Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and 
DOT's Enforcement Approach (10-JAN-03, GAO-03-22).		 
                                                                 
When shipments of dangerous goods (hazardous chemical substances 
that could endanger public safety or the environment, such as	 
flammable liquids or radioactive materials) are not properly	 
packaged and labeled for air transport, they can pose significant
threats because there is little room for error when something	 
goes wrong in flight. To better understand the risks posed by	 
improper ("undeclared") air shipments, we assessed what is known 
about their nature and frequency, what key mechanisms are in	 
place to prevent their occurrence, and what the Department of	 
Transportation (DOT) and the Postal Service do to enforce federal
regulations for shipping dangerous goods by air.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-22						        
    ACCNO:   A05843						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous   
Goods and DOT's Enforcement Approach				 
     DATE:   01/10/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Air transportation operations			 
	     Federal regulations				 
	     Hazardous substances				 
	     Inspection 					 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Safety regulation					 
	     Safety standards					 
	     Transportation safety				 

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GAO-03-22

Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

January 2003 AVIATION SAFETY Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods
and DOT*s Enforcement Approach GAO- 03- 22

Little is known about the nature and frequency of undeclared shipments of
dangerous goods. While major carriers and the Postal Service believe such
shipments are rare, their belief is based mainly on inspections of problem
shipments, such as those that leak. Statistically valid, generalizable
data are not available and would be difficult to obtain, not only because
more

inspections would entail costly delays for carriers but also because
Constitutional protections limit DOT*s and the Postal Service*s inspection
authority. DOT is seeking greater authority to open potentially
problematic shipments for inspection, but its efforts are not limited to
air transport and would not enable DOT*s Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to obtain statistically valid, generalizable data on the nature and
frequency of undeclared air shipments. A change in the law requiring that
shippers consent to the opening of packages for inspection might be
appropriate for air transport and would enable FAA to obtain such data.
FAA could then identify the resources and actions needed to address the
problem. Federal regulations create a framework for transporting dangerous
goods

safely, and outreach to shippers and carriers helps to prevent undeclared
shipments. Private industry does business primarily with *known shippers*
(those that have shown they comply with the regulations). The Postal
Service cannot restrict its business to known shippers, but it requires
customers to bring packages weighing 16 ounces or more to a post office
for screening. Carriers and the Postal Service both train their employees
to screen for undeclared shipments.

The Postal Service and FAA monitor and enforce compliance with federal
regulations for transporting dangerous goods by air. However, the Postal
Service cannot fine violators and seldom takes criminal action, since most
violations are inadvertent. FAA*s enforcement guidance calls for
documenting the reasons for any changes in the fines its inspectors
initially propose. GAO*s review of enforcement case files indicates that
the reasons for changes were not always documented. FAA attributes some
changes to the results of penalty negotiations. Because FAA is not always
following its guidance, it cannot ensure that its fines are appropriate or
consistent.

Figure 1: Air Transport of Dangerous Goods Authorized by DOT 



May not travel by either passenger or cargo aircraft Sources: Research and
Special Programs Administration, Department of Transportation, and (c)
1998 Nova Development Corporation. May travel by cargo, but

not by passenger, aircraft May travel by either passenger or cargo
aircraft

20% 30% 50%

AVIATION SAFETY

Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT*s Enforcement Approach

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 22. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Gerald Dillingham at (202)- 512- 2384 or dillinghamg@
gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 22, a report to the

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

January 2003

When shipments of dangerous goods (hazardous chemical substances that
could endanger public safety or the environment, such as flammable liquids
or radioactive materials) are not properly packaged and labeled for air
transport, they can pose significant threats because there is little room
for error when something goes wrong in flight. To better understand the
risks posed by improper (* undeclared*) air shipments, we assessed what is
known about their nature and frequency, what key mechanisms are in place
to prevent their

occurrence, and what the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Postal
Service do to enforce federal regulations for shipping dangerous goods by
air.

Figure 1 shows how DOT regulates the air transport of dangerous goods in
the United States.

GAO recommends that DOT improve its enforcement approach by (1)
determining whether the unique characteristics of air transport warrant
the development of a legislative proposal that would enhance DOT*s
authority to inspect packages shipped by air and (2) requiring FAA to
strengthen its policy on documenting the reasons for changes to the
amounts of the recommended fines.

Page i GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background
5

Shipments of Undeclared Dangerous Goods Can Have Serious Consequences, but
Their Nature and Frequency Are Difficult to Estimate 11 Government and
Industry Rely on Several Mechanisms to Prevent

Dangerous Goods Shipments from Compromising Safety 20 For DOT, Inadequate
Documentation, and for the Postal Service,

Lack of Civil Penalty Authority Hamper Enforcement of Dangerous Goods
Regulations 27 Conclusions 32 Recommendations for Executive Action 33
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33 Scope and Methodology 34

Appendix I FAA*s Dangerous Goods Informational Brochure for Passengers 37

Appendix II Mailability of Dangerous Goods, by DOT Class 38

Appendix III Data Collected by DOT Agencies on Dangerous Goods Incidents
and Enforcement Actions 39

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 41 GAO Contacts 41
Acknowledgments 41

Tables

Table 1: Dangerous Goods Classes and Descriptions 8 Table 2: DOT Databases
Tracking Information on the Air

Transportation of Dangerous Goods 39 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Figures

Figure 1: Air Transport of Dangerous Goods Authorized by DOT 6 Figure 2:
Dangerous Goods Cargo Containers 7 Figure 3. FAA*s Dangerous Goods
Enforcement Process (for Civil

Penalty Cases) 30

Abbreviations

AAIRS Airport and Air Carrier Information Reporting System C. F. R. Code
of Federal Regulations DOT Department of Transportation EIS Enforcement
Information System FAA Federal Aviation Administration

GAO General Accounting Office HMIRS Hazardous Materials Information
Reporting System HMR Hazardous Materials Regulations RSPA Research and
Special Programs Administration TSA Transportation Security Administration
UNISHIP Unified Shipper Enforcement Data System

Page 1 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety January 10, 2003 The Honorable William
O. Lipinski

Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Aviation Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Lipinski: Each day, businesses, individuals, and government
agencies package and ship dangerous goods on ships, trains, trucks, and
airplanes. 1 Dangerous goods are by definition chemical, including
infectious, substances (or anything containing such substances) that pose
a threat to public safety or the environment during transportation. When
these goods are properly packaged, labeled, and stowed onboard, they can
be transported safely, but when they are not, they can pose significant
threats to people and

property. Improper, or *undeclared,* 2 shipments of dangerous goods are
particularly dangerous in air transport because there is little room for
error or time to take corrective action if a problem occurs in flight* a
lesson learned tragically in 1996 when a ValuJet plane crashed in Florida
after oxygen generators caught fire in the plane*s cargo compartment.

To better understand the overall risks that undeclared shipments of
dangerous goods can pose to aviation safety, we examined the Department of
Transportation*s (DOT) and the U. S. Postal Service*s monitoring of the
transportation of dangerous goods by commercial cargo and passenger
aircraft, although we focused primarily on cargo aircraft. As agreed with
your office, we addressed three researchable questions:

1 The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, as amended, principally
governs the transportation of dangerous goods. It is codified at title 49,
chapter 51, of the United States Code.

2 We use the term *undeclared* to describe two types of improper shipments
of dangerous goods: (1) those that a shipper has explicitly denied are
hazardous or has not identified as hazardous and (2) those that a shipper
has identified as hazardous but has otherwise misrepresented (for example,
the shipper has understated the quantity so that the materials can be
shipped by passenger aircraft rather than by cargo aircraft).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety  What do DOT, the Postal Service, and
others involved in the commercial air transport of dangerous goods know
about the nature and frequency of

undeclared shipments?  What are the key mechanisms the federal government
and private industry

have in place to prevent dangerous goods shipments from compromising
aviation safety?

 What do DOT and the Postal Service do to enforce federal regulations for
shipping dangerous goods by air?

We focused our review primarily on the shipments of dangerous goods
onboard cargo aircraft, in part, because more types and quantities of
dangerous goods are permitted on cargo aircraft than on passenger
aircraft. To address these questions, we analyzed recent reports by DOT on
its dangerous goods programs and on the threat that carrying such goods
can pose, particularly when the shipments are undeclared. We reviewed
research on methods that might be used to estimate the frequency of
undeclared shipments, and we consulted with both GAO and academic experts
in these methods. To determine the extent to which undeclared shipments
may occur, we interviewed officials of four major carriers that handle
over 60 percent of annual air freight traffic in the United States, and we
visited the premises of three of these carriers to review their procedures
for identifying and preventing undeclared dangerous goods shipments. We
also reviewed the results of a joint effort by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the U. S. Customs Service, which has the
authority to inspect and search international shipments, to detect, among
other things, undeclared dangerous goods shipments. We interviewed Postal
Service, FAA, and other DOT officials with various oversight
responsibilities for dangerous goods transportation. To evaluate FAA*s
enforcement strategy, we examined the agency*s assessments in 30 cases.
These cases were randomly selected to fairly represent the full range of
over 2,000 cases in the database. While the number of cases we tested was
too small for us to estimate the extent to which FAA*s enforcement
strategy was followed in the entire database,

our examination allowed us to describe the types of practices that occur
at critical points in the penalty assessment process. Our detailed scope
and methodology appears at the end of this report.

DOT, the Postal Service, and major carriers know that undeclared air
shipments of dangerous goods occur and can have serious consequences, but
they lack statistically valid, generalizable data to reliably estimate the
Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety nature and frequency of such shipments,
assess their risks, profile potential violators, and allocate resources
optimally for prevention,

detection, and correction. DOT researchers have concluded that data are
not available to reliably estimate the nature and frequency of dangerous
goods shipments or assess their risks. Carriers maintain that such
shipments are rare, but their views are based almost entirely on the
occurrence of incidents* shipments that were opened after a leak, spill,
odor, or other anomaly suggested a potential problem* rather than on
information about shipments that gave no cause for opening. Technological,
economic, and legal hurdles combine to make estimates of undeclared
dangerous goods shipments difficult. The current less intrusive screening
equipment is not designed to detect many types of dangerous goods, and
therefore opening packages is the only reliable means of obtaining
information on undeclared shipments. While carriers generally obtain the
consent of shippers to open packages that they accept for shipment, they
seldom open packages because doing so is too slow and costly to be
practicable except when incidents occur. Under the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, DOT may
generally not open and inspect packages without a search warrant or the
shipper*s consent. The Postal Service treats First Class or Express mail
packages traveling by air as being sealed against inspection and protected
by the Fourth Amendment. Without the authority to open packages for
inspection, neither DOT nor the Postal Service is in a position to gather
data on undeclared shipments of dangerous goods.

To prevent dangerous goods shipments from compromising safety, the federal
government relies on regulation, research, and outreach, and private
industry relies on policies for dealing with *known shippers* (a DOT term
for shippers that have demonstrated their previous business history),
other restrictions on customers or the materials they carry, training, and
sanctions. Federal regulations create a framework for transporting
dangerous goods safely. If DOT finds that these regulations are
insufficient to ensure safety, it can sponsor and has sponsored research
to determine how it should modify the regulations. DOT and the Postal
Service also provide information to the public on materials that may not
be shipped by air. Carriers try to prevent dangerous goods shipments from
compromising safety by dealing preferentially with known shippers. In
addition, some carriers accept fewer types of dangerous goods for

shipment than the law allows. While the Postal Service cannot limit its
business to known shippers, it restricts the materials it accepts for
shipment and requires shippers to bring packages weighing 16 ounces or
more to a post office, where employees can ask questions about the
contents. Carriers, including the Postal Service, also train their
employees

Page 4 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety to be a first line of defense against
undeclared shipments. Finally, carriers may require shippers to take
remedial training or may refuse to do

business with them if they repeatedly violate the dangerous goods
regulations. To evaluate the effectiveness of and enforce federal
regulations for

shipping dangerous goods by air, DOT collects data on incidents involving
dangerous goods, monitors shippers* and carriers* performance, and
assesses civil penalties. DOT has the authority to either assess civil

penalties or seek criminal enforcement action against violators. Within
DOT, FAA is responsible for enforcing compliance with the regulations for
shipping dangerous goods by air, while the Transportation Security
Administration, which is scheduled to be transferred to the new Department
of Homeland Security, is responsible for the security of cargo shipments.
To ensure that appropriate civil penalties are assessed, FAA*s enforcement
guidance requires the agency to consider the compliance history of
violators across all modes of transportation. This guidance was difficult
for FAA to follow because most operating administrations were

not submitting current enforcement data to DOT. DOT has directed its
operating administrations to submit current enforcement data to a
centralized database, so that the administrations can obtain current
information on the compliance history of violators across the modes. To
ensure that similar cases are treated consistently and fairly, FAA*s
enforcement guidance also requires the agency to document the reasons for
any reduction in a recommended civil penalty. Our analysis of FAA*s case
files indicates that the agency is not always following this policy. We
are recommending that FAA document its penalty assessments, as required,
so that it can demonstrate that it is handling similar cases consistently.
The Postal Service also collects data on actual releases of dangerous

goods being transported, monitors the compliance of shippers and carriers,
and can seek criminal penalties for violations of its regulations;
however, it cannot impose civil penalties for such violations. According
to industry officials, many dangerous goods violations result from
ignorance.

Under such circumstances, the Postal Service maintains, civil penalties
may be appropriate and would make it easier to recover the sometimes
substantial costs of cleanup and damages. DOT*s hazardous materials
reauthorization proposal includes a provision that would allow the Postal
Service to impose civil penalties.

This report contains recommendations to DOT that FAA evaluate the need for
additional inspection authority to obtain statistically valid data on

Page 5 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety undeclared air shipments of dangerous
goods and document its penalty assessments, as required, so that it can
demonstrate that it is handling

similar cases consistently. DOT agreed with our recommendations, and DOT
and the Postal Service generally agreed with the facts in our report. Both
DOT and the Postal Service provided clarifying and technical comments,
which we incorporated as appropriate.

DOT regulates tens of thousands of dangerous goods, which can include
poisons, pesticides, radioactive materials, and explosives. 3 About 20
percent of these goods may not travel by air at all. As shown in figure 1,
the remainder may travel on passenger or cargo aircraft, or both.

3 Each time someone ships dangerous goods, the contents of the shipment
must be identified by using 1 of over 3, 400 different shipping names. A
shipping name can refer to a specific material that DOT has identified as
dangerous; it can also be a generic description

for a material that meets the overall criteria for a dangerous goods
class, but for which there is not a division (within that class) to more
precisely identify it. According to DOT, because many materials are
identified using the generic descriptions within each class, the actual
number of dangerous goods is much greater than the 3,400 shipping names
that DOT spells out. Background

Page 6 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Figure 1: Air Transport of Dangerous
Goods Authorized by DOT

Using a United Nations classification system, DOT divides all dangerous
goods into nine general classes according to their physical, chemical,
biological, and nuclear properties. Most of the dangerous goods that may
not travel by air at all are the most highly explosive, toxic, oxidizing,
selfreactive, or flammable chemical substances or articles in their class.
In addition to prohibiting some types of dangerous goods from being
carried by air at all, DOT restricts the types and amounts of other
dangerous goods that any individual passenger or cargo aircraft may carry.
For both passenger and cargo aircraft, DOT spells out these restrictions
in four ways:

 By name* dangerous goods that represent an unacceptable hazard on
aircraft or are known to have caused an aircraft fire or explosion, such
as chemical oxygen generators, are specifically forbidden by name.

 By hazard class and subdivision* certain subdivisions of the classes of
dangerous goods are known to be highly reactive or toxic (for example,
most explosives and all spontaneously combustible materials), so DOT
excludes them from passenger flights. 

% 

May not travel by either passenger or cargo aircraft

May travel by cargo, but not by passenger, aircraft

May travel by either passenger or cargo aircraft

20% 30 50% Sources: Research and Special Programs Administration,
Department of Transportation, and (c) 1998 Nova Development Corporation.

Page 7 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety  By quantities contained per outer
package* DOT restricts on passenger aircraft the quantity of certain
substances or the number of articles that

may be present in the outermost shipping containers in the cargo hold. For
example, DOT allows the carriage of up to 30 liters of certain highly
flammable liquids per outer package on cargo aircraft, but imposes limits
of 1 liter or less on passenger aircraft.

 By packaging integrity* dangerous goods must be packaged so as to
protect the integrity of the shipment and safeguard against accidental
leaks or spills.

For passenger aircraft, whose cargo areas are divided into multiple
compartments, DOT also restricts the aggregate quantities of dangerous
goods that may be carried per cargo compartment. Figure 2 shows the kinds
of containers in which dangerous goods typically travel in these cargo
compartments.

Figure 2: Dangerous Goods Cargo Containers

Page 8 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Dangerous goods permitted onboard
passenger aircraft include dry ice and solvents; cargo aircraft may also
carry materials such as paint or medical

waste. Table 1 provides a complete listing of the nine classes of
dangerous goods, their descriptions, an example for each class, and some
of the restrictions DOT places on the carriage of each by type of
aircraft.

Table 1: Dangerous Goods Classes and Descriptions Class Description
Example( s) Cargo aircraft restrictions Passenger aircraft

restrictions

1 Explosives Fireworks Most are forbidden Most are forbidden 2 Gases
Propane Most are permitted within

quantity limitations Most are forbidden 3 Flammable liquids Acetone,
lighter fluid, paints Most are permitted, except

those that are toxic by inhalation

Most are permitted within quantity limitations

4 Flammable solids Safety matches Most are permitted within quantity
limitations; others are forbidden (for example,

spontaneously combustible materials)

Most are permitted within quantity limitations

5 Oxidizers and organic peroxides Swimming pool chemicals Most are
permitted within

quantity limitations; others are forbidden (for example, temperature-
controlled organic peroxides)

Most are permitted within quantity limitations

6 Toxic materials and infectious substances Regulated medical waste,

motor fuel anti- knock mixtures Most are permitted within quantity
limitations, exceptions for subsidiary risks a or those

that are toxic by inhalation Most are permitted within

quantity limitations 7 Radioactive materials Uranium hexafloride b b 8
Corrosive materials Batteries, cleaning

compounds Most are permitted within quantity limitations Most are
permitted within

quantity limitations 9 Miscellaneous dangerous

goods Asbestos Most are permitted within quantity limitations Most are
permitted within

quantity limitations Source: U. S. Department of Transportation, RSPA. a
*Subsidiary risk* means that the dangerous good also meets the definition
of one or more other

classes. b For nearly all radioactive materials, the Department of
Transportation*s Research and Special

Programs Administration (RSPA) spells out restrictions in terms of the
radiological reading that comes from the package rather than a quantity
limit (as it does for other classes of dangerous goods).

According to the U. S. Census Bureau*s most recent survey on the movement
of hazardous goods in the United States, class 3 dangerous goods
(flammable liquids, such as paint) account for the greatest portion (by
weight) of the nine classes of dangerous goods shipped by air. However,
the vast majority of flammable liquids travel by other modes. The
percentage of total shipments made by air was greatest for radioactive

Page 9 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety materials (class 7)* just over 8
percent of the total radioactive tonnage shipped in 1997 was shipped by
air. According to FAA, cargo aircraft, such as those operated by the major
delivery services FedEx and United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), carry about
75 percent of the nation*s dangerous

goods air shipments. The remaining 25 percent travel onboard passenger
aircraft in cargo compartments.

Ensuring the safe transportation of dangerous goods by air is a shared
responsibility of federal agencies, shippers, and airlines* the success of
which ultimately depends on the efforts of thousands of individuals every
day. Within DOT, the following have responsibility for dangerous goods:

 The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) regulates the
transportation of dangerous goods by truck, train, ship, pipeline, and
plane. It decides which materials to define as hazardous; writes the rules
for packaging, handling, and carrying them; and prescribes training
requirements for shippers* and carriers* dangerous goods employees. RSPA,
along with the other DOT operating administrations that operate and manage
dangerous goods programs, 4 conducts inspections and investigations to
determine compliance with dangerous goods laws and regulations for all
modes of transportation and, where appropriate, initiates enforcement
actions against those it finds not to be in compliance. RSPA maintains a
database for closed dangerous goods

enforcement actions from these operating administrations, and another
database that tracks dangerous goods incidents from these operating
administrations.

 The Office of Intermodalism, reporting to the Secretary of
Transportation, is responsible for implementing recommendations from a
March 2000 evaluation of DOT*s dangerous goods program, 5 coordinating
intermodal and cross- modal dangerous goods activities, and coordinating
DOT- wide outreach activities. For example, in 2001, to improve awareness
of dangerous goods incidents occurring during shipments, this office sent
out letters to shippers most frequently identified in RSPA*s dangerous
goods incident database.

4 The DOT operating administrations that operate and manage dangerous
goods programs include the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration,
the Research and Special Programs Administration, and the United States
Coast Guard. 5 U. S. Department of Transportation, Departmentwide Program
Evaluation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Program, Final Report
(March 2000).

Page 10 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety  FAA carries out responsibilities for
ensuring compliance with the rules for transporting dangerous goods by
air. In addition, FAA assesses carriers*

operations and investigates dangerous goods incidents or accidents. FAA
also has other responsibilities, including those relating to the
prosecution and adjudication of enforcement actions against those found to
have

violated the dangerous goods rules. The Postal Service is both a carrier
and a shipper of dangerous goods because it not only carries shipments on
aircraft that it leases, but it also sends U. S. mail onboard commercial
passenger and cargo airlines. As a result, the airlines carrying U. S.
mail rely on the Postal Service as a first line of defense in ensuring the
safety of the packages they accept for transport and in preventing the
shipment of anything that should not travel by air.

Shippers* whether they are businesses or individuals* have the primary
responsibility for ensuring the safety of their dangerous goods shipments.
They are required to train their employees to package their shipments
safely and to tell the carriers to whom they deliver these shipments that
they contain dangerous goods. Carriers share some of the responsibility
for the safe transportation of dangerous goods. They do so by training
their employees to handle these shipments properly, to identify likely
instances of improper shipments (such as those containing undeclared
dangerous goods), and to verify that the indirect air carriers from whom
they accept consolidated cargo shipments have FAA- approved security

programs in place to prevent explosive or incendiary devices from being
placed onboard. 6 Carriers are also responsible for reporting to DOT any
instance of noncompliance they discover.

6 An indirect air carrier accepts and delivers cargo to commercial
airlines for transport. An example of an indirect air carrier would be a
freight forwarder that consolidates shipments from a large number of
shippers and then transports them via the cargo compartments of commercial
aircraft. Because the U. S. Postal Service uses commercial aircraft to
ship the mail, the FAA also considers it an indirect air carrier.

Page 11 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety From tragic accidents over the years
and day- to- day experience in handling cargo traffic, DOT and major
carriers know that shipments of

undeclared dangerous goods can have disastrous consequences. The nature
and frequency of such shipments* and, by extension, the amount of effort
that should be put into stopping them* are difficult to estimate because
of data limitations. However, the inability of commercially available
screening equipment to detect many types of dangerous goods, the costs of
delaying shipments to inspect them, and restrictions against opening
certain packages may preclude the collection of data. Undeclared and other
improper shipments of dangerous goods can pose a

high risk because of the nature of air transportation. In recent years,
both RSPA and FAA have expressed concern about undeclared dangerous goods
shipments. In its departmentwide March 2000 evaluation of the dangerous
goods program, DOT reported that the United States has a relatively good
safety record, given the amounts of dangerous goods that are shipped by
all modes of transportation each year. However, DOT added that the
potential still remains for dangerous goods incidents with catastrophic
consequences, and, even though relatively small amounts of dangerous goods
travel by air (compared with other modes of transportation), a single
mishap can have serious consequences. For example, FAA has reported the
following incidents:

 In 1996, a major passenger airline carried undeclared dangerous goods*
calcium hypochlorite and liquid bleach* on a flight from California to
Jamaica. Upon arrival, airport personnel discovered smoke coming from the
aircraft*s cargo doors and encountered toxic fumes when they opened the
cargo compartment. The box of undeclared dangerous goods was leaking and
burst into flames shortly after the airport personnel removed it from the
cargo hold.

 In 1998, an undeclared shipment of electric storage batteries
(considered *wet* because they contain either electrolyte acid or alkaline
corrosive battery fluid) burst into flames while en route by truck to an
airport, where it had been scheduled to be placed aboard a major passenger
carrier*s aircraft.

 In 1999, a major cargo carrier transported an undeclared shipment of
liquefied petroleum gas from Portland, Oregon, to New York on a regularly
Shipments of

Undeclared Dangerous Goods Can Have Serious Consequences, but Their Nature
and Frequency Are Difficult to Estimate

Consequences of Carrying Undeclared Dangerous Goods Have Been Serious and
Remain a Concern

Page 12 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety scheduled cargo flight. One day after
arriving in New York, the package burst into flames at the carrier*s
sorting facility.

Three of the four major carriers we interviewed and DOT expressed concern
about the safety of carrying dangerous goods. According to these three
carriers, even though they discover relatively few undeclared shipments,
their greatest safety concern in the air transportation of these goods is
prompted by the undeclared shipments* particularly those they do not
detect before accepting them. They expressed this concern over not knowing
how much of the volume of undeclared dangerous goods they do not find,
because these shipments present a greater risk than do those that shippers
properly declare.

The major cargo carriers we interviewed and the Postal Service agreed that
ignorance or misunderstanding of the rules for transporting dangerous
goods is by far the most common reason why shippers fail to properly
declare their dangerous goods shipments. According to one carrier, in very
limited instances, shippers will deliberately not declare their shipments
even when they know they are breaking the rules. However, no carrier cited
cost as a reason why shippers fail to declare their shipments, even though
shipping costs are usually higher for

dangerous goods than for nondangerous goods. An official from one carrier
stated that he had never seen a case of a shipper willfully failing to
properly declare a dangerous goods shipment because of cost concerns.

Furthermore, at the Postal Service, it is doubtful that cost is a cause of
undeclared shipments, because the Postal Service does not charge more for
carrying these shipments than it does for carrying those that are not
hazardous; all of the Postal Service*s charges are based on weight and
class, regardless of the contents.

According to a 1999 threat assessment published by DOT*s Volpe Center, 7
three types of data that are needed to thoroughly assess the risks of
carrying declared and undeclared dangerous goods by air were unavailable.
These were

7 The John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center is part of
RSPA. It provides policy support, strategic planning, and analysis to
customers within as well as outside DOT in areas such as strategic
investment and resource allocation. Its work addresses issues in air and
other modes of transportation. Data Limitations Make Estimates of
Undeclared

Dangerous Goods Shipments Difficult

Page 13 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety  what amounts of dangerous goods are
shipped by class and division (for all modes of transportation),

 how often incidents related to dangerous goods involve undeclared
shipments, and

 what amounts and what types of undeclared dangerous goods are shipped by
air.

Without these data, the Volpe Center was limited to assessing the threat
from dangerous goods instead of the risk. The danger associated with a
specific item is its *threat,* while the likelihood that the threat will
actually result in harm is its *risk.* Assessing risk, according to the
Volpe Center, requires some indication of the likelihood that dangerous
goods will be present on an aircraft* and the data to determine this
likelihood were not available.

Volpe Center officials attempted to find or compile data sources that
would allow them to estimate the total amount of various dangerous goods
that might be shipped (for example, over the course of a year), but they
were unsuccessful. They found no single source of such data and were not
able to piece together data sources. For example, Volpe Center staff
attempted to compile data from chemical manufacturers to identify the
total amounts of their products that move by air and the related
distribution chain (that is, the amounts that move by other modes); this
information would enable them to identify aggregate amounts of certain
dangerous goods that shippers should be declaring, which would be a first
step in working toward an estimate of undeclared shipments. However, the
industry sources the Volpe Center consulted considered such information
proprietary and would not share it. Volpe Center staff also considered
assembling cargo manifest information from the airlines, because these
records indicate for each flight the amounts and types of dangerous goods
the aircraft is carrying. However, Volpe Center staff said the airlines
informed them that these data are not in a form usable for such an
analysis. Even if the manifest information were available, data on the

overall amounts of dangerous goods shipments (such as the Volpe Center
sought from the chemical industry) would still be necessary before this
manifest information could be useful for estimating undeclared dangerous
goods shipments.

According to Volpe Center staff, the limitations in the amount and quality
of data on dangerous goods shipments make estimating how many shipments
contain undeclared dangerous goods more difficult. Our

Page 14 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety experts in applied research and
methodology agreed, noting that certain *hidden populations* methods might
be useful for estimating the amount

of undeclared dangerous goods shipments, 8 but only if data limitations
such as those the Volpe Center identified were overcome. A Massachusetts
Institute of Technology expert in transportation research with whom we met
agreed that none of the known methods for estimating hidden populations
would be feasible for undeclared dangerous goods.

The major carriers we interviewed said they most commonly identify
undeclared dangerous goods (after accepting them for shipment) when some
occurrence prompts them to open a package or, in the case of the Postal
Service, to set the package aside for further investigation (because the
Postal Service generally cannot open such a package without a search
warrant). Most often, this happens when a package leaks, spills, breaks
open, or emits an odor, and the carrier or Postal Service employees
identify the occurrence as potentially a dangerous goods incident. 9 One
carrier also indicated that occasionally packages open as a result of
handling or must be opened when they lose their address labels. In some of
these instances, the company has discovered undeclared dangerous goods.
This same company also noted that, on rare occasions, it learns of
undeclared dangerous goods from informants* employees of either the
company that shipped the package or competitors of that company.

The carriers we interviewed reported that, although they have the consent
of shippers to open packages that have been accepted for shipment, they
seldom discover undeclared dangerous goods. Although they did not cite a
specific percentage, they described shipments of undeclared dangerous
goods as *very rare* and *a handful.* The numbers are believed to be
similarly small for the Postal Service* officials estimated that declared
dangerous goods represent less than one- tenth of 1 percent of their
shipments, and the percentage of these shipments that is undeclared is

8 The term *hidden populations* refers to those that are difficult to
count by traditional means because, for example, they involve illegal or
undesirable conditions that people are unlikely to self- report. For
example, illegal aliens or intravenous drug users would be considered
*hidden populations,* as would persons deliberately shipping undeclared

dangerous goods. 9 A dangerous goods incident is an event that results in
a release, including an unanticipated or unintentional release, of
hazardous material during the course of transportation. RSPA requires
carriers to report incidents as soon as possible when they involve certain
serious consequences, such as deaths or a change in the operational flight
pattern of an aircraft. RSPA requires carriers to report all other
incidents to the agency within 30 days of their occurrence.

Page 15 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety *very small.* The Volpe Center
reported in a 1999 threat assessment that undeclared dangerous goods
shipments made up about 0.05 percent of the

shipments of several large cargo carriers, but this estimate was based on
the recollections of the carriers of how many incidents they typically
report to RSPA.

Because estimates by the Volpe Center, major carriers, and the Postal
Service are based on reported incidents or memory, they are incomplete.
Moreover, these estimates refer only to those undeclared shipments that

resulted in dangerous goods incidents* they do not include undeclared
shipments that never gave carriers cause to open them. As a result,
according to the Volpe Center, there are no valid figures for the numbers
of dangerous goods shipments that do not comply with regulations for
transportation by air. 10 Additionally, when a carrier reports an incident
to DOT, RSPA does not

currently require the carrier to report whether the shipper properly
declared the dangerous goods. Consequently, the estimates of undeclared
shipments reported by the Volpe Center and by carriers to us may not

include all of the incidents carriers discovered, because the estimates
are based on memory and are therefore subject to error. RSPA plans to
remedy this limitation by requiring carriers to report whether dangerous
goods shipments involved in incidents were declared or undeclared. To do
so, RSPA is modifying its incident- reporting paperwork (Form 5800.1) to
more systematically collect and analyze information on undeclared

shipments. RSPA expects to complete this and other ongoing revisions to
its incident- reporting form by spring 2003.

10 Recently, RSPA received comments on the frequency of undeclared
shipments in response to an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. RSPA
received these comments under Docket HM- 228, which considers changes to
the regulations on the transportation of hazardous materials. According to
an RSPA official, the agency is analyzing these comments and expects to
complete its analysis by the end of October 2003.

Page 16 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Technological limitations complicate
efforts to estimate the incidence of undeclared dangerous goods shipments.
Ideally, technologies generally considered to be less intrusive, such as
X- ray or explosives- detection

equipment, could be used to identify and characterize undeclared
shipments. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 11 is
currently using this equipment to screen passenger carry- on and checked
baggage for weapons and explosives, and, under the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, 12 TSA must ensure that a system is in
operation to screen, inspect, or otherwise provide for the security of all
air cargo to be transported in all cargo aircraft as soon as practicable.
However, X- ray and explosives- detection equipment is not designed to
detect many types of dangerous goods. 13 In the future, technology may
enable the rapid, less intrusive screening of packages, but in the near
term, opening packages remains the best way to obtain information on the
nature and frequency of undeclared shipments.

Economic obstacles* particularly the costs of opening packages after
accepting them* also make it difficult to estimate the nature and
frequency of undeclared dangerous goods shipments. According to each of
the major carriers we interviewed, the volume of cargo that these airlines

carry each day is tremendous. For example, the carriers stated that they
carry from at least 1.3 million to more than 2 million shipments each
night, a small fraction of which contain dangerous goods. Because the
carriers

typically guarantee delivery on nearly all of the shipments they carry
(such as within 24 hours or 2 business days), anything that slows their
ability to move shipments could compromise their ability to meet their
guarantees to their customers and, as a result, hurt their competitive
position in their industry.

Although the carriers we interviewed told us that they obtain the consent
of shippers to open packages, they also said they seldom do open packages.
Carriers and an association representing cargo and passenger airlines
stressed that they are not in the business of opening packages,
particularly when shippers are primarily responsible for ensuring the

11 The Homeland Security Act of 2002, P. L. 107- 296, provides that TSA be
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. The Under Secretary
for Border Transportation and Security has responsibility for TSA.

12 P. L. 107- 71, November 19, 2001. 13 We do not describe how this
technology works because TSA considers this to be sensitive security
information. Technological, Economic,

and Legal Hurdles Also Make Estimates of Undeclared Dangerous Goods
Shipments Difficult

Page 17 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety integrity and proper declaration of
those packages. The carriers indicated that they have confidence in and
place a great, ongoing emphasis on their

up- front screening to prevent shippers from offering them undeclared
dangerous goods in the first place. Opening packages without probable
cause to do so would also be costly to the carriers because they would be
responsible for repackaging anything they found to be properly declared*
and dangerous goods require special, more expensive packaging than other
shipments. Although carriers remain concerned about the possibility of
undeclared shipments they may miss, to date the frequency with which they
discover shipments of undeclared dangerous goods does not, in their view,
justify a step as disruptive and costly as systematically opening a random
or targeted selection of shipments.

Because the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures and neither DOT nor the Postal Service has obtained
the consent of owners to have their packages opened for inspection,
neither agency may conduct or require random or targeted intrusive
inspections of domestic cargo shipments to look for undeclared dangerous
goods. Although FAA may remove a package from an aircraft

and take such emergency actions if it reasonably believes that the package
presents an immediate threat, it has no authority, generally, to open and
inspect a package without a warrant or without the owner*s consent.

The Postal Service may inspect Parcel Post packages. However, packages
sent as First Class or Express mail traveling by air may not be inspected.
14 The mail classification schedule recommended by the Postal Rate
Commission and adopted by the Postal Service does not distinguish between
letters and packages, treating both as *sealed against inspection* and
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, these packages are protected to
the same extent as letters, and all First Class and Express mail is
treated as protected by the Fourth Amendment.

14 The Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U. S. C. S: 3623( d), addresses the
issue of letters sealed against inspection. It states, *The Postal Service
shall maintain one or more classes of mail for the transmission of letters
sealed against inspection* No letter of such a class of domestic origin
shall be opened except under authority of a search warrant authorized by
law, or by an officer or employee of the Postal Service for the sole
purpose of determining an address at which the letter can be delivered, or
pursuant to the authorization of the addressee.*

Page 18 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety To obtain more information on the
nature and frequency of undeclared dangerous goods in air transport, FAA
has teamed with the U. S. Customs

Service, which has the authority to inspect and search international cargo
(imports and exports). Specifically, the Customs Service can and does
randomly open and inspect international cargo for purposes such as
ensuring that shippers have paid the proper tariffs. Most recently, in
June and July 2000, the U. S. Customs Service and FAA together conducted
inspections of passenger carry- on and checked bags and cargo aboard
flights that were entering or departing from the United States at 19
domestic airports. 15 This series of inspections found that

 8 percent of targeted cargo shipments (those whose tariff codes
indicated that their contents might be hazardous) contained undeclared
dangerous goods,  1 percent of passenger carry- on bags contained
undeclared dangerous

goods, and  just under 0.5 percent of passenger checked baggage contained

undeclared dangerous goods. The undeclared dangerous goods in the cargo
shipments included flammable liquids, fuel control units, aerosols, fire
extinguishers, and devices powered by flammable liquid. In the passengers*
checked and carry- on bags, the Customs- FAA teams found aerosols,
lighters, flammable liquids, safety matches, compressed flammable gases,
and automotive batteries. The Customs- FAA team randomly selected the
passenger baggage it inspected, but for the cargo, the team matched tariff
codes for commodity imports and exports with a dangerous goods trigger
list to determine which shipments to inspect. 16 15 Final Report of
Operation Clear Sky, Joint Inspection Activity, United States Customs

Service/ Federal Aviation Administration, June 26* July 21, 2000. 16 The
Customs- FAA inspections focused on international cargo and passenger
baggage because the Customs Service has the authority to open and inspect
shipments coming into or leaving the United States. Beyond the border,
neither agency has the authority to open

and inspect domestic cargo or passenger baggage without a search warrant.
DOT Has Teamed with the

U. S. Customs Service to Obtain Information on Undeclared Dangerous Goods
in International Shipments

Page 19 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety DOT has tried several times to clarify
and expand its authority to inspect and open certain packages when its
inspectors suspect a violation of the dangerous goods regulations. In its
1997, 1999, and 2001 reauthorization

proposal, DOT sought the authority to access, open, examine, and, if need
be, remove a package from transportation if it had an objectively
reasonable and articulable belief that the package might contain
undeclared dangerous goods. 17 According to DOT, this authority, which is
specific to all modes, would require its officers or inspectors to have a
*particularized and objective basis* for suspecting a violation, such as a
pattern of shipping undeclared dangerous goods, in order to open an
unmarked package. DOT further stated that this enhanced authority would
enable it to more effectively detect potential violations and to ensure
that it took the appropriate remedial actions. According to DOT officials,
its

reauthorization proposal has not been enacted for reasons unrelated to the
merits of its request for additional inspection authority.

Because DOT*s reauthorization proposal applies equally to all modes of
transportation, it would, if approved, allow DOT to follow up on problem
shippers across the modes. However, the proposal would also extend the
government*s inspection authority without regard to the differences
inherent in transporting dangerous goods by different modes. The same
distinctions between air and the other modes that justify more stringent
regulations for transporting dangerous goods by air might also justify
greater inspection authority for packages shipped by air.

A primary objective of DOT*s reauthorization proposal has been to improve
the ability of its inspectors to monitor and enforce the dangerous goods
regulations. The proposal has not been designed to obtain better
information about the nature and frequency of undeclared air shipments.
Because it would require a *particularized and objective basis* for
opening

packages, it would not allow DOT to identify a random sample of packages
and conduct inspections whose results could be generalized to all packages
in air transport. Thus, its usefulness as a tool for gathering data to
estimate the nature and frequency of undeclared air shipments and to
profile and target violators would be limited. DOT officials agree that
their proposal would not generate statistically valid data, and they have
indicated their willingness to modify the proposal so that it would yield
more useful information.

17 In this report, we are not expressing an opinion on potential
constitutional issues related to DOT*s proposal. Increased Inspection

Authority That DOT Is Seeking Would Not Produce Statistically Valid Data
and Does Not Distinguish between Air and Other Modes of Transportation

Page 20 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety An alternative to DOT*s proposal,
based on the premise that additional and perhaps unique measures are
needed to protect air commerce, would

require that shippers consent to DOT*s opening packages shipped by air for
inspection. This would allow the department to select and open a random
sample of packages in order to gather statistically valid data on
undeclared air shipments.

To prevent dangerous goods shipments from compromising aviation safety,
the federal government relies on regulation, research, and outreach, while
private industry depends on policies for dealing with known shippers,
other restrictions, training, and sanctions.

Federal regulations provide a framework for transporting dangerous goods
safely by air. As discussed in the background section of this report,
these regulations define dangerous goods, identify those that may and may
not travel by air, and specify how the materials are to be packaged,
handled, and carried. In addition, the regulations prescribe initial and
recurrent training for shippers* and carriers* employees, and require
shippers and carriers to test their employees* understanding of the
material covered in the training. The training, which is designed to
increase dangerous goods employees* safety awareness and to reduce the
frequency of dangerous goods incidents, is important because insufficient
understanding of the rules is often a factor contributing to such
incidents. For example, in 17 of 25 dangerous goods enforcement cases we
reviewed involving businesses, FAA identified employees* lack of training
as a contributing factor. 18 To monitor the effectiveness of its
regulations in promoting safety, RSPA

collects information on dangerous goods incidents occurring in the air, 18
The remaining 5 cases of the 30 we reviewed involved individuals not
engaged as HAZMAT employees, to whom the rules regarding initial and
recurrent training do not apply. Government and

Industry Rely on Several Mechanisms to Prevent Dangerous Goods Shipments
from Compromising Safety

The Federal Government Depends on Regulations, Research, and Outreach to
Prevent Problems

Page 21 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety water, rail, and truck modes through
its Form 5800.1. Nonetheless, the form is not designed to collect all the
information that would be useful in

monitoring the effectiveness of DOT*s dangerous goods regulations. As
previously noted, the form does not ask whether a problem shipment was
declared or undeclared* a key question in assessing effectiveness. 19 In
addition, the form does not include data fields that precisely identify
the different types of packaging deficiencies. While the form has space
for written comments, there is no mechanism for standardizing and entering
the information from the comments into DOT*s databases. RSPA is revising
the form to overcome these limitations. Once carriers begin collecting
information on dangerous goods incidents using this revised form, better
information on the incidence of undeclared shipments and reasons for
packaging deficiencies should be available to FAA and the other operating
administrations.

In the course of such monitoring, DOT sometimes identifies safety issues
that require further research. For example, DOT is currently evaluating
ways in which it will strengthen the regulations for shipping batteries,
because its analysis indicated that the existing dangerous goods
regulations for these shipments may not be sufficient. Beginning in the
early 1990s, FAA identified a number of incidents associated with
batteries, particularly lithium batteries, aboard aircraft in which the
batteries caused fires, smoke, or extreme heat* precisely the kind of
effects that make dangerous goods dangerous. In response to these and
other concerns, RSPA has taken a number of actions designed to improve the
regulations for the transportation of lithium batteries. 20 FAA*s
monitoring of reports on incidents involving dangerous goods also

led to further work on packaging standards. In examining nearly 3,000
reports from 1998 and 1999, FAA found that 60 percent of the incidents
involved properly declared shipments, indicating that the shipments

19 Two DOT initiatives* the Flagship Initiative on Hazardous Materials
Handling/ Incidents and the DOT- wide program evaluation* cited a better
understanding of the frequency and impact of undeclared shipments as
essential. 20 In response to an incident at Los Angeles International
Airport in 1999, the National Transportation Safety Board issued five
safety recommendations to RSPA for improving the transportation of lithium
batteries. In response to these concerns, RSPA published safety advisories
in the Federal Register, worked with the lithium battery industry to adopt
voluntary safety standards, undertook a study on the transportation of
lithium batteries, and initiated changes to domestic and international
regulations on the transport of lithium batteries.

Page 22 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety complied with the existing packaging
standards. Yet just over half (873) of these properly declared shipments
had problems because their packaging failed* that is, their closures or
seals leaked. These data prompted FAA to attempt to determine the adequacy
of packaging standards for air

transportation and the likely causes of leaking closures and seals.
Observing an increase in the number of package failures in the past 3
years, FAA questioned whether the existing test methods simulate the
realistic combined effects of pressure, temperature, and vibration. As a
result, FAA contracted with Michigan State University to study packaging
in air transportation. The results of that study, which FAA recently
received, indicate that closures are continuing to leak in packages marked
as complying with existing packaging standards. Subjecting packages to

both high altitude and vibration resulted in a package failure rate of 50
percent. RSPA is reviewing these results. To help prevent dangerous goods
incidents aboard passenger aircraft, FAA and RSPA conduct outreach to the
public. For example, FAA worked with RSPA to develop for air travelers a
brochure that lists items prohibited in passenger baggage (see app. I).
The brochure also explains that in- flight variations in temperature and
pressure can cause seemingly harmless items to leak or generate toxic
fumes during air travel. RSPA requires that signs be posted in airport
terminals and at check- in counters listing items

prohibited in air travel, some of which passengers may not recognize as
hazardous in air transportation. In addition, FAA has placed kiosks with
information on dangerous goods at 24 major airports to better inform the
general public about items that are considered hazardous onboard aircraft.

The Postal Service also does consumer outreach to better inform the public
about the materials that may and may not be sent through the mail.
According to Postal Service officials, there are posters in all of its
facilities that warn customers about shipping restricted dangerous goods.
In addition, for any customer who ships or requests information about
shipping dangerous goods, Postal Service retail employees provide an
informational brochure summarizing the applicable rules as well as the

shipper*s responsibilities.

Page 23 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety To prevent undeclared dangerous goods
shipments, major carriers limit their business to known shippers and may
impose other restrictions. They

also train their employees to be a first line of defense against
undeclared shipments, and may apply sanctions to shippers who have
violated dangerous goods regulations.

To ensure that they are dealing with legitimate businesses that are more
likely to properly train their employees to comply with dangerous goods
rules, the major carriers we interviewed rely on TSA*s *known shipper*
requirements or establish formal, contractual relationships with their
shippers that mirror the known shipper requirements. 21 According to
officials of one of the carriers, the steps involved in becoming a known
shipper reduce to an acceptable level the risk that the shipper presents
to the carrier. 22 By contrast, the carriers have found, casual or one-
time shippers are more likely to offer undeclared dangerous goods for
shipment. Three of the four carriers said they try to limit their business
with casual or one- time shippers and do not advertise to them. Rather,
two of the carriers said, they target business- to- business shippers that
typically have experience with shipping high volumes of dangerous goods
and may have long- standing relationships with the carriers. The fourth
carrier said that it does not accept dangerous goods from casual shippers
at all and, for other shippers, requires the establishment of a dangerous
goods*

shipping agreement, or contract, that spells out obligations for shippers,
such as recurring employee- training requirements. Officials of this
carrier believe that these contractual obligations reduce the incidence of
undeclared shipments.

21 We have not included a detailed description of the criteria that
shippers must meet for carriers to consider them *known* because TSA
considers this to be sensitive- security information. 22 Recent media
reports as well as work by the DOT Inspector General have raised concerns

about the extent to which (1) the known shipper procedures are a reliable
deterrent to criminal attacks and (2) selected carriers were adequately
complying with regulations requiring them to, among other things, properly
screen packages from unknown shippers. Most recently, virtually all of the
cargo carriers the Inspector General tested were complying with the
requirement, put in place after September 11, 2001, to take no packages
from unknown shippers. However, the Inspector General raised additional
serious concerns about weaknesses in FAA*s procedures for individuals or
businesses to become

approved indirect air carriers. (A carrier using the known shipper
requirements must verify that shippers have such approval from FAA.) Major
Carriers Rely on

Known Shipper Policies, Other Restrictions, Training, and Sanctions to
Prevent Undeclared Shipments

Carriers Deal with Known Shippers and Impose Other Restrictions

Page 24 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Besides limiting their business
primarily to known shippers, the major carriers we interviewed may try to
prevent undeclared shipments by

limiting the types of materials they will carry and the places where they
will accept dangerous goods shipments. Three of the four carriers said
they accept fewer types of dangerous goods for shipment than DOT
authorizes to travel by air. For example, the carriers said they refuse to
carry materials such as toxic or infectious substances, certain
explosives, and organic peroxides. In addition, one of the carriers said
it would not accept dangerous goods shipments at its retail
establishments. This carrier said it would accept such shipments only when
its own drivers picked them up from established customers. This carrier*s
policy is designed to screen out the casual shippers that might use its
retail establishments. According to the carrier, this policy also allows
it to rely on its drivers* experience with dangerous goods shipments,
their training, and their longstanding relationships with established
customers as a first line of screening against undeclared shipments of
dangerous goods.

While the Postal Service cannot limit its business to known shippers, it
accepts fewer dangerous goods for shipment than DOT authorizes to travel
by air. In general, the Postal Service limits the dangerous goods it will
accept for shipment to certain quantities of consumer commodities that
typically present a limited hazard in transportation because of their
form, quantity, or packaging.

In addition to limiting what dangerous goods it will carry, the Postal
Service, as part of its aviation mail security program, requires customers
to bring any package weighing 16 ounces or more to a post office for
shipment. The intent of this program is to prevent explosives in the mail,
but Postal Service officials indicated it has a residual benefit in
helping to prevent undeclared shipments of dangerous goods. Specifically,
by

requiring customers to bring packages that weigh 16 ounces or more to a
post office for shipment, Postal Service employees can inspect packages,
ask questions about their contents to determine whether they contain
anything prohibited, and ensure proper handling for packages containing
dangerous goods that may be mailed. The major carriers we interviewed
emphasized that the training they

provide for their employees is a key component in their efforts to prevent
shippers from offering undeclared dangerous goods, supplementing their use
of restrictions or the known shipper requirements to guard against such
shipments. This training provides information on dangerous goods
requirements and procedures for drivers and employees who handle, sort,
and load shipments. Through this training, the carriers expect that
Carriers Train Their Employees

to Monitor Compliance with Dangerous Goods Requirements

Page 25 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety employees throughout their
distribution chain will be able to identify problems such as declaration
paperwork that is missing information about

the contents of a package labeled as dangerous. Carriers rely particularly
on their drivers to draw on their training to, in effect, extend the known
shipper concept to their day- to- day interactions with shippers.
Training, plus a working knowledge of a company*s established customers,
helps the drivers detect inadvertent failures to properly declare a
shipment. For example, a driver picking up a shipment from a customer who
typically sends some dangerous goods would be expected to raise questions
if the customer did not label or declare any of the packages as dangerous.
In such an instance, the shipper may have made a mistake or forgotten to
declare the dangerous goods.

The Postal Service trains its retail employees, who accept packages from
the public, to screen packages and prevent those with undeclared or
improperly packaged dangerous goods from entering the mail system.
According to Postal Service officials, as of August 2002, the agency had
trained all 131,000 of its retail employees in procedures for preventing
the acceptance of any package containing prohibited materials. These
procedures include (1) asking shippers a series of questions about the
contents of their packages, including whether the packages contain
anything hazardous; (2) visually inspecting packages to look for signs of
problems, such as leaks, the lack of a return address, or markings
indicating that a package contains something a shipper may not know is
hazardous; and (3) referring to a reference guide for assistance in
answering shippers* questions about items that may or may not be
permissible in the U. S. mail. (See app. II for a summary of DOT*s
dangerous goods classes and the materials or quantities from each that are
allowed in the U. S. mail.) While the retail employees may be the first to
deal with shipments entering the mail system, the Postal Service also
provides dangerous goods training to its non- retail employees (such as
postal inspectors or employees at business mail entry units), who also
handle or carry dangerous goods or respond to incidents involving them.
According to the official responsible for the Postal Service*s dangerous

goods program, the agency has to rely on its retail employees to screen
out unacceptable items because it has limited authority to open mail that
has been accepted for shipment. These officials believe that face- to-
face questioning reduces the anonymity associated with depositing a letter
in a mailbox. And reducing anonymity, this official says, improves their
confidence in shippers* statements about the contents of packages. To test
its retail employees* performance in specific aspects of customer service,

Page 26 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety the Postal Service has an ongoing
*mystery shopper* program in which its employees pose as customers. In
late 2001, the Postal Service began

including in the mystery shopper tests a determination of whether the
retail employees were following requirements for asking the question about
dangerous goods. To date, the Postal Service*s tests indicate that the
retail employees asked the required screening question 69 percent of the
time. When the retail employees failed to ask the dangerous goods
question, Postal Service officials said they provided feedback and
retrained the employees. These officials also told us that they provided
this feedback to each postal office manager and have incorporated targets
for improved performance on the mystery shopper tests into the managers*
performance goals. Officials say these results are slowly and steadily
improving.

A shipper who fails to properly declare a dangerous goods shipment can
face serious consequences from a major carrier, particularly if the
shipper is a business or other operation with an ongoing need for the
carrier*s services. Two of the major carriers we interviewed may,
depending on the seriousness of the violation, require a shipper to
provide additional remedial training in shipping dangerous goods; apply
more stringent terms for accepting shipments from the shipper; or, in more
serious instances, permanently terminate the business relationship with
the shipper. Officials from one of the carriers stated that their
company*s requirements for remedial training in these instances exceed
DOT*s requirements for shippers. Similarly, officials from another carrier
told us that an inadvertent violation of the rules governing the
declaration of dangerous goods would, in most cases, result in a minimum
suspension of 60 days, pending the shipper*s completion of training or any
other steps the carrier chose to require before again accepting packages
from that shipper. This same carrier*s officials said that when they
suspect that a shipper may have sent undeclared dangerous goods through
their system, they will begin an investigation to determine whether the
shipper knew or should have known that it was doing so. Until the carrier
completes that investigation, the shipper must agree to let the carrier*s
staff open and inspect every shipment before accepting it. If this carrier
determines that the shipper knowingly offered undeclared dangerous goods,
it terminates its business with that shipper. Carriers May Impose
Sanctions

for Shipping Undeclared Dangerous Goods

Page 27 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety To evaluate the effectiveness of and
to enforce federal regulations for shipping dangerous goods by air, DOT
collects data on dangerous goods

incidents, monitors shippers* and carriers* performance, and assesses
civil penalties. Within DOT, FAA is primarily responsible for enforcing
the regulations for transporting dangerous goods by air. To ensure that
the penalties it imposes for violations of dangerous goods regulations are
appropriate to shippers* and carriers* complete compliance histories, FAA,
together with DOT*s other affected operating administrations, is required
to consider the compliance history of violators in all modes of
transportation when assessing penalties against them. This guidance was
difficult for FAA and others to follow because, until very recently, with
the

exception of RSPA, DOT*s operating administrations were not submitting
their enforcement data in a timely manner to DOT*s centralized enforcement
database. Finally, to further ensure that appropriate civil penalties are
assessed and that similar cases are treated consistently and fairly, FAA
requires that the reasons for any reduction to a recommended civil penalty
be documented. Our analysis of FAA*s enforcement case files found that FAA
is not always documenting its assessments.

Like DOT, the Postal Service collects data on dangerous goods incidents,
but it lacks DOT*s authority to assess civil penalties for violations and
therefore takes few enforcement actions. Legislation proposed by DOT would
allow the Postal Service to assess civil penalties.

To monitor and enforce compliance with DOT*s dangerous goods regulations,
FAA collects data on dangerous goods air incidents and discrepancies
through its Airport and Air Carrier Information Reporting System (AAIRS).
RSPA*s regulations define incidents as reportable releases of hazardous
materials, including those that are unintended and unanticipated.
*Discrepancies* are defined in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR)
as instances in which dangerous goods are found to be undeclared,
misdeclared, or improperly packaged. 23 In addition, FAA

collects data on closed dangerous goods enforcement cases through its 23
An incident is defined in RSPA*s regulations as an event that results in a
reportable release of a hazardous material, including unintended and
unanticipated releases that otherwise require reporting under 49 C. F. R.
S:171.15 or S:171. 16. As used in the Hazardous Materials Regulations, the
term *discrepancies* describes instances of undeclared dangerous goods
(material found in transportation that was not identified as dangerous
goods) and instances of misdeclared or improperly packaged dangerous
goods. For DOT, Inadequate

Documentation, and for the Postal Service, Lack of Civil Penalty Authority
Hamper Enforcement of Dangerous Goods Regulations

FAA Collects Data to Monitor and Enforce Compliance

Page 28 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Enforcement Information System. (See
app. III for more information about FAA*s and DOT*s incident and
enforcement databases.)

To ensure that appropriate civil penalties are assessed, FAA*s enforcement
guidance requires the agency to consider the compliance history of
violators across all modes of transportation. Until recently, FAA had
difficulty complying with this guidance because, with the exception of
RSPA, DOT*s operating administrations were not submitting their closed
enforcement action data in a timely manner to a central database* the
Unified Shipper Enforcement Data System (UNISHIP), maintained by RSPA. DOT
developed this database in response to a 1991 GAO report.

RSPA is working with DOT*s affected operating administrations to ensure
the timely submission of enforcement data. On July 17, 2002, the Office of
the Secretary of Transportation issued a memorandum calling for the

implementation of required procedures for entering data on dangerous goods
enforcement actions into UNISHIP. If the database is kept up to date, FAA
inspectors can obtain compliance information by querying the central
database.

Our analysis of FAA*s case files indicates that FAA is not always
documenting the reasons for reductions to recommended civil penalties, as
its guidance requires. We found cases in which the proposed civil

penalty was changed, but either no documentation or incomplete
documentation was provided to explain the reasons for the reduction. An
FAA official stated that it was FAA*s policy to include documentation for

civil penalty changes in the case files. To help ensure that appropriate
civil penalties are assessed and that similar cases are treated
consistently and fairly, it is important that FAA document the reasons for
any reduction to a recommended civil penalty.

The enforcement process begins when FAA inspectors obtain indication of a
violation (see fig. 4.). The inspector then determines whether the
violation warrants administrative action (such as a warning notice or
letter of correction), legal enforcement action (such as the imposition of
a civil penalty), or referral for criminal prosecution. When the inspector
finds that a civil penalty is appropriate, he or she must determine the
amount of the civil penalty by consulting FAA*s sanction guidance policy.
Legal staff

in the regional office or headquarters then review the strength of the
evidence, the type of enforcement action, and the amount of the civil
penalty, if any. Next, a notice of proposed civil penalty is issued that
is FAA Could Not Readily

Consider Complete Compliance Histories When Assessing Penalties

FAA Is Not Documenting Changes to Recommended Civil Penalties as Required

Page 29 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety consistent with the inspector*s report
and the review. The alleged violator then has an opportunity to reply to
the civil penalty assessed. If the alleged

violator provides convincing evidence that it did not commit the
violation, FAA dismisses the case. If FAA and the alleged violator agree
on an appropriate fine, FAA issues an order assessing a civil penalty that
binds the violator to pay the agreed- upon amount. If no agreement is
reached, the case is litigated.

Page 30 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Figure 3. FAA*s Dangerous Goods
Enforcement Process (for Civil Penalty Cases)

In 15 of the cases we reviewed, the assessed civil penalty differed from
the proposed civil penalty, but FAA included either no documentation or
incomplete documentation in the case files to account for the changes. For
example:

FAA inspectors obtain evidence of a violation.

The inspector then determines whether the violation calls for a civil
penalty or some other enforcement action.

When the inspector finds that a civil penalty is appropriate, he or she
must determine the amount of the civil penalty by consulting FAA's
sanction guidance policy.

A notice of proposed civil penalty is issued.

If the alleged violator provides convincing evidence that it did not
commit these violations, FAA dismisses the case.

If FAA and the alleged violator agree on an appropriate fine, FAA issues
an order assessing a civil penalty that binds the violator to pay the
agreed- upon amount.

If no agreement is reached, the case is litigated.

Legal staff in the regional office or headquarters then review the case.

Source: Federal Aviation Administration.

Page 31 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety  In 2000, the assessed civil penalty
on a chemical company for not properly shipping flammable paint was
reduced from $75,000 to $15,000, but no

reason was provided in the file for the change.  In 2000, the assessed
civil penalty on a paint company for not properly

shipping flammable paint was reduced from $59,500 to $37,500, but no
reason was provided in the file for the change.

In addition, in one case involving the shipment of an oxygen generator by
an air carrier in 1997, the recommended civil penalty was reduced by 20
percent, even though oxygen generators were responsible for the ValuJet
aircraft crash in 1996. This penalty was reduced for reasons that were not
documented. The reduction was not consistent with the known risks of

oxygen generators. The Postal Service*s standards for mailing dangerous
goods are similar to DOT*s detailed specifications for packaging, marking,
and labeling dangerous goods, although the mail is subject to many
additional limitations and prohibitions, which are imposed by provisions
of criminal statutes. 24 Yet in contrast with DOT, which can assess civil
or pursue criminal penalties for violations of its standards, the Postal
Service can only pursue criminal penalties. This leads to little
enforcement, because many violations are unintentional and involve
situations that are

inappropriate for criminal sanctions. At the same time, the high cleanup
and damage costs associated with dangerous goods violations are
timeconsuming, and damages may be difficult to recover absent authority to
assess civil penalties. For example, in a 1998 incident, the Postal
Service incurred costs of $87,000 and the carrier incurred damages of $1.4
million when a Priority mail shipment containing four bottles of mercury
was found to be leaking upon removal from the aircraft. Another costly
incident occurred in 2000, when 3 gallons of gasoline were illegally
shipped in a motorcycle gas tank and the tank leaked during the flight,

requiring the plane to be taken out of service and cleaned. As part of its
24 The mail is subject to the restrictions in title 18 that prohibit the
mailing of any matter that is outwardly or of its own force dangerous to
life, health, or property, and to restrictions defined in the Postal
Service*s rules. However, the Postal Service is not subject to the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act or to the HMR. We also note that
while commercial carriers are subject to the federal regulations set forth
in title 49, C. F. R., the Postal Service operates under title 39, C. F.
R. The USPS hazardous material regulations are set forth in the Domestic
Mail Manual (39 C. F. R. Part 111) and further explained in

Publication 52, Hazardous, Restricted, and Perishable Mail.

Postal Service Lacks Authority to Impose Civil Penalties for Violations

Page 32 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety proposal to reauthorize the hazardous
materials transportation program, DOT has included a provision that would
allow the Postal Service to

collect civil penalties and to recover costs and damages for dangerous
goods violations. 25 The Postal Service has been actively working with
DOT, and it supports this provision. Yet others have raised concerns about
possible conflicts between the Postal Service*s current law enforcement
authority and its effect on fair competition between the Postal Service
and other shippers. The question of whether changes should be made
regarding the Postal Service*s law enforcement responsibilities continues
to be discussed as the Congress and others revisit the Postal Service*s

mission and roles as part of broader postal reform efforts. Without
statistically valid, generalizable data on the nature and frequency of
undeclared dangerous goods in air transport, DOT does not know to what
extent such goods pose a threat to aviation safety, or what resources
should be allocated to address that threat. Eventually, affordable
diagnostic screening technologies may enable carriers and DOT to monitor
dangerous goods shipments efficiently and nonintrusively. Until then,
greater inspection authority would enable DOT to randomly select and open
packages; gather statistically valid, generalizable data; and profile and
target potential violators, thereby possibly enhancing aviation safety. A
change in the law requiring that shippers consent to the inspection of

packages shipped by air might help to accomplish these objectives. The
legislation that DOT has proposed seeking greater inspection authority has
not to date been limited to the air mode and has not been designed to
obtain statistically valid data. However, the distinctions between air and
the other modes that justify more stringent regulations for transporting
dangerous goods by air, along with the potential benefits to aviation
safety that could accrue from better data on undeclared air shipments,
might

warrant the development of a proposal that would enable DOT to obtain such
data.

The Office of the Secretary*s recent memorandum to the operating
administrations, calling for the timely submission of closed enforcement
action data to DOT*s centralized enforcement database, should strengthen
FAA*s ability to take appropriate enforcement action against violators of

DOT*s dangerous goods regulations. Provided that the operating 25 S. 1669
and H. R. 3276, Hazardous Material Transportation Safety Reauthorization
Act of 2001. Conclusions

Page 33 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety administrations continue to follow the
memorandum, FAA should be able to identify high- risk or problem entities,
consider their compliance histories in all modes of transportation as its
enforcement policy guidance

requires, and ensure that the penalties it assesses against them are
appropriate to their histories. Yet FAA still needs to do more to
demonstrate that it has assessed appropriate civil penalties. Until it
fully documents the reasons for its assessments, or for changes to its
initial assessments, as its guidance requires, it cannot provide assurance
that the penalties are appropriate or that it has handled similar cases
consistently. In order to strengthen DOT*s enforcement of dangerous goods
regulations,

we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation determine whether the
unique characteristics of air transport warrant the development of a
legislative proposal that would enhance DOT*s authority to inspect
packages shipped by air. Depending on the results of his determination, we
further recommend that

the Secretary direct the FAA Administrator to develop a legislative
proposal that would require shippers to consent to the opening for
inspection of packages shipped by air. Such a proposal would not only
enhance FAA*s inspection authority but would also enable FAA to obtain
statistically valid, generalizable data on the nature and frequency of
undeclared air shipments of dangerous goods.

Finally, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Administrator to
ensure that FAA better communicate and enforce its requirement to document
the justification for any substantial changes to an initially proposed
penalty before issuing a final order assessing a penalty.

We provided DOT and the U. S. Postal Service with a draft of this report
for their review and comment. We met with DOT officials, including the
Director of RSPA*s Office of Hazardous Materials Enforcement and the
Manager of FAA*s Dangerous Goods and Cargo Security Enforcement Program,
to receive their comments. The U. S. Postal Service provided comments via
E- mail. DOT and the Postal Service generally agreed with our report and
provided clarifying and technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate.

In our draft report, we recommended that the Secretary of Transportation
direct the DOT administrations that operate and manage a dangerous goods
program to submit their enforcement data to RSPA*s centralized
Recommendations for

Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Page 34 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety database. According to our audit work,
the administrations were not submitting the data and, therefore, FAA could
not readily comply with its

guidance requiring it to consider the compliance history of violators in
all modes of transportation. However, when we discussed the draft report
with DOT officials in October 2002, they provided a July 17, 2002,
memorandum from the Office of the Secretary of Transportation directing
the operating administrations to submit the data. In addition, in October
2002, DOT furnished evidence that three of the five administrations
subsequently provided current data. We therefore deleted this
recommendation from the final report. DOT agreed with our other

recommendations, acknowledging that its legislative proposals seeking
greater inspection authority have not been designed to obtain
statistically valid data on undeclared shipments of dangerous goods. DOT
further noted that FAA*s upcoming reauthorization legislation could serve
as a vehicle for a proposal to expand FAA*s inspection authority, so that
the agency could obtain better data on undeclared air shipments. While
indicating that changes to initially proposed civil penalties sometimes
occur as a result of penalty negotiations, DOT agreed that documenting the
justification for changes is important for providing assurance that final
penalties are appropriate and consistent.

To determine what DOT, the Postal Service, and others involved in the air
transport of dangerous goods know about undeclared shipments, we
identified relevant studies and interviewed DOT, Postal Service, industry,
and industry association officials. We reviewed the documents and reports
we obtained, visited DOT*s John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems
Center and FAA*s William J. Hughes Technical Center, and conducted
additional interviews with the researchers who had carried out critical
studies. We also interviewed officials at four of the major cargo
carriers, and conducted site visits at three of their facilities.

To determine the key mechanisms that the federal government and private
industry have in place to prevent dangerous goods from compromising
safety, we interviewed agency and industry officials and federal
researchers. We also reviewed relevant reports and documents in order to
identify recent developments in screening technology.

To determine what DOT and the Postal Service do to foster compliance with
federal regulations for shipping dangerous goods by air, we interviewed
agency officials and reviewed reports and documents. We also examined
FAA*s practices for assessing civil penalties by testing 30

randomly selected cases from FAA*s Enforcement Information System, Scope
and

Methodology

Page 35 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety which contains a database of over
2,000 cases. 26 These cases were randomly selected to fairly represent the
full range of over 2,000 cases in

the database. While the number of cases we tested was too small to enable
us to estimate the extent to which FAA*s enforcement strategy was followed
in the entire database, these 30 cases permit us to describe the types of
practices that occur at critical points in the penalty assessment process.

We performed our work from September 2001 through November 2002, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the
Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Chairman of its Subcommittee on
Aviation; other appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of
Transportation; the Postmaster General, United States Postal Service; the
Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, Transportation Security
Administration; the Administrator, Research and Special Programs
Administration; and the Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www.
gao. gov.

26 The Enforcement Information System contains entries of violations found
during inspections or through other means (such as police inspections or
public complaints) that initiate enforcement cases. It contains detailed
information on the status and resolution of each enforcement case and
allows field, regional, and headquarters staff to enter and retrieve data.

Page 36 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Please call me at (202) 512- 2384 if
you or your staff have any questions about the information in this report.
Key contributors to this report are

listed in appendix IV. Sincerely yours,

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph. D. Director, Physical Infrastructure

Appendix I: FAA*s Dangerous Goods Informational Brochure for Passengers

Page 37 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Appendix I: FAA*s Dangerous Goods
Informational Brochure for Passengers

There are certain exceptions for personal care, medical needs, sporting
equipment, and items to support physically challenged passengers. For
example:

Hazardous materials are prohibited in luggage or carried on board.

Signal flares, sparklers or other explosives

Drain cleaners and solvents

Spray cans, butane fuel, scuba tanks, propane tanks, CO 2 cartridges,
self- inflating rafts

Firearms, ammunition, gunpowder, mace, tear gas orpepper spray You must
declare your hazardous materials to the airline,

air package carrier, or U. S. Postal Service. Violators of Federal
Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 CFR Parts 171- 180) may be subject to
a civil penalty of up to $25,000 for each violation and, in appropriate
cases, a criminal penalty of up to $500,000 and/ or imprisonment of up to
5 years. Dry ice, gasoline- powered tools,

wet- cell batteries, camping equipment with fuel, radioactive materials
(except limited quantities), poisons, infectious substances The above list
is not all inclusive. For exceptions, read

Fuel, paints, lighter refills, matches

Personal care items containing hazardous materials (e. g., flammable
perfume, aerosols) totaling no more than 75 ounces may be carried on
board. Contents of each container may not exceed 15 fluid ounces.

Matches and lighters may only be carried on your person. However, "strike-
anywhere" matches, lighters with flammable liquid reservoirs and lighter
fluid are forbidden.

Firearms and ammunition may not be carried by a passenger on an aircraft.
However, unloaded firearms may be transported in checked luggage if
declared to the agent at check in and packed in a suitable container.
Handguns must be in a locked container. Boxed small arms ammunition for
personal use may be transported in checked luggage. Amounts may vary
depending on the airline.

Dry ice (4 pounds or less) for packing perishables, may be carried on
board an aircraft provided the package is vented.

Electric wheelchairs must be transported in accordance with airline
requirements. The battery may need to be dismounted.

Further restrictions may apply to the above items. Some items may be
shipped as air cargo. If you are unsure whether the item you wish

to pack in your luggage or ship by air is hazardous, contact your airline
representative.

Many common items used everyday in the home or workplace may seem
harmless; however, when transported by air, they

can be very dangerous. In flight, variations in temperature and pressure
can cause items to leak, generate toxic fumes or start a fire.

Brochure inside Brochure outside

Source: Federal Aviation Administration and Research and Special Programs
Administration.

Appendix II: Mailability of Dangerous Goods, by DOT Class Page 38 GAO- 03-
22 Aviation Safety Appendix II: Mailability of Dangerous Goods, by DOT
Class

Source: United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), C023.

Appendix III: Data Collected by DOT Agencies on Dangerous Goods Incidents
and Enforcement Actions

Page 39 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety FAA collects data on dangerous goods
air incidents, discrepancies, and enforcement actions through two
databases. Its Airport and Air Carrier

Information Reporting System (AAIRS) collects basic incident and
discrepancy information such as the mode, date, and location of the
incident or discrepancy, the carrier and shipper involved, the hazard
class of the spilled material, and the consequences of the incident or
discrepancy. (See table 1.) FAA*s Enforcement Information System (EIS)
collects information on closed dangerous goods enforcement cases. It
contains data such as the incident date, the regulations violated, the
sanction initially recommended, and the final sanction. These enforcement
data are used to monitor and enforce compliance with DOT*s dangerous goods
regulations.

Table 2: DOT Databases Tracking Information on the Air Transportation of
Dangerous Goods

Database name Database custodian Description

Hazardous Material Incident Reporting System (HMIRS)

RSPA DOT*s HMIRS is the primary source of national incident data for the
federal, state, and local government agencies responsible for the safety
of dangerous goods

transportation. Carriers of dangerous goods supply these data through
their reporting of dangerous goods incidents. Unified Shipper Enforcement
System (UNISHIP)

RSPA UNISHIP contains information on closed enforcement actions taken
against shippers and freight forwarders in all modes of transportation,
including air. Airport/ Air Carrier Information Reporting System (AAIRS)

FAA AAIRS has been used since 1996 to track inspections of airports and
air carrier stations. It includes dangerous goods incidents (which are
also reported to HMIRS) and discrepancies (dangerous goods discoveries
that occur through avenues other than faulty packaging, such as luggage
inspection). Enforcement Information System (EIS) FAA The EIS contains
entries of violations found

during inspections or through other means (such as police inspections or
public complaints) that initiate enforcement cases.

Source: RSPA and FAA.

RSPA collects dangerous goods incident and enforcement data through two
databases. Its Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS)
collects dangerous goods incident information across all transportation
modes, not just the air mode. This information is similar to that
collected in FAA*s AAIRS database, but it does not include Appendix III:
Data Collected by DOT

Agencies on Dangerous Goods Incidents and Enforcement Actions

Appendix III: Data Collected by DOT Agencies on Dangerous Goods Incidents
and Enforcement Actions

Page 40 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety discrepancies. RSPA tracks closed
hazardous materials enforcement cases through its Unified Shipper
Enforcement System (UNISHIP). This

database tracks closed enforcement actions across all transportation
operating administrations, not simply air.

RSPA collects data on dangerous goods incidents from all transportation
modes through DOT Form F 5800.1, which captures basic information on
incidents such as the mode, date, and location of the incident; the
carrier and shipper involved; the hazard class and shipping name of the
spilled material; and the consequences of the incident (including deaths,
injuries, product loss, and damage). RSPA uses the data and the
information it collects on dangerous goods incidents to (1) evaluate the
effectiveness of existing regulations, (2) assist in determining the need
for regulatory changes to cover changing transportation safety problems,
and (3) determine major problem areas so that attention can be more
suitably directed to them. In addition, both the government and industry
use this dangerous goods incident information to chart trends and identify
training inadequacies and packaging deficiencies.

In addition to RSPA, UNISHIP serves the enforcement programs of the
Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the U. S. Coast Guard, and
the Inspector General by providing a history of compliance for the
companies contained in the system.

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 41 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph. D., (202)
512- 2834 Belva M. Martin, (202) 512- 2834

In addition to those named above, Elizabeth R. Eisenstadt, Arthur L.
James, Bert Japikse, David Laverny- Rafter, Bill MacBlane, Kieran
McCarthy, Richard Scott, and Katherine Wulff made key contributions to
this report. Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Acknowledgments

(540004)

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