving the physical security of containers. The report also
recommended supporting international container security efforts and the
increased use of advanced technologies to improve the detection of
potential security problems with containers.

Officials Say Collaboration The administration has said that collaboration
with state and local

with State and Local governments and other entities is important to
homeland security

Governments Increasingly effectiveness. In March 2002, the President
issued Executive Order 13260 Effective, but Concerns

establishing the President*s Homeland Security Advisory Council (Council)
and Senior Advisory Committees for Homeland Security. According to the
Remain

administration, the Council and committees will provide opportunities for
state and local officials and emergency services, law enforcement, and
public health and hospital officials to share homeland security
information and advice. In addition, OHS officials said they met with
state and local first responders and elected officials to gather
information and address concerns about state and local homeland security
issues. OHS also has hosted conference calls with designated homeland
security representatives from the states, territories, and the District of
Columbia for information exchanges. In a July 2002 report on state and
local homeland security actions, the Director of the Office of Homeland
Security said that a key objective of the national homeland security
strategy was to develop a framework ensuring vertical coordination between
local, state, and federal authorities so actions are mutually supportive
and communities receive the assistance they need to develop and execute
comprehensive counterterrorism plans.

16 This working group is part of the National Infrastructure Security
Committee within DOT, with oversight from OHS, and includes
representatives from the Customs Service, Departments of Defense and
Commerce, DOE, DOJ, USDA, HHS; and other agencies.

The national, state, and local association officials we interviewed and
information from these associations that we reviewed indicated that
collaboration and support across all levels of government is vital to
homeland security efforts. For example, in a recent position paper, the
National Governors Association (NGA) said it viewed homeland security as a
complex challenge that demands significant investment and collaboration

among local, state, and federal governments, and integration with the
private sector. Among other things, NGA said homeland security
coordination must involve all levels of government, state and local
governments need help and technical assistance to identify and protect
critical infrastructure, and the federal government should provide
adequate federal funding and support to ensure that homeland security
needs are met.

Officials representing the National Association of Counties (NACo) and the
National League of Cities (NLC) told us that coordination efforts with OHS
had been extensive and helpful. For example, NACo said efforts had been
very beneficial in defining policy and operational needs at the local
level, and matching federal efforts to those needs. NACo officials said
that OHS officials were present at each of NACo*s Homeland Security Task
Force meetings where homeland security policy recommendations were made.
NACo officials said that OHS had worked closely with NACo in developing
homeland security policies, operational plans, initiatives, the national
strategy for homeland security, and the proposal for DHS. NLC officials

said its involvement has included discussions of fiscal years 2002 and
2003 funding, criteria for the President*s first responder initiative,
policy objectives for regional coordination, and resources targeted to
local governments for domestic preparedness.

However, at the time of our interviews, the national associations voiced
some concerns about continued federal coordination and services. Both NACo
and NLC officials hoped the new DHS office dealing with state and local
contacts would allow the continued collaborative relationships they had
experienced with OHS. Both said that they support the use of state
homeland security task forces for DHS coordination with state and local
governments. NACo officials added that they would like the task forces to
include local representatives, such as first responders, so there is not
undue emphasis on state government concerns. NLC officials said the task
forces should include cities as well as regional officials where resources
are shared locally. In addition, NLC officials were concerned about other
federal current or anticipated initiatives, for example, (1) promised
first responder funding has been delayed, (2) federal standards or
mandates

might not be accompanied by funding or other support, such as training,
and (3) existing public safety and security programs might not be
adequately funded, with funds diverted to homeland security programs. They
further said local officials also would like more specific threat
information as part of the Homeland Security Threat Advisory System.

The new DHS legislation contains provisions that should help maintain
federal coordination. The legislation establishes within DHS*s Office of
the Secretary an Office for State and Local Coordination that will
coordinate DHS activities relating to state and local government. In
addition, this office is to develop a process for receiving meaningful
input from state and

local governments to assist the development of the national strategy for
combating terrorism and other homeland security activities.

At the department and agency level, our interviews indicated that existing
working relationships might have aided homeland security work. FEMA, of
course, has extensive relationships with state and local governments. USDA
officials told us that the department has historically had strong,
longstanding

relations at the state and local level. These relations have come through
agricultural programs, land grant colleges, and food safety activities.
They believe these relationships have made it easier to broaden the
discussion to homeland security issues. In HHS, HRSA took advantage

of its relationship with the National Association of County and City
Health Officials (NACCHO) and the American Hospital Association to receive
input on designing the bioterrorism hospital preparedness program. They
believe the agency*s already developed relations with state and local
governments were critical in developing the hospital preparedness grant
program. CDC officials said they work with NACCHO, NGA, and the National
Emergency Management Association, along with other health associations,
such as the American Medical Association and the American Nurses
Association, to increase surge capacity at hospitals and other medical
laboratories.

Collaboration with Private Since September 11, federal government agencies
have increasingly

Sector Needs Greater coordinated with the private sector on homeland
security initiatives. The

Emphasis importance of federal and private sector partnerships have been

recognized in the government*s Critical Infrastructure Protection effort,
started in 1998, and the President*s National Homeland Security Strategy.
The partnerships cover many areas, particularly critical infrastructure
and border security. However, the partnerships require additional
attention to address challenges with information sharing, business
continuity, customer

protection, business capabilities, and duplicative or burdensome
governmental efforts.

Several federal agencies included in our study helped identify critical
infrastructure risks and assess security measures for private sector
entities they provide service to or regulate. This assistance involved
efforts such as advisories, inspections, and alerts. For example, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) said it issued a notice of
proposed rule

making regarding how to define and protect critical energy infrastructure
information, and is developing the final rule. After September 11, FERC
assessed all FERC- jurisdictional dams, developed an E- mail system to
alert all licensees, developed a security program for hydro projects, and
identified critical dams that require a higher level of scrutiny. During
operations inspections, FERC engineers annually assess whether security
measures are in place at all high and significant hazard dams under FERC*s
jurisdiction. FERC reported that it continues to work with industry and
other government representatives to address such initiatives as
cybersecurity and incident response and recovery to hydropower and natural
gas emergencies. Other agency examples include water facilities, food
supplies, and public

health. EPA said it had been working to accelerate the development of a
waste and water vulnerability assessment tool to be used at 16,000 public
water facilities. Vulnerability assessments had already been completed

within major metropolitan areas and EPA had sent security alerts to the
facilities. USDA*s Food Safety Inspection Service has worked with the food
industry to help prevent biosecurity threats to the nation*s food supply,
ensure early detection of such threats, and assure containment of
pathogens. Moreover, in the public health sector, CDC said it has worked

in cooperation with private sector medical and hospital associations such
as the American Medical Association and the American Heart Association to
develop strategies to produce just- in- time information that enhances
protection and prevention via information technology, especially with
regard to safety for support workers.

Private sector association information also described government and
private sector partnerships. For example, DOJ issued a chemical facility
vulnerability assessment methodology, developed in cooperation with the
DOE*s Sandia National Laboratories and with the assistance of chemical
industry representatives. The American Chemistry Council (ACC) also said

that it had partnered with EPA, the FBI, and others to organize regional
security briefings around the nation. Its Chemical Transportation

Emergency Center team had worked with the FBI*s Hazardous Materials
Response Unit to improve coordination between the chemical industry and
the FBI. ACC also signed an agreement with the National Infrastructure
Protection Center (NIPC), a government and private sector partnership, to
create the Chemical Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center, aimed
at sharing security- related information between NIPC and the companies
that make and use chemical products. The American Bankers Association
(ABA) noted that efforts to address money laundering and tracking,
particularly with respect to terrorists and their supporters, could draw
on the Department of the Treasury*s long history of public- private
partnerships to establish policies and regulations to prevent and detect
money

laundering. After September 11, the National Food Processors Association
said it established the Alliance for Food Security, a consortium of more
than 130 industry associations and government agencies that addressed a
wide range of potential threats and provided guidance.

Border security also has been the target of increased joint federal and
private efforts. In our previous work, we described the Customs Service*s
engagement with the trade community in a partnership program to protect U.
S. borders and international commerce from acts of terrorism. In this
initiative, U. S. importers enter into voluntary agreements with Customs
to enhance the security of their global supply chains and those of their
business partners. In return, Customs agrees to expedite the clearance of
the members* cargo at U. S. ports of entry. 17 Under this program* called
Customs- Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C- TPAT)* Customs said
businesses sign an agreement that commits them to actions such as
conducting comprehensive self- assessments of supply chain security and
developing and implementing programs to enhance supply chain security
according to C- TPAT guidelines. Business benefits include a reduced
number of border inspections and an emphasis on self- policing instead of
Customs* verification. According to Customs* officials, 1,100 companies
have agreed to participate in the program as of November 2002. C- TPAT is
currently open to all importers, brokers, freight forwarders, and non-
vessel owning common carriers as well as carriers involved in air, rail,
and sea transportation and U. S.- Canadian border highway carriers.
Customs plans

to expand the program to port authorities, terminal operators, warehouse
17 U. S. General Accounting Office, Container Security: Current Efforts to
Deter Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and Challenges, GAO- 03- 297T
(Washington, D. C.: Nov. 18, 2002).

operators, and foreign manufacturers. Customs launched the C- TPAT program
in April 2002. The DHS Office of State and Local Coordination mentioned
earlier may also help improve coordination and collaboration with the
private sector. It will have responsibilities for coordinating with the
private sector. In addition, under the DHS legislation, the DHS Secretary
is to appoint a Special Assistant responsible for creating and fostering
strategic communications with the private sector, creating and managing
private sector advisory councils, and developing new public- private
partnerships.

Partnership Issues Require The federal government and private sector face
many challenges in

Additional Attention establishing homeland security partnerships. In prior
work, we stated that

information- sharing barriers with the private sector were a problem and
noted that a number of activities have been undertaken to build
relationships between the federal government and the private sector, such

as NIPC*s InfraGard program, the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure
Security, efforts by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, and
efforts by lead federal agencies to promote the establishment of
information sharing and analysis centers (ISAC). For example, the
InfraGard program has expanded, providing the FBI and NIPC with a means of
securely sharing information and a forum for education and training on
infrastructure vulnerabilities and protection measures. In addition, NIPC
said a new ISAC development and support unit had been created, whose
mission was to enhance private sector cooperation and trust. NIPC
indicates that ISACs had been established for the chemical industry,
surface transportation, electric power, telecommunications, information
technology, financial services, water supply, oil and gas, emergency fire
services, food, emergency law enforcement, and state and local
governments. The new DHS legislation contains provisions for information
sharing and security that may respond to some of these concerns. For
example, the legislation includes safeguards on voluntarily provided
critical infrastructure information.

Federal officials and their private sector partners are faced with
striking a reasonable balance between security efforts and business
objectives. While the private sector supports homeland security efforts,
it also is concerned that proposed federal mandates or guidelines might
prove harmful to security or not adequately consider business needs. For
example, the International Mass Retail Association (IMRA) had urged the
Customs Service not to sign a recent rule requiring carriers to transmit

manifest information 24 hours prior to a container being loaded on a ship.
IMRA believed such a requirement might result in increased theft and
tampering at the foreign port of lading. The National Association of
Manufacturers (NAM) has supported administration smart border plans and
attempts to improve cargo security. However, NAM believes that the
government should carefully assess the impact of new cargo security
measures on trade and business operations, ensuring that security benefits

are commensurate with economic costs. The U. S. Chamber of Commerce has
also highlighted the need for government and industry teamwork on border
and transportation security that would allow businesses to stay

competitive. In addition, ABA highlighted limitations in bank capabilities
in security efforts. For example, ABA noted that there are operational
limitations to what a bank can do in reporting customer transactions. For
example, ABA said banks can request information on who is the *beneficial
owner* of an account or the ultimate recipient of a money transfer, but
most often would have no way to investigate or confirm this information.

Our work indicates that achieving the nation's homeland security goals
will require considerable input and collaboration between and among the
federal, state, and local governments. Restructuring federal agencies
involved in homeland security to reduce overlap or conflicts in assistance
provision will help to make activities and initiatives more effective, and
will help to clarify lines of authority and ensure accountability in an
emergency. Many stakeholders we interviewed indicated that working
relationships

between government levels have increased since September 11, as public
sector organizations have worked more closely to identify risks and solve
problems. While progress has occurred in this important area, state and
local government organizations articulated that concerns remain with the
level of collaboration in certain areas and with certain obstacles, such
as access to critical data. Ultimately, the success of public sector
collaboration is necessary to increase the likelihood that many homeland

security initiatives can be sustained affordably over the long term.
Similarly, while progress has been made in improving collaboration between
the public and private sectors, advances have not been made in some
sectors where such work is necessary. The effective protection of the
nation's critical infrastructure is vital to public safety and security,
and

efforts to achieve this goal cannot be accomplished by the government
absent private sector assistance. A greater emphasis is required on the
part of all stakeholders to find common ground, to eliminate obstacles,
and to

build strong working relationships in order to strengthen homeland
security. DHS includes an Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate that will have responsibility for assessments and
protection plans for key resources and critical infrastructure. Part of
that effort will include consultation and cooperation with state and local
governments and the private sector. For example, the directorate will
recommend protection measures in cooperation with state and local
government agencies and authorities and the private sector.

Addressing Homeland The federal government*s effort to strengthen homeland
security will

Security Mission require a well- articulated strategy to accomplish
agencies* missions and

activities, to create a transition planning focus for DHS, and to leverage
through a ResultsOriented certain key success factors for organizational
success to ensure mission

Approach accountability and sustainability over time. A key component in
integrating homeland security missions and activities is the national

homeland security strategy, which articulates activities that must be
accomplished or coordinated to improve the nation*s homeland security.
While the national strategy seeks to articulate the many important tasks

and activities that must be accomplished or coordinated to improve the
nation*s homeland security outlines, much of the implementation and
mechanisms for achieving goals have not yet been articulated.

To accomplish the government*s transition efforts will require adherence
to certain management practices and key success factors. As we have
previously indicated in testimony before the Congress, these factors

include strategic planning, risk management, information technology
management, human capital strategy and management, and a variety of other
critical management processes and tools that will improve opportunities
for achieving significant homeland security objectives. For example,
strong financial management will be necessary to assure accountability
over significant direct and indirect federal expenditures. Improvements in
leveraging information technology will also be necessary to enhance not
only the effective utilization of management systems, but also to increase
information sharing among and between all parties. Appendix II provides a
description of the critical success factors discussed in our previous
testimony. Attention to these factors will be critical both to the
government*s strategy

for achieving homeland security goals via multiple departments and levels
of government and other stakeholders, as well as efforts to potentially
transition agencies into a new department. By establishing a transition

office within OMB, the President has taken an important first step in
creating an effective transition for agencies to be incorporated into the
proposed department. Continued transition efforts thereafter in the new
department must sustain and build upon the initial actions to maintain
mission focus while simultaneously integrating multiple entities into the
new structure. Further, the President*s Management Agenda provides needed
governmentwide emphasis on many important management objectives.

National Strategy Requires A critical component of the government's
efforts to coordinate and

Implementation establish a plan for homeland security activities has been
the creation of a

homeland security strategy* one of the initial tasks the President gave to
OHS shortly after the terrorist attacks. On July 16, 2002, the President
released the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The administration
indicated that the national strategy was the product of intense
consultation across the United States, including conversations with, among
others, governors and mayors, state legislators, Members of the Congress,

concerned citizens, academics, soldiers, firefighters, and police
officers. 18 The national strategy established three strategic homeland
security objectives, further defined by critical mission areas under each
objective. They are  to prevent terrorist attacks within the United
States, with mission areas

of intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, and
domestic counterterrorism;

 to reduce America*s vulnerability to terrorism, with related mission
areas of critical infrastructure and asset protection and catastrophic
threat defense; and

 to minimize the damage and recover from attacks that occur, with the
mission area of emergency preparedness and response.

The national strategy also describes four foundations* law, science and
technology, information sharing and systems, and international
cooperation* that cut across the mission areas, all levels of government,
18 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security,
Washington,

D. C.: July 2002).

and all sectors of society. Figure 3 summarizes the national strategy*s
strategic objectives and foundation areas and related mission areas.

Figure 3: National Strategy Components Strategic objectives Prevent
terrorist attacks within the United States

Intelligence and warning

Detect terrorist activity before it manifests itself in an attack so
proper preemptive, preventative, and protective action can be taken.

Border and transportation security

Promote the efficient and reliable flow of people, goods, and services
across borders while preventing terrorists from using transportation
conveyances or systems to deliver implements of destruction.

Domestic counterterrorism

Identify, halt, and where appropriate, prosecute terrorists in the United
States, including those directly involved in terrorist activity and their
sources of support.

Reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism Critical infrastructure and
key asset protection

Protect the nation's critical infrastructure and key assets from terrorist
attacks to levels appropriate to each target's vulnerability and
criticality.

Catastrophic threat defense

Develop new approaches, a focused strategy, and a new organization to
address chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorist attacks.

Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur Emergency
preparedness and response

Develop a comprehensive national system to bring together and coordinate
all necessary response assets quickly and effectively.

Foundation areas Law

Federal level

Utilize laws to win the war on terrorism while protecting civil liberties.

State level

Strengthen state codes to protect public welfare (not mandated).

Science and technology

Have a systematic national effort to harness science and technology in
support of homeland security.

Information sharing and systems

Build a national environment that enables the sharing of essential
homeland security information horizontally across each level of government
and vertically among federal, state, and local governments, private
industry, and citizens.

International cooperation

Pursue a sustained, steadfast, and systematic international agenda to
counter the global terrorist threat and improve homeland security. Source:
GAO analysis of the National Strategy for Homeland Security. Office of
Homeland Security, July 2002.

By providing a definition of homeland security, along with a set of
strategic objectives and crosscutting foundation areas, the national
strategy provides some direction for the federal government*s homeland
security

activities. In defining homeland security needs and objectives, the
national strategy describes the nation*s vulnerabilities, the means of
attack, and the terrorist organizations that potentially pose threats to
the United States. The strategy also discusses the importance of
developing comprehensive national threat, risk, and vulnerability
assessments to identify homeland security needs. Importantly, the risk
assessments are discussed within the context of other national strategies,
such as the National Security Strategy. In addition, the national strategy
highlights the necessity of

intergovernmental and private sector partnerships and outlines expected
near- term budgeting priorities, such as enhancing the analytic
capabilities of the FBI and increasing the security of international
shipping containers.

As with most complex strategies, implementing the national homeland
security strategy represents a significant challenge. The strategy would
be most effective if it included definitions of measurable objectives,
clarifications of responsibilities among federal agencies and other
entities, affordable, long- term budget priorities, and addressed
management capabilities and accountability. The strategy sets overarching
performance expectations through its strategic objectives, which are
further defined by critical mission areas under each objective. These
strategic objectives would benefit from having targeted performance levels
that define a minimum level of homeland preparedness.

Moreover, implementation of the national strategy will depend on
clarifying federal agency and nonfederal partner responsibilities as well
as performance objectives. The national strategy identifies DHS as the
central point for coordinating national homeland security efforts. Many
national strategy initiatives rely on DHS leadership, yet the national
strategy does not cover the period prior to DHS*s operation. To better
clarify roles, the strategy could designate a federal lead agency for each
initiative below the department level, even for those initiatives that
call for crosscutting coordination. The new DHS legislation sets out
organizational responsibilities that may help in further defining partner
roles. For example, as mentioned earlier, the Under Secretary for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection is to assess threats
and vulnerabilities and to develop a national plan for securing key
resources and critical infrastructure.

Nonfederal partner responsibilities will also be important. Many of the
national strategy*s initiatives rely on the efforts of nonfederal
entities. However, only a few strategy initiatives directly address
nonfederal performance expectations and related accountability. While this
is a

difficult area given federalism principles, international sovereignty, and
private sector independence, a national strategy requires national (and
international) performance expectations and accountabilities if it is to
be successfully implemented.

Further, the national strategy would benefit from addressing how federal,
state, local, and private efforts for specific initiatives are
operationally coordinated and integrated. The national strategy
articulates the development or consolidation of existing federal plans,
such as developing a national infrastructure protection plan and
integrating federal response

plans into a single all- discipline incident management plan. However,
those efforts may not address duplicate program efforts under each of the
strategic objectives.

Our review of the national strategy indicates that more than 30 of the
strategy*s initiatives appear to be already under way in whole or in part,
including those relating to DHS implementation. For example, initiatives
are under way to implement the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of
2001 and target and suppress terrorist financing. However, beyond the
initial priorities mentioned for fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004, the
strategy does not contain a long- range implementation plan for the
remaining planned initiatives or a discussion about the strategy*s long-
term

implementation costs. Further, priorities need to be established and
timelines defined.

Implementation of the national strategy will also require addressing key,
specific federal management capabilities. Some of the federal departments
and agencies assigned to carry out the strategy face management challenges
in administering their programs, managing their human capital, and
implementing and securing information technology systems. Federal agencies
will need to address these challenges as well as develop or enhance
specific homeland security management capabilities, such as identifying
homeland security threats, risks, vulnerabilities, and responses and
effectively working in interagency, intergovernmental, and private sector
relationships.

Finally, the strategy could be more explicit on the accountability
structure that will be necessary to ensure the implementation of efforts
to strengthen and sustain homeland security. The interrelationship of OHS,
OMB, and DHS* as well as other federal organizations* is not articulated
with respect to creating a structure that can assure an effective homeland
security strategy that is accountable to the President and the Congress.

Agencies* Strategic Planning Several departments and agencies reported
that since September 11, they

Revisions Started, but were developing or revising strategic plans to
address homeland security*

Incomplete yet these efforts are far from complete. Some departments and
agencies

have revised their plans to better incorporate homeland security goals and
objectives in their planning activities. For example, FEMA has revised its
strategic plan to broaden its focus on addressing all hazards, including
weapons of mass destruction, under a new strategic goal focusing on
terrorism. Under this goal, FEMA plans to develop and implement a federal

program to support state and local government incident management
capability and establish a process for sharing information among federal,
state, and local governments; emergency responders; and the general
public. Likewise, DOJ substantially revised its strategic plan to
consolidate

homeland security activities under a new strategic goal. While homeland
security objectives were in the strategic plan before September 11, 2001,
the heightened awareness and overriding priority of DOJ's homeland
security activities and responsibilities necessitated a separate strategic

goal to focus on the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of
terrorist acts. Among the strategies addressing this goal is the
establishment of the Anti- Terrorism Task Forces. Other strategies under
this goal include building and maintaining the capacity of the FBI,
developing an intelligence capability that supports DOJ's counterterrorism
efforts, mitigating threats to the nation*s infrastructure, and
coordinating with state and local government agencies to develop and
maintain domestic preparedness. However, according to a recent DOJ
Inspector General report, 19 the FBI*s

Strategic Plan has not been updated to reflect the counterterrorism
priorities in DOJ*s updated Strategic Plan. The FBI indicates that it is
now updating this plan. Other agencies are still in the process of
revising their strategic plans or are developing new homeland security-
specific plans to better incorporate

their homeland security goals and objectives in their planning activities.
For example, HHS is revising its strategic plan to consolidate its public
health threat response and bioterrorism activities under one strategic
goal. Similarly, USDA is also revising its strategic plan to focus more on
homeland security initiatives. Several officials noted that they expect 19
Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the
Federal Bureau of

Investigation*s Counterterrorism Program: Threat Assessment, Strategic
Planning, and Resource Management, Report No. 02- 38 (September 2002).

greater attention to homeland security in the fiscal year 2004 planning
cycle. CDC officials stated that while its fiscal year 2003 performance
plan does not contain any new goals regarding homeland security, it
expects the fiscal year 2004 performance plan to contain new goals and
measures for the smallpox vaccine program and, perhaps, the public health
preparedness and response to bioterrorism cooperative agreement program.
The new department, in fulfilling its broad mandate, has the challenge of

developing a national homeland security performance focus. This focus will
necessarily rely on related national and agency strategy and performance
plan efforts of OHS, OMB, and other departments and agencies. Indeed, the
planning activities of the various departments and agencies represent a
good start in the development of this focus; however, our past work on
implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act has
highlighted ongoing difficulty with many federal departments and agencies
setting adequate performance goals, measures, and targets. Accordingly,
attention will need to be given to federal department and agency
capabilities in developing and achieving appropriate homeland security
performance expectations and measures and in ensuring that there is
linkage between these agency plans and the national strategy, and
ultimately to individual performance expectations. Ensuring these
capabilities and linkages will be vital in establishing a

comprehensive homeland security planning and accountability framework that
will not only guide the nation*s homeland security efforts but also help
assess how well they are really working. The new DHS legislation does
require some specific planning efforts that

include goals and measures. For example, the Directorate of Science and
Technology is to develop a national policy and strategic plan for
developing countermeasures to weapons of mass destruction. The directorate
must develop comprehensive, research- based definable goals and annual
measurable objectives and specific targets to evaluate the goals.

Comprehensive Risk Many departments and agencies are placing a stronger
emphasis on risk Analysis Efforts Incomplete

management to focus their homeland security activities. In addition, the
national strategy places a high priority on the collection and analysis of
homeland security intelligence and information to strengthen defenses
against different threats. Departments and agencies have told us they are
refining and broadening their risk management approaches to capture the
full range of their agencies* homeland security activities. For example,

CDC included a risk assessment in the design of its public health
preparedness cooperative agreement program. NRC initiated a comprehensive
reevaluation of its safeguards and security programs soon after September
11. NRC officials stated that, although NRC had always conducted risk,
threat, and vulnerability assessments, a reevaluation was undertaken to
include additional consequence modeling and vulnerability assessments to
reflect changes in the threat environment, including the effects aircraft
used as weapons might have on facilities. In another example, FDA recently
used a risk management approach in its National Food Safety System Project
to develop counterterrorism strategies and strategic plans, import control
programs, and food safety programs. Other agencies are focusing their risk
management activities on critical infrastructure protection. For example,
EPA will be working with the

chemical industry to assist and encourage the development of a chemical
facility vulnerability assessment tool. In addition, the Department of the
Interior*s (DOI) Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) is conducting a vulnerability
assessment of all BOR- administered dams and facilities. BOR has
contracted with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, and others to conduct in- depth vulnerability
assessments of these dams and facilities. BOR expects to have 55 of the
most critical assessments completed by the end of the year and the
remaining 253 completed by the end of fiscal year 2003. In another
example, DOE officials said the department was considering altering its
facilities to make them more defendable and thus reduce the need to add
additional forces to respond to an attack. Under the DHS legislation, DHS
will consolidate many vulnerability

assessment efforts under its Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate. Combining such efforts could help to eliminate
possible duplicative efforts, provide a focus for department activities,
and result in stronger and more coordinated capabilities and information
sharing. While many federal agencies have taken steps to improve risk
management, comprehensive approaches remain incomplete. As we have
indicated in the past, 20 we continue to believe that risk management must
be at the center of the nation's effort to prevent or mitigate terrorism.
Without a comprehensive risk management approach, there is little

20 U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk Management
Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO- 02- 208T (Washington, D. C.:
Oct. 31, 2001).

assurance that programs to combat terrorism are prioritized and properly
focused.

DHS Transition Planning Effective change for leveraging critical homeland
security goals requires Started, but Requires

meaningful transition planning. Careful planning and attention to
Sustained Efforts for management practices and key success factors, such
as strategic planning,

Successful Implementation information technology, risk management, and
human capital management

are important for the broad goals of establishing an overarching framework
to achieve the national strategy and to create an effective transition for
agencies being incorporated into DHS. The creation of DHS will be one of
the largest reorganizations ever undertaken and the difficulty of this
task should not be underestimated. Under the reorganization, 22 existing
agencies and programs and an estimated 170,000 people will be integrated
into the new department in order to strengthen the country*s defense
against terrorism. With an estimated budget authority of $37.45 billion
for the component parts of the new department, successfully transitioning
the government in an endeavor of this scale will take considerable time
and money. Careful and thorough planning will be critical to the
successful creation of the new department. While national needs suggest a
rapid reorganization of homeland security functions, the transition of
agencies and programs into the new department is likely to take time to
achieve. At the same time, the need for speed to get the new department up
and running must be balanced with the need to maintain readiness for new
and existing threats during the transition period. Moreover, the
organizational transition of the various components will simply be the
starting point* as implementation challenges beyond the first year should
be expected in building a fully integrated department and could take 5 to
10 years to fully

implement the department in an effective and sustainable manner. On
September 24, 2002, we convened a forum of public and private sector
leaders to identify and discuss useful practices and lessons learned from
major private and public sector organizational mergers, acquisitions, and
transformations that federal agencies could implement to successfully
transform their cultures and DHS could use to merge its various
originating components into a unified department. 21 The results of this
forum provide insights into the challenges facing the federal government
in forming a new

21 U. S. General Accounting Office, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and
Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and
Other Federal Agencies, GAO- 03- 293SP (Washington, D. C.: November 2002).

cabinet department and in building a world- class, high performance
organization.

Many major mergers and acquisitions in the private sector do not live up
to their expectations or potential. In the short term, the experience of
major private sector mergers or acquisitions is that productivity and
effectiveness actually decline in the period immediately following a
merger and acquisition. This happens for a number of reasons, including
attention

being concentrated on critical and immediate integration issues and
diverted from longer- term mission issues, and employees and managers
inevitably worrying about their place in the new organization. The key is
to adopt practices that minimize the duration and the significance of the
reduced productivity and effectiveness and ultimately create a new
organization that is more than the *sum of its parts.*

Research suggests that the failure to adequately address* and often even
consider* a wide variety of people and cultural issues is at the heart of
unsuccessful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. But this does not

have to be the case. While there is no one right way to manage a
successful merger, acquisition, or transformation, the experiences of both
successful and unsuccessful efforts suggest that there are practices that
are key to their success. Table 4 outlines these key practices that can
serve as a basis for subsequent consideration as federal agencies seek to
transform their cultures in response to governance challenges.

Tabl e 4: Lessons Learned about Mergers and Transformations for DHS and
Other Federal Agencies

 Ensure top leadership drives the transformational change.  Establish a
coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the
transformation.  Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the
outset of the transformation.

 Set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show
progress from day one.  Dedicate an implementation team to manage the
transformation process.  Use the performance management system to define
responsibility and assure accountability for change.  Establish a
communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related
progress.

 Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the
transformation.  Build a world- class organization.

Source: GAO.

On June 20, 2002, the President signed Executive Order 13267 establishing
within OMB a Transition Planning Office to design and coordinate the DHS
transition. A joint memorandum from OHS and OMB directors describes *day
one* issues that need immediate resolution upon creation of the
department, such as chain of command, incident management, and
communications. Planning teams will be of two types: those that are
organized around the major operating components of the organization and
those that are crosscutting, that is, teams for functions such as human
capital, budget, legal, systems, and communications. Additionally, OMB
Director Mitchell Daniels issued a memorandum temporarily ceasing all
financial management, procurement, human resource, and information
technology system development or modernization efforts above $500,000 for
fiscal years 2002 and 2003, to avoid actions and spending that would seem
wasteful or redundant once DHS becomes operational.

Despite these initial efforts to identify potentially redundant spending,
the creation of a new department will cost money. The administration has
maintained that the consolidation of functions within DHS will reduce
costs below what would otherwise have been the case if these functions
continued to operate separately. In the long run savings may well be
realized, but any reorganization will incur start- up costs as well as
require some funding that may be temporarily redundant, but necessary to
maintain continuity of effort during the transition period. The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) priced the various legislative proposals
for DHS, and all proposals would increase spending. A July 2002 cost
estimate anticipates that implementation will cost about $4.5 billion over
the 2003- 2007 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. 22
This is in addition to the projected net spending for ongoing activities
of the

transferred agencies* about $19 billion in 2002, growing to $27 billion by
2007 under CBO*s baseline assumptions. 23

22 According to CBO, they are planning to revise the cost estimate for
direct spending for H. R. 5005 as enacted. However, there will not be any
changes to the cost estimate for spending subject to appropriations. H. R.
5005, as amended, was enacted on November 25, 2002 (P. L. 107- 296).

23 Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate:
H. R. 5005 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Washington, D. C.: July 23,
2002).

CBO*s estimates could best be described as conservative. Although CBO*s
July 2002 estimate included an assumption that key senior managers will
need to be in a centralized office location along with core functions, CBO
does not include such potentially significant cost drivers as the
combination of the multiple pay and retirement legacy systems. More
important than a precise cost of the transition is the recognition that
there

will be short- term transition costs and that these costs need to be made
transparent in a transition plan for congressional consideration. 24

The importance of the transition efforts to this new homeland security
environment cannot be overemphasized. OMB was ordered to initiate a
homeland security transition planning process for DHS, although its
transition authorities expire 90 days after the law*s enactment. OMB told
us that some initial transition efforts for the new department are under
way, especially regarding the consolidation of multiple financial and
management information systems among agencies. The creation and
integration of the new department will only be achieved through a
realistic

and aggressive strategy that, to the largest extent possible, quickly and
seamlessly merges important homeland security components into a cohesive
entity capable of protecting the nation from terrorism. The DHS
legislation requires the President to provide a DHS reorganization plan to
appropriate congressional committees 60 days after enactment, which he
did, on November 25, 2002. 25 Practices that have been consistently found
to be at the center of successful mergers, as outlined during our recent
Mergers and Transformation Forum, and in the key success factors
articulated in recent congressional testimony (see app. II), will be
beneficial to this process and helpful to other federal agencies and
organizations engaged in homeland security.

Strategic Human Capital An organization's people are its most important
asset. People define an

Plan Critical to Transition organization, affect its capacity to perform,
and represent the knowledge

24 The fifth continuing resolution (P. L. 107- 294) enacted on November
23, 2002, permits the Secretary of DHS, with OMB*s approval, to transfer
up to $500 million in budget authority for unforeseen homeland security
requirements. In addition, OMB is allowed to reallocate up to $140 million
of unused budget authority appropriated to organizations and entities

transferring to DHS for salaries and expenses associated with establishing
the new department. 25 Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan
(The White House, Washington,

D. C.: Nov. 25, 2002).

base of the organization. A strategic human capital plan is, therefore,
critical to effectively managing federal agencies with homeland security
missions and activities, including DHS. The legislation requires all
agencies

moving into DHS, and DHS itself, to appoint chief human capital officers
and include human capital planning in performance plans and performance
reports.

Agencies slated to move into DHS will need to address long- standing human
capital problems in order to ease the transition to the new department.
One of these challenges has been the ability to hire and retain a talented
and motivated staff. For example, we have reported that INS has

been unable to reach its program goals in large part because of such
staffing problems as agent attrition. 26 INS staffing problems in several
of its functions had been affected by the lack of a staff resource
allocation model 27 that would identify staffing needs.

To accomplish homeland security missions some agencies have recognized the
need for new skills in the workforce. It is anticipated that agencies will
need employees with skills in information technology, law enforcement,
foreign languages, and other proficiencies. For example, we have reported
that the FBI has an action plan to hire translators, interpreters, and
special

agents with language skills* areas in which the federal government
currently has a shortage. 28 Similarly, last year*s anthrax outbreak
highlighted the need for trained communications staff at CDC to respond to
information requests from the media and the general public.

Increased attention to border security will test the capacity of DHS to
hire large numbers of inspectors for work at our nation's border entry
points. Additionally, TSA has faced an extraordinary challenge in hiring
and training 33,000 passenger security screeners by November 2002. 29 26
U. S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Enforcement: Challenges to
Implementing

the INS Interior Enforcement Strategy, GAO- 02- 861T (Washington, D. C.:
June 19, 2002). 27 U. S. General Accounting Office, Immigration and
Naturalization Service: Overview of Recurring Management Challenges, GAO-
02- 168T (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 17, 2001). 28 U. S. General Accounting
Office, Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct
Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls, GAO- 02- 375 (Washington, D. C.: Jan.
31, 2002). 29 U. S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security:
Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate and Long- Term
Challenges, GAO- 02- 971T (Washington, D. C.: July 25, 2002).

Moreover, other agencies that are to transfer to DHS are also expected to
experience challenges in hiring security workers and inspectors. For
example, APHIS has been seeking to increase the size of its inspection
force by 50 percent at the same time that the Customs Service, INS, and
other agencies are increasing the size of their inspection staffs. In
addition, various agency officials have cited retention problems

associated with homeland security missions. Since much of TSA*s
recruitment of federal air marshals has come from other federal agencies,
this has increased competition for skilled law enforcement staff.

According to a TSA official, approximately 64 percent of the Federal Air
Marshal Service*s newly hired staff have previous professional experience
in other federal agencies. TSA is not limited to the grade and step pay
structure of the General Schedule, and can offer more flexible
compensation to law enforcement recruits. Several agency officials have
cited TSA*s compensation levels as the reason they have been losing many

employees. For example, the police force protecting the facilities of
HHS*s National Institutes of Health says it has experienced high turnover
over the last year. As a result, it is considering offering a better
compensation package to officers. In addition, INS reported that it did
not meet its hiring goal for one reason* a significant increase in the
loss of agents to other federal agencies. INS reported that a 556 percent
increase in the loss of agents from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2002
was due in large part to the availability of higher paying jobs with the
Federal Air Marshal Service at TSA.

Another potential human capital challenge to homeland security activities
is the expected retirement of many federal employees in the near future.
Many of the agencies that are due to be transferred to the new department
are projected to lose substantial portions of their staffs to retirement.
According to our analysis of OPM data, 26 percent of career employees at
APHIS, 33 percent at the Coast Guard, 31 percent at the Customs Service,

40 percent at FEMA, 21 percent at INS, and 30 percent at the Secret
Service will be eligible for retirement with unreduced annuities by the
end of fiscal year 2007.

Agencies and New Hiring and retaining a talented and motivated staff is
only one aspect

Department Need an agency leaders must consider as part of its human
capital strategy. To Integrated Human Capital

assist agencies in facing human capital challenges, we have released an
Strategy exposure draft of a model of strategic human capital management
that highlights the steps that agencies can take to manage their human
capital more strategically. 30 The GAO Strategic Human Capital Model
identifies four governmentwide human capital cornerstones that have been
shown to be essential to agency effectiveness. (See fig. 4.) These four
critical areas are leadership; strategic human capital planning;
acquiring, developing, and retaining talent; and results- oriented
organizational cultures. To address each of these cornerstones, the model
identifies eight critical success factors, based on the following
underlying principals:

 People are assets whose value can be enhanced through investment. The
objective is to maximize value while minimizing risk.

 An organization*s human capital strategy should be designed,
implemented, and assessed based on its ability to achieve results and
contribute to the organization*s mission.

30 U. S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital
Management, GAO- 02- 373SP (Washington, D. C.: March 15, 2002).

Figure 4: GAO*s Model of Strategic Human Capital Management Four human
capital cornerstones Eight critical success factors

Leadership

Commitment Role of the

to human capital human capital function

management

Strategic

Integration Data- driven

human capital

and alignment human capital

planning

decisions

Acquiring,

Targeted Human

developing, and

investments in capital approaches

retaining talent

people tailored to meet

organizational needs

Resultsoriented

Empowerment Unit and

organizational

and inclusiveness individual performance

cultures

linked to organizational goals

Source: GAO- 02- 373SP.

Performance Management Performance management systems and personnel
flexibilities can help to

Systems and Personnel improve the effectiveness of agencies, and some
homeland security

Flexibilities Can Improve agencies are already utilizing such tools. The
Aviation and Transportation

Effectiveness Security Act requires TSA to develop a performance
management system

and to use performance agreements as a way to align organizational and
individual goals for employees, managers, and executives. TSA has
established an interim performance management system, which includes
procedures for creating performance agreements, monitoring employee
performance, and determining employee development needs. For example,
according to the template developed for a TSA executive, an executive's
performance agreement includes organizational goals to

improve and maintain the security of American air travel, ensure an
emphasis on customer satisfaction, and to make substantial contributions
to TSA and the accomplishment of its performance goals. Results- oriented
performance agreements are a good mechanism in a performance

management system to help create a *line of sight* showing how individual
employees can contribute to overall organizational goals. 31 31 U. S.
General Accounting Office, Managing for Results: Emerging Benefits From
Selected Agencies* Use of Performance Agreements, GAO- 01- 115
(Washington, D. C.: Oct. 30, 2000).

Moreover, to deal with their human capital challenges, it will be
important for the new department and other homeland security agencies to
assess and determine which human capital flexibilities are the most
appropriate and effective for managing their workforces. 32 But while this
determination is important, how personnel flexibilities are implemented is
equally important. We have identified six key practices that agencies
should implement to use human capital flexibilities effectively: (1) plan
strategically and make targeted investments, (2) ensure stakeholder input
in developing policies and procedures, (3) educate managers and employees
on the availability and use of flexibilities, (4) streamline and improve
administrative processes, (5) build transparency and accountability into
their systems, and (6) change their organizational cultures. By more
effectively using flexibilities, agencies would be in a better position to
manage their workforces, assure accountability, and transform their
cultures to address current and emerging demands. 33

At the same time, new flexibilities for DHS and other homeland security
agencies should be viewed in the context of how similar flexibilities have
been exercised by other agencies with similar missions, such as TSA. As we
testified last summer, 34 the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
authorizes TSA to use and modify the personnel system established by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which is exempt from many federal
personnel provisions. To meet its need for talented employees quickly, TSA
officials stated that they made use of personnel flexibilities such as
temporary hiring authority, on- the- spot hiring authority, and the
authority to use detailees from other agencies and executives on loan from
the private sector. A TSA official said that these various flexibilities
have been useful for increasing its staffing for critical positions. TSA
is also basing its compensation system on FAA*s pay banding approach,
which allows the agency to hire employees anywhere within broad pay bands
for their positions. For example, the pay band for screeners ranges from
$23, 600 to

32 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 amends part III of title 5 of the
United States Code. Title 5 covers government employees in areas such as
employment and retention, employee performance, pay and allowances, and
labor- management and employee relations. The act allows the Secretary of
DHS and the Director of OPM to jointly establish and adjust a human

resources management system. The legislation establishes criteria for the
system, such as nonwaivable provisions.

33 U. S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: Effective Use of
Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies in Managing Their Workforces, GAO- 03- 2
(Washington, D. C.: Dec. 6, 2002).

34 GAO- 02- 971T.

$35,400 (from about $11 to $17 per hour). Pay banding is one example of a
personnel flexibility that can help agency managers establish a more
direct link between pay and an individual*s knowledge, skills, and
performance.

Effective Oversight The success of the federal government*s homeland
security mission will

Critical to Success depend on effective oversight by the appropriate parts
of our government.

The oversight entities of the executive branch, including the inspectors
general, OMB, OPM, and OHS, will have a vital role to play in ensuring
expected performance and accountability. As stated in the President*s June
2002 DHS proposal, OHS was seen as continuing to play a key role, advising
the President and coordinating a simplified interagency process. Likewise,
congressional committees, with their long- term and broad institutional
roles, will also play a role in overseeing the transformation of the
federal government as it meets the demands of its homeland security
mission. The creation of DHS has raised questions regarding how the
Congress can best meet its oversight, authorizing, and appropriations
responsibilities for the new department. DHS will be comprised of some 22
federal agencies or their components and be overseen by numerous
congressional committees. The DHS legislation asks each House of the
Congress to review its

committee structure in light of the reorganization of homeland security
responsibilities within the executive branch. As a result, the Congress
may wish to explore ways to facilitate conducting its responsibilities in
a more consolidated and integrated manner. Whether or not the Congress
does so could have an impact on the effective implementation and oversight
of DHS.

Conclusion The nation*s efforts to strengthen homeland security will
require extensive commitments and perseverance to ensure their
effectiveness and

sustainability. There will continue to be multiple demands placed on
federal agencies* ability to accomplish their homeland security missions,
to coordinate and collaborate in meaningful ways with each other, with
state and local government entities, and with the private sector. Many of
these demands may be better met through the effective implementation of
DHS. However, critical roles remain for OHS and other agencies with
homeland security related missions, as well as for central management
agencies like

OMB and OPM. The coordination and oversight of a national strategy to
better protect Americans from terrorism is vital to achieving the nation*s
homeland

security objectives. This will be a primary role for OHS. Because all
homeland security objectives cannot be achieved simultaneously, it will be
important for OHS, DHS, and other agencies to focus initially on the most
critical issues and greatest risks to security, and to guide the
strategy*s implementation in phases. For example, concerns related to
border

security or visa processing may need to have priority and resources over
other areas in which current approaches may be more effective, or in which
fewer risks are apparent. Additionally, the completion of a comprehensive
threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment must be addressed.

While there are indications that federal agencies are developing better
working relationships among themselves and with other relevant
stakeholders, concerns remain about collaboration in certain areas,
especially in regards to the sharing of critical information. Creating
effective linkage* building the critical partnerships* will be a key to
successfully implementing the DHS transition and the national strategy.
The complexity and urgency of the nation*s homeland security goals require
effective, cooperative, and sustained action from multiple public and
private entities, and addressing coordination and collaboration

concerns will be vital to success. OHS, in conjunction with OMB, must help
support and oversee the implementation of the national strategy in order
to ensure that responsible entities have clear missions, are held
accountable for achieving specific results in a timely manner, design
effective human capital strategies to attract and retain critical skills
and talent, and create strong partnerships so that the nation obtains
meaningful and measurable results in its efforts to prevent terrorism.

Another critical component of implementing the national strategy is the
effective transition to DHS. OMB will have a critical support and
oversight role to play in leading this effort through its responsibilities
for the DHS transition strategy. OMB has the lead responsibility to
develop the DHS transition plan, and this role will have to be
accomplished in conjunction with OHS and DHS. The creation and integration
of the new department will only be achieved through a realistic and
aggressive strategy that, to the largest extent possible, quickly and
seamlessly merges important homeland security components into a cohesive
entity capable of protecting the nation from terrorism. Practices that
have been consistently found to be at the center of successful mergers, as
outlined in our recent Mergers and Transformation Forum, and in the key
success factors central to well performing organizations articulated in
recent congressional testimony

(see app. II), will be beneficial to this process, and helpful to other
federal agencies and organizations engaged in homeland security.

There is little doubt, however, that the integration and transformation
required will be difficult and complex and, as a result, not as quick or
seamless as would be ideally desired. Nor should focus from important
homeland security missions being integrated into DHS be unduly diverted or
sidetracked by administrative concerns during the transition period. Thus,
management attention must be focused upon an effective transition

plan that prioritizes functions and appropriately phases in the transition
so that protection of the nation is maintained at the same time the new
department*s initial transition steps are accomplished. Achieving this
overarching goal will be important for DHS and for maintaining linkages
between people, processes, and results during the transition in order to
effectively meet objectives for protecting the nation from terrorism. It
may also be necessary to acknowledge that, at least in the near term,
program objectives may differ or conflict. In addition, while steps must
be

taken to link all 22 agencies in meaningful ways through an overarching
mission, common core values, and other means, it may not be necessary or
appropriate to try and create a single culture within DHS. Program
objectives of certain DHS agencies may differ or conflict, and difficult
balances between homeland security and non- homeland security missions

and resource allocations will remain. Other homeland security objectives
will be implemented outside of DHS. As a result, OHS, OMB, and OPM must
continue to assist DHS in resolving policy, budget, human capital,
communications, and program tensions that may interfere with national
homeland security objectives, particularly during the transition period.

Further, although the creation of the Transition Planning Office for DHS
is an important first step in the transition of federal agencies into a
new department, its termination 90 days after the enactment of the
legislation creating the department means that a sustained management
approach will need to be developed and refined over time* as the new
department will likely take years to become fully integrated and
effective. Once again, OMB, in conjunction with OHS, has a significant
role and responsibility to play in supporting the long- term transition
efforts of DHS. The governmentwide management role of OMB, particularly,
may help to provide DHS with the expertise and guidance necessary to
succeed in

building this complex new entity. OMB*s oversight of the government*s
principal management laws and practices relating to performance
management, information technology, financial management, human

capital management, and acquisition management, for example, can help
DHS*s leadership create a strong and viable structure sustainable for
years to come. Moreover, OMB*s role in federal management activities can
also benefit those agencies with homeland security missions that are not
being integrated into DHS. Ensuring effective homeland security strategic
planning and performance measurement, for instance, is equally important
to the success of the FBI as it is to the new department, even though its
mission will complement and not be subsumed by DHS. A realistic human
capital strategy that helps to lead agencies*

transformation into high- performing organizations will be vital to the
effectiveness and sustainability of our homeland security efforts. An
organization's people are its most important asset. People define an
organization, affect its capacity to perform, and represent the knowledge
base necessary to achieve its objectives. A strategic human capital plan
is, therefore, critical to effectively managing federal agencies with
homeland security missions and activities, including DHS and others. OPM,
in conjunction with OMB, OHS, and DHS, will need to help craft and support

such a plan in implementing the national strategy and the DHS transition
to ensure the optimum effectiveness of organizational goals, cooperation,
and collaboration among all parties, especially DHS employees and
management.

Recommendations for As the federal government clearly faces a number of
leadership and Executive Action

management challenges in achieving its homeland security mission, we
recommend the following:

 Given the scope of homeland security objectives across the public and
private sector, it is important for OHS, in conjunction with OMB and DHS,
to set priorities, to help guide and support the development of
performance measures and time frames, and to assess and oversee progress,
in implementing the national homeland security strategy. Through the
national strategy, OHS should also lead efforts to ensure clarity in the
roles and responsibilities of all parties* OHS, OMB, DHS, and others* to
leverage collaboration among them, and to establish effective
accountability to meet national goals. Moreover, these entities will need
to balance and reconcile program objectives and priorities, and make
realistic resource allocations, within and among homeland security and
non- homeland security missions across government.

 OMB, in developing an effective transition plan for DHS, should ensure
that the plan incorporates the practices identified during our Mergers and
Transformation Forum, as well as the key factors for successful
organizations listed in appendix II in helping lay the foundation for a
cohesive, world- class organization capable of protecting the nation from
terrorism.  Over the coming years, OMB, in conjunction with DHS, should
help

ensure the implementation of broad- based management practices and
principles that will improve the sustainability of DHS and other homeland
security activities, consistent with statutory and regulatory requirements
as well as with the President*s Management Agenda.

They should, in part, direct the establishment of appropriate plans and
management systems to ensure the needed management capacity, people,
partnerships, and accountability to achieve national homeland security
goals. This includes an effective strategic planning system that
articulates meaningful performance goals, objectives, and measures; an

effective human capital strategy; and a process for reporting and
oversight. Strong financial and information technology systems and
internal controls will also be critical to the success of DHS and other

organizations with homeland security missions.  OPM, in conjunction with
OMB and the agencies, should develop and oversee the implementation of a
long- term human capital strategy that

can support the capacity building across government required to meet the
objectives of the nation's efforts to strengthen homeland security. With
respect to DHS, in particular, this strategy should

 establish an effective performance management system, which incorporates
the practices that reinforce a *line of sight* that shows how unit and
individual performance can contribute to overall organization goals;

 provide for the appropriate utilization of the human capital
flexibilities granted to DHS to effectively manage its workforce; and

 foster an environment that promotes employee involvement and
empowerment, as well as constructive and cooperative labormanagement
employee relations.

Agency Comments On November 26, 2002, we provided a draft of this report
to the Directors of OMB, OHS, and OPM for their official comments. OMB did
not provide

official comments. However, OMB staff members provided technical comments
to our draft and we have incorporated them as appropriate. The Director of
OPM provided written comments on December 19, 2002, which have been
reproduced in appendix III. OPM concurred with the recommendations
relevant to them and noted that they were actively involved in
accomplishing them. OPM also provided technical comments that we have
incorporated as appropriate. OHS informed us that they had no comments. On
December 7, 2002, we provided excerpts of our draft report to those
agencies that were mentioned within the report. We received technical
comments from USDA, DOJ, DOT, Treasury, FEMA,

FERC, and NRC, and we have incorporated them as appropriate. As agreed
with your office, unless you announce the contents of the report earlier,
we plan no further distribution until 30 days after its date. At that
time, we will send copies to the Directors of OMB, OHS, and OPM. We will
also send copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees

and to the federal agencies and offices discussed in this report. We will
make copies available to other interested parties upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http:// www. gao. gov.

Please contact me on (202) 512- 6806 if you or your staff has any
questions. Major contributors to this report included Shawn Arbogast,
Joseph Byrns, Sharon Caudle, Kevin Copping, Katharine Cunningham, Seth
Dykes, Denise Fantone, Mark Goldstein, Steven Lozano, Kristeen McLain,
Mary Reintsma, Bradley Trainor, Summer Ramke, and James Whitcomb.

Sincerely yours, Patricia A. Dalton Director, Strategic Issues

Appendi xes Homeland Security Funding by Department or

Appendi x I

Agency, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2003 Dollars in millions

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 President's

Department/ independent agency actual estimated a budget request

Department of Agriculture $339. 87 $776.56 $573.38 Department of Commerce
97. 65 124.35 158.68 National Security/ Department of Defense b 4,021. 00
6,665.00 7,844.00 Department of Education 0.04 0.04 0.04 Department of
Energy 1,000. 28 1,271.13 1,201.40 Department of Health and Human Services
401. 36 3,084.12 4,408.39 Department of Housing and Urban Development 1.97
1.97 2.72 Department of the Interior 25. 18 114.14 110.51 Department of
Justice 4,625. 71 7,446.19 7,112.16 Department of Labor 15. 97 26. 37
26.95 Department of State 476. 37 610.26 749.50 Department of the Treasury
1,786. 38 2,741.55 2,888.75 Department of Transportation 2,535. 95
9,252.60 7,784.17 Department of Veterans Affairs 18. 74 47. 42 83.92
Agency for International Development 0.11 0.18 0.18 Corporation for
National Community Service 0.00 29. 00 118.00 District of Columbia 0.00
212.65 15.00 Environmental Protection Agency 5.59 185.91 133.48 Executive
Office of the President 0.16 143.80 47.50 Federal Communications
Commission 0.00 0.00 1.00 Federal Emergency Management Administration 31.
45 329.03 3,554.53 General Services Administration 92. 93 276.95 346.91
Kennedy Center 0.00 4.31 1.91 National Aeronautics and Space
Administration 120. 42 228.92 137.48 National Archives 0.00 2.00 7.00
National Capital Planning Commission 0.00 0.76 0.00 National Gallery of
Art 0.00 2.15 2.17 National Science Foundation 212. 15 236.29 236.33
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5.85 41. 13 34.41 Office of Personnel
Management 2.04 1.93 1.25 Securities and Exchange Commission 1.86 0.75
0.17 Smithsonian 0.00 21. 70 20.00 Social Security Administration 73. 83
113.10 129.16

(Continued From Previous Page)

Dollars in millions

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 President's

Department/ independent agency actual estimated a budget request

United States Postal Service 0.00 762.00 0.00 U. S. Army Corps of
Engineers 0.00 138.60 65.00 Other small/ independent agencies 1.54 2.60
1.97

Tot al c $15,894. 40 $34,895.44 $37,798.01

Source: OMB Memorandum M- 02- 14, "Additional Information Requirements for
Overseas Combating Terrorism and Homeland Security for the FY 2004 Budget"
(August 8, 2002) and GAO analysis. Note: Numbers may not add to totals
because of rounding. a The FY 2002 estimated funds includes homeland
security amounts from the FY 2002 enacted budget

($ 19, 582.46); the emergency supplemental enacted September 2001 ($
10,728.83), and the emergency supplemental enacted August, 2002 ($
4,584.15). b The category "National Security" includes Department of
Defense and intelligence community funding

combined to keep figures unclassified. c OMB does not report on homeland
security funds for the judicial or legislative branch.

Critical Success Factors for New

Appendi x II

Organizations In our prior work, entitled Homeland Security: Critical
Design and Implementation Issues, (GAO- 02- 957T, July 17, 2002), we
identified certain critical success factors a new organization should
emphasize in its initial implementation phase. Over the years, we have has
made observations and recommendations about many of these success factors,
based on effective

management of people, technology, and financial and other issues,
especially in our biannual Performance and Accountability Series on major
government departments. These factors include the following:

 Strategic planning: Leading results- oriented organizations focus on the
process of strategic planning that includes involvement of stakeholders;
assessment of internal and external environments; and an alignment of
activities, core processes, and resources to support mission- related
outcomes.  Organizational alignment: The organization of the new
Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) should be aligned to be consistent with the goals
and objectives established in the strategic plan.

 Communications: Effective communication strategies are key to any major
consolidation or transformation effort.  Building partnerships: One of
the key challenges of this new

department will be the development and maintenance of homeland security
partners at all levels of the government and the private sector, both in
the United States and overseas.  Performance management: An effective
performance management

system fosters institutional, unit, and individual accountability.  Human
capital strategy: The new department must ensure that its

homeland security missions are not adversely impacted by the government*s
pending human capital crisis, and that it can recruit, retain, and reward
a talented and motivated workforce, which has required core competencies,
to achieve its mission and objectives. The people factor is a critical
element in any major consolidation or

transformation.  Information management and technology: The new
department

should leverage enabling technology to enhance its ability to transform
capabilities and capacities to share and act upon timely, quality
information about terrorist threats.

 Knowledge management: The new department must ensure it makes maximum
use of the collective body of knowledge that will be brought together in
the consolidation.

 Financial management: The new department has a stewardship obligation to
prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; to use tax dollars appropriately; and to
ensure financial accountability to the President, the Congress and the
American people.

 Acquisition management: As one of the largest federal departments, DHS
will potentially have some of the most extensive acquisition requirements
in government. Early attention to strong systems and controls for
acquisition and related business processes will be critical both to
ensuring success and maintaining integrity and accountability.

 Risk management: The new department must be able to maintain and enhance
current states of homeland security readiness while transitioning and
transforming itself into a more effective and efficient structural unit.
DHS will also need to immediately improve the government*s overall ability
to perform risk management activities that can help to prevent, defend
against and respond to terrorist acts.

 Change management: Assembling a new organization out of separate pieces
and reorienting all of its processes and assets to deliver the desired
results while managing related risks will take an organized, systematic
approach to change. The new department will both require an executive and
operational capability to encourage and manage change.

Comments from the Office of Personnel

Appendi x III Management

Related GAO Products Homeland Security Border Security: Implications of
Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program.

GAO- 03- 38. Washington, D. C.: November 22, 2002.

Homeland Security: CDC's Oversight of Select Agent Programs. GAO- 03-
315R. Washington, D. C.: November 22, 2002.

Homeland Security: INS Cannot Locate Many Aliens Because It Lacks Reliable
Address Information. GAO- 03- 188, November 21, 2002.

Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New
Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO- 03- 297T. Washington, D. C.: November
18, 2002.

Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for
a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies. GAO- 03-
293P. Washington, D. C.: November 14, 2002.

Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security. GAO- 03174.
Washington, D. C.: November 14, 2002. Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for
Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort

for All Missions. GAO- 03- 155. Washington, D. C.: November 12, 2002.

Building Security: Security Responsibilities for Federally Owned and
Leased Facilities. GAO- 03- 8. Washington, D. C.: October 31, 2002.

Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism
Tool. GAO- 03- 132NI. Washington, D. C.: October 21, 2002. Homeland
Security: Department of Justice's Response to Its

Congressional Mandate to Assess and Report on Chemical Industry
Vulnerabilities. GAO- 03- 24R. Washington, D. C.: October 10, 2002.
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued

Management Challenges. GAO- 02- 1122T. Washington, D. C.: October 1, 2002.

Homeland Security: OMB's Temporary Cessation of Information Technology
Funding for New Investments. GAO- 03- 186T. Washington, D. C.: October 1,
2002.

Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems. GAO- 02- 1075T.
Washington, D. C.: September 18, 2002.

Building Security: Interagency Security Committee Has Had Limited Success
in Fulfilling Its Responsibilities. GAO- 02- 1004. Washington, D. C.:
September 17, 2002. September 11: Interim Report on the Response of
Charities. GAO- 02- 1037.

Washington, D. C.: September 3, 2002.

National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing Challenges. GAO-
02- 1048R. Washington, D. C.: August 30, 2002.

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success. GAO- 02- 1013T. Washington, D. C.: August 23, 2002. Homeland
Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to

Success. GAO- 02- 1012T. Washington, D. C.: August 22, 2002.

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success. GAO- 02- 1011T. Washington, D. C.: August 20, 2002.

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO- 02- 993T. Washington, D. C.: August 5, 2002.

Chemical Safety: Emergency Response Community Views on the Adequacy of
Federally Required Chemical Information. GAO- 02- 799. Washington, D. C.:
July 31, 2002. Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation
Issues. GAO- 02- 957T. Washington, D. C.: July 17, 2002. Homeland
Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but

Transferring Control of Certain Public Health Programs Raises Concerns.
GAO- 02- 954T. Washington, D. C.: July 16, 2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Biomedical R& D
Coordination but May Disrupt Dual- Purpose Efforts. GAO- 02- 924T.
Washington, D. C.: July 9, 2002.

Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. GAO02-
927T. Washington, D. C.: July 9, 2002.

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will Be
Critical to Success. GAO- 02- 901T. Washington, D. C.: July 3, 2002.

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnerships Will Be
Critical to Success. GAO- 02- 899T. Washington, D. C.: July 1, 2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Priority Setting. GAO- 02- 893T. Washington, D. C.: June 28,
2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Public Health Priority Setting. GAO- 02- 883T. Washington, D.
C.: June 25, 2002.

Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But
Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success. GAO- 02- 886T. Washington, D.
C.: June 25, 2002. Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are
Underway but

Uncertainty Remains. GAO- 02- 610. Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002.
National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and
Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy.

GAO- 02- 811T. Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002.

Review of Studies of the Economic Impact of the September 11, 2001,
Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center. GAO- 02- 700R. Washington, D.
C.: May 29, 2002. Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for
Achieving

National Goals. GAO- 02- 627T. Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002. Homeland
Security: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts
Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security. GAO-
02- 621T. Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002.

Homeland Security: Progress Made, More Direction and Partnership Sought.
GAO- 02- 490T. Washington, D. C.: March 12, 2002.

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and
Long- Term National Needs. GAO- 02- 160T. Washington, D. C.: November 7,
2001.

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO- 02- 208T. Washington, D. C.: October 31, 2001. Homeland
Security: Need to Consider VA*s Role in Strengthening Federal

Preparedness. GAO- 02- 145T. Washington, D. C.: October 15, 2001.

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach.

GAO- 02- 150T. Washington, D. C.: October 12, 2001.

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation*s Issues. GAO-
01- 1158T. Washington, D. C.: September 21, 2001. Combating Terrorism
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services' Antiterrorism

Efforts at Installations. GAO- 03- 14. Washington, D. C.: November 1,
2002.

Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export
Control Regimes. GAO- 03- 43. Washington, D. C.: October 25, 2002.

Chemical Weapons: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Needs Comprehensive Plan to Correct Budgeting Weaknesses. GAO- 03- 5.
Washington, D. C.: October 24, 2002. Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed
to Improve Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports.
GAO- 03- 15. Washington,

D. C.: October 22, 2002.

Chemical Biological Defense: Observations on DOD's Risk Assessment of
Defense Capabilities. GAO- 03- 137T. Washington, D. C.: October 1, 2002.

Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned Program Generally Effective but Could Be
Improved and Expanded. GAO- 02- 890. Washington, D. C.: September 10,
2002. Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat

Terrorism Abroad. GAO- 02- 1021. Washington, D. C.: September 6, 2002.

Export Controls: Department of Commerce Controls over Transfers of
Technology to Foreign Nationals Need Improvement. GAO- 02- 972.
Washington, D. C.: September 6, 2002.

Nonproliferation R& D: NNSA's Program Develops Successful Technologies,
but Project Management Can Be Strengthened. GAO- 02- 904. Washington, D.
C.: August 23, 2002. Diffuse Security Threats: USPS Air Filtration Systems
Need More Testing

and Cost Benefit Analysis Before Implementation. GAO- 02- 838. Washington,
D. C.: August 22, 2002.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U. S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. GAO-
02- 989T. Washington, D. C.: July 30, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports. GAO- 02955TNI.
Washington, D. C.: July 23, 2002. Diffuse Security Threats: Technologies
for Mail Sanitization Exist, but

Challenges Remain. GAO- 02- 365. Washington, D. C.: April 23, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a
National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 550T.
Washington, D. C.: April 2, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National
Preparedness Strategy. GAO- 02- 549T. Washington, D. C.: March 28, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance
State and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 548T. Washington, D. C.: March 25,
2002.

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National Strategy
to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 547T. Washington, D. C.:
March 22, 2002. Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to
Enhance

State and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 473T. Washington, D. C.: March 1,
2002.

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical
and Biological Preparedness. GAO- 01- 162T. Washington, D. C.: October 17,
2001.

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations. GAO-
01- 822. Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD*s Antiterrorism Program
Implementation and Management. GAO- 01- 909. Washington, D. C.: September
19, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H. R. 525 to Create a President*s Council
on Domestic Preparedness. GAO- 01- 555T. Washington, D. C.: May 9, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal
Response. GAO- 01- 660T. Washington, D. C.: April 24, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National
Strategy. GAO- 01- 556T. Washington, D. C.: March 27, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating
Preparedness and Response. GAO- 01- 15. Washington, D. C.: March 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities;
Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination. GAO- 01- 14. Washington, D.
C.: November 30, 2000.

Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs. GAO/ T-
NSIAD- 0- 45. Washington, D. C.: April 6, 2000. Combating Terrorism: Need
to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training. GAO/
NSIAD- 00- 64. Washington, D. C.: March 21, 2000. Combating Terrorism:
Observations on the Threat of Chemical and

Biological Terrorism. GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 50. Washington, D. C.: October
20, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of
Chemical and Biological Attack. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 163. Washington, D. C.:
September 7, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs. GAO/ T-
NSIAD- 99- 181. Washington, D. C.: June 9, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment
and Sustainment Costs. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 151. Washington, D. C.: June 9,
1999.

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear. GAO/
NSIAD- 99- 110. Washington, D. C.: May 21, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism
Operations. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 135. Washington, D. C.: May 13, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat

Terrorism. GAO/ T- NSIAD/ GGD- 99- 107. Washington, D. C.: March 11, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness
Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 3. Washington, D. C.:
November 12, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn- Lugar- Domenici Domestic
Preparedness Program. GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 16. Washington, D. C.: October 2,
1998.

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and
Target Program Investments. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 74. Washington, D. C.: April
9, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better
Management and Coordination. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 39. Washington, D. C.:
December 1, 1997.

Public Health Public Health: Maintaining an Adequate Blood Supply Is Key
to Emergency Preparedness. GAO- 02- 1095T. Washington, D. C.: September
10, 2002. Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*s
Role in

Public Health Protection. GAO- 02- 235T. Washington, D. C.: November 15,
2001.

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO02-
149T. Washington, D. C.: October 10, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO- 02- 141T.
Washington, D. C.: October 10, 2001.

Food Safety and Security: Fundamental Changes Needed to Ensure Safe Food.
GAO- 02- 47T. Washington, D. C.: October 10, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. GAO- 02- 129T. Washington, D.
C.: October 5, 2001. Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness
Activities. GAO- 01- 915.

Washington, D. C.: September 28, 2001. Chemical and Biological Defense:
Improved Risk Assessments and Inventory Management Are Needed. GAO- 01-
667. Washington, D. C.: September 28, 2001.

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness.

GAO/ HEHS- 00- 180. Washington, D. C.: September 11, 2000. Need for
Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological
Attacks. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 163. Washington, D. C.: September 7, 1999.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should
Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 159. Washington, D. C.:
August 16, 1999. Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism
and Public

Health Initiatives. GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 112. Washington, D. C.: March 16,
1999. Aviation Security Aviation Security: Transportation Security
Administration Faces

Immediate and Long- Term Challenges. GAO- 02- 971T. Washington, D. C.:
July 25, 2002. Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives
for, Preboard

Screening Security Operations. GAO- 01- 1171T. Washington, D. C.:
September 25, 2001.

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO- 01- 1165T. Washington, D. C.:
September 21, 2001.

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation
Security. GAO- 01- 1166T. Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001. Aviation
Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve

Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO- 01- 1162T. Washington, D. C.:
September 20, 2001.

Aviation Security: Long- Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners'
Performance. GAO/ RCED- 00- 75. Washington, D. C.: June 28, 2000.

Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long- Standing Screener
Performance Problems. GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 125. Washington, D. C.: March 16,
2000.

Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long- term Attention Is
Needed. GAO/ T- RCED- 98- 190. Washington, D. C.: May 14, 1998.

Aviation Security: FAA's Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices.

GAO/ RCED- 97- 111R. Washington, D. C.: May 1, 1997.

Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection
Devices. GAO/ RCED- 97- 119R. Washington, D. C.: April 24, 1997.

Aviation Security: Technology's Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities. GAO/
T- RCED/ NSIAD- 96- 262. Washington, D. C.: September 19, 1996.

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed. GAO/ T- RCED/
NSIAD- 96- 251. Washington, D. C.: September 11, 1996.

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security. GAO/ T-
RCED/ NSIAD- 96- 237. Washington, D. C.: August 1, 1996. Critical
Infrastructure

Computer Security: Progress Made, But Critical Federal Operations and

Protection

Assets Remain at Risk. GAO- 03- 303T. Washington, D. C.: November 19,
2002.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Commercial Satellite Security Should
Be More Fully Addressed. GAO- 02- 781. Washington, D. C.: August 30, 2002.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be
Addressed. GAO- 02- 961T. Washington, D. C.: July 24, 2002.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More
Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach to Protecting Information Systems.
GAO- 02- 474. Washington, D. C.: July 15, 2002.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security
Challenges Need to Be Addressed. GAO- 02- 918T. Washington, D. C.: July 9,
2002.

Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure
Protection. GAO- 02- 24. Washington, D. C.: October 15, 2001. Critical
Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in

Safeguarding Government and Privately Controlled Systems from Computer-
Based Attacks. GAO- 01- 1168T. Washington, D. C.: September 26, 2001.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Protecting
Federal Systems and Developing Analysis and Warning Capabilities.

GAO- 01- 1132T. Washington, D. C.: September 12, 2001.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing
Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities. GAO- 01- 1005T. Washington,
D. C.: July 25, 2001.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing
Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities. GAO- 01- 769T. Washington,
D. C.: May 22, 2001.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing
National Capabilities. GAO- 01- 323. Washington, D. C.: April 25, 2001.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges to Building a Comprehensive
Strategy for Information Sharing and Coordination.

GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 268. Washington, D. C.: July 26, 2000.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the Proposed Cyber
Security Information Act of 2000. GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 229. Washington, D.
C.: June 22, 2000.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: National Plan for Information Systems
Protection. GAO/ AIMD- 00- 90R. Washington, D. C.: February 11, 2000.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the National Plan for
Information Systems Protection. GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 72. Washington, D. C.:
February 1, 2000.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Fundamental Improvements Needed to
Assure Security of Federal Operations. GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 7. Washington, D.
C.: October 6, 1999.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on
Year 2000 Experiences. GAO/ AIMD- 00- 1. Washington, D. C.: October 1,
1999.

Disaster Assistance September 11: Small Business Assistance Provided in
Lower Manhattan in Response to the Terrorist Attacks. GAO- 03- 88.
Washington, D. C.: November 1, 2002. Disaster Assistance: Improvement
Needed in Disaster Declaration

Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO- 01- 837. Washington,
D. C.: August 31, 2001. Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive
in Preparing

States for Emergencies. GAO- 01- 850. Washington, D. C.: August 13, 2001.

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and
Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO- 01- 832. Washington, D. C.:
July 9, 2001.

Budget and Management Highlights of a GAO Roundtable: The Chief Operating
Officer Concept* A Potential Strategy to Address Federal Governance
Challenges. GAO- 03- 192SP. Washington, D. C.: October 4, 2002.

Program Evaluation: Strategies for Assessing How Information Dissemination
Contributes to Agency Goals. GAO- 02- 923. Washington, D. C.: September
30, 2002.

Results- Oriented Cultures: Using Balanced Expectations to Manage Senior
Executive Performance. GAO- 02- 966. Washington, D. C.: September 27,
2002.

Performance Budgeting: Opportunities and Challenges. GAO- 02- 1106T.
Washington, D. C.: September 19, 2002. Electronic Government: Proposal
Addresses Critical Challenges. GAO- 02-

1083T. Washington, D. C.: September 18, 2002. Results- Oriented Cultures:
Insights for U. S. Agencies from Other Countries' Performance Management
Initiatives. GAO- 02- 862. Washington, D. C.: August 2, 2002. Acquisition
Workforce: Agencies Need to Better Define and Track the

Training of Their Employees. GAO- 02- 737. Washington, D. C.: July 29,
2002. Managing for Results: Using Strategic Human Capital Management to

Drive Transformational Change. GAO- 02- 940T. Washington, D. C.: July 15,
2002. Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond.
GAO- 02- 538T. Washington, D. C.: March 19, 2002. Managing for Results:
Building on the Momentum for Strategic Human

Capital Reform. GAO- 02- 528T. Washington, D. C.: March 18, 2002.

A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO- 02- 373SP. Washington,
D. C.: March 15, 2002. Budget Issues: Long- Term Fiscal Challenges. GAO-
02- 467T. Washington,

D. C.: February 27, 2002. Managing for Results: Progress in Linking
Performance Plans with Budget and Financial Statements. GAO- 02- 236.
Washington, D. C.: January 4, 2002.

Results- Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO- 01- 1084SP.
Washington, D. C.: August 2001.

Managing for Results: Federal Managers* Views on Key Management Issues
Vary Widely Across Agencies. GAO- 01- 592. Washington, D. C.: May 2001.

High- Risk Series: An Update. GAO- 01- 263. Washington, D. C.: January
2001.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide
Perspective. GAO- 01- 241. January 2001.

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks. GAO-
01- 159SP. Washington, D. C.: November 2000.

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission
Fragmentation and Program Overlap. GAO/ AIMD- 97- 156. Washington, D. C.:
August 29, 1997. Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential
Duplication in Federal

Missions and Approaches. GAO/ T- AIMD- 95- 161. Washington, D. C.: June 7,
1995.

Reorganization FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps Encouraging but Broad
Transformation Needed. GAO- 02- 865T. Washington, D. C.: June 21, 2002.

Environmental Protection: Observations on Elevating the Environmental
Protection Agency to Cabinet Status. GAO- 02- 552T. Washington, D. C.:
March 21, 2002.

Implementation: The Missing Link in Planning Reorganizations.

GAO/ GGD- 81- 75. Washington, D. C.: March 20, 1981. Grant Design Grant
Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and

Performance Information. GAO/ GGD- 98- 137. Washington, D. C.: June 22,
1998.

Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go
Further. GAO/ AIMD- 97- 7. Washington, D. C.: December 18, 1996.

Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions.

GAO/ AIMD- 95- 226. Washington, D. C.: September 1, 1995.

(450111)

a

GAO United States General Accounting Office

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government
has invigorated the homeland security missions of many departments and
agencies, nearly doubled the amount of federal funds devoted to homeland
security, enacted new legislation to create a new department and
strengthen transportation security and law enforcement activities,
leveraged relationships with state and local governments and the private
sector, and begun to establish a framework for planning the national
strategy and the transition required for implementing the new Department
of Homeland Security and other homeland security goals. Overall, the
federal government's response on homeland security issues is still
evolving.

* A new homeland security emphasis is under way, but remains incomplete.
Agencies reported a new emphasis on homeland security activities, such as
accelerated implementation of existing homeland security activities or
increased coordination with other government agencies or the private
sector. Agencies will be challenged in meeting dual or unrelated missions
while maintaining and strengthening homeland security operations.
Government organizational changes are also contributing to the new
emphasis, including creation of the Office of Homeland Security, the
Transportation Security Administration, and the integration of many
homeland security functions into the new Department of Homeland Security.
Although officials say that coordination efforts at all levels have
increased, concerns remain particularly with state and local government
and collaboration with the private sector needs greater emphasis.

 The federal government*s efforts to improve homeland security will
require a results- oriented approach to ensure mission accountability and
sustainability over time. Efforts to strengthen homeland security will
require a strategy to accomplish agencies* missions, to create an
effective transition for DHS, and to leverage management practices and key
success factors in order to merge and transform the new department. In
recognizing the value of a national strategy, OHS, DHS, and others should
not expect that all of the homeland security objectives can be achieved
simultaneously. As a result, it will be important for these agencies to
focus initially on the most critical issues and greatest risks, and to
guide the strategy*s implementation in phases. Strategic planning efforts
and comprehensive risk analysis activities have been started, but remain
incomplete. Agencies with homeland security missions and the new
department need an integrated human capital strategy, and the development
of a performance management system and utilization of personnel
flexibilities can improve organizations* effectiveness. DHS transition
planning has started, but will require sustained efforts, including
attention to management practices and key success factors.

HOMELAND SECURITY

Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 260 To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Patricia A. Dalton (202) 512- 6806 or daltonp@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 260, a report to the

Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U. S. Senate

December 2002

To understand the federal government*s response since the September 11
terrorist attacks, GAO was asked to review governmentwide changes and
challenges prevalent in the missions and activities of agencies involved
in homeland security, including the coordination and collaboration
required to meet overall goals and needs, and government's efforts in
planning and implementing strategic, transitional, and human capital
activities designed to reorganize and strengthen homeland security.

GAO recommends that  OHS, with OMB and DHS,

guide development of performance measures and time frames, and clarify the
roles of all parties to establish accountability;  OMB develop an
effective

transition plan for DHS, including practices identified in GAO*s Mergers
and Transformation Forum and other key success factors;  OMB, with DHS,
ensure the

implementation of broad based management practices and principles that
will improve the sustainability of DHS; and  OPM, with OMB, develop and

oversee the implementation of a long- term human capital strategy for
homeland security activities. OHS had no comments. OMB staff provided
technical comments. OPM agreed with our recommendations.

Page i GAO- 03- 260 Homeland Security

Contents

Contents

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Contents

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Page 1 GAO- 03- 260 Homeland Security United States General Accounting
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Appendix I

Appendix I Homeland Security Funding by Department or Agency, Fiscal Years
2001 to 2003

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Appendix II

Appendix II Critical Success Factors for New Organizations

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Appendix III

Appendix III Comments from the Office of Personnel Management Page 63 GAO-
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Appendix III Comments from the Office of Personnel Management Page 64 GAO-
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Related GAO Products Page 67 GAO- 03- 260 Homeland Security

Related GAO Products Page 68 GAO- 03- 260 Homeland Security

Related GAO Products Page 69 GAO- 03- 260 Homeland Security

Related GAO Products Page 70 GAO- 03- 260 Homeland Security

Related GAO Products Page 71 GAO- 03- 260 Homeland Security

Related GAO Products Page 72 GAO- 03- 260 Homeland Security

Related GAO Products Page 73 GAO- 03- 260 Homeland Security

Related GAO Products Page 74 GAO- 03- 260 Homeland Security

Related GAO Products Page 75 GAO- 03- 260 Homeland Security

Related GAO Products Page 76 GAO- 03- 260 Homeland Security

Related GAO Products Page 77 GAO- 03- 260 Homeland Security

Related GAO Products Page 78 GAO- 03- 260 Homeland Security

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a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:

U. S. General Accounting Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington, D. C.
20548 To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512- 6000 TDD: (202) 512- 2537 Fax:
(202) 512- 6061

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs

Contact: Web site: www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm E- mail:
fraudnet@ gao. gov Automated answering system: (800) 424- 5454 or (202)
512- 7470

Public Affairs Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@ gao. gov (202)
512- 4800 U. S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D. C. 20548

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001
Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300 Address Service Requested

Presorted Standard Postage & Fees Paid

GAO Permit No. GI00
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