Defense Management: Munitions Requirements and Combatant	 
Commanders' Needs Require Linkage (15-OCT-02, GAO-03-17).	 
                                                                 
The Department of Defense (DOD) planned to spend $7.9 billion on 
acquiring munitions in fiscal year 2002. Ongoing military	 
operations associated with the global war on terrorism have	 
heightened concerns about the unified combatant commands having  
sufficient quantities of munitions. Since 1994, the DOD Inspector
General and GAO have issued numerous reports identifying	 
weaknesses and expressing concerns about the accuracy of the	 
process used by the department to determine munitions		 
requirements. DOD has improved its munitions requirements process
by eliminating most of the systematic problems--correcting	 
questionable and inconsistently applied data, completing target  
templates, and resolving issues involving the level of detail	 
that should be included in planning guidance. However, a	 
fundamental problem remains unaddressed--inadequate linkage	 
between the near-term munitions needs of the combatant commands  
and the purchases made by the military services based on	 
computations derived from the department's munitions requirement 
determination process. The department's munitions requirements	 
process provides varied answers for current munitions		 
acquisitions questions because of the aforementioned disjunction.
As a result, the services, in the short term, are purchasing some
critically needed munitions based on available funding and	 
contractors' production capacity. Although this approach may be  
necessary in the short term, it raises questions as to whether	 
over the long term it would position the services to make the	 
most efficient use of appropriated funds and whether the needs of
combatant commands to carry out their missions will be met.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-17						        
    ACCNO:   A05277						        
  TITLE:     Defense Management: Munitions Requirements and Combatant 
Commanders' Needs Require Linkage				 
     DATE:   10/15/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Defense budgets					 
	     Military operations				 
	     Munitions						 
	     Defense procurement				 

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GAO-03-17

Report to the Secretary of Defense

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

October 2002 DEFENSE MANAGEMENT Munitions Requirements and Combatant
Commanders* Needs Require Linkage

GAO- 03- 17

Page i GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Improvements Made, but Gap Remains between
the Combatant

Commanders* Needs and the Services* Purchasing Decisions 5 Munitions
Requirements Process Provides Varying Answers for

Acquisition Decisions 10 Conclusion 11 Recommendation for Executive Action
11 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 11

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 13

Appendix II Related DOD Inspector General and General Accounting Office
Reports 14

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 16 Contents

Page 1 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

October 15, 2002 The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary: The Department of Defense planned to spend about $7.9
billion on acquiring munitions 1 in fiscal year 2002. Ongoing military
operations associated with the global war on terrorism have heightened
concerns about the unified combatant commands 2 having sufficient
quantities of munitions. In September and October of 2001, Congress
provided emergency funding of $1.3 billion for munitions, with a
supplemental increase in the fiscal year 2002 munitions budget of $397
million. Significant funding increases are also planned, which would bring
the fiscal year 2003 munitions budget to over $10 billion.

Since 1994, the Department of Defense Inspector General and GAO have
issued numerous reports identifying weaknesses and expressing concerns
about the accuracy of the process used by the department to determine
munitions requirements. Our April 2001 report discussed steps being taken
by the department to improve the process and additional actions still
needed. 3 In response to that report, the department outlined actions
underway that address all aspects of the report*s recommendations. The
department expected that its efforts to improve the munitions requirements
process should correct over- or understated requirements and provide the
combatant commands with needed munitions.

1 Munitions include a wide variety of ammunition for small arms, mortars,
cannons, artillery, and guns, as well as bombs, rockets, missiles, mines,
demolition material, grenades, flares, and torpedoes. The Department of
Defense also considers chemicals, nuclear weapons, and pyrotechnics to be
munitions. However, we are not referring to these categories of munitions
in this letter.

2 Each unified combatant command is composed of forces from two or more
military services, has broad and continuing missions, and is organized
either on a geographical or functional basis. There are currently nine
unified combatant commands.

3 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Unfinished
Actions Limit Reliability of the Munition Requirements Determination
Process, GAO- 01- 18 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 5, 2001).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

Notwithstanding the improvements the department said it would make to the
munitions requirements determination process, combatant commands have
continued to report munitions shortages. Accordingly, this review was
undertaken, pursuant to GAO*s legislative authority, to determine the
extent to which (1) improvements have been made to the Department of
Defense*s munitions requirements determination process and (2) the process
is being used to guide current munitions acquisitions.

The Department of Defense has improved its munitions requirements process
by eliminating most of the systemic problems* for example, correcting
questionable and inconsistently applied data, completing target templates,
and resolving issues involving the level of detail that should be included
in planning guidance. However, a fundamental problem remains unaddressed*
inadequate linkage between the near- term munitions needs of the combatant
commands and the purchases made by the military services based on
computations derived from the department*s munitions requirements
determination process. This disjunction* sometimes referred to as a
difference between the combatant commanders* near- term focus (generally 2
years) and the services* longer- term planning horizon (generally 6
years)* has resulted in the combatant commands and the services
identifying different munitions needs and, ultimately, in the combatant
commanders reporting shortages. However, we believe there is a more
fundamental reason for the disconnect; it occurs because the department*s
munitions requirements determination process does not fully consider the
combatant commanders* preferences for munitions and weapon systems that
will be used against targets identified in projected scenarios. The
department recognizes that a disjunction exists between needs identified
by the combatant commanders and the services* purchasing decisions. On
June 18, 2002, the department contracted for an assessment of its
munitions requirements process with the goal of developing a process that
will include determinations of the near- year and out- year munitions
requirements.

The department*s munitions requirements process provides varied answers
for current munitions acquisitions questions because of the aforementioned
disjunction. As a result, the services, in the short term, are purchasing
some critically needed munitions based on available funding and
contractors* production capacity. In one such case* involving a munition
preferred by each of the combatant commanders* the quantities of munitions
shortages identified by both the services and the combatant commanders
differed, exceeding previously planned acquisition quantities. As a
result, the department entered into an agreement to purchase the Results
in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

maximum quantities that it could fund the contractor to manufacture at
this time. In such cases, the department could purchase too much or too
little, depending upon the quantities of munitions ultimately needed.
While this approach may be necessary in the short term, it raises
questions as to whether over the long term it would position the services
to make the most efficient use of appropriated funds and whether the needs
of combatant commands to carry out their missions will be met.

Our report recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish a direct
link between the munitions needs of the combatant commands and the
munitions requirements determinations and purchasing decisions made by the
military services. In written comments on a draft of this report, the
department concurred with our recommendation.

The Department of Defense*s budget is the product of a complex process
designed to develop an effective defense strategy that supports U. S.
national security objectives. For munitions, the department generally does
not have the combatant commands submit separate budgets, but relies on the
military services* budget submissions. 4 Thus, the military services are
largely responsible for determining requirements for the types and
quantities of munitions that are bought. The Department of Defense
Inspector General and GAO have issued numerous reports dating back to 1994
identifying systemic problems* such as questionable and inconsistently
applied data, inconsistent processes among and between services, and
unclear guidance* that have inflated the services* requirements for
certain categories of munitions and understated requirements for other
categories. (For a listing of these reports, see app. II.)

In 1997, as one step toward addressing these concerns, the Department of
Defense issued Instruction 3000.4, which sets forth policies, roles and
responsibilities, time frames, and procedures to guide the services as
they develop their munitions requirements. This instruction is referred to
as the capabilities- based munitions requirements process and is the
responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics. The instruction describes a multi- phased

4 The U. S. Special Operations Command has a separate budget for a portion
of its munitions needs. Its munitions budget for fiscal years 2001 and
2002 was about $60 million and $42 million, respectively. Background

Page 4 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

analytical process that begins when the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy develops* in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the military services, and the combatant commands* policy for the

Defense Planning Guidance. 5 The Defense Intelligence Agency uses the
Defense Planning Guidance and its accompanying scenarios, as well as other
intelligence information, to develop a threat assessment. This assessment
contains estimates and facts about the potential threats that the United
States and allied forces could expect to meet in war scenarios. The
combatant commanders (who are responsible for the theaters of war
scenarios), in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, use the threat
assessment to allocate each service a share of the identified targets by
phases of the war. The services then develop their combat requirements 6
using battle simulation models and scenarios to determine the number and
mix of munitions needed to meet the combatant commanders* specific
objectives.

Despite the department*s efforts to standardize the process and generate
consistent requirements, many questions have continued to be raised about
the accuracy or reliability of the munitions requirements determination
process. In April 2001, we reported continuing problems with the
capabilities- based munitions requirements determination process because
the department (1) had yet to complete a database providing detailed
descriptions of the types of targets on large enemy installations that
would likely be encountered, based on warfighting scenarios; (2) had not
set a time frame for completing its munitions effectiveness database; and
(3) was debating whether to include greater specificity in its warfighting
scenarios and to rate the warfighting scenarios by the probability of
their occurrence. These process components significantly affect the
numbers and types of munitions needed to meet the warfighting combatant
command*s objectives. The department acknowledged these weaknesses and
recognized that inaccurate requirements can negatively affect munitions
planning, programming, and budget decisions, as well as assessments of the
size and composition of the industrial production base.

5 The Secretary of Defense and his staff prepare the Defense Planning
Guidance, issue policy, and articulate strategic objectives that reflect
the national military strategy. The

Defense Planning Guidance includes the Secretary*s force and resource
guidance to the military departments, other combat support agencies, and
the unified combatant commands.

6 These quantities include weapons- based load expenditures (a fighting
load of munitions appropriate for engaging the enemy), resupply, and
logistics add- ons due to environmental factors in the theater of
operations (i. e., terrain and weather).

Page 5 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

In responding to our report*s recommendations, the department has taken a
number of actions to correct the problems we identified.

Our review of the requirements process and related documentation showed
that the Department of Defense corrected the previously identified
systemic problems in its process for determining munitions requirements,
but the reliability of the process continues to be uncertain because of
the department*s failure to link the near- term munitions needs of the
combatant commands and the purchases made by the military services based
on computations derived from the department*s munitions requirements
determination process. Because of differences in how requirements are
determined, asking a question about the quantities of munitions that are
needed can result in one answer from the combatant commanders and
differing answers from the military services. For this reason, the
combatant commands may report shortages of munitions they need to carry
out warfighting scenarios. We believe* and the department*s assessment of
its munitions requirements process recognizes* that munitions requirements
and purchase decisions made by the military services should be more
closely linked to the needs of the combatant commanders. The main issue
that the department still needs to address is engaging the combatant
commands in the requirements determination process, budgeting processes,
and related purchasing decisions to minimize the occurrence of reported
shortages. Because of the present gap between the combatant commands*
munitions needs and department*s requirements determination process, which
helps shape the services* purchasing decisions, munitions requirements are
not consistently stated, and thus the amount of funding needed to
alleviate possible shortages is not always fully understood.

In April 2001, we reported that key components of the requirements
determination process either had not been completed or had not been
decided upon. 7 At that time, the department had not completed a database
listing detailed target characteristics for large enemy installations
based on warfighting scenarios and had not developed new munitions
effectiveness data to address deficiencies identified by the services and
the combatant commanders. Additionally, the department had not

7 U. S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Unfinished Actions
Limit Reliability of the Munition Requirements Determination Process, GAO-
01- 18 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 5, 2001). Improvements Made,

but Gap Remains between the Combatant Commanders* Needs and the Services*
Purchasing Decisions

Steps Taken to Improve the Requirements Determination Process

Page 6 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

determined whether to create more detailed warfighting scenarios in the
Defense Planning Guidance or to rate scenarios in terms of their
probability. We concluded that until these tasks were completed and
incorporated into the process, questions would likely remain regarding the
accuracy of the munitions requirements process as well as the department*s
ability to identify the munitions most appropriate to defeat potential
threats.

In response to our report, the department took actions during fiscal years
2001 and 2002 to resolve the following three key issues affecting the
reliability of the munitions requirements process:

 List of targets* The department lacked a common picture of the number
and types of targets on large enemy installations as identified in the
warfighting scenarios, and, as a result, each of the services had been
identifying targets on enemy installations differently. To resolve this
issue, the Joint Chiefs instructed the Defense Intelligence Agency, in
coordination with the combatant commanders, to develop target templates
that would provide a common picture of the types of potential targets on
enemy installations. In August 2001, the department revised its
capabilities- based requirements instruction to incorporate the target
templates developed by the Defense Intelligence Agency as the
authoritative threat estimate for developing munitions requirements.

 Munitions effectiveness data* The department was using outdated
information to determine the effectiveness of a munition against a target
and to predict the number of munitions necessary to defeat it. The
department recognized that munitions effectiveness data is a critical
component for requirements planning and that outdated information could
over- or understate munitions requirements. To address this shortfall, the
department updated its joint munitions effectiveness manual with up- to-
date munitions effectiveness data for use by the services in their battle
simulation models.

 Warfighting scenarios* The Defense Planning Guidance contains
warfighting scenarios that detail conditions that may exist during the
conduct of war; these scenarios are developed with input from several
sources, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the services. This guidance should provide a common baseline
from which the combatant commands and the services determine their
munitions requirements. However, when the department adopted the
capabilities- based munitions requirements

Page 7 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

instruction, details were eliminated in favor of broader guidance. To
ensure that the combatant commanders and the services plan for the most
likely warfighting scenario and do not use unlikely events to support
certain munitions, the department revised the Defense Planning Guidance to
provide fewer warfighting scenarios and more detail on each.

The department expected that these actions to improve the munitions
requirements process would correct over- or understated requirements and
provide the combatant commands with needed munitions. However, despite the
department*s efforts to enhance the requirements determination process,
one problem area remains* inadequate linkage between the near- term
munitions needs of the combatant commands and the purchases made by the
military services based on computations derived from the department*s
munitions requirements determination process. Various actions taken to
address this issue have not been successful.

The disjunction between the department*s requirements determination
processes and combatant commanders* needs is rooted in separate
assessments done at different times. The services, as part of their
budgeting processes, develop the department*s munitions requirements using
targets provided by the combatant commands (based on the Defense
Intelligence Agency*s threat report), battle simulation models, and
scenarios to determine the number and mix of munitions needed to meet the
combatant commanders* objectives in each war scenario. To develop these
requirements, the services draw upon and integrate data and assumptions
from the Defense Planning Guidance, warfighting scenarios, and target
allocations, as well as estimates of repair and return rates for enemy
targets and projected assessments of damage to enemy targets and
installations. Other munitions requirements are also determined, and
include munitions needed (1) for forces not committed to support combat
operations, (2) for forward presence and current operations, (3) to
provide a post- theater of war combat capability, and (4) to train the
forces, support service programs, and support peacetime operations. These
requirements, in addition to the combat requirement, comprise the
services* total munitions requirement. The total munitions requirement is
then compared to available inventory and appropriated funds to determine
how many of each munition the services will procure within their specified
funding limits and is used to develop the services* Program Objectives
Memorandum and their budget submissions to the President. Continuing
Limitations in

Requirements Determination Process

Page 8 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

Periodically the combatant commanders prepare reports of their readiness
status, including the availability of sufficient types and quantities of
munitions needed to meet the combatant commanders* warfighting objectives,
but these munitions needs are not tied to the services* munitions
requirements or to the budgeting process. In determining readiness, the
combatant commanders develop their munitions needs using their own battle
simulation models, scenarios, and targets and give emphasis to the
munitions they prefer to use or need for unique war scenarios to determine
the number and mix of munitions they require to meet their warfighting
objectives. The combatant commanders calculate their needs in various
ways* unconstrained and constrained and over various time periods (e. g.,
30 days and 180 days). Unconstrained calculations are based on the
combatant commanders* assessment of munitions needs, assuming that all
needed munitions are available. Constrained calculations represent the
combatant commanders* assessment of munitions needs to fight wars under
certain rules of engagement that limit collateral damage and civilian and
U. S. military casualties. Because the combatant commanders* battle
simulation models and scenarios differ from those used by the military
services, their munitions needs are different, which can result in reports
of munitions shortages. In contrast, the U. S. Special Operations Command
develops its combat requirements for the number and mix of munitions
needed to meet its warfighting objectives using the same battle simulation
models and scenarios that the services used and provides these
requirements to the services, rather than providing only potential targets
to the services as other commands do. This permits the U. S. Special
Operations Command to more directly influence the assumptions about
specific weapons systems and munitions to be used. As a result of working
together, the Command*s and the services* requirements are the same. 8

In an effort to close the gap between the combatant commanders* needs and
the department*s munitions requirements determination process, a 1999
pilot project was initiated by the department to bridge this gap by better
aligning the combatant commanders* near- term objectives (which generally
cover a 2- year period) and the services* long- term planning horizon
(which is generally 6 years). Another benefit of the pilot was that

8 In addition, the U. S. Special Operations Command had a separate
munitions budget to offset shortages resulting from the difference between
the quantities of munitions that the Command had determined were required
and the quantities the services had purchased. Title II of the Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P. L. 99- 433)
permitted the combatant commands to have their own operations budgets.

Page 9 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

the Joint Chiefs of Staff could validate the department*s munitions
requirements by matching requirements to target allocations. However, the
Army, the Navy, and a warfighting combatant commander objected to the
pilot*s results because it allocated significantly more targets to the Air
Force and fewer targets to the Army. Army officials objected that the
pilot*s methodology did not adequately address land warfare, which is
significantly different from air warfare. 9 The Navy did not concur with
the results, citing the lack of recognition for the advanced capabilities
of future munitions. U. S. Central Command officials disagreed with the
results, stating that a change in methodology should not in and of itself
cause the allocation to shift. In July 2000, citing substantial concerns
about the pilot, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics suspended the target allocation for fiscal year
2000 and directed the services to use the same allocations applied to the
fiscal year 2002 to the 2007 Program Objectives Memorandum.

In August 2000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made another attempt to address
the need for better linkage between the department*s munitions
requirements process and the combatant commanders* munitions needs. The
combatant commanders were to prepare a near- term target allocation using
a methodology developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each warfighting
combatant commander developed two allocations* one for strike (air
services) forces and one for engagement (land troops) forces for his area
of responsibility. The first allocated specific targets to strike forces
under the assumption that the air services can eliminate the majority of
enemy targets. The second allocation assumed that less than perfect
conditions exist (such as bad weather), which would limit the air
services* ability to destroy their assigned targets and require that the
engagement force complete the mission. The combatant commanders did not
assign specific targets to the engagement forces, but they estimated the
size of the expected remaining enemy land force. The Army and the Marines
then were expected to arm themselves to defeat those enemy forces. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff used the combatant commanders* nearyear threat
distribution and extrapolated that information to the last year of the
Program Objectives Memorandum for the purpose of the services* munitions
requirements planning. The department expected that these

9 The Army*s position was that unlike the air services that plan munitions
requirements to destroy assigned targets, assigning specific targets to a
land battle is meaningless, because the number of targets destroyed may
not be an accurate measure of a successful operation. Specifically, in a
land battle, circumventing enemy forces or surrounding them and cutting
off their supply lines may meet the combatant commander*s operational
plan.

Page 10 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

modifications would correct over- or understated requirements and bridge
the gap between the warfighting combatant commanders* near- term interests
and objectives and the services* longer planning horizon.

However, inadequate linkage remains between the near- term munitions needs
of the combatant commands and the department*s munitions requirements
determinations and purchases made by the military services. This is
sometimes referred to as a difference between the combatant commanders*
near- term focus (generally 2 years) and the services longerterm planning
horizon (generally 6 years). However, we believe that there is a more
fundamental reason for the disconnect; it occurs because the department*s
munitions requirements determination process does not fully consider the
combatant commanders* preferences for munitions and weapon systems to be
used against targets identified in projected scenarios.

On June 18, 2002, the department contracted with TRW Inc. to assess its
munitions requirements process and develop a process that will include a
determination of the near- year and out- year munitions requirements. The
assessment, which will build upon the capabilities- based munitions
requirements process, is also expected to quantify risk associated with
any quantity differential associated between requirements and inventory
and achieve a balance between inventory, production, and consumption. A
final report on this assessment is due in March 2003.

The department*s munitions requirements process provides varying answers
for current munitions acquisitions because of the inadequate linkage
between the near- term munitions needs of the combatant commands and the
munitions requirements computed by the military services. As a result, the
services are purchasing some critically needed munitions based on
available funding and the contractors* production capacity. For example,
in December 2001, both the services and the combatant commanders
identified shortages for joint direct attack munitions (a munition
preferred by each of the combatant commanders). According to various
Department of Defense officials, these amounts differed and exceeded
previously planned acquisition quantities. Therefore, the department
entered into an agreement to purchase the maximum quantities that it could
fund the contractor to manufacture and paid the contractor to increase its
production capacity. In such cases, the department could purchase too much
or too little, depending upon the quantities of munitions ultimately
needed. While this approach may be needed in the short term, it raises
questions whether over the long term it Munitions

Requirements Process Provides Varying Answers for Acquisition Decisions

Page 11 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

would position the services to make the most efficient use of appropriated
funds and whether the needs of combatant commands to carry out their
missions will be met.

Until the department establishes a more direct link between the combatant
commanders* needs, the department*s requirements determinations, and the
services* purchasing decisions, the department will be unable to determine
with certainty the quantities and types of munitions the combatant
commanders need to accomplish their missions. As a result, the amount of
munitions funds needed will remain uncertain, and assessments of the size
and composition of the industrial production base will be negatively
affected. Unless this issue is resolved, the severity of the situation
will again be apparent when munitions funding returns to normal levels and
shortages of munitions are identified by the combatant commands.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish a direct link between
the munitions needs of the combatant commands* recognizing the impact of
weapons systems and munitions preferred or expected to be employed* and
the munitions requirements determinations and purchasing decisions made by
the military services.

As you know, 31 U. S. C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to
submit a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to
the Senate Committee on Government Affairs and the House Committee on
Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A
written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations with the agency*s first request for appropriations made
more than 60 days after the date of this report.

The Director of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense*s Strategic
and Tactical Systems provided written comments on a draft of this report.
They are included in appendix III. The Department of Defense concurred
with the recommended linkage of munitions requirements and combatant
commanders* needs. The Director stated that the department, through a
munitions requirements study directed by the fiscal year 2004 Defense
Planning Guidance, has identified this link as a problem and has
established a solution that will be documented in the next update of
Instruction 3000.4 in fiscal year 2003. The department also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.
Conclusion

Recommendation for Executive Action

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Page 12 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees and to the Director, Office of Management and Budget. The
report is also available on GAO*s Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. The
scope and methodology of our work is presented in appendix I. If you or
your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this letter,
please contact me at (202) 512- 4300. Key contributors to this letter were
Ron Berteotti, Roger Tomlinson, Tommy Baril, and Nelsie Alcoser.

Sincerely yours, Barry W. Holman Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 13 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

To determine the extent to which improvements had been made to the
Department of Defense*s requirements determination process, we reviewed
the Department*s Instruction 3000.4, Capabilities- Based Munitions
Requirements (to ascertain roles and oversight responsibilities and to
identify required inputs into the process); 17 Department of Defense
Inspector General reports and 4 General Accounting Office reports relating
to the department*s munitions requirements determination process (to
identify reported weaknesses in the requirements determination process);
and reviewed requirements determinations and related documentation and
interviewed officials (to identify actions taken to correct weaknesses in
the requirements determination process) from the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
Washington, D. C.; Joint Chiefs of Staff (Operations, Logistics, Force
Structure, Resources and Assessment), Washington, D. C.; and Army, Navy,
and Air Force officials responsible for budgeting, buying, and allocating
munitions.

To determine whether the munitions requirements determination process was
being used to guide current munitions acquisitions, we met with the
services* headquarters officials (to determine how each service develops
its munitions requirements, to obtain data on the assumptions and inputs
that go into its simulation models, to see how each service reviews the
outcome of its munitions requirement process, and to determine the basis
for recent munitions purchases) and interviewed officials at U. S. Central
Command and U. S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
Florida; U. S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida; U. S. Pacific Command;
Headquarters Pacific Air Forces; U. S. Army Pacific; Marine Forces
Pacific; U. S. Pacific Fleet, Oahu, Hawaii; U. S. Forces Korea; Eighth U.
S. Army, Seoul, Korea; and 7th Air Force, Osan, Korea (to determine
whether the munitions needed by the warfighters are available).

We performed our review from March 2002 through July 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I: Scope
and Methodology

Appendix II: Related DOD Inspector General and General Accounting Office
Reports

Page 14 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

Defense Logistics: Unfinished Actions Limit Reliability of the Munition
Requirements Determination Process. GAO- 01- 18. Washington, D. C.: April
2001.

Summary of the DOD Process for Developing Quantitative Munitions
Requirements. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D. C.:
February 24, 2000.

Air Force Munitions Requirements. Department of Defense Inspector General.
Washington, D. C.: September 3, 1999.

Defense Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in Antiarmor Weapon
Acquisitions. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 105. Washington, D. C.: July 22, 1999.

U. S. Special Operations Command Munitions Requirements.

Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D. C.: May 10, 1999.

Marine Corps Quantitative Munitions Requirements Process.

Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D. C.: December 10,
1998.

Weapons Acquisitions: Guided Weapon Plans Need to be Reassessed.

GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 32. Washington, D. C.: December 9, 1998.

Navy Quantitative Requirements for Munitions. Department of Defense
Inspector General. Washington, D. C.: December 3, 1998.

Army Quantitative Requirements for Munitions. Department of Defense
Inspector General. Washington, D. C.: June 26, 1998.

Management Oversight of the Capabilities- Based Munitions Requirements
Process. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D. C.: June
22, 1998.

Threat Distributions for Requirements Planning at U. S. Central Command
and U. S. Forces Korea. Department of Defense Inspector General.
Washington, D. C.: May 20, 1998.

Army*s and Marine Corps* Quantitative Requirements for Blocks I and II
Stinger Missiles. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.
C.: June 25, 1996. Appendix II: Related DOD Inspector General

and General Accounting Office Reports

Appendix II: Related DOD Inspector General and General Accounting Office
Reports

Page 15 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

U. S. Combat Air Power* Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction
Capabilities Could Save Billions. Department of Defense Inspector General.
Washington, D. C.: May 13, 1996.

Summary Report on the Audits of the Anti- Armor Weapon System and
Associated Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington,
D. C.: June 29, 1995.

Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory, Production,
and Development. GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 95. Washington, D. C.: June 23, 1995.

Acquisition Objectives for Antisubmarine Munitions and Requirements for
Shallow Water Oceanography. Department of Defense Inspector General.
Washington, D. C.: May 15, 1995.

Army*s Processes for Determining Quantitative Requirements for Anti- Armor
Systems and Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General.
Washington, D. C.: March 29, 1995.

The Marine Corps* Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements for
Anti- Armor Munitions for Ground Forces. Department of Defense Inspector
General. Washington, D. C.: October 24, 1994.

The Navy*s Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements for Anti-
Armor Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.
C.: October 11, 1994.

The Air Force*s Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements for
Anti- Armor Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General.
Washington, D. C.: June 17, 1994.

Coordination of Quantitative Requirements for Anti- Armor Munitions.
Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D. C.: June 14, 1994.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 16 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 17 GAO- 03- 17 Defense Management (350150)

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