Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation	 
Detection Equipment (17-OCT-02, GAO-03-235T).			 
                                                                 
GAO reviewed the Customs Service's acquisition and deployment of 
radiation detection equipment and assistance provided by the	 
United States to foreign countries to combat nuclear smuggling.  
GAO found that observations concerning the acquisition of	 
radiation detection equipment have not changed. The Customs	 
Service's primary radiation detection equipment--radiation	 
pagers--have certain limitations and may be inappropriate for the
task. Further, there is still no comprehensive plan in place for 
installing and using radiation detection equipment at all U.S.	 
border crossings and ports of entry. Regarding U.S. efforts to	 
help other countries combat smuggling, a number of U.S. agencies,
including Customs, have provided assistance to foreign		 
countries--mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and	 
Eastern Europe. The agencies have provided a range of assistance 
including radiation detection equipment and training as well as  
other equipment and training to generally improve countries'	 
ability to interdict nuclear smuggling. 			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-235T					        
    ACCNO:   A05299						        
  TITLE:     Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation 
Detection Equipment						 
     DATE:   10/17/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Federal procurement				 
	     International relations				 
	     Radiation monitoring				 
	     Smuggling						 
	     Central Europe					 
	     DOE Second Line of Defense Program 		 
	     Eastern Europe					 
	     Soviet Union					 

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GAO-03-235T

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 9: 00 a. m., Thursday, October 17,
2002 CUSTOMS SERVICE

Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment

Statement of (Ms.) Gary L. Jones, Director Natural Resources and
Environment and Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Tax Administration and
Justice

GAO- 03- 235T

Page 1 GAO- 03- 235T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We appreciate the
opportunity to be here today to discuss our ongoing work related to
Customs* acquisition and deployment of radiation detection equipment, and
our report related to assistance provided by the United States to foreign
countries to combat nuclear smuggling. 1 As you know, we have also been
doing work for the Committee, including visits to ports, concerning other
aspects of Customs* inspection of cargo at seaports. The Customs Service
has deemed the information we are collecting regarding that work as law
enforcement sensitive, which precludes us from discussing it in an open
hearing. We understand that a closed session for questions and answers
will follow this open session. We will be happy to share information about
this law enforcement sensitive work in that setting.

Our testimony focuses on (1) Customs* acquisition and deployment of
radiation detection equipment on U. S. borders and ports of entry and (2)
U. S. assistance to foreign countries to help them combat nuclear
smuggling. We shared our observations from visits to two major ports with
this Subcommittee during a closed hearing on July 9, 2002, and our
observations on the deployment of radiation detection equipment in a
letter to the full Committee on August 15, 2002. Our statement today
results from interviews with Customs and Department of Energy (DOE)
officials and draws upon our prior work on U. S. efforts to help other
countries combat nuclear smuggling.

Our observations concerning the acquisition of radiation detection
equipment have not changed from what we reported to you in August.
Specifically, the Customs Service*s primary radiation detection equipment*
radiation pagers* have certain limitations and may be inappropriate for
the task. Further, we remain concerned that no comprehensive plan is in
place for installing and using radiation detection equipment at all U. S.
border crossings and ports of entry. Regarding U. S. efforts to help other
countries combat nuclear smuggling, a number of U. S. agencies, including
Customs, have provided assistance to foreign countries* mostly in the
former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. The agencies have
provided a range of assistance including

1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U. S. Efforts
to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened
Coordination and Planning,

GAO- 02- 426, (Washington, D. C.: May 16, 2002).

Page 2 GAO- 03- 235T

radiation detection equipment and training as well as other equipment and
training to generally improve countries* ability to interdict nuclear
smuggling.

Based on our work with Customs and DOE officials and our review of U. S.
efforts to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling, we have concerns
that Customs has not yet deployed the best available technologies for
detecting radioactive and nuclear materials at U. S. border crossings and
ports of entry. Customs officials told us that its approximately 7, 500
inspectors rely primarily on personal radiation detection pagers, worn on
a belt. Since fiscal year 1998, Customs has deployed about 4,200 pagers
among its inspectors and expects to purchase over 4,000 additional pagers
to complete deployment by September 2003. At that time, every inspector
will have his or her own pager.

However, radiation detection pagers have limitations. DOE officials told
us that they do not view pagers as search instruments, but rather as
personal safety devices to protect against radiation exposure, and that
the pagers have a limited range and are not designed to detect weapons-
usable nuclear material. According to U. S. radiation detection vendors
and DOE laboratory specialists, pagers are more effectively used in
conjunction with other radiation detection equipment, such as portal
monitors similar to what DOE is providing to Russia for use at its border
crossings. Customs has deployed over 200 radiation detectors on its x- ray
systems for screening small packages, but it has not deployed the larger
portal monitors for screening pedestrians and entire vehicles. Customs
plans to install portal monitors at every U. S. border crossing and port
of entry, but so far has only deployed them at one border crossing as a
pilot project. Customs has told us that a report on the pilot project
would be issued by the middle of this month, but according to a Customs
official we spoke with the report is not yet available. We will be
reviewing, among other things, the results of this pilot project in
response to the Committee*s recent request to review the Customs Service*s
efforts to deploy radiation detection equipment on U. S. borders and ports
of entry. Customs officials also told us that they plan to purchase up to
400 portal monitors by the end of fiscal year 2003. While these purchases
are a step in the right direction, Customs officials told us that
equipment evaluation and testing could still take several years, and in
the meantime they do not have a time frame or specific plan for actually
deploying portal monitors.

We believe that it is important that Customs develop a comprehensive plan
for installing radiation detection equipment at all U. S. border crossings
Customs* Acquisition

and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment

Page 3 GAO- 03- 235T

and ports of entry, and in the near term, while the plan is being
developed, consider immediate steps to deploy currently available
radiation detection equipment. A comprehensive plan would address, among
other things, vulnerabilities and risks; identify the complement of
radiation detection equipment that should be used at each type of border
entry point* air, rail, land, and sea* and whether equipment could be
immediately deployed; identify longer- term radiation detection needs; and
develop measures to ensure that the equipment is adequately maintained.
However, it is not enough to simply deploy equipment. Customs personnel
must be effectively trained in radiation science, the use of the
equipment, and identifying and responding to alarms. The plan would need
to identify costs, annual budgetary needs, and timeframes for all these
activities. The plan would provide for an integrated, systematic approach
to Customs antiterrorism efforts and provide the basis for setting
priorities and for coordinating efforts with other federal, state, and
local agencies that would be involved with these activities. While Customs
officials told us that they have developed the elements of a plan,
including schedules to purchase equipment and train personnel, these
elements have not yet been integrated into a comprehensive plan.

U. S. assistance efforts to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among six
federal agencies* DOE and the Departments of State and Defense; Customs;
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the U. S. Coast Guard. From
fiscal year 1992 through 2001, the six agencies spent about $86 million to
help about 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and
Eastern Europe, combat the threat of smuggling of nuclear and other
materials that could be used in weapons of mass destruction. The agencies
have provided a range of assistance including radiation detection
equipment and training as well as other equipment and training to
generally improve countries* ability to interdict nuclear smuggling. DOE
has two programs to combat nuclear smuggling, primarily focusing on
Russia. The State Department has provided radiation detection portal
monitors, mobile vans equipped with radiation detectors, handheld
radiation detectors, and other assistance to about 30 countries through
two separate programs. The Department of Defense has two programs that
have provided radiation detection portal monitors, handheld detectors, and
other assistance to about 20 countries. With funding provided by the
Departments of State and Defense, Customs, the FBI, and the U. S. Coast
Guard have provided a variety of training and equipment to customs, border
guard, and law enforcement officials in numerous countries. U. S.
International

Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Page 4 GAO- 03- 235T

As part of U. S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling, DOE is
implementing the Second Line of Defense program to install radiation
detection portal monitors at Russian border crossings. From fiscal year
1997 through 2001, DOE installed 70 portal monitors at eight border
crossings in Russia* an airport in Moscow, six seaports and one railroad
crossing* at a cost of $11.2 million. The eight border crossings are the
first of close to 60 sites where DOE plans to install portal monitors
based on its assessment of over 300 border crossings in Russia. DOE
prioritized the border crossings based on factors that might increase the
risk that potential smugglers would use particular routes to smuggle
nuclear material out of Russia. According to DOE officials, the portal
monitors they provided to Russia have detected more than 275 cases
involving radioactive material including contaminated scrap metal,
irradiated cargo, and other radioactive materials that could pose a
proliferation concern.

Russian customs officials told us that radiation detection equipment
funded by DOE*s Second Line of Defense program has helped accelerate
Russia*s plans to improve border security. According to these officials,
as of October 2001, DOE had financed the purchase of about 15 percent of
Russia*s 300 portal monitors. The U. S.- funded equipment is manufactured
in Russia to, among other things, facilitate maintenance, and DOE national
laboratory personnel test the portal monitors to ensure that they are
placed in an optimal configuration (to maximize detection capability) and
are being used as intended. According to Russian officials, there is
excellent cooperation with DOE on ways to continually improve the
performance of the equipment, and DOE makes follow- up visits to inspect
the equipment and ensure that it is recalibrated as necessary to meet
performance specifications.

During our visit to Russia, we observed several U. S.- funded pedestrian
portal monitors that were installed at Moscow*s Sheremetyevo Airport as
well as a control room that included video equipment and a computerized
monitoring system, also funded by DOE, that was connected to the portal
monitors. Russian officials tested the equipment we saw at the airport on
our behalf. With our knowledge, they *planted* a radioactive source in an
attache case that we carried past a pedestrian portal monitor, which
activated an alarm. A computer screen in the control room displayed our
movements past the portal monitor.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. We will be happy to
answer any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time.

Page 5 GAO- 03- 235T

For further information about this testimony, please contact Gary Jones at
(202) 512- 3841 or Laurie E. Ekstrand at (202) 512- 9110. Gene Aloise,
Seto Bagdoyan, Ryan T. Coles, Joseph Cook, and Glen Levis also made key
contributions to this testimony. GAO Contact and

Acknowledgments

(360282)
*** End of document. ***