Defense Management: Army Needs to Address Resource and Mission
Requirements Affecting Its Training and Doctrine Command
(10-FEB-03, GAO-03-214).
The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) trains soldiers
and develops doctrine and future warfighting concepts to fight
the battles of today and tomorrow. As such, the Command has been
designated as the lead in the Army's transformation from a Cold
War-oriented force into a rapidly deployable and responsive force
better able to meet the diverse challenges of the future.
Concerns have been raised at congressional hearings about
TRADOC's readiness to perform its mission, particularly within
the context of Army transformation and associated funding
priorities. GAO assessed the impact of budget, workload, and
personnel changes, as well as ongoing transformation plans, on
TRADOC's ability to perform its mission and deliver well-trained
soldiers to the combat forces.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-214
ACCNO: A06065
TITLE: Defense Management: Army Needs to Address Resource and
Mission Requirements Affecting Its Training and Doctrine Command
DATE: 02/10/2003
SUBJECT: Army personnel
Combat readiness
Defense economic analysis
Defense operations
Human resources utilization
Military training
Mission budgeting
Agency missions
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GAO-03-214
Report to Congressional Requesters
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
February 2003 DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
Army Needs to Address Resource and Mission Requirements Affecting Its
Training and Doctrine Command
GAO- 03- 214
Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOC*s workload has grown as a result of
new mission requirements, the number of personnel authorized to meet those
requirements has declined. Also since fiscal year 1995, the Command*s
operation and maintenance funding increased, but TRADOC allocated these
and other operations money to support its highest mission priority*
training* while other areas received less emphasis. The table below
depicts the number of personnel TRADOC believes are needed to perform its
workload (personnel requirements), as well as the number of personnel the
Army has authorized for this purpose. Unresolved differences exist between
TRADOC and Army Headquarters over TRADOC*s personnel requirements.
Amid the increases in workload and reductions in personnel authorizations,
TRADOC has met its training mission, but with difficulty. Moreover, the
Command has workload backlogs in other mission areas, such as developing
training materials and Army doctrine. The effect of these backlogs is
illustrated in TRADOC*s monthly status reports, which show that the
Command assigned the lowest readiness rating to more than two- thirds of
its units during fiscal year 2001 and into 2002 and attributed the low
ratings primarily to the lack of personnel. Furthermore, two Army
leadership panels concluded that TRADOC*s training and development
standards had deteriorated, and mechanisms for evaluating training and
leader development programs were lacking. Several ongoing and planned Army
initiatives may affect TRADOC*s ability
to perform its mission in the future. These include efforts to reassess
TRADOC*s process for determining personnel requirements and ongoing
efforts to transfer forces from TRADOC and other noncombatant commands to
warfighting forces. At the same time, TRADOC is losing flexibility to
shift funds from one mission area to another because the Army established
the Installation Management Agency to manage its facilities. TRADOC is
developing a reengineering plan that Command officials believe will
increase TRADOC*s efficiency and improve its ability to meet mission
requirements; however, the costs, benefits, performance measures, and
human capital issues associated with the plan are not yet clear.
TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995- 2001 1995 1996 1997 1998 a
1999 a 2000 a 2001
Personnel required by TRADOC 79,298 77,069 76,650 75,613 76,139 76,409
78,255 Personnel authorized by the Army 63,139 57,814 57,700 56,814 55,852
54,659 55,204 Authorizations as a percent of requirements 80% 75% 75% 75%
73% 71% 71%
Source: TRADOC. a Numbers adjusted for the addition and subsequent
elimination of two TRADOC subcommands. DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
Army Needs to Address Resource and Mission Requirements Affecting Its
Training and Doctrine Command
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 214. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Barry Holman at (202) 512- 8412 or holmanb@ gao. gov.
Highlights of GAO- 03- 214, a report to
Congressional Requesters
February 2003
The Army*s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) trains soldiers and
develops doctrine and future warfighting concepts to fight the battles of
today and tomorrow.
As such, the Command has been designated as the lead in the Army*s
transformation from a Cold War- oriented force into a rapidly deployable
and responsive force better able to meet the diverse challenges of the
future. Concerns have been raised at congressional hearings about TRADOC*s
readiness to perform its mission, particularly within the context of Army
transformation and
associated funding priorities. GAO assessed the impact of budget,
workload, and personnel changes, as well as ongoing transformation plans,
on TRADOC*s ability to
perform its mission and deliver well- trained soldiers to the combat
forces.
GAO recommends that the Army validate TRADOC*s workload and personnel
requirements before further reducing the Command*s personnel
authorizations, and
ensure that the Command*s reengineering plan adequately addresses
efficiency, effectiveness, and human capital issues. In commenting on the
report, the Department of Defense concurred with the recommendations
related to TRADOC*s reengineering but expressed various concerns about
other related recommendations, leaving unclear what overall actions would
be taken.
Page i GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
Background 5 TRADOC Personnel Authorizations Have Been Reduced, While
Budget Increases Have Gone to Training and New Workload 10 TRADOC*s Full
Workload Requirements Are Not Being Met; Leadership Panels and Combat
Forces Cite Quality Problems 18 Effect of Ongoing and Planned Actions on
TRADOC Is Uncertain 31 Conclusions 40 Recommendations for Executive Action
41 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 41 Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology 44
Appendix II Overview of Armywide Personnel Reductions 47
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 50
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 51
Tables
Table 1: TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995- 2001 11 Table 2:
TRADOC*s Top 13 Training and Doctrine Development Priorities (as of
October 2002) 21 Table 3: Status of TRADOC Commercial Activity Studies
Announced during Fiscal Years 1997 and 1999 (as of November 2002) 35 Table
4: Reductions in Army Personnel Authorizations for the
Active Army and Selected Commands between Fiscal Years 1991 and 2001 49
Contents
Page ii GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Figures
Figure 1: Major TRADOC Installations 6 Figure 2: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001
Funding by Appropriation 9 Figure 3: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 O& M Funding
by Mission Area 10 Figure 4: TRADOC Personnel Requirement Trends for
Selected Mission Areas, Fiscal Years 1995- 2001 13 Figure 5: Selected
Mission Area Personnel Authorizations as a Percentage of Personnel
Requirements, Fiscal Years 1995- 2001 14 Figure 6: TRADOC O& M Funding
Trends for Selected Mission
Areas for Fiscal Years 1995- 2001 16 Figure 7: TRADOC O& M Funding
Percentages by Mission Area for Fiscal Years 1995- 2001 17 Figure 8: Army
Training Workload, Fiscal Years 1991- 2003 19 Figure 9: Army Field Manual
Status (as of January 2002) 22 Figure 10: Average Readiness Ratings for 30
TRADOC Reporting
Units, for the Period January 2001 * February 2002 25 Figure 11: Army
Civilian Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected Commands, Fiscal
Years 1991- 2001 47 Figure 12: Army Military Personnel Authorization
Trends for Selected Commands, Fiscal Years 1991- 2001 48 Abbreviations
AMC Army Materiel Command DOD Department of Defense FORSCOM Army Forces
Command IMA Installation Management Agency O& M Operations and Maintenance
OMB Office of Management and Budget POI Programs of Instruction TRADOC
Training and Doctrine Command
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Page 1 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management February 10, 2003 The Honorable
Joel Heffley
Chairman The Honorable Soloman P. Ortiz Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness Committee on Armed Services House of
Representatives
The Army has begun to transform itself from a Cold War- oriented force
into a more rapidly deployable and responsive force better able to meet
the diverse challenges of the future. The far- reaching organizational and
operational changes that the Army plans will affect virtually every
element of the Army. The Army*s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has
been designated the lead command for this transformation and, as the
architect of the Army*s future, TRADOC has a key role in the
transformation process. TRADOC is responsible for ensuring that the
Army remains a modern and capable fighting force by developing warfighting
concepts and doctrine and by providing recruiting, training, and
associated support for military personnel. Like the Department of
Defense (DOD) and other Army commands, TRADOC incurred significant
decreases in its resources* particularly its personnel resources* during
the 1990s as the department took major steps to reshape and reduce the
size of its forces. Between fiscal years 1991 and 2001, Army active duty
military personnel and civilian personnel were reduced by about 33 percent
and 42 percent, respectively. TRADOC incurred similar reductions during
this period.
Each year, senior Army officials must decide how to allocate resources
among competing priorities and programs within and among the Army*s
operational and institutional forces. In recent years, the Army has chosen
to give priority to its operational or warfighting units and accept a
higher
level of risk of mission failure in support organizations such as TRADOC.
At the same time, at congressional hearings over the last few years,
concerns have been raised about TRADOC*s readiness to perform its mission,
particularly within the context of Army transformation. At your request,
we reviewed the resources and workload assigned to the Command and its
readiness to carry out its mission. Our specific review objectives were to
examine (1) the Training and Doctrine Command*s personnel, workload, and
budget trends since 1995; (2) the impact of personnel and budget changes
on the Command*s ability to perform its
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management mission and deliver well- trained
soldiers to the combat forces; and (3) the actions taken or planned that
could have an effect on the Command*s
ability to perform its mission. In conducting this examination, we
reviewed documents and interviewed officials at Army Headquarters, the
Training and Doctrine Command, and Forces Command. Our analysis of the
trends in the Command*s personnel and budgetary resources focused
primarily on fiscal years 1995 through 2001. A complete description of our
methodology is shown in appendix I. Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOC*s
workload has grown due to new
mission requirements and its budget has increased in selected areas, its
authorized personnel gradually decreased about 13 percent. Specifically,
the number of authorized personnel declined during this period from about
63,000 to 55,000. The current authorization represents about 70 percent of
the personnel that the Command believes are needed to perform its work
(otherwise known as requirements), which have ranged from about 75,000 to
79,000 personnel. 1 The reductions in authorized
personnel were caused by a number of DOD and Army decisions. Key among
these were reductions mandated by force structure reshaping decisions that
began in the early 1990s, such as *Quicksilver,* 2 and other department
initiatives that occurred since 1995, such as reductions recommended by
the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. 3 While TRADOC officials believe that
the Command*s reported personnel requirements are accurate, unresolved
differences exist between TRADOC and Army Headquarters staff over the
accuracy of these requirements, particularly as they relate to the use of
contractors. Despite personnel reductions, the
Command*s primary funding source* operations and maintenance funding*
increased about 23 percent (in constant dollars). However, at the
Command*s discretion, funding for all of TRADOC*s programs did not
increase* funding devoted to training increased about 13 percent, while
1 Throughout this report, we refer to personnel requirements and personnel
authorizations. Personnel requirements refer to the number of personnel,
both civilian and military, deemed necessary by TRADOC to support its
workload. Personnel authorizations refer to the number of personnel an
organization, in this case TRADOC, is allowed to hire. Personnel
authorizations are often less than requirements because of budget
constraints. 2 *Quicksilver* was an Army initiative intended to reduce its
force structure and create a more balanced, versatile, lethal, smaller,
and ready force.
3 The Quadrennial Defense Review analyzes military strategy for U. S.
forces. Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management funding devoted to base operations
decreased about 20 percent as the Command reallocated limited resources to
higher- priority missions. Also,
a large portion of the increased funding was directed to hiring contract
personnel to support new mission requirements such as Army transformation
to a lighter force. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, contractor support
funding increased by about 38 percent, or about $317 million, but this
increase did not fully offset the loss of personnel authorizations,
according to Command officials. Amid these reductions in personnel
authorizations, TRADOC met its
highest mission priority, training, although not without some concerns
about quality from other Army organizations. The Command has had more
difficulty fully meeting other mission requirements* such as those
involving the development of training materials and doctrine* many of
which have sizeable workload backlogs. The effect of these workload
backlogs is illustrated in TRADOC*s monthly status reports. Our analysis
of these status reports showed that the Command assigned the lowest
readiness rating to more than two- thirds of its units during fiscal year
2001 and into 2002, and it attributed the low ratings primarily to the
lack of personnel. The impact of these conditions has been observed by
organizations outside TRADOC. Two Army leadership panels chartered by the
Army Chief of Staff* one representing officers and one representing
noncommissioned officers* concluded in 2001 and 2002 that TRADOC*s
training and development standards had deteriorated and that mechanisms
for evaluating training and leadership development programs were lacking.
Officials with the Army Forces Command* a primary
customer of TRADOC services* have also expressed concern about TRADOC*s
reduced capabilities, but the impact cannot be fully quantified due to a
lack of Army empirical data and analysis. Although TRADOC does
not have a formal process to obtain feedback on the quality and relevance
of the products provided to its customers, Forces Command officials
indicated that they believe the quality of TRADOC*s individual training
programs and doctrine products has declined. For example, they cite the
lack of a training strategy to support operational units* adoption of
digital technology, as well as the outdated condition of some doctrine
used to guide tactics and procedures in the field. On the other hand,
Forces Command officials noted that TRADOC*s support for an element of the
Army transformation* the Interim Brigade Combat Teams* had been good.
Continuing disconnects between mission requirements and
resources could adversely affect TRADOC*s ability to carry out its mission
and improve its readiness posture in the future as it continues to address
additional transformation requirements, while also training and supporting
the current force.
Page 4 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Several ongoing and planned actions
may affect the Command*s ability to perform its mission in the future;
however, the overall outcome is unclear at this time. In October 2002, a
major Army Headquarters initiative, already
underway, began shifting budgetary resources and about 10,000 personnel
authorizations related to base operations away from the Command to the new
Army Installation Management Agency. This reorganization will reduce
TRADOC*s mission requirements, but will also eliminate base operations
funds that, in the past, were used by the Command as a source of training
support; thus, in the future, the Command will have less flexibility to
shift funding among its primary missions. Another Army Headquarters
initiative is aimed at reassessing the process used to determine personnel
requirements for TRADOC and other commands that support warfighting units,
but the outcome is uncertain because
differences of opinion exist over TRADOC*s requirements and the extent to
which its requirements have been offset by contractor support. Also, the
Army is conducting commercial activities studies to identify opportunities
to use in- house personnel more efficiently and to contract some
activities to an outside vendor. Such studies are likely to lead to
reduced personnel
requirements in the activities studied but would not necessarily free
personnel for assignment to other activities or mission areas where
shortages exist. In addition, the Army has an initiative underway, known
as *Manning the Force,* which is transferring military personnel from the
noncombatant forces across the Army to warfighting forces to improve the
Army*s combat readiness. This initiative, which continues through fiscal
year 2003, is reducing the number of military personnel assigned to
TRADOC; however, the Command has not fully quantified the impact of this
specific initiative. Finally, TRADOC is developing a reengineering plan
that is intended to create a more streamlined and efficient command
structure, rely more heavily on technology, and better position the
Command to support current and future mission requirements. Command
officials believe the plan, once finalized and implemented, will increase
TRADOC*s efficiency and improve its ability to meet mission requirements.
However, the costs, benefits, performance measures, and human capital
issues associated with implementing the plan are not yet clear. Also, the
extent to which this effort will lead to organizational consolidations and
reductions in personnel requirements remains unclear. These issues could
take on more importance as the Army continues its transformation efforts
and, if not adequately addressed, could place the Command at increased
risk in its role as the Army*s architect of the future.
We are making recommendations for executive action to help the Command
address workload backlogs; better measure the quality of its products and
services; and ensure that its reengineering plan adequately
Page 5 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management addresses efficiency,
effectiveness, and human capital issues and is properly resourced to
support Army transformation. In commenting on a
draft of the report, DOD concurred with the recommendations related to
TRADOC*s reengineering process but expressed various concerns about other
related recommendations, leaving unclear what overall actions would be
taken.
The Army consists of both operational and institutional forces. The
institutional forces support such activities as training, supply, and
maintenance, and perform a broad range of noncombatant functions that
enable operational forces* combat and support units* to deploy and fight
in regional and theater wars. TRADOC is part of the Army*s institutional
forces. The Command is viewed as the Army*s *architect of the future*
because much of what it does is focused on identifying future warfighting
requirements and developing organizations, training curriculum, doctrine,
and people to fight the battles of tomorrow, as well as those of today.
TRADOC carries out its mission at 26 schools and several training centers
located on 15 major installations throughout the continental United
States. (See fig. 1.) The Command also has 11 battle laboratories, which
support research and development activities associated with weapon systems
and combat operations. The schools and battle laboratories specialize in
developing and testing warfighting capabilities such as air defense,
armor, artillery, aviation, infantry, and transportation. During fiscal
year 2001, TRADOC was authorized about 36, 500 military personnel and
18,700
civilian personnel. Background
TRADOC*s Responsibilities
Page 6 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Figure 1: Major TRADOC
Installations
In general, TRADOC*s overall mission focuses on five primary areas:
Combat Development. Through its combat development mission,
TRADOC identifies needed capabilities and requirements for new and
existing weapon and battlefield management systems to improve warfighting
capabilities and responsiveness. The capabilities and requirements are
designed and incorporated into current and new weapon systems to improve
the Army*s warfighting capabilities. As part of this effort, TRADOC
provides an Armywide focus on research and development activities and
conducts analysis and experimentation. The Command*s battle laboratories
are heavily involved in the combat development mission. Doctrine
Development. TRADOC develops doctrine to address the
complete range of potential tactical and operational missions and
operating environments* from infantry operations to aviation* that combat
units might encounter. Doctrine establishes the tactics,
Page 7 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management techniques, and procedures the
combat units might use to carry out their warfighting missions; it is
essential for conducting warfare. Much of the
Army*s doctrine is found in its field manuals, which number more than 600.
Doctrine developers write and update the field manuals, as well as develop
organizational structures for combat units. Training and Training
Development. TRADOC*s training and training
development mission is directed at developing competent soldiers, capable
leaders, and relevant training materials. TRADOC provides soldiers with
initial individual entry- level training. The Command also provides
advanced individual training, such as learning how to operate a tank. As
the training developer, TRADOC develops course material for over 2,000
courses that support individual training. TRADOC also develops training
material for unit training, which takes place in the combat units. In
addition, through training development, TRADOC certifies staff and faculty
associated with its schools, develops a distance- learning curriculum, and
promotes continuing education for its military personnel. During fiscal
year 2001, TRADOC trained about 323,000 military and civilian personnel at
its schools. Accessions/ Recruiting. TRADOC is responsible for
recruiting soldiers
for the Army. Recruiting activities are conducted throughout the United
States, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and at U. S. facilities in
Germany and Asia. Recruiting is carried out by a TRADOC subcommand called
the Accessions Command, which was established in February 2002. From the
beginning of fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2001, accessions
activities were carried out by the Army Recruiting Command, the Cadet
Command, and the Military Entrance Processing Command. These
commands are now components of the Accessions Command. Base Operations.
TRADOC has historically maintained the school
buildings, barracks, roads, training ranges, and other structures used to
carry out its mission. Base support activities have included facilities
maintenance as well as equipment repair. However, in October 2002, base
operations support across the Army was consolidated and transitioning to a
new Army agency called the Installation Management Agency was begun.
Like other Army commands, TRADOC will no longer have direct responsibility
for base operations. A large portion of the TRADOC personnel and funding
resources associated with base operations is being transferred to the new
agency.
TRADOC is also the lead command for Army transformation. This
transformation, which was announced in October 1999, is a plan to move the
Army*s Cold War organization and equipment to a lighter, more
strategically responsive force to fill what the Army sees as a strategic
gap in its warfighting capabilities. The transformed force is expected to
be capable of responding to a broad range of operations* from peacekeeping
Page 8 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management to regional conflicts to major
theater wars. To realize the transformation, the Army plans to develop new
equipment, revise its operating concepts
and doctrine, build unit- level organizations that can quickly adapt to
changes in the intensity of a given military operation, and change how it
trains its soldiers and leaders. Transformation will touch on all of
TRADOC*s mission areas because TRADOC is heavily involved in developing
requirements for current and new equipment, revising doctrine, developing
new organizations, and training soldiers and leaders. As part of its
transformation responsibilities, TRADOC has already played a lead role in
developing and fielding the Interim Brigade Combat Teams*
commonly referred to as the Stryker brigades* which are being organized
and equipped to deploy nearly as quickly as light infantry units but with
more lethality and survivability.
In fiscal year 2001, TRADOC was provided a budget of about $3.2 billion to
carry out its mission. 4 This total, however, does not include funding to
pay the Command*s military personnel, who are paid from funds that are
centrally managed at Army Headquarters. Figure 2 depicts TRADOC*s funding
by appropriation.
4 We focused primarily on TRADOC*s fiscal year 2001 budget because the
Command had not yet received its final 2002 budget authorization at the
time we conducted a significant portion of our analysis. Overview of
TRADOC
Funding
Page 9 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Figure 2: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001
Funding by Appropriation
The largest segment of the budget was comprised of Operations and
Maintenance (O& M) funding. It totaled approximately $2.9 billion, or
about 91 percent of TRADOC*s total budget. Figure 3 shows how O& M funding
was allocated among TRADOC mission areas.
Page 10 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Figure 3: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001
O& M Funding by Mission Area
Training and base operations were allocated most of the O& M funding.
Funding for doctrine development is included in both combat developments
and training development.
TRADOC*s O& M funding increased to about $3.5 billion for fiscal year
2002* about $600 million more than fiscal year 2001. A large portion of
the increase resulted from additional funding to support the global war on
terrorism.
Since at least fiscal year 1995, the number of personnel that TRADOC has
been authorized to accomplish its mission has been less than the number of
personnel that TRADOC officials believe are required. While personnel
requirements remained relatively steady between fiscal years 1995 and
2001, TRADOC*s workload increased and its personnel authorizations
decreased as a result of DOD and Army efforts to reshape and constrain the
size of the in- house workforce. TRADOC and Army Headquarters officials do
not agree on the accuracy of TRADOC*s personnel requirements. As personnel
authorizations decreased, TRADOC*s budget increased; however, the increase
was not applied uniformly across all of TRADOC*s programs or mission
areas. An increasing percentage of the budget was shifted to the Command*s
highest- priority mission area* training. In addition, a portion of the
budget increase was directed to new mission requirements related to Army
transformation. Because TRADOC TRADOC Personnel
Authorizations Have Been Reduced, While Budget Increases Have Gone to
Training and New Workload
Page 11 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management did not have the in- house
personnel to address the new requirements, the Command increased its use
of contractors to satisfy some of the new
mission requirements. Since fiscal year 1995, TRADOC*s personnel
requirements, as identified by the Command, have remained somewhat steady.
Yet, its personnel authorizations and the actual number of personnel on
hand have gradually declined by nearly 13 percent* from about 63,000 to
55,000* to where they represent about 71 percent and 65 percent,
respectively, of the Command*s personnel requirements. Table 1 details
these personnel trends.
Table 1: TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995- 2001 1995 1996 1997
1998 a 1999 a 2000 a 2001
Requirements 79,298 77,069 76,650 75,613 76,139 76,409 78,255
Authorizations 63,139 57,814 57,700 56,814 55,852 54,659 55,204 Actual
61,207 57,036 57,273 54,839 53,699 51,993 50,936 Authorizations as a
percent of requirements 80% 75% 75% 75% 73% 71% 71% Actual as a percent of
requirements 77% 74% 75% 72% 71% 68% 65% Actual as a percent of
authorizations 97% 99% 98% 97% 96% 95% 92%
Source: TRADOC. a Numbers adjusted for the addition and subsequent
elimination of personnel requirements and authorizations, and actual
personnel that are associated with two TRADOC subcommands: the Recruiting
Command and Military Entrance Processing Command. (For additional
information, see app. I).
TRADOC also experienced a reduction in actual staffing levels between
fiscal years 1995 and 2001. As shown in table 1, the Command was staffed
at 77 percent of its requirements in fiscal year 1995 and at only 65
percent of its requirements in fiscal year 2001. The table also shows that
the Command has experienced a decline in the number of actual personnel
assigned to the Command. According to TRADOC officials, this shortfall in
actual personnel provides an even clearer indication that the Command*s
full workload cannot be accomplished. The reductions in TRADOC*s personnel
authorizations were similar to those of the Army overall, as well as for
selected commands. See appendix II for a comparison of TRADOC*s TRADOC
Personnel
Authorizations Are Down Despite Increasing Workload and Associated
Personnel Requirements
Page 12 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management personnel authorizations with
those of other selected major Army commands. Since fiscal year 1995,
TRADOC*s workload has grown due to the addition of several new mission
requirements. A number of these are associated
with supporting Army transformation requirements that began to emerge
after transformation plans were announced in 1999. The Command acquired
responsibility for conceptualizing and developing two new aspects of the
Army*s fighting forces* the interim and objective forces* while still
retaining the responsibilities for supporting, modernizing, and
transforming the current force. These new responsibilities include
developing weapon systems requirements, combat and training doctrine, and
training courses to facilitate the transformation.
In addition, a number of other DOD and Army decisions resulted in TRADOC
gaining new mission responsibilities. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001,
the Command assumed responsibility for several smaller commands and
agencies, including the Army Recruiting Command, the Military Entrance
Processing Command, and the Army Management Staff College. 5 Each of these
commands and agencies brought new workload
requirements with them. However, they also brought most of the personnel
authorizations associated with that workload.
The personnel requirements associated with the Command*s major mission
areas, as identified by TRADOC, fluctuated only slightly between fiscal
years 1995 and 2001, as depicted in figure 4.
5 TRADOC also assumed responsibility for the Army Civilian Training
Education Development Student Detachment, the Army Aeronautical Services
Agency, and the Army Nuclear Chemical Agency.
Page 13 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Figure 4: TRADOC Personnel
Requirement Trends for Selected Mission Areas, Fiscal Years 1995- 2001
Note: The training component of TRADOC*s training and training development
mission area has the single most personnel requirements and is shown in
the chart separately from the training development component. The doctrine
development mission area is included in the figure, but TRADOC does not
account for doctrine development personnel separately. Instead, doctrine
development personnel are accounted for in the training development and
combat developments mission areas.
As shown in figure 4, requirements in TRADOC*s training mission area
ranged from about 35,000 to 37,000, with slight reductions between fiscal
years 1996 and 1999. Likewise, the personnel requirements for the training
development, combat development, and base operations mission areas
had some minor changes from year to year. The reductions in personnel
authorizations between fiscal years 1995 and 2001 forced TRADOC to set
priorities among its mission areas to ensure that it successfully
performed its highest- priority function* training. Figure 5 shows
TRADOC*s authorization allocations relative to personnel requirements
during this period. In comparison to the other mission areas, training was
authorized the highest percentage of personnel authorizations
Page 14 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management in each year. Furthermore,
training authorization levels remained relatively steady, while those in
the base operations mission area were
steadily reduced.
Figure 5: Selected Mission Area Personnel Authorizations as a Percentage
of Personnel Requirements, Fiscal Years 1995- 2001
Several DOD and Army force structure decisions were responsible for a
large portion of TRADOC*s personnel authorization reductions. Throughout
the 1990s, DOD implemented several force structure reshaping initiatives*
including those resulting from the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review* that
were aimed at streamlining the military services.
Most of these initiatives directed across- the- board cuts in personnel
authorizations and often left the military services and their commands to
determine how to allocate the reductions. For example, one such
initiative* referred to as *Quicksilver** was implemented between fiscal
years 1991 and 1996 to reduce the Army*s force structure to create a
balanced, versatile, smaller, more lethal, and more ready force than
existed in the late 1980s. As a result, the initiative eliminated 3, 134
civilian
Page 15 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management positions and 6,224 military
positions at TRADOC between fiscal years 1991 and 2001.
TRADOC officials expressed confidence in the accuracy of their reported
personnel requirements. They cite the validation of their requirements
determination process in 2001 by the Army Manpower Analysis Agency as
proof that their process produces valid requirements. 6 Also,
representatives of the Manpower Analysis Agency stated that TRADOC*s
personnel requirements determination process was based on a sound
methodology. However, unresolved differences remain between TRADOC and
Army Headquarters officials regarding the accuracy of the Command*s
personnel requirements. Representatives of the Army*s Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Plans question the methods and assumptions used
by TRADOC to link workload and personnel. More specifically, these
officials told us they believe that TRADOC does not accurately account for
work being done by contract personnel, and thus the difference between the
Command*s requirements and authorizations is not as large as it
appears. They believe that contractors are filling the gap between
requirements and authorizations. However, these officials did not provide
any objective analysis to document the extent to which this might be the
case. Similarly, TRADOC officials did not have sufficient data to show the
extent to which they were relying on contractors. 7 However, according to
TRADOC officials, the Command*s personnel requirements determination
process appropriately considers work being done by contractors. Although
we did not independently validate TRADOC*s personnel requirements
processes, our discussions with knowledgeable officials and review of
available documentation indicated that their requirements analysis was
based on a rigorous multistep process and gave due consideration to the
work being performed by contractors. Furthermore, as discussed later in
this report, TRADOC frequently cited personnel shortfalls as a cause of
low readiness ratings.
6 The Army Manpower Analysis Agency is assigned responsibility for
overseeing and certifying the Army requirements determination processes
used by Army commands. The Manpower Analysis Agency reports to the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower &
Reserve Affairs). 7 During fiscal year 2002, the Army began collecting
information to identify the size of its contractor workforce.
Page 16 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Between fiscal years 1995 and
2001, TRADOC*s O& M budget increased $544 million, or about 23 percent
(expressed in constant fiscal year 2001
dollars). However, this increase in funding was not uniform across all of
TRADOC*s mission areas or budget categories. For example, funding for the
base operations mission decreased by around $20 million, or about
2 percent, while training mission funds increased by around $326 million,
or about 36 percent. Over time, funding allocated to the recruiting or
accessions mission area increased by about $200 million, or almost 100
percent. (See fig. 6.) Figure 6: TRADOC O& M Funding Trends for Selected
Mission Areas for Fiscal
Years 1995- 2001
Likewise, the increase in funding was not uniform across TRADOC budget
categories. For example, between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, funding in
the civilian personnel budget category decreased by $60 million, while
TRADOC Received Budget
Increases, but Additional Funds Benefited Limited Areas
Page 17 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management contract funding increased by $317
million. The decrease in civilian personnel funding resulted from the loss
of personnel authorizations.
During this period, an increasing percentage of the budget was shifted
from base operations accounts to the Command*s highest priority mission*
training. This is shown in figure 7. This practice generally left TRADOC
in a position to conduct only minimal repair and maintenance on its
facilities.
Figure 7: TRADOC O& M Funding Percentages by Mission Area for Fiscal Years
1995- 2001
The largest increases in TRADOC*s budget were directly related to
contracting and added mission responsibilities. Between fiscal years 1995
and 2001, the amount of funding spent on contracting increased by 38
percent, or about $317 million (in constant fiscal year 2001 dollars).
According to TRADOC budget officials, a large portion of this contract
funding was used to support Army transformation initiatives. They noted
that in several instances the Army provided funding for
transformationrelated
activities but did not provide the associated personnel
Page 18 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management authorizations. TRADOC did not
have available in- house personnel to address the new requirements, which
effectively forced the Command to
contract for those activities. In fiscal year 2001, the Command received
$289 million related to new mission funding. Of that total, $150 million,
or 52 percent of new mission funding, was directly associated with Army
transformation and was used to acquire contractor support. For example,
contractors were used to develop doctrine and training materials for the
new Stryker brigades.
Reductions in personnel authorizations, coupled with unchanged personnel
requirements, have affected TRADOC*s ability to meet workload requirements
in some mission areas. The Command has been able to perform its training
mission, but with difficulty. Moreover, backlogs of work exist in the
training development, doctrine development, combat development, and base
operations mission areas. The Command*s inability to address its personnel
shortages and workload backlogs are reflected in its monthly readiness
reports, which consistently show low readiness
levels throughout the Command. At the same time, TRADOC lacks a formal
process for obtaining customer feedback information to evaluate the
effectiveness of its mission and alert Army leaders to potential problem
areas. Two Army leadership panels completing their work in 2001 and 2002
identified concerns about TRADOC*s ability to effectively carry out its
mission. Also, anecdotal evidence from U. S. Army Forces Command
(FORSCOM)* a major TRADOC customer* indicates that the quality of TRADOC
training provided to individuals has declined and
confirms that some doctrine is not up to date. Army transformation and
other potential future requirements will likely place new demands on
TRADOC, making it even more challenging for the Command to perform its
mission at its current resource levels.
Over the past several years TRADOC has been able to perform its training
mission, but officials noted some concerns about the quality of the
training. As shown in figure 8, the number of full- time equivalent
students per year* referred to as the training workload* decreased
significantly between fiscal years 1991 and 1994, primarily as a result of
DOD downsizing. Since approximately 1994 the training workload has
remained relatively steady, between 60,000 and 70,000 full- time
equivalent students annually. Due to the high priority placed on meeting
the training workload, TRADOC ensures that the students arriving at its
schools receive timely scheduled training. TRADOC*s Full
Workload Requirements Are Not Being Met; Leadership Panels and Combat
Forces Cite Quality Problems
TRADOC Performed Training Mission but Experienced Difficulty Meeting Other
Mission Workload
Page 19 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Figure 8: Army Training Workload,
Fiscal Years 1991- 2003
However, officials located at both TRADOC Headquarters and the TRADOC
schools we visited expressed concern about a decline in quality in some
aspects of the training provided by the Command. They believe that the
Command does not have enough experienced training instructors to provide
the quality of training they would like. They noted that personnel
reductions have resulted in the loss of some of the corporate knowledge
necessary to develop training courses and doctrine publications and that
personnel who were once devoted solely to writing doctrine are now asked
to conduct training first and to write doctrine as a secondary
responsibility. Furthermore, they told us that the decreasing number of
personnel, coupled with increasing class sizes, resulted in more students
per instructor and less individual training time.
Workload backlogs are evident in some of TRADOC*s primary mission areas. A
training and doctrine development backlog exists throughout the Command.
Moreover, the combat development backlog is growing. Finally, declining
personnel and budgetary resources have affected the Command*s ability to
carry out base operations. Workload Backlogs Exist
in Some Mission Areas
Page 20 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management According to TRADOC workload data,
a training and doctrine development backlog exists throughout the Command.
Army training and doctrine materials must complement one another so that
soldiers are
trained according to current doctrine. However, as a result of an
insufficient number of training development personnel, TRADOC has not been
able to maintain the currency of its highest- priority training courses*
commonly referred to as programs of instruction (POI)* and associated
doctrine. TRADOC officials stated that to compensate for the shortage of
doctrine development personnel, the Command has used contractors in some
instances to write and revise doctrine publications. Even with the use of
contractors, backlogs continue.
TRADOC managers use a database to manage the Command*s highestpriority
training and doctrine development workload. TRADOC leadership uses the
information contained in this database to make resource and workload
allocation decisions. Table 2, which shows data extracted from the
database, identifies the Army*s top 13 training and doctrine development
priorities as understood by TRADOC. However, these top priorities do not
represent the entirety of the Command*s training and doctrine development
workload. The work associated with these priorities is expressed in terms
of staff- years of work and staff- years available to perform the work. As
the table shows, TRADOC*s available personnel
cannot complete the workload associated with these top priorities* only 45
percent of the staff- years required for the top priority training and
doctrine development work were available, indicating a significant
shortfall in personnel available to do this work. TRADOC Has Training and
Doctrine Development Backlogs
Page 21 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Table 2: TRADOC*s Top 13 Training
and Doctrine Development Priorities (as of October 2002) Priority ranking
Workload categories Staff- years
1 Contemporary operating environment/ force protection 717.98
2 Unit set fielding * 1st Cavalry 108.49 3 Interim B\ brigade combat teams
(Stryker
brigades) 850.22 4 Distance learning courseware 1,911.81 5 Doctrine (field
manuals, joint and NATO pubs) 306.82 6 Mission training plans 1,403.97 7
Soldier training pubs 17.02 8 TRADOC transformation 103.80 9 Institutional
digital education plan 84.00 10 Interim division 187.18 11 Individual
training requirements (POI, etc.) 1,326.19 12 Total army training system
courseware 35.17 13 Warrior training support packages 265.43
Total staff- year requirements 7,318.08 Total staff- years available
3,294.00
Shortfall in staff- years (4,024.08) Source: TRADOC.
Most of the Command*s training and doctrine developers are focusing on the
top four priorities. TRADOC officials stated that the first and fourth
priorities are both being filled at nearly 100 percent of the staff- years
required, while attention given to other areas* such as Mission Training
Plans and TRADOC Transformation* varies. 8 Although many of the areas
represented in table 2 have a component of
doctrine writing, priority number 5 is the area most directly related to
TRADOC*s doctrine mission. TRADOC doctrine development officials told us
that the Command had enough personnel to complete about 40 percent
of its existing doctrine development workload. A large portion of this
backlog involves field manuals, which have to be written, reviewed
8 TRADOC does not track actual staff- year data. However, officials were
confident that the Contemporary Operating Environment/ Force Protection
and the Distance Learning Courseware priorities were filled to 100
percent. They identified other areas that have received resources, but
could not provide a measure of the level of resourcing for these
areas.
Page 22 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management periodically, and revised. 9 In
total, TRADOC is responsible for more than 600 field manuals and
publications, which include joint operations with
other military services and U. S. allies. We calculated that as of January
2002 only about 33 percent of the field manuals in the inventory were up
to date. (See fig. 9.) The other 67 percent of the manuals required work,
including the development of at least 81 new publications, the review of
129 existing publications, and the revision of 205 outdated publications.
Of the 81 new publications, 26 are directly
related to the Stryker brigades and Army transformation. Without updated
field manuals, the Army*s combat units may not have the benefit of the
tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to help them better perform
their missions in future conflicts.
Figure 9: Army Field Manual Status (as of January 2002)
9 The Army doctrine development (field manual development) cycle has six
phases: (1) assessment, (2) planning, (3) development, (4) production, (5)
print and dissemination, and (6) implementation and evaluation. This
process may take from 18 to 24 months to complete. The length of time
varies depending on whether a field manual is being newly
written or revised, the scope and complexity of the material, the extent
of the staffing/ review required, and the level of approval authority
required.
Page 23 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Doctrine writing is one mission
area that relies on contractors to satisfy some workload requirements. For
example, Fort Benning, which is
responsible for supporting the development and fielding of the Stryker
brigades, is using contractor personnel to develop doctrine for the new
brigades. In this particular situation, Fort Benning officials told us
that the contractor used retired military personnel with infantry
experience to help write the field manuals. The officials noted that the
retired military
personnel being used by the contractor had relevant experience needed for
writing doctrine; however, they also expressed concern that reduced
personnel authorizations may eventually shrink the pool of available
retired military personnel with the experience needed to fill the contract
positions.
TRADOC is also experiencing growing workload backlogs in its combat
developments mission area. The backlogs include tasks required to develop
and analyze warfighting concepts and materiel requirements related to
force modernization and transformation, among other things. According to
TRADOC officials, the Command is responsible for about 46,200 combat
development tasks per year. Those same officials noted that the Command*s
workload backlog is growing at a rate of about 33 percent per year because
the mission area does not have enough personnel to address the large
volume of tasks that needs to be completed. TRADOC*s base operations
mission area, which involves activities like
logistics and the sustainment, restoration, and modernization of real
property, has also been affected by declining resources. TRADOC officials
told us that they frequently were able to provide only emergency or
minimal real property maintenance at installations between fiscal years
1995 and 2001, due to insufficient personnel and funding. Moreover, during
that time, TRADOC shifted O& M funding from base operations accounts to
training accounts to ensure that the training mission could be
accomplished. This explains, in part, the backlog of reported real
property
maintenance. For example, for fiscal year 2001, the funding level for the
Command*s base operations was set at about 70 percent of its workload
requirements, thus TRADOC was able to make more funding available for
higher- priority mission areas, such as training.
Various TRADOC officials have also expressed concern about the difficulty
of staffing and maintaining training ranges. For example, officials from
both TRADOC and FORSCOM noted that the National Training Center, which is
used to conduct large- scale collective training exercises, has not been
adequately staffed to observe the training and provide feedback to units
involved in the exercises. As a result, FORSCOM units Combat Development
Backlog
Is Growing Declining Resources Affect TRADOC*s Ability to Provide Base
Operations
Page 24 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management have had to use their own
personnel to augment National Training Center personnel, particularly in
the area of forward observers; consequently, some FORSCOM combat personnel
were not able to participate fully in training exercises.
TRADOC prepares a monthly status report that assesses the readiness of
most of its organizational units. These monthly reports are provided to
the Army Chief of Staff. Our review of these reports showed that a
majority of the Command*s organizations were assigned the lowest readiness
rating throughout most of fiscal year 2001 and into fiscal year 2002 and
that 17 of TRADOC*s 30 reporting units identified personnel shortages as
the primary reason for their lower readiness status. 10 TRADOC*s readiness
rating criteria call for a unit to be rated low in the category of
personnel if it has less than 70 percent of the personnel it requires.
Figure 10 shows how the 30 units included in the reports were rated.
10 Readiness ratings are based on specific criteria related to personnel
levels, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and training. The
ratings are measures of a unit/ component*s ability to perform its
mission. A C- 1 rating represents the highest readiness position, denoting
that the mission can be fully performed. Conversely, a C- 4 rating
represents the lowest readiness position, denoting that the mission cannot
be accomplished. Readiness Reports Show
Personnel Shortages and Effects
Page 25 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Figure 10: Average Readiness
Ratings for 30 TRADOC Reporting Units, for the Period January 2001 *
February 2002
Note: GAO analysis of TRADOC monthly status reports.
A few units that did not report problems with personnel shortages had
other problems that caused them to report low readiness ratings. For
example, one reporting unit that was consistently at a C- 4 rating
identified the lack of equipment on hand rather than insufficient
personnel as the reason for its low readiness ratings.
Unit commanders include written comments that accompany the readiness
ratings they provide on monthly readiness reports. The comments highlight
the types of problems being experienced and the effect those problems have
on the unit*s mission performance. We reviewed the comments for the period
covered in figure 10, and the following quote is representative of many of
the comments that appeared in the monthly reports:
[The] lack of personnel and funding, especially a very limited officer
presence, has put Combat, Doctrine and Training Development at risk
resulting in the use of outdated doctrine and training materials.* The
Operating Force has to compensate by developing what it needs on its own.
According to our analysis, commanders most often reported the shortage
of doctrine, training, and combat developers as their top readiness
Page 26 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management concern. For example, one comment
stated that TRADOC needs funding for 400 permanent civilian training
development positions to eliminate the
Command*s large training development backlog. Another comment noted that
the 70 percent reduction in military and civilian training developers
severely degraded the Command*s capability to maintain current force
training materials as well as support the evolving future forces*
requirements. Between January 2001 and January 2002, 28 units reported a
shortage of developers as a major concern at least once.
Other comments regarding the lack of personnel referred to reductions in
the required rank of soldiers that were filling supervisory/ training
positions, thus assigning training responsibilities to less experienced
military personnel. Likewise, commanders noted that personnel reductions
had placed civilian personnel in positions for which they were marginally
qualified or not qualified at all.
DOD also reports on the readiness of the military services to perform
their respective training functions. This readiness assessment is
presented to Congress in the department*s quarterly and annual
Institutional Training Readiness reports. Although TRADOC has consistently
reported a low overall readiness status, the quarterly reports DOD
provided to Congress generally showed Army institutional training
readiness at the C- 1 and C- 2 levels. The readiness reports provided to
Congress, however, only reflect the training portion of TRADOC*s mission
and do not rate the Command*s
readiness to carry out training, doctrine, and combat development. For
example, the department*s annual Institutional Training Readiness Report
for Fiscal Year 2001, issued January 2002, showed TRADOC*s institutional
training readiness to be either C- 1 or C- 2 for six of the seven training
categories assessed. 11 The report did note, however, that
personnel and funding shortages caused some ratings to drop below C- 1,
particularly in the flight training area. The report also noted that
TRADOC had to put other mission areas* combat, doctrine, and training
developments* at risk to meet its primary mission of training. In
addition, DOD*s Institutional Training Readiness reports compare the
number of
students projected to enter the training system and the number that
actually receive training. For this reason, the reports do not provide a
measure of training quality.
11 The seven categories of institutional training that were assessed were
(1) recruiting, (2) one- station unit training, (3) officer acquisition,
(4) initial skill training, (5) skill progression training, (6) functional
training, and (7) flight training.
Page 27 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management While TRADOC readiness reports
show a significant degradation in readiness* often attributed to resource
constraints* the impact on its
ability to support operational forces is not well established and is often
limited to anecdotal concerns voiced by operational leaders. TRADOC
previously collected and evaluated such anecdotal information in the form
of feedback from its customers, but it does not currently have the
capability to do so. According to TRADOC officials, this capability was
eliminated in the early 1990s as part of the Command*s response to reduced
personnel authorizations. Nevertheless, collecting feedback from customers
is a good management practice. The Government Performance and Results Act
12 as well as prior GAO reports reference the need to obtain and analyze
data related to the quality of services provided by and to government
organizations. 13 Obtaining feedback from customers is an important aspect
of assessing the quality of services. Without a systematic process to
collect and evaluate customer feedback information, the ability to plan
and prioritize workload based on customers* needs is hindered. The Command
decided in fiscal year 2002 to reestablish a quality
assurance program. According to TRADOC officials, the program*s objectives
would be to (1) establish and maintain an organizational structure within
TRADOC to ensure the quality and standardization of education/ training
across components; (2) ensure that all components are trained to the same
standard and trained to perform in a contemporary operating environment;
14 (3) ensure that students can perform to training standards; and (4)
ensure that education/ training meets the needs of the legacy, interim,
and objective forces. However, it is unclear how many
12 The Government and Performance and Results Act requires federal
agencies to set strategic goals, measure performance, and report on the
degree to which the goals are met. Its intent is to focus agencies more on
results, service delivery, and program outcomes (P. L. 103- 62, 1993).
13 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Improving
Customer Feedback Program Could Enhance DLA*s Delivery of Services, GAO-
02- 776 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 9, 2002); Tax Administration: IRS Faces
Challenges in Measuring Customer Service, GAO/ GGD- 98- 59 (Washington, D.
C.: Feb. 23, 1998); and Federal Prison Industries: Limited Data Available
on Customer Satisfaction, GAO/ GGD- 98- 50 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 16,
1998).
14 According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook No. 02- 8,
Operation Enduring Freedom Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, the
contemporary operational environment is the overall operational
environment that exists today and in the near future, out to the year
2020. The range of threats during this period extends from smaller,
lowertechnology opponents using more adaptive, asymmetric methods to
larger, modernized forces able to engage deployed U. S. forces in more
conventional, symmetrical ways. TRADOC Lacks
Information to Evaluate Its Mission Effectiveness
Page 28 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management resources TRADOC would be able to
allocate to this program and whether the program would incorporate a
customer feedback component.
Two recent Army training and leader development panels and various FORSCOM
officials indicate that the quality of TRADOC*s products* such as well-
trained soldiers and adequate field manuals and training materials* has
declined. Also, officials at FORSCOM Headquarters and at one of its major
installations, Fort Hood, Texas, provided us with anecdotal information
about the quality of TRADOC*s products that reinforced the panels*
observations.
During 2001 and 2002, two Army Training and Leader Development Panels* one
representing officers and one representing noncommissioned officers*
raised issues about the quality of TRADOC*s products. The purpose of these
panels, which were chartered by the Army Chief of Staff, was to assess the
quality of the Army*s training and leader development programs and
identify areas needing improvement. In particular, the panels were to
determine the relevancy of existing training and leader development
programs to the needs of the future forces. The first panel focused on
evaluating training and leader development efforts related to commissioned
officers, and the second panel focused on noncommissioned officers.
The officer panel concluded that (1) TRADOC was not providing the Army
with up- to- date training and educational products due to a severe lack
of training development resources; (2) TRADOC was not updating or
developing training and education products fast enough to support both the
current and future forces; (3) many of the foundational publications and
products related to standards- based training and leader development were
obsolete; and (4) mechanisms for evaluating training and leader
development programs were lacking. The panel made the general observation
that the Army*s combat forces were evolving at a pace that was not
allowing the institutional training base to provide up- to- date training
and educational products. The noncommissioned officer panel presented
similar but more detailed conclusions than the officer panel. The panel
noted, among other things,
that (1) more than 40 percent of Army military occupational specialties
did not have current manuals; (2) the Army training and development
standards had deteriorated since the early 1990s; and (3) the Army*s
failure to keep its standards up to date since the Gulf War had created a
generation of senior noncommissioned officers that do not know and are not
executing the principles and processes of Army training doctrine. Army
Leadership Panels
and FORSCOM Officials Believe the Quality of TRADOC Products Has Declined
Page 29 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management FORSCOM*s observations complement
the findings of the two Training and Leader Development Panels. FORSCOM
officials consistently noted that soldiers graduating from TRADOC schools
are not as well trained as
they once were because TRADOC no longer has the number of personnel it
needs to ensure comprehensive, quality training. Nor did they feel that
TRADOC had adequately developed or communicated a strategy for training
personnel on digital equipment like the new Army Battle Command System.
Moreover, they noted that some of the equipment being used for training
was not current, and thus the training being provided on those systems was
not properly preparing soldiers to operate the equipment that their
operational units were using. For example, they said that armor officers
were being trained on older versions of Abrams tanks at TRADOC, while
several operational units were already using newer digitized versions.
Several armor battalion commanders at Fort Hood said that they had to
frequently provide individual training to armor officers coming from
TRADOC*s Armor School in order to familiarize the officers with the
digital equipment being used in battalion tanks.
Some FORSCOM officials also expressed concerns about the age of Army
doctrine publications, several of which are Cold War- era documents. They
noted that the lack of current doctrinal publications causes units in
FORSCOM to develop battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures based
on doctrinal foundations that do not reflect the current operating
environment. FORSCOM officials did note one exception to their general
observations about doctrine: they believed TRADOC had provided both
timely and quality doctrine development and related support for the new
Stryker brigades.
TRADOC*s ability to meet its future responsibilities will likely be
challenged because the Command continues to acquire new mission
requirements that will continue to compound its already large workload
backlogs. For example, Army transformation requirements will continue to
place new demands on TRADOC over the next several years. 15 Transformation
will bring changes in equipment as the Army modernizes
existing equipment and transitions to the interim and objective forces. 15
See U. S. General Accounting Office, Military Transformation: Army Has a
Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major
Challenges,
GAO- 02- 96 (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 16, 2001). TRADOC Likely to Face
Additional Workload Challenges as the Army*s *Architect of the Future*
Page 30 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management This, in turn, will necessitate
changes in operating concepts, doctrine, and training.
The Army*s plans, however, do not call for the total elimination of
current capabilities. While it is developing the objective force and
establishing the interim force, such as the Stryker brigades, the Army
plans to sustain, recapitalize (upgrade and rebuild), and modernize many
of the systems currently in use. For example, all of the Abrams tanks
currently in the Army*s arsenal will eventually be equipped with digital
battlefield command systems as part of modernization and transformation
efforts and will remain in the arsenal until about 2031. Maintaining and
upgrading current capabilities will continue to place demands on TRADOC*s
combat, doctrine, and training developments mission areas.
Available budget data indicate that TRADOC could face increased funding
challenges as the Army proceeds with its transformation efforts and
continues to maintain its current weapon systems. We reported in May 2001
that the modernization and transformation of the current force will
require significantly more resources* current systems alone would require
substantial investment to sustain and modernize. 16 As we noted in the
report, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology) said on September 6, 2000, that the Army would require $23
billion to modernize its current forces during fiscal years 2002 to 2007,
but projected that it would only have about $15.5 billion for that
purpose, a $7.5 billion shortfall. Given this magnitude of budget
shortfalls, without additional budgetary resources and improved operating
efficiencies, the Army will have to make trade- offs between modernization
initiatives and operational demands. Moreover, Army Headquarters has not
been persuaded to provide TRADOC with significantly more resources,
primarily because it does not have extra resources available. Officials
involved in prioritizing Army budgetary resources stated that the Army
simply had too many other, higher- priority programs and requirements to
satisfy before it could provide TRADOC with additional funding. 16 U. S.
General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces
Weapon Systems Challenges, GAO- 01- 311 (Washington, D. C.: May 21, 2001).
Page 31 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Both Army Headquarters and TRADOC
have actions or plans in process that could affect TRADOC, but it is
unclear how these actions will affect
the Command*s resource posture or its ability to perform its mission.
Armywide actions include the transfer of responsibility for base
operations away from all of its commands to a new Armywide organization, a
reassessment of the process used to determine personnel
requirements for TRADOC and the other institutional forces, and ongoing
commercial activities studies that may cause TRADOC to rely more on
contractors to support future operations. The Command is also losing some
military personnel to the combat forces as part of the Army*s *Manning the
Force* initiative. Finally, TRADOC is in the process of developing a
commandwide reengineering plan, which is intended to streamline its
organizational structure, make better use of information technology, and
be more responsive to the Army*s combat forces. Issues and questions
related to these various initiatives remain unresolved or unanswered.
As part of its effort to transform, streamline its headquarters, and
improve resource management, the Army announced plans in October 2001 to
create a new agency for managing all of its base operations activities.
The new agency, called the Installation Management Agency (IMA), was
activated in October 2002 and assumed management responsibilities for base
operations activities such as force protection, logistics, public works,
facilities maintenance, and morale and welfare programs under one
management organization. 17 The Army hopes to achieve several goals with
IMA, which include improving the efficiency and effectiveness of
installation management and allowing mission commanders to focus more on
maintaining readiness. The Army expects to transfer about 35,000 personnel
authorizations and about $8 billion in funding from various Army commands
to IMA during fiscal year 2003.
For fiscal year 2001, TRADOC had about 18,100 personnel requirements and
about 10,350 personnel authorizations for base operations. The Army began
to transfer personnel authorizations and associated funding from TRADOC to
IMA in October 2002. As many as 10,000 personnel may be transferred,
although the number had not been finalized. The personnel
17 IMA is comprised of a headquarters located in the Washington, D. C.
area and seven regional offices* four located within the continental
United States and one each in Hawaii, Germany, and Korea. Effect of
Ongoing and
Planned Actions on TRADOC Is Uncertain
Base Operations Mission Transferred to New Organization
Page 32 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management authorizations to be transferred
represent most of the authorizations allocated to TRADOC*s base operations
mission area.
The loss of the base operations mission will result in TRADOC having less
flexibility to shift funding among its primary mission areas. In the past,
TRADOC has been able provide additional funding to its higher- priority
mission areas by taking some funds from base operations. For example, in
fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, the Command moved $115 million, $98
million, and $145 million, respectively, from investment accounts* which
were primarily base operations accounts* to training accounts. 18 As a
result, TRADOC was able to complete its primary mission* training* at the
expense of some base operations activities, such as the maintenance and
rehabilitation of facilities. TRADOC officials told us they will no longer
have the flexibility to do this after base operations funding is
reallocated to IMA.
The Army is reassessing the process it uses to determine personnel
requirements. Army regulations require that the institutional force*s
personnel requirements be based on workload. A sound workload analysis is
needed to allocate personnel resources among institutional organizations
throughout the Army and to ensure that the highest- priority functions and
missions are funded first. Moreover, current law specifies that civilian
personnel are to be managed solely on the basis of the workload required
to carry out the functions and activities of their respective military
department and the funds made available to the department. 19 The law also
requires the military department secretaries to report annually on their
compliance with the provisions of this law.
However, the Army has had longstanding issues with its institutional force
personnel requirements, as documented in previously published GAO and Army
Audit Agency reports. 20 Since early 1995, the Army has developed
18 The investment accounts included funds for (a) infrastructure
sustainment, rehabilitation, and modernization; (b) facility reduction;
(c) integrated training management; and (d) combat developments.
19 The legislative requirements are set out in 10 U. S. C. Section 129;
the annual reports are to be completed by February 1 of each year. 20 See
U. S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Army*s Efforts to
Improve Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few Results, GAO/
NSIAD- 98- 65 (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 26, 1998) and U. S. Army Audit
Agency, Managing Workload,
Organizations and Staffing, HQ 94- 751 (Alexandria, Va.: June 23, 1994).
Army Reassessing Process
for Determining Institutional Force Personnel Requirements
Page 33 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management plans and taken steps to improve
the processes used to develop personnel requirements for the institutional
forces. Nevertheless, we reported in May
2001 that the accuracy of the personnel requirements for the Army*s
institutional forces was questionable. 21 We recommended that, among other
things, the Army use the results of Army Manpower Analysis Agency reviews
to improve the personnel requirements of the institutional forces.
While some progress to develop more accurate personnel requirements has
been made, the Army is still concerned about two primary problems: (1) the
validity of workload estimates and the resulting personnel requirements
and (2) the extent to which contractors are satisfying workload
requirements. For example, in fiscal year 2002, the Army did not have
accurate information about the size and use of the contractor workforce.
As a result, the Army was unable to report that it was managing its
civilian personnel solely on the basis of the workload required to carry
out the functions and activities of the department during fiscal year
2002. A major issue involved the extent to which contractors were meeting
workload requirements. Although the Army expends about one- third of its
total obligation authority for contractor support, its estimates of the
number of contractor personnel supporting the Army ranges from about
125,000 to 600,000. 22 Without accurate information about the contractor
workforce, the Army was not confident that its civilian personnel
requirements were valid. In 2002 the Army began an effort to identify the
size of its contractor workforce; this effort is still underway.
In early 2002, concerned about the accuracy of its personnel requirements
and the widening gap between personnel requirements and authorizations,
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans within Army
Headquarters initiated a study of the requirements determination process
21 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Projected
Requirements for Some Army Forces Not Well Established, GAO- 01- 485
(Washington, D. C.: May 11, 2001). 22 The estimate is based on a study
sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve
Affairs), which was completed in March 2002. The Assistant Secretary
(Manpower & Reserve Affairs) is responsible for Army personnel policies.
Page 34 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management for all of the commands that
comprise the institutional forces. 23 The intent of the study was twofold*
to arrive at a process that produces valid
requirements and to strengthen the role of Army leadership components in
the review and approval of the requirements. Among other things, the study
team proposed in August 2002 that personnel requirements simply be
adjusted downward so that they would equal personnel authorizations. This
proposal applied to TRADOC even though its personnel requirements
determination process had previously been certified as valid by the Army*s
Manpower Analysis Agency. The proposed change in the process was expected
to pressure the commands that comprise the institutional force to
rejustify their respective personnel requirements and give Army
Headquarters more control over the process. However, the commands, as well
as some Headquarters offices, opposed the proposal for several reasons.
They believed that it did not (a) acknowledge valid requirements processes
that were already in place; (b) acknowledge existing workload backlogs in
excess of resource levels, which makes areas of risk more visible to
senior managers; (c) acknowledge the role the commands play in validating
requirements; and (d) comply with legislative requirements to
manage personnel requirements solely on the basis of workload. As a result
of the commands* concerns, the proposal has been abandoned. However, the
study team continues to seek out other options for strengthening senior
Army managers* control over the process and to identify potential new
policy guidance related to the personnel requirements determination
process for institutional forces. The follow- on study is not expected to
be completed until sometime during fiscal year 2003.
Studies conducted as part of the Army*s commercial activities program will
likely lead to some reduction in personnel authorizations at TRADOC. To
help meet DOD force reshaping and downsizing goals, the Army established a
goal for TRADOC to study about 13,600 positions under Office of Management
Budget Circular A- 76. One goal of the A- 76 studies is to identify
commercial functions that could be performed more efficiently, either by a
streamlined in- house workforce or a contract with the private
23 The Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans is responsible for
conducting the Total Army Analysis, which determines the allocation of
personnel resources among the operational and institutional forces. Within
Operations and Plans, the Force Management Division has had a long-
standing role in determining personnel allocations for the Army*s combat
forces. The Force Management Division was the sponsor of this study and
believes it needs to be more involved in allocating personnel
authorizations to the institutional forces. The Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans also receives TRADOC*s monthly status reports on
readiness. Commercial Activity
Studies Likely to Reduce Personnel Requirements and Authorizations
Page 35 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management sector. In either case, the
required number of personnel authorizations would likely be reduced*
either because the in- house workforce would
become more efficient and would not require as many staff or because the
function would no longer be performed by current federal employees.
However, these studies by themselves will not free personnel for
assignment to other mission areas where shortages exist.
Most of TRADOC*s commercial activity studies were initiated in fiscal
years 1997 and 1999. Because studies generally take from 2 to 4 years to
complete, TRADOC did not begin to implement decisions until fiscal year
2001. As of November 2002, decisions on 39 of the 57 studies had been
made. Decisions implemented thus far resulted in a majority of the
activities under study going to private- sector contractors. Remaining
decisions will not be made until sometime in fiscal year 2003. Table 3
shows the status of the studies.
Table 3: Status of TRADOC Commercial Activity Studies Announced during
Fiscal Years 1997 and 1999 (as of November 2002)
1997 1999 Total
Studies announced 13 44 57 Total positions to be studied 4,833 3,999 8,832
Civilian 4,709 2,043 6,752
Military 124 1,956 2,080
Studies completed 13 26 39
Positions retained in- house 935 1,429 2,364
Positions to contract 3,898 423 4,321
Source: TRADOC.
The studies reviewed a number of commercial activities; however, most of
the larger studies fell within the base operations mission area and
involved the logistics and public works functions. Because TRADOC*s base
operations mission was transferred to IMA beginning in October 2002, the
Command will not be affected in the future by most of these studies. Of
TRADOC*s remaining primary mission areas, training and training support
will be most affected by some of the smaller commercial activities studies
that are currently underway.
In addition to the above studies that are nearing completion, the Army
announced plans in October 2002 to further study all of its functions that
do not necessarily require military personnel to perform. If these plans
are carried out, Army officials estimate that as many as 150,000 personnel
Page 36 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management authorizations Armywide could be
eliminated as work shifts to the private sector. To what extent this will
affect TRADOC remains to be seen.
Further, although commercial activity studies can reduce TRADOC*s
personnel requirements and improve operating efficiencies, they can
increase the Command*s budget requirements when their outcome results in
military positions being replaced by civilian or contractor personnel. In
these instances, the Army plans to reallocate the military positions to
other needs. However, the increase in budgetary requirements occurs
because the Command must budget for the cost of its civilian personnel and
contractors, which are paid from O& M funds. They no longer have the
benefit of the military personnel who were paid by Army Headquarters from
centrally managed funds. These additional costs are referred to as
*military buy- back* costs. In September 2001, TRADOC estimated that its
military buy- back costs would be about $44 million, $90 million, and $92
million for fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively.
The Army*s *Manning the Force* initiative was announced in fiscal year
2000 and is intended, in part, to transfer military personnel from the
institutional to the operational forces to improve the readiness of combat
forces. This initiative will continue at least through fiscal year 2003.
Initially, TRADOC expected to lose about 1,400 military personnel to the
combat units as a result of the *Manning the Force* initiative. Since a
lack of military personnel is already contributing to workload backlogs
and low readiness reports, the initiative is not likely to improve
TRADOC*s ability to reduce backlogs and improve readiness. Furthermore,
the loss of authorized military personnel will not free funds for the
Command because, as discussed above, military personnel are not paid from
TRADOC*s O& M funds. However, TRADOC officials were not able to identify
the number of
military personnel that either have been or will be sent to the combat
units as a result of the *Manning the Force* initiative. They explained
that several initiatives affecting the number of military personnel
assigned to TRADOC, such as *Quicksilver,* were already underway when the
*Manning the Force* initiative began. TRADOC has begun developing a plan
to overhaul its structure and
processes, and that plan is still evolving. TRADOC officials believe that
the Command must reengineer or overhaul its structure and processes to
ensure that it continues to support the combat forces* readiness and Army
*Manning the Force* Initiative Is Reducing
TRADOC*s Military Authorizations
TRADOC*s Plan to Reengineer the Command Is Still Evolving
Page 37 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management transformation. They believe that
an overhaul is needed because (1) the rapid pace of change related to
transformation is stressing the systems and
processes associated with combat, doctrine, and training development; (2)
the current procedures are too resource- intensive; (3) the weapon systems
requirements determination process does not respond to the needs of the
combat forces in a timely manner; and (4) the cost of maintaining TRADOC*s
current organizational structure cannot be sustained.
In May 2002 the Command received approval from the Army Chief of Staff to
develop a reengineering plan. Its draft plan, referred to as the TRADOC
Transformation Operational and Organizational Plan, is linked to Armywide
plans that provide overall strategic direction* the 2002 Army
Modernization Plan and the Army Transformation Campaign Plan. The
TRADOC plan is based on two primary goals: (1) streamline the Command*s
organization and processes and (2) make better and more extensive use of
information technology. The Command*s staff is also in the process of
updating policies and regulations to support the reengineering effort.
Although TRADOC*s draft plan has not been finalized, the Command is
considering the following organizing concepts to help it achieve its
goals: Implement new teaming and partnering arrangements. TRADOC is
considering establishing new teaming and partnering arrangements across
organizational boundaries to better focus its resources on key mission
areas. Command officials believe that this approach will maximize
personnel resources and expertise across the Command to produce better
products and eventually result in more effective partnership arrangements.
As part of this organizing concept, the role of TRADOC Headquarters will
evolve from program management to the integration of functions and
organizations within TRADOC. Establish a Combined Arms Command. TRADOC
is considering
establishing a subcommand, notionally being referred to as a Combined Arms
Command. This command will focus on training and leader development. Most
of TRADOC*s educational institutions will be placed under this
organization, which will oversee the activities of the schools.
Centralize development for training materials, doctrine, and combat
systems. TRADOC is considering centralizing development
activities as a by- product of its adoption of a standard schoolhouse
model (as discussed in the following point). Responsibility for training
development, doctrine development, and combat development for the
future force would be shifted from the current 26 schools to six primary
Page 38 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management battlefield mission areas
associated with future combat operations* maneuver, maneuver support,
maneuver sustainment, fires, command and
control, and special purpose forces. Development of each of these primary
battlefield mission areas would be under the command of a general officer.
In addition, each primary battlefield mission area would be supported by a
battle laboratory. The six battlefield areas would report to the Combined
Arms Center, leaving the individual schools to become more focused on the
primary mission of training soldiers. TRADOC believes doing this would
help the command become more efficient and effective. Readopt the
standard schoolhouse model. After TRADOC was
established in the 1970s, it established school houses/ training centers
(infantry, armor, artillery, etc.) that followed a standard model in the
way they were organized and staffed. As resources became more constrained,
the schools were given more flexibility to organize in a manner that
suited
the commanders* needs and, theoretically, would make the best use of
TRADOC resources. Management became more decentralized. TRADOC is
considering a move away from the decentralized management approach and
back to a standard schoolhouse model. In addition, the schools would be
clustered or organized under the primary battlefield mission areas
associated with future combat operations. Refocus battle laboratories
and centralize their management. The
command*s 11 battle laboratories are currently aligned with TRADOC*s
schools. For example, an armor battle laboratory is part of the armor
school at Fort Knox, and the infantry battle laboratory is part of the
infantry school at Fort Benning. TRADOC is considering centralizing the
management of six laboratories and refocusing them on the six primary
battlefield mission areas discussed above. TRADOC believes realigning the
laboratories, along with creating new teaming and partnering arrangements,
will better focus its resources on broader issues, such as
Army transformation. Use distance learning more extensively. Distance
learning is expected to become an integral part of the Command*s training
curriculum.
Implementation of this concept has been underway for some time at TRADOC.
In general, it allows soldiers to complete computer- based training
courses or selected modules of a course at their permanent duty location
rather than traveling to a TRADOC facility to complete the course. TRADOC
expects to develop at least 525 distance learning courses by 2010.
TRADOC officials also believe that better and more extensive use of
information technology is just as important as the organizational changes
it is considering. These officials state that information technology will
be the basic building block of the reengineering effort. TRADOC officials
believe the Command has to address mission requirements more quickly
Page 39 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management with fewer resources. They also
believe improved processes built on the latest technology will allow
TRADOC and its customers to share data and
develop products* such as doctrine, training materials, and operational
requirements documents* in a timely manner.
At the time we completed our review of TRADOC, the Command had not yet
developed costs and benefits associated with the reengineering plan, and
it was not clear to what extent the reengineering effort would result in
organizational realignments or consolidations that might reduce personnel
requirements. TRADOC officials told us that an analysis of costs and
benefits would take place and be incorporated into an implementation plan
after the reengineering concepts and organizing principles were agreed to
within the Army. The analysis is to be completed by mid- fiscal year 2003.
We also inquired about development of performance measures to gauge the
progress of the reengineering effort and a human capital plan to support
the effort. Ideally, a reengineering effort such as the one being
undertaken by TRADOC is guided by an overall strategic framework, which
sets out the strategic goals to be attained and performance measures to be
used to measure and report progress toward reaching the goals. Moreover,
the Government Performance and Results Act requires DOD to develop a
strategic framework to improve its performance. In addition, it is
important for DOD and its components to align their human capital policies
with their strategic goals. 24 A human capital plan that supports or is
integrated with an overall strategic plan can help align the policies and
identify the necessary workforce size and skills mix and where those
skills need to be deployed. When the right personnel are on board and
provided the training, technology, structure, incentives, and
accountability to work effectively, the likelihood of organizational
success will be increased.
We found that TRADOC recognized the need for performance measures but had
not yet developed them. We also found that the Command has not
24 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: A Self- Assessment
Checklist for Agency Leaders, GAO/ OCG- 00- 14G (Washington, D. C.:
September 2000, Version I); U. S. General Accounting Office, Human
Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at the Departments of Defense and
State, GAO- 01- 565T (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 29, 2001); and U. S. General
Accounting Office, Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help
Maintain Momentum of DOD*s Strategic Human Capital Planning, GAO- 03- 237
(Washington, D. C.: Dec. 5, 2002).
Page 40 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management developed a human capital plan to
support the reengineering effort; however, it has identified the elements
needed for a human capital plan, which is to be completed during fiscal
year 2003. Thus far, the effort
addresses civilian personnel and how the Command can better cope with the
civilian personnel reductions it has incurred; it does not address
workforce issues associated with military personnel or contractors, which,
in a broad sense, are also part of the Command*s human capital. Given the
personnel downsizing that TRADOC has experienced and its potentially
increasing reliance on contractors to meet its workload, a human capital
plan could help the Command thoroughly assess its personnel
requirements and integrate them into the reengineering effort. Although
TRADOC*s budget has increased in recent years, the Command has experienced
reductions in personnel authorizations that have challenged it to fully
meet its workload in most mission areas. TRADOC data indicate that its
primary problems relate to personnel shortages, and its readiness reports
indicate that more than two- thirds of its units were not ready to perform
their missions due primarily to a lack of personnel. Most of the training
workload is getting done, but a significant amount of mission work
associated with training material, doctrine, and combat developments is
not. In addition, TRADOC does not know how well it is accomplishing its
mission because it does not have a process in place to obtain systematic
feedback from its customers on the quality and relevance of its training
and doctrine. Without this type of information, the Army and TRADOC are
not in a sound position to fully assess the Command*s mission
effectiveness, which could lead to inefficient allocation of resources and
ranking of requirement priorities. Army Headquarters officials are aware
of some of TRADOC*s difficulties, but,
operating within existing resource constraints, officials have had to make
difficult choices and allocate resources to higher Army priorities.
However, issues related to TRADOC*s personnel and workload could take on
more importance as the Army continues its transformation efforts and, if
not adequately addressed, could place the Command at increased risk in its
role as the Army*s architect of the future. TRADOC is currently developing
a plan to reengineer its mission areas. The extent to which this effort
could lead to organizational consolidations and reduced personnel
requirements remains to be seen. A broad assessment of TRADOC*s workload
requirements and backlogs in conjunction with its reengineering plans
would help it set its future direction. Because the Command*s
reengineering effort is still evolving, the Army and TRADOC have an
opportunity to establish a plan based on a strategic framework for
Conclusions
Page 41 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management addressing resource and mission
requirements, human capital, reengineering costs, and performance
measures.
To ensure that TRADOC retains sufficient resources to carry out all of its
missions in an effective and efficient manner* supporting current forces
as well as the transformation effort* we recommend that the Secretary of
the Army direct the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve
Affairs) to work with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,
as part of their personnel and force management oversight
responsibilities, to examine TRADOC*s workload requirements, the adequacy
of TRADOC*s
resources, and TRADOC*s mission performance as it finalizes plans for its
reengineering efforts. In doing this, action is needed to
reassess TRADOC*s backlog of current work and future work requirements
across all mission areas to ensure that all personnel requirements are
identified and validated before further reducing TRADOC*s personnel
authorizations; develop a human capital plan in conjunction with
TRADOC*s
reengineering plan that addresses issues associated with the mix and
skills of civilian, military, and contractor personnel; establish
performance measures to gauge progress and identify the costs
and benefits associated with the reengineering effort; and develop a
feedback system so TRADOC is acquiring the best information
possible about the quality and relevance of the products and services it
provides to its customers.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Program Integration) stated that the department agreed with the
recommendations related to TRADOC*s reengineering process without
elaborating on planned actions, but expressed various concerns about the
recommendations related to reassessing TRADOC*s personnel requirements and
developing a customer feedback system* leaving unclear what overall
actions would be taken. The department*s written
comments are reprinted in Appendix III. DOD interpreted our recommendation
to reassess TRADOC*s backlog of current workload and personnel
requirements before further reducing TRADOC*s personnel authorizations as
a recommendation to fence TRADOC*s current work force, and it cited
resource constraints and competing demands as making it impractical to do
so. Further, the department*s response expressed concern that our report
did not quantify Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
Page 42 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management the resources required to remedy
backlogs in training material, doctrine, and combat developments. Our
recommendation was not intended to be taken in isolation or to suggest an
absolute fencing of TRADOC personnel,
but rather to encourage a reassessment of workload and personnel
requirements as part of TRADOC*s ongoing reengineering effort. Likewise,
our intent was not to quantify the resources required to remedy the
backlogs of work in the various areas noted. That effort can best be done
by the Army in the context of a number of considerations. From our
perspective, the Army and TRADOC have several options if they are to
effectively deal with reported shortfalls in personnel related to workload
requirements. The options include identifying functions and activities
that may no longer be required, identifying opportunities to reduce
personnel requirements or reallocate resources through its reengineering
efforts, obtaining additional resources, or some combination of these.
Given that TRADOC*s reengineering effort is still underway, and we
understand that TRADOC*s new commander has recently directed his staff to
focus on the potential for reducing workload requirements, it remains
unclear what changes in resource requirements will ultimately be
necessary. Given the resource constraints identified by TRADOC commanders
in their monthly readiness reports, we continue to believe it appropriate
that TRADOC reassess its work requirements as part of its reengineering
efforts.
Concerning our recommendation for developing a customer feedback system,
DOD commented that existing informal feedback mechanisms help evaluate
TRADOC*s support to its customers. It indicated they would evaluate our
recommendations in terms of the costs, benefits, and likely accuracy of
more formal reporting processes. DOD also noted that it would evaluate
potential incentives for TRADOC to further improve product relevance and
customer responsiveness as part of the TRADOC reengineering process.
Separately, DOD expressed concern that our report did not quantify the
impact of shortcomings noted in our report on operational force readiness.
Our assessment of impact was, aside from information contained in TRADOC*s
readiness reports, more qualitative in nature based on the results of
internal Army studies and our limited
discussions with leaders in the Army*s Forces Command. Given the nature of
the concerns identified, we continue to believe that the Army could
benefit from a more formal feedback system, one that, if appropriately
designed, could be useful to the Army in better determining how well
TRADOC supports the operational readiness of the combat forces. Absent
such a system, it will be more difficult to fully assess the impact of the
shortcomings noted in our report.
Page 43 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management We are sending copies of this
report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget;
and interested congressional committees and members. We will also make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.
If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please contact
me on (202) 512- 8412 or holmanb@ gao. gov. Other GAO contacts and staff
acknowledgments are identified in appendix IV. Barry W. Holman, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Page 44 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management As requested by the House Armed
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness, we examined the workload,
funding levels, and personnel
resources at the Army*s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Our review
was structured to determine if the Command was adequately resourced to
carry out its mission. Our specific review objectives were to
examine (1) TRADOC*s personnel, budget, and workload trends since 1995;
(2) the impact of personnel and budget changes on the Command*s ability to
perform its mission and deliver well- trained soldiers to combat forces;
and (3) the actions taken or planned that could have an effect on the
Command*s ability to perform its mission.
To determine the extent to which TRADOC has experienced budget, personnel,
and workload changes over the past several years, we met with Army
Headquarters and TRADOC budget, personnel, operations, and training
officials. Pertinent budget, personnel, and workload documentation/ data
were obtained and analyzed to determine the magnitude of the changes. We
focused our analyses primarily on documentation from fiscal years 1995
through 2001 because we were able to obtain more complete information for
these years. Fiscal year 2002 budget data had not been finalized at the
time we completed our analysis. We also examined relevant DOD and Army
senior leader guidance, including the Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
the Army Transformation Campaign Plan, TRADOC mid- year budget reviews,
and TRADOC command plans. We also discussed the allocation of Army
personnel among its commands resulting from the Total Army Analysis
process. We identified the primary TRADOC mission areas* combat
development, doctrine development, training and training development,
accessions (more commonly referred to as recruiting), and base operations*
and structured our analysis of budget, personnel, and workload data around
these mission areas. Our analysis of budget data was limited to budgetary
obligations for the fiscal years we reviewed. Our
analysis of personnel data compared the differences in required,
authorized, and available personnel for fiscal years 1995 through 2001. We
also discussed and reviewed available documentation pertinent to the
process used by TRADOC to develop and validate its personnel requirements.
We held discussions and reviewed documentation with TRADOC, Army Manpower
Analysis Agency, and Army Force Management Support Agency representatives.
The documentation included mathematical models and studies completed by
TRADOC to develop manpower estimating criteria. We also compared the
changes in TRADOC*s civilian and military authorizations with those of the
total active Army and two of the Army*s largest commands* Army Materiel
Command and Forces Command* to put the personnel changes into an Appendix
I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Page 45 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management overall Army context. We also
identified the changes in budgetary resources allocated to TRADOC*s
mission areas for fiscal years 1995
through 2001. Because aspects of TRADOC*s accessions mission were added to
its responsibilities in fiscal year 1998 and subsequently eliminated from
its responsibilities, we excluded the accessions mission when we analyzed
the trends in personnel and workload. This included personnel
requirements, which averaged about 12,400 for fiscal years 1998 through
2000, and personnel authorizations, which averaged about 11,900 for this
3- year period. The analyses that excluded the accessions mission are
noted, where appropriate, in the report.
To determine the effect of personnel and budget changes on the Command*s
ability to perform its mission, we met with officials from TRADOC and
Forces Command Headquarters and several of their installations. At TRADOC
Headquarters we discussed and obtained documentation related to the
Command*s ability to measure mission effectiveness. This included
reviewing the Command*s monthly readiness reports for the period November
2000 through April 2002 for all of its schools and training facilities;
these reports are provided to the Army Chief of Staff each month. We also
compared TRADOC*s readiness reports with DOD*s Institutional Training
Readiness reports issued during the same period to identify similarities
and/ or differences between the two; the Institutional Training Readiness
reports are provided to Congress annually. At the TRADOC facilities we
visited* the armor school, the air defense school, and the infantry
school* we discussed the resources available to support the facilities*
workload. We also identified examples of impacts that resulted from
resource shortages and obtained information about how the facilities were
measuring their mission effectiveness. At Forces Command Headquarters and
one of its heavy armor installations, Fort Hood, we discussed the quality
of soldiers coming out of TRADOC schools and requested available data that
measured the quality of TRADOC products* trained soldiers, doctrine, and
training support materials. We also reviewed numerous reports and analyses
of agencies and groups that have examined TRADOC* such as RAND
Corporation, TRADOC Analysis Center, and the Defense Science Board* to
obtain any additional observations and findings not revealed during our
review of TRADOC.
To identify Army actions taken or planned that might have an effect on the
Command*s ability to perform its mission, we met with Army Headquarters
officials and TRADOC officials to discuss past, current, or future
initiatives
that could affect the resources TRADOC will have available to carry out
its mission. During these discussions, we obtained documentation and
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Page 46 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management testimonial evidence regarding
several initiatives. These included the Command*s commercial activities
program, the Armywide Transformation
of Installation Management initiative, and the Command*s plan to
reengineer itself. We analyzed the impact of the commercial activities
program, which is being carried out under OMB*s Circular A- 76 process, on
TRADOC*s budget and personnel since fiscal year 1995. We determined the
number of positions announced for competition, the number of positions
awarded to contractors, and the number of positions retained by TRADOC*s
in- house workforce. We also discussed the scope and implementation
schedule for the Army*s Transformation of Installation Management
initiative, which is an Armywide program that is moving base operations
and support from garrison commanders to a new agency called the Army
Installation Management Agency. Finally, we discussed the status of plans
to reengineer TRADOC, which involves organizational streamlining and
better use of information technology.
We communicated regularly with Department of the Army and TRADOC officials
during the analysis process to ensure that our analysis appropriately
considered their views, and we conducted work at the
following locations: Army Headquarters, Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia;
TRADOC Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia; Armor School, Fort Knox,
Kentucky; Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas;
Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia; Forces Command Headquarters,
Fort McPherson, Georgia; 4th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division,
Fort Hood, Texas; Army Manpower Analysis Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia;
and Army Force Management Support Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
We conducted our review from September 2001 through October 2002 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel Reductions
Page 47 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Since the early 1990s, the Army*s
civilian and military personnel authorizations have been significantly
reduced as DOD reshaped and
reduced the size of its institutional and operational forces. Overall, the
Army*s authorizations for civilian and active duty military personnel have
been reduced by about 41.5 percent and 33.8 percent, respectively, since
fiscal year 1991. 1 The following figures show the reductions for the Army
and three of its largest commands: TRADOC; the Army Forces Command
(FORSCOM), which provides unit training for combat forces; and the Army
Materiel Command (AMC), which is responsible for acquiring and supporting
weapon systems.
Figure 11: Army Civilian Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected
Commands, Fiscal Years 1991- 2001
Note: GAO analysis of Army and TRADOC data.
1 The totals do not include members of the Army Reserve and National
Guard. Appendix II: Overview of Armywide
Personnel Reductions
Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel Reductions
Page 48 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Figure 12: Army Military Personnel
Authorization Trends for Selected Commands, Fiscal Years 1991- 2001
Note: GAO analysis of Army and TRADOC data.
As shown by these figures, all three commands realized significant
reductions in civilian personnel. Table 4 summarizes the reductions that
occurred from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal year 2001.
Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel Reductions
Page 49 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Table 4: Reductions in Army
Personnel Authorizations for the Active Army and Selected Commands between
Fiscal Years 1991 and 2001
Civilian personnel Military personnel Number of reductions Percent Number
of
reductions Percent
Active Army 153,200 -41.5 245,400 -33.8 TRADOC 13,515 -41.9 13,549 -27.1
FORSCOM 10,056 -36.4 28,694 -12.4 AMC 41,561 -45.5 5,915 -79.5 Source:
Army. Note: GAO analysis of Army data.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 50 GAO- 03- 214 Defense Management Appendix III: Comments from the
Department of Defense
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments Page 51 GAO- 03- 214
Defense Management James E. Fuquay, (937) 258- 7963
In addition to the person named above, James Hatcher, Nancy Lively, Travis
Masters, Debra McKinney, Robert Preston, and R. K. Wild made key
contributions to this report. Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments GAO Contact Acknowledgments
(350113)
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