    Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and
    DOT's Enforcement Approach (10-JAN-03, GAO-03-22).

    When shipments of dangerous goods (hazardous chemical substances
    that could endanger public safety or the environment, such as
    flammable liquids or radioactive materials) are not properly
    packaged and labeled for air transport, they can pose significant
    threats because there is little room for error when something
    goes wrong in flight. To better understand the risks posed by
    improper ("undeclared") air shipments, we assessed what is known
    about their nature and frequency, what key mechanisms are in
    place to prevent their occurrence, and what the Department of
    Transportation (DOT) and the Postal Service do to enforce federal
    regulations for shipping dangerous goods by air.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-22
        ACCNO:   A05843
      TITLE:     Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous
    Goods and DOT's Enforcement Approach
         DATE:   01/10/2003
      SUBJECT:   Air transportation operations
    	     Federal regulations
    	     Hazardous substances
    	     Inspection
    	     National preparedness
    	     Safety regulation
    	     Safety standards
    	     Transportation safety

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    GAO-03-22

    Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee
    on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

    January 2003 AVIATION SAFETY Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods
    and DOT*s Enforcement Approach GAO- 03- 22

    Little is known about the nature and frequency of undeclared shipments of
    dangerous goods. While major carriers and the Postal Service believe such
    shipments are rare, their belief is based mainly on inspections of problem
    shipments, such as those that leak. Statistically valid, generalizable
    data are not available and would be difficult to obtain, not only because
    more

    inspections would entail costly delays for carriers but also because
    Constitutional protections limit DOT*s and the Postal Service*s inspection
    authority. DOT is seeking greater authority to open potentially
    problematic shipments for inspection, but its efforts are not limited to
    air transport and would not enable DOT*s Federal Aviation Administration
    (FAA) to obtain statistically valid, generalizable data on the nature and
    frequency of undeclared air shipments. A change in the law requiring that
    shippers consent to the opening of packages for inspection might be
    appropriate for air transport and would enable FAA to obtain such data.
    FAA could then identify the resources and actions needed to address the
    problem. Federal regulations create a framework for transporting dangerous
    goods

    safely, and outreach to shippers and carriers helps to prevent undeclared
    shipments. Private industry does business primarily with *known shippers*
    (those that have shown they comply with the regulations). The Postal
    Service cannot restrict its business to known shippers, but it requires
    customers to bring packages weighing 16 ounces or more to a post office
    for screening. Carriers and the Postal Service both train their employees
    to screen for undeclared shipments.

    The Postal Service and FAA monitor and enforce compliance with federal
    regulations for transporting dangerous goods by air. However, the Postal
    Service cannot fine violators and seldom takes criminal action, since most
    violations are inadvertent. FAA*s enforcement guidance calls for
    documenting the reasons for any changes in the fines its inspectors
    initially propose. GAO*s review of enforcement case files indicates that
    the reasons for changes were not always documented. FAA attributes some
    changes to the results of penalty negotiations. Because FAA is not always
    following its guidance, it cannot ensure that its fines are appropriate or
    consistent.

    Figure 1: Air Transport of Dangerous Goods Authorized by DOT

    May not travel by either passenger or cargo aircraft Sources: Research and
    Special Programs Administration, Department of Transportation, and (c)
    1998 Nova Development Corporation. May travel by cargo, but

    not by passenger, aircraft May travel by either passenger or cargo
    aircraft

    20% 30% 50%

    AVIATION SAFETY

    Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT*s Enforcement Approach

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 22. To view the full report,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact Gerald Dillingham at (202)- 512- 2384 or dillinghamg@
    gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 22, a report to the

    Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on
    Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

    January 2003

    When shipments of dangerous goods (hazardous chemical substances that
    could endanger public safety or the environment, such as flammable liquids
    or radioactive materials) are not properly packaged and labeled for air
    transport, they can pose significant threats because there is little room
    for error when something goes wrong in flight. To better understand the
    risks posed by improper (* undeclared*) air shipments, we assessed what is
    known about their nature and frequency, what key mechanisms are in place
    to prevent their

    occurrence, and what the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Postal
    Service do to enforce federal regulations for shipping dangerous goods by
    air.

    Figure 1 shows how DOT regulates the air transport of dangerous goods in
    the United States.

    GAO recommends that DOT improve its enforcement approach by (1)
    determining whether the unique characteristics of air transport warrant
    the development of a legislative proposal that would enhance DOT*s
    authority to inspect packages shipped by air and (2) requiring FAA to
    strengthen its policy on documenting the reasons for changes to the
    amounts of the recommended fines.

    Page i GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background
    5

    Shipments of Undeclared Dangerous Goods Can Have Serious Consequences, but
    Their Nature and Frequency Are Difficult to Estimate 11 Government and
    Industry Rely on Several Mechanisms to Prevent

    Dangerous Goods Shipments from Compromising Safety 20 For DOT, Inadequate
    Documentation, and for the Postal Service,

    Lack of Civil Penalty Authority Hamper Enforcement of Dangerous Goods
    Regulations 27 Conclusions 32 Recommendations for Executive Action 33
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33 Scope and Methodology 34

    Appendix I FAA*s Dangerous Goods Informational Brochure for Passengers 37

    Appendix II Mailability of Dangerous Goods, by DOT Class 38

    Appendix III Data Collected by DOT Agencies on Dangerous Goods Incidents
    and Enforcement Actions 39

    Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 41 GAO Contacts 41
    Acknowledgments 41

    Tables

    Table 1: Dangerous Goods Classes and Descriptions 8 Table 2: DOT Databases
    Tracking Information on the Air

    Transportation of Dangerous Goods 39 Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Figures

    Figure 1: Air Transport of Dangerous Goods Authorized by DOT 6 Figure 2:
    Dangerous Goods Cargo Containers 7 Figure 3. FAA*s Dangerous Goods
    Enforcement Process (for Civil

    Penalty Cases) 30

    Abbreviations

    AAIRS Airport and Air Carrier Information Reporting System C. F. R. Code
    of Federal Regulations DOT Department of Transportation EIS Enforcement
    Information System FAA Federal Aviation Administration

    GAO General Accounting Office HMIRS Hazardous Materials Information
    Reporting System HMR Hazardous Materials Regulations RSPA Research and
    Special Programs Administration TSA Transportation Security Administration
    UNISHIP Unified Shipper Enforcement Data System

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety January 10, 2003 The Honorable William
    O. Lipinski

    Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Aviation Committee on
    Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives

    Dear Mr. Lipinski: Each day, businesses, individuals, and government
    agencies package and ship dangerous goods on ships, trains, trucks, and
    airplanes. 1 Dangerous goods are by definition chemical, including
    infectious, substances (or anything containing such substances) that pose
    a threat to public safety or the environment during transportation. When
    these goods are properly packaged, labeled, and stowed onboard, they can
    be transported safely, but when they are not, they can pose significant
    threats to people and

    property. Improper, or *undeclared,* 2 shipments of dangerous goods are
    particularly dangerous in air transport because there is little room for
    error or time to take corrective action if a problem occurs in flight* a
    lesson learned tragically in 1996 when a ValuJet plane crashed in Florida
    after oxygen generators caught fire in the plane*s cargo compartment.

    To better understand the overall risks that undeclared shipments of
    dangerous goods can pose to aviation safety, we examined the Department of
    Transportation*s (DOT) and the U. S. Postal Service*s monitoring of the
    transportation of dangerous goods by commercial cargo and passenger
    aircraft, although we focused primarily on cargo aircraft. As agreed with
    your office, we addressed three researchable questions:

    1 The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, as amended, principally
    governs the transportation of dangerous goods. It is codified at title 49,
    chapter 51, of the United States Code.

    2 We use the term *undeclared* to describe two types of improper shipments
    of dangerous goods: (1) those that a shipper has explicitly denied are
    hazardous or has not identified as hazardous and (2) those that a shipper
    has identified as hazardous but has otherwise misrepresented (for example,
    the shipper has understated the quantity so that the materials can be
    shipped by passenger aircraft rather than by cargo aircraft).

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    Page 2 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety  What do DOT, the Postal Service, and
    others involved in the commercial air transport of dangerous goods know
    about the nature and frequency of

    undeclared shipments?  What are the key mechanisms the federal government
    and private industry

    have in place to prevent dangerous goods shipments from compromising
    aviation safety?

     What do DOT and the Postal Service do to enforce federal regulations for
    shipping dangerous goods by air?

    We focused our review primarily on the shipments of dangerous goods
    onboard cargo aircraft, in part, because more types and quantities of
    dangerous goods are permitted on cargo aircraft than on passenger
    aircraft. To address these questions, we analyzed recent reports by DOT on
    its dangerous goods programs and on the threat that carrying such goods
    can pose, particularly when the shipments are undeclared. We reviewed
    research on methods that might be used to estimate the frequency of
    undeclared shipments, and we consulted with both GAO and academic experts
    in these methods. To determine the extent to which undeclared shipments
    may occur, we interviewed officials of four major carriers that handle
    over 60 percent of annual air freight traffic in the United States, and we
    visited the premises of three of these carriers to review their procedures
    for identifying and preventing undeclared dangerous goods shipments. We
    also reviewed the results of a joint effort by the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) and the U. S. Customs Service, which has the
    authority to inspect and search international shipments, to detect, among
    other things, undeclared dangerous goods shipments. We interviewed Postal
    Service, FAA, and other DOT officials with various oversight
    responsibilities for dangerous goods transportation. To evaluate FAA*s
    enforcement strategy, we examined the agency*s assessments in 30 cases.
    These cases were randomly selected to fairly represent the full range of
    over 2,000 cases in the database. While the number of cases we tested was
    too small for us to estimate the extent to which FAA*s enforcement
    strategy was followed in the entire database,

    our examination allowed us to describe the types of practices that occur
    at critical points in the penalty assessment process. Our detailed scope
    and methodology appears at the end of this report.

    DOT, the Postal Service, and major carriers know that undeclared air
    shipments of dangerous goods occur and can have serious consequences, but
    they lack statistically valid, generalizable data to reliably estimate the
    Results in Brief

    Page 3 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety nature and frequency of such shipments,
    assess their risks, profile potential violators, and allocate resources
    optimally for prevention,

    detection, and correction. DOT researchers have concluded that data are
    not available to reliably estimate the nature and frequency of dangerous
    goods shipments or assess their risks. Carriers maintain that such
    shipments are rare, but their views are based almost entirely on the
    occurrence of incidents* shipments that were opened after a leak, spill,
    odor, or other anomaly suggested a potential problem* rather than on
    information about shipments that gave no cause for opening. Technological,
    economic, and legal hurdles combine to make estimates of undeclared
    dangerous goods shipments difficult. The current less intrusive screening
    equipment is not designed to detect many types of dangerous goods, and
    therefore opening packages is the only reliable means of obtaining
    information on undeclared shipments. While carriers generally obtain the
    consent of shippers to open packages that they accept for shipment, they
    seldom open packages because doing so is too slow and costly to be
    practicable except when incidents occur. Under the Fourth Amendment to the
    Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, DOT may
    generally not open and inspect packages without a search warrant or the
    shipper*s consent. The Postal Service treats First Class or Express mail
    packages traveling by air as being sealed against inspection and protected
    by the Fourth Amendment. Without the authority to open packages for
    inspection, neither DOT nor the Postal Service is in a position to gather
    data on undeclared shipments of dangerous goods.

    To prevent dangerous goods shipments from compromising safety, the federal
    government relies on regulation, research, and outreach, and private
    industry relies on policies for dealing with *known shippers* (a DOT term
    for shippers that have demonstrated their previous business history),
    other restrictions on customers or the materials they carry, training, and
    sanctions. Federal regulations create a framework for transporting
    dangerous goods safely. If DOT finds that these regulations are
    insufficient to ensure safety, it can sponsor and has sponsored research
    to determine how it should modify the regulations. DOT and the Postal
    Service also provide information to the public on materials that may not
    be shipped by air. Carriers try to prevent dangerous goods shipments from
    compromising safety by dealing preferentially with known shippers. In
    addition, some carriers accept fewer types of dangerous goods for

    shipment than the law allows. While the Postal Service cannot limit its
    business to known shippers, it restricts the materials it accepts for
    shipment and requires shippers to bring packages weighing 16 ounces or
    more to a post office, where employees can ask questions about the
    contents. Carriers, including the Postal Service, also train their
    employees

    Page 4 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety to be a first line of defense against
    undeclared shipments. Finally, carriers may require shippers to take
    remedial training or may refuse to do

    business with them if they repeatedly violate the dangerous goods
    regulations. To evaluate the effectiveness of and enforce federal
    regulations for

    shipping dangerous goods by air, DOT collects data on incidents involving
    dangerous goods, monitors shippers* and carriers* performance, and
    assesses civil penalties. DOT has the authority to either assess civil

    penalties or seek criminal enforcement action against violators. Within
    DOT, FAA is responsible for enforcing compliance with the regulations for
    shipping dangerous goods by air, while the Transportation Security
    Administration, which is scheduled to be transferred to the new Department
    of Homeland Security, is responsible for the security of cargo shipments.
    To ensure that appropriate civil penalties are assessed, FAA*s enforcement
    guidance requires the agency to consider the compliance history of
    violators across all modes of transportation. This guidance was difficult
    for FAA to follow because most operating administrations were

    not submitting current enforcement data to DOT. DOT has directed its
    operating administrations to submit current enforcement data to a
    centralized database, so that the administrations can obtain current
    information on the compliance history of violators across the modes. To
    ensure that similar cases are treated consistently and fairly, FAA*s
    enforcement guidance also requires the agency to document the reasons for
    any reduction in a recommended civil penalty. Our analysis of FAA*s case
    files indicates that the agency is not always following this policy. We
    are recommending that FAA document its penalty assessments, as required,
    so that it can demonstrate that it is handling similar cases consistently.
    The Postal Service also collects data on actual releases of dangerous

    goods being transported, monitors the compliance of shippers and carriers,
    and can seek criminal penalties for violations of its regulations;
    however, it cannot impose civil penalties for such violations. According
    to industry officials, many dangerous goods violations result from
    ignorance.

    Under such circumstances, the Postal Service maintains, civil penalties
    may be appropriate and would make it easier to recover the sometimes
    substantial costs of cleanup and damages. DOT*s hazardous materials
    reauthorization proposal includes a provision that would allow the Postal
    Service to impose civil penalties.

    This report contains recommendations to DOT that FAA evaluate the need for
    additional inspection authority to obtain statistically valid data on

    Page 5 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety undeclared air shipments of dangerous
    goods and document its penalty assessments, as required, so that it can
    demonstrate that it is handling

    similar cases consistently. DOT agreed with our recommendations, and DOT
    and the Postal Service generally agreed with the facts in our report. Both
    DOT and the Postal Service provided clarifying and technical comments,
    which we incorporated as appropriate.

    DOT regulates tens of thousands of dangerous goods, which can include
    poisons, pesticides, radioactive materials, and explosives. 3 About 20
    percent of these goods may not travel by air at all. As shown in figure 1,
    the remainder may travel on passenger or cargo aircraft, or both.

    3 Each time someone ships dangerous goods, the contents of the shipment
    must be identified by using 1 of over 3, 400 different shipping names. A
    shipping name can refer to a specific material that DOT has identified as
    dangerous; it can also be a generic description

    for a material that meets the overall criteria for a dangerous goods
    class, but for which there is not a division (within that class) to more
    precisely identify it. According to DOT, because many materials are
    identified using the generic descriptions within each class, the actual
    number of dangerous goods is much greater than the 3,400 shipping names
    that DOT spells out. Background

    Page 6 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Figure 1: Air Transport of Dangerous
    Goods Authorized by DOT

    Using a United Nations classification system, DOT divides all dangerous
    goods into nine general classes according to their physical, chemical,
    biological, and nuclear properties. Most of the dangerous goods that may
    not travel by air at all are the most highly explosive, toxic, oxidizing,
    selfreactive, or flammable chemical substances or articles in their class.
    In addition to prohibiting some types of dangerous goods from being
    carried by air at all, DOT restricts the types and amounts of other
    dangerous goods that any individual passenger or cargo aircraft may carry.
    For both passenger and cargo aircraft, DOT spells out these restrictions
    in four ways:

     By name* dangerous goods that represent an unacceptable hazard on
    aircraft or are known to have caused an aircraft fire or explosion, such
    as chemical oxygen generators, are specifically forbidden by name.

     By hazard class and subdivision* certain subdivisions of the classes of
    dangerous goods are known to be highly reactive or toxic (for example,
    most explosives and all spontaneously combustible materials), so DOT
    excludes them from passenger flights.

    %

    May not travel by either passenger or cargo aircraft

    May travel by cargo, but not by passenger, aircraft

    May travel by either passenger or cargo aircraft

    20% 30 50% Sources: Research and Special Programs Administration,
    Department of Transportation, and (c) 1998 Nova Development Corporation.

    Page 7 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety  By quantities contained per outer
    package* DOT restricts on passenger aircraft the quantity of certain
    substances or the number of articles that

    may be present in the outermost shipping containers in the cargo hold. For
    example, DOT allows the carriage of up to 30 liters of certain highly
    flammable liquids per outer package on cargo aircraft, but imposes limits
    of 1 liter or less on passenger aircraft.

     By packaging integrity* dangerous goods must be packaged so as to
    protect the integrity of the shipment and safeguard against accidental
    leaks or spills.

    For passenger aircraft, whose cargo areas are divided into multiple
    compartments, DOT also restricts the aggregate quantities of dangerous
    goods that may be carried per cargo compartment. Figure 2 shows the kinds
    of containers in which dangerous goods typically travel in these cargo
    compartments.

    Figure 2: Dangerous Goods Cargo Containers

    Page 8 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Dangerous goods permitted onboard
    passenger aircraft include dry ice and solvents; cargo aircraft may also
    carry materials such as paint or medical

    waste. Table 1 provides a complete listing of the nine classes of
    dangerous goods, their descriptions, an example for each class, and some
    of the restrictions DOT places on the carriage of each by type of
    aircraft.

    Table 1: Dangerous Goods Classes and Descriptions Class Description
    Example( s) Cargo aircraft restrictions Passenger aircraft

    restrictions

    1 Explosives Fireworks Most are forbidden Most are forbidden 2 Gases
    Propane Most are permitted within

    quantity limitations Most are forbidden 3 Flammable liquids Acetone,
    lighter fluid, paints Most are permitted, except

    those that are toxic by inhalation

    Most are permitted within quantity limitations

    4 Flammable solids Safety matches Most are permitted within quantity
    limitations; others are forbidden (for example,

    spontaneously combustible materials)

    Most are permitted within quantity limitations

    5 Oxidizers and organic peroxides Swimming pool chemicals Most are
    permitted within

    quantity limitations; others are forbidden (for example, temperature-
    controlled organic peroxides)

    Most are permitted within quantity limitations

    6 Toxic materials and infectious substances Regulated medical waste,

    motor fuel anti- knock mixtures Most are permitted within quantity
    limitations, exceptions for subsidiary risks a or those

    that are toxic by inhalation Most are permitted within

    quantity limitations 7 Radioactive materials Uranium hexafloride b b 8
    Corrosive materials Batteries, cleaning

    compounds Most are permitted within quantity limitations Most are
    permitted within

    quantity limitations 9 Miscellaneous dangerous

    goods Asbestos Most are permitted within quantity limitations Most are
    permitted within

    quantity limitations Source: U. S. Department of Transportation, RSPA. a
    *Subsidiary risk* means that the dangerous good also meets the definition
    of one or more other

    classes. b For nearly all radioactive materials, the Department of
    Transportation*s Research and Special

    Programs Administration (RSPA) spells out restrictions in terms of the
    radiological reading that comes from the package rather than a quantity
    limit (as it does for other classes of dangerous goods).

    According to the U. S. Census Bureau*s most recent survey on the movement
    of hazardous goods in the United States, class 3 dangerous goods
    (flammable liquids, such as paint) account for the greatest portion (by
    weight) of the nine classes of dangerous goods shipped by air. However,
    the vast majority of flammable liquids travel by other modes. The
    percentage of total shipments made by air was greatest for radioactive

    Page 9 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety materials (class 7)* just over 8
    percent of the total radioactive tonnage shipped in 1997 was shipped by
    air. According to FAA, cargo aircraft, such as those operated by the major
    delivery services FedEx and United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), carry about
    75 percent of the nation*s dangerous

    goods air shipments. The remaining 25 percent travel onboard passenger
    aircraft in cargo compartments.

    Ensuring the safe transportation of dangerous goods by air is a shared
    responsibility of federal agencies, shippers, and airlines* the success of
    which ultimately depends on the efforts of thousands of individuals every
    day. Within DOT, the following have responsibility for dangerous goods:

     The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) regulates the
    transportation of dangerous goods by truck, train, ship, pipeline, and
    plane. It decides which materials to define as hazardous; writes the rules
    for packaging, handling, and carrying them; and prescribes training
    requirements for shippers* and carriers* dangerous goods employees. RSPA,
    along with the other DOT operating administrations that operate and manage
    dangerous goods programs, 4 conducts inspections and investigations to
    determine compliance with dangerous goods laws and regulations for all
    modes of transportation and, where appropriate, initiates enforcement
    actions against those it finds not to be in compliance. RSPA maintains a
    database for closed dangerous goods

    enforcement actions from these operating administrations, and another
    database that tracks dangerous goods incidents from these operating
    administrations.

     The Office of Intermodalism, reporting to the Secretary of
    Transportation, is responsible for implementing recommendations from a
    March 2000 evaluation of DOT*s dangerous goods program, 5 coordinating
    intermodal and cross- modal dangerous goods activities, and coordinating
    DOT- wide outreach activities. For example, in 2001, to improve awareness
    of dangerous goods incidents occurring during shipments, this office sent
    out letters to shippers most frequently identified in RSPA*s dangerous
    goods incident database.

    4 The DOT operating administrations that operate and manage dangerous
    goods programs include the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal
    Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration,
    the Research and Special Programs Administration, and the United States
    Coast Guard. 5 U. S. Department of Transportation, Departmentwide Program
    Evaluation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Program, Final Report
    (March 2000).

    Page 10 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety  FAA carries out responsibilities for
    ensuring compliance with the rules for transporting dangerous goods by
    air. In addition, FAA assesses carriers*

    operations and investigates dangerous goods incidents or accidents. FAA
    also has other responsibilities, including those relating to the
    prosecution and adjudication of enforcement actions against those found to
    have

    violated the dangerous goods rules. The Postal Service is both a carrier
    and a shipper of dangerous goods because it not only carries shipments on
    aircraft that it leases, but it also sends U. S. mail onboard commercial
    passenger and cargo airlines. As a result, the airlines carrying U. S.
    mail rely on the Postal Service as a first line of defense in ensuring the
    safety of the packages they accept for transport and in preventing the
    shipment of anything that should not travel by air.

    Shippers* whether they are businesses or individuals* have the primary
    responsibility for ensuring the safety of their dangerous goods shipments.
    They are required to train their employees to package their shipments
    safely and to tell the carriers to whom they deliver these shipments that
    they contain dangerous goods. Carriers share some of the responsibility
    for the safe transportation of dangerous goods. They do so by training
    their employees to handle these shipments properly, to identify likely
    instances of improper shipments (such as those containing undeclared
    dangerous goods), and to verify that the indirect air carriers from whom
    they accept consolidated cargo shipments have FAA- approved security

    programs in place to prevent explosive or incendiary devices from being
    placed onboard. 6 Carriers are also responsible for reporting to DOT any
    instance of noncompliance they discover.

    6 An indirect air carrier accepts and delivers cargo to commercial
    airlines for transport. An example of an indirect air carrier would be a
    freight forwarder that consolidates shipments from a large number of
    shippers and then transports them via the cargo compartments of commercial
    aircraft. Because the U. S. Postal Service uses commercial aircraft to
    ship the mail, the FAA also considers it an indirect air carrier.

    Page 11 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety From tragic accidents over the years
    and day- to- day experience in handling cargo traffic, DOT and major
    carriers know that shipments of

    undeclared dangerous goods can have disastrous consequences. The nature
    and frequency of such shipments* and, by extension, the amount of effort
    that should be put into stopping them* are difficult to estimate because
    of data limitations. However, the inability of commercially available
    screening equipment to detect many types of dangerous goods, the costs of
    delaying shipments to inspect them, and restrictions against opening
    certain packages may preclude the collection of data. Undeclared and other
    improper shipments of dangerous goods can pose a

    high risk because of the nature of air transportation. In recent years,
    both RSPA and FAA have expressed concern about undeclared dangerous goods
    shipments. In its departmentwide March 2000 evaluation of the dangerous
    goods program, DOT reported that the United States has a relatively good
    safety record, given the amounts of dangerous goods that are shipped by
    all modes of transportation each year. However, DOT added that the
    potential still remains for dangerous goods incidents with catastrophic
    consequences, and, even though relatively small amounts of dangerous goods
    travel by air (compared with other modes of transportation), a single
    mishap can have serious consequences. For example, FAA has reported the
    following incidents:

     In 1996, a major passenger airline carried undeclared dangerous goods*
    calcium hypochlorite and liquid bleach* on a flight from California to
    Jamaica. Upon arrival, airport personnel discovered smoke coming from the
    aircraft*s cargo doors and encountered toxic fumes when they opened the
    cargo compartment. The box of undeclared dangerous goods was leaking and
    burst into flames shortly after the airport personnel removed it from the
    cargo hold.

     In 1998, an undeclared shipment of electric storage batteries
    (considered *wet* because they contain either electrolyte acid or alkaline
    corrosive battery fluid) burst into flames while en route by truck to an
    airport, where it had been scheduled to be placed aboard a major passenger
    carrier*s aircraft.

     In 1999, a major cargo carrier transported an undeclared shipment of
    liquefied petroleum gas from Portland, Oregon, to New York on a regularly
    Shipments of

    Undeclared Dangerous Goods Can Have Serious Consequences, but Their Nature
    and Frequency Are Difficult to Estimate

    Consequences of Carrying Undeclared Dangerous Goods Have Been Serious and
    Remain a Concern

    Page 12 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety scheduled cargo flight. One day after
    arriving in New York, the package burst into flames at the carrier*s
    sorting facility.

    Three of the four major carriers we interviewed and DOT expressed concern
    about the safety of carrying dangerous goods. According to these three
    carriers, even though they discover relatively few undeclared shipments,
    their greatest safety concern in the air transportation of these goods is
    prompted by the undeclared shipments* particularly those they do not
    detect before accepting them. They expressed this concern over not knowing
    how much of the volume of undeclared dangerous goods they do not find,
    because these shipments present a greater risk than do those that shippers
    properly declare.

    The major cargo carriers we interviewed and the Postal Service agreed that
    ignorance or misunderstanding of the rules for transporting dangerous
    goods is by far the most common reason why shippers fail to properly
    declare their dangerous goods shipments. According to one carrier, in very
    limited instances, shippers will deliberately not declare their shipments
    even when they know they are breaking the rules. However, no carrier cited
    cost as a reason why shippers fail to declare their shipments, even though
    shipping costs are usually higher for

    dangerous goods than for nondangerous goods. An official from one carrier
    stated that he had never seen a case of a shipper willfully failing to
    properly declare a dangerous goods shipment because of cost concerns.

    Furthermore, at the Postal Service, it is doubtful that cost is a cause of
    undeclared shipments, because the Postal Service does not charge more for
    carrying these shipments than it does for carrying those that are not
    hazardous; all of the Postal Service*s charges are based on weight and
    class, regardless of the contents.

    According to a 1999 threat assessment published by DOT*s Volpe Center, 7
    three types of data that are needed to thoroughly assess the risks of
    carrying declared and undeclared dangerous goods by air were unavailable.
    These were

    7 The John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center is part of
    RSPA. It provides policy support, strategic planning, and analysis to
    customers within as well as outside DOT in areas such as strategic
    investment and resource allocation. Its work addresses issues in air and
    other modes of transportation. Data Limitations Make Estimates of
    Undeclared

    Dangerous Goods Shipments Difficult

    Page 13 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety  what amounts of dangerous goods are
    shipped by class and division (for all modes of transportation),

     how often incidents related to dangerous goods involve undeclared
    shipments, and

     what amounts and what types of undeclared dangerous goods are shipped by
    air.

    Without these data, the Volpe Center was limited to assessing the threat
    from dangerous goods instead of the risk. The danger associated with a
    specific item is its *threat,* while the likelihood that the threat will
    actually result in harm is its *risk.* Assessing risk, according to the
    Volpe Center, requires some indication of the likelihood that dangerous
    goods will be present on an aircraft* and the data to determine this
    likelihood were not available.

    Volpe Center officials attempted to find or compile data sources that
    would allow them to estimate the total amount of various dangerous goods
    that might be shipped (for example, over the course of a year), but they
    were unsuccessful. They found no single source of such data and were not
    able to piece together data sources. For example, Volpe Center staff
    attempted to compile data from chemical manufacturers to identify the
    total amounts of their products that move by air and the related
    distribution chain (that is, the amounts that move by other modes); this
    information would enable them to identify aggregate amounts of certain
    dangerous goods that shippers should be declaring, which would be a first
    step in working toward an estimate of undeclared shipments. However, the
    industry sources the Volpe Center consulted considered such information
    proprietary and would not share it. Volpe Center staff also considered
    assembling cargo manifest information from the airlines, because these
    records indicate for each flight the amounts and types of dangerous goods
    the aircraft is carrying. However, Volpe Center staff said the airlines
    informed them that these data are not in a form usable for such an
    analysis. Even if the manifest information were available, data on the

    overall amounts of dangerous goods shipments (such as the Volpe Center
    sought from the chemical industry) would still be necessary before this
    manifest information could be useful for estimating undeclared dangerous
    goods shipments.

    According to Volpe Center staff, the limitations in the amount and quality
    of data on dangerous goods shipments make estimating how many shipments
    contain undeclared dangerous goods more difficult. Our

    Page 14 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety experts in applied research and
    methodology agreed, noting that certain *hidden populations* methods might
    be useful for estimating the amount

    of undeclared dangerous goods shipments, 8 but only if data limitations
    such as those the Volpe Center identified were overcome. A Massachusetts
    Institute of Technology expert in transportation research with whom we met
    agreed that none of the known methods for estimating hidden populations
    would be feasible for undeclared dangerous goods.

    The major carriers we interviewed said they most commonly identify
    undeclared dangerous goods (after accepting them for shipment) when some
    occurrence prompts them to open a package or, in the case of the Postal
    Service, to set the package aside for further investigation (because the
    Postal Service generally cannot open such a package without a search
    warrant). Most often, this happens when a package leaks, spills, breaks
    open, or emits an odor, and the carrier or Postal Service employees
    identify the occurrence as potentially a dangerous goods incident. 9 One
    carrier also indicated that occasionally packages open as a result of
    handling or must be opened when they lose their address labels. In some of
    these instances, the company has discovered undeclared dangerous goods.
    This same company also noted that, on rare occasions, it learns of
    undeclared dangerous goods from informants* employees of either the
    company that shipped the package or competitors of that company.

    The carriers we interviewed reported that, although they have the consent
    of shippers to open packages that have been accepted for shipment, they
    seldom discover undeclared dangerous goods. Although they did not cite a
    specific percentage, they described shipments of undeclared dangerous
    goods as *very rare* and *a handful.* The numbers are believed to be
    similarly small for the Postal Service* officials estimated that declared
    dangerous goods represent less than one- tenth of 1 percent of their
    shipments, and the percentage of these shipments that is undeclared is

    8 The term *hidden populations* refers to those that are difficult to
    count by traditional means because, for example, they involve illegal or
    undesirable conditions that people are unlikely to self- report. For
    example, illegal aliens or intravenous drug users would be considered
    *hidden populations,* as would persons deliberately shipping undeclared

    dangerous goods. 9 A dangerous goods incident is an event that results in
    a release, including an unanticipated or unintentional release, of
    hazardous material during the course of transportation. RSPA requires
    carriers to report incidents as soon as possible when they involve certain
    serious consequences, such as deaths or a change in the operational flight
    pattern of an aircraft. RSPA requires carriers to report all other
    incidents to the agency within 30 days of their occurrence.

    Page 15 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety *very small.* The Volpe Center
    reported in a 1999 threat assessment that undeclared dangerous goods
    shipments made up about 0.05 percent of the

    shipments of several large cargo carriers, but this estimate was based on
    the recollections of the carriers of how many incidents they typically
    report to RSPA.

    Because estimates by the Volpe Center, major carriers, and the Postal
    Service are based on reported incidents or memory, they are incomplete.
    Moreover, these estimates refer only to those undeclared shipments that

    resulted in dangerous goods incidents* they do not include undeclared
    shipments that never gave carriers cause to open them. As a result,
    according to the Volpe Center, there are no valid figures for the numbers
    of dangerous goods shipments that do not comply with regulations for
    transportation by air. 10 Additionally, when a carrier reports an incident
    to DOT, RSPA does not

    currently require the carrier to report whether the shipper properly
    declared the dangerous goods. Consequently, the estimates of undeclared
    shipments reported by the Volpe Center and by carriers to us may not

    include all of the incidents carriers discovered, because the estimates
    are based on memory and are therefore subject to error. RSPA plans to
    remedy this limitation by requiring carriers to report whether dangerous
    goods shipments involved in incidents were declared or undeclared. To do
    so, RSPA is modifying its incident- reporting paperwork (Form 5800.1) to
    more systematically collect and analyze information on undeclared

    shipments. RSPA expects to complete this and other ongoing revisions to
    its incident- reporting form by spring 2003.

    10 Recently, RSPA received comments on the frequency of undeclared
    shipments in response to an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. RSPA
    received these comments under Docket HM- 228, which considers changes to
    the regulations on the transportation of hazardous materials. According to
    an RSPA official, the agency is analyzing these comments and expects to
    complete its analysis by the end of October 2003.

    Page 16 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Technological limitations complicate
    efforts to estimate the incidence of undeclared dangerous goods shipments.
    Ideally, technologies generally considered to be less intrusive, such as
    X- ray or explosives- detection

    equipment, could be used to identify and characterize undeclared
    shipments. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 11 is
    currently using this equipment to screen passenger carry- on and checked
    baggage for weapons and explosives, and, under the Aviation and
    Transportation Security Act, 12 TSA must ensure that a system is in
    operation to screen, inspect, or otherwise provide for the security of all
    air cargo to be transported in all cargo aircraft as soon as practicable.
    However, X- ray and explosives- detection equipment is not designed to
    detect many types of dangerous goods. 13 In the future, technology may
    enable the rapid, less intrusive screening of packages, but in the near
    term, opening packages remains the best way to obtain information on the
    nature and frequency of undeclared shipments.

    Economic obstacles* particularly the costs of opening packages after
    accepting them* also make it difficult to estimate the nature and
    frequency of undeclared dangerous goods shipments. According to each of
    the major carriers we interviewed, the volume of cargo that these airlines

    carry each day is tremendous. For example, the carriers stated that they
    carry from at least 1.3 million to more than 2 million shipments each
    night, a small fraction of which contain dangerous goods. Because the
    carriers

    typically guarantee delivery on nearly all of the shipments they carry
    (such as within 24 hours or 2 business days), anything that slows their
    ability to move shipments could compromise their ability to meet their
    guarantees to their customers and, as a result, hurt their competitive
    position in their industry.

    Although the carriers we interviewed told us that they obtain the consent
    of shippers to open packages, they also said they seldom do open packages.
    Carriers and an association representing cargo and passenger airlines
    stressed that they are not in the business of opening packages,
    particularly when shippers are primarily responsible for ensuring the

    11 The Homeland Security Act of 2002, P. L. 107- 296, provides that TSA be
    transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. The Under Secretary
    for Border Transportation and Security has responsibility for TSA.

    12 P. L. 107- 71, November 19, 2001. 13 We do not describe how this
    technology works because TSA considers this to be sensitive security
    information. Technological, Economic,

    and Legal Hurdles Also Make Estimates of Undeclared Dangerous Goods
    Shipments Difficult

    Page 17 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety integrity and proper declaration of
    those packages. The carriers indicated that they have confidence in and
    place a great, ongoing emphasis on their

    up- front screening to prevent shippers from offering them undeclared
    dangerous goods in the first place. Opening packages without probable
    cause to do so would also be costly to the carriers because they would be
    responsible for repackaging anything they found to be properly declared*
    and dangerous goods require special, more expensive packaging than other
    shipments. Although carriers remain concerned about the possibility of
    undeclared shipments they may miss, to date the frequency with which they
    discover shipments of undeclared dangerous goods does not, in their view,
    justify a step as disruptive and costly as systematically opening a random
    or targeted selection of shipments.

    Because the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits unreasonable
    searches and seizures and neither DOT nor the Postal Service has obtained
    the consent of owners to have their packages opened for inspection,
    neither agency may conduct or require random or targeted intrusive
    inspections of domestic cargo shipments to look for undeclared dangerous
    goods. Although FAA may remove a package from an aircraft

    and take such emergency actions if it reasonably believes that the package
    presents an immediate threat, it has no authority, generally, to open and
    inspect a package without a warrant or without the owner*s consent.

    The Postal Service may inspect Parcel Post packages. However, packages
    sent as First Class or Express mail traveling by air may not be inspected.
    14 The mail classification schedule recommended by the Postal Rate
    Commission and adopted by the Postal Service does not distinguish between
    letters and packages, treating both as *sealed against inspection* and
    protected by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, these packages are protected to
    the same extent as letters, and all First Class and Express mail is
    treated as protected by the Fourth Amendment.

    14 The Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U. S. C. S: 3623( d), addresses the
    issue of letters sealed against inspection. It states, *The Postal Service
    shall maintain one or more classes of mail for the transmission of letters
    sealed against inspection* No letter of such a class of domestic origin
    shall be opened except under authority of a search warrant authorized by
    law, or by an officer or employee of the Postal Service for the sole
    purpose of determining an address at which the letter can be delivered, or
    pursuant to the authorization of the addressee.*

    Page 18 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety To obtain more information on the
    nature and frequency of undeclared dangerous goods in air transport, FAA
    has teamed with the U. S. Customs

    Service, which has the authority to inspect and search international cargo
    (imports and exports). Specifically, the Customs Service can and does
    randomly open and inspect international cargo for purposes such as
    ensuring that shippers have paid the proper tariffs. Most recently, in
    June and July 2000, the U. S. Customs Service and FAA together conducted
    inspections of passenger carry- on and checked bags and cargo aboard
    flights that were entering or departing from the United States at 19
    domestic airports. 15 This series of inspections found that

     8 percent of targeted cargo shipments (those whose tariff codes
    indicated that their contents might be hazardous) contained undeclared
    dangerous goods,  1 percent of passenger carry- on bags contained
    undeclared dangerous

    goods, and  just under 0.5 percent of passenger checked baggage contained

    undeclared dangerous goods. The undeclared dangerous goods in the cargo
    shipments included flammable liquids, fuel control units, aerosols, fire
    extinguishers, and devices powered by flammable liquid. In the passengers*
    checked and carry- on bags, the Customs- FAA teams found aerosols,
    lighters, flammable liquids, safety matches, compressed flammable gases,
    and automotive batteries. The Customs- FAA team randomly selected the
    passenger baggage it inspected, but for the cargo, the team matched tariff
    codes for commodity imports and exports with a dangerous goods trigger
    list to determine which shipments to inspect. 16 15 Final Report of
    Operation Clear Sky, Joint Inspection Activity, United States Customs

    Service/ Federal Aviation Administration, June 26* July 21, 2000. 16 The
    Customs- FAA inspections focused on international cargo and passenger
    baggage because the Customs Service has the authority to open and inspect
    shipments coming into or leaving the United States. Beyond the border,
    neither agency has the authority to open

    and inspect domestic cargo or passenger baggage without a search warrant.
    DOT Has Teamed with the

    U. S. Customs Service to Obtain Information on Undeclared Dangerous Goods
    in International Shipments

    Page 19 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety DOT has tried several times to clarify
    and expand its authority to inspect and open certain packages when its
    inspectors suspect a violation of the dangerous goods regulations. In its
    1997, 1999, and 2001 reauthorization

    proposal, DOT sought the authority to access, open, examine, and, if need
    be, remove a package from transportation if it had an objectively
    reasonable and articulable belief that the package might contain
    undeclared dangerous goods. 17 According to DOT, this authority, which is
    specific to all modes, would require its officers or inspectors to have a
    *particularized and objective basis* for suspecting a violation, such as a
    pattern of shipping undeclared dangerous goods, in order to open an
    unmarked package. DOT further stated that this enhanced authority would
    enable it to more effectively detect potential violations and to ensure
    that it took the appropriate remedial actions. According to DOT officials,
    its

    reauthorization proposal has not been enacted for reasons unrelated to the
    merits of its request for additional inspection authority.

    Because DOT*s reauthorization proposal applies equally to all modes of
    transportation, it would, if approved, allow DOT to follow up on problem
    shippers across the modes. However, the proposal would also extend the
    government*s inspection authority without regard to the differences
    inherent in transporting dangerous goods by different modes. The same
    distinctions between air and the other modes that justify more stringent
    regulations for transporting dangerous goods by air might also justify
    greater inspection authority for packages shipped by air.

    A primary objective of DOT*s reauthorization proposal has been to improve
    the ability of its inspectors to monitor and enforce the dangerous goods
    regulations. The proposal has not been designed to obtain better
    information about the nature and frequency of undeclared air shipments.
    Because it would require a *particularized and objective basis* for
    opening

    packages, it would not allow DOT to identify a random sample of packages
    and conduct inspections whose results could be generalized to all packages
    in air transport. Thus, its usefulness as a tool for gathering data to
    estimate the nature and frequency of undeclared air shipments and to
    profile and target violators would be limited. DOT officials agree that
    their proposal would not generate statistically valid data, and they have
    indicated their willingness to modify the proposal so that it would yield
    more useful information.

    17 In this report, we are not expressing an opinion on potential
    constitutional issues related to DOT*s proposal. Increased Inspection

    Authority That DOT Is Seeking Would Not Produce Statistically Valid Data
    and Does Not Distinguish between Air and Other Modes of Transportation

    Page 20 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety An alternative to DOT*s proposal,
    based on the premise that additional and perhaps unique measures are
    needed to protect air commerce, would

    require that shippers consent to DOT*s opening packages shipped by air for
    inspection. This would allow the department to select and open a random
    sample of packages in order to gather statistically valid data on
    undeclared air shipments.

    To prevent dangerous goods shipments from compromising aviation safety,
    the federal government relies on regulation, research, and outreach, while
    private industry depends on policies for dealing with known shippers,
    other restrictions, training, and sanctions.

    Federal regulations provide a framework for transporting dangerous goods
    safely by air. As discussed in the background section of this report,
    these regulations define dangerous goods, identify those that may and may
    not travel by air, and specify how the materials are to be packaged,
    handled, and carried. In addition, the regulations prescribe initial and
    recurrent training for shippers* and carriers* employees, and require
    shippers and carriers to test their employees* understanding of the
    material covered in the training. The training, which is designed to
    increase dangerous goods employees* safety awareness and to reduce the
    frequency of dangerous goods incidents, is important because insufficient
    understanding of the rules is often a factor contributing to such
    incidents. For example, in 17 of 25 dangerous goods enforcement cases we
    reviewed involving businesses, FAA identified employees* lack of training
    as a contributing factor. 18 To monitor the effectiveness of its
    regulations in promoting safety, RSPA

    collects information on dangerous goods incidents occurring in the air, 18
    The remaining 5 cases of the 30 we reviewed involved individuals not
    engaged as HAZMAT employees, to whom the rules regarding initial and
    recurrent training do not apply. Government and

    Industry Rely on Several Mechanisms to Prevent Dangerous Goods Shipments
    from Compromising Safety

    The Federal Government Depends on Regulations, Research, and Outreach to
    Prevent Problems

    Page 21 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety water, rail, and truck modes through
    its Form 5800.1. Nonetheless, the form is not designed to collect all the
    information that would be useful in

    monitoring the effectiveness of DOT*s dangerous goods regulations. As
    previously noted, the form does not ask whether a problem shipment was
    declared or undeclared* a key question in assessing effectiveness. 19 In
    addition, the form does not include data fields that precisely identify
    the different types of packaging deficiencies. While the form has space
    for written comments, there is no mechanism for standardizing and entering
    the information from the comments into DOT*s databases. RSPA is revising
    the form to overcome these limitations. Once carriers begin collecting
    information on dangerous goods incidents using this revised form, better
    information on the incidence of undeclared shipments and reasons for
    packaging deficiencies should be available to FAA and the other operating
    administrations.

    In the course of such monitoring, DOT sometimes identifies safety issues
    that require further research. For example, DOT is currently evaluating
    ways in which it will strengthen the regulations for shipping batteries,
    because its analysis indicated that the existing dangerous goods
    regulations for these shipments may not be sufficient. Beginning in the
    early 1990s, FAA identified a number of incidents associated with
    batteries, particularly lithium batteries, aboard aircraft in which the
    batteries caused fires, smoke, or extreme heat* precisely the kind of
    effects that make dangerous goods dangerous. In response to these and
    other concerns, RSPA has taken a number of actions designed to improve the
    regulations for the transportation of lithium batteries. 20 FAA*s
    monitoring of reports on incidents involving dangerous goods also

    led to further work on packaging standards. In examining nearly 3,000
    reports from 1998 and 1999, FAA found that 60 percent of the incidents
    involved properly declared shipments, indicating that the shipments

    19 Two DOT initiatives* the Flagship Initiative on Hazardous Materials
    Handling/ Incidents and the DOT- wide program evaluation* cited a better
    understanding of the frequency and impact of undeclared shipments as
    essential. 20 In response to an incident at Los Angeles International
    Airport in 1999, the National Transportation Safety Board issued five
    safety recommendations to RSPA for improving the transportation of lithium
    batteries. In response to these concerns, RSPA published safety advisories
    in the Federal Register, worked with the lithium battery industry to adopt
    voluntary safety standards, undertook a study on the transportation of
    lithium batteries, and initiated changes to domestic and international
    regulations on the transport of lithium batteries.

    Page 22 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety complied with the existing packaging
    standards. Yet just over half (873) of these properly declared shipments
    had problems because their packaging failed* that is, their closures or
    seals leaked. These data prompted FAA to attempt to determine the adequacy
    of packaging standards for air

    transportation and the likely causes of leaking closures and seals.
    Observing an increase in the number of package failures in the past 3
    years, FAA questioned whether the existing test methods simulate the
    realistic combined effects of pressure, temperature, and vibration. As a
    result, FAA contracted with Michigan State University to study packaging
    in air transportation. The results of that study, which FAA recently
    received, indicate that closures are continuing to leak in packages marked
    as complying with existing packaging standards. Subjecting packages to

    both high altitude and vibration resulted in a package failure rate of 50
    percent. RSPA is reviewing these results. To help prevent dangerous goods
    incidents aboard passenger aircraft, FAA and RSPA conduct outreach to the
    public. For example, FAA worked with RSPA to develop for air travelers a
    brochure that lists items prohibited in passenger baggage (see app. I).
    The brochure also explains that in- flight variations in temperature and
    pressure can cause seemingly harmless items to leak or generate toxic
    fumes during air travel. RSPA requires that signs be posted in airport
    terminals and at check- in counters listing items

    prohibited in air travel, some of which passengers may not recognize as
    hazardous in air transportation. In addition, FAA has placed kiosks with
    information on dangerous goods at 24 major airports to better inform the
    general public about items that are considered hazardous onboard aircraft.

    The Postal Service also does consumer outreach to better inform the public
    about the materials that may and may not be sent through the mail.
    According to Postal Service officials, there are posters in all of its
    facilities that warn customers about shipping restricted dangerous goods.
    In addition, for any customer who ships or requests information about
    shipping dangerous goods, Postal Service retail employees provide an
    informational brochure summarizing the applicable rules as well as the

    shipper*s responsibilities.

    Page 23 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety To prevent undeclared dangerous goods
    shipments, major carriers limit their business to known shippers and may
    impose other restrictions. They

    also train their employees to be a first line of defense against
    undeclared shipments, and may apply sanctions to shippers who have
    violated dangerous goods regulations.

    To ensure that they are dealing with legitimate businesses that are more
    likely to properly train their employees to comply with dangerous goods
    rules, the major carriers we interviewed rely on TSA*s *known shipper*
    requirements or establish formal, contractual relationships with their
    shippers that mirror the known shipper requirements. 21 According to
    officials of one of the carriers, the steps involved in becoming a known
    shipper reduce to an acceptable level the risk that the shipper presents
    to the carrier. 22 By contrast, the carriers have found, casual or one-
    time shippers are more likely to offer undeclared dangerous goods for
    shipment. Three of the four carriers said they try to limit their business
    with casual or one- time shippers and do not advertise to them. Rather,
    two of the carriers said, they target business- to- business shippers that
    typically have experience with shipping high volumes of dangerous goods
    and may have long- standing relationships with the carriers. The fourth
    carrier said that it does not accept dangerous goods from casual shippers
    at all and, for other shippers, requires the establishment of a dangerous
    goods*

    shipping agreement, or contract, that spells out obligations for shippers,
    such as recurring employee- training requirements. Officials of this
    carrier believe that these contractual obligations reduce the incidence of
    undeclared shipments.

    21 We have not included a detailed description of the criteria that
    shippers must meet for carriers to consider them *known* because TSA
    considers this to be sensitive- security information. 22 Recent media
    reports as well as work by the DOT Inspector General have raised concerns

    about the extent to which (1) the known shipper procedures are a reliable
    deterrent to criminal attacks and (2) selected carriers were adequately
    complying with regulations requiring them to, among other things, properly
    screen packages from unknown shippers. Most recently, virtually all of the
    cargo carriers the Inspector General tested were complying with the
    requirement, put in place after September 11, 2001, to take no packages
    from unknown shippers. However, the Inspector General raised additional
    serious concerns about weaknesses in FAA*s procedures for individuals or
    businesses to become

    approved indirect air carriers. (A carrier using the known shipper
    requirements must verify that shippers have such approval from FAA.) Major
    Carriers Rely on

    Known Shipper Policies, Other Restrictions, Training, and Sanctions to
    Prevent Undeclared Shipments

    Carriers Deal with Known Shippers and Impose Other Restrictions

    Page 24 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Besides limiting their business
    primarily to known shippers, the major carriers we interviewed may try to
    prevent undeclared shipments by

    limiting the types of materials they will carry and the places where they
    will accept dangerous goods shipments. Three of the four carriers said
    they accept fewer types of dangerous goods for shipment than DOT
    authorizes to travel by air. For example, the carriers said they refuse to
    carry materials such as toxic or infectious substances, certain
    explosives, and organic peroxides. In addition, one of the carriers said
    it would not accept dangerous goods shipments at its retail
    establishments. This carrier said it would accept such shipments only when
    its own drivers picked them up from established customers. This carrier*s
    policy is designed to screen out the casual shippers that might use its
    retail establishments. According to the carrier, this policy also allows
    it to rely on its drivers* experience with dangerous goods shipments,
    their training, and their longstanding relationships with established
    customers as a first line of screening against undeclared shipments of
    dangerous goods.

    While the Postal Service cannot limit its business to known shippers, it
    accepts fewer dangerous goods for shipment than DOT authorizes to travel
    by air. In general, the Postal Service limits the dangerous goods it will
    accept for shipment to certain quantities of consumer commodities that
    typically present a limited hazard in transportation because of their
    form, quantity, or packaging.

    In addition to limiting what dangerous goods it will carry, the Postal
    Service, as part of its aviation mail security program, requires customers
    to bring any package weighing 16 ounces or more to a post office for
    shipment. The intent of this program is to prevent explosives in the mail,
    but Postal Service officials indicated it has a residual benefit in
    helping to prevent undeclared shipments of dangerous goods. Specifically,
    by

    requiring customers to bring packages that weigh 16 ounces or more to a
    post office for shipment, Postal Service employees can inspect packages,
    ask questions about their contents to determine whether they contain
    anything prohibited, and ensure proper handling for packages containing
    dangerous goods that may be mailed. The major carriers we interviewed
    emphasized that the training they

    provide for their employees is a key component in their efforts to prevent
    shippers from offering undeclared dangerous goods, supplementing their use
    of restrictions or the known shipper requirements to guard against such
    shipments. This training provides information on dangerous goods
    requirements and procedures for drivers and employees who handle, sort,
    and load shipments. Through this training, the carriers expect that
    Carriers Train Their Employees

    to Monitor Compliance with Dangerous Goods Requirements

    Page 25 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety employees throughout their
    distribution chain will be able to identify problems such as declaration
    paperwork that is missing information about

    the contents of a package labeled as dangerous. Carriers rely particularly
    on their drivers to draw on their training to, in effect, extend the known
    shipper concept to their day- to- day interactions with shippers.
    Training, plus a working knowledge of a company*s established customers,
    helps the drivers detect inadvertent failures to properly declare a
    shipment. For example, a driver picking up a shipment from a customer who
    typically sends some dangerous goods would be expected to raise questions
    if the customer did not label or declare any of the packages as dangerous.
    In such an instance, the shipper may have made a mistake or forgotten to
    declare the dangerous goods.

    The Postal Service trains its retail employees, who accept packages from
    the public, to screen packages and prevent those with undeclared or
    improperly packaged dangerous goods from entering the mail system.
    According to Postal Service officials, as of August 2002, the agency had
    trained all 131,000 of its retail employees in procedures for preventing
    the acceptance of any package containing prohibited materials. These
    procedures include (1) asking shippers a series of questions about the
    contents of their packages, including whether the packages contain
    anything hazardous; (2) visually inspecting packages to look for signs of
    problems, such as leaks, the lack of a return address, or markings
    indicating that a package contains something a shipper may not know is
    hazardous; and (3) referring to a reference guide for assistance in
    answering shippers* questions about items that may or may not be
    permissible in the U. S. mail. (See app. II for a summary of DOT*s
    dangerous goods classes and the materials or quantities from each that are
    allowed in the U. S. mail.) While the retail employees may be the first to
    deal with shipments entering the mail system, the Postal Service also
    provides dangerous goods training to its non- retail employees (such as
    postal inspectors or employees at business mail entry units), who also
    handle or carry dangerous goods or respond to incidents involving them.
    According to the official responsible for the Postal Service*s dangerous

    goods program, the agency has to rely on its retail employees to screen
    out unacceptable items because it has limited authority to open mail that
    has been accepted for shipment. These officials believe that face- to-
    face questioning reduces the anonymity associated with depositing a letter
    in a mailbox. And reducing anonymity, this official says, improves their
    confidence in shippers* statements about the contents of packages. To test
    its retail employees* performance in specific aspects of customer service,

    Page 26 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety the Postal Service has an ongoing
    *mystery shopper* program in which its employees pose as customers. In
    late 2001, the Postal Service began

    including in the mystery shopper tests a determination of whether the
    retail employees were following requirements for asking the question about
    dangerous goods. To date, the Postal Service*s tests indicate that the
    retail employees asked the required screening question 69 percent of the
    time. When the retail employees failed to ask the dangerous goods
    question, Postal Service officials said they provided feedback and
    retrained the employees. These officials also told us that they provided
    this feedback to each postal office manager and have incorporated targets
    for improved performance on the mystery shopper tests into the managers*
    performance goals. Officials say these results are slowly and steadily
    improving.

    A shipper who fails to properly declare a dangerous goods shipment can
    face serious consequences from a major carrier, particularly if the
    shipper is a business or other operation with an ongoing need for the
    carrier*s services. Two of the major carriers we interviewed may,
    depending on the seriousness of the violation, require a shipper to
    provide additional remedial training in shipping dangerous goods; apply
    more stringent terms for accepting shipments from the shipper; or, in more
    serious instances, permanently terminate the business relationship with
    the shipper. Officials from one of the carriers stated that their
    company*s requirements for remedial training in these instances exceed
    DOT*s requirements for shippers. Similarly, officials from another carrier
    told us that an inadvertent violation of the rules governing the
    declaration of dangerous goods would, in most cases, result in a minimum
    suspension of 60 days, pending the shipper*s completion of training or any
    other steps the carrier chose to require before again accepting packages
    from that shipper. This same carrier*s officials said that when they
    suspect that a shipper may have sent undeclared dangerous goods through
    their system, they will begin an investigation to determine whether the
    shipper knew or should have known that it was doing so. Until the carrier
    completes that investigation, the shipper must agree to let the carrier*s
    staff open and inspect every shipment before accepting it. If this carrier
    determines that the shipper knowingly offered undeclared dangerous goods,
    it terminates its business with that shipper. Carriers May Impose
    Sanctions

    for Shipping Undeclared Dangerous Goods

    Page 27 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety To evaluate the effectiveness of and
    to enforce federal regulations for shipping dangerous goods by air, DOT
    collects data on dangerous goods

    incidents, monitors shippers* and carriers* performance, and assesses
    civil penalties. Within DOT, FAA is primarily responsible for enforcing
    the regulations for transporting dangerous goods by air. To ensure that
    the penalties it imposes for violations of dangerous goods regulations are
    appropriate to shippers* and carriers* complete compliance histories, FAA,
    together with DOT*s other affected operating administrations, is required
    to consider the compliance history of violators in all modes of
    transportation when assessing penalties against them. This guidance was
    difficult for FAA and others to follow because, until very recently, with
    the

    exception of RSPA, DOT*s operating administrations were not submitting
    their enforcement data in a timely manner to DOT*s centralized enforcement
    database. Finally, to further ensure that appropriate civil penalties are
    assessed and that similar cases are treated consistently and fairly, FAA
    requires that the reasons for any reduction to a recommended civil penalty
    be documented. Our analysis of FAA*s enforcement case files found that FAA
    is not always documenting its assessments.

    Like DOT, the Postal Service collects data on dangerous goods incidents,
    but it lacks DOT*s authority to assess civil penalties for violations and
    therefore takes few enforcement actions. Legislation proposed by DOT would
    allow the Postal Service to assess civil penalties.

    To monitor and enforce compliance with DOT*s dangerous goods regulations,
    FAA collects data on dangerous goods air incidents and discrepancies
    through its Airport and Air Carrier Information Reporting System (AAIRS).
    RSPA*s regulations define incidents as reportable releases of hazardous
    materials, including those that are unintended and unanticipated.
    *Discrepancies* are defined in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR)
    as instances in which dangerous goods are found to be undeclared,
    misdeclared, or improperly packaged. 23 In addition, FAA

    collects data on closed dangerous goods enforcement cases through its 23
    An incident is defined in RSPA*s regulations as an event that results in a
    reportable release of a hazardous material, including unintended and
    unanticipated releases that otherwise require reporting under 49 C. F. R.
    S:171.15 or S:171. 16. As used in the Hazardous Materials Regulations, the
    term *discrepancies* describes instances of undeclared dangerous goods
    (material found in transportation that was not identified as dangerous
    goods) and instances of misdeclared or improperly packaged dangerous
    goods. For DOT, Inadequate

    Documentation, and for the Postal Service, Lack of Civil Penalty Authority
    Hamper Enforcement of Dangerous Goods Regulations

    FAA Collects Data to Monitor and Enforce Compliance

    Page 28 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Enforcement Information System. (See
    app. III for more information about FAA*s and DOT*s incident and
    enforcement databases.)

    To ensure that appropriate civil penalties are assessed, FAA*s enforcement
    guidance requires the agency to consider the compliance history of
    violators across all modes of transportation. Until recently, FAA had
    difficulty complying with this guidance because, with the exception of
    RSPA, DOT*s operating administrations were not submitting their closed
    enforcement action data in a timely manner to a central database* the
    Unified Shipper Enforcement Data System (UNISHIP), maintained by RSPA. DOT
    developed this database in response to a 1991 GAO report.

    RSPA is working with DOT*s affected operating administrations to ensure
    the timely submission of enforcement data. On July 17, 2002, the Office of
    the Secretary of Transportation issued a memorandum calling for the

    implementation of required procedures for entering data on dangerous goods
    enforcement actions into UNISHIP. If the database is kept up to date, FAA
    inspectors can obtain compliance information by querying the central
    database.

    Our analysis of FAA*s case files indicates that FAA is not always
    documenting the reasons for reductions to recommended civil penalties, as
    its guidance requires. We found cases in which the proposed civil

    penalty was changed, but either no documentation or incomplete
    documentation was provided to explain the reasons for the reduction. An
    FAA official stated that it was FAA*s policy to include documentation for

    civil penalty changes in the case files. To help ensure that appropriate
    civil penalties are assessed and that similar cases are treated
    consistently and fairly, it is important that FAA document the reasons for
    any reduction to a recommended civil penalty.

    The enforcement process begins when FAA inspectors obtain indication of a
    violation (see fig. 4.). The inspector then determines whether the
    violation warrants administrative action (such as a warning notice or
    letter of correction), legal enforcement action (such as the imposition of
    a civil penalty), or referral for criminal prosecution. When the inspector
    finds that a civil penalty is appropriate, he or she must determine the
    amount of the civil penalty by consulting FAA*s sanction guidance policy.
    Legal staff

    in the regional office or headquarters then review the strength of the
    evidence, the type of enforcement action, and the amount of the civil
    penalty, if any. Next, a notice of proposed civil penalty is issued that
    is FAA Could Not Readily

    Consider Complete Compliance Histories When Assessing Penalties

    FAA Is Not Documenting Changes to Recommended Civil Penalties as Required

    Page 29 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety consistent with the inspector*s report
    and the review. The alleged violator then has an opportunity to reply to
    the civil penalty assessed. If the alleged

    violator provides convincing evidence that it did not commit the
    violation, FAA dismisses the case. If FAA and the alleged violator agree
    on an appropriate fine, FAA issues an order assessing a civil penalty that
    binds the violator to pay the agreed- upon amount. If no agreement is
    reached, the case is litigated.

    Page 30 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Figure 3. FAA*s Dangerous Goods
    Enforcement Process (for Civil Penalty Cases)

    In 15 of the cases we reviewed, the assessed civil penalty differed from
    the proposed civil penalty, but FAA included either no documentation or
    incomplete documentation in the case files to account for the changes. For
    example:

    FAA inspectors obtain evidence of a violation.

    The inspector then determines whether the violation calls for a civil
    penalty or some other enforcement action.

    When the inspector finds that a civil penalty is appropriate, he or she
    must determine the amount of the civil penalty by consulting FAA's
    sanction guidance policy.

    A notice of proposed civil penalty is issued.

    If the alleged violator provides convincing evidence that it did not
    commit these violations, FAA dismisses the case.

    If FAA and the alleged violator agree on an appropriate fine, FAA issues
    an order assessing a civil penalty that binds the violator to pay the
    agreed- upon amount.

    If no agreement is reached, the case is litigated.

    Legal staff in the regional office or headquarters then review the case.

    Source: Federal Aviation Administration.

    Page 31 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety  In 2000, the assessed civil penalty
    on a chemical company for not properly shipping flammable paint was
    reduced from $75,000 to $15,000, but no

    reason was provided in the file for the change.  In 2000, the assessed
    civil penalty on a paint company for not properly

    shipping flammable paint was reduced from $59,500 to $37,500, but no
    reason was provided in the file for the change.

    In addition, in one case involving the shipment of an oxygen generator by
    an air carrier in 1997, the recommended civil penalty was reduced by 20
    percent, even though oxygen generators were responsible for the ValuJet
    aircraft crash in 1996. This penalty was reduced for reasons that were not
    documented. The reduction was not consistent with the known risks of

    oxygen generators. The Postal Service*s standards for mailing dangerous
    goods are similar to DOT*s detailed specifications for packaging, marking,
    and labeling dangerous goods, although the mail is subject to many
    additional limitations and prohibitions, which are imposed by provisions
    of criminal statutes. 24 Yet in contrast with DOT, which can assess civil
    or pursue criminal penalties for violations of its standards, the Postal
    Service can only pursue criminal penalties. This leads to little
    enforcement, because many violations are unintentional and involve
    situations that are

    inappropriate for criminal sanctions. At the same time, the high cleanup
    and damage costs associated with dangerous goods violations are
    timeconsuming, and damages may be difficult to recover absent authority to
    assess civil penalties. For example, in a 1998 incident, the Postal
    Service incurred costs of $87,000 and the carrier incurred damages of $1.4
    million when a Priority mail shipment containing four bottles of mercury
    was found to be leaking upon removal from the aircraft. Another costly
    incident occurred in 2000, when 3 gallons of gasoline were illegally
    shipped in a motorcycle gas tank and the tank leaked during the flight,

    requiring the plane to be taken out of service and cleaned. As part of its
    24 The mail is subject to the restrictions in title 18 that prohibit the
    mailing of any matter that is outwardly or of its own force dangerous to
    life, health, or property, and to restrictions defined in the Postal
    Service*s rules. However, the Postal Service is not subject to the
    Hazardous Materials Transportation Act or to the HMR. We also note that
    while commercial carriers are subject to the federal regulations set forth
    in title 49, C. F. R., the Postal Service operates under title 39, C. F.
    R. The USPS hazardous material regulations are set forth in the Domestic
    Mail Manual (39 C. F. R. Part 111) and further explained in

    Publication 52, Hazardous, Restricted, and Perishable Mail.

    Postal Service Lacks Authority to Impose Civil Penalties for Violations

    Page 32 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety proposal to reauthorize the hazardous
    materials transportation program, DOT has included a provision that would
    allow the Postal Service to

    collect civil penalties and to recover costs and damages for dangerous
    goods violations. 25 The Postal Service has been actively working with
    DOT, and it supports this provision. Yet others have raised concerns about
    possible conflicts between the Postal Service*s current law enforcement
    authority and its effect on fair competition between the Postal Service
    and other shippers. The question of whether changes should be made
    regarding the Postal Service*s law enforcement responsibilities continues
    to be discussed as the Congress and others revisit the Postal Service*s

    mission and roles as part of broader postal reform efforts. Without
    statistically valid, generalizable data on the nature and frequency of
    undeclared dangerous goods in air transport, DOT does not know to what
    extent such goods pose a threat to aviation safety, or what resources
    should be allocated to address that threat. Eventually, affordable
    diagnostic screening technologies may enable carriers and DOT to monitor
    dangerous goods shipments efficiently and nonintrusively. Until then,
    greater inspection authority would enable DOT to randomly select and open
    packages; gather statistically valid, generalizable data; and profile and
    target potential violators, thereby possibly enhancing aviation safety. A
    change in the law requiring that shippers consent to the inspection of

    packages shipped by air might help to accomplish these objectives. The
    legislation that DOT has proposed seeking greater inspection authority has
    not to date been limited to the air mode and has not been designed to
    obtain statistically valid data. However, the distinctions between air and
    the other modes that justify more stringent regulations for transporting
    dangerous goods by air, along with the potential benefits to aviation
    safety that could accrue from better data on undeclared air shipments,
    might

    warrant the development of a proposal that would enable DOT to obtain such
    data.

    The Office of the Secretary*s recent memorandum to the operating
    administrations, calling for the timely submission of closed enforcement
    action data to DOT*s centralized enforcement database, should strengthen
    FAA*s ability to take appropriate enforcement action against violators of

    DOT*s dangerous goods regulations. Provided that the operating 25 S. 1669
    and H. R. 3276, Hazardous Material Transportation Safety Reauthorization
    Act of 2001. Conclusions

    Page 33 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety administrations continue to follow the
    memorandum, FAA should be able to identify high- risk or problem entities,
    consider their compliance histories in all modes of transportation as its
    enforcement policy guidance

    requires, and ensure that the penalties it assesses against them are
    appropriate to their histories. Yet FAA still needs to do more to
    demonstrate that it has assessed appropriate civil penalties. Until it
    fully documents the reasons for its assessments, or for changes to its
    initial assessments, as its guidance requires, it cannot provide assurance
    that the penalties are appropriate or that it has handled similar cases
    consistently. In order to strengthen DOT*s enforcement of dangerous goods
    regulations,

    we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation determine whether the
    unique characteristics of air transport warrant the development of a
    legislative proposal that would enhance DOT*s authority to inspect
    packages shipped by air. Depending on the results of his determination, we
    further recommend that

    the Secretary direct the FAA Administrator to develop a legislative
    proposal that would require shippers to consent to the opening for
    inspection of packages shipped by air. Such a proposal would not only
    enhance FAA*s inspection authority but would also enable FAA to obtain
    statistically valid, generalizable data on the nature and frequency of
    undeclared air shipments of dangerous goods.

    Finally, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Administrator to
    ensure that FAA better communicate and enforce its requirement to document
    the justification for any substantial changes to an initially proposed
    penalty before issuing a final order assessing a penalty.

    We provided DOT and the U. S. Postal Service with a draft of this report
    for their review and comment. We met with DOT officials, including the
    Director of RSPA*s Office of Hazardous Materials Enforcement and the
    Manager of FAA*s Dangerous Goods and Cargo Security Enforcement Program,
    to receive their comments. The U. S. Postal Service provided comments via
    E- mail. DOT and the Postal Service generally agreed with our report and
    provided clarifying and technical comments, which we incorporated as
    appropriate.

    In our draft report, we recommended that the Secretary of Transportation
    direct the DOT administrations that operate and manage a dangerous goods
    program to submit their enforcement data to RSPA*s centralized
    Recommendations for

    Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    Page 34 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety database. According to our audit work,
    the administrations were not submitting the data and, therefore, FAA could
    not readily comply with its

    guidance requiring it to consider the compliance history of violators in
    all modes of transportation. However, when we discussed the draft report
    with DOT officials in October 2002, they provided a July 17, 2002,
    memorandum from the Office of the Secretary of Transportation directing
    the operating administrations to submit the data. In addition, in October
    2002, DOT furnished evidence that three of the five administrations
    subsequently provided current data. We therefore deleted this
    recommendation from the final report. DOT agreed with our other

    recommendations, acknowledging that its legislative proposals seeking
    greater inspection authority have not been designed to obtain
    statistically valid data on undeclared shipments of dangerous goods. DOT
    further noted that FAA*s upcoming reauthorization legislation could serve
    as a vehicle for a proposal to expand FAA*s inspection authority, so that
    the agency could obtain better data on undeclared air shipments. While
    indicating that changes to initially proposed civil penalties sometimes
    occur as a result of penalty negotiations, DOT agreed that documenting the
    justification for changes is important for providing assurance that final
    penalties are appropriate and consistent.

    To determine what DOT, the Postal Service, and others involved in the air
    transport of dangerous goods know about undeclared shipments, we
    identified relevant studies and interviewed DOT, Postal Service, industry,
    and industry association officials. We reviewed the documents and reports
    we obtained, visited DOT*s John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems
    Center and FAA*s William J. Hughes Technical Center, and conducted
    additional interviews with the researchers who had carried out critical
    studies. We also interviewed officials at four of the major cargo
    carriers, and conducted site visits at three of their facilities.

    To determine the key mechanisms that the federal government and private
    industry have in place to prevent dangerous goods from compromising
    safety, we interviewed agency and industry officials and federal
    researchers. We also reviewed relevant reports and documents in order to
    identify recent developments in screening technology.

    To determine what DOT and the Postal Service do to foster compliance with
    federal regulations for shipping dangerous goods by air, we interviewed
    agency officials and reviewed reports and documents. We also examined
    FAA*s practices for assessing civil penalties by testing 30

    randomly selected cases from FAA*s Enforcement Information System, Scope
    and

    Methodology

    Page 35 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety which contains a database of over
    2,000 cases. 26 These cases were randomly selected to fairly represent the
    full range of over 2,000 cases in

    the database. While the number of cases we tested was too small to enable
    us to estimate the extent to which FAA*s enforcement strategy was followed
    in the entire database, these 30 cases permit us to describe the types of
    practices that occur at critical points in the penalty assessment process.

    We performed our work from September 2001 through November 2002, in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
    earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
    after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the
    Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on
    Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Chairman of its Subcommittee on
    Aviation; other appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of
    Transportation; the Postmaster General, United States Postal Service; the
    Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, Transportation Security
    Administration; the Administrator, Research and Special Programs
    Administration; and the Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration. We
    will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
    report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www.
    gao. gov.

    26 The Enforcement Information System contains entries of violations found
    during inspections or through other means (such as police inspections or
    public complaints) that initiate enforcement cases. It contains detailed
    information on the status and resolution of each enforcement case and
    allows field, regional, and headquarters staff to enter and retrieve data.

    Page 36 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Please call me at (202) 512- 2384 if
    you or your staff have any questions about the information in this report.
    Key contributors to this report are

    listed in appendix IV. Sincerely yours,

    Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph. D. Director, Physical Infrastructure

    Appendix I: FAA*s Dangerous Goods Informational Brochure for Passengers

    Page 37 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Appendix I: FAA*s Dangerous Goods
    Informational Brochure for Passengers

    There are certain exceptions for personal care, medical needs, sporting
    equipment, and items to support physically challenged passengers. For
    example:

    Hazardous materials are prohibited in luggage or carried on board.

    Signal flares, sparklers or other explosives

    Drain cleaners and solvents

    Spray cans, butane fuel, scuba tanks, propane tanks, CO 2 cartridges,
    self- inflating rafts

    Firearms, ammunition, gunpowder, mace, tear gas orpepper spray You must
    declare your hazardous materials to the airline,

    air package carrier, or U. S. Postal Service. Violators of Federal
    Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 CFR Parts 171- 180) may be subject to
    a civil penalty of up to $25,000 for each violation and, in appropriate
    cases, a criminal penalty of up to $500,000 and/ or imprisonment of up to
    5 years. Dry ice, gasoline- powered tools,

    wet- cell batteries, camping equipment with fuel, radioactive materials
    (except limited quantities), poisons, infectious substances The above list
    is not all inclusive. For exceptions, read

    Fuel, paints, lighter refills, matches

    Personal care items containing hazardous materials (e. g., flammable
    perfume, aerosols) totaling no more than 75 ounces may be carried on
    board. Contents of each container may not exceed 15 fluid ounces.

    Matches and lighters may only be carried on your person. However, "strike-
    anywhere" matches, lighters with flammable liquid reservoirs and lighter
    fluid are forbidden.

    Firearms and ammunition may not be carried by a passenger on an aircraft.
    However, unloaded firearms may be transported in checked luggage if
    declared to the agent at check in and packed in a suitable container.
    Handguns must be in a locked container. Boxed small arms ammunition for
    personal use may be transported in checked luggage. Amounts may vary
    depending on the airline.

    Dry ice (4 pounds or less) for packing perishables, may be carried on
    board an aircraft provided the package is vented.

    Electric wheelchairs must be transported in accordance with airline
    requirements. The battery may need to be dismounted.

    Further restrictions may apply to the above items. Some items may be
    shipped as air cargo. If you are unsure whether the item you wish

    to pack in your luggage or ship by air is hazardous, contact your airline
    representative.

    Many common items used everyday in the home or workplace may seem
    harmless; however, when transported by air, they

    can be very dangerous. In flight, variations in temperature and pressure
    can cause items to leak, generate toxic fumes or start a fire.

    Brochure inside Brochure outside

    Source: Federal Aviation Administration and Research and Special Programs
    Administration.

    Appendix II: Mailability of Dangerous Goods, by DOT Class Page 38 GAO- 03-
    22 Aviation Safety Appendix II: Mailability of Dangerous Goods, by DOT
    Class

    Source: United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), C023.

    Appendix III: Data Collected by DOT Agencies on Dangerous Goods Incidents
    and Enforcement Actions

    Page 39 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety FAA collects data on dangerous goods
    air incidents, discrepancies, and enforcement actions through two
    databases. Its Airport and Air Carrier

    Information Reporting System (AAIRS) collects basic incident and
    discrepancy information such as the mode, date, and location of the
    incident or discrepancy, the carrier and shipper involved, the hazard
    class of the spilled material, and the consequences of the incident or
    discrepancy. (See table 1.) FAA*s Enforcement Information System (EIS)
    collects information on closed dangerous goods enforcement cases. It
    contains data such as the incident date, the regulations violated, the
    sanction initially recommended, and the final sanction. These enforcement
    data are used to monitor and enforce compliance with DOT*s dangerous goods
    regulations.

    Table 2: DOT Databases Tracking Information on the Air Transportation of
    Dangerous Goods

    Database name Database custodian Description

    Hazardous Material Incident Reporting System (HMIRS)

    RSPA DOT*s HMIRS is the primary source of national incident data for the
    federal, state, and local government agencies responsible for the safety
    of dangerous goods

    transportation. Carriers of dangerous goods supply these data through
    their reporting of dangerous goods incidents. Unified Shipper Enforcement
    System (UNISHIP)

    RSPA UNISHIP contains information on closed enforcement actions taken
    against shippers and freight forwarders in all modes of transportation,
    including air. Airport/ Air Carrier Information Reporting System (AAIRS)

    FAA AAIRS has been used since 1996 to track inspections of airports and
    air carrier stations. It includes dangerous goods incidents (which are
    also reported to HMIRS) and discrepancies (dangerous goods discoveries
    that occur through avenues other than faulty packaging, such as luggage
    inspection). Enforcement Information System (EIS) FAA The EIS contains
    entries of violations found

    during inspections or through other means (such as police inspections or
    public complaints) that initiate enforcement cases.

    Source: RSPA and FAA.

    RSPA collects dangerous goods incident and enforcement data through two
    databases. Its Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS)
    collects dangerous goods incident information across all transportation
    modes, not just the air mode. This information is similar to that
    collected in FAA*s AAIRS database, but it does not include Appendix III:
    Data Collected by DOT

    Agencies on Dangerous Goods Incidents and Enforcement Actions

    Appendix III: Data Collected by DOT Agencies on Dangerous Goods Incidents
    and Enforcement Actions

    Page 40 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety discrepancies. RSPA tracks closed
    hazardous materials enforcement cases through its Unified Shipper
    Enforcement System (UNISHIP). This

    database tracks closed enforcement actions across all transportation
    operating administrations, not simply air.

    RSPA collects data on dangerous goods incidents from all transportation
    modes through DOT Form F 5800.1, which captures basic information on
    incidents such as the mode, date, and location of the incident; the
    carrier and shipper involved; the hazard class and shipping name of the
    spilled material; and the consequences of the incident (including deaths,
    injuries, product loss, and damage). RSPA uses the data and the
    information it collects on dangerous goods incidents to (1) evaluate the
    effectiveness of existing regulations, (2) assist in determining the need
    for regulatory changes to cover changing transportation safety problems,
    and (3) determine major problem areas so that attention can be more
    suitably directed to them. In addition, both the government and industry
    use this dangerous goods incident information to chart trends and identify
    training inadequacies and packaging deficiencies.

    In addition to RSPA, UNISHIP serves the enforcement programs of the
    Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, the
    Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the U. S. Coast Guard, and
    the Inspector General by providing a history of compliance for the
    companies contained in the system.

    Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

    Page 41 GAO- 03- 22 Aviation Safety Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph. D., (202)
    512- 2834 Belva M. Martin, (202) 512- 2834

    In addition to those named above, Elizabeth R. Eisenstadt, Arthur L.
    James, Bert Japikse, David Laverny- Rafter, Bill MacBlane, Kieran
    McCarthy, Richard Scott, and Katherine Wulff made key contributions to
    this report. Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff

    Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Acknowledgments

    (540004)

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