Combating Terrorism: Funding Data Reported to Congress Should Be 
Improved (26-NOV-02, GAO-03-170).				 
                                                                 
Congress responded to the attacks of September 11, 2001, with	 
dramatic funding increases to combat terrorism. Even before these
attacks, Congress was concerned about increased funding in this  
area, and based on  findings from a 1997 GAO report, mandated	 
that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) report annually on
funding to combat terrorism. In this review, GAO was asked to	 
analyze such funding trends, describe difficulties in		 
coordinating combating terrorism budgets, assess data reported to
Congress, and describe the executive branch's efforts to maximize
the effective use of combating terrorism funds. The review relied
on OMB's definition of "combating terrorism" to include both	 
homeland security and overseas combating terrorism missions.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-170 					        
    ACCNO:   A05388						        
  TITLE:     Combating Terrorism: Funding Data Reported to Congress   
Should Be Improved						 
     DATE:   11/26/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Budget activities					 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Federal funds					 
	     Funds management					 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Terrorism						 

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GAO-03-170

                                       A

Briefing Section I: Introduction

Introduction: Background

 OMB*s annual report on combating terrorism to Congress must

 include listing of proposed amounts to be expended for combating
terrorism programs and activities in the current and next fiscal year,

 describe specific programs and activities,

 list priorities with respect to programs and activities,

 identify duplication of efforts,

 summarize obligations and expenditures on domestic emergency
preparedness for terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction, and

 be issued by March 1 of each year.

 OMB identified over 27 federal entities spending combating terrorism
funds.

In a 1997 report, we found that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and the National Security Council (NSC) did not regularly collect,
aggregate, and review data on funding to combat terrorism on a
governmentwide basis for the many Departments and agencies involved in
combating terrorism. 4 On the basis of our findings, Congress required OMB

to establish a reporting system on the budgeting and expenditure of such
funds, and, since 1998, OMB has been required to prepare both a classified
and an unclassified report on combating terrorism to Congress by March 1
of each year. 5 The report must

 include a list of proposed amounts to be expended for programs for
combating terrorism and activities in the current and next fiscal year,

 describe specific programs and activities,

 list priorities with respect to programs and activities,  summarize
obligations and expenditures on domestic emergency preparedness for
terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, and

 identify duplication of efforts. The 2002 OMB report provides funding
and programmatic information on 27 federal entities that have received
funds for combating terrorism. These federal entities are responsible for
the federal government*s efforts to combat terrorist activity both
domestically and overseas, including defense

against terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. After
the September 11 attacks, OMB included an analysis of homeland security as
part of its June 2002 report.

4 See Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires
Better Management and Coordination, GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 39 (Washington, D. C.:
Dec. 1, 1997). 5 P. L. 105- 85, sec. 1051, Nov. 18, 1997, as amended by P.
L. 105- 261, sec. 1403, Oct. 17, 1998.

Introduction: Timeline of Events

Budget events

OMB Issues FY 2001 ends

A- 11 9/ 30/ 01

Guidance $29 billion

OMB *passback* to 6/ 28/ 02

emergency agencies on policy,

supplemental $40 billion emergency

OMB issues signed 8/ 2/ 02

supplemental signed priorities, and

memo on FY 9/ 18/ 01

funding levels President

2004 budget OMB issues

late 11/ 01 submits FY

priorities annual report on

Agency budgets 2003 budget

4/ 24/ 02 combating

due to OMB request

terrorism 9/ 10/ 01

2/ 4/ 02 6/ 24/ 02

9/ 11/ 01 7/ 16/ 02

To be

Terrorist 11/ 19/ 01

President issues

determined:

attacks Transportation

National

Department of

10/ 8/ 01 Security

Strategy for

Homeland

Office of Administration

Homeland

Security

Homeland established

Security

established

Security 6/ 02

established President proposes

Dept. of Homeland 10/ 4/ 01

Security First known victim

of anthrax attack dies

Combating- terrorism- related events

Source: GAO*s analysis of various government publications. Legend: FY =
fiscal year

Departments* and agencies* submissions of their budget requests for fiscal
year 2003 to OMB coincided closely with the attacks of September 11, 2001.
In response to the attacks, the first of two emergency supplemental
appropriations, totaling $40 billion* of which $12 billion was provided
for

the combating terrorism mission* was signed into law on September 18,
2001. 6 The remaining $28 billion from that supplemental appropriation was
provided for other missions, such as military actions overseas and
recovery at the attack sites. Since this supplemental appropriation was
enacted in the last 2- week period of fiscal year 2001, most of these
funds were not available to agencies for obligation until fiscal year 2002
and were allocated

over several months. The second supplemental appropriation was signed into
law on August 2, 2002. 7 Other key events occurred to influence funding
decisions as OMB considered what requests should be included in the
emergency supplemental appropriation, reviewed agencies* budget requests
for fiscal year 2003, and notified agencies of funding decisions in late
November

during a process known as *passback.* On October 4, 2001, the first known
victim of the anthrax attack died, drawing more attention to funding
needed to counter the threat from biological weapons. On October 8, 2001,
the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) was established and given
responsibility for developing a national strategy for homeland security
and related homeland security activities, including certifying that budget
requests for homeland security were necessary and appropriate. On November
19, 2001, the Transportation Security Administration was established, with
a budget request of $4. 8 billion for fiscal year 2003. 8 On February 4,
2002, the President submitted the budget request for fiscal

year 2003 to Congress. OMB*s 2002 Annual Report on Combating Terrorism,
which includes data from the request for fiscal year 2003, was issued in
June 2002.

In the spring and summer of 2002, offices within the Executive Office of
the President issued guidance related to preparing the budget request for
fiscal year 2004. On April 24, 2002, OMB issued initial budget guidance
indicating

that homeland security was one of the key priorities for fiscal year 2004.
In June 2002, OMB issued the A- 11 Circular, which outlined guidance for
the

6 P. L. 107- 38 made $20 billion of the $40 billion available for
obligation only when enacted in a subsequent emergency appropriations bill
as a condition for the availability of funds. That bill was passed as part
of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, P. L. 107- 117, on
January 10, 2002.

7 P. L. 107- 206. 8 P. L. 107- 71, Nov. 19, 2001. Almost half ($ 2.2
billion) of the Transportation Security Administration*s budget is
supported by user fees.

preparation, submission, and execution of the budget to the agencies. In
the summer of 2002, the President issued two documents that OMB cited as
key guidance for agencies to develop budget requests for fiscal year 2004
and performance plans: the proposal for the new Department of Homeland
Security and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. Establishing the
Department of Homeland Security was under Congress*s consideration at the
time of our review.

Briefing Section II: Funding Analysis

Funding Analysis: Increases in Combating Terrorism Scope &

Funding

 Combating terrorism scope broadened, and funding rose in years prior to
September 11 attacks.

 Postattack combating terrorism missions further expanded to include
homeland security missions.

 Post September 11 combating terrorism funding included

 $12 billion from the emergency supplemental appropriation signed
September 18, 2001, and

 $45 billion from the fiscal year 2003 budget request.

In the years prior to the September 11 attacks, we reported on a rapid
increase in the number of federal programs and funding to combat terrorism
that spanned multiple agencies. These included (1) programs for training
and equipping first responders to address chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear terrorist attacks and (2) federal teams capable
of analyzing such weapons, containing terrorist incidents, and providing

medical support or response. 9 We also reported on significant funding
increases, as well as improvements in OMB*s efforts to track funding
related to combating terrorism.

After the September 11 attacks, the missions and funding for combating
terrorism were dramatically expanded. Most notably, a new group of
homeland security activities* such as border and aviation security* was
included under the definition *combating terrorism.* Since September 11,
$12 billion has been appropriated for missions to combat terrorism in a

supplemental appropriation, and an additional $45 billion has been
requested in the budget request for fiscal year 2003. 10

9 See Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs,
GAO/ TNSIAD- 00- 145 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 6, 2000). 10 The
appropriated amount does not include combating terrorism funding from the
August 2002 supplemental appropriation of $29 billion.

Scope Funding

change increase

Funding Analysis: Changes in Scope Complicate Trend Analysis

Dollars in billions 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

5 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 a

2003 Fiscal year OMB Report, July 2001 OMB Report, June 2002 Source: OMB,
Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, July 2001, and OMB, 2002
Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, June 2002.

a 2002 figure includes emergency supplemental funding enacted September
2001 but does not include emergency supplemental funding, enacted in
August 2002.

As shown in the figure, scope changes and funding increases resulted in a
276- percent surge between 2001 and 2002 (as reported in OMB*s Annual
Reports for 2001 and 2002, respectively). A 106- percent increase is
attributed to changes in definition to broaden the scope of combating

terrorism, such as the addition of border and homeland security, and a
170- percent increase is attributed to increased funding overall.

It is difficult to discuss historical trends in funding for combating
terrorism because of the changing scope of programs and activities
included before

and after the September 11 attacks. In each of the last 5 years, OMB has
issued its Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, which
attempts to capture, across the federal government, total spending on
combating terrorism and, in the most recent report, related homeland
security initiatives. However, as more programs are included in the
definition of *combating terrorism,* funding comparisons become more
complicated. We therefore were unable to determine a funding trend by

agency or mission category (including the homeland security initiatives)
prior to 2001.

Funding Analysis: FEMA and HHS Increased Share of Funding

Preattack funding

Fiscal year 2001 actual--$ 20 billion Fiscal year 2002 enacted--$ 24
billion

<1% <1%

2% 1%

39% 36%

59% 63%

Postattack funding

Emergency supplemental--$ 12 billion a Fiscal year 2003 request--$ 45
billion

<1% 8% 22%

10% 51%

51% 27%

32%

Federal Emergency Management Agency National Security

Health and Human Services All other Departments Source: OMB, 2002 Report
to Congress on Combating Terrorism, June 2002. Figures do not always add
to 100 percent because of rounding.

a The emergency supplemental figure includes the emergency supplemental
appropriation enacted in September 2001 but does not include the emergency
supplemental appropriation enacted in August 2002. Moreover, it includes
only the $12 billion designated by OMB as funds for combating terrorism,
not the entire $40 billion appropriation. In dollar terms, on the basis of
the definition that OMB used in its 2002

report, funding for all federal entities with missions for combating
terrorism increased following the attacks. In percentage terms, National
Security agencies consistently received the highest proportion of funds,
but their share of these funds decreased after September 11, whereas the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Federal

Emergency Management Agency*s (FEMA) proportion of funds for combating
terrorism increased substantially. Most other agencies received a smaller
portion of the total funds provided after the attacks, as shown in table
2.

Table 2: Federal Entities* Percentage of Funding for Combating Terrorism
Percentage of funding for combating terrorism Preattack funding Postattack
funding

Emergency Supplemental Fiscal year 2002

Appropriation enacted

enacted Fiscal year 2003

Fiscal year 2001 pre- Sept. 11

Sept. 2001 budget request

Federal entity ($ 20 billion) ($ 24 billion)

($ 12 billion) ($ 45 billion)

National Security 39 36 27 32 Department of Transportation 12 17 10 16
Department of Justice 23 21 18 16 Department of Health and Human Services
2 1 22 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency <1 <1 <1 8 Department of the
Treasury 9 9 5 6 Department of State 8 7 1 5 Department of Energy 5 5 3 3
Environmental Protection Agency <1 <1 <1 1 Other a 3 3133

Source: OMB, 2002 Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, June 2002. a
The *Other* category includes the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
District of Columbia, and the

U. S. Postal Service, all of which received significant funding in the
emergency supplemental appropriation in the wake of the September 11
attacks.

Funding Analysis: Analysis by OMB Report Mission Area

Preattack funding

Fiscal year 2001 actual--$ 20 billion Fiscal year 2002 enacted--$ 24
billion

6% 3% 7% 3%

36% 40%

55% 50%

Postattack funding

Emergency supplemental--$ 12 billion a Fiscal year 2003 request--$ 45
billion

3% 13%

6% 17%

33% 40%

44% 44%

Physical security of government and national populace Preparing and
responding to terrorist incidents Investigative, intelligence, and
offensive activities

Research and development Source: OMB, Annual Report to Congress on
Combating Terrorism, July 2002. Figures do not always add to 100 percent
because of rounding.

a The emergency supplemental figure includes the emergency supplemental
appropriation enacted in September 2001 but does not include the emergency
supplemental enacted in August 2002. Moreover, it includes only the $12
billion designated by OMB as funds for combating terrorism.

OMB divides combating terrorism into the four mission categories of (1)
research and development; (2) preparing and responding to terrorist
incidents; (3) physical security of the government and national populace;
and (4) investigative, intelligence, and offensive capabilities. Although
all missions received more funding, priorities shifted after the September
11 attacks and are reflected in the proportion of dollars for combating
terrorism designated for various mission categories. As shown in the
figure,

which is based on the definitions used in OMB*s 2002 report, there were
marginal differences in how funds were divided among the categories
between the actual budget for fiscal year 2001 and the budget for fiscal
year 2002 enacted prior to the attacks. The emergency supplemental

appropriation enacted in September 2001, however, reflected a dramatic
shift in priorities from funding the physical security of government and
the national populace and investigative, intelligence, and offensive
activities, toward the more immediate needs of preparing and responding to
terrorist incidents, as might be expected in the immediate aftermath of
the attacks.

The budget request for fiscal year 2003 shows that funding priorities have
shifted back to the physical security of the government and national
populace, but the proportion of funding for this category did not return
to the preattack levels of the original enacted budget for fiscal 2002.
Rather,

compared to preattack funding levels, more emphasis was placed on research
and development (where the share of funds increased from 3 to 6 percent)
and preparing and responding to terrorist incidents (where the share of
funds increased from 7 to 17 percent).

Briefing Section III: Coordination and Priority Setting

Coordination and Priority Setting: Challenges

 Coordinating programs and resources to combat terrorism is inherently
difficult because of the number of agencies and diverse missions involved.

 Budget requests for combating terrorism activities are often subsumed in
budget accounts with unrelated funding requests.

Despite the coordination roles played by OHS, NSC, and OMB within the
Executive Office of the President, there are inherent challenges in
managing federal programs and resources to combat terrorism. First,
numerous federal agencies have some role in combating terrorism. Second,

these federal agencies represent different types of organizations,
including those involved in intelligence, law enforcement, military
matters, health services, environmental protection, emergency management,
and diplomacy. These agencies often include both domestic and
international components. In addition, these agencies undertake a wide
variety of activities to combat terrorism, including prevention,
detection, crisis response, criminal prosecution, and consequence
management, which require effective interagency coordination. As a result
of these factors, no individual agency is in charge of all the relevant
programs and resources needed to combat terrorism, making budget
coordination more difficult. 11

Another challenge in coordinating budgets to combat terrorism is that
funding for these programs is also used for missions unrelated to
terrorism. Agencies* budget requests for activities to combat terrorism
are often subsumed in budget accounts along with unrelated funding
requests. For example, according to OMB officials, funding for the
salaries of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents assigned to
combating terrorism activities are not separately identified from the
salaries of agents assigned to white- collar crime and other activities.
FBI estimates a percentage of these agents* salaries to be included in the
total funds to combat terrorism.

At the Department of Defense (DOD), we estimated that $19.4 billion of the
funds for combating terrorism from fiscal years 1999 through the budget
request for fiscal year 2003 is for military and civilian personnel and
personnel- related operating costs in designated specialties that have
missions to combat terrorism, such as military police, civilian police,
and security guards. 12 However, this estimate may be overstated because
it represents total personnel costs even if the individuals spend only a
portion of their time performing activities to combat terrorism.

11 The administration expects that the proposed Department of Homeland
Security would minimize coordination problems. However, these challenges
would exist even if the Department of Homeland Security is established
because key combating terrorism agencies, such as the FBI, will remain
outside the Department under the administration*s proposal.

12 See Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services*
Antiterrorism Efforts, GAO- 03- 14 (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 1, 2002).

Coordination and Priority Setting: Chronology of Process- Fiscal Years
2001 & 2002

 In 1999 and 2000, NSC and OMB led interagency working groups on
combating terrorism funding to support preparation of the fiscal year 2001
and 2002 budget requests, respectively.

Because missions for combating terrorism are spread across multiple
agencies and appropriations, a coordinated, governmentwide approach for
collecting, aggregating, and reviewing funding data can help prioritize
funding proposals. Such an approach has varied in recent years. In
preparing the budget requests for fiscal years 2001 and 2002, NSC and OMB
used interagency working groups to identify priorities and duplication.
The groups reviewed agencies* proposals and developed recommendations on
whether they should be funded. The agencies integrated the working groups*
funding recommendations into their budget submissions to

OMB. According to OMB, NSC and OMB then reviewed agencies* actions on the
recommendations and made necessary course corrections prior to acceptance
by the President, on the basis of information from the working groups,
relative standing among the agencies* other priorities, priorities for the
rest of the government, and the overall funding that the administration
was willing to request.

Coordination and Priority Setting: Chronology of Process: Fiscal Year 2003

 In 2001, funding decisions for the fiscal year 2003 budget were
influenced by the emergency supplemental appropriation enacted September
18, 2001, and tight time frames.

 OMB worked collaboratively with OHS officials to set fiscal year 2003
funding priorities, and OHS certified the requests for homeland security
as necessary and appropriate, according to OMB officials.

Decisions by OMB and agency officials regarding the budget request for
fiscal year 2003 were made under very tight time frames and included two
crosscutting Director*s reviews on homeland security funding. 13 According
to OMB officials, these reviews were more rigorous than past reviews on 13
Director*s reviews are key internal meetings for the OMB budget decision-
making process. They occur after OMB examiners review agencies* budget
requests, and provide an opportunity for the OMB Director to discuss staff
recommendations before final budget

decisions are made.

other governmentwide issues, were attended by the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security, and involved trade- offs necessary to
ensure that funding requests for homeland security priorities were
sufficient. On September 18, 2001, one week after the attacks, the
President

signed a $40 billion emergency appropriation to respond to the attacks, of
which $12 billion was designated for combating terrorism (the remainder
was designated for, among other things, military operations overseas, and
immediate recovery needs in New York and at the Pentagon). 14 Because of
the timing of the emergency appropriation in relation to the ongoing

process for preparing the President*s budget request for fiscal year 2003,
funding decisions for the supplemental appropriation and the request were
inextricably linked. Table 3 lists key budget dates in relation to the
attacks.

Table 3: Timeline of Budget Events Occurring around September 11, 2001

Sept. 10, 2001 OMB*s deadline for agencies* fiscal year 2003 budget
submittals. Sept. 11, 2001 Terrorist attacks. Sept. 12, 2001 Agencies
begin a *triage* assessment of the budget to identify immediate-, medium-,
and longer- term requirements.

Sept. 14, 2001 OMB issues guidance to agencies on the emergency
appropriation, which was passed by Congress the same day.

Sept. 18, 2001 $40 billion emergency appropriation (with $12 billion
designated for combating terrorism) signed by the President. Sept. 21,
2001 President authorizes initial transfers from the emergency
appropriation. Late Nov. 2001 OMB informs executive branch agencies about
decisions on their budget requests (known as *passback*).

Source: GAO*s analysis.

Agencies were asked to identify their most immediate needs* primarily
related to response and recovery* using OMB*s September 14, 2001,
guidance. Those needs that were determined to fit OMB*s criteria for the

emergency supplemental appropriation were funded first. At the same time,
agencies and OMB reported that some adjustments to the submissions for
fiscal year 2003 were needed for the agencies most directly affected by
the attacks of September 11. These adjustments were necessary

14 P. L. 107- 38 made $20 billion of the $40 billion available for
obligation only when enacted in a subsequent emergency appropriations bill
as a condition for the availability of funds. That bill was passed as part
of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, P. L. 107- 117, on
January 10, 2002.

in some cases to reflect changing priorities and, in others, because of
funds provided by the emergency supplemental appropriation. In addition,
OMB officials said that planning on the future needs in fiscal year 2004
were considered as part of the deliberations for fiscal 2003.

Both OMB and OHS were involved in setting priorities for developing the
budget proposal for fiscal year 2003. OMB provided the analytical and
budgetary support for OHS, and officials from both OMB and OHS reported
their working relationship as collaborative. OHS did not issue formal
guidance as part of the budget process* OMB officials communicated

OHS*s priorities on homeland security funding to the agencies. The
executive order establishing OHS required the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security to certify that budget requests for homeland
security are necessary and appropriate, but it did not specify how this
certification should take place. 15 OMB officials told us that the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security formally certified the
budget requests in writing. However, they did not provide this written
certification for our

review. 15 Executive Order No. 13228, Oct. 8, 2001.

Coordination and Priority Setting: Chronology: Fiscal Year 2004 Issues

 Uncertainty in the preparation of the 2004 budget proposals is due to

 uncertainty an the evolving structure of the proposed Department of
Homeland Security and

 a lack of overseas combating terrorism strategies.

 OMB guidance was improved to require agencies to identify homeland
security and overseas combating terrorism funding for budget requests but
does not require them to report the status of obligations. Obligation data
are key to assessing future funding needs.

 OMB has introduced a new formal assessment tool to enhance program
performance evaluation. Several combating terrorism agencies were selected
for review this year.

Coordination and priority setting for the budget process for fiscal year
2004 are complicated by uncertainty. The proposed Department of Homeland
Security had not yet been established. Moreover, those agencies with
overseas missions for combating terrorism did not have the benefit of key
strategies for combating the overseas threat of terrorism because such
strategies have either not yet been published or were published very late
in

the budget deliberation process.

In April 2002, OMB issued the spring planning guidance to executive
agencies for the fiscal year 2004 budget, which stated that the National
Strategy for Homeland Security would provide a framework against which
they could assess how their programs contribute to homeland security.
Agencies were instructed to submit budgets consistent with the strategy*s
framework, emphasizing areas that are given priority and deemphasizing
areas that are not. However, the strategy was released in July, well into
the budget development season for the executive agencies. Similarly, for
combating terrorism overseas, The National Security Strategy for the
United States of America was not published until September 17, 2002, and

the National Strategy on Combating Terrorism has not yet been published.

Improved OMB guidance should enhance data on funding to combat terrorism,
but the status of obligations is not being captured. In June 2002, OMB
updated its annual guidance on the preparation, submission, and execution
of the budget for preparing the budget request for fiscal year 2004* the
A- 11 guidance. Agencies are required to report budget data for homeland
security and overseas combating terrorism in OMB*s MAX database* the
database that OMB uses to develop and prepare the

President*s budget. In an August 2002 memo, OMB instructed agencies to
provide budgetary and programmatic information on homeland security and
overseas combating terrorism to be submitted concurrently with their
budget requests. These data are to include programs and activities and the

funding requests associated with them, aggregated to the budget account
level. We believe that these instructions are a very positive development
because aggregating data to provide account- level detail, if reported to
Congress, would present the data in a manner that is consistent with the

account structure that Congress uses to provide appropriations annually.
However, neither the A- 11 guidance nor the subsequent August memo
requires agencies to report data on obligations. As noted previously, such
data are useful for establishing the current status on spending and
informing decisions on future funding to combat terrorism. In addition to
this guidance, OMB has introduced a formal assessment tool into the budget
process: the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). The purpose of PART,
according OMB, is to (1) measure and diagnose program performance; (2)
evaluate programs in a systematic, consistent, and transparent manner; (3)
inform agency and OMB decisions for management, legislative, or regulatory
improvements and budget decisions; and (4) focus program improvements and
measure progress

(compared with prior- year ratings). OMB expects to use PART assessments

in considering Department and agency budget submissions for the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2004 to Congress. Several key
programs involved in combating terrorism were selected for this year*s
review, such as Immigration Services within the Department of Justice, the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center within the Department of Treasury,
and the Disaster Relief Fund- Public Assistance Program within FEMA. OMB
plans to make results of its PART reviews available to the public on its
Web site, which could provide additional information for

Congress and others on programs and activities for combating terrorism.

Briefing Section IV: Data Reported to Congress

Data Reported to Congress: OMB*s Annual Report

 Shortcomings in the report make it a weak tool for congressional
decision makers.

 Although required March 1, it has been issued in late spring and summer,
well into the appropriations decision- making process.

 The absence of obligation data in the report limits its use in
monitoring the status and planning future funding priorities of combating
terrorism activities.

On the basis of the findings in one of our reviews, Congress required OMB
to report annually on the proposed expenditure of funds to combat
terrorism. 16 OMB has since issued five annual reports summarizing budget
authority in this area. However, several current shortcomings in the
report

weaken it as a tool for congressional decision makers. For example,
although they are required to be issued in March of each year, recent 16
See GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 39.

reports have not been issued until the late spring or summer, well into
congressional budget deliberations, limiting their usefulness to decision
makers. Furthermore, the reports do not present data on funds obligated to
combat terrorism. Obligations are binding agreements that will result in
immediate or future outlays, and as such, they are important for decision

makers in terms of understanding the current status of funding and for
establishing future funding priorities.

Data Reported to Congress: Varying Mission Categories Complicate

Oversight

OMB*s 2002 Report to Securing the Homeland,

National Strategy for Congress on Combating

Strengthening the Nation Homeland Security

Terrorism

(President*s FY 2003 budget (critical mission areas)

(mission areas) initiative areas)

Physical security of government Supporting first responders

Intelligence and warning and national populace Investigative,
intelligence, and

Defending against biological Border and transportation

offensive activities terrorism

security Preparing for and responding to

Securing U. S. borders Domestic counterterrorism

terrorist acts Research and development

Sharing information and using Protecting critical infrastructures

technology to secure the and key assets

homeland Aviation security

Defending against catastrophic threats

Other non- DOD homeland Emergency preparedness and

security response

DOD homeland security (outside initiatives)

Source: GAO*s analysis of cited documents.

The lack of a common structure to categorize activities related to
combating terrorism also complicates oversight by and accountability to
Congress and OMB, and can be attributed to strategies that were evolving
as various funding presentations were being written. Each of the three
documents presented in the table portray governmentwide
combatingterrorism- related mission categories in a unique manner. OMB's
annual report categories in the first column address combating terrorism,

including homeland security and overseas combating terrorism. The
President's budget initiative areas and the critical mission areas in the

National Strategy for Homeland Security in the second and third columns,
respectively, address homeland security only. 17 No two mission categories
are exactly the same, nor can they be crosswalked to each other.

In addition, categories in these documents cannot be crosswalked to the
statutory structure used by Congress to fund programs and activities*
appropriations accounts. For example, the most recent OMB report states
that all funding associated with border security is homeland security
related, and as such, is counted as combating terrorism. Border security

involves nearly a dozen federal agencies and their activities, including
the Immigration and Naturalization Service*s enforcement and detention
activities, the Customs Service*s enforcement activities, the Coast
Guard*s enforcement activities, the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection
program, and the Department of State*s visa program. While the report
lists the relevant bureaus and agencies involved, it does not identify
funding by appropriation accounts. OMB officials told us they are planning
to crosswalk the President*s budget initiative areas to appropriations

accounts as part of the budget request for fiscal year 2004. In the case
of the Department of Defense, linking mission categories for combating
terrorism to appropriations is made more complex because of the unique way
DOD was allocated funds from its share of the emergency

supplemental appropriation enacted in September 2001. Unlike other
agencies, DOD was allocated funds from this supplemental appropriation on
the basis of 10 funding categories* such as Increased Situational
Awareness, Enhanced Force Protection, and Airport Security* not linked to
its normal budget accounts. Therefore, linking appropriations to mission

categories would involve an analysis of both normal appropriations 17 The
overseas component of combating terrorism is in the National Security
Strategy of the United States of America and the forthcoming National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

accounts and the special funding categories established for the emergency
supplemental appropriation. The absence of these key linkages, both across
strategies and to the appropriation accounts structure, results in no
transparency for making policy choices and trade- offs between homeland
security programs and other activities.

Briefing Section V: Potential for Overlap

Potential for Overlap: Chronology: Past Areas Identified by GAO

 Past GAO reviews have identified potential overlap or unnecessary
duplication in areas of

 establishment of a focal point for combating terrorism,

 development of federal combating terrorism strategies,

 law enforcement related to terrorism,

 assistance to state and local governments,

 information and technology management, and

 research and development to combat terrorism.

 In five annual reports to Congress on combating terrorism, OMB has not
identified duplication of effort as required.

Our past work has identified potential duplication of effort on combating
terrorism over the past several years, and the administration has taken
steps to reduce the risk of this duplication in some areas.

 Establishment of a combating terrorism focal point: In a 2001 report,
prior to the establishment of OHS, we noted that some interagency roles of
various agencies are not always clear and sometimes overlap, which often
led to a fragmented approach. 18 We noted in the same report that a clear
assignment of responsibilities and the authority to discharge these
responsibilities are necessary to avoid duplication.

 Development of federal combating terrorism strategies: Also, in the 2001
report we observed that strategies had been developed or were being
developed by NSC, the Attorney General, the National Domestic Preparedness
Office in FBI, and FEMA.

 Law enforcement related to terrorism: In a 1999 report we observed that
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) did not generally carry
out terrorism training with FBI, despite the fact that the two

bureaus had potentially overlapping responsibilities. 19 The report also
stated that ATF was developing a crisis management exercise program
similar to FBI*s program. This lack of coordination between these two

law enforcement agencies could reduce the effectiveness of a total federal
response to a terrorist incident and lead to duplication of effort.

 Assistance to state and local governments: In 1998 and 1999, we reported
that grant assistance to state and local agencies and federal weapons of
mass destruction training programs were not well coordinated. 20 This
resulted in inefficiencies in the federal effort, and state and local
officials and representatives of various responder organizations voiced
their concern over duplication and overlap between federal training
programs.

18 See Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related
Recommendations,

GAO- 01- 822 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 20, 2001). 19 See Combating
Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations,
GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 135 (Washington, D. C.: May 13, 1999). 20 See Combating
Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Programs Focus
and Efficiency, GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 3 (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 12, 1998), and
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs (GAO/ T-
NSIAD- 99- 181, Washington, D. C.: June 8, 1999).

 Information and technology management: In February 2002, we reported
that without an enterprise architecture to guide and constrain information
technology investments, *stovepipe* operations and systems can emerge,
which in turn, lead to needless duplication. 21 Currently, only about 4
percent of federal agencies have developed their

enterprise architecture to the point where they can be considered
effective.

 Research and development to combat terrorism: Overlap in research and
development related to combating terrorism has also been reviewed in our
reports. In 1999 and 2001, we reported that existing formal and informal
research and development coordination mechanisms may not ensure that
potential overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration are
addressed. 22 We reported that a number of factors, including
compartmentalization of research and development activities and the

lack of formal mechanisms to capture the entire universe of governmentwide
research and development efforts, create the potential for duplicative
efforts between federal agencies. We have also observed that OMB*s annual
reports to Congress on combating terrorism had not identified duplication
of effort, as required by Congress. 23 The June 2002 OMB report also does
not include such an analysis. However, OMB reported in an August 2002
memorandum that it would review fiscal year 2004 budget proposals to
identify areas where duplication and overlap may hinder efficient resource
allocation. We view

this as a positive development that, if executed and reported, should
bring OMB into compliance with the reporting requirement. 21 Enterprise
architecture provides a clear and comprehensive picture of an entity,
whether it be an organization (federal Department, agency, or bureau) or a
functional or mission area that cuts across more than one organization (e.
g., financial management). See Information Technology: Enterprise
Architecture Use across the Federal Government Can Be Improved, GAO- 02-
06 (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 19, 2002). 22 See Chemical and Biological
Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R& D Programs,
GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 160 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 16, 1999) and GAO- 01- 822.

23 See GAO- 01- 822.

Potential for Overlap: Chronology: Executive Branch Efforts

 President established focal points for combating terrorism.

 The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security in OHS serves as
the homeland security focal point and issued the National Strategy for
Homeland Security.

 The Director for Combating Terrorism in NSC serves as focal point for
combating terrorism overseas and has not yet issued the National Strategy
for Combating Terrorism.

 President*s proposal for Department of Homeland Security acknowledges
need to minimize duplication of effort.

 Grant programs to state and local governments.

 Research and development to combat terrorism.

 Port inspection activities.

 Information technology systems.

 Management of property and assets.

The administration has taken steps to address some past areas of potential
duplication.

 To address concerns of overall management, in September 2001, we
recommended the establishment of a focal point within the Executive Office
of the President, with responsibility for all critical missions to lead
and coordinate the various programs for combating terrorism. After
September 11, the President established both OHS and the Director for

Combating Terrorism within NSC.

 Efforts to address the proliferation of agency- level strategies include
the July 2002 publication of the administration*s National Strategy for
Homeland Security, which noted that the terrorism threat would be
addressed by this strategy as well as forthcoming national strategies on
overseas combating terrorism and on national security, which are

discussed in more detail in section VI. The President*s proposal for the
Department of Homeland Security recognized some of the problems we
identified and other areas and the need to minimize duplication. His
proposal specifically identified several areas where duplication needs to
be addressed.

 Grants to state and local governments: The President*s proposal states
that the proposed Department would consolidate and streamline grant making
and promote targeted, effective programs at the state and local

level, recognizing that such programs currently exist in an environment of
multiple funding sources and sometimes overlapping missions. The
Department would also give state and local officials one primary contact
instead of many for matters related to training, equipment, planning, and
other critical needs.

 Research and development: The President*s proposal calls for the
proposed Department to provide direction and establish priorities for
national research and development of new technologies to counter the bio-
chemical threat. The Department would also focus the intellectual energy
and extensive laboratory capacity at several scientific institutions to
combat this threat.

 Port inspection: The President*s plan calls for port inspection
activities to be consolidated. A single federal Department would be in
charge of all ports of entry, including security and inspection
operations, and would manage and coordinate port- of- entry activities of
other federal Departments and agencies.

 Information technology: According to the proposal for the new
Department, to reduce redundant spending on information technology, the
proposed Department would develop a single enterprise architecture to
eliminate duplicative and poorly coordinated systems. Projects would be
funded on the basis of priorities for homeland security missions, which
are, in turn, based on an overall assessment of requirements. OHS has
established or is in the process of establishing working groups to develop
enterprise architectures in line with the primary mission areas of the
proposed Department, according to an OHS official. In addition, as we
testified in October 2002, OMB issued

two memoranda to selected agencies telling them to *cease temporarily* and
report on new proposed information technology infrastructure and business
system investments to OMB. 24 At the time of our review, some submissions
were still being evaluated by OMB, and it was too early to assess the
effect of OMB*s action. 25  Property and asset management: The proposed
Department would also

better utilize assets through consolidation and joint, comprehensive
capital planning, procurement and maintenance. This would apply to boats,
vehicles, and aircraft, as well as property management. 24 See Homeland
Security: OMB*s Temporary Cessation of Information Technology Funding for
New Investments, GAO- 03- 186T (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 1, 2002). 25 The
July memoranda also stated that, if an agency had a critical need or
emergency, it could submit information for an expedited review. As of
September 26, 2002, agencies had requested three emergency requests for
expedited review, all of which were approved.

Briefing Section VI: Challenges in Effective Use of Funds

Challenges in Effective Use of Funds: Strategies Require Measures and
Priorities

 Combating terrorism strategies are evolving.

 July 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security includes strategic
areas and missions; however, challenge will be to establish

 performance measures and

 clear funding priorities.

 National Security Strategy published in September 2002.

 National Security Council has not yet published its strategy on overseas
combating terrorism.

 Some Departments have moved forward in revising annual performance plans
with combating terrorism objectives, despite evolving national guidance.

On numerous occasions, we have called for a national strategy on combating
terrorism and stated that such a strategy should not only define the roles
and missions of federal, state, and local governments and establish
priorities, but also identify outcome- related goals with milestones and
performance measures. 26 In addition, the strategy should incorporate the
principles of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, which
requires federal agencies to set strategic goals, measure performance, and
report on the degree to which goals are met. 27 We further noted that the
State Department emphasized the need for such a strategy to include an
international component.

The administration plans to address the terrorist threat through a series
of national strategies. The National Strategy for Homeland Security,

published in July 2002, addresses how to mobilize and organize the nation
to secure the U. S. homeland from terrorist attack. The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America, published on September 17, 2002,
and the forthcoming National Strategy for Combating Terrorism will address
the terrorism threat overseas. The National Strategy for Homeland Security
is a good initial step in defining strategic objectives and related
mission areas (e. g., intelligence and warning, and border and

transportation security), and in establishing foundations that extend
across the mission areas (law, science and technology, information sharing
and systems, and international cooperation). It also proposes to
consolidate

these strategic planning functions in the proposed Department of Homeland
Security. However, the strategy*s initiatives often do not provide
performance goals and measures to assess and improve preparedness at the
federal or national levels. For example, in the National Strategy for
Homeland Security, the initiative of creating *smart borders* lacks

specifics to identify what is expected of a smart border, including
consideration of security and economic aspects of moving people and goods.
Moreover, although the strategy includes a list of funding priorities for
the budget for fiscal year 2004, the strategy does not provide criteria
for trade- offs needed to fund such priorities, nor does it include a

comprehensive threat/ risk assessment to guide future efforts. Finally,
how 26 See for example Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships through
a National Preparedness Strategy, GAO- 02- 549T (Washington, D. C.: Mar.
28, 2002), GAO- 01- 822, and Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to
Strategies and Resources, GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 218 (Washington, D. C.: July
26, 2000). 27 P. L. 103- 62 (Aug. 3, 1993).

the three strategies and their respective priorities will be coordinated
with each other to avoid inconsistency remains unclear.

Some agencies have been taking steps to manage new priorities for
combating terrorism. For example, some agencies are updating plans to
address their missions to combat terrorism. The Environmental Protection

Agency developed a specific strategic plan on homeland security, in
addition to its current strategic plan. FEMA revised its strategic plan in
the summer of 2002 to include a new goal related to terrorism. In
addition, the Department of Justice revised its strategic plan in November
2001 in recognition of its increased focus on combating terrorism.
Officials from

DOD, however, told us that while DOD has a strategic plan, it does not
establish Department- level performance measures consistent with the
Results Act because of the difficulty of establishing such measures for
the broad range of scenarios that might be posed by a terrorist attack.
Moreover, these officials said that DOD includes performance measurement
as part of its regular process for executing and evaluating exercises and
missions.

Challenges in Effective Use of Funds: Management Challenges

 Increased funding requires leadership to ensure that the funds are spent
effectively.

 Human capital management requires a qualified work force.

 Procurement of new capabilities and equipment requires comprehensive
planning to establish sound acquisition strategies.

 Management of grants requires an established process to provide
accountability and oversight.

 Information sharing and technology challenges require a blueprint for
action.

Funding increases for combating terrorism have been dramatic and reflect
the high priority that the administration and Congress place on this
mission. These increases bring an added responsibility for the government
to ensure that this large investment of taxpayer dollars is wisely
applied. The strategies and plans discussed in the previous pages are an
important component of managing funds to combat terrorism. The challenges
stemming from increased funding for combating terrorism are significant
management issues and could impede the implementation of national
strategies if not effectively addressed. These areas are as follows:

 Human capital management : Some of the increased funding will be used to
address requirements for additional personnel, a requirement that poses
challenges for most agencies. The Immigration and Naturalization

Service, for example, was already facing recruiting challenges prior to
the September 11 attacks. The October 26, 2001, USA PATRIOT Act authorized
the Attorney General to triple the number of Immigration and
Naturalization Service Border Patrol personnel and inspectors along the
Northern Border. 28 Moreover, the establishment of the Transportation
Security Administration has exacerbated some other agencies* efforts to
recruit and retain qualified security personnel. Officials from the
Justice Department and the Department of the

Treasury reported losing seasoned staff to the Transportation Security
Administration as the new agency attempted to meet its own personnel
requirements.

 Acquisition strategies: The budget request for fiscal year 2003 includes
increased funding to acquire a broad array of technologies and equipment
to combat terrorism. Before committing substantial dollars, it will be
incumbent on Departments and agencies to ensure that requirements for such
assets are linked to mission needs and costs and

after careful consideration of alternative solutions. As we reported
previously, good acquisition outcomes start with sound acquisition
strategies. 29

28 P. L. 107- 56, Oct. 26, 2001. 29 See Homeland Security: Proposal for
Cabinet Agency Has Merit, but Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success,
GAO- 02- 886T (Washington, D. C.: June 25, 2002).

 Grants management: A significant portion of the budget request for
fiscal year 2003 is to increase grants to state and local jurisdictions
for their first responder efforts. The budget request for FEMA, for
example, includes a $3.5 billion in block grants to be used by state and
local governments to purchase equipment; train personnel; and exercise,

develop, or enhance response plans. We testified recently that in
designing such grants, it is important to (1) target the funds to states
and localities with the greatest need on the basis of the highest risk and
lowest capacity to meet these needs from their own resource bases; (2)
discourage the replacement of state and local funds with federal funds,

commonly referred to as *supplantation,* with a maintenance- of- effort
requirement that recipients maintain their level of previous funding; and
(3) strike a balance between accountability and flexibility. 30 
Information sharing and technology: One of the administration*s budget
priorities in its budget request for fiscal year 2003 was to use 21 st
century

technology to secure the homeland. In June 2002, we testified on
information sharing and technology challenges facing the country in this
regard. 31 First, the nature of the threat makes it difficult to identify
and differentiate information that can provide an early indication of a
terrorist threat from the mass of data available. Second, we face
considerable barriers* cultural, legal, and technical* in effectively
collecting and sharing information. And third, many technologies key to
addressing threats are not yet available, and many existing technologies
have not been effectively adapted for the threats the country now faces.

We observed that responding to these challenges would require developing a
blueprint, or architectural construct, that defines both the homeland
security mission and the information technologies and approaches necessary
to perform the mission in a way that is divorced from organizational
parochialism and cultural differences.

30 See Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key
to Success,

GAO- 02- 1011T (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 20, 2002). 31 See National
Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and Information
Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy, GAO- 02- 811T
(Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002).

Appendi Appendi xes x I Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendi x II Comments from the Department of State

Appendi x II I GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments Contacts Combating
Terrorism

Raymond J. Decker (202) 512- 6020 Stephen L. Caldwell (202) 512- 9610

Budget Issues

Paul L. Posner (202) 512- 9573 Denise Fantone (202) 512- 4997

Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Margaret Best, Joseph
Byrns, Kristeen McLain, Harry L. Purdy, Mary Reintsma, Susan Woodward,
Joseph

Zamoyta, and Michael Zola made key contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Service*s Antiterrorism
Efforts. GAO- 03- 14. Washington, D. C.: November 1, 2002.

Homeland Security: Department of Justice's Response to Its Congressional
Mandate to Assess and Report on Chemical Industry Vulnerabilities. GAO-
03- 24R. Washington, D. C.: October 10, 2002.

Homeland Security: OMB*s Temporary Cessation of Information Technology
Funding for New Investments. GAO- 03- 186T. Washington, D. C.: October 1,
2002.

Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued
Management Challenges. GAO- 02- 1122T. Washington, D. C.: October 1, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat Terrorism
Abroad. GAO- 02- 1021. Washington, D. C.: September 6, 2002.

National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing Challenges.

GAO- 02- 1048R. Washington, D. C.: August 30, 2002.

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success. GAO- 02- 1013T. Washington, D. C.: August 23, 2002.

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO- 02- 993T. Washington, D. C.: August 5, 2002.

Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. GAO- 02-
957T. Washington, D. C.: July 17, 2002.

Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

GAO- 02- 927T. Washington, D. C.: July 9, 2002.

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnerships Will Be
Critical to Success. GAO- 02- 899T. Washington, D. C.: July 1, 2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Priority Setting. GAO- 02- 893T. Washington, D. C.: June 28,
2002.

Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, but
Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success. GAO- 02- 886T. Washington, D.
C.: June 25, 2002.

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
Uncertainty Remains. GAO- 02- 610. Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002.

National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and
Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy. GAO02-
811T. Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002.

Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving
National Goals. GAO- 02- 627T. Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002.

National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private
Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland
Security. GAO- 02- 621T. Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a
National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 550T.
Washington, D. C.: April 2, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships through a National
Preparedness Strategy. GAO- 02- 549T. Washington, D. C.: March 28, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance
State and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 548T. Washington, D. C.: March 25,
2002.

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National Strategy
to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 547T. Washington, D. C.:
March 22, 2002.

Homeland Security: Progress Made, More Direction and Partnership Sought.
GAO- 02- 490T. Washington, D. C.: March 12, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State
and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 473T. Washington, D. C.: March 1, 2002.

Information Technology: Enterprise Architecture Use Across the Federal
Government Can Be Improved. GAO- 02- 06. Washington, D. C.: February 19,
2002.

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and
Long- Term National Needs. GAO- 02- 160T. Washington, D. C.: November 7,
2001.

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO- 02- 208T. Washington, D. C.: October 31, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical
and Biological Preparedness. GAO- 01- 162T. Washington, D. C.: October 17,
2001.

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach.

GAO- 02- 150T. Washington, D. C.: October 12, 2001.

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation*s Issues.

GAO- 01- 1158T. Washington, D. C.: September 21, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations. GAO-
01- 822. Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD*s Antiterrorism Program
Implementation and Management. GAO- 01- 909. Washington, D. C.: September
19, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs.

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 145. Washington, D. C.: April 6, 2000.

Chemical and Biological Defenses: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and
Biological R& D Programs. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 160. Washington, D. C.: August
16, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs. GAO/ T-
NSIAD- 99- 181. Washington, D. C.: June 6, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism
Operations. GAO- 99- 135. Washington, D. C.: May 13, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness
Programs* Focus and Efficiency. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 3. Washington, D. C.:
November 12, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Government Programs Requires Better
Management and Coordination. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 39. Washington, D. C.:
December 1, 1997.

(350123)

Report to Congressional Requesters

November 2002 COMBATING TERRORISM Funding Data Reported to Congress Should
Be Improved

GAO- 03- 170

Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Conclusions and Recommendations for Executive
Action 5 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 6 Scope and Methodology 8

Briefing Section I: 14

Introduction Briefing Section II:

20 Funding Analysis

Briefing Section III: 28 Coordination and Priority Setting

Briefing Section IV: 40 Data Reported to Congress

Briefing Section V: 46 Potential for Overlap

Briefing Section VI: 54 Challenges in Effective Use of Funds

Appendixes

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense 61

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State 62

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments 65 Related GAO Products 66
Tables Table 1: Departments and Agencies Contacted during GAO*s

Review and Their Share of Funding for Combating Terrorism from the
President*s Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2003 of $45 Billion 8

Table 2: Federal Entities* Percentage of Funding for Combating Terrori sm
25 Table 3: Timeline of Budget Events Occurring around

September 11, 2001 33

Abbreviations

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms DHS Department of Homeland
Security DOD Department of Defense FBI Federal Bureau of Investigations
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency GAO General Accounting Office HHS
Department of Health and Human Services NSC National Security Council OHS
Office of Homeland Security OMB Office of Management and Budget PART
Program Assessment Rating Tool

Lett er

November 26, 2002 Congressional Requesters In the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the administration and Congress
raised the federal government*s emphasis on combating terrorism through
increased appropriations, organizational changes, and legislative
proposals to establish the Department of

Homeland Security. While the President*s budget request for fiscal year
2003 elevated the importance of combating terrorism by making homeland
security one of the administration*s top priorities, funding to combat
terrorism had been steadily increasing even prior to the September 11

attacks. 1 Understanding funding trends as well as the budget processes
used to make resource decisions will be key to developing future funding
initiatives, particularly as Congress considers funding priorities as well
as the implications of establishing the proposed Department of Homeland
Security. At the time we finalized this report, the Department had not
been established.

On the basis of findings from a 1997 GAO report, Congress required the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to report annually on funding to
combat terrorism. You requested that we review such funding for fiscal
years 1998 through 2003. In September 2002, we briefed staff in your
offices on our preliminary findings. As agreed with your offices, this
report

 provides a trend analysis of funds used to combat terrorism,

 describes the difficulties in coordinating budgets to combat terrorism
across agencies and the efforts to address them,

 assesses the adequacy of crosscutting data on funding to combat
terrorism reported to Congress,

 discusses the efforts to identify and minimize potential areas of
duplication, and 1 In this report, *combating terrorism* includes both
homeland security (activities within the United States) and overseas
combating terrorism (activities outside the United States excluding direct
military action). This is discussed further in the methodology section.

 describes the challenges faced by the executive branch in maximizing the
effectiveness of these funds.

Results in Brief The upward climb of federal government funding to combat
terrorism in the years prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, was
dwarfed by the

dramatic funding increases that occurred afterward. These latter increases
occurred as budget priorities quickly shifted to missions for combating
terrorism and as the scope of combating terrorism was redefined to include

homeland security missions, such as border and transportation security. As
a result, funds designated for combating terrorism increased 276 percent
from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal 2002 (106 percent due to changes in
definition and scope, and 170 percent due to funding increases), as
reported in OMB*s annual reports to Congress on combating terrorism. 2 In
the same time frame, the Department of Defense and other national security
agencies received the largest share of funds for combating

terrorism (over 30 percent), although the Department of Health and Human
Services* (HHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency*s (FEMA)
shares of such funds have risen substantially. There has also been a
change in priorities among mission categories for combating terrorism as
defined by OMB. Since fiscal year 2001, funding priorities have shifted
from the physical security of government and the national populace and
investigative, intelligence, and offensive activities to research and
development related to combating terrorism and preparing and responding to
terrorist incidents. The executive branch is faced with several
difficulties in coordinating funding to combat terrorism, and approaches
to such coordination have varied. The difficulties include (1) the large
number of agencies involved;

(2) the wide variety of missions represented, including intelligence, law
enforcement, health services, and environmental protection; and (3) the
global nature of missions for combating terrorism. In addition, funding
for missions for combating terrorism is often subsumed in budget accounts
that provide funding for other activities. Over the past 4 years, various
approaches to coordinating budget requests prior to and during OMB*s

review have been employed to address these challenges. For example, during
the fiscal year 2001 and 2002 budget processes, interagency working groups
led by OMB and the National Security Council (NSC) made 2 See Annual
Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, July 2001, and 2002 Report to
Congress on Combating Terrorism, June 2002.

recommendations prior to the agencies* formal submissions to OMB. During
the period immediately following September 11, 2001, the greatest
attention was given to those activities for combating terrorism related to
homeland security. As a result, coordination for the budget process for

fiscal year 2003 was primarily between OMB and the newly created Office of
Homeland Security (OHS). Together, these offices set priorities that
resulted in the budget initiatives for homeland security included in the
President*s budget for fiscal year 2003. Efforts to coordinate the budget
request for fiscal year 2004 are characterized by uncertainties with

agencies* development of budgets in the face of the evolving status and
structure of the proposed Department of Homeland Security and delays in
final appropriations for fiscal 2003.

Crosscutting funding data reported to Congress do not adequately support
congressional oversight. OMB*s annual reports to Congress on combating
terrorism, which summarizes proposed spending, is not as useful a tool as
it might be for effective congressional oversight, partly because (1)
recent reports have been published well after the March 1 deadline and (2)
the report does not include data on obligations. Although legislation
mandating OMB*s report does not require the presentation of data on
obligations for all programs and activities for combating terrorism, we
believe that such

data are important for understanding the current status of funding and
establishing future funding priorities. Also, a common structure to
categorize combating terrorism activities among key governmentwide

reports is lacking, and the categories cannot be linked to appropriations
accounts* the structure used by Congress to fund programs and activities.
Consequently, there is no transparency for making policy choices and
trade- offs between combating terrorism and other activities. OMB has
taken an important step to improve the data used to develop its fiscal
2004 budget request to Congress by requiring agencies to identify funds
for combating terrorism by account* the level at which funds are
appropriated* in OMB*s centralized budget database (known as the MAX

database). However, the guidance did not require agencies to report on
obligations.

Potential duplication of effort has been identified in our past reviews,
and the administration has made efforts to minimize such duplication. We
have found in the past that there is a risk of duplication in areas such
as assistance to state and local governments, information management and

technology, and research and development, and we recommended that a focal
point for combating terrorism be established to better coordinate such
programs. In addition, we reported that OMB has not included an

analysis of potential duplication as part of its annual reports to date,
as required in the 1997 legislation establishing the reporting
requirement. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the President
established focal points for homeland security and combating terrorism
overseas* the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security in OHS and
the Director for Combating Terrorism within the NSC, respectively.
Furthermore, the administration anticipates that the proposed Department
of Homeland

Security would address some areas of duplication. However, the proposed
Department will exclude some agencies with homeland security missions and,
therefore, could not address all areas of potential duplication without
interagency coordination. OMB has stated that it plans to review the
budget proposal for fiscal year 2004 to identify areas of duplication.
Such an

analysis, if reported, would increase the visibility of potential
duplication areas to Congress.

While the executive branch has established some national strategies
important to maximizing the effective use of funds for combating
terrorism, it faces challenges in measuring progress against its goals.
The administration has published two of three national strategies intended
to address the terrorist threat both domestically and internationally. The
National Strategy for Homeland Security provides an important first step
in

establishing strategic objectives and mission areas, and proposes to
consolidate the administration of these functions in the proposed
Department of Homeland Security. The strategy also directs Departments and
agencies to create performance measures by which progress can be measured
and future resources allocated. However, at the federal and national
levels, for the most part, the strategy does not provide performance goals
and measures to assess progress and improve preparedness, nor does it set
clear funding priorities among and within the various initiatives. In the
absence of clear performance goals, measures,

and funding priorities, it is difficult to assess whether funding
increases are being allocated to the highest- priority programs.
Notwithstanding incomplete guidance from the national strategies, some
Departments and agencies have either updated or are in the process of
updating strategic and performance plans to reflect priorities for
combating terrorism. For combating terrorism overseas, the President
issued the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, but
the National Strategy for

Combating Terrorism is still pending.

Conclusions and Congressional decision makers require governmentwide
information on

Recommendations for funding for combating terrorism (including
obligations) in a timely fashion.

In preparing the fiscal year 2004 budget request to Congress, OMB is
Executive Action requiring agencies to provide information on combating
terrorism (including homeland security) so that funding for these
activities can be identified by account* the level at which funds are
appropriated. If made

available to Congress, this information should greatly improve the
transparency of funding requested for combating terrorism programs and
activities within Departments and across the federal government. Although
this is an important first step, OMB has not required agencies to
separately

identify obligations for relevant programs and activities. Without
obligation information, it is impossible to know (1) how much funding from
prior years is still available to potentially offset new requests, (2)
whether the

rate of spending for a program is slower than anticipated, or (3) what the
level of effort (i. e., the size of the program) is for a particular year
as well as for a program over time.

OMB*s annual report on funding for combating terrorism summarizes funding
data for the current and next fiscal years, and is supposed to be issued
by March 1 of each year and identify duplication of efforts. To be a
useful tool, we believe it should also include obligation data for the
reasons described above. However, the report has had limited utility
because it (1) has been issued in the late spring and summer* late in the
congressional

budget decision- making process, (2) does not include data on obligations,
and (3) neglects to identify areas of duplication.

It is important for the government to establish federal- and national-
level goals and performance measures to maximize the effectiveness of
funds to combat terrorism. The administration has made progress in
publishing national strategies to address priorities for combating
terrorism, but these strategies do not include governmentwide performance
measures.

Establishing these priorities will be critical for individual agencies in
aligning their strategic and performance plans, including performance
measures, with governmentwide strategic direction and guidance.

On the basis of these conclusions, we make the following recommendations.

 To help Congress obtain timely information on spending that supports the
President*s annual budget request for combating terrorism, OMB should
require agencies to provide information on obligations in its

MAX database* the database used by OMB to produce the President*s annual
budget request.

 To improve the usefulness of OMB*s Annual Report to Congress on
Combating Terrorism, OMB should

 publish the report by the required March 1 deadline to provide
information for congressional budget deliberations;

 include obligations as reported in the MAX database; and

 include, as required by Congress, an analysis of areas where overlap in
programs could result in unnecessary duplication of effort.

 To help maximize the effective use of funds for combating terrorism, 
OHS and NSC should include national- level, as well as federal
governmentwide, performance measures as a supplement to existing
strategies and in future revisions to strategies for homeland security and
the combating of terrorism overseas and

 OMB, in conjunction with OHS and NSC, should direct relevant Departments
to develop or enhance performance objectives and measures for combating
terrorism in alignment with performance

measures in national strategies, and include performance measures for
combating terrorism in the governmentwide plan that OMB is required to
produce annually.

Agency Comments and In October 2002, we requested comments on a draft of
this report from the

Our Evaluation Director of OMB; the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, Health
and Human

Services, State, Transportation, and the Treasury; the Attorney General of
the United States; the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency; and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. In
addition, copies of the report were made available to OHS and NSC for
their comment.

In oral comments on the report, OMB staff questioned whether the value
added of collecting obligation data related to combating terrorism would
be worth the effort. While OMB staff acknowledged that OMB examiners use
obligation data in assessing the appropriateness of agency budget requests
overall, they felt that budget authority data provide the most

insight into combating terrorism programs and facilitate follow up on
areas of concern. Furthermore, they explained that, in the MAX database,
obligation data are collected for specific programs that correspond to
major agency activities, and these activities may or may not line up with
combating terrorism programs. Aligning these activities with combating
terrorism programs would require splitting up agency activities in the MAX
database, which are familiar and useful, into terrorism- specific
activities. Therefore, OMB staff suggested these obligations would more
likely have

to be collected and/ or displayed through a parallel process outside the
MAX database. Targeting such an effort on obligations would not be the
most productive way to provide more insight into combating terrorism
priorities or to enhance the value of the Annual Report, according to the
officials. We agree with OMB that budget authority data provide valuable
insights into programs. However, we disagree that obligation data related
to combating terrorism also are not worth collecting and reporting. First,
we believe that the very reason why OMB examiners find the obligation data
useful to them is the same reason that congressional decision makers would
find the data useful* obligation data gives decision makers an

insight as to whether programs are being run according to plans
established by their budget projections. We acknowledge that collecting
these data would pose an additional workload on both OMB and agency budget
officials, but believe that such a workload is warranted in light of the
high priority placed on this issue. OMB itself gave the issue high
priority

when it required agencies to report on budget authority data according to
combating terrorism categories, including homeland security. Furthermore,
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security will make this type of
detailed information more important, as the Executive Branch tries to
integrate 22 agencies into the Department. Finally, for some of the

programs related to combating terrorism, the law establishing the
reporting requirement already requires OMB to report obligation data.

We also received comments from other Departments and agencies. DOD
concurred with our recommendations to OMB and its comments are reprinted
in appendix I. The State Department also concurred with our
recommendations. In its comments, the State Department cited its efforts
in various coordination activities and its plans to improve its
performance planning and measurement. As an example, the Department
established the Office of Strategic and Performance Planning to improve
strategic plans and ensure that funding is linked to such plans. The State
Department*s comments are reprinted in appendix II. FEMA concurred with
our

recommendations in oral comments to the report. OHS and NSC did not
provide comments on our recommendations to them. The remaining Departments
and agencies informed us that they had no substantive comments on the
report. Technical comments from OMB, the Department of Defense, and the
Environmental Protection Agency were incorporated

as appropriate. Scope and Our scope includes federal Departments and
agencies that have key Methodology

missions for combating terrorism and, when combined, represent 97 percent
of the total funding requested for combating terrorism in the presidential
budget request for fiscal year 2003, as shown in table 1.

Table 1: Departments and Agencies Contacted during GAO*s Review and Their
Share of Funding for Combating Terrorism from the President*s Budget
Request for Fiscal Year 2003 of $45 Billion

Percent of funding to Department/ Agency combat terrorism

National Security a 32 Department of Transportation 16 Department of
Justice 16 Department of Health and Human Services 10 Federal Emergency
Management Agency 8 The Treasury 6 Department of State 5 Department of
Energy 3 Environmental Protection Agency 1 Other 3

Tot al 100

Source: OMB, 2002 Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, June
2002. a National Security includes Department of Defense and intelligence
community funding combined to

keep figures unclassified. Because the intelligence community includes
intelligence elements from the Departments of State, Energy, the Treasury
and Justice, the percentages displayed for these Departments do not
represent the entirety of these Departments* budgets for combating
terrorism.

In addition, our scope included OMB, OHS, and NSC. We did not include
classified intelligence agencies* budgets in detail. Intelligence
community agencies and their corresponding classified budgets will be
included in a

separate review by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

To analyze funding trends of federal funding to combat terrorism, we
relied on OMB*s annual reports containing data from fiscal year 1998
through the budget request for fiscal year 2003. The 2002 report included
data from the emergency supplemental appropriation signed into law on
September 18, 2001, but did not include data from a second emergency
supplemental appropriation signed into law on August 2, 2002. 3 Although
OMB provided

us data from the August 2002 appropriation, we did not receive the data in
time to incorporate into our report.

We used the definitions from the OMB annual reports, as summarized below:

 Homeland security: Activities within the United States coordinated by
OHS.

 Overseas combating terrorism: Activities outside the United States
coordinated by NSC, excluding direct military actions.

 Combating terrorism: Combination of homeland security and overseas
combating terrorism, further divided into four main categories:

 Research and development: Developing technologies to deter, prevent, or
mitigate acts of terrorism.

 Preparing for and responding to terrorist incidents: Planning, training,
equipment, and personnel directed at incident response.

 Physical security of government and national populace: Protecting
federally owned, leased, occupied facilities; federal employees, including
high- ranking officials, and the national populace from terrorist acts as
well as physical protection of the national infrastructure.

 Investigative, intelligence, and offensive capabilities: Reducing the
ability of groups or individuals to commit terrorist acts, and the
investigation of terrorist acts when they occur and prosecution of their
perpetrators.

3 P. L. 107- 38 and P. L. 107- 206, respectively.

To describe difficulties in coordinating budgets to combat terrorism and
efforts to address them, we reviewed data from OMB and OHS. In addition,
we evaluated data from Departments and agencies with critical missions for
combating terrorism, as well as data from our previous reports. We
conducted interviews with knowledgeable officials and discussed their
views on the effectiveness of interagency approaches. To assess the

adequacy of funding data reported to Congress, we compared OMB*s annual
reports with the legislative requirement for drafting the reports and
identified potential areas for improvement on the basis of other common

budget presentations. To identify areas of potential duplication of effort
among agencies and the efforts to minimize them, we relied on our past and
ongoing analyses of programs for combating terrorism and reviewed the
administration*s proposals for minimizing such duplication. To identify
the challenges faced by the executive branch in maximizing the
effectiveness of funds for combating terrorism, we relied on our recent
analyses of national strategies and interviewed key agency officials to
determine

whether performance plans were updated to reflect revised missions for
combating terrorism. Our work was conducted from March through September
2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We will send copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees

and to the federal agencies and offices discussed in this report. We will
make copies available to other interested parties upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http:// www. gao. gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
Raymond Decker at (202) 512- 6020 or Paul Posner at (202) 512- 9573. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. .

Raymond J. Decker Director Defense Capabilities and Management

Paul L. Posner Managing Director Strategic Issues

                                       A

List of Congressional Requesters The Honorable Dianne Feinstein Chairman
The Honorable Jon Kyl Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Technology,

Terrorism and Government Information Committee on the Judiciary U. S.
Senate

The Honorable Bob Graham Chairman The Honorable Richard C. Shelby Ranking
Minority Member Select Committee on Intelligence U. S. Senate

The Honorable James F. Sensenbrenner, Jr. Chairman The Honorable John
Conyers, Jr. Ranking Minority Member Committee on the Judiciary House of
Representatives

a

GAO United States General Accounting Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Congress responded to the attacks of September 11, 2001, with dramatic
funding increases to combat terrorism. Even before these attacks, Congress
was concerned about increased funding in this area, and based on findings
from a 1997 GAO report, mandated that the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) report annually on funding to combat terrorism. In this review, GAO
was asked to analyze such funding trends, describe difficulties in
coordinating combating terrorism budgets, assess data reported to
Congress, and describe the executive branch*s efforts to maximize the
effective use of combating terrorism funds.

The review relied on OMB*s definition of *combating terrorism* to include
both homeland security and overseas combating terrorism missions.

COMBATING TERRORISM Funding Data Reported to Congress Should Be Improved
Highlights of GAO- 03- 170, a report to the Subcommittee on Technology,
Terrorism and Government Information, Senate Committee on the Judiciary;
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; and the House Committee on
the Judiciary.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations to improve OMB*s annual report, including
collecting and reporting obligation data. It also recommends improvements
to performance measures in strategies and performance plans related to
combating terrorism.

In comments on a draft of this report, OMB expressed concern about
collecting obligation data. Other agencies either concurred with the
recommendations or made no comment. The full report, including GAO's
objectives, scope, methodology, and analysis is available at www. gao.
gov. For additional information about the report, contact Ray Decker at
(202) 512- 6020 or Paul Posner at (202) 512- 9573.

United States General Accounting Office

What GAO Found

GAO calculated, on the basis of OMB*s data, that there was a 276- percent
total increase in funds designated to combat terrorism during fiscal years
2001 and 2002 (as reported in OMB*s annual reports to Congress for 2001
and 2002, respectively). This increase includes a 106- percent increase
from the post- September 11 redefinition of combating terrorism to include
homeland security activities such as aviation and transportation security,
and a 170- percent increase due to funding increases.

Difficulties in coordinating budgets to combat terrorism stem from the
variety of missions involved and the fact that activities related to
combating terrorism are often funded through budget accounts that also
provide funding for other activities. Various approaches have been used to
address these challenges. The process for preparing the budget for fiscal
year 2003 was characterized by collaboration between OMB and the Office of
Homeland Security that resulted in the budget priorities included in the
President*s budget for fiscal 2003.

Crosscutting funding data reported to Congress, however, do not adequately
support congressional oversight. An OMB annual report summarizing funding
for combating terrorism has had limited utility for decision makers
because it was issued late in the congressional decisionmaking process and
did not include data on obligations or on duplication in programs for
combating terrorism. OMB plans to analyze areas of duplication as part of
the preparation of the budget request for fiscal year 2004. If completed,
this analysis will enable OMB to comply with the legislative mandate to
include such an analysis in its annual report.

While the executive branch has established some national strategies
important to coordinating the effective use of funds for combating
terrorism, it faces challenges in measuring its progress. Although the
strategies provide an important first step, they provide neither clearly
defined federal and national performance goals and measures for assessing
progress, nor set clear funding priorities. Lacking such measures and
priorities, it is also difficult to assess whether funding increases are
being allocated to the highest- priority programs. G A O Accountability
Integrity Reliability

Highlights

Page i GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism

Contents

Contents Page ii GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism

Page 1 GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism United States General Accounting
Office

Washington, D. C. 20548 Page 1 GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism

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Briefing Section I: Introduction Page 15 GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism

Briefing Section I: Introduction Page 16 GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism

Briefing Section I: Introduction Page 17 GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism

Briefing Section I: Introduction Page 18 GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism

Briefing Section I: Introduction Page 19 GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism

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Briefing Section II: Funding Analysis Page 21 GAO- 03- 170 Combating
Terrorism

Briefing Section II: Funding Analysis Page 22 GAO- 03- 170 Combating
Terrorism

Briefing Section II: Funding Analysis Page 23 GAO- 03- 170 Combating
Terrorism

Briefing Section II: Funding Analysis Page 24 GAO- 03- 170 Combating
Terrorism

Briefing Section II: Funding Analysis Page 25 GAO- 03- 170 Combating
Terrorism

Briefing Section II: Funding Analysis Page 26 GAO- 03- 170 Combating
Terrorism

Briefing Section II: Funding Analysis Page 27 GAO- 03- 170 Combating
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Briefing Section III: Coordination and Priority Setting Page 29 GAO- 03-
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Briefing Section III: Coordination and Priority Setting Page 30 GAO- 03-
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Briefing Section III: Coordination and Priority Setting Page 31 GAO- 03-
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Briefing Section III: Coordination and Priority Setting Page 32 GAO- 03-
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Briefing Section III: Coordination and Priority Setting Page 33 GAO- 03-
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Briefing Section III: Coordination and Priority Setting Page 34 GAO- 03-
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Briefing Section III: Coordination and Priority Setting Page 35 GAO- 03-
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Briefing Section III: Coordination and Priority Setting Page 36 GAO- 03-
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Briefing Section IV: Data Reported to Congress Page 41 GAO- 03- 170
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Briefing Section IV: Data Reported to Congress Page 42 GAO- 03- 170
Combating Terrorism

Briefing Section IV: Data Reported to Congress Page 43 GAO- 03- 170
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Briefing Section IV: Data Reported to Congress Page 44 GAO- 03- 170
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Briefing Section IV: Data Reported to Congress Page 45 GAO- 03- 170
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Briefing Section V: Potential for Overlap Page 47 GAO- 03- 170 Combating
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Briefing Section V: Potential for Overlap Page 48 GAO- 03- 170 Combating
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Briefing Section V: Potential for Overlap Page 49 GAO- 03- 170 Combating
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Briefing Section V: Potential for Overlap Page 50 GAO- 03- 170 Combating
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Briefing Section V: Potential for Overlap Page 51 GAO- 03- 170 Combating
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Briefing Section V: Potential for Overlap Page 52 GAO- 03- 170 Combating
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Briefing Section V: Potential for Overlap Page 53 GAO- 03- 170 Combating
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Briefing Section VI: Challenges in Effective Use of Funds

Page 55 GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism

Briefing Section VI: Challenges in Effective Use of Funds

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Briefing Section VI: Challenges in Effective Use of Funds

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Briefing Section VI: Challenges in Effective Use of Funds

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Briefing Section VI: Challenges in Effective Use of Funds

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Briefing Section VI: Challenges in Effective Use of Funds

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Appendix I

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Appendix II

Appendix II Comments from the Department of State

Page 63 GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism

Appendix II Comments from the Department of State

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Appendix III

Page 66 GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism

Related GAO Products Page 67 GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism

Related GAO Products Page 68 GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism

Related GAO Products Page 69 GAO- 03- 170 Combating Terrorism

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