Military Personnel: Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a
Strategic Approach Is Needed (19-DEC-02, GAO-03-238).		 
                                                                 
DOD has increasingly engaged in multiservice and multinational	 
operations. Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, in part, so that DOD's	 
military leaders would be better prepared to plan, support, and  
conduct joint operations. GAO assessed DOD actions to implement  
provisions in the law that address the development of officers in
joint matters and evaluated impediments affecting DOD's ability  
to fully respond to the provisions in the act.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-238 					        
    ACCNO:   A05745						        
  TITLE:     Military Personnel: Joint Officer Development Has	      
Improved, but a Strategic Approach Is Needed			 
     DATE:   12/19/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Defense contingency planning			 
	     Education or training				 
	     Military officers					 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Desert Storm					 
	     DOD Quadrennial Defense Review			 

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GAO-03-238

Report to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

December 2002 MILITARY PERSONNEL Joint Officer Development Has Improved,
but a Strategic Approach Is Needed

GAO- 03- 238

DOD has taken positive steps to implement the Goldwater- Nichols Act
provisions that address the education, assignment, and promotion of
officers serving in joint positions. However, DOD has relied on waivers
allowable under the law to comply with the provisions and has experienced
difficulties implementing some of its programs. Because of these
difficulties, DOD cannot be assured that it is preparing officers in the
most effective manner to serve in joint organizations and leadership
positions. * Education. DOD has met provisions in the act to develop
officers

through education by establishing a two- phased joint education program,
but has not determined how many officers should complete both phases. In
fiscal year 2001, only one- third of the officers serving in joint
positions had completed both phases of the program.  Assignment. DOD has
increasingly not filled all of its critical joint duty

positions with joint specialty officers, who are required to have both
prior education and experience in joint matters. In fiscal year 2001, DOD
did not fill 311, or more than one- third, of its critical joint duty
positions with joint specialty officers.  Promotion. DOD has promoted
more officers with prior joint

experience to the general and flag officer pay grades. However, in fiscal
year 2001, DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint
experience to promote one in four officers to these senior levels.
Beginning in fiscal year 2008, most officers promoted to these senior
levels will also have to complete DOD*s joint education program or
otherwise meet the requirements to be a joint specialty officer. Our
analysis of officers promoted in fiscal year 2001 showed that 58 out of
124 officers promoted to the general and flag level did not meet these
requirements. DOD has promoted mid- grade officers who serve in joint
organizations at rates equal to or better than the promotion rates of
their peers. However, DOD has had difficulty meeting this objective for
colonels and Navy captains.

DOD*s ability to respond fully to these provisions has been hindered by
the absence of a strategic plan that (1) establishes clear goals for
officer development in joint matters and (2) links those goals to DOD*s
overall mission and goals. DOD has not identified how many joint specialty
officers it needs and, without this information, cannot determine if its
joint education programs are properly structured. The services vary in the
emphasis they place on joint officer development and continue to struggle
to balance joint requirements against their own service needs. DOD has
also not fully addressed how it will develop reserve officers in joint
matters* despite the fact that it is increasingly relying on reservists to
carry out its mission. Finally, DOD has not tracked meaningful data
consistently to measure progress in meeting the act*s provisions.

MILITARY PERSONNEL

Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach Is Needed

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 238. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Derek B. Stewart at (202) 512- 5140 or stewartd@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 238, a report to the

Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives

December 2002

DOD has increasingly engaged in multiservice and multinational operations.
Congress enacted the Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, in part, so that DOD*s military leaders would
be better prepared to plan, support, and conduct joint operations. GAO
assessed DOD actions to implement provisions in the law that address the
development of officers in joint matters and evaluated impediments
affecting DOD*s ability to fully respond to the provisions in the act.

GAO recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness develop a strategic plan that links joint officer development to
DOD*s overall mission. This plan should  identify the number of joint

specialty officers needed,  provide for the education and

assignment of reservists who may serve in joint organizations, and  be
developed to provide more

meaningful data to track progress made against the plan.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation because it views
provisions in the act as impediments that must be removed before it can
develop an effective strategic plan. We do not believe that the act*s
provisions impede DOD from developing a strategic plan.

Page i GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Positive Actions Taken, but Gaps Remain in
Education,

Assignments, and Promotions 7 Lack of a Strategic Approach Is Contributing
to DOD*s Difficulties

to Fully Respond to the Act*s Intent 24 Conclusions 30 Recommendation for
Executive Action 31 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 31

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 35

Appendix II Demographic Data for Joint Positions 38

Appendix III Mid- Level Promotion Statistics 41

Appendix IV Survey Questionnaire and Summary of Responses 48 Officers*
Background 48 Officers* Views on Joint Assignments 49 Officers* Views of
Phase I of DOD*s Joint Professional Military

Education Program 49 Officers* Views of Phase II of DOD*s Joint
Professional Military

Education Program 50

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 55

Tables

Table 1: Service Fill Rates and Vacancy Rates at the Joint Forces Staff
College for Academic Years 1996 through 2001 11 Table 2: Placement of Non-
Joint Specialty Officers after

Graduation from Joint Professional Military Education Schools for Fiscal
Years 1996 through 2001 13 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Table 3: Placement of Joint Specialty Officers after Graduation from Joint
Professional Military Education Schools for Fiscal Years 1996 through 2001
14 Table 4: Officers Filling Joint Duty Positions in July 2002 Who Are

Joint Specialty Nominees or Joint Specialty Officers 18 Table 5: Joint
Positions by Major Command or Activity 38 Table 6: Promotion Rates for
Mid- Level Officers Assigned to the

Joint Staff Compared to Officers Assigned to Their Service Headquarters
during Fiscal Years 1988 through 2001 42 Table 7: Promotion Rates for Mid-
Level Joint Specialty Officers

Compared to Promotion Rates of Officers Assigned to Their Service
Headquarters during Fiscal Years 1988 through 2001 44 Table 8: Promotion
Rates for Mid- Level Officers Assigned to Other

Joint Organizations Compared to the Board Average Promotion Rate during
Fiscal Years 1988 through 2001 46

Figures

Figure 1: Allocation of Joint Positions by Service in Fiscal Year 2001 6
Figure 2: Distribution of Vacant and Filled Critical Joint Positions

during Fiscal Years 1989 through 2001 15 Figure 3: Number of Officers
Designated Annually as Joint

Specialty Officers and Total Number of Joint Specialty Officers for Fiscal
Years 1990 through 2001 17 Figure 4: Percentage of Officers Promoted to
General or Flag Rank

with Joint Experience between Fiscal Years 1995 and 2001 20 Figure 5:
Good- of- the- Service Waiver Usage for Fiscal Years 1989

through 2001 21 Figure 6: Distribution of Joint Positions by Pay Grade 39
Figure 7: Distribution of Joint Positions by Occupational

Categories 40

Page 1 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

December 19, 2002 The Honorable John McHugh Chairman The Honorable Vic
Snyder Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

Prior to 1986, the Department of Defense (DOD) primarily operated under a
culture in which the four military services educated their officers in
service- specific matters, assigned their most talented officers to key
service positions, and promoted them to leadership positions within their
own service. This arrangement served DOD well when military operations
fell primarily within the capabilities of one of the military branches.
Given that DOD was increasingly moving toward engaging in joint*
multiservice and multinational* operations, however, Congress recognized
that cultural change was needed to move DOD away from its service
parochialisms toward interservice cooperation and coordination. Congress
also believed that DOD needed to better prepare its military leaders to
plan, support, and conduct joint operations. It enacted the
GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 1 in
part, to improve officers* professional development through education in
joint matters and assignment to joint organizations. The act further
requires DOD to factor this joint education and experience into its
officer promotion decisions.

The act has been hailed as landmark legislation, given the significance of
the cultural change that it was designed to achieve, and DOD has, in fact,
subsequently issued joint vision statements that anticipate an armed force
that will be *fully joint: intellectually, operationally,
organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.* 2 During the 16 years
since the act*s passage, however, DOD has repeatedly sought legislative
relief from the act*s provisions that address the development of officers
in joint matters and, although it has complied with many of these
provisions, it is still experiencing difficulties in implementing some of
its joint officer

1 Pub. L. 99- 433, Oct. 1, 1986. 2 Department of Defense, Joint Vision
2010 and Joint Vision 2020, Washington, D. C.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

development programs and policies. Concerns exist in Congress about the
extent of DOD*s progress in this area and impediments to further change.
For this report, we (1) assessed DOD*s actions to implement the major
provisions of the law in terms of the education of officers in joint
matters, their assignment to joint organizations, and the services*
promotion of officers who are serving or who have served in joint
positions 3 and (2) evaluated impediments affecting DOD*s ability to fully
respond to the act*s intent regarding the development of officers in joint
matters. We also surveyed and spoke with more than 500 officers serving in
joint positions on the Joint Staff and in joint organizations located in
the United States and abroad to obtain their perspectives on joint officer
development. Appendix I contains a more detailed discussion of our scope
and methodology.

DOD has taken positive steps to implement the major provisions of the
Goldwater- Nichols Act that address the education and assignment of
officers in joint matters and the promotion of officers who are serving or
who have served in joint positions. In certain cases, DOD has met or
surpassed the act*s objectives. DOD, however, has also relied on waivers
allowable under the law to comply with some of the provisions and has
experienced difficulties in implementing some of its programs and policies
that address joint officer development. Because of these difficulties, DOD
cannot be assured that it is preparing officers in the most effective
manner to serve in joint organizations and leadership positions. For
example,

 DOD has met provisions in the act that require it to develop officers in
joint matters through education by establishing a two- phased joint
professional military education program. The act, however, did not
establish specific numerical requirements and DOD has also not determined
the number of officers who should complete the joint education program. In
fiscal year 2001, only one- third of the officers who were serving in
joint organizations had completed both phases of the education.

 DOD has surpassed certain provisions in the act that require it to
assign officers who meet specified criteria to joint positions. However,
DOD has also increasingly relied on allowable waivers and has not filled
all

3 The Goldwater- Nichols Act uses the term joint duty assignment. For the
purposes of this report, we use the term joint positions. Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

of its critical joint duty positions with officers who hold a joint
specialty designation. This number reached an all- time high in fiscal
year 2001 when DOD did not fill 311, or more than one- third, of its
critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers.

 DOD has, in response to the requirements of the act, promoted more
officers with previous joint experience to the general and flag officer
pay grades. However, in fiscal year 2001, DOD still relied on allowable
waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote one in four officers to
these senior pay grades. Furthermore, DOD has made progress, but it is
still not fully meeting provisions to promote mid- grade officers (majors,
lieutenant colonels, and colonels in the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps
and lieutenant commanders, commanders, and captains in the Navy) who are
serving or who have served in joint positions at rates not less than the
promotion rates of their peers who have not served in joint positions.
Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met more than 90 percent of its
promotion goals for officers who served on the Joint Staff, almost 75
percent of its promotion goals for joint specialty officers, and just over
70 percent of its promotion goals for all other officers who served in
joint positions.

A significant impediment affecting DOD*s ability to fully realize the
cultural change that was envisioned by the act is the fact that DOD has
not taken a strategic approach to develop officers in joint matters. For
example, DOD has not identified how many joint specialty officers it
needs, and the four services have emphasized joint officer development to
varying degrees. In addition, DOD has not yet, within a total force
concept, fully addressed how it will provide joint development to reserve
officers who are serving in joint organizations* despite the fact that DOD
officials have stated that no significant operation can be conducted
without reserve involvement. Finally, DOD has not been tracking certain
data consistently to measure its progress in meeting the act*s joint
officer development objectives. For example, the four services have not
kept historical data on the number of joint positions that are filled with
joint specialty officers and joint specialty officer nominees. Without
these data, DOD cannot assess the degree to which it is properly targeting
its joint education programs.

The officers we interviewed in focus group discussions told us that they
expect, and willingly accept orders, to work in joint assignments during
their careers. In fact, about 50 percent of the services* mid- grade
officers have served in at least one joint assignment. In addition, more
than 75 percent of the officers in our survey who had completed the second
phase

Page 4 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

of the joint education program stated that the second phase was important
from a moderate to a great extent. Those officers who did not find the
program helpful stated in focus group discussions that the program is too
long, redundant with the first phase of the education program, and of
little added value.

This report contains a recommendation that DOD develop a strategic plan
that will link joint officer development to DOD*s overall mission and
goals. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with our recommendation because it views provisions in the act as
impediments that must be removed before it can develop an effective
strategic plan. We do not believe that the act*s provisions impede DOD
from developing a strategic plan.

The intent of the Goldwater- Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 was, in
part, to reorganize DOD into a more unified military structure. Within
that act, Congress included several provisions that specifically address
the education of officers in joint matters, 4 their assignment to joint
organizations, and the promotion of officers serving in joint positions.
The act also established a joint specialty officer designation for
officers who are specifically trained in and oriented toward joint
matters. 5 Although the act contains a number of specific requirements,
Congress also provided DOD with flexibility in meeting the requirements by
granting it waiver authority when it can demonstrate justification. DOD
approves waivers on a case- specific basis. 6 These waivers apply to a
number of the provisions, including (1) the methods for designating joint
specialty officers, (2) the

4 Congress defined joint matters as those matters relating to the
integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters
relating to national military strategy, strategic planning and contingency
planning, and command and control of combat operations under unified
command. 10 U. S. C. sec. 668. 5 There are four methods for an officer to
be selected for the joint specialty: (1) An officer completes joint
professional military education and subsequently serves in a joint
position; (2) An officer who has a military occupational specialty that is
a critical occupational specialty involving combat operations, serves in a
joint position, and then completes the joint professional military
education program; (3) An officer serves in a joint position and then
completes the joint professional military education, provided the
Secretary of Defense determines a waiver is in the interest of sound
personnel management; and (4) An officer completes two joint assignments
and the Secretary of Defense waives the joint education requirement. A
numerical limitation on the last two waivers is specified in the law. 10
U. S. C. sec. 661. 6 10 U. S. C. secs. 619a (b), 661 (c)( 3) (and) (d)(
2)( C), 663 (d). Background

Page 5 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

posteducation assignments for joint specialty officers, (3) the assignment
of joint specialty officers to critical joint duty positions, and (4) the
promotions of officers to the general and flag officer pay grades.

Moreover, Congress has issued follow- on reports and made changes to the
law in subsequent legislation. For example, a congressional panel on
military education issued a report in April 1989 that contained numerous
recommendations regarding joint professional military education. 7 Among
other things, this panel recommended that the services* professional
military education schools teach both service and joint matters and that
the student body and faculty at each of the service schools include
officers from the other services. DOD has implemented these
recommendations. Most recently, Congress amended the law regarding the
promotion criteria for officers being considered for promotion to the
general and flag officer pay grades. 8 The Goldwater- Nichols Act
established a requirement that officers must have served in a joint
position prior to being selected for these promotions. The amendment,
contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002,
will require most officers being considered for appointment to this grade
after September 30, 2007, to complete the joint education program as well.

DOD uses a number of multiservice and multinational commands and
organizations to plan and support joint matters. Since passage of the
Goldwater- Nichols Act, officers serving in these commands and
organizations have overseen a number of joint and multinational military
operations that range from humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping to
major operations such as Operation Desert Storm and ongoing operations in
Afghanistan. The number of joint positions in these organizations has
ranged from a low of 8, 217 positions in fiscal year 1988 to a high of
9,371 positions in fiscal year 1998. Changing missions and reorganizations
have contributed to this variation. In fiscal year 2001, DOD had a total
of 9,146 joint positions. Of these positions, 3, 400 positions were
allocated to the Air Force; 3, 170 positions were allocated to the Army;
2, 004 positions were allocated to the Navy; and 572 positions were
allocated to the Marine Corps. Figure 1 shows that the Air Force had the
largest percentage, followed by the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps.

7 Report of the Panel on Military Education of the 100th Congress,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, April 21, 1989. 8
Pub. L. 107- 107, Div. A, Title V, sec. 525 (a), (b), Dec. 28, 2001.

Page 6 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Figure 1: Allocation of Joint Positions by Service in Fiscal Year 2001

Officers in pay grades O- 4 (majors in the Air Force, Army, and Marine
Corps and lieutenant commanders in the Navy) and above can receive credit
for joint experience when they serve in the Joint Staff, joint geographic
and functional commands, combined forces commands, and defense agencies.
In addition, the Secretary of Defense has authority to award joint credit
to officers for serving in certain joint task force headquarters staffs. 9
DOD has developed a joint duty assignment list that includes all of the
active duty positions in pay grades O- 4 and above in the multiservice
organizations that are involved in or support the integrated employment of
the armed forces. DOD*s policy places limits on the number of positions in
the defense agencies and other jointly staffed activities that can be
included on the list. The list of joint organizations and demographic
descriptions of the officers serving in those organizations are provided
in appendix II.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, under the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, has
overall responsibility for the policies and procedures governing DOD*s
joint officer management program. Among other things, the Assistant
Secretary is responsible for reviewing joint professional military
education

9 10 U. S. C. sec. 664 (i).

Page 7 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

initiatives, approving the list of joint duty assignments, reviewing the
promotion and appointment of joint specialty officers and other officers
who are serving or have served in joint duty positions, and acting on
requests to waive DOD joint officer management requirements. The Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has responsibility, among other things, for
implementing DOD*s policies governing joint officer management and for
making recommendations to the Assistant Secretary. The service secretaries
are responsible for, among other things, supporting DOD policy and for
ensuring the qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty positions.
These responsibilities are delineated in DOD*s Joint Officer Management
Program Directive 1300. 19, issued on September 9, 1997.

DOD has taken positive steps to implement the provisions of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act that address the education of officers in joint matters,
officers* assignments to joint organizations, and the promotion of
officers who are serving or who have served in joint positions. 10 In
certain cases, DOD has met or surpassed the act*s objectives. However, DOD
has also relied on waivers allowable under the law to comply with the
provisions. In addition, DOD has experienced difficulties in implementing
some of its programs and policies that address joint officer development.
Because of these difficulties, DOD cannot be assured that it is preparing
officers in the most effective manner to serve in joint organizations and
leadership positions.

One of the provisions in the Goldwater- Nichols Act requires DOD to
develop officers, in part, through education in joint matters. 11
Accordingly, DOD defined joint education requirements in terms of a two-
phased program in joint matters. It incorporated the first phase of the
program into the curricula of the services* intermediate- and senior-
level professional military education schools. 12 DOD offers the second
phase of the program at the National Defense University*s Joint Forces
Staff

10 Pub. L. 99- 433, Oct. 1, 1986; 10 U. S. C. secs. 661 (c), 662 (a), and
663 (d). 11 10 U. S. C. sec. 661 (c). 12 These schools include the Air
Command and Staff College and the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama;
the Army Command and General Staff College in Leavenworth, Kansas; the
Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania; the Marine Corps Command and
Staff College and the Marine Corps War College in Quantico, Virginia; and
the College of Naval Command and Staff and the College of Naval Warfare in
Newport, Rhode Island. Positive Actions

Taken, but Gaps Remain in Education, Assignments, and Promotions

Education Program in Joint Matters Developed, but Not Delivered to Most
Officers

Page 8 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

College in Norfolk, Virginia. This phase is designed to provide officers
with the opportunity to study in a truly joint environment and to apply
the knowledge they gained during the first phase of their joint education.
DOD also offers a combined program that includes both phases at the
National Defense University*s National War College and Industrial College
of the Armed Forces in Washington, D. C. The Secretary of Defense is
required to educate sufficient numbers of officers so that approximately
one- half of the joint positions are filled at any time by officers who
have either successfully completed the joint professional education
program or received an allowable waiver to complete the education after
their assignment. 13 The act, however, did not identify a specific
numerical requirement and, similarly, DOD has not established numerical
goals concerning the number of officers who should complete joint
professional military education.

In the most effective model, officers would complete the first phase of
joint education in an in- resident or nonresident program through one of
the services* professional military education schools. The in- resident
programs are a full academic year in length; officers completing the
curricula in nonresident programs will often do this over several years,
given that they are completing their education on a part- time basis in
addition to their normal duties. Upon completion of the first phase,
officers would attend the second phase of the program at the Joint Forces
Staff College. The Joint Forces Staff College offers the second phase
three times during the year and, by law, this phase may not be less than 3
months. 14 Upon graduation from the second phase, officers would be
assigned to a joint position.

According to DOD data, only one- third of the officers serving in joint
positions in fiscal year 2001 had received both phases of the joint
education program. This is due, in large part, to space and facility
limitations at the National Defense University schools that provide the
second phase. Although DOD assigns approximately 3, 000 active duty
officers to joint positions each year, the three schools, collectively,
have about 1, 200 seats available for active duty officers.

Furthermore, the Joint Forces Staff College, from which most officers
receive the second phase, is currently operating at 83 percent of its 906-

13 10 U. S. C. sec. 661 (b) and (d). 14 10 U. S. C. sec. 663 (e).

Page 9 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

seat capacity. Moreover, the number of unfilled seats at the Joint Forces
Staff College has risen significantly in recent years, from a low of 12
empty seats in fiscal year 1998 to a high of 154 empty seats in fiscal
year 2001. DOD officials cited pressing needs to assign officers to the
increasing number of military operations as a major reason for these
vacancies. A Joint Staff officer responsible for joint education expressed
concern about the services* ability to fill seats in the future due to the
ongoing war on terrorism.

Logistics, timing, and budget issues are also making it difficult for
officers to attend the second phase of the joint education program. The
Joint Forces Staff College can only accommodate approximately 300 students
in each 3- month term and does not have the space to receive all of the
service professional military education school graduates at the same time.
Given that, officers can report to their joint position after completing
the first phase and subsequently attend the second phase on a temporary
duty basis at some point during their assignment. However, officers and
senior leaders at the sites we visited told us that their joint commands
cannot afford a 3- month gap in a position due to pressing schedules and
workload demands. Officers at the U. S. Forces in Korea posed a slightly
different problem. Given its remote location, officers typically serve in
Korea for only 1- 2 years. That command cannot afford to send someone
serving in a 1- year billet away for 3 months. In addition to logistics
and timing issues, related budget issues exist. When an officer attends
the second phase en route to a joint command, the officer*s service pays
the expenses associated with sending the officer to the Joint Forces Staff
College. When the officer attends the program midtour, the joint
organization pays the expenses. Officers serving on the Joint Staff told
us that a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had instituted a
policy that the Joint Staff would not send officers to the Joint Forces
Staff College* or to any other training lasting more than 30 days* after
they reported to the Joint Staff for duty. DOD officials confirmed this
and explained that the former chairman understood the budget implications
and, believing in the importance of joint education, instituted his policy
with the expectation that the services would send their officers to the
second phase of the education before sending them to their Joint Staff
assignments. DOD officials acknowledged, however, that unintended
consequences resulted from this policy. The services still are not sending
their officers to the second phase before they assign them to the Joint
Staff.

Officers we interviewed suggested that alternatives should be considered
for delivering the second phase of DOD*s joint education program. For
example, some officers believed that the course should be shortened while

Page 10 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

others thought that it should be integrated into the first phase of the
program that is offered in the services* professional military education
schools. However, to shorten the principal course of instruction at the
Joint Forces Staff College, which delivers the second phase, would require
a change in the law. 15

In addition, considerable variation exists among the services in terms of
the number of officers each service sends to the Joint Forces Staff
College. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has directed that the
seats at the Joint Forces Staff College be allocated among the services in
accordance with the distribution of service positions on the joint duty
assignment list. The percentage of seats reserved for each service at the
school does, in fact, reflect the distribution on the list. However, while
the Air Force filled almost 98 percent of its allocated seats in academic
year 2001, the Navy filled only 67 percent of its seats. Moreover, vacancy
rates for the Army and the Navy have, for the most part, increased between
academic years 1996 and 2001. Table 1 shows seats filled and vacancy
rates, by service, at the school for academic years 1996 through 2001.
Table 1 also shows that the allocation of seats has been constant for the
last 3 years.

15 10 U. S. C. sec. 663 (e).

Page 11 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Table 1: Service Fill Rates and Vacancy Rates at the Joint Forces Staff
College for Academic Years 1996 through 2001

Fiscal year Seats

available Seats filled Difference

Percent of seats unfilled Army

1996 289 282 -7 2 1997 282 271 -11 4 1998 298 286 -12 4 1999 297 253 -44
15 2000 297 248 -49 16 2001 297 228 -69 23

Total 1,760 1,568 -192 11 Air Force

1996 321 321 0 0 1997 321 329 +8 0 1998 333 341 +8 0 1999 336 348 +12 0
2000 336 332 -4 1 2001 336 328 -8 2

Total 1,983 1,999 +16 -1 Marine Corps

1996 52 46 -6 12 1997 51 48 -3 6 1998 51 48 -3 6 1999 54 51 -3 6 2000 54
61 +7 0 2001 54 49 -5 9

Total 316 303 -13 4 Navy

1996 217 213 -4 2 1997 207 195 -12 6 1998 207 202 -5 2 1999 219 168 -51 23
2000 219 170 -49 22 2001 219 147 -72 33

Total 1,288 1,095 -193 15 Grand total 5, 347 4,965 -382 7

Source: Joint Forces Staff College.

The officers we spoke with told us that they see the importance of
completing the first phase of the joint professional military education
program perhaps because, in most services, there is a clear correlation
between completion of the first phase and promotion potential. In the

Page 12 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Army and the Air Force, completion of the first phase has become a
prerequisite for promotion to lieutenant colonel, if not by directive,
then at least in practice. In all services, completion of the first phase,
whether or not it is an absolute requirement, is looked upon favorably, at
the very least, for promotion purposes.

The officers we surveyed provided mixed responses when we asked them about
their observations of the second phase of the program at the Joint Forces
Staff College. Of the 184 officers in our survey who had completed the
second phase of the program, 11 percent responded that attending the
second phase was important to a very great extent, 33 percent responded
that attending the second phase was important to a great extent, and 33
percent responded that attending the second phase was important to a
moderate extent. About 24 percent of the officers who had completed the
second phase responded that attending the second phase was important to a
little or no extent. In focus group discussions, these officers said that
the program is too long, redundant with the first phase of joint
education, and of little added value. Some of these officers also said
that the second phase of the program only had value for officers who were
interested in being appointed to the general and flag officer grades in
their future. Officers from all the services and pay grades in our focus
groups agreed that, if an officer were to attend the second phase at all,
an officer should attend en route before reporting to a joint position.

Overall, officers at the commands we visited reported that they were
adequately prepared for their joint position but, often times, cited a
steep learning curve involved with working in their particular joint
organization. Officers in over one- half of the focus groups we conducted
said that they were most prepared for their joint positions because (1)
they were serving in joint positions that drew upon their tactical level
primary military occupation skills; (2) their military occupation, by
nature, was oriented toward joint matters (e. g., communications,
intelligence, special operations, foreign affairs); (3) they had
previously served in a joint or staff position; or (4) they had attended
both phases of the joint education program. Officers who responded that
they were least prepared said that they were serving in joint positions
unrelated to their military occupations or that they lacked familiarity of
joint structures or organization, systems, and processes.

General and flag officers with whom we spoke also provided mixed
responses. While the senior officers talked about the strengths and
importance of the joint education, some senior officers told us that they
did not check the records of the officers serving under them to see

Page 13 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

whether the officers had attended the second phase of the joint
professional military education program and that they did not view this
lack of education as an issue.

The act contains a number of provisions affecting the assignment of
officers to joint positions. These provisions include (1) the percentage
of graduates of the National Defense University schools who must be
assigned to joint duty, (2) the number of joint critical positions that
must be filled by designated joint specialty officers, and (3) the
percentage of positions on the joint duty assignment list that must be
filled by joint specialty officers or joint specialty officer nominees.

The Goldwater- Nichols Act established specific requirements for DOD to
assign officers who attended a joint professional military education
school to joint positions after graduation. 16 Placement of these
graduates in joint positions was intended to help DOD realize the full
benefit of education provided by all three joint colleges. First, DOD must
send more than 50 percent of the officers who are not joint specialists to
a joint position upon graduation from a joint professional military
school. 17 Table 2 shows that DOD has exceeded this requirement since
fiscal year 1996.

Table 2: Placement of Non- Joint Specialty Officers after Graduation from
Joint Professional Military Education Schools for Fiscal Years 1996
through 2001

Fiscal year Number of graduates Number of graduates

placed in joint assignments

Percent of graduates placed in

joint assignments

1996 1,133 937 82 1997 1,114 938 84 1998 1,134 934 82 1999 1,069 874 82
2000 1,058 896 85 2001 998 857 86

Total 6,506 5,436 84

Source: The Joint Staff.

16 10 U. S. C. sec. 663 (d). 17 The Goldwater- Nichols Act was amended in
1993 to allow DOD the flexibility to send these officers to a joint
position as their first or second assignment after graduation. 10 U. S. C.
sec. 663 (d)( 2)( A). DOD Assigning Officers to

Joint Positions but Unable to Fill Critical Positions

Assignment of National Defense University Graduates

Page 14 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Second, DOD must assign all joint specialty officers who graduate from
joint professional military education schools, including the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces and the National War College, to joint
positions upon graduation unless a waiver is granted. 18 Table 3 shows
that 140 joint specialty officers graduated from one of these schools in
the past 6 years and that DOD did not place 35 officers, or 25 percent,
into joint positions. DOD officials explained that the primary reason that
these officers were given allowable waivers was because they had received
orders to command assignments within their own service.

Table 3: Placement of Joint Specialty Officers after Graduation from Joint
Professional Military Education Schools for Fiscal Years 1996 through 2001

Fiscal year

Joint specialty officer graduating

Number placed in joint assignments

Number not placed in joint

assignments Percent of

officers not placed in joint

assignments after graduating

1996 21 16 5 24 1997 22 17 5 23 1998 26 22 4 15 1999 25 11 14 56 2000 22
19 3 14 2001 24 20 4 17

Total 140 105 35 25

Source: The Joint Staff.

The Goldwater- Nichols Act, as amended, further requires DOD to designate
at least 800 joint positions as critical joint duty positions 19 *

positions where the duties and responsibilities are such that it is highly
important that officers assigned to the positions are particularly trained
in, and oriented toward, joint matters. DOD has met this requirement and
has designated 808 positions as critical joint duty positions. However,
DOD is also required to place only joint specialty officers in these
positions unless the Secretary exercises his waiver authority. 20 DOD has
increasingly used its waiver authority to meet this requirement. The
percentage of critical

18 10 U. S. C. 663 (d)( 1). 19 The act originally required the Secretary
to designate no fewer than 1, 000 critical joint duty positions, but the
act was amended in 1996 by Public Law 104- 106 section 501( a) to reduce
the number to 800. 10 U. S. C. sec. 661 (d)( 2)( A). 20 10 U. S. C. sec.
661 (d)( 2)( B) and (C). Assignment to Critical

Joint Duty Positions

Page 15 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

joint duty positions that were filled by officers other than joint
specialty officers has steadily increased from 9 percent in fiscal year
1996 to 38 percent in fiscal year 2001. In fiscal year 2001, DOD was not
able to fill 311 of its critical joint duty positions with joint specialty
officers. In addition, DOD has left other critical joint duty positions
vacant. The percentage of unfilled critical joint duty positions has
steadily increased from 8 percent in fiscal year 1989 to 22 percent in
fiscal year 2001. Therefore, only 331 positions, or 41 percent, of the 808
critical joint duty positions were filled by joint specialty officers in
fiscal year 2001. Figure 2 shows the distribution of vacant and filled
critical joint duty positions by joint specialty officers and non- joint
specialty officers during fiscal years 1989 through 2001.

Figure 2: Distribution of Vacant and Filled Critical Joint Positions
during Fiscal Years 1989 through 2001

The services fill these critical joint positions with officers who have
both the joint specialty designation and the appropriate primary military
skill, any additional required skills, and pay grade. However, when (1) no
joint specialty officer with the other requisite skills is available for
assignment (e. g., pay grade and military occupation) or (2) the best-
qualified candidate is not a joint specialty officer, a waiver must be
approved to fill the position with an otherwise qualified officer. Service
and Joint Staff officials explained that DOD*s inability to fill a
critical position with a joint specialty officer may be due to the fact
that the critical joint duty position

Page 16 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

description may not reflect the commander*s needs at the time the position
is filled. These officials told us that the most frequently cited reason
for requesting an allowable waiver was because the commander believed that
the best- qualified officer for the position was not a joint specialty
officer.

In addition, DOD*s population of joint specialty officers may not be
sufficient to meet this requirement. By fiscal year 1990, DOD had
designated just over 12, 000 officers, who already had the joint education
and experience, as joint specialty officers. However, DOD experienced a 56
percent decrease in its joint specialty officers between fiscal years 1990
and 1997 and has experienced moderate decreases in fiscal years 2000 and
2001. Officials on the Joint Staff attributed the decreases in the early
years to the fact that the attrition of officers who received the
designation in fiscal year 1990 has exceeded the number of new
designations of joint specialty officers. DOD officials also projected
that they would need to designate approximately 800 new joint specialty
officers each year to maintain its current population. Since fiscal year
1990, however, DOD has only met this projection in 3 of the last 4 fiscal
years. Figure 3 shows the number of new designations of joint specialty
officers each year and the total number of joint specialty officers for
fiscal years 1990 through 2001.

Page 17 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Figure 3: Number of Officers Designated Annually as Joint Specialty
Officers and Total Number of Joint Specialty Officers for Fiscal Years
1990 through 2001

Officials told us that DOD has been selective in nominating and
designating officers for the joint specialty because of the promotion
objectives specified in the law. Officials noted that as a result, the
population of joint specialty officers has been small. The act requires
the services to promote joint specialty officers, as a group, at a rate
not less than the rate of officers being promoted who are serving on, or
have served on, the headquarters staff of their service. 21 This higher
promotion standard is applied to joint specialty officers from the time
they receive the joint specialty designation until they are considered for
or promoted to pay grade O- 6. DOD sought relief from this provision and,
in December 2001, Congress reduced the standard for 3 years. During this
3- year period, the services are to promote joint specialty officers at a
rate not less than the promotion rates of all other officers being
promoted from the same military service, pay grade, and competitive
category. Currently, about 2,700 officers meet the joint specialty officer
qualifications but have not been designated, and DOD, given this change in
the law, is in the process of designating these officers. Once they are
designated, DOD will have a population of about 7,600 joint specialty
officers.

21 10 U. S. C. sec. 662 (a)( 2).

Page 18 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

The act also requires DOD to fill approximately 50 percent of all of the
joint positions on the joint duty assignment list either with fully
qualified joint specialty officers or with officers who have been
nominated for that designation. 22 Although the act does not establish
specific numerical requirements, it does require that the number should be
large enough so that approximately one- half of the joint positions in pay
grades O- 4 and above will be filled by officers who are joint specialty
officers or nominees who meet certain requirements. Because the act does
not require DOD to report these data to Congress and DOD has not
maintained historical data on the percentage of joint positions filled by
either fully qualified joint specialty officers or joint specialty officer
nominees, we were not able to measure progress. Nevertheless, we did ask
DOD to provide us with data for a point in time. Table 4 shows that more
than 70 percent of the officers who served in joint positions in July 2002
were joint specialty officers or nominees.

Table 4: Officers Filling Joint Duty Positions in July 2002 Who Are Joint
Specialty Nominees or Joint Specialty Officers

Service Number of

officers who are joint specialty

officer nominees

Number of officers who are

joint specialty officers

Total number of

filled joint positions

Percent of joint positions filled

by joint specialty officers or

nominees

Army 1,466 381 2,493 74 Air Force 1, 491 314 2,620 69 Marine Corps 318 49
479 77 Navy 1,024 196 1,638 74

Total 4,299 940 7,230 72

Source: GAO*s analysis of DOD data.

We note, however, that DOD met this requirement by relying heavily on
joint specialty officer nominees who filled more than 80 percent of the
positions being filled by joint specialty officers or joint specialty
officer nominees. This ranged from 79 percent in the Army to 87 percent in
the

22 In order for those nominated for the joint specialty to count toward
the approximate 50 percent requirement, the officers must have completed
joint professional military education prior to their joint assignment or
have a military occupational specialty that is designated as a critical
occupational specialty involving combat operations. Officers with critical
occupational specialties involving combat, therefore, can be nominated to
be joint specialty officers without having completed joint professional
military education prior to their joint assignment. 10 U. S. C. sec. 661
(d)( 1). Assignment to Joint Duty

Assignment List Positions

Page 19 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Marine Corps. Comparable figures for the Air Force and the Navy are 83
percent and 84 percent, respectively.

The Goldwater- Nichols Act established promotion requirements and
objectives for officers being selected for appointment to the general or
flag officer pay grade and for mid- grade officers who are serving or have
served in joint positions.

The Goldwater- Nichols Act set a requirement that officers must complete a
full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment, or receive a waiver, prior
to being selected for appointment to the general or flag officer pay
grade. The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement for (1) officers
when the selection is necessary for the good of the service; (2) officers
with scientific and technical qualifications for which joint requirements
do not exist; (3) medical officers, dental officers, veterinary officers,
medical service officers, nurses, biomedical science officers, chaplains,
or judge advocates; (4) officers who had served at least 180 days in a
joint assignment at the time the selection board convened and the
officer*s total consecutive service in joint duty positions within that
immediate organization is not less than 2 years; and (5) officers who
served in a joint assignment prior to 1987 that involved significant
duration of not less than 12 months. 23

As of fiscal year 2001, DOD has been promoting more officers who had the
requisite joint experience to the general and flag officer pay grades than
it did in fiscal year 1995. In fiscal year 2001, however, DOD still relied
on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote one in four
officers to these senior pay grades. Figure 4 shows that the percentage of
officers who were selected for promotion to the general and flag officer
pay grades, and who had previous joint experience, rose from 51 percent in
fiscal year 1995 to 80 percent in fiscal year 1999. Conversely, DOD*s
reliance on waivers decreased from 49 percent in fiscal year 1995 to 20
percent in fiscal year 1999. Figure 4 also shows, however, that DOD
experienced slight increases in its use of promotion waivers in fiscal
years 2000 and 2001.

23 10 U. S. C. sec. 619a (b). DOD Promoting Officers

with Joint Experience with Mixed Results

General and Flag Officer Promotions

Page 20 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Figure 4: Percentage of Officers Promoted to General or Flag Rank with
Joint Experience between Fiscal Years 1995 and 2001

Note: DOD did not report this information in this format prior to fiscal
year 1995.

DOD*s reliance on good- of- the- service waivers, 24 in particular, to
promote officers who had not previously served in joint positions is one
indicator of how DOD is promoting its senior leadership. The service
secretaries request use of this waiver authority when they believe they
have sound justification for promoting an officer who (1) has not
completed a full tour of duty in a joint position and (2) does not qualify
for promotion through one of the other four specific waivers. We analyzed
the extent to which DOD has relied on this waiver category to promote its
senior officers because these waivers apply most directly to the
population of general and flag officers who are likely to be assigned to
senior leadership positions in the joint organizations. 25 The Secretary
of Defense has also paid particular

24 10 U. S. C. sec. 619a (b)( 1). 25 We did not analyze the four other
waiver categories because they apply to officers for whom joint
requirements generally do not exist, officers who already had joint
experience that predated the implementation of the Goldwater- Nichols Act,
and officers who were already serving in joint positions when they were
selected for promotion.

Page 21 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

attention to this waiver category and, in 2000, established a policy that
restricts the use of good- of- the- service waivers to 10 percent of total
promotions to the general and flag officer pay grades each year. 26

DOD approved 185 good- of- the- service waivers, representing 11 percent
of the 1, 658 promotions to the general and flag officer pay grades,
between fiscal years 1989 and 2001. Specifically, DOD approved 10 or more
good- ofthe- service waivers each year between fiscal years 1989 and 1998
and only 3 to 7 waivers in fiscal years 1999 through 2001. DOD relied most
heavily on good- of- the- service waivers in fiscal year 1995, when it
approved 25 waivers, and used them on a decreasing basis between fiscal
years 1995 and 1999. In fiscal year 1999, DOD approved just 3 good- of-
the service waivers. In the 2 years since the Secretary of Defense issued
limitations on the use of these waivers, DOD has used them in about 5
percent of its promotions. Figure 5 shows the extent to which DOD has used
good- ofthe- service waivers between fiscal years 1989 and 2001.

Figure 5: Good- of- the- Service Waiver Usage for Fiscal Years 1989
through 2001

26 Secretary of Defense memorandum dated July 6, 2000.

Page 22 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

For most appointments to the general and flag level made after September
30, 2007, officers will have to meet the requirements expected of a joint
specialty officer. 27 This means that most officers, in addition to
completing a full tour of duty in a joint position, will also have to
complete DOD*s joint education program as well. 28 Our analysis of the 124
officers promoted in fiscal year 2001 showed that 58 officers, or 47
percent, had not fulfilled the joint specialty officer requirements. These
58 officers included 18 of 43 officers promoted in the Air Force, 18 of 40
officers promoted in the Army, 19 of 33 officers promoted in the Navy, and
3 of the 8 officers promoted in the Marine Corps.

The Goldwater- Nichols Act also established promotion policy objectives
for officers serving in pay grades O- 4 and above who (1) are serving on
or have served on the Joint Staff, (2) are designated as joint specialty
officers, and (3) are serving in or have served in other joint positions.
DOD has been most successful in achieving its promotion objectives for
officers assigned to the Joint Staff, but it has made less significant
progress in achieving the promotion objectives for officers in the other
two categories. 29 (Appendix III provides detailed promotion data.)

DOD has been most successful in meeting the promotion objective set for
officers assigned to the Joint Staff. The act established an expectation
that officers who are serving or have served on the Joint Staff be
promoted, as a group, at a rate not less than the rate of officers who are
serving or have

27 10 U. S. C. sec. 619a (a)( 2). 28 The existing waiver authority remains
unchanged by the amendments made to 10 U. S. C. sec. 619a (a) by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Pub. L. 107- 107,
Div. A, Title V, sec. 525, Dec. 28, 2001. 29 For our analysis, we compared
progress DOD made between fiscal years 1988 and 1994 with progress DOD
made between fiscal years 1995 and 2001. For each of the three promotion
categories (Joint Staff, joint specialty officers, and other officers
serving in joint positions), we multiplied the three pay grades by the
four services by the 7 years and identified 84 potential promotion groups.
We then eliminated those groups in which no promotions occurred to
identify the actual promotion groups. We then counted the number of groups
in which DOD met or exceeded the applicable standard. DOD is required to
report, on an annual basis, the extent to which it met the promotion
objectives in a given year. However, DOD is not required to report this
type of trend analysis over time. 10 U. S. C. sec. 662 (b). Mid- grade
Officer

Promotions

Page 23 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

served in their service headquarters. 30 Between fiscal years 1988 and
1994, DOD met its promotion objectives for officers assigned to the Joint
Staff in 43 out of 68 promotion groups, or 63 percent of the time. Between
fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this objective in 55 out of 60
promotion groups, or 92 percent of the time.

DOD has also made improvements in meeting its promotion objective for
joint specialty officers. The act established an expectation that joint
specialty officers, as a group, be promoted at a rate not less than the
rate of officers who are serving or have served in their service
headquarters. 31 Between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, DOD met this
promotion objective in 26 of 52 promotion groups, or 50 percent of the
time. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met the promotion objective
in 37 out of 50 promotion groups, or 74 percent of the time. Where DOD did
not meet its promotion objective was somewhat random and we were not able
to attribute problem areas to specific pay grades or services. As we noted
earlier, this standard has been temporarily reduced, and, through December
2004, DOD is required to promote joint specialty officers, as a group, at
a rate not less than the rate for other officers in the same service, pay
grade, and competitive category. We also compared the promotion rates of
joint specialty officers against this lower standard and found that, with
few exceptions, DOD would have met this standard between fiscal years 1988
and 2001.

DOD has made less significant improvement in meeting its promotion
objective for officers assigned to other joint organizations. 32 The act
established an expectation that officers who are serving or have served in
joint positions be promoted, as a group, at a rate not less than the rate
for

30 The Goldwater- Nichols Act states that *officers who are serving on, or
have served on, the Joint Staff are expected, as a group, to be promoted
to the next higher grade at a rate not less than the rate for officers of
the same armed force in the same grade and competitive category who are
who are serving on, or have served on, the headquarters staff of their
armed force.* 10 U. S. C. sec. 662 (a)( 1). 31 The Goldwater- Nichols Act
states that *officers who have the joint specialty are expected, as a
group, to be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for officers of the
same armed force in the same grade and competitive category who are
serving on, or have served on, the headquarters staff of their armed
force.* 10 U. S. C. sec. 662 (a)( 2). 32 This category excludes officers
who have served on the Joint Staff and joint specialty

officers.

Page 24 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

all officers in their service. 33 Between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, DOD
met its promotion objective in 41 out of 82 promotion groups, or 50
percent of the time. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this
objective in 60 out of 84 promotion groups, or 71 percent of the time.
With few exceptions during the last 7 years, all services are meeting the
promotion objective for their officers being promoted to the O- 5 pay
grade who are assigned to the other joint organizations. However, the
services have had significant difficulty meeting the promotion objectives
for their officers being promoted to the O- 6 pay grade. For example, the
Navy has failed to meet this objective for its O- 6 officers since fiscal
year 1988, and the Army has only met this promotion objective twice* in
fiscal years 1995 and 2001* since fiscal year 1988. The Air Force has
generally met this objective for its officers at the O- 6 pay grade, but
it has not met this objective in the past 4 years. Conversely, the Marine
Corps had difficulty in meeting this promotion objective for its officers
at the O- 6 pay grade between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, but it met this
objective in every year until fiscal year 2001.

A significant impediment affecting DOD*s ability to fully realize the
cultural change that was envisioned by the act is the fact that DOD has
not taken a strategic approach to develop officers in joint matters. For
example, DOD has not identified how many joint specialty officers it
needs, and the four services have emphasized joint officer development to
varying degrees. In addition, DOD has not yet, within a total force
concept, fully addressed how it will provide joint development to reserve
officers who are serving in joint organizations* despite the fact that it
is increasingly relying on reservists to carry out its mission. Moreover,
DOD has not been tracking certain data in a consistent manner that would
help DOD measure its progress in following a strategy to meet the act*s
overall objectives and its own goals as well.

33 The Goldwater- Nichols Act states that *officers who are serving in, or
have served in, joint duty assignments (other than officers covered in
paragraphs (1) and (2)) are expected, as a group, to be promoted to the
next higher grade at a rate not less than the rate for all officers of the
same armed force in the same grade and competitive category.* 10 U. S. C.
sec. 662 (a)( 3). Lack of a Strategic

Approach Is Contributing to DOD*s Difficulties to Fully Respond to the
Act*s Intent

Page 25 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

DOD has issued a number of publications, directives, and policy papers
regarding joint officer development. However, it has not developed a
strategic plan that establishes clear goals for officer development in
joint matters and links those goals to DOD*s overall mission and goals.
This lack of an overarching vision or strategy will continue to hamper
DOD*s ability to make continued progress in this area. A well- developed
human capital strategy would provide a means for aligning all elements of
DOD*s human capital management, including joint officer development, with
its broader organizational objectives. Professional military education and
joint assignments are tools that an organization can use to shape its
officer workforce, fill gaps, and meet future requirements.

In prior reports and testimony, we identified strategic human capital
management planning as a governmentwide high- risk area and a key area of
challenge. 34 We stated that agencies, including DOD, need to develop
integrated human capital strategies that support the organizations*
strategic and programmatic goals. In March 2002, we issued an exposure
draft of our model for strategic human capital management to help federal
agency leaders effectively lead and manage their people. 35 We also
testified on how strategic human capital management can contribute to
transforming the cultures of federal agencies. 36

Several DOD studies have also identified the need for a more strategic
approach to human capital planning within DOD. The 8th Quadrennial Review
of Military Compensation, completed in 1997, strongly advocated that DOD
adopt a strategic human capital planning approach. The review found that
DOD lacked an institutionwide process for systematically examining human
capital needs or translating needs into a coherent strategy. Subsequent
DOD and service studies, including the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Human Resources Strategy and the Naval Personnel Task Force, endorsed the
concept of human capital strategic planning.

34 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: A Self- Assessment
Checklist for Agency Leaders, GAO/ OGC- 00- 14G (Washington, D. C.: Sept.
2000); Human Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at the Departments of
Defense and State, GAO- 01- 565T (Washington, D. C.: Mar 29, 2001); and
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense, GAO-
01- 244 (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 2001). 35 See U. S. General Accounting
Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management,

Exposure Draft, GAO- 02- 373SP (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 2002). 36 See U.
S. General Accounting Office, Managing for Results: Building on the
Momentum

for Strategic Human Capital Reform, GAO- 02- 528T (Washington, D. C.: Mar.
18, 2002). DOD Lacks a Strategic

Plan Regarding Joint Officer Development

Page 26 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

DOD*s Joint Vision 2020 portrays a future in which the armed forces are

*fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally,
doctrinally, and technically.* To exploit emerging technologies and to
respond to diverse threats and new enemy capabilities requires
increasingly agile, flexible, and responsive organizations. The vision
requires the services to reexamine traditional criteria governing span of
control and organizational layers; to develop organizational climates that
reward critical thinking, encourage competition of ideas, and reduce
barriers to innovation; to develop empowered individual warfighters; and
to generate and reinforce specific behaviors such as judgment, creativity,
adaptability, initiative, teamwork, commitment, and innovative strategic
and operational thinking.

The Goldwater- Nichols Act not only defined new duty positions and
educational requirements but also envisioned a new culture that is truly
oriented toward joint matters. The key question, today, is how does DOD
best seize the opportunity and build on current momentum. In April 2002,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued the Military Personnel Human
Resource Strategic Plan to establish the military priorities for the next
several years. The new military personnel strategy captures the DOD
leadership*s guidance regarding aspects of managing human capital, but the
strategy*s linkage to the overall mission and programmatic goals is not
stated. DOD*s human capital strategy does not address the vision cited in

Joint Vision 2020. DOD*s human capital approach to joint officer
development* if it were linked to its overall mission* would emphasize
individuals with the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to function
in the joint environment.

DOD has not fully assessed how many joint specialty officers it actually
needs. As we have previously shown, the number of joint specialty officers
has decreased by almost 60 percent over the years, and DOD has a
significant backlog of officers who, although otherwise qualified, have
not been designated as joint specialty officers. Moreover, without knowing
how many joint specialty officers it needs, DOD*s joint professional
military education system may not be structured or targeted properly. For
example, without first defining how many officers should be joint
specialty officers* all officers, most officers, or only those needed to
fill joint positions* DOD has not been able to determine the number of
joint professional military education graduates it needs. Although we have
already noted that there are many vacant seats at the Joint Forces Staff
College, DOD does not know if the total number of available seats is
sufficient to meet its needs or if it will need to explore alternatives
for providing joint education to greater numbers of officers. Number of
Joint Specialty

Officers Needed Unknown

Page 27 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Furthermore, comments from officers we surveyed at various commands
demonstrate that they place different values on the importance of the
joint specialty designation. Overall, officers told us that they viewed
their assignment to a joint position as a positive experience and that
their services also saw joint assignments as valuable career moves.
Moreover, 51 percent of the officers surveyed responded that an assignment
to a joint position is a defined aspect of their career path. Responses
ranged from 57 percent in the Air Force, to 52 percent in the Army, 47
percent in the Navy, and 29 percent in the Marine Corps. However, many
officers also told us that they were reluctant to seek the joint specialty
designation. Their concern was that they would be flagged as joint
specialty officers and, accordingly, be reassigned to subsequent tours of
duty within joint organizations. They were concerned about the need to
balance the requirements of already crowded service career paths and the
expectation to serve in joint organizations. Their ultimate concern was
that multiple joint assignments would take them away from service
assignments for too great a period and that this time away could adversely
affect their career progression and promotion potential. The officers
responded that the joint specialty officer designation was not really
important for the rank and file* but really only important for those who
were going to be admirals and generals. In other words, these officers
believed that the need to meet service expectations seemed to override any
advantages that the joint specialty officer designation might provide. Our
survey and more detailed responses to that survey are presented in
appendix IV.

Each of the four services has been assigning officers in pay grades O- 4
through O- 6 to joint organizations and, as of fiscal year 2002, about 50
percent of the services* mid- level officers had served in at least one
joint assignment. The percentage of officers who served in a joint
position ranged from 46 percent in the Navy and the Marine Corps to 52
percent and 57 percent in the Air Force and the Army, respectively.

Data* including some that we have already presented* however, suggest that
the four services continue to struggle to balance joint requirements
against their own service needs and vary in the degree of importance that
they place on joint education, assignments, and promotions. The Air Force,
for example, filled 16 more than its 1,983 allocated seats at the Joint
Forces Staff College between fiscal years 1996 and 2001. During that 6-
year period, the Air Force actually surpassed its collective allocation by
1 percent. The Marine Corps left 13 of its 316 allocated seats, or 4
percent, unfilled during those same fiscal years. Also during that time
period, the Army left 192 of 1, 760 seats, or 11 percent, unfilled and the
Navy left 193 of Service Emphasis on Joint

Education and Assignments Varies

Page 28 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

1,288 allocated seats, or 15 percent, unfilled. Accordingly, the Air Force
has been able to send a higher percentage of its officers to a joint
position after the officers attend a joint professional military education
school. In fiscal year 2001, for example, 44 percent of Air Force officers
serving in joint positions had previously attended a joint professional
military education school. In contrast, 38 percent of Army officers and 33
percent of Navy and Marine Corps officers serving in joint positions had
attended a joint professional military education school prior to their
joint assignments. This difference can be largely attributed to the fact
that the Air Force sends a higher percentage of its officers at the O- 4
pay grade to the Joint Forces Staff College.

Promotion statistics also suggest differences among the services. As we
noted earlier, the Navy did not meet the pay grade O- 6 promotion
objective for officers serving in joint organizations other than the Joint
Staff, and who are not joint specialty officers, between fiscal years 1988
and 2001. The Army met this objective 2 times, the Marine Corps met it 6
times, and the Air Force met it 10 times in the 14- year period. Our
analysis of general and flag officer promotions showed that, between
fiscal years 1995 and 2000, the Marine Corps used good- of- the service
waivers to promote 19 percent of its officers to brigadier general. The
Army used this waiver authority for 17 percent of its promotions, and the
Navy used the authority for 13 percent of its promotions. In contrast, the
Air Force only approved one good- of- the- service waiver during that time
period.

The Goldwater- Nichols Act states that the Secretary of Defense should
establish personnel policies for reserve officers that emphasize education
and experience in joint matters. 37 A recent congressionally- sponsored
study concluded, however, that DOD has not yet met this requirement and
that DOD*s reserve components lack procedures to identify and track
positions that will provide reserve officers with the knowledge and
experience that come from working with other services and from joint
operations. 38 Providing education in joint matters to reservists has
become increasingly important since 1986, given that DOD has increasingly
relied on reservists in the conduct of its mission. When the act was
enacted,

37 10 U. S. C. sec. 666. 38 See Congressional Research Service, Department
of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Proposals for Reforming the Joint
Officer Personnel Management Program

(Washington, D. C.: July 18, 2000). Development of Reserve

Officers in Joint Positions Not Fully Realized

Page 29 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

reservists were viewed primarily as an expansion force that would
supplement active forces during a major war. Since then the Cold War has
ended and a shift has occurred in the way DOD uses the reserve forces.
Today, no significant military operation can be conducted without reserve
involvement. In addition, the current mobilization for the war on
terrorism is adding to this increased use and is expected to last a long
time. A few of the officers who attended our focus groups were, in fact,
reservists serving on active duty in joint commands. We excluded their
responses, however, since the educational and experience requirements for
joint officers do not directly apply to reserve officers and, as indicated
above, the Secretary of Defense has not as yet issued personnel policies
emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for reserve officers
as required by the Goldwater- Nichols Act. Nevertheless, many of the
active duty officers we spoke with raised the issue of providing education
to reservists.

We interviewed officers at several joint organizations and found that
reservists are serving in positions at all levels from the Chief of Staff
at one command down to the mid- grade officer positions. Moreover, DOD has
identified 2,904 additional positions that it will fill with reservists
when it operates under mobilized conditions. All of this suggests that
reservists can be assigned to joint positions without the benefit of joint
education.

In 1995, the Office of the DOD Inspector General recommended that DOD
develop policy guidance that provides for the necessary training and
education of reserve component officers assigned to joint organizations.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred with
this recommendation. In 1997, we reported that DOD officials noted that
many details needed to be resolved. For example, they said that, since
reservists typically perform duties on an intermittent or part- time
basis, it is difficult for reservists to find the time to attend the 3-
month second phase of the joint education program. Reservists also cannot
be readily assigned to locations outside of their reserve unit area, thus
limiting their availability for joint education. Another concern raised by
a DOD official was that if the education and experience requirements for
reservists are too stringent, the available pool of reservists who can
meet them will be limited, thereby denying joint duty assignments to many
highly qualified personnel. During our review, officials on the Joint
Staff told us that DOD recently completed a pilot program that considered
alternatives for providing joint education to reservists. DOD officials
anticipate that they will be able to deliver joint education to reservists
through distancelearning beginning in fiscal year 2004.

Page 30 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

DOD has a wealth of information to support its implementation of
provisions in the Goldwater- Nichols Act, and it has been collecting data
and submitting annual reports to Congress in accordance with the act*s
reporting requirements. However, in cases where the act does not require
DOD to report data, DOD has not tracked meaningful information that it
needs in order to fully assess its progress. For example, DOD has not kept
historical data on the number of positions in joint organizations that are
filled with joint specialty officers and joint specialty officer nominees.
Without trend data, DOD and others cannot assess the degree to which DOD
is properly targeting its joint education program or foresee problematic
trends as they arise. Also, when we attempted to identify the number of
officers who have completed both phases of the joint education program,
DOD officials told us that they did not have fully reliable data because
the services do not consistently maintain and enter such information into
their databases. Furthermore, DOD does not track the degree to which
reservists are filling joint positions. Given that DOD plans to offer
joint education to reservists and that reservists are serving in joint
positions, tracking this type of data would help DOD identify reservists
who have joint education and experience during mobilizations.

Effective organizations link human capital approaches to their overall
mission and programmatic goals. An organization*s human capital approaches
should be designed, implemented, and assessed by the standard of how well
they help an organization pursue its mission and achieve desired results
or outcomes. High- performing organizations use data to determine key
performance objectives and goals that enable them to evaluate the success
of their human capital approaches. Collecting and analyzing data are
fundamental building blocks for measuring the effectiveness of human
capital approaches in support of the mission and goals of the agency.

DOD has taken positive steps to implement the major provisions of the
Goldwater- Nichols Act that address joint officer development. However,
DOD has not taken a strategic approach toward joint officer development
and, without a strategic plan that will address the development of the
total force in joint matters, it is more than likely that DOD will
continue to experience difficulties in the future in meeting the
provisions of the Goldwater- Nichols Act. While DOD has made progress in
implementing provisions of the law, it has not identified how many joint
specialty officers it needs. Moreover, the fact that the four services
have emphasized the development of their officers in joint matters to
varying degrees suggests that DOD has not taken a fully unified approach
and that Difficult to Measure

Progress due to Variations in Data Tracking Methods

Conclusions

Page 31 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

service parochialisms still prevail. Addressing these points will provide
DOD with data it needs to determine whether it has the resources or
capacity to deliver its two- phased joint education program to all of the
active duty officers who need it. Furthermore, although DOD is
increasingly relying upon its reserve forces, including using reserves in
some of its key joint positions, it has not fully assessed how it will
develop its reserve officers in joint matters. Finally, DOD has not been
consistent in tracking key indicators since enactment of the act in 1986.
A strategic plan that is designed appropriately will help DOD assess
progress made toward meeting the act*s specific objectives and overall
intent regarding joint officer development.

Because the services lack the guidance they need to undertake a unified
approach that will address the development of the total force in joint
matters, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop a strategic
plan that links joint officer development to DOD*s overall mission and
goals. At a minimum, this plan should (1) identify the number of joint
specialty officers needed, (2) include provisions for the education and
assignment of reservists who are serving in joint organizations, and (3)
be developed in a manner to provide DOD with more meaningful data to track
progress made against the plan.

We requested written comments from the Department of Defense, but none
were provided. However, the Office of the Vice Director, Joint Staff, did
provide us with DOD*s oral comments in which DOD partially concurred with
our recommendation that it develop a strategic plan that links joint
officer development to DOD*s overall mission and goals. DOD stated that
its ability to develop a strategic plan, that would improve DOD*s
capability to conduct successful joint operations, is limited by the
current legislation that specifies 1) quotas that artificially drive the
production of joint specialty officers, 2) requirements that limit the
availability of the second phase of DOD*s joint education program, and 3)
post- education requirements that make advance planning for joint
education difficult. DOD added that it views provisions in the act as
impediments that must be removed before it can develop an effective
strategic plan. Our report recognizes that DOD is required to comply with
numerous provisions in the act that address the education, assignment, and
promotion of officers in joint matters. While we recognize that DOD must
be mindful of these provisions as it attempts to develop a strategic plan,
we do not believe that the act*s provisions prohibit DOD from
Recommendation for

Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Page 32 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

developing a strategic plan to achieve its goals. We believe that DOD will
not be able to demonstrate that changes to the law are needed unless it
first develops a strategic plan that identifies the department*s goals and
objectives for joint officer development and produces empirical data to
support needed changes.

In response to our recommendation that DOD develop a strategic plan that
identifies the number of joint specialty officers needed, DOD asserted
that numerical quotas prevent it from pursuing a strategic approach to
joint officer development that is based on true joint specialty
requirements. Instead, DOD stated that it will produce about 1,000 joint
specialty officers each year in order to satisfy the law. However, the
statute does, in fact, provide some flexibility and permits the Secretary
of Defense to determine the number of joint specialty officers. The act
only requires that approximately one- half of the joint positions be
filled at any time by officers who have either successfully completed the
joint education program or received an allowable waiver to complete the
education after their joint assignment. DOD also asserted that officers
today are more experienced in joint matters and therefore believes that
the difference between a joint educated officer and a joint specialty
officer has diminished. During our review, officers who participated in
our focus groups told us they believe that today*s senior leaders should
have joint experience and education. We continue to believe that, in the
absence of a strategic plan that is requirements based, DOD is not in a
position to determine whether it is producing too many or too few joint
specialty officers.

In response to our recommendation that a strategic plan should include
provisions for the education and assignment of reservists who are serving
in joint organizations, DOD stated that it has recently finalized guidance
for their development and management and is developing a joint education
program for reserve officers. However, this guidance was not available at
the time of our review. The act states that the Secretary of Defense
should establish personnel policies for reserve officers that emphasize
education and experience in joint matters. Our report acknowledges the
steps DOD is taking. Given that reservists play an integral role within
the total force, we view these recent actions that DOD is taking to
integrate reserve officers in joint matters as positive steps.

In response to our recommendation that a strategic plan should be
developed in a manner to provide DOD with more meaningful data to track
progress made against the plan, DOD reported that it is revamping the data
system it uses to evaluate joint officer management. When complete, DOD
stated that it will have current and historical data and that

Page 33 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

this information will be used to identify and correct inconsistencies. We
believe that a strategic plan would help DOD identify its goals and track
progress made in its joint officer program. We view DOD*s effort in this
area as a positive step, provided that the revamped data system gives DOD
the information it needs to better manage its joint officer program.

DOD also commented on our findings that address critical joint duty
positions, joint education, and general and flag officers promotions.

Concerning critical joint duty positions, DOD stated that it is further
inhibited from achieving its joint vision by a legislative requirement to
identify 800 critical joint duty positions and fill them with joint
specialty officers. Moreover, DOD questioned whether there is a valid
requirement for critical billets within joint organizations. DOD believes
that the essential factors that should be considered to identify those
officers who best meet the needs of a joint organization are service
competencies and expertise in a military occupational skill. It stated
that joint qualifications should be viewed as one of many attributes that
can be used. Although we did not validate the numerical requirements for
critical joint positions, we do discuss difficulties DOD has experienced
in filling these positions with joint specialty officers. In the absence
of a strategic plan that is requirements based, we continue to believe
that DOD is not in a position to determine whether it is filling its
critical billets appropriately.

Regarding joint education, DOD stated that it realizes the value of joint
education and the importance of acculturating its officers in joint
matters. However, DOD also stated that it does not have the flexibility it
needs to educate top quality officers in joint matters. DOD viewed the
existing requirements that it must follow as inhibitors to good personnel
management and further stated that these requirements cause some officers
to miss joint education due to timing limitations. DOD believes that, in
order to develop an effective strategic plan, it needs greater flexibility
and that leveraging new educational technologies would facilitate its
ability to prepare officers for the joint environment. Specifically, DOD
asserted that, while it has the flexibility to offer the first phase of
its joint education program in both resident and nonresident settings, it
can only provide the second phase of its joint education program in an in-
resident setting, and then must assign 50 percent of the graduates to a
joint assignment. Our report acknowledges the progress DOD has made in
providing joint education to its officers and the difficulties DOD has
experienced in providing the second phase of its joint education program.
We believe, however, that while legislative provisions address the
education needed to qualify an officer for the joint specialty, DOD is not
precluded from using new technologies and alternative venues

Page 34 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

to provide joint education. While officers educated under alternative
approaches may not be awarded the joint specialty officer designation,
these officers, nonetheless, would be better educated in joint matters and
prepared for joint positions. We continue to believe that a strategic
approach will help DOD better identify its joint education needs.

Concerning general and flag officer promotions to pay grade O- 7, DOD
acknowledged that our findings regarding waiver usage are correct.
However, DOD believed that without further analysis, our finding that DOD
still relies heavily on allowable waivers to promote one in four officers
to this level without joint experience is misleading. DOD pointed out that
a closer examination of the types of waivers used might be a better
indicator of how well it is doing. In our report, we identify the five
categories of allowable waivers. We discuss the progress DOD has made in
promoting officers with joint experience as well as its progress in
limiting its use of good- of- the- service waivers in particular. During
our review, we attempted to obtain data on the other categories of
waivers. However, DOD does not capture and report waiver usage by the
various categories in its annual reports and DOD was not able to provide
it to us at the time of our review.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees. We are also sending copies of this report to the Secretary of
Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; the Commandant
of the Marine Corps; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www.
gao. gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
call me at (202) 512- 5140. Major contributors to this report are listed
in appendix V.

Derek B. Stewart Director Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 35 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

To examine the steps the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken to address
the education and assignment of officers in joint matters, we initially
conducted a legislative history of the act, reviewed joint directives and
publications, and analyzed data contained in the Goldwater- Nichols Act
Implementation Reports that are presented as an appendix to DOD*s Annual
Reports to the Congress for fiscal years 1988 through 2001. We also
analyzed data contained in DOD*s joint duty assignment list database and
interviewed and gathered data from officials serving in the Manpower and
Personnel Directorate within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and the four military services headquarters. In
certain cases, we analyzed data dating back to fiscal year 1989. In other
cases, we could only analyze data going back to fiscal year 1996 due to
changes in DOD*s reporting methods that made comparisons difficult. We
used fiscal year 2001 as our end point because that year represents the
last year for which complete annual data were available.

To assess the services* compliance with provisions that pertain to the
promotion of officers to the flag and general officer pay grades, we
measured the extent to which the services promoted officers with the
requisite joint experience or used allowable waivers. In addition, we
obtained and analyzed individual biographies and service histories for
each officer promoted to these senior pay grades in fiscal year 2001. To
analyze the extent to which DOD has complied with provisions that address
the promotions of mid- grade officers who are serving or have served in
joint positions, we obtained and analyzed data from the Manpower and
Personnel Directorate within the Joint Staff for fiscal years 1988 through
2001.

To evaluate impediments affecting DOD*s ability to fully respond to the
act*s intent, we reviewed previously issued Department of Defense vision
statements and human resource strategic plans. We also analyzed existing
data to measure trends over time and identify the key reasons why DOD is
having difficulty in responding to the act.

We interviewed agency officials and obtained data at the following
locations:

 Manpower and Personnel Directorate, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington,
D. C.;

 Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Washington, D. C.; Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 36 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Force Management and Policy,
Washington, D. C.;

 Air Force Education Branch, Headquarters, U. S. Air Force, Washington,
D. C.;

 Joint Officer Management Branch, Air Force Personnel Center, Randolph
Air Force Base, Texas;

 Joint Management Branch, Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, Virginia;

 Office of Joint Officer Management Policy Office, Naval Bureau of
Personnel, Arlington, Virginia;

 Marine Corps Training and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia;

 Personnel Management Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps,
Quantico, Virginia;

 National Defense University, Washington, D. C.; and

 Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia. To obtain the
perspectives of officers serving in joint positions on joint officer
development, we surveyed 557 officers and conducted focus group
discussions with 513 officers serving in 11 different locations. We did
not conduct a random sample due to the dispersion of officers serving in
joint positions, and, therefore, cannot project from the information the
officers provided us. However, we did attempt to include the different
types of organizations in which officers serve in joint positions by
selecting the Joint Staff, three geographic commands, two functional
commands, three combined forces commands, and two defense agencies. While
the results cannot be projected, the population of officers surveyed
reflects the overall composition of the joint duty assignment list. At
each location, we administered a survey (shown in appendix IV) and
conducted focus group interviews with active duty officers in pay grades
O- 4, O- 5, and O- 6. To gain firsthand information from officers serving
in joint duty positions, we asked them about their joint education and
assignments. We also asked them about the value they place on (1) serving
in a joint position and (2) attaining the joint specialty officer
designation. In addition, we conducted individual interviews with senior
officers and personnel officers at the commands we visited.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 37 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

We surveyed officers and conducted focus group discussions at the
following offices, commands, and agencies:

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C. Combined Commands Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium Allied Forces South,
Naples, Italy U. S. Forces Korea, Seoul, Korea

Functional Commands Special Operations Command, Tampa, Florida Strategic
Command, Omaha, Nebraska

Geographic Commands Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia European
Command, Stuttgart, Germany Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii

Defense Agencies Defense Information Systems Agency, Arlington, Virginia
Defense Intelligence Agency, Arlington, Virginia

We administered surveys, but did not conduct site visits, to officers
serving in joint positions at the following locations within the U. S.
Central Command*s area of responsibility:

 Joint Task Force* Southwest Asia,

 Office of Military Cooperation* Egypt, and

 U. S. Military Training* Saudi Arabia We conducted our review from
January 2002 through October 2002 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Demographic Data for Joint Positions

Page 38 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

This appendix presents information about the distribution of joint
positions in DOD*s joint duty assignment list by organization, pay grade,
and occupational category.

Table 5 identifies the major commands and activities where joint positions
are located and the number of joint positions that were in each command or
activity in fiscal year 2001.

Table 5: Joint Positions by Major Command or Activity Organizations/
Activities Number of positions

U. S. Pacific Command 923 U. S. European Command 602 U. S. Central Command
575 U. S. Joint Forces Command 564 U. S. Strategic Command 539 U. S.
Special Operations Command 438 U. S. Space Command 356 U. S. Southern
Command 344 U. S. Transportation Command 242 North American Aerospace
Defense Command 112 Allied and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
activities 884 Defense Agencies 1,669 Office of the Secretary of Defense
365 Miscellaneous DOD and other activities 267 Chairman Joint Chiefs of
Staff 158 Joint Staff and miscellaneous joint activities 877 General and
flag officer joint positions 231

Total 9,146

Source: GAO*s analysis of DOD data.

In fiscal year 2001, DOD*s joint duty assignment list contained 9, 146
joint positions for active duty officers in pay grades O- 4 and above.
Figure 6 shows that 80 percent of the positions were equally divided
between the O- 4 and O- 5 pay grades. Appendix II: Demographic Data for
Joint

Positions

Appendix II: Demographic Data for Joint Positions

Page 39 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Figure 6: Distribution of Joint Positions by Pay Grade

Joint positions include a wide range of occupational categories. Figure 7
shows that, in fiscal year 2001, the single largest percentage of joint
positions fell within the category of tactics and operations. Officers
with military occupation skills such as aviation and navigation, armor and
infantry, and surface and submarine warfare serve in this category of
positions. The second largest percentage of joint positions fell within
the intelligence category. This category includes strategic intelligence,
politico- military affairs, and information operations.

Appendix II: Demographic Data for Joint Positions

Page 40 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Figure 7: Distribution of Joint Positions by Occupational Categories

Note: May not add due to rounding.

Appendix III: Mid- Level Promotion Statistics Page 41 GAO- 03- 238
Military Personnel

The Goldwater- Nichols Act established promotion policy objectives for
three categories of mid- level officers who are serving in or have served
in joint positions. The act set expectations that these officers be
promoted at a rate not less than the promotion rate of their peers. The
services are expected to

 promote officers who are in or have been assigned to the Joint Staff, as
a group, at a rate equal to or better than the promotion rate of officers
who are or have been assigned to their service headquarters;

 promote joint specialty officers, as a group, at a rate equal to or
better than the promotion rate of officers who are or have been assigned
to their service headquarters; and

 promote officers who are serving in or have served in other joint
assignments, as a group, that are not included in the previous two
categories, at a rate equal to or better than their service average
promotion rates.

For our analysis, we compared progress DOD made between fiscal years 1988
and 1994 with progress DOD made between fiscal years 1995 and 2001. For
each of the three promotion categories (Joint Staff, joint specialty
officers, and officers serving in other joint positions), we multiplied
the three pay grades by the four services by the 7 years and identified 84
potential promotion groups. We then eliminated those groups in which no
promotions occurred to identify the actual promotion groups. We then
counted the number of groups in which DOD met or exceeded the applicable
standard. Appendix III: Mid- Level Promotion Statistics

Appendix III: Mid- Level Promotion Statistics Page 42 GAO- 03- 238
Military Personnel

Table 6 shows that DOD met its promotion objectives for mid- level
officers assigned to the Joint Staff in 43 out of 68 promotion groups
between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, or 63 percent of the time. Between
fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this objective in 55 out of 60
promotion groups, or 92 percent of the time.

Table 6: Promotion Rates for Mid- Level Officers Assigned to the Joint
Staff Compared to Officers Assigned to Their Service Headquarters during
Fiscal Years 1988 through 2001

Grade Group 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 N/ A Met target Missed

target Air Force

O- 4 Joint Staff 83.3 a 80.0 80.0 80.0 n/ a n/ a 66.7 a 2 3 2 O- 4 Service
Headquarters 93.3 72.7 72.7 72.7 72.7 92.9 94.3 O- 5 Joint Staff 84.2 a
92.5 84.6 a 92.9 a 84.2 a 88.9 92.3 3 4 O- 5 Service Headquarters 90.9
92.1 91.5 93.9 87.3 88.1 89.1 O- 6 Joint Staff 60.6 60.6 58.1 a 64.1 a
59.6 a 50.0 a 57.7 a 2 5 O- 6 Service Headquarters 58.8 58.8 65.2 65.8
66.2 67.9 60.5

Army

O- 4 Joint Staff 100.0 n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a 6 1 O- 4 Service
Headquarters 87.5 100.0 94.4 95.5 92.9 100.0 93.8 O- 5 Joint Staff 91.7
100.0 92.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.0 7 O- 5 Service Headquarters 78.7 78.3
79.6 77.5 78.4 88.2 75.3 O- 6 Joint Staff 35.3 a 40.7 43.2 a 54.5 34.4 a
57.4 50.9 4 3 O- 6 Service Headquarters 40.0 37.4 51.3 43.3 47.3 53.0 45.1

Navy

O- 4 Joint Staff n/ a 75.0 a n/ a 100.0 n/ a 100.0 100.0 3 3 1 O- 4
Service Headquarters n/ a 88.9 n/ a 100.0 n/ a 75.0 86.7 O- 5 Joint Staff
100.0 71.4 a 87.5 84.2 80.0 a 83.3 88.6 5 2 O- 5 Service Headquarters 89.6
84.8 73.4 84.1 85.1 76.9 84.1 O- 6 Joint Staff 15.4 a 61.5 33.3 a 57.1 a
54.5 a 64.6 52.6 3 4 O- 6 Service Headquarters 41 56.1 57.8 60.6 61.4 54.1
52.0

Marine Corps

O- 4 Joint Staff n/ a n/ a 100.0 n/ a n/ a n/ a 100.0 5 2 O- 4 Service
Headquarters n/ a 67.2 75.4 73.8 76.8 82.9 80.4 O- 5 Joint Staff 81.8 81.8
75.0 71.4 71.4 60.0 a 100.0 6 1 O- 5 Service Headquarters 70.8 70.8 66.1
57.0 64.2 73.3 65.5 O- 6 Joint Staff 100.0 100.0 27.3 a 61.5 60.0 50.0 a
16.7 a 4 3 O- 6 Service Headquarters 62.3 62.3 52.9 44.4 52.8 52.0 38.2

Total 16 43 25

Appendix III: Mid- Level Promotion Statistics Page 43 GAO- 03- 238
Military Personnel

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 N/ A Met target Missed

target

n/ a 100.0 n/ a n/ a n/ a 100.0 n/ a 5 2 95.0 93.3 92.5 90.3 96.8 100.0
97.3 84.4 a 96.8 92.3 90.9 94.7 93.3 80.0 a 5 2 85.0 86.1 83.2 80.8 80.3
87.9 80.7 77.2 75.6 76.4 72.3 70.3 73.8 80.6 7 62.8 55.7 64.0 59.3 60.4
65.3 56.8

n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a 7 88.9 79.3 92.3 92.3 77.8 n/ a 100.0
92.3 80.0 88.2 85.7 91.7 100.0 91.7 7 74.5 74.0 74.6 73.0 77.2 75.2 90.5
76.8 58.1 58.9 68.9 76.1 72.5 74.6 7 39.7 44.0 45.2 52.2 61.8 59.5 66.1

100.0 100.0 n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a 5 2 81.8 100.0 n/ a n/ a n/ a 91.7
73.7 80.0 93.8 85.7 78.6 a 81.8 100.0 90.5 6 1 70.0 71.4 71.8 86.8 81.3
87.8 89.1 57.7 a 65.6 73.0 77.8 81.3 84.4 85.4 6 1 61.4 63.3 71.7 67.7
62.5 67.1 68.4

n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a 7 n/ a n/ a 79.3 81.0 100.0 94.1 95.2
80.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 50.0 a 100.0 75.0 6 1 60.3 76.7 71.1 74.5 74.7 75.9
62.5 77.8 57.1 75.0 65.4 61.1 42.9 92.9 7 37.9 53.7 46.5 39.5 39.5 31.6
45.7

24 55 5

n/ a = not applicable a The Joint Staff promotion rate was not equal to or
greater than the promotion rates for officers who were or had been
assigned to their service headquarters. Source: GAO*s analysis of DOD
data.

Appendix III: Mid- Level Promotion Statistics Page 44 GAO- 03- 238
Military Personnel

Table 7 shows that DOD met its promotion objectives for mid- level joint
specialty officers in 26 out of 52 promotion groups between fiscal years
1988 and 1994, or 50 percent of the time. Between fiscal years 1995 and
2001, DOD met this objective in 37 out of 50 promotion groups, or 74
percent of the time.

Table 7: Promotion Rates for Mid- Level Joint Specialty Officers Compared
to Promotion Rates of Officers Assigned to Their Service Headquarters
during Fiscal Years 1988 through 2001

Grade Category 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 N/ A Met target Missed

target Air Force

O- 4 Joint Specialty Officer n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a 7 O- 4
Service Headquarter 93.3 72.7 72.7 72.7 72.7 92.9 94.3 O- 5 Joint
Specialty Officer n/ a 92.9 78.1 a 85.2 a 76.4 a 71.3 a 80.9 a 1 15 O- 5
Service Headquarter 90.9 92.1 91.5 93.9 87.3 88.1 89.1 O- 6 Joint
Specialty Officer 68.1 68.1 64.0 a 60.6 a 54.2 a 62.7 a 59.5 a 2 5 O- 6
Service Headquarter 58.8 58.8 65.2 65.8 66.2 67.9 60.5

Army

O- 4 Joint Specialty Officer n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a 7 O- 4
Service Headquarter 87.5 100.0 94.4 95.5 92.9 100.0 93.8 O- 5 Joint
Specialty Officer n/ a 79.0 83.0 82.2 80.9 92.7 90.0 1 6 O- 5 Service
Headquarter 78.7 78.3 79.6 77.5 78.4 88.2 75.3 O- 6 Joint Specialty
Officer n/ a 46.8 41.0 a 48.5 46.0 a 36.2 a 41.0 a 1 24 O- 6 Service
Headquarter 40.0 37.4 51.3 43.3 47.3 53.0 45.1

Navy

O- 4 Joint Specialty Officer n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a 7 O- 4
Service Headquarter n/ a 67.2 75.4 73.8 76.8 82.9 80.4 O- 5 Joint
Specialty Officer 77.7 77.7 72.2 73.3 78.1 60.0 a 85.7 6 1 O- 5 Service
Headquarter 70.8 70.8 66.1 57.0 64.2 73.3 65.5 O- 6 Joint Specialty
Officer 60. 3 a 60.3 a 56.3 56.1 45.3 a 43.6 a 44.0 3 4 O- 6 Service
Headquarter 62.3 62.3 52.9 44.4 52.8 52.0 38.2

Marine Corps

O- 4 Joint Specialty Officer n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a 7 O- 4
Service Headquarter n/ a 88.9 n/ a 100.0 n/ a 75.0 86.7 O- 5 Joint
Specialty Officer 72. 1 a 72.1 a 75.6 77.2 a 81.0 a 64.9 a 71.1 a 1 6 O- 5
Service Headquarter 89.6 84.8 73.4 84.1 85.1 76.9 84.1 O- 6 Joint
Specialty Officer n/ a 73.7 65.9 70.0 66.3 64.0 49.7 a 1 51 O- 6 Service
Headquarter 41.0 56.1 57.8 60.6 61.4 54.1 52.0

Total 32 26 26

Appendix III: Mid- Level Promotion Statistics Page 45 GAO- 03- 238
Military Personnel

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 N/ A Met target Missed

target

n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a 7 95.0 93.3 92.5 90.3 96.8 100.0 97.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n/ a 1 6 85.0 86.1 83.2 80.8 80.3 87.9
80.7 65.1 60.7 55.0 a 56.8 a 62.2 80.2 89.2 0 5 2 62.8 55.7 64.0 59.3 60.4
65.3 56.8

n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a 7 88.9 79.3 92.3 92.3 77.8 n/ a 100.0
90.9 100.0 100.0 86.7 85.7 75.0 a 50.0 a 0 52 74.5 74.0 74.6 73.0 77.2
75.2 90.5 47.8 46.9 53.4 59.2 75.6 76.7 64.3 a 0 61 39.7 44.0 45.2 52.2
61.8 59.5 66.1

n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a 7 n/ a n/ a 79.3 81.0 100.0 94.1 95.2
50.0 a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a 100.0 5 1 1 60.3 76.7 71.1 74.5 74.7 75.9
62.5 41.2 50.8 a 42.9 a 47.7 41.9 60.7 69.4 0 5 2 37.9 53.7 46.5 39.5 39.5
31.6 45.7

n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a n/ a 7 81.8 100.0 n/ a n/ a n/ a 91.7 73.7
83.3 76.5 88.9 88.9 88.9 90.5 71.4 a 0 61 70.0 71.4 71.8 86.8 81.3 87.8
89.1 57.0 a 50.4 a 64.4 a 57.8 a 70.9 80.0 75.8 0 3 4 61.4 63.3 71.7 67.7
62.5 67.1 68.4

34 37 13

n/ a = not applicable a The joint specialty officer promotion rate was not
equal to or greater than the promotion rate for officers who were or had
been assigned to their service headquarters. Source: GAO*s analysis of DOD
data.

Appendix III: Mid- Level Promotion Statistics Page 46 GAO- 03- 238
Military Personnel

Table 8 shows that DOD met its promotion objectives for mid- level
officers assigned to joint organizations other than the Joint Staff in 41
out of 82 promotion groups between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, or 50
percent of the time. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this
objective in 60 out of 84 promotion groups, or 71 percent of the time.

Table 8: Promotion Rates for Mid- Level Officers Assigned to Other Joint
Organizations Compared to the Board Average Promotion Rate during Fiscal
Years 1988 through 2001

Grade Group 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 N/ A Met target Missed

target Air Force

O- 4 Other Joint 93.0 98.6 98.6 98.6 98.6 85.3 78.4 7 O- 4 Service Board
82.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 80.0 73.1 72.6 O- 5 Other Joint 60.6 a 69.5 73.5 74.4
71.1 70.4 69.2 6 1 O- 5 Board Rate 62.5 63.6 64.2 65.8 67.0 63.4 62.9 O- 6
Other Joint 39.4 a 39.4 a 45.6 47.6 44.4 55.7 42.8 5 2 O- 6 Board Rate
44.1 44.1 44.0 45.0 41.8 41.6 41.9

Army

O- 4 Other Joint 85.7 71.4 89.3 64.3 a 68.4 a 90.9 84.6 5 2 O- 4 Board
Rate 68.7 64.7 62.1 71.1 73.5 77.7 73.3 O- 5 Other Joint 74.8 63.5 39.8 a
61.6 a 62.0 a 71.4 67.5 4 3 O- 5 Board Rate 65.1 61.5 60.6 61.8 63.0 63.1
65.2 O- 6 Other Joint 26.4 a 21.6 a 11.2 a 21.7 a 26.0 a 43.5 a 40.4 a 7
O- 6 Board Rate 39.7 40.5 37.2 38.7 44.4 43.9 42.8

Navy

O- 4 Other Joint 56.6 a 85.4 75.9 a 74.0 a 76.7 a 87.8 82.1 3 4 O- 4 Board
Rate 79.3 79.4 86.4 80.7 81.4 70.6 71.3 O- 5 Other Joint 43.2 a 50.7 a
39.7 a 58.1 a 60.5 a 66.4 70.7 2 5 O- 5 Board Rate 63.9 62.0 62.7 65.4
67.4 59.4 65.5 O- 6 Other Joint 14.7 a 16.2 a 15.5 a 29.5 a 36.7 a 37.6 a
44.7 a 7 O- 6 Board Rate 45.9 30.2 54.8 53.6 54.7 51.7 50.3

Marine Corps

O- 4 Other Joint n/ a 37.5 a 66.7 a 40.0 a 62.5 a n/ a 82.6 2 1 4 O- 4
Board Rate n/ a 70.0 70.4 71.2 69.8 70.7 69.7 O- 5 Other Joint 69.7 69.7
66.7 63.6 56.8 58.0 56.5 a 6 1 O- 5 Board Rate 60.0 60.0 60.4 58.6 56.3
54.2 56.8 O- 6 Other Joint 37.9 a 37.9 a 37.5 a 17.9 a 56.4 54.5 35.5 a 2
5 O- 6 Board Rate 44.6 44.6 43.9 41.9 44.4 41.7 41.0

Total 2 4141

Appendix III: Mid- Level Promotion Statistics Page 47 GAO- 03- 238
Military Personnel

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 N/ A Met target Missed

target

82.4 85.7 93.9 88.9 85.2 a 89.2 96.4 6 1 72.9 73.0 81.2 82.6 86.5 88.5
88.0 66.2 69.1 69.2 70.6 67.9 70.1 72.1 7 62.9 63.0 63.0 62.6 64.9 65.8
65.1 43.5 46.0 44.4 41.2 a 39.6 a 40.9 a 45.1 a 3 4 41.9 41.8 41.7 41.4
41.4 44.6 46.6

100.0 100.0 85.7 85.7 60.0 a 100.0 100.0 6 1 73.3 78.5 74.3 77.1 78.1 79.8
83.1 66.7 67.9 64.1 76.1 73.5 81.3 76.2 7 60.9 60.0 59.9 67.8 68.8 71.8
75.7 45.1 32.3 a 32.9 a 37.0 a 33.8 a 44.1 a 55.5 2 5 44.5 41.2 39.0 42.3
49.7 51.7 54.7

63.0 a 81.8 82.6 65.0 a 73.8 a 88.5 84.2 4 3 70.5 71.2 69.8 69.9 77.5 82.6
84.2 85.4 66.9 69.1 67.6 73.2 58.3 a 68.9 6 1 66.6 61.3 63.7 66.2 65.7
65.0 68.2 40.0 a 42.9 a 47.0 a 34.9 a 44.0 a 43.2 a 41.8 a 7 48.9 48.8
56.1 49.1 55.9 54.1 56.2

100.0 60.0 a 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 6 1 70.1 80.6 80.0 85.1 85.0
90.0 90.0 62.4 73.3 74.3 72.3 81.3 75.9 73.2 7 57.2 65.5 68.2 66.8 68.0
64.6 65.7 42.9 48.1 47.3 60.5 46.3 47.4 47.7 a 6 1 42.9 44.9 42.4 43.1
44.4 46.7 48.7

60 24

n/ a = not applicable a The other joint officer promotion rate was not
equal to or greater than the service board average promotion rate. Source:
GAO*s analysis of DOD data.

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire and Summary of Responses

Page 48 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

We administered a survey to 557 officers serving in joint positions
regarding their current joint duty assignment, their thoughts and opinions
on joint duty assignments in general, joint professional military
education, and other opinions regarding joint officer management. A copy
of the survey appears at the end of this summary.

Although the survey findings cannot be generalized to all officers serving
in joint positions, the composition of the officers in our survey
generally reflected the service and pay grade distribution in DOD*s joint
duty assignment list. Thirty- seven percent of the officers were in the
Air Force, 33 percent were in the Army, 24 percent were in the Navy, and
about 6 percent were in the Marine Corps. Forty- seven percent of the
officers were in pay grade O- 4, 35 percent were in pay grade O- 5, and 18
percent were in pay grade O- 6. On average, the officers we surveyed had
16 years of commissioned service.

We asked the officers in our survey to identify their current joint duty
position in the context of broad functional areas and types of duties
performed.

 Twenty- seven percent of the officers responded that their joint
positions fell within the functional area of strategic, tactical, or
contingency operations. Their duties involved command and control of
combat operations or combat support forces; military operations; or the
planning, development, staffing, assessment, or implementation of plans or
requirements for forces and materiel.

 Twenty- eight percent of the officers surveyed responded that their
joint positions fell within the functional area of direct or general
support or the development, staffing, or assessment of military doctrine
or policy.

 Forty- five percent of the officers responded that they were engaged in
the functional areas of education and training or administration. They
performed duties that included (1) directing, commanding, and controlling
noncombat units, organizations, or activities or (2) providing general,
administrative, or technical support services to military operations.

Seventy- one percent of the officers we surveyed were serving in their
first joint duty position in the joint duty assignment list. Twenty- one
percent of the officers were in their second joint duty position, and the
remaining 8 percent were serving in their third joint duty position.
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire and

Summary of Responses Officers* Background

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire and Summary of Responses

Page 49 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Most officers (85 percent) responded that their service had clearly
defined the career path for their military occupation. On the other hand,
just over half (51percent) of the officers responded that a joint
assignment was a clearly defined component of their career path and about
35 percent of the officers responded that a joint duty assignment was not
a well- defined aspect of their career path. (Fourteen percent of the
officers responded that they were unsure.)

Most officers (70 percent) responded that a joint duty assignment was
beneficial to their career to a moderate or very great extent, while about
19 percent responded that a joint duty assignment was beneficial only to a
little extent. The remaining 7 percent of the officers responded that a
joint duty assignment was not beneficial to their careers. We asked the
officers to identify the greatest incentive for serving in a joint
position. The most common response offered by Army, Air Force, and Marine
Corps officers was that joint duty assignments broadened their experience,
perspective, and knowledge of the multiservice and multinational
environment. The most common response offered by officers in the Navy was
that joint duty assignments enhanced their promotion potential and
professional development. Conversely, when we asked officers to provide
their opinion regarding the greatest disincentive to serving in a joint
duty position, officers in all of the services cited the time they spent
in a joint position that took them away from their service.

Seventy- seven percent of the officers we surveyed had attended the first
phase of DOD*s joint professional military education program. Among those
who had attended the first phase, 56 percent completed it at one of the
professional military education schools and 44 percent completed Phase I
through a nonresident program.

Most officers (59 percent) responded that the first phase of the joint
education program was beneficial to their careers to a great or moderate
extent. Sixty- three percent of the officers responded that it was
important to a great or moderate extent to complete the first phase of the
joint education prior to serving in a joint position. Sixty- six percent
of the officers believed that the first phase of the joint education
increased their effectiveness in their joint position. Officers in all
services responded that the first phase of the joint education provided a
foundation of joint knowledge* a first exposure to joint doctrine, other
service*s methods, and the operational and strategic levels of war-
fighting. Officers* Views on

Joint Assignments Officers* Views of Phase I of DOD*s Joint Professional
Military Education Program

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire and Summary of Responses

Page 50 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Thirty- six percent of the officers we surveyed said that they had
attended the second phase of DOD*s joint professional military education
program. The majority of these officers had attended the Joint Forces
Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia (92 percent), while significantly
smaller percentages had attended the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces (5 percent) and the National War College (3 percent).

Sixty- four percent of the officers had not completed the second phase of
the joint professional military education program and the overwhelming
majority (86 percent) of these officers reported that they would not
likely attend the second phase before the end of their current joint duty
assignment. Officers in all services cited timing, budget, and logistics
issues as reasons for not attending the second phase after reporting to a
joint assignment. They added their views that neither the losing nor
gaining command wanted to be responsible for funding the education.

About 60 percent of the officers responded that it was important to
complete the second phase of the joint professional military education
program prior to serving in a joint assignment and that this education
would increase an officer*s effectiveness in a joint position. Slightly
fewer officers (56 percent) responded that the second phase of the joint
education program was beneficial to their careers. Officers* Views of

Phase II of DOD*s Joint Professional Military Education Program

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire and Summary of Responses

Page 51 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire and Summary of Responses

Page 52 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire and Summary of Responses

Page 53 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire and Summary of Responses

Page 54 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 55 GAO- 03- 238 Military Personnel

Brenda S. Farrell (202) 512- 3604 In addition, Ann M. Asleson, James R.
Bancroft, Larry J. Bridges, Jocelyn O. Cortese, Herbert I. Dunn, Jack E.
Edwards, Alicia E. Johnson, David E. Moser, Krislin M. Nalwalk, Madelon B.
Savaides, and Susan K. Woodward contributed to this report. Appendix V:
GAO Contact and Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contact Acknowledgments

(350143)

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