Aviation Infrastructure: Challenges Related to Building Runways
and Actions to Address Them (30-JAN-03, GAO-03-164).
Aviation experts believe that building runways is one key way to
address airport capacity issues and prevent delays that can
affect the entire U.S. economy, but runway projects are often
controversial and time-consuming. GAO was asked to examine how
much time airports spend completing runways, what challenges
airports and other stakeholders experience during this process,
and what airports and other stakeholders have done to address
challenges related to runway projects. GAO analyzed the results
of surveys from 30 airports on 32 runway projects and visited 5
airports in order to interview numerous runway project
stakeholders. The Department of Transportation agreed with GAO's
characterization of the challenges associated with building
runways and some of the initiatives taken to address these
challenges. They did express some concerns related to GAO's
analysis of the time airports spent or estimated spending in
developing runways, and suggested that GAO acknowledge additional
FAA efforts to improve the runway process. We believe that our
approach was a reasonable assessment of the amount of time taken
to build runways; however, we clarified our discussion about the
length of time. We also added information regarding initiatives
undertaken by FAA.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-164
ACCNO: A05981
TITLE: Aviation Infrastructure: Challenges Related to Building
Runways and Actions to Address Them
DATE: 01/30/2003
SUBJECT: Airports
Aviation
Construction (process)
Construction costs
Environmental monitoring
Program evaluation
Strategic planning
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GAO-03-164
A
Report to the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure
January 2003 AVIATION INFRASTRUCTURE Challenges Related to Building
Runways and Actions to Address Them
GAO- 03- 164
Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Some Airports Have Spent Many
Years Building Runways and Have Faced a Variety of Challenges 10
A Number of Initiatives Are Underway to Address Challenges Related to
Building Runways 16 Agency Comments 22
Appendixes
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 24
Appendix II: Airport Site Visits 26 General Edward Lawrence Logan
International Airport * East Boston, MA 27
Current Status of the Runway Project 30 Stakeholders Cite Community
Opposition as a Major Challenge and Say Efforts to Address This Issue Were
Unsuccessful 30
Stakeholders Say Meeting Extensive Environmental Requirements Has Been
Challenging Because of Community Opposition 31 Litigation Added Time to
Process 34
Appendix III: Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport * DFW, TX 36
Current Status of the Two Runway Projects 38 Airport Officials Described
Extensive Environmental Review
Process as Challenging 38 The Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport
Used Some Unique
Approaches to Mitigate Runway Impacts 38 Stakeholder Experiences, from
Start to Finish, Were Many and
Varied 39 Litigation Delayed Process 40
Appendix IV: Memphis International Airport 43 Status of the Runway project
45 Airport Officials Stated That They Faced Challenges Reaching
Consensus among Stakeholders on Project Funding Issues and Decisionmaking
45 Extensive Requirements Raised Challenges Regarding Wetlands
Mitigation and Land Acquisition during Construction of Runway 46 Site-
Specific Challenges Involved Relocating Other
Infrastructure 47
Appendix V: Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport 49 Current Status
of the Runway Project 51 Stakeholders Agree That Comprehensive Mitigation
Plans Are
Essential but Difficult to Develop 51 Stakeholders Believe That Mitigation
Funding Should Be More
Flexible to Include More Communities 52 A Nationwide Low Frequency Noise
Policy Is Not in Place 52 Some Communities Question Justification of State
Zoning Laws 53
Appendix VI: Seattle- Tacoma International Airport 56 Status of the Runway
project 58 Simplifying Purpose and Need May Help Reduce the Circuitous
Nature of the Review Process 58 A Compatible Land Use Program May Help to
Reduce
Opposition 59 New Mitigation Approaches and Increased Community
Interaction
Could Help Foster Community Support 60 Extensive Regulatory and Legal
Requirements Posed Resource Challenges 62
Site- Specific Issues Involve Safety and Environmental Challenges 63
Appendix VII: Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto, Canada 65
Status of Runway Projects 67 Airport Development Process in Canada Differs
from U. S.
Process 67 Canadian Airports Face Many of the Same Challenges as U. S.
Airports 68
Appendix VIII: Survey of Airports 70
Appendix IX: Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects 72
Tables Table 1: Summary of Provisions in H. R. 4481 and S. 633, and the
Challenges Each Seeks to Address 18 Table 2: Airports Selected for Site
Visit and their Runway
Projects 27 Table 3: History of the Boston Logan Runway Project 35 Table
4: History of Dallas* Fort Worth Runway Project 41 Table 5: History of
Memphis Runway Project 48 Table 6: History of Minneapolis- St. Paul
International Airport
Runway Project 54 Table 7: History of Sea- Tac Runway Project 64
Table 8: Airports Surveyed 71 Figures Figure 1: Runway Development Process
8
Figure 2: Amount of Time Airports Have Spent or Planned to Spend on Runway
Projects Varied 11 Figure 3: Median Time Spent on Runway Projects Overall
and on Each Phase 12
Figure 4: Airport Diagram* Boston*s Logan International Airport 29 Figure
5: Airport Diagram* Dallas- Fort Worth International
Airport 37 Figure 6: Airport Diagram* Memphis International Airport 44
Figure 7: Airport Diagram* Sea- Tac International Airport 57 Figure 8:
Airport Diagram* Lester B. Pearson International
Airport 66
Letter
January 30, 2003 The Honorable John L. Mica Chairman The Honorable William
O. Lipinski Ranking Democratic Member Subcommittee on Aviation Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives
Although the events of September 11, 2001, diverted the aviation
industry*s attention from airport flight capacity to security issues,
aviation experts believe that addressing capacity issues must be brought
back to the forefront to prevent costly flight delays and their negative
effect on the U. S. economy. According to a recent report on the impact on
civil aviation, 1 the
flight congestion and delay problems that were experienced in 2000 had a
significant effect on the entire U. S. economy and were felt not only in
the commercial aviation industry but also in the tourism and related
supplier industries. The report found that in 2000, commercial aviation
delays resulted in over $9 billion in negative economic effects on the
entire U. S. economy and cost commercial airlines over $3 billion. In
addition, the report stated that if there were no new investments in
airport construction (including new runways) or in the air traffic system
beyond 2000, delays could potentially cost the U. S. economy $13.5 billion
in 2007 and $17.2 billion in 2012.
Building runways can involve years of planning, an extensive environmental
review phase, and the design and construction of the actual runway.
Airport authorities who want to build a runway must also coordinate with
numerous stakeholders, including airlines, federal and
state officials, and community groups. In addition, they may face legal
challenges from opponents of the runway that can take years to resolve.
Nonetheless, according to FAA, despite these challenges, building new
runways is widely regarded as the most effective way to increase capacity
1 The National Economic Impact of Civil Aviation, DRI- WEFA, Inc., July
2002.
in the national airspace system and is critical to the entire U. S.
economy. 2 This report provides information on the process for building
runways, taking into consideration the needs of the system and the
concerns of the various stakeholders. Specifically, as agreed with your
offices, we address the following questions:
1. How much time do airports spend building their runway projects, and
what challenges do airports and other stakeholders experience during this
process?
2. What have airports and other stakeholders done or proposed to do to
address the challenges they experienced in building runways? To determine
the amount of time that airports spent to complete runway projects, along
with challenges that airports and other stakeholders faced during this
process and initiatives to address these challenges, we surveyed 30
airports that had built or planned to build a total of 32 runways between
1991 and 2010. Based on survey responses, we selected 5 airports that were
diverse in size, location, and challenges at which we conducted in- depth
site visits in order to understand the perspectives of numerous
stakeholders. At these locations, we interviewed airport, airline, federal
and state, and community officials about their experiences. We also
visited the Lester B. Pearson International Airport in Toronto, Canada, to
gain a perspective on the Canadian runway development process. A more
detailed explanation of the scope and methodology can be found in appendix
I.
Results in Brief The amount of time that airports spend planning and
building their runways can vary because of a number of factors. For
example, although it
is relatively straightforward to determine the beginning and ending of the
environmental and the design and construction phases of the runway
development process, there is no consensus among stakeholders about what
constitutes the beginning of the planning phase of the process.
Consequently, the length of time and the number of activities considered
by
some airports to be part of the planning phase vary. In light of these
circumstances, we decided to use a median time rather than the average
time because it would minimize the impact of outlying airports that may
have taken a very long or very short time. For the airports we surveyed,
the
2 Some in the aviation industry believe that demand management and peak
pricing are also feasible alternatives to reducing congestion and delays.
median time spent from planning to completion of their runway projects was
about 10 years, and the median time that airports estimated they would
spend on projects not yet completed was about 14 years. Several of the
airports with unfinished runway projects stated that significant
challenges had delayed their projects* completion. Although the level of
challenges
faced by airports varied depending on such factors as proximity of the
airport to a major city, amount of community opposition to the runway, and
specific environmental issues, some common themes emerged. For example,
several airports described challenges related to reaching stakeholder
agreement on the purpose and need for the new runway. Another theme was
the challenge of completing required environmental
reviews; specifically, airports described challenges related to complying
with extensive and duplicative federal and state requirements and
obtaining the necessary permits. Some airports also described challenges
related to reaching agreement on how to mitigate the impact of noise and
other issues. Several airports commented that they faced challenges during
the design and construction of their runways such as dealing with weather
and site preparation issues. Although there may be no single solution that
addresses all the issues
involved in planning and building runways, the federal government and
airport authorities have undertaken a number of initiatives in this area.
Most recently, the President issued an Executive Order that is directed at
streamlining the environmental review of transportation infrastructure
projects by requiring federal agencies that conduct environmental reviews
to develop procedures that will allow the reviews to be completed in a
timely and responsible manner. In addition, to address challenges
associated with the many regulatory requirements of the runway development
process, two legislative initiatives designed to streamline the runway
development process have been under consideration at the federal
level. FAA has also undertaken several initiatives directed at increasing
communication and coordination, and at streamlining the planning and
environmental review of runway projects. FAA officials expect these
initiatives to produce measurable improvements in the runway development
process. Although some airports stated that the federal initiatives held
promise for helping airports to resolve challenges more quickly, it is too
early to assess their impact on the runway development process. Airports
have also undertaken initiatives to address challenges related to building
runways, including getting local stakeholders such as community groups
involved at the very beginning of the process and
reaching early agreement on how to mitigate the impacts of the runway.
Airports described these initiatives as helpful to facilitating the
completion
of their runway projects, and their efforts may be useful for other
airports involved in runway projects to consider, but the variety of
situations that airports described and the different levels of challenges
they faced make it difficult to generalize from one airport*s experience
to another.
We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this report
for their review and comment. FAA officials agreed with our
characterization of the challenges associated with building runways and
our identification of some of the initiatives to address these challenges.
However, they did express some concerns related to our analysis of the
time that airports spent developing their runways, and suggested that GAO
include more acknowledgment of FAA*s efforts to improve the process. In
response to FAA*s comments, we believe our approach was a reasonable
assessment of the amount of time it takes airports to build runways;
however, we clarified our discussion about the length of time. We also
added information regarding several initiatives that FAA has undertaken to
streamline the runway development process, and we made technical changes
where appropriate. Background The decision to build runways has
traditionally elicited strong and often
emotional reactions among stakeholders, both negative and positive.
Generally, these reactions are directed at the decision to build a runway*
usually in response to the perceived environmental or economic impacts
that the proposed project will have on the surrounding communities. Often,
opponents to a runway project base their opposition on the belief that the
negative impact of the runway on their quality of life will outweigh the
projected benefits of the project. At other times, opponents contend that
alternatives such as high- speed rail, regional airports, or demand
management are better alternatives to resolving delay issues than building
new runways. In contrast, proponents of new runway projects generally
contend that building new runways can increase the level of service and
reduce delay at the airport, can result in a positive economic impact to
the region served by the airport, and in some cases can reduce noise
pollution by distributing flights over a larger geographical area.
Airports that plan to build runways must comply with what can become a
complex process involving three general phases that often overlap:
planning, environmental review, and design and construction. In addition,
airports can be involved in legal actions that can occur in any or all of
the
three phases.
The first phase in the runway development process is planning. According
to FAA guidance, airports should begin planning for a new runway when the
airport has reached 60 to 75 percent of total annual flight capacity.
During the planning phase, airport authorities and local officials begin
by identifying the type of development needed at a specific airport and
the proposed project*s estimated cost and benefits, in both political and
economic terms. Some of the planning tasks include establishing the
purpose and need for the runway (for example, assessing the capability of
current facilities, reviewing and refining aviation demand forecasts, and
evaluating options to accommodate forecast demands), coordinating land use
issues with community planning boards, and preparing capacity
enhancement plans, master plans, airspace reviews, cost benefit analyses,
and airport layout plans. 3 Further, most airports consider numerous
alternatives for increasing capacity or reducing delay before deciding on
a project to pursue. During this phase, airports will begin addressing how
to fund the proposed project.
The environmental review phase, which often overlaps with planning, is the
second phase in the runway development process. This phase typically
begins with a determination by FAA of the extent to which a proposed
project will affect the quality of the environment. 4 To make this
determination, FAA examines the proposed project and its possible
environmental impacts on air and water quality, on noise, and on
historical lands. FAA will make one of three determinations. If the agency
determines that the scope of the project is such that it will not directly
affect the environment, it will issue a categorical exclusion. 5 If FAA
determines that a project will have a measurable effect on the
environment, but that its impact will not exceed guidelines established in
the agency*s Environmental Handbook, it will issue a Finding of No
Significant Impact
(FONSI). After issuance of a FONSI, runway projects can begin applying for
necessary permits, such as those that may be required under the Clean 3
Airports and other stakeholders develop these plans to help them identify
potential ways to increase airfield capacity at major airports and to
coordinate major infrastructure projects at the airports.
4 Some states have environmental review requirements in addition to
federal requirements. 5 Under the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, a categorical exclusion exempts the project from the requirements of
the federal environmental review process. However, according to FAA,
categorical exclusions are not an option for a new runway or major runway
extension. A categorical exclusion does not necessarily relieve the
project from state and local environmental review requirements.
Air Act or the Clean Water Act. Where potentially significant impacts are
obvious, FAA will proceed directly to the preparation of an environmental
impact statement (EIS) rather than start with the airport sponsors*
environmental assessment. 6
If FAA determines that a proposed project will have significant
environmental effects, it will issue a notice of intent to prepare an EIS.
An EIS includes an analysis of the potential environmental effects of a
proposed project and how to mitigate significant impacts. Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations do not require that all impacts be
mitigated; agencies are required to disclose impacts that will not be
mitigated, and the reason. After the draft EIS is completed, FAA provides
it to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which publishes a notice
of its availability in the Federal Register, where it is made available
for review and comment to federal, state, and local agencies and the
public for at least
45 days. Public hearings, if necessary, usually occur during the review
and comment period. At the end of the public comment period, FAA responds
to comments received on the draft and prepares the final EIS. Once FAA
approves the final EIS, the document is printed, distributed, and once
again filed with EPA. EPA subsequently publishes notice of the
availability of the final EIS in the Federal Register. According to CEQ
regulations, FAA can not issue a Record of Decision (ROD) for at least 30
days after the publication of the final EIS. Once the final EIS has been
issued, it takes FAA an average of about 3 months to issue a ROD. The ROD,
which is the final step of the environmental review process, summarizes
the administrative record of the agency*s proposals, alternatives,
analysis, findings/
determinations, decisions, actions, and mitigation measures that were made
a condition of approval of the EIS. If, however, FAA finds that the
revised draft differs significantly from the initial draft, the agency may
issue a supplemental draft EIS and release this document for further
review
and comment. In addition, other factors that may lead to a supplemental
EIS include a change in the proposed action, a change in the agency*s
6 An EIS is a document required of federal agencies by the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and its implementing regulations as
formulated by the Council on Environmental Quality for major projects or
legislative proposals that significantly affect the environment. It
describes the environmental effects of the undertaking and lists
alternative actions. In principle, it is a basis for deciding whether to
approve the project. FAA is responsible for preparing an EIS for a major
airport project or selecting a contractor (that is, consultant) to assist
FAA in preparing the EIS. Typically, FAA coordinates with the airport
authority when it selects an EIS consultant.
decision, or new reasonable alternatives not previously evaluated. A
supplemental draft EIS can occur anywhere in the environmental process.
In addition to the requirements above, airport sponsors may be required to
obtain environmental permits/ approvals from other state, local, and
federal agencies before they can begin construction of the proposed
project. These permits/ approvals cover various federal and state
requirements related to wetlands, water and air quality, coastal zone
management, and endangered
species, among others. These requirements arise from various regulations,
including the federal Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act. For example, the
Army Corp of Engineers requires permits when proposed projects have an
impact on wetlands under the Clean Water Act. State and local agencies may
also be responsible for requiring permits dealing with air and water
quality. Similar to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process,
the permitting process may include a public review and comment period.
Project opponents may initiate litigation once the final EIS has been
approved and the FAA has issued a favorable ROD. However, a lawsuit can
be filed at any time during the planning, environmental, and design and
construction phases. Following the completion of the permit process,
project sponsors generally
begin the final phase of the runway development process* the design and
construction phase. This phase includes a myriad of tasks, such as project
engineering, financing, contracting, land acquisition, site preparation,
and actual project construction. This phase also includes construction
tasks related to mitigating noise, wetland, and other environmental
impacts. According to FAA, it is common for airport sponsors to begin
runway design while the environmental process is underway in the interest
of saving time by undertaking these actions concurrently. Once
construction
of the runway has been completed, FAA certifies the runway for operation
and commissions it for service. Figure 1 illustrates the main steps
involved in the runway development process.
Figure 1: Runway Development Process
Note: GAO analysis of FAA and other documents.
Some Airports Have The amount of time that airports spend planning and
building their
Spent Many Years runways can vary because of a number of factors. For
example, although it
is relatively straightforward to determine the beginning and ending of the
Building Runways and
environmental and the design and construction phases of the process, Have
Faced a Variety of
there is no consensus about what constitutes the beginning of the planning
Challenges
phase. Consequently, the length of time and the number of activities
considered by some airports to be part of the planning phase vary.
Airports also described a variety of challenges that they said delayed
their projects. Many of these challenges related to reaching stakeholder
agreement, completing the environmental review phase, mitigating the
impact of noise, or designing and constructing the actual runway.
Completed Runways Took a As shown in figure 2, airports we surveyed
reported spending a wide range
Median of 10 Years to Build, of time in completing runway projects. In
general, airports reported
and Unfinished Runways spending less time on completed projects than they
estimate they will
May Take Even Longer spend on those projects not yet completed; for
example, airports reported
that about half of the completed runways took 10 years or less but
estimated that almost all the projects that were not yet completed (16 out
of 17) would take 10 years or more. According to the airports with
uncompleted projects, a number of factors contributed to the time spent,
such as community opposition and difficulties in dealing with
environmental requirements.
Figure 2: Amount of Time Airports Have Spent or Planned to Spend on Runway
Projects Varied
Note: GAO analysis of airport survey data.
Figure 3 shows that the median time spent on completed runway projects was
about 10 years, while the median time airports estimated they would spend
on runway projects not yet completed was about 14 years. Similarly, the
median time spent on the planning and environmental phases for
airports that had completed these phases was significantly shorter than
the median time airports estimated would be spent on those phases for
projects that they had not yet completed. This may have been because the
three projects in the planning phase and the five projects in the
environmental phase were experiencing challenges that the airports
believed would delay the completion of the respective phases. Moreover,
the median time spent on the environmental phase of projects that had
completed their environmental requirements under a FONSI was about 2.7
years, while the median time spent on the environmental phase of projects
that had completed their environmental requirements with an EIS was about
3.7 years. This difference is likely attributable to the greater number of
requirements that accompany an EIS as compared with a FONSI.
Figure 3: Median Time Spent on Runway Projects Overall and on Each Phase
Varied
Note 1: GAO analysis of airport survey data. Note 2: Airports used
different milestones to indicate the start and end dates for each phase.
Given this difference, we used median time rather than average time.
Note 3: Although we received 32 responses regarding the amount of time
taken or estimated to complete the overall process, the number of
responses regarding the amount of time taken or estimated to complete each
phase varied.
In May 2001, the Department of Transportation issued a report to the
Congress on an environmental review of airport improvement projects that
reported results similar to our analysis. 7 As a part of its analysis, FAA
measured the average time that elapsed between the start of planning and
the start of construction for 10 airports that received approval for a new
runway between 1996 and 2000. FAA found that the average time from
7 Report to the U. S. Congress on Environmental Review of Airport
Improvement Projects, U. S. Department of Transportation, May 2001.
thestart of planning until the start of construction was about 10 years. 8
The report also stated that the average time to complete an EIS for a new
runway was 3.25 years from the beginning of the EIS process to the
issuance of the Record of Decision* or about one- third of the 10- year
time. According to FAA, there can be a considerable lag from the inception
of the runway process until the runway is completed and in operation. FAA
added
that these delays occur as part of the process that airports sometimes go
through in seeking to achieve consensus and the political will to move
forward while contending with local public and political opposition to
runway development. According to FAA, numerous examples can be found where
runway development has been delayed 5, 10, or more years while plans are
revised, discarded, or shelved until political and/ or economic factors
can be satisfied. FAA stated that these actions make it difficult to
determine how long it takes to build a runway.
Several Themes Emerged Most airports that we surveyed and visited
described significant factors
among the Challenges That that delayed their runway projects. In many
cases, the challenges they Airports Described
described were interrelated. For example, several airports said they faced
significant community opposition, which affected their ability to reach
stakeholder agreement and to complete the environmental review phase.
Although many of the airports we surveyed experienced similar types of
challenges, some airports, such as those in Boston, Atlanta, and Seattle,
faced a heightened level of challenges because of their locations in urban
areas with a large number of residences very close by. Some of the
specific challenges identified by airports and other stakeholders we
visited include the following:
Reaching stakeholder agreement. Reaching consensus on the purpose and need
for a runway was described by several airports as being particularly
challenging. In order to reach this consensus, airports generally must
meet numerous times with stakeholders who may have differing opinions
about the runway project or uses of land surrounding the airport. For
example, airport officials in Los Angeles and Boston described challenges
related to working with community interest groups and local metropolitan
planning organizations that opposed the runway projects and advocated
using means other than building a new runway to address
8 FAA officials said that if they added 3 to 5 years for design and
construction, then FAA*s determination of average time to complete a
runway would become about the same as that reported by GAO for projects
not yet completed.
capacity issues, such as developing regional airports, building new
airports, or pursuing alternative transportation modes like high- speed
rail. Some airports described challenges related to reaching agreement
with stakeholders other than community groups. For example, stakeholders
in Seattle said that reaching agreement was challenging on issues such as
where the runway should be located or the coordination of sometimes
inconsistent land use plans among various planning groups. Officials at
Boston*s Logan Airport said they could not reach agreement with FAA, a key
stakeholder on all runway projects, regarding what was needed to satisfy
the environmental review process. Specifically, Logan Airport officials
disagreed with FAA*s decision to extend its environmental process by
requiring a supplemental EIS because they believed that environmental
issues had been settled during the initial analysis. They believed that
FAA*s decision to require the supplemental draft stemmed from significant
public and political pressure from those opposed to the project.
Completing the environmental review phase. Of the 30 airports we surveyed,
13 stated that one of their most significant challenges in planning and
building their runways was complying with environmental requirements.
Under the current process, airports must comply with over 40 federal laws,
executive orders, and regulations that often overlap with the
environmental requirements mandated by some states. For example, federal
law requires the governor of each state to certify that federally funded
runways conform to local air quality standards, a requirement known as the
Governor*s certification. In addition, the Clean Air Act requires FAA to
determine whether emissions from each airport project conform to its
state*s plan for implementing national air quality standards. According to
officials from the American Association of Airport Executives and Airports
Council International, many state air quality plans contain
unrealistically low airport emissions budgets, and few realistically
anticipate reasonable airport growth. They believe that coordinating
airport development activity with the state air quality plans causes a
major source of delay and risk to airport projects. The officials also
noted that the
Governor*s Certificate requirement duplicates requirements found in the
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.
Moreover, several airports, including those in Boston, Atlanta, Houston,
and Minneapolis- St. Paul, commented that obtaining the permits necessary
to complete the environmental review was a challenge that delayed their
projects, because permitting agencies often took much longer than
expected. Boston Logan officials stated that they experienced delays
because the permitting agencies did not agree on the order in which the
permits should be issued. For example, the coastal zone management agency
was unwilling to issue its permit until FAA issued the ROD; however, FAA
was unwilling to issue the ROD until the coastal permit was issued.
According to FAA officials, the agency was able to obtain a satisfactory
assurance from the state permitting agency that allowed FAA
to move forward with the issuance of the ROD. As a result, according to
FAA officials, they were able to avoid a significant delay. Mitigating the
impact of noise and other issues. As we reported in
October 2000, 9 mitigating the potential impact of aircraft noise on the
surrounding community continues to be a significant challenge for airports
that are building new runways. One of the reasons is that community
concerns with aircraft noise are generally already high around many
airports, and adding new runways adds to the already heightened concern.
Another reason, according to some stakeholders, why mitigating noise is
particularly challenging for several of the airports is because they do
not participate in FAA*s voluntary Part 150 Noise Compatibility Program,
which provides funding to airports to help mitigate the impact of noise on
the communities. Several other airports also told us that their noise
problems are the result of incompatible land uses (existing or planned)
around the airports.
In addition to mitigating the impact of noise on the surrounding
community, officials at Sea- Tac Airport said that they were equally
challenged to mitigate the impact of the project on wetlands, particularly
because two key stakeholders had conflicting views on how this should be
done. According to Sea- Tac officials, the state of Washington has a
strong preference that mitigation measures for wetland and stream impacts
be located in the same water basin where the impacts occur. However,
because of concerns about attracting wildlife, and the danger to aircraft
of
bird strikes, FAA strongly advises that airports avoid locating wetlands
within 10,000 feet of runways.
Design and construction of the runway. Several airports commented that
they also faced some challenges during the design and construction phase
of their runways. For example, Dallas- Fort Worth officials stated that
adverse weather conditions created construction problems for them, as the
9 U. S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Infrastructure: Challenges
Associated with Building and Maintaining Runways, GAO- 01- 90T
(Washington, D. C., Oct. 5, 2000).
region*s high temperatures made it difficult to ensure that concrete
poured for the runway would cure properly. Airport officials at Sea- Tac
also described challenges related to the design and construction phase.
For
example, before Sea- Tac can build its runway it has to import 17 million
cubic yards of dirt to the airport to extend a plateau for a foundation.
Thus, the airport authority has to find suitable, nonpolluted fill dirt to
use for the
foundation. Once the dirt is located, it must be transported to the
airport over an indirect route using trucks that the airport is required
to clean before they leave the airport. Finally, the airport authority is
to use extensive mitigation measures to ensure that moving the dirt will
not adversely affect the surrounding communities and wetlands.
Appendixes II through VI provide a detailed description of how various
challenges have affected runway projects at the Boston, Dallas, Memphis,
Minneapolis- St. Paul, and Seattle airports, according to airport
authorities
and other stakeholders. A Number of Initiatives
While there may be no single solution to all the challenges associated
with Are Underway to
planning and building runways, the federal government and airports have
undertaken a number of initiatives to address the challenges related to
Address Challenges
such issues as duplicative environmental requirements, stakeholder Related
to Building
differences, and noise mitigation. Primarily, these initiatives focused on
Runways streamlining the environmental review process and improving
cooperation, communication, and coordination among major stakeholders.
Federal Initiatives Focus on One initiative designed to address a
significant issue identified by airports
Streamlining the and other stakeholders* the extensive and often
duplicative environmental
Environmental Review review requirements* is Executive Order 13274,
entitled Environmental
Stewardship and Transportation Infrastructure Project Reviews, which was
Process to Reduce
signed by the President on September 18, 2002. 10 The order directs
agencies Duplication
that conduct required environmental reviews with respect to transportation
infrastructure projects, including runways, to formulate and implement
administrative, policy, and procedural mechanisms that enable the agencies
to ensure completion of such reviews in a timely and
10 The order does not supersede the requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act or other environmental laws.
environmentally responsible manner. The order also states that the
Secretary of Transportation shall
designate a list of high- priority transportation infrastructure
projects to receive expedited agency reviews; 11
chair an inter- agency task force to monitor and expedite environmental
reviews of high- priority transportation infrastructure projects, and
identify and promote policies that can effectively streamline the
environmental review process; and
prepare an annual report to the President describing the results of the
expedited reviews, and provide recommendations.
Executive departments and agencies shall take appropriate actions, to the
extent consistent with applicable law and available resources, to promote
environmental stewardship in the nation*s transportation system and to
expedite environmental reviews of high- priority transportation
infrastructure projects. The Secretary has stated that the Department of
Transportation will work with federal and state agencies to reduce
duplicative and overlapping requirements and promote effective strategies
for enhancing the timeliness of the decisionmaking process.
Proposed legislation was introduced in the 107th Congress to address
several of the concerns raised by a number of airports and other
stakeholders we surveyed and visited* H. R. 4481, the Airport Streamlining
Approval Process Act of 2002, and S. 633, the Aviation Delay Prevention
Act. H. R. 4481, the House bill, focused on capacity- enhancement projects
and was generally directed at streamlining the runway development process,
while the Senate bill was directed at reducing aviation delays. Table 1
summarizes some of the key provisions in H. R. 4481 and S. 633 that sought
to address the challenges the airports identified.
11 On October 31, 2002, the Secretary of Transportation selected seven
high- priority transportation projects. One airport project was selected*
a runway construction project at the Philadelphia International Airport.
The Secretary is currently considering additional transportation projects,
including airport projects, to add to the initial list.
Table 1: Summary of Provisions in H. R. 4481 and S. 633, and the
Challenges Each Seeks to Address H. R. 4481, Airport Streamlining Approval
Process Act of 2002 S. 633, Aviation Delay Prevention Act Challenge
addressed
Directs FAA to take action to encourage the Requires DOT to designate
certain airport projects
Reaching stakeholder construction of airport capacity- enhancement
as national capacity projects. The airports where agreement.
projects at congested airports. these national capacity projects are
designated would be required to complete the planning and environmental
review process within 5 years, or else lose access to certain federal
funds.
Authorizes DOT to develop interagency cooperative Requires DOT to
implement an expedited Completing the
agreements with other federal and state coordinated environmental review
process for environmental review stakeholders in the environmental review
process.
national capacity projects that provides for better phase.
coordination among federal, regional, state, and local agencies.
Allows airports to reimburse FAA for the additional Authorizes DOT to
develop a 5- year pilot program Completing the
staff necessary to review and approve project funded by airport sponsors
to hire additional FAA
environmental review construction requests. environmental specialists and
attorneys.
phase. Makes DOT the lead agency for all capacity Requires DOT to
implement an expedited Completing the
enhancement project environmental reviews, with environmental review
process that provides a *date
environmental review responsibility for setting time frames for all
relevant certain* process deadline for environmental reviews.
phase. agency reviews. All federal agency reviews would be required to
occur concurrently.
Allows DOT to define the purpose and need for any Not addressed. Reaching
stakeholder
airport capacity- enhancement project for any federal agreement.
or state review that requires the establishment of a purpose and need.
Eliminates the required Governor's certification,
Eliminates the required Governor's certification, Completing the which
states that an airport will meet state and local which states that an
airport will meet state and local
environmental review environmental standards. environmental standards.
phase. Source: U. S. General Accounting Office.
In responding to our survey, seven airports stated that eliminating the
governor*s certificate requirement would reduce duplicative environmental
requirements. In an August 2000 report to the Congress on aviation and the
environment, we suggested that Congress may wish to consider eliminating
the state air quality certification requirements in airport legislation
becauseit is duplicative of protections offered under the Clean Air Act.
12 FAA officials stated that they agreed with our suggestion and believed
that a parallel situation exists with respect to state water quality
certification,
12 U. S. General Accounting Office, Aviation and the Environment: Airport
Operations and Future Growth Present Environmental Challenges, GAO/ RCED
00- 153 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 30, 2000).
which is largely duplicative of protections under the Clean Water Act.
Both the House and the Senate bills would have eliminated the Governor*s
Certificate requirement.
FAA Initiatives Focus on FAA has identified and undertaken several
initiatives directed at
Streamlining the Planning streamlining the planning and environmental
review processes and
and Environmental Review improving cooperation, communication, and
coordination among major
Processes stakeholders. Some of the initiatives have been implemented, and
others
are currently underway. FAA officials believe that the initiatives, if
successful, will provide measurable improvements in the amount of time and
resources spent in the planning and environmental review phases of the
process. FAA has undertaken several initiatives to improve the planning
and environmental processes that the agency believes will help ensure that
runway projects are completed in a timely manner. With respect to
planning, FAA prepared an internal Memorandum of Agreement in September
2002 to standardize the procedures for establishing
multidisciplinary teams to participate in major airport planning studies.
The agency has plans to update its guidance on airport master plans and to
upgrade an airspace and ground capacity simulation model in fiscal year
2003, and to update its guidance on airport terminal planning and design
by the end of fiscal year 2004. With respect to streamlining the
environmental review process, FAA began implementing several initiatives
in January 2001 that are designed to produce measurable improvements. FAA
began establishing multidisciplinary EIS teams for new EISs at large hub
primary airports, reallocating staff resources and seeking airport
reimbursable agreements to support environmental work, and increasing the
use of consultants to assist FAA with coordination and administration of
EISs.
To increase coordination and assign accountability for runway development
tasks to key stakeholders, FAA began another initiative in August 2001 as
a part of its Operational Evolution Plan* a 10- year plan to expand and
modernize the nation*s airport system. FAA developed detailed plans called
Runway Template Action Plans to provide a standard set of tasks that must
be considered when developing new runways. FAA has completed Runway
Template Action Plans for 12 airports that are expected to complete new
runways by 2008. According to FAA officials, the agency has met the
deadlines for its commitments at all of the airports, and no runway
completion date has changed as a result of FAA actions since the
program began.
While the Executive Order and the proposed legislation were designed to
address challenges some of the airports experienced, it is too early to
assess their impact; the Executive Order was only recently signed, and the
legislation did not pass in the 107th session of Congress. Nonetheless,
several stakeholders, including airports we surveyed and visited,
supported
efforts consistent with these initiatives. Further, FAA officials believe
that the initiatives FAA has taken and proposed will yield measurable
improvements in the runway development process* particularly with respect
to the planning and environmental review phases of the process.
Airports Have Undertaken Airports we visited and surveyed described a
number of actions they have
Some Initiatives to Address taken to address the challenges they faced in
building their runways. These
Challenges actions included proactive approaches to working with
stakeholders to
plan for and mitigate various impacts of the runway projects on
neighboring communities. For example, the Louisville airport used an
unusual approach to deal with the needs of neighboring homeowners who
would be required to move in order to be outside the noise parameter
levels posed by the new runway. After reaching agreement on the market
value that the airport would pay for each home, the airport offered these
residents a choice: residents either could move to a new home of equal
value in a new community development being built by the airport, or they
could participate in the traditional relocation program, where the airport
purchases the home and the family relocates to a home and location of its
choosing. Airport officials stated that this approach worked well for both
the airport and the displaced residents. According to airport officials,
the residents benefited because those who wished to stay together as a
community (which was the preference of many) were able to do so, and the
airport saved approximately $17,000 per home on those homes built in the
new community development.
A Washington State Department of Transportation official stated that
minimizing controversy over the uses of land needed for expanding runway
capacity could be important in avoiding lengthy project delays. The
department developed an Airport Land Use Compatibility Program,
implementing a 1996 amendment of the Washington State Growth Management
Act* the state*s land- use planning law. The law requires cities and
counties to identify, site, and protect essential public facilities
(including airports) from incompatible land use, such as encroaching
development. In other words, when developing local land- use plans, cities
and counties must ensure that their plans do not adversely affect these
facilities. As part of the land- use compatibility program, certain state
transportation officials provide consultations, including mediation,
between airport sponsors and community representatives (often municipal or
county planning staff) to balance the state*s dual interest of promoting
aviation and ensuring the health, safety, and welfare of its residents.
The approach to facilitating airports* future expansion includes several
steps, including the development of planning- based solutions and the
integration of those solutions into a legally enforceable document, such
as a comprehensive development plan* rather than the Airport Master Plan,
which is not binding on land- use authority* in order to increase the
probability that the solutions will succeed. In Minneapolis, the airport
attempted to build consensus throughout the project by considering
mitigation agreements that were more liberal than those required by FAA.
For example, the airport has been pursuing a liberal noise- mitigation
strategy in order to better address community concerns about noise
impacts. The airport chose to keep residential blocks together for noise-
mitigation measures, whether or not the entire block fell within the same
noise contour. In other words, if one residence in a block lay within the
65- decibel Day Night Average Sound Level (DNL) noise contour, every
residence on the block received similar mediation measures. 13 Another
challenge for which the airport had to develop a solution was
mitigating the noise impacts on a National Wildlife Refuge located within
the flight path of the new runway. The refuge contains an educational
center and is a popular location for bird watching. The refuge contended
that the usefulness of the center and bird watching activities would be
severely impacted by noise from the runway. The airport and the refuge
were ultimately able to negotiate an agreement whereby the airport
authority would pay the organization $26 million for the right to conduct
flight operations over the refuge.
In Dallas- Fort Worth, the airport chose to implement a four- stage
approach to mitigating the noise impacts of the runway project: 1) direct
land acquisition for properties located in the runway protection zone, 2)
direct land acquisition of certain properties for noise mitigation, 3)
sound proofing structures for noise mitigation, and 4) acquisition of
aviation easements. Airport officials noted that the first three stages of
the mitigation plan are standard among most runway projects and, in the
case of acquiring properties in the runway protection zone, required of
all
13 The Day Night Average Sound Level is a measurement of the average noise
impacts of the airport on the surrounding community.
airports. However, with respect to aviation easements, the airport
undertook an approach that it considered to be extraordinary at the time.
The airport offered residents 25 percent of the fair market value of their
property to acquire easements for noise impacts. The easements are
attached to the property deed, affecting the current property owner and
all future owners of that property.
Overall, the airports that described these initiatives believed they had a
positive impact on their runway projects. Other airports described similar
initiatives that they believed were helpful in facilitating the completion
of the various phases of their projects. It may be helpful for other
airports to consider these initiatives when faced with similar challenges;
however, the wide variety of situations faced by airports and the
differing levels of community opposition or environmental issues each
airport faces make it difficult to determine whether an effort undertaken
successfully by one airport will have the same positive results at another
airport.
Agency Comments We provided the Secretary of Transportation with a copy of
a draft of this report. FAA officials agreed with our characterization of
the challenges
associated with building runways and our identification of some of the
initiatives to address these challenges. However, they did express some
concerns related to our analysis of the amount of time airports spent or
estimated spending in developing their runways, as compared with the
results of FAA*s 2001 study. They also suggested that GAO include more
acknowledgment of their efforts in trying to improve the runway
development process. Regarding FAA*s concerns, we believe our approach was
a reasonable assessment of the amount of time it takes airports to
build runways. However, we clarified our discussion on the length of time
by focusing on the median time rather than the average time because this
approach minimizes the impact of outlying airports that may have taken a
very long or a very short time to build their runways. We also compared
our analysis of the time taken by airports to build runways with FAA*s
study. See appendix I for a more detailed discussion of the comparative
analysis.
Finally, we included information regarding several initiatives that FAA
has undertaken to streamline and improve the planning and environmental
processes. We also made technical changes throughout the report as
appropriate. We performed our work from April 2001 through December 2002
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As agreed with your office, unless you release its contents earlier, we
plan no further distribution of this report until 10 days after the date
of its issuance. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
congressional committees with responsibilities for the activities
discussed in this report; to the Secretary of Transportation; and to the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. We will make copies
available to others upon request. This report is also available at no
charge on GAO*s Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding the contents of this
report, please call me or Tammy Conquest at (202) 512- 2834. Other key
contributors to this report were Ruthann Balciunas, William Chatlos, David
Hooper, Gary Lawson, David Lehrer, and Alwynne Wilbur. Gerald L.
Dillingham, Ph. D Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
Appendi Appendi xes x I
Scope and Methodology Our primary methods for addressing our two research
questions* first, how much time do airports spend building their runway
projects and what challenges do airports and other stakeholders experience
during this process, and second, what have airports and other stakeholders
done or
proposed to do to address the challenges they experienced in building
runways*- were to conduct a nationwide survey of airports that built new
runways between 1991 and 2000 or planned to build new runways by 2010, and
to perform site visits at five airports. The survey population included 30
airports, 16 of which had built their airports between 1991 and 2000, and
14 of which had planned to build new runways by 2010. The survey,
conducted in February 2002, provided data on the amount of time that 30
airports spent in planning and building 32 runway projects; on key factors
that accelerated or delayed the projects; and on initiatives that airports
have taken to address the challenges they faced during the process. 14
Based on our analysis of the survey responses, we judgmentally selected
five airports at which to conduct site visits, to develop a more in- depth
understanding of the experiences and challenges they faced. We
subsequently visited Boston Logan, Dallas- Fort Worth, Memphis Shelby
County, Minneapolis- St. Paul, and Seattle- Tacoma Airports, where we
interviewed the airport authority, FAA, hub airlines, state agencies,
metropolitan planning organizations, and local community and environmental
groups about their experiences with the runway projects. In addition, we
also interviewed officials from Lester B. Pearson International Airport in
Toronto, Canada, and Transport Canada to gain an understanding of the
Canadian runway development process.
We also compared our analysis with FAA*s May 2001 report. While the
results of the two studies are similar, there are some methodological
differences between the two studies. First, our measurement begins at the
start of planning and ends with the completion of the runway. In contrast,
FAA*s measurement begins with planning but ends with the beginning of the
design and construction phase. Second, GAO*s analysis is based on the
median time, which minimizes the impact of runways that take a very long
or a very short time to complete; FAA*s estimate, however, is based on the
average time, which does not account for the impact of outliers. Based on
our survey responses, when considering the average time, we found that
airports that had completed their projects took 12.25 years and airports
14 Information on the time airports spent in various parts of the process
is based, in part, on estimates provided by some airports that have not
yet completed their projects.
that had not yet completed their projects estimated that their projects
would take about 16 years. Third, our survey allowed the airports to
determine the beginning and end of each of the process phases, whereas FAA
selected specific events for analysis. For example, FAA*s analysis based
the end of the environmental review phase on the issuance of the ROD.
Certain airports responding to GAO*s survey included federal and state
permits as part of the environmental process. FAA*s May 2001 report found
that federal and state permits can take 6 to 12 months or more to complete
after the ROD. Finally, each of the two analyses examined a different
universe of airports. FAA analyzed data on 10 airports that had projects
approved between 1996 and 2000. GAO analyzed data on over 30
runway projects that were completed, or expected to be completed, between
1991 and 2010. GAO*s analysis included 6 of the 10 airports that FAA
analyzed.
We also interviewed officials from FAA, Airports Council International,
the Airline Transport Association, and the National Association of State
Aviation Officials to obtain information on the process for building
runways and to identify what actions have been taken to address challenges
related to planning and building runways.
We conducted our work from April 2001 through December 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendi x II
Airport Site Visits To gain additional perspective on the runway
development process, we visited five airports that had significant
positive or negative experiences in going through the runway development
process; some of the airports identified initiatives to overcome these
challenges. 15 We also included airports that were in various stages of
completing their runway projects,
and in various parts of the country. We asked the airports to share their
experiences in the process of building new runways, as well as those
events that either significantly delayed or accelerated the completion of
the runway projects. We identified several key factors* the amount of time
that transpired, how this time compared with the airports* expectations of
the process timeline, how key stakeholders* timeliness compared with the
airports* expectations, and the significant events that either delayed or
accelerated the completion of the runways. In addition, we considered the
airports* responses to other questions, as warranted. We also visited the
Lester B. Pearson International Airport in Toronto, Canada, to gain an
understanding of the Canadian runway development process and of the
airport*s experiences in building runways. The overarching factor leading
to selection was the airports* experiences that appeared appropriate for
other airports to draw upon. These experiences, both positive and
negative, are intended to yield lessons that other airports can emulate or
avoid. Table 2 shows the airports we selected and the phase of each
project as of December 2002.
15 See appendix I for the methodology we used to select the airports we
visited.
Table 2: Airports Selected for Site Visit and their Runway Projects
Airport Location Size Phase a
Gen. Edward Lawrence Logan East Boston, MA Large Environmental
International Dallas- Fort Worth International DFW, TX Large Completed
Dallas- Fort Worth International DFW, TX Large Suspended b Memphis
International Memphis, TN Medium Completed Minneapolis- St. Paul
International Minneapolis, MN Large Construction Seattle- Tacoma
International Seattle, WA Large Environmental Lester B. Pearson
International Toronto, Ontario Large Completed Lester B. Pearson
International Toronto, Ontario Large Completed Lester B. Pearson
International Toronto, Ontario Large Planning Source: U. S. General
Accounting Office. a Runway development phases often overlap. The phase
shown is the phase with the predominant
activity as of December 2002. b The airport suspended development of this
runway to explore implications of recent economic and
industry events.
Appendixes II through VII contain a summary of the results of our visit to
each airport, including background information and status of the runway
project. The summaries also highlight significant events and experiences
for each specific location, based on our discussions with the airport
authorities and key stakeholders. While each of the airports we visited
experienced challenges within several broad themes noted earlier
(resolving stakeholder differences, completing extensive environmental
requirements, and addressing issues related to runway design and
construction), those broad themes were not necessarily the most important
at that specific site. Consequently, we highlight different experiences at
each site. For example, the Boston airport*s legal challenges were much
more extensive than were those at the Minneapolis- St. Paul airport. We
discuss Boston*s legal challenges at length, while we mention those at
Minneapolis- St. Paul as they applied to other experiences. General Edward
Boston*s Logan International Airport is operated by the Massachusetts Port
Lawrence Logan Authority (Massport). According to FAA, airport, state, and
airline officials, Logan plays a critical role in the New England economy,
and it serves as the International Airport *
region*s long- haul and international gateway airport. According to East
Boston, MA
Massport officials, in 2000, the airport handled 27.4 million passengers
and
contributed about $6.6 billion to the regional economy, supporting about
100,000 jobs. It was North America*s nineteenth- busiest in terms of
passenger traffic. Logan is consistently ranked as one of the nation*s
most delayed airports. In 2000, Logan was the sixth- most delayed airport
overall and second- most delayed for arrivals. Logan is served by all the
major U. S. carriers. The top carriers are U. S. Airways, American, and
Delta, with roughly equal shares of passenger traffic. The airport is
primarily an origin and destination point, with about 90 percent of the
passengers beginning or ending their trips at Logan.
In good weather, Logan generally operates on a north- south, three- runway
configuration with a capacity of about 120 flight operations per hour.
However, during adverse weather conditions (such as northwest or southeast
winds in excess of 10 knots per hour, which occur about onethird of the
year), the airport can be reduced to as few as 60 to 90 operations per
hour on an east- west, one- or two- runway operation. Massport believes
that its proposed 5,000- foot, unidirectional runway will avoid the
significant reduction in efficiency during adverse weather conditions and
help mitigate weather- related delays. 16 Massport views the runway as a
capacity- neutral airfield enhancement, which means that the proposed
runway will decrease delays without increasing the airport*s top capacity
of about 120 flights per hour. The Massachusetts Executive Office of
Environmental Affairs administers the Massachusetts Environmental Policy
Act, the state*s environmental protection act. In its Final
Environmental Impact Report certificate, the Secretary, Massachusetts
Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, stated that the central
environmental question is not whether the project is accommodating or
generating demand per se, but rather whether Massport is operating the
airport in a manner that avoids, minimizes, or mitigates environmental
impacts in light of its obligations under MEPA. An official from the
environmental office stated that the project might increase airfield
capacity, but that an airport capacity determination was beyond the scope
of its review. Figure 4 shows the existing Logan runway configuration,
including the proposed runway project.
16 All flights using this runway would arrive from the southeast or depart
from the northwest, over Boston Harbor.
Figure 4: Airport Diagram* Boston*s Logan International Airport
We selected Logan Airport as a site- visit location, in part, because its
runway project has been in the planning phase since 1969. 17 Further, a
state court injunction against building new runways at the airport has
been in place since the mid- 1970s (FAA approved an EIS for a runway in
the same
general location on the airfield in the late 1960s). Further, because of
the injunction, Massport decided not to actively pursue the project until
the project was reinstituted in 1995, based on an FAA Capacity Enhancement
17 Logan Airport was not the only airport that spent a long time in the
planning phase. Of the 30 airports we surveyed, two others* Phoenix and
Indianapolis* also reported spending a long time (about 20 years or more)
in the planning phase.
Study. Logan is an example of an airport that has spent a long time in the
process, and it has gone through several iterations of the EIS review
process.
We interviewed officials at Massport, who were the main sponsors of the
new, sixth runway at Logan. We also interviewed officials at FAA*s New
England Region, American Eagle Airlines, Massachusetts Executive Office of
Environmental Affairs, and the Massachusetts High Technology Council. We
also gathered information from Communities Against Runway Expansion, the
primary community interest group. 18
Current Status of the FAA issued its ROD indicating that the project had
satisfied all federal
Runway Project environmental requirements on August 2, 2002. However, the
airport can not yet begin constructing the runway because of an existing
state court
injunction. Moreover, opposition groups appealed the ROD in August 2002 in
the U. S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D. C., arguing, among other
things, that FAA did not adequately analyze the noise and air quality
impacts on neighboring communities.
Stakeholders Cite Massport and other stakeholders we interviewed (American
Eagle Airlines,
Community Opposition Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental
Affairs, FAA, and the
High Technology Council) said that the lack of agreement among as a Major
Challenge
stakeholders* particularly with regard to responding to the strong ongoing
and Say Efforts to
community opposition to the runway project* has presented a major Address
This Issue
challenge. Communities Against Runway Expansion and other local community
groups surrounding the airport opposed the project because of Were
Unsuccessful
a number of issues, including the impact of the runway on noise,
emissions, economic growth, and endangered species. Opponents to the
project also question the intended use of the runway (for example, delay
reduction versus capacity enhancement). According to FAA, Massachusetts
Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, American Eagle Airlines, the
High Technology Council, and Massport officials themselves, the public
appears to distrust Massport. These stakeholders added that much of the
opposition stems from the fact that the airport is located in downtown
Boston rather than from plans for a new runway, and that community
18 The Communities Against Runway Expansion Vice President is also the
Chair of the Community Advisory Council, a group representing various
communities around Logan.
groups opposed to the project are not likely to change their position.
According to an American Eagle Airlines official, FAA should help
community groups understand the economic benefits of the project on their
communities.
Massport said it has attempted to address this challenge through extensive
public participation and review efforts, but that these have not been
successful. FAA, Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs,
and the airlines have agreed that Massport involved the public throughout
most of the lengthy process, and that the public was able to express its
concerns to Massport through the public meetings and the required public
comment periods on FAA*s decisions. According to Massport, in response to
public pressure, FAA created a special review panel and required Massport
to undertake a supplemental Draft EIS as a means to further expand public
participation. As part of the public outreach process, Massport provided
$350,000 for technical assistance to the Community Advisory Council.
Communities Against Runway Expansion, on the other
hand, stated that Massport*s efforts toward communication were for
appearance only* that the airport authority spoke to them but did not
listen to their concerns. All agreed that extensive communication did not
lead to cooperation and consensus.
Stakeholders Say Massport and FAA prepared a joint Draft Environmental
Impact Report and
Meeting Extensive Draft EIS to meet state and federal requirements.
According to Massport, this joint effort is a common approach for
streamlining the environmental
Environmental review process. The joint state and federal permit process
lasted over 7
Requirements Has years. Stakeholders said this is partly attributable to
community opposition
Been Challenging and to the effect of this opposition on the process.
Because of Community In 1995, in what it described as an effort to conduct
the environmental
Opposition analysis with input from all concerned parties, Massport
established the
Airside Review Committee, which included representatives from the 24
communities surrounding the airport and from 11 business and industry
organizations. However, according to both FAA and Massport, this effort
was suspended for about 18 months between 1996 and 1998, when the entire
runway project stalled because of a change in Massport leadership and
priorities. In 1998, according to Massport officials, the airport
attempted to pick up the environmental review process where it had been
suspended. Community groups complained that they had not been part of
the recent process and appealed to FAA that the Draft EIS was no longer
accurate, complete, or up- to- date. Massport believes it did try numerous
times to meet with the Airside Review Committee, but to no avail. The
state approved the Draft Environmental Impact Review in May 1999 and the
final Environmental Impact Review in June 2001. However, FAA requested a
Supplemental Draft EIS rather than approving the Draft EIS. FAA officials
stated that the agency did so because it needed to address several issues,
including changing technology and the high level of concerns expressed by
project opponents in public comments to the Draft
EIS. Massport, the Massachusetts High Technology Council, and American
Eagle Airlines all believe that FAA*s decision was unreasonable. Massport
officials contended that the project had already undergone 5 years of
public process, that continuation was unlikely to help achieve local
consensus, and that they believed it had not. FAA officials, however,
believe that it did result in a better, more informative EIS document.
Individuals, communities, action groups, and business groups submitted
comments during public information meetings and hearings and in response
to the Draft EIS and Final EIR documents that were extensive. For example,
about 800 people attended the two April 2001 public hearings
for the Supplemental Draft EIS document and about 850 comment letters were
received during the 75- day comment period.
The Supplemental Draft EIS took about 1 year to complete, and it delayed
the filing of the Final EIS by about 1.5 years, according to Massport.
During this time, in another attempt to develop agreement among
stakeholders, FAA chaired a city and commonwealth Task Force to request
further comments to the Draft EIS for incorporation into the Supplemental
Draft EIS. Although this group met, analyzed, and discussed many runway
issues, not all stakeholders were pleased with its outcome. For example,
Communities Against Runway Expansion stated that the products of the
panel*s work, the Supplemental Draft EIS and the Final Environmental
Impact Review, were inaccurate and inconclusive, and they justified the
runway without proposing a viable alternative.
In late June 2002, FAA issued the Final EIS for public comment, as
required by the NEPA process. FAA received approximately 100 comment
letters raising 42 main issues, ranging from general opposition to a
concern about the adequacy of technical analyses. FAA said that it
responded to the comments as required and issued its final approval, the
ROD, in August 2002. In both the Final EIS and the ROD, FAA included a
restriction (which Massport officials said was unprecedented) that the
proposed runway be
used only when winds create conditions in which the usefulness of other
current runways is limited. 19 FAA considers this wind restriction a
mitigation measure, as it would ensure that the runway was not used to
increase capacity during good weather. Many stakeholders* including
proponents and opponents* view this restriction as a compromise designed
to achieve consensus, but others, such as community groups, maintain that
the wind restriction does not go far enough to mitigate the environmental
effects of this project. Communities Against Runway Expansion continued to
contest FAA*s approval in the press and in federal court and, through an
urgent message on its Web page, urged others to respond to the Final EIS.
Moreover, Massport and Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental
Affairs officials said that, by issuing the ROD with wind restrictions,
FAA could reactivate the state environmental review process because the
approved project differs significantly from what
Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs approved in 2001.
Subsequently, the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs chose not to
reexamine the environmental document because it did not believe that the
wind restriction significantly changed the environmental impacts of the
runway.
FAA, Massport, and American Eagle Airlines said that, during the length of
time spent attempting to get all of the environmental approvals needed,
some assumptions made early on in the process have been called into
question. For example, concerns have been raised that traffic forecasts
may not materialize, that the increasing use of Regional Jets may change
the equipment mix more than planned, and that the 5,000 foot runway may
not be long enough to be as useful as hoped. They believe that these
issues played a part in triggering FAA*s Supplemental Draft EIS process.
However, a Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs
official stated that it is not possible to *freeze* the process to figure
out all the answers
before making a decision. According to many stakeholders, the
environmental review process is a continuous cycle in which comments
require additional study, which leads to revisions, which lead to more
comments, which lead to additional study. They contend that the circuitous
nature of the process is the primary source of delay. The Massachusetts
environmental permit process has important time triggers that allow for
the
19 The ROD limits the use of the proposed 14/ 32 runway to those times
when wind conditions equal or exceed 10 knots, either northwest or
southeast. FAA Air Traffic Control is responsible for runway assignments
and will base its use of 14/ 32 on forecasted wind conditions. The Record
of Decision also includes a 2- hour window to adjust to changing
conditions.
process to come to an end. Massport believes that if similar triggers were
in place at the federal level, many of the delays encountered during the
EIS process could have been avoided. Litigation Added Time
Massport first suggested, and actually began construction on, a new 3,830
to Process
foot runway in the same general location on the airfield almost 30 years
ago (May 1974). Massport took the position that the 1974 runway project
did not require a state environmental review because 1) both the Massport
Board and the Commonwealth Office of Transportation and Construction
determined it had no environmental impact and 2) the project commenced
before July 1, 1973, the effective date of the Massachusetts Environmental
Policy Act. The City of Boston and the Massachusetts Secretary of
Environmental Affairs both disagreed and sued Massport. The Suffolk
Superior Court enjoined Massport from proceeding with the 1974 Runways
Project, pending the preparation, filing, and review of a final EIR as
directed by the Secretary of Environmental Affairs.
On June 15, 2001, the Secretary of Environmental Affairs determined that
Massport*s Final EIR submitted in March 2001 adequately and properly
complied with the Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs.
Massport went to court to get the injunction lifted. The court began
considering this injunction in late January 2003. Groups opposing the
project declared victory because the motion to lift the injunction went to
trial. A second lawsuit, regarding runway development in Plymouth County,
located southeast of the airport, resulted in a summary judgment in favor
of Massport. This matter is now under appeal. Plymouth County includes the
cities of Hull, Hingham, and Cohasset, all in the flight path of the over-
thewater operations. These local municipalities alleged that the state
environmental permit was invalid because Massport misled the Massachusetts
Executive Office of Environmental Affairs about the project*s impact by
providing incomplete and inaccurate technical data. Table 3 summarizes the
history of the Boston Logan runway project.
Table 3: History of the Boston Logan Runway Project Date Event
Late 1960s FAA approves new runway. August 1974 State court injunction
against building new runways at airport. June 1976 State court injunction
against building new runways at airport
amended. November 1995 Massachusetts Secretary of Environmental Affairs
defines Draft
EIR scope. November 1995 Massport establishes Airside Review Committee.
January 1996 FAA defines Draft EIS scope. February 1999 Massport files
Draft EIS/ Draft EIR with state and FAA.
April 1999 FAA and Massport hold public meetings on Draft EIS/ Draft EIR.
May 1999 State approves Draft EIR. January 2000 FAA orders supplemental
Draft EIS. March 2001 Massport submits supplemental Draft EIS/ Final EIR
to state and
FAA. April 2001 FAA and Massport hold public hearings on supplemental
Draft
EIS/ Final EIR. June 2001 State approves Final EIR. June 2002 FAA
publishes Final EIS for public comment. August 2002 FAA issues ROD. August
2002 FAA approves Airport Layout Plan. August 2002 Community groups appeal
ROD in U. S. Court of Appeals. September 2002 Massachusetts MEPA decides
not to reopen state process. October 2002 Community challenge of state
environmental approval trial
dismissed. January 2003 Massport challenge of injunction trial date
(Suffolk Superior
Court). Spring 2006 Projected completion date. Source: U. S. General
Accounting Office.
Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport *
Appendi x III
DFW, TX In 2001, the Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport was the
fourth- busiest North American airport in terms of passengers. Both
American Airlines and Delta Airlines run hub operations at the airport,
with about 70 percent and 19 percent of the airport*s annual operations,
respectively. According to the
airport*s Chief Executive Officer, the airport provides $12 billion in
annual economic activity for North Texas.
The Dallas- Fort Worth Airport Board (the Board) governs the airport. The
Board is composed of 12 members, 11 of whom are appointed by the councils
of the airport*s owner cities in accordance with each city*s ownership
interest in the airport; 7 represent the city of Dallas, and 4
represent the city of Fort Worth. The 12th member is a nonvoting member
representing the neighboring host cities of Coppell, Euless, Grapevine,
and Irving on a rotating annual basis (the member is from a particular
city every fourth year). The Board may enter into contracts without
approval of the City Councils, but its annual operating budget requires
City Council approval of the owner cities.
The airport lies within the city limits of the four host cities. It
obtained the freedom to pursue independent development through state
legislation known as the Texas Municipal Airports Act. It covers over 29
square miles, and its real property consists of over 18, 000 acres. The
current configuration is seven runways* five north- south parallel, two
diagonal. Four of these runways are over 11, 000 feet in length. This
configuration
allows the airport to land four planes simultaneously. In good weather,
the airport generally operates with a capacity of about 260 to 270
operations per hour. Airport revenue is shared with the surrounding cities
based upon the location of the enterprise. For example, the rental car
franchises are located in Euless, so that city receives a portion of the
car rental tax
revenues. The seventh runway was designed to reduce delays as well as to
increase overall aircraft operations capacity. Airport officials developed
the 1991 DFW Airport Development Plan, which included two new runways in
response to market demand, to maintain the highest level of service for
their customers. Figure 5 shows the existing Dallas- Fort Worth
International Airport configuration, including the proposed eighth runway
and several proposed extensions.
Figure 5: Airport Diagram* Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport
We selected the Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport for a site visit
because the airport, which was completed in February 1974, is one of the
most recently constructed airports in the United States (only Denver is a
more recently constructed large hub airport). The airport completed its
seventh runway in 1996, and had planned to complete an additional eighth
runway before more sophisticated demand- delay studies were completed.
Furthermore, the airport reported in our survey that many elements of the
runway development process took less time than expected.
We interviewed officials at the following: Dallas- Fort Worth
International Airport, the sponsor of the new runway projects; the four
host cities surrounding the airport* Coppell, Euless, Grapevine, and
Irving; FAA Southwest Regional Office and Airports District Office; North
Central Texas Council of Governments; and the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality. We attempted to contact American Airlines, but
airline officials said that too much time had passed since the early
phases of the project for its response to be meaningful.
Current Status of the The seventh runway was commissioned in October 1996.
All activities for
Two Runway Projects the proposed eighth runway have been temporarily
suspended while
airport officials explore the implications that recent economic and
industry events will have for runway need.
Airport Officials According to the airport Chief Executive Officer, the
environmental review
Described Extensive process for the seventh runway required the airport to
coordinate the
activities of 19 federal agencies and 15 state agencies, and this process
was Environmental Review
further complicated by the lack of prime contacts and personnel changes at
Process as Challenging
reviewing agencies. Public controversy and public demands for information
exceeded the airport*s expectations and necessitated a highly detailed
environmental review. According to airport officials, this review included
an analysis of 12 project alternatives, although many were not
equally viable or would not survive the review process. According to these
officials, the airport will probably include two alternatives in future
reviews* build/ no build* and then add specific alternatives for study if
reviewers request that additional alternatives be examined. Officials felt
that preparing an analysis of alternatives in this way will likely be less
costly and time- consuming than would preparing alternatives that, in
their opinion, clearly have no relevance.
The Dallas- Fort Worth The Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport chose
to implement a fourstage
International Airport approach to mitigating the off- airport noise
impacts of the runway
project: 1) direct land acquisition for properties located in the runway
Used Some Unique
safety area; 2) direct land acquisition of certain properties for noise
Approaches to Mitigate
mitigation; 3) sound- proofing structures for noise mitigation; and 4)
acquisition of aviation easements. 20 The airport offered 25 percent of
the Runway Impacts
fair market value of the property to acquire aviation easements. According
to airport officials, the easements were written so that residents who
accepted them still have legal standing to take the airport to court over
noise impacts. Airport officials estimated that final mitigation costs
would be about $176 million. The last of the real estate settlements were
paid out in 2002. The final cost of the mitigation program exceeded the
runway cost by a wide margin.
20 Aviation Easements (also referred to as Avigation Easements) are rights
given to the airport to fly aircraft over property; they indicate that
property owners acknowledge and accept the noise impacts of the aircraft.
The airport created an independent agency, the Action Desk, before
beginning the mitigation plan implementation. The Action Desk was the main
point of contact for property owners to provide and obtain information and
to file concerns and complaints. This office developed a database of
property- owner information and disseminated a newsletter. According to
airport officials, this approach was highly effective in
providing property- specific information to property owners that countered
misinformation about the project and allayed fears. The airport also hired
a consultant to manage the mitigation process, and it established an
appeals process by which property owners could contest the acquisition
process. The appeals council was composed of airline employees, local
residents, a local clergy member, and airport board members. The airport
Chief Executive Officer had final approval of any appeals.
Stakeholder The Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport still maintains
its Capacity
Experiences, from Enhancement Team, first established in the 1970s,
composed of officials
from FAA, the airport, and the airlines. The airport refers to the team as
a Start to Finish, Were
*three- legged stool.* Each of the groups is equally important to
supporting Many and Varied
this stool. If one of the *legs* doesn*t provide support, the stool falls
over. Airport officials, FAA, and even local governments made reference to
this team during our visit. The team*s responsibility is to recommend how
the airport should address increases in airfield efficiency, safety, and
capacity. According to airport officials, one of the biggest factors
contributing to the
successful completion of the seventh runway project was the staff
dedicated to the project from FAA, the Department of Justice, and various
consultant teams. These stakeholders were assigned to the project. The
dedicated team provided the airport with single points of contact and
reduced the potential for misinterpretation or ambiguity, as well as
continually reeducated the participants. This experience was in contrast
to the difficulties the airport experienced in coordinating the input from
over 30 agencies in the environmental review process. Airport officials
wished that they had kept the Environmental Protection Agency involved
throughout the process, rather than only at the beginning and at the end.
They also suggested that FAA limit the time frame for agency comments, and
thereby eliminate lengthy comment periods. The Environmental Protection
Agency took 260 days to review the EIS, which is considerably longer than
the 60 to 90 days that the airport expected.
FAA officials thought that holding many more public information meetings
than required also contributed to the success of the project, especially
during the environmental review process. This way, FAA and others answered
questions or comments and addressed concerns before the official comment
period began. FAA also repeated the airport*s suggestion that FAA should
adhere to the comment deadlines.
The four communities surrounding the airport had both positive and
negative experiences while working with the airport. Three cities
challenged the ROD on the basis that its noise analysis and mitigation
plan
were insufficient. (The ROD was upheld 23 months later.) Grapevine felt
that the airport broke long- standing promises. According to Grapevine
representatives, the plan that the airport originally presented would have
placed the area subsequently developed by Grapevine outside projected
flight patterns. Currently, if the airport continues with its plan for the
eighth
runway, flights will go directly over the city of Grapevine. Irving
realized that asking for no airport expansion was probably unreasonable,
and *you really have to cut the best deal you can.* The best possible
runway
development process should make the city whole. Euless will be more
affected by the eighth runway. While Euless initially joined forces with
two cities to contest the ROD, it withdrew its challenge. The Euless City
Manager stated that he appreciated the positive economic impact of the
airport on the North Central Texas economy and believed the airport needs
additional capacity to support that economic impact. If the eighth runway
does become a reality, the City Manager expects the same mitigation plan
that Irving received for the seventh runway, which he considered fair. The
fourth community, Coppell, did not challenge the ROD. According to the
Coppell City Manager, Coppell realized that it had to do its part to
approve the runway somehow, because the airport is seen as vital to the
economies of Coppell as well as to the region. The manager felt that
airport staff were professional, knowledgeable, and helpful and never held
things out to be different from reality. For example, the airport put
together a task force to work with the communities affected by
overflights.
Litigation Delayed The surrounding communities of Irving, Grapevine,
Euless, and Coppell
Process challenged the airport, asserting that the cities had the rights
to control
zoning on the airport property that fell within their municipal
boundaries. The municipalities wanted to zone the land for *government
use.* Such zoning would require that the airport obtain the approval of
the city boards
prior to doing any construction on airport property. The airport objected,
and took the cities to court. The cities won the case, and also won the
subsequent appeal. The Texas State Legislature ultimately passed the Texas
Municipal Airports Act, which stated that the airport sponsors and not the
municipalities control zoning on airport property. According to the Chief
Executive Officer, while the act can apply to any Texas municipal airport,
the wording of the act leaves little doubt that it applies specifically to
the Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport. The Chief Executive Officer
also felt that the support of the local business community was crucial in
the development and implementation of the project. For example, the
business community provided support to the airport in the state
legislature. This
case resulted in nearly 7 years of litigation in state courts and ended
when the Texas Supreme Court denied hearing the complaint. In addition to
the zoning suit, the surrounding municipalities filed suit contending that
the FAA ROD was based on an inadequate environmental impact study.
According to the airport*s General Counsel, the cities surrounding the
airport alleged that FAA and airport officials did not properly follow the
environmental review process, primarily because the airport did not use a
proper methodology in determining single- event noise impacts. The U. S.
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia upheld the ROD after 23
months of argument, and the U. S. Supreme Court denied hearing the case.
The runway construction was delayed 23 months pending the resolution of
the case.
Table 4: History of Dallas* Fort Worth Runway Project Date Event
February 1974 Airport opens. September 1986 FAA Task Force forms to
explore means of expanding air space
capacity. January 1987 FAA Task Force initiates Metroplex Air Traffic
System Plan Studies. September 1987 DFW begins runway planning. February
1989 DFW begins EIS Scoping. April 1990 Neighboring cities challenge DFW
on zoning issues. August 1990 FAA releases Draft EIS. March 1991 DFW
completes runway planning, publishes Airport Development
Plan. December 1991 FAA issues Final EIS. April 1992 FAA issues ROD. April
1992 Three cities challenge ROD. 1993 DFW seeks legislative solution to
zoning issues from the 73rd Texas
Legislature. May 1993 Texas Municipal Airports Act, reaffirming DFW as
exempt from local zoning ordinances, takes effect.
March 1994 U. S. Court of Appeals for D. C. Circuit upholds ROD. April
1996 Texas Supreme Court denies hearing appeal on zoning case from
Fort Worth Court of Appeals. October 1996 DFW completes construction of
7th runway. February 1998 Texas Supreme Court denies appeal on zoning case
from Dallas
Court of Appeals. May 1998 DFW publishes 1997 Airport Development Plan
Update. October 2001 DFW suspends activities for 8th runway, while DFW
Capacity Design
Team explores implications of recent economic and industry events for
runway need.
Spring 2002 DFW pays final real estate settlements. Source: U. S. General
Accounting Office.
Appendi x IV
Memphis International Airport The Memphis International Airport is a
medium- size hub airport that has significant levels of both commercial
passenger traffic and cargo traffic. According to FAA data, this airport
was among the 31 busiest U. S. airports in 2001. Memphis is one of three
major hubs operated by Northwest
Airlines. Federal Express is based in Memphis, and along with other cargo
airlines operating there, Memphis has served as the busiest cargo airport
in the world for the past several years. Additionally, Memphis has claimed
the
distinction of being the number one hub airport in the United States for
ontime flights. The Memphis- Shelby County Airport Authority operates the
Memphis and two general aviation airports. The authority is managed by a
seven- member county board composed of commissioners who must be qualified
community leaders in the fields of aviation, engineering, or finance. Of
the airlines operating at Memphis, three account for about 60 percent of
the operations. Northwest and Federal Express each accounts for slightly
more than 20 percent of the operations, while Northwest Airlink* a
commuter airline* accounts for slightly less than 20 percent.
Memphis currently has four runways, three of which are parallel and run
north and south, including the new runway on the east side of the airport,
developed between 1984 and 1997, which was the focus of our study. The
fourth runway runs east and west and is located north of the other
runways. The addition in 1997 of the new 9,000 foot runway (18L/ 36R)
raised the airport*s maximum capacity in good weather from 131 to 145
operations per hour (about 11 percent) and in bad weather from 84 to 99
operations per hour (about 18 percent). However, the runway was
constructed mainly to counteract the capacity reduction incurred by the
reconstruction and extension of an existing runway, and to help the
combination of commercial and cargo air service work at the airport.
Figure 6 shows the existing Memphis airport configuration.
Figure 6: Airport Diagram * Memphis International Airport
Note: According to Memphis airport officials, the center runway has been
completed, and changes to the remaining runways are no longer planned.
We selected the Memphis Airport for study because it had quite recently
experienced all phases of the runway development process* planning,
environmental, and design and construction. In addition, unlike most other
airports in our study, it had a significant proportion of its operations
devoted to cargo, and it was the only medium- size hub airport we visited.
We interviewed airport officials from the Memphis- Shelby County Airport
Authority who were the sponsors of the runway project. We also interviewed
officials at FAA Memphis Airport District Office; Federal
Express Airlines, which accounted for about 20 percent of the airport*s
operation but about 50 percent of its landed weight; Northwest Airlines,
Memphis*s leading commercial airline; neighboring business community and
residential representatives; Tennessee Department of Transportation,
Aeronautics Division and Highway Division; and Tennessee Department of
Environment and Conservation.
Status of the Runway FAA commissioned the runway in 1997.
Project
Airport Officials Stated A Memphis Shelby County Airport Authority
official stated that the airport
That They Faced faced challenges reaching agreement among airlines
regarding project
funding during the development of their runway project. Specifically,
Challenges Reaching
during the planning phase, a funding disagreement arose between the two
Consensus among
airlines that were the biggest airport users* one a passenger airline and
Stakeholders on
one a cargo airline. The passenger airline objected to the airport*s
initial proposal to fund a major portion of the project using passenger
facility
Project Funding Issues charges, which are collected only by commercial
passenger airlines and not
and Decisionmaking by cargo airlines, as it believed that this approach
would disproportionately
benefit the cargo airlines. Ultimately, the airport authority was able to
negotiate an agreement with the airlines in which project funding was
based on landing fees, which are proportionate to the gross landed weight
at the airport and therefore apply to both passenger and cargo aircraft.
The disagreement among airlines regarding project funding highlighted a
broader issue regarding the establishment of the overall decisionmaking
process at the airport, according to an airport official. The Memphis
airport uses a Majority- in- Interest Agreement that stipulates how the
airlines (and other airport tenants) are involved in the airport*s
decisionmaking process.
As some airline fees are based on landed weight, some airports* agreements
base each airline*s vote on its proportion of landed weight, giving more
power to those airlines with the greatest landed weight and highest fees.
However, the Memphis airport chose to structure its voting process to
prevent any one airline from dominating the decisionmaking process.
According to its Majority- in- Interest Agreement, a vote to approve or
reject a proposal, such as any that addressed the runway completed in
1997, must
have represented more than 51 percent of signatory airlines* landed weight
and more than 51 percent of the number of signatory airlines serving the
airport. This approach allowed all airlines to participate in runway
project decisions affecting them. Additionally, after 1996, the airport
started using an *inverted* Majority- in- Interest Agreement, whereby the
airport may proceed with projects unless an airline requests a formal vote
and the majority of airlines vote to disapprove the project. This
approach*
supported by the two hub airlines at the airport* gives the airport more
flexibility in project development than would an approach requiring
airlines to affirmatively approve every significant project step.
Extensive Airport officials said that extensive environmental and land
acquisition
Requirements Raised requirements presented challenges during the
construction of the runway
project. The airport was required to mitigate a wetland area called
Challenges Regarding
Hurricane Creek and a series of small, adjacent marshy areas on its
Wetlands Mitigation
property that needed to be relocated because of impacts associated with
the construction of the runway and adjacent developable land. 21 Airport
and Land Acquisition
officials said wetlands attract birds that must be *harvested* through
during Construction of
periodic hunting because of the danger that birds represent to jet
airplanes, Runway
and that airport workers do not like being exposed to the poisonous snakes
in the creek as they work to maintain the relocated wetlands. According to
airport officials, it was necessary to relocate a portion of the existing
creek
to construct the new runway, and to straighten the remainder of the creek
to maximize the use of remaining developable airport property. The airport
proposed a concrete- lined channel for the relocated creek based on a City
of Memphis standard. However, state governmental authorities required the
airport to obtain an aquatic alteration permit from the state and
requested that it relocate the creek in its natural state so that animals
such as frogs and poisonous snakes in the creek bed would still have their
21 According to FAA officials, the EIS addressed all major development in
the Memphis Airport Master Plan, including the new runway. FAA officials
contend that if the EIS had included only the new runway, no appreciable
wetland impacts would have occurred.
habitat. According to an official from the Tennessee Department of
Environment and Conservation, this type of requirement is fairly typical
for airports that are expanding into areas containing water. Another state
environmental official said that the airport*s concrete lined- channel
approach had no habitat for living species and would be a direct conduit
for pollutants. Ultimately, large wire baskets filled with medium- sized
rocks were used along the new stream alignment, and four artificially
constructed habitat structures were added in the channel bottom to
support fish that had been in the stream before it was altered. Airport
officials stated that acquiring land for the runway project took longer
than they expected because of litigation and requirements associated with
acquiring the land. According to airport officials, for the new runway,
the airport acquired a road and adjacent property next to the airport that
previously contained gas stations and industrial property. Some of the
acquired properties contained underground tanks that had previously leaked
chemicals into the ground. The state environmental
agency required the airport to clean up the polluted properties prior to
constructing the project, although the airport did not cause the residue
problems.
Site- Specific During the construction phase, the Memphis airport faced a
challenge in
Challenges Involved attempting to relocate a road that lay adjacent to the
airport and in the path
of the new runway. According to airport officials, the City of Memphis
Relocating Other
preferred that the airport be responsible for relocating the road to
ensure Infrastructure
that the work was done in a timely manner. After the new runway project
was completed in 1997, the airport had a subsequent project to reconstruct
and extend an existing runway by 2,700 feet to permit use by larger planes
used for international flights. An airport boundary road had to be lowered
to allow for the proper clearance of the flight path for the extended
runway over the boundary road. According to airport officials, the City of
Memphis owned the road and had widened it about 15 years earlier; the road
could have been lowered for an additional $250,000. However, the city
refused to fund the additional project cost at that time. When the airport
asked for
funding from the Federal Highway Administration to assist in lowering the
highway, the agency determined that no funds were available to meet the
airport*s required time schedule, and it could not fulfill the request.
Ultimately, the airport accomplished the project with FAA and bond funds.
On another roadway project through the center of the airfield, the airport
worked with the Tennessee Department of Transportation to widen and
lower a portion of an existing road passing under an existing taxiway, the
original center runway, and two additional taxiways. The state
transportation agency chose to be responsible for the design and
construction of a new roadway to match the city*s current road plan. The
airport notified the city that the taxiway and runway would be closed to
air traffic because of airport reconstruction, and it offered the
opportunity to accomplish the needed street improvements at the least
cost. The airport funded and constructed two taxiway crossings over the
existing road in the same general time period, and it contributed funds
toward the cost of a replacement tunnel and a portion of the lowered and
widened roadway needed to accommodate the eastern taxiway. According to
airport officials, the airport was responsible for these improvements at a
cost of $17 million.
They said that the airport complied with state requests at a cost and time
greater than was planned for by the airport because of the state
transportation agency*s jurisdiction and power over factors that can slow
down or stop an airport*s project.
Table 5: History of Memphis Runway Project Date Event
June 1984 Airport initiates Master Plan for new runway. March 1987 Airport
initiated Environmental Assessment and noise study. June 1989 Airport*s
noise study report issued. Litigation began. June 1991 First Majority in
Interest Agreement between airport and airlines to build a new runway is
reached.
December 1991 Airport completes Environmental Assessment. December 1991
FAA begins EIS process. April 1992 Airport initiates first of eight runway
design projects. May 1992 FAA publishes Draft EIS. November 1992 FAA
issues Supplemental Draft EIS to address EPA noise comments.
April 1993 FAA issues Final EIS. May 1993 FAA issues ROD. July 1996
Airlines* disagreement about prorated funding for runway project
resolved. September 1997 Airport opens runway. October 2000 Litigation
ended. Source: U. S. General Accounting Office.
Appendi x V
Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport The Minneapolis- St. Paul
International Airport (Minneapolis- St. Paul) ranked as North America*s
tenth- busiest airport in terms of passenger traffic during 2001. The
Metropolitan Airports Commission (Commission) broke ground in May 1999 for
the new north- south runway. This runway, the airport*s fourth, is
expected to add about 25 percent additional capacity. According to the
Commission Chairman at the groundbreaking, the new runway is vital to the
economic growth of Minnesota and the region.
The Commission owns and operates the Minneapolis- St. Paul International
Airport and six reliever airports. The Commission reports directly to the
Minnesota legislature and governor. Northwest Airlines, the major hub
carrier serving Minneapolis, accounts for nearly 80 percent of annual
operations. Several other airlines account for the remaining traffic.
Northwest is headquartered in the neighboring community of Eagan, Minn.
The configuration is two parallel northwest- southeast runways, one
crosswind runway, and the new north- south runway. In good weather, the
airport operates with a capacity of 115 to 120 operations per hour. The
runway was originally scheduled for completion in December 2003, but the
terrorist events of September 11, 2001, forced the airport to delay
completion until November 2004* an 11 month delay. Airport officials cited
reduced cash flow as the primary reason for this delay. They also said
that the new runway would accommodate future demand, increase runway
capacity, relieve congestion, and reduce delays. Figure 7 shows the
existing
airport configuration, including the new runway.
Figure 7: Airport Diagram* Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport
We selected Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport as a site- visit
location because it is one of the nation*s busiest airports with an active
runway project; its project was in the construction phase; it had detailed
and comprehensive planning and environmental phases; and its Executive
Director has been a prominent speaker regarding airport issues. We
interviewed Commission officials who were the main sponsors of a new
fourth runway at the airport. We also interviewed officials at FAA*s
Minneapolis Airport District Office; Northwest Airlines, which had a
majority of the air operations at the airport; Minnesota Department of
Transportation Office of Aeronautics, which is responsible for promoting
safety zones around the airport; and the Metropolitan Council, which had a
key role in the planning process. Additionally, we interviewed
representatives of the cities of Eagan, Richfield, and Bloomington, which
surround the airport and are impacted by the runway project.
Current Status of the The Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport is
in the construction phase
Runway Project for its fourth runway (Runway 17/ 35).
Stakeholders Agree According to both FAA District Office and airport
officials, the Commission
That Comprehensive worked hard at building consensus throughout the
project and entered into
numerous mitigation agreements to resolve issues. The prevailing
Mitigation Plans Are
philosophy was to do whatever was necessary to make the project Essential
but Difficult
successful. Commission officials, communities, airlines, and other to
Develop
stakeholders worked together to achieve this. For example, when developing
noise contour maps, the Commission chose to include an entire city block
if the noise contour intersected any part of the block. If one residence
received sound insulation measures because it lay within the Day Night
Noise Level (DNL) 65 contour, every house on the block received identical
remediation measures. According to Minneapolis* St. Paul airport
officials, the effort represented good comprehensive community
involvement. The Commission spent considerable resources trying to keep
all stakeholders satisfied. According to airport officials, the Commission
and FAA also tried to avoid having the project go into litigation, viewed
as an unproductive use of time and resources and the worst scenario in the
process. In the long run, the FAA District Office, the state Department of
Transportation, and Commission officials agreed that consensus building,
while taking longer than expected in the project*s early stages, saved
time in the long run.
However, often what was good for one community was bad for another
community. At least one community accused the Commission of buying
communities off, neighborhood by neighborhood. For example, Minneapolis
was *made happy* by eliminating the north parallel runway from
consideration. A National Wildlife Refuge located near the airport was
*made whole* through the payment of over $26 million; 22 however, the
22 According to an airport official, the amount was determined by an
independent professional appraiser and includes costs to relocate
significant educational activities.
noise will continue over the refuge. According to FAA officials, this cost
was required to mitigate the impact on refuge property protected under 49
U. S. C. 303( c), formerly known as section 4( F) of the DOT Act. The
opposition viewed the process as achieving *traveling* consensus* just
moving the problem around. Opposition groups described the process as one
seeking cooperation for appearances only* a *divide and conquer* approach.
Stakeholders Believe Stakeholders impacted by the runway said that they
would be more
That Mitigation supportive of the project if the airport authority would
increase the level of
noise mitigation on the surrounding community. The FAA concluded, as
Funding Should Be
indicated in its Minneapolis- St. Paul ROD, that federal- funds
eligibility for More Flexible to
future residential sound insulation measures is generally limited to the
DNL Include More 65+ contour. However, it said that FAA might extend
federal- funds eligibility for the residential insulation program to
include the area out to
Communities the DNL 60 contour if there are applicable local standards.
For the
Minneapolis airport, FAA plans to evaluate this extension through a future
Commission- initiated Federal Aviation Regulations Part 150 Noise
Compatibility Plan. The Commission submitted an updated noise
compatibility plan to FAA in November 2001 and withdrew it in May 2002,
prior to an FAA decision. Mitigation efforts continue in the DNL 65+
contour area; time frames released to the public called for the extended
(DNL 60- 64) program to be completed in phases between 2005 and 2012. A
major factor in Northwest Airlines* objection to paying for the additional
mitigation measures was that the future had changed significantly enough
since September 11, 2001, to reevaluate these additional measures. 23
A Nationwide Low The impact of low frequency noise on the surrounding
community is an
Frequency Noise issue for the Minneapolis- St. Paul airport, which is
close to neighborhoods, according to the Federal Interagency Committee on
Aviation Noise
Policy Is Not in Place 23 MAC intends to update the noise contours to
reflect a 2002 base year and the 2007 forecast, incorporating the 2007
fleet mix plans. As a result, noise contours could shrink because of
quieter aircraft. MAC adopted a noise- mitigation plan for single- family
homes in the DNL 60* 64 contours in April 2002. Implementation of this
plan is contingent upon resubmission
of the Part 150 Update and its FAA approval.
(FICAN). 24 According to the City of Richfield official, the Commission
received $10 million in FAA Airport Improvement Program funds for noise
mitigation activities for the west side of the new runway (the City of
Richfield lies west of the new runway), pending FAA*s review of the noise
impacts of the project. The $10 million was earmarked in the 2001
Department of Transportation Appropriations Act conference report. 25 In
December 1998, the City of Richfield and the Commission agreed to
undertake a detailed study of existing and potential impacts of low
frequency aircraft noise in communities around the airport. In order to
develop a consistent low frequency noise policy, FAA turned to FICAN for
input on the review of this study and technical aspects of the issue*
particularly for an assessment of the problem and metrics to evaluate it.
Low frequency noise was discussed at the committee meeting held in June
2001. Commission and Richfield experts attended. The Committee released
its findings in August 2002 and basically said that additional data are
needed to determine whether any relationship exists between low frequency
noise and human annoyance. 26 According to FAA officials, FAA is reluctant
to fund low frequency noise mitigation until the alleged adverse impacts
are conclusively validated and national standards established.
Some Communities According to the Minnesota Department of Transportation,
FAA, the
Commission, and community officials, Minnesota has state safety zones
Question Justification
that go beyond the federal Runway Protection Zone limits. 27 Within these
of State Zoning Laws
safety zones, certain types of development are prohibited. The
establishment of safety zones involves issues of safety, land use, and
encroachment that can impact not only the development of an airport
24 Low frequency noise is aircraft- generated noise that is likely to
induce audible rattles in residences, most likely below 100 hertz. 25
House Conference Report 106- 940, October 5, 2000.
26 Federal Interagency Committee on Aviation Noise on the Findings of the
Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport Low Frequency Expert Panel,
August 2002. 27 FAA requirements cover both the primary runway surface and
runway protection zone limits. The length and width of the zones depend
upon the aircraft operating on the particular runway and the visibility
minimums. Minnesota state requirements include 1) Zone A* begins 200 feet
from the runway end and extends for a distance two- thirds the runway
length; 2) Zone B* begins at the end of Zone A and extends for a distance
of onethird the runway length; and 3) Zone C* the required horizontal
clearance.
runway but also the development of land surrounding the airport. Some
communities around the airport question whether the safety zones are
beneficial for them. Although not all stakeholders oppose Minnesota*s
strict zoning, The Commission authorized and funded a consultant study to
research the need for the state safety zones as well as the approaches
that
the other 49 states have taken. The consultant*s April 2002 report, sent
to the Joint Zoning Board, found no justification for the strict zoning.
The application of a grandfather clause in the use of state- created
safety zones presents an additional challenge to the communities
surrounding the airport. Under the terms of the grandfather clause, if a
residential area existed in the state zones in 1978 or earlier, it was
allowed to remain in place and not be removed by the airport. However,
business expansion in the general area around the airport is subjected to
state safety zone restrictions. Communities are unhappy because it makes
no sense to the community leaders to leave residences closer to the runway
itself but not permit businesses to expand in an area further away from
the airport. Businesses feel that, although their property was not
acquired, the impact is the same, since expansion is forbidden.
Table 6: History of Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport Runway
Project Date Event
October 1988 Metropolitan Airports Commission (Commission) and
Metropolitan Council issue Airport Adequacy Study. May 1989 Minnesota
legislature establishes Dual Track Airport Planning Process. April 1992
Scoping meetings held. FAA, in cooperation with Commission,
publishes Notice of Intent to prepare EIS. FAA and Commission issue First
Phase Scoping Report. March 1993 FAA and MAC publish responses to First
Phase Scoping Report. December 1993 Airport Capacity Team completes
Capacity Enhancement Plan. December 1994 State Department of
Transportation completes Terminal Airspace Study for relocated airport.
May 1995 FAA issues Second Phase Scoping report, holds public meetings.
July 1995 FAA issues EIS Scoping Decision. December 1995 FAA and
Commission publish Draft EIS. March 1996 Commission and Metropolitan
Council issue Dual Track Planning Study.
April 1996 Minnesota legislature decides to expand existing airport.
August 1996 FAA issues Airport Capacity Enhancement Terminal Airspace
Study.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Date Event
May 1998 FAA issues Final EIS. September 1998 FAA issues ROD. December
1998 Richfield individual files suit against Commission and state
Environmental Quality Board.
May 1999 Commission commences runway construction. June 2000 State Court
of Appeals upholds Summary judgment regarding
Richfield individual*s lawsuit. October 2000 $10 million earmarked for
noise mitigation activities for the west side of the new runway.
June 2001 Federal Interagency Committee on Aviation Noise begins
discussing low frequency noise standards.
November 2001 Commission submits Part 150 Noise Compatibility Plan. March
2002 FAA clarifies airport zoning standards. April 2002 Study authorized
by Commission results in consultant report that
finds no need for state safety zones. May 2002 Commission withdraws Part
150 Noise Compatibility Plan. November 2004 Planned runway completion.
Source: U. S. General Accounting Office.
Appendi x VI
Seattle- Tacoma International Airport The Seattle- Tacoma International
Airport (Sea- Tac) is the primary air transportation hub of Washington
State and the northwestern United States. It is the 17th- busiest
passenger airport, the 20th- busiest cargo airport, and among the 31
busiest hub airports in the United States. Located
12 miles south of downtown Seattle and 20 miles north of Tacoma, it is the
primary provider of international and domestic air carrier service in the
region surrounding the Seattle/ Tacoma area. Its primary service market is
the Puget Sound region, composed of four counties and approximately 3.5
million people. About three- fourths of the air travelers using Sea- Tac
Airport are origin and destination passengers who begin or end their trip
at the airport. The remaining flights are connecting flights. The airport
is a
significant employer in the region, with 20,000 airport employees. Sea-
Tac currently has two parallel runways. Our primary focus was on a runway
development project for a new third parallel runway first considered in
Sea- Tac*s plans in 1989, and which the Port of Seattle approved in 1992.
The project has proceeded through several steps of the environmental
review process, and it is currently scheduled for completion in 2006. Sea-
Tac*s sole purpose for adding this 8,500 foot parallel runway,
which would be separated by 2,500 feet from the furthest parallel runway,
is to address constraints attributable to Seattle*s poor weather, and
although the new runway would increase capacity, airport officials do not
consider the runway project to be a capacity- enhancing project. During
periods of reduced weather conditions, which occur about 44 percent of the
time, Sea- Tac can use only one of the two existing runways for arrivals
because of the narrow spacing between them, thereby causing delays. The
number of flights that can be accommodated drops from about 60 arrivals
per hour in good weather to 48 or fewer in poor weather. The new runway,
which is planned to have much greater separation from other runways, would
allow independent landings on two runways at the same time, which
reduces delays. Figure 8 shows the existing Sea- Tac airport
configuration, including the proposed runway.
Figure 7: Airport Diagram* Sea- Tac International Airport
We selected Sea- Tac Airport for study because it was an airport with a
significant amount of both passenger and cargo operations and it had
experienced significant planning and environmental issues during the
development of its runway project. Additionally, in constructing the
planned runway, Sea- Tac is expanding the plateau where the airport is
located* undertaking one of the most significant landfill and embankment
projects in the United States (about 17 million cubic yards). According to
Sea- Tac officials, this earth- moving project is producing several
accompanying environmental considerations. We interviewed officials from
Sea- Tac, who were the sponsors of the runway project. We also interviewed
officials at the FAA Seattle Airports District Office; Alaska Airlines;
Puget Sound Regional Council; Airport Community Coalition; Regional
Commission on Airport Affairs; Washington State Department of
Transportation Aviation Division; Washington State Department of Ecology;
the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers; and the U. S. Environmental Protection
Agency.
Status of the Runway As indicated above, the runway project for the new
third parallel runway at
Project Sea- Tac has completed environmental review and has received state
and
Corps wetland fill permits. However, according to Sea- Tac officials, both
permits are currently in litigation and under appeal. Sea- Tac has begun
constructing the foundation that will be required to support the third
runway. Simplifying Purpose
Sea- Tac officials stated that continual review of the purpose of and need
for and Need May Help
their runway project, as well as alternatives to it, presented a
significant challenge to moving forward in the process. They stated that
reducing the Reduce the Circuitous
number of reviews could reduce the amount of potential delay in the Nature
of the Review
process. The purpose and need was established and reviewed by the Process
airport, FAA, consultants, and the local Metropolitan Planning
Organization during the planning and environmental process; it was then
re- reviewed by the Corps of Engineers (Corps) during the permitting
process under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 28 FAA officials
questioned the usefulness of the Corps* review of the project*s purpose
and need, stating that the extra review created frustrations for other
stakeholders and added time to the process when the purpose and need had
already been 28 According to Sea- Tac and FAA, the Corps was involved as a
cooperating agency during
Master Plan updates and participated in an early EIS draft.
established. Additionally, FAA officials said that aviation expertise is
needed to analyze the alternatives, and the Corps has no such expertise.
According to Corps officials, the Corps is required to ensure that
alternatives have been adequately considered. 29 Corps officials said that
their review of the alternatives was justified because it had been a
considerable time since the EIS had been developed, and it wanted to
determine if the events of September 11, 2001, had changed the relative
benefits of the alternatives. Officials from the Puget Sound Regional
Council, the metropolitan planning organization in the Seattle area,
suggested that the Corps could have been included more in the early
consideration of alternatives, but acknowledged that the Corps* limited
resources made early participation difficult. FAA officials, however,
believe that the Corps did participate in the development of alternatives
in its role as a cooperating agency during the development of the EIS.
Sea- Tac Airport, while not specifically citing purpose and need, said
that a clear federal policy of encouraging runway development and moving
projects through the regulatory process would help ensure that adequate
airport capacity is in place to reduce growing air traffic delays. It
suggested that such a commitment could be similar to the one the federal
government took in developing the interstate highway system and national
railroads. A task force could be created to identify runway projects that
are critical to the national air transportation system. Such an approach
could help
expedite implementation of decisions already made at the local level.
Additionally, they suggested that Congress could adopt a policy of
directing all organizations to achieve a balance between environmental,
economic, and social goals, coupled with statutory deadlines for
decisionmaking.
They contend that such an approach, now used by other countries, would
help agencies make difficult decisions and get needed runways built.
A Compatible Land Use A Washington State Department of Transportation
official stated that
Program May Help to minimizing controversy over the uses of land needed
for expanding runway
capacity could be important in avoiding lengthy project delays. The Reduce
Opposition
department developed an Airport Land Use Compatibility Program,
implementing a 1996 amendment of the Washington State Growth Management
Act* the state*s land use planning law. The law requires cities and
counties to identify, site, and protect essential public facilities
29 33 CFR part 323.
(including airports) from incompatible land use, such as encroaching
development. In other words, when developing local land use plans, cities
and counties must ensure that their plans do not adversely affect these
facilities.
As part of the land use compatibility program, certain state
transportation officials provide consultations, including mediation,
between airport sponsors and community representatives (often municipal or
county planning staff) to balance the state*s dual interest of promoting
aviation and ensuring the health, safety, and welfare of its residents.
The approach to facilitating airports* future expansion includes several
steps, including the development of planning- based solutions and the
integration of those solutions into a legally enforceable document such as
a comprehensive development plan (rather than the Airport Master Plan,
which is not binding on a land use authority).
New Mitigation In Seattle, the Airport Communities Coalition, representing
several
Approaches and communities near Sea- Tac Airport but not the city of
SeaTac, said that
expanding the scope of mitigation beyond direct environmental Increased
Community applications would go far in building community support for
runway
Interaction Could Help projects. They said that the airport*s use of heavy
trucks over local roads to
Foster Community haul dirt for its landfill project for the runway caused
significant
deterioration of the community*s roads, for which it has not been Support
reimbursed. 30 Similarly, when the airport acquires residence and business
locations in order to mitigate noise or wetland impacts, these buyouts
deplete the tax base in the community where the properties are based,
resulting in negative economic impacts for which the community is not
reimbursed. Therefore, the community has no reason to support the runway
project. However, they said that the community would have reasons to
support the project if some funding were provided to mitigate the economic
damage to the community. An organization official said that the Department
of Defense reimburses communities for economic loss when it acquires
property within the community to build military bases. Officials at the
Regional Commission on Airport Affairs, a citizens* group in the greater
Seattle metropolitan area, stated that that the airport could do
more to mitigate economic impacts. However, they also said that 30 An
airport official stated that most of the impacts have been to roads in the
city of SeaTac, and that mitigation costs pertaining to the impacts have
been addressed.
expanding the scope of mitigation would not diminish their opposition to
the runway project.
According to the Airport Communities Coalition, communities seek to
contribute meaningful input into the airport expansion process; however,
when they are not allowed to do so, they are forced to file lawsuits
against airports and other stakeholders over decisions that have been
made. Officials at both the Coalition and the Regional Commission believed
that the planning process used by the airport and the Puget Sound Regional
Council needed to include meaningful input from the communities near the
airport. An official at the Regional Commission stated that there should
be a citizen*s advisory committee with genuine input into the airport*s
expansion projects early in the planning process. The official suggested
that the federal government should provide the incentive for the
establishment of such a committee by providing federal funds only when
such a committee was established. In the official*s view, the success of
such an approach would be contingent on the airport*s taking the
committee*s views into account and substantively addressing them. These
community organizations have filed several lawsuits against the airport,
the Puget Sound Regional Council, and FAA, based on objections to their
approach for addressing environmental issues. An Airport Communities
Coalition official said that the community filed lawsuits in part, to get
the airport to
listen to the needs of the community and to negotiate solutions. The
official noted that communities near other airports had successfully used
such an approach. Sea- Tac and FAA officials stated that there was
extensive community involvement beyond that required by law.
An official at the Airport Communities Coalition said that the public
hearing process on environmental matters gives stakeholders the ability to
voice concerns but, because of the limited time allocated to each person,
does not give those convening the hearing an ability to understand the
concerns or allow citizens to have an impact on the project. The thrust of
FAA*s 2001 best practices guide seems to agree with the coalition
official;
the guide states that periodic informal workshops during the planning and
environmental processes tend to provide better forums for community
consultation than do formal public hearings. Understandable information on
the project and its environmental impacts should be made available at the
workshop, and knowledgeable stakeholders such as the airport, FAA, and EIS
consultants should be present to answer questions. In the guide, FAA notes
that strong local opposition tends to slow down the environmental process
and that a citizens* advisory committee in some locations has been useful
in improving working relationships and
communication between the airport and the community. FAA said that such a
committee may be established on either a permanent basis or for the
duration of a specific project*s planning and environmental review. FAA
added that factors that help build local consensus and address opposition
include, among others: 1) open and frank dialogue on the aviation need and
the airport proprietor*s initial planning, including possible
alternatives; 2) an effective forum for constructive exchanges on expected
benefits, impacts, alternatives, and mitigation prospects; and 3) serious
consideration of community concerns and views, including project
adjustments that have merit and are possible, as well as responses to
community proposals that cannot be accommodated, and the reasons why. A
SeaTac official emphasized that the airport did include public outreach
beyond that required by environmental regulations. For example, such
efforts included public information sessions and community open houses,
among others. Extensive Regulatory
Stakeholders may have limited staff and resources to address the extensive
and Legal
regulatory and legal requirements of the process, leading to delays. For
example, officials from FAA*s Seattle office said that when an endangered
Requirements Posed
species of fish was identified at Sea- Tac Airport, 20 months elapsed
before Resource Challenges
officials from the federal Fish and Wildlife Service and the state
Department of Marine Fisheries approved actions to address the conditions
of endangered species. Both agencies had limited staff to review and
analyze the discovery and the approach for addressing it. FAA officials
said that they understood that the Corps had only six staff members to
review about 1,000 water quality permits, and according to state aviation
department officials, the Corps had a significant backlog in processing
permit applications. Additionally, an official from the state Department
of Ecology said that the Sea- Tac runway project had been a significant
drain on resources at the agency. The agency has had difficulty finding
sufficient resources to complete environmental reviews and must redirect
personnel from other functions. The official said that, because of the
shortage of state funds, applicants wanting reviews to proceed quickly
will have to bear the burden
of funding water quality reviews. Sea- Tac officials noted that additional
staff resources are needed in regulatory agencies in order to process
environmental permits in a timely manner and, aside from adding federal
funding, funding could be provided by project proponents. The airport
acknowledged that agencies were reluctant to accept funding because of a
concern with potential conflicts of interest. The airport suggested that
Congress could make guidelines under which the agencies could remain
impartial. The purpose of allowing such funding would not be to curry
favor but to work efficiently with the federal government to get runways
built. They asserted that these staff would work exclusively under FAA*s
supervision and would be under no obligation to the airport. They
contended that this proposal would provide a mechanism for airports to
bear the financial cost of accelerated project reviews.
Site- Specific Issues A major site- specific challenge involves the
construction of a large plateau
Involve Safety and to enable the airport to construct the new runway.
According to Sea- Tac
officials, in order to bring the new runway site up to the elevation of
its Environmental
other two runways, a 17* million cubic yard landfill and embankment is
Challenges being built. The embankment will require three retaining walls
to reduce impacts on a nearby creek and wetlands and to accommodate safety
areas at the ends of the runway. The walls are mechanically stabilized,
using concrete panels and layers of galvanized reinforced strips that bind
to and reinforce the embankment material in a coherent way. According to
the Port, this type of wall is highly earthquake resistant, and it has
been used successfully elsewhere in the United States. In April 2002, Sea-
Tac Airport officials said that the communities surrounding the airport
were concerned that the wall will collapse or will be unable to withstand
an earthquake. However, according to airport officials, the airport used
the services of consulting engineers, geotechnical consultants, and
earthquake engineers from companies and the University of Washington, and
sought advice from a technical review board in developing the wall design
to ensure that it is safe. The airport has also held public hearings in an
attempt to enlighten the public about the durability and safety of the
wall project.
Table 7: History of Sea- Tac Runway Project Date Event
June 1992 Puget Sound Regional Council completes 2. 5 year study of air
capacity needs that included possible third runway at SeaTac.
April 1993 Metropolitan Planning Organization approves Regional Airport
System Plan.
November 1993 Initial design contracts awarded. October 1994 Metropolitan
Planning Organization concludes no sites suitable for
new airport. February 1996 Final EIS completed. July 1996 Metropolitan
Planning Organization amends metropolitan
transportation plan to include new runway. August 1996 Airport authority
adopts revised Master Plan that includes new runway.
December 1996 Supplemental EIS begun. May 1997 Final Supplemental EIS
issued. July 1997 ROD issued. August 1997 ROD challenged. December 1997
Airport submits permit applications to state and Corps of Engineers. March
1998 Construction begins on the first phase of the landfill project.
September 1998 New wetlands discovered in project area. January 1999
Circuit court affirms ROD. September 1999 Airport submits revised permit
applications. November 1999 Public comment hearings held on permit
applications. September 2000 Airport withdraws permit application before
expiration deadline to address remaining issues and provide agency
additional time to
process application. October 2000 Airport resubmits permit applications.
January 2001 Public comment hearings held on permit applications. August
2001 State issues water quality certification. December 2001 State water
quality certification suspended pending community
appeal to Pollution Control Hearings Board. July 2002 FAA approves Part
150 noise study. August 2002 Pollution Control Hearings Board upholds
water quality certification,
subject to additional conditions. September 2002 Airport appeals Pollution
Control Hearings Board*s conditional
approval of water quality certification. December 2002 Corps issues
wetland permits; permits challenged. 2006 Planned completion of runway
construction. Source: U. S. General Accounting Office.
Lester B. Pearson International Airport,
Appendi x VII
Toronto, Canada The Lester B. Pearson International Airport (Pearson) is
the primary commercial airport serving the Toronto area. The Greater
Toronto Airports Authority manages the day- to- day operations of the
Pearson airport, as well as managing its capital infrastructure projects.
The Greater Toronto Airports Authority was established in March 1993 as a
community initiative, was reconstituted in accordance with Canadian
Airport Authority guidelines, and was recognized by the Minister of
Transport in November 1994 as the airport authority responsible for
Pearson airport. The airport authority is a private, not- for- profit
corporation. Its 15- member Board of Directors is composed of nominees
from the City of Toronto, the Province of Ontario, the Government of
Canada, and four regional municipalities. The airport authority assumed
control of the management, operation, and maintenance of Pearson on
December 2, 1996.
Pearson Airport is the busiest airport in Canada and the 16th- busiest in
North America, having served 28 million passengers in 2001. With regard to
international passengers, Pearson was ranked as the 2nd- busiest in North
America and 17th- busiest in the world in 2001. To handle the projected
demand for air travel through the airport, the airport authority developed
a $4.4 billion (Canadian) development plan for the improvement of the
airport*s infrastructure* the Airport Development Program (ADP), which
includes new runway projects, among other infrastructure projects. Figure
9 shows the existing Pearson airport configuration.
Figure 8: Airport Diagram* Lester B. Pearson International Airport
We chose Pearson Airport as a site visit to learn about the runway
development process used in Canada, and because the airport had three
runway projects that met the criteria we used to select airports in the
United States* one runway completed in 1997, one completed in October
2002, and one planned for future implementation. 31 The three additional
runways were approved for development as warranted by demand in 1993 by
Transport Canada after a lengthy Environmental Assessment Review process
in 1990* 1992.
31 When we visited the airport, the runway project completed in October
2002 was still under construction.
Status of Runway As noted above, Pearson Airport completed the
construction of a new
Projects runway in 1997, completed the construction of a second new runway
in
2002, and has a third runway in the planning stages, to be constructed
when capacity demands warrant another runway.
Airport Development The airport development process in Canada differs from
the U. S. process in
Process in Canada several distinct ways. Pearson Airport was one of the
first airports in
Canada to attempt to build additional runways since the airports were
first Differs from U. S.
constructed to serve the Canadian military during World War II. As a
result, Process
there was no established runway development process in place* Transport
Canada officials had to learn about the process as they progressed through
it. In the broadest sense, there are three pieces of legislation that
affect the process* the Aeronautics Act, the Fisheries Act, and the
Environmental Act.
The environmental phase differs greatly from that employed in the United
States. Prior to the development of the EIS, the airport authority begins
the process with scoping. The scoping process is a public process.
According to airport officials, every project goes through environmental
screening (equivalent to an Environmental Assessment) as a part of the
planning process. When the Pearson project went through the screening
process, the airport authority was responsible for conducting
environmental screening. However, current legislation requires that the
screening results be available to the public.
The Minister of Transport and the Minister of the Environment
cooperatively choose an Environmental Review Panel consisting of
government officials and knowledgeable local residents (that is,
academics.) The panel begins by developing a list of issues that it
believes the EIS must identify. The issues and, therefore, the
requirements of the EIS will vary from airport to airport. Airport
officials referred to the process as *organic** changing from airport to
airport, project to project. The airport authority is responsible for
preparing the EIS documents, and it
submits them to the panel for review. The panel reviews the environmental
impact documents and convenes hearings to hear testimony in order to
formulate its opinions regarding the environmental impacts of the project
and accompanying mitigation measures. The hearings are judicial in nature,
and attendees have never resorted to shouting or histrionics. According to
airport officials, the hearings were well balanced between opponents and
proponents of the projects. With respect to the EIS, the focus of the
environmental hearings was medium- term capacity enhancement projects* the
three runways at Pearson. The issues that the panel considered depended
greatly on their perception of the issues raised during the hearings. The
members of the panel did not work on the EIS full- time, and did not have
the requisite expertise to conduct their reviews* the panel either hires
knowledgeable consultants or develops the necessary knowledge. This
process takes a long time.
Once the EIS is completed, the panel reviews the document, develops a
series of recommendations, and submits them to the Minister of
Environment. The Minister of Environment then makes a final determination
and submits recommendations to the Minister of Transport. The Minister of
Transport has sole discretion as to whether to implement the
recommendations of the Minister of Environment. The Minister of Transport
makes the final determination, and it is incumbent upon the
airport authority to respond to the final recommendations. The design and
construction process in Canada does not differ substantially from that in
the United States. The airport must prepare preliminary engineering and
final design, and then construct the runway infrastructure. Finally, in
summary, airport officials believed that the
process went very well and did not believe that they would proceed
dramatically differently if they were to go through the process again.
However, both airport and Transport Canada officials noted that the
recently passed Canadian Environmental Assessment Act will result in
changes to the existing process.
Canadian Airports Airports in Canada seeking to add capacity by
constructing new runways
Face Many of the Same face many of the same challenges that airports in
the United States face,
including environmental issues, wetlands mitigation issues, and the
Challenges as U. S.
impacts of noise on the surrounding communities. These impacts generally
Airports
lead to some community opposition to the proposed project. Canadian
airports are also subject to site- specific constraints attributable
primarily to the northern climate.
Because of the northern climate, airport operations in Toronto require
extensive ice removal in the winter months, resulting in the use of a
large quantity of Glycol that can cause an environmental impact on
surrounding wetlands. The airport straddles both the Etobicoke and Mimico
Creek
watersheds, covering 1, 640 hectares of land. Most of the airport,
including runways, cargo areas, Terminal Three, Terminal One aprons, and
infield
areas, drains to Etobicoke Creek. According to the Toronto and Region
Conservation Authority, although runoff contamination from these sources
is a concern, significant progress has recently been made to mitigate the
airport's impact on water quality through the expanded use of wastewater
and storm water recovery and containment systems. Airport officials cited
their wastewater treatment facility as contributing greatly to allaying
the concerns of residents over ground and surface water contamination, and
they stated that the airport has never exceeded contaminant limits.
The Council of Concerned Residents, a coalition of three residents*
associations near the airport, opposed the expansion of the airport
fundamentally on the premise that the projects would increase the noise
impacts on their communities. In 1993, the group filed a lawsuit against
the airport claiming that the proposed project was illegal for three
reasons: 1) a
1973 order precluded the Toronto airport from expanding beyond its
borders; 2) a federally approved airport master plan and the local
municipality*s land use plan stipulated that they were based on the
assumption that the airport would have no more than three runways; and 3)
the Environmental Review Panel stated that the project should not be
pursued because the adverse social impacts of the project outweighed the
capacity gains at the airport. According to Transport Canada officials,
Canada*s noise mitigation standards are very similar to FAA*s Federal
Aviation Regulations Part 150 programs in the United States. According to
airport officials, neither Transport Canada nor the airport authorities
are required to acquire noise- sensitive properties surrounding the
airport. According to airport authority officials, airports in Canada face
a shortened construction season because of the sometimes severe winter
weather associated with the northern climate. Therefore, airports seeking
to construct runways must take the climate into account when entering into
the construction phase of the runway development process. Airports must
schedule construction tasks such that weather- dependent tasks such as
concrete construction are scheduled during the warmer months, and reserve
climate- independent tasks for the winter months.
Appendi x VIII
Survey of Airports The following section provides a copy of the survey
that we sent to airports that have built a runway between 1991 and 2000 or
planned to do so by 2010. Where appropriate, we have summarized their
responses to each question. In instances where summarized answers are not
possible* such
as dates* we have listed the number of airports that answered the
question. In total, we sent 39 surveys to 34 airports* Dallas- Fort Worth,
Detroit, Indianapolis, Louisville, and Washington Dulles received more
than one survey, because each had more than one runway that met our
criteria. We excluded five surveys because the airports reported that
their projects did not meet our selection criteria. For our statistical
analysis, we excluded responses from five airports* Kailua- Kona, Little
Rock, Reno, Sacramento, and one of the two surveys sent to Washington
Dulles* because their responses indicated that their projects did not meet
our criteria. The primary reason why their responses were dropped from our
statistical analysis was that they planned only runway extensions or no
new runways during our time frame. We did, however, rely on their
responses during the remainder of our review. In total, we received 32 out
of a potential 34 responses from 30 airports* a response rate of 94
percent. Table 8 lists the airports we surveyed.
Tabl e 8: Ai rpor t s Sur veyed
1. Atlanta Hartsfield 2. Baltimore 3. Boston Logan 4. Charlotte 5.
Cincinnati 6. Colorado Springs 7. Dallas- Fort Worth (2) 8. Denver 9.
Detroit Wayne County (2) 10. Grand Rapids 11. Houston 12. Indianapolis (2)
13. Kansas City 14. Las Vegas 15. Los Angeles 16. Louisville (2) 17.
Madison 18. Memphis Shelby County 19. Miami 20. Minneapolis 21. Nashville
22. Orlando 23. Philadelphia 24. Phoenix 25. Salt Lake City 26. San
Francisco 27. Seattle 28. St. Louis Lambert 29. Tampa 30. Washington-
Dulles Source: U. S. General Accounting Office.
Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned
Appendi x IX
Runway Projects United States General Accounting Office
Survey of Airports With Recent or Planned Runway Projects
___ ___ ___ Introduction Survey ID
The U. S. General Accounting Office (GAO) is an agency of the legislative
branch that reviews federal programs for the U. S. Congress. We have been
asked by the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Aviation,
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, to review what long-
term improvements can be made to enhance capacity in the National Airport
System, particularly as it relates to building runways.
As part of our study, we are asking a select group of 34 airports for
information on their experiences with building runways and how the process
could be improved. Your airport was selected because you built a runway
between 1991 and 2000 or plan to build a runway before 2010. If you have
more than one runway that meets these criteria, you have received one
survey for each runway. Your responses will help us better understand the
various phases of runway construction and the challenges you had or
foresee in the future. We will present the results of this survey in our
report.
We have made every effort to minimize the amount of information we are
requesting by using other data sources when available. Your participation
is important and will enable us to report to the Congress on what works
well and what can be improved to expedite the building of runways. Please
have appropriate staff respond to these questions including consultants
that may have assisted in this project. Please return your completed
survey, within the next 15 working days or by January 11, 2002, in the
enclosed pre- addressed, postage- paid envelope, or fax your response to
David Lehrer at (312) 220- 7726. In the event that the envelope is
misplaced, the return address is:
Mr. David Lehrer U. S. General Accounting Office 200 W. Adams Street,
Suite 700 Chicago, IL 60606- 5219 EMAIL: lehrerd@ gao. gov
Your responses to this survey should pertain to the airport and runway
stated below, unless the questions ask you to do otherwise. If you have
any questions, please call either David Lehrer (312) 220- 7667 or Gary
Lawson at (202) 512- 3649.
Thank you very much for taking time to complete the survey.
1. . Airport Name: ______________________________________ 2. . Runway of
interest is: ____________________ ___________ 3. . Name and phone number
of person( s) completing this survey:
a. Name: ______________________________ Telephone: (_____) _____ -
____________ b. Name: ______________________________ Telephone: (_____)
_____ - ____________ 4. . Name of a person we may call if we have
questions:
a. Name: ___________________________________ Telephone: (_____) _____ -
____________ b. Best times of day to call:
________________________________________________________
1
EXPERIENCES WITH PLANNING AND BUILDING RUNWAYS
5. . Please provide the start and completion dates for each of the
following phases of your runway project and describe the event or task
related to each date. (Note: The time frames associated with each of the
phases listed below can overlap.)
Phase Date Date started completed
a. Planning _ [a] ___ _______ ______ _ [a] ___ _______ ______
N= 32 (month/ year) (month/ year)
_Begin Master Plan______ _Complete Master Plan_ _
(event/ task) (event/ task) b. Environmental process _ [a] ___ _______
______ _ [a] ___ _______ ______
N= 31 (month/ year) (month/ year)
_Begin EIS_______ ______ _Record of Decision_ ____
(event/ task) (event/ task) c. Litigation _ [a] ___ _______ ______ _ [a]
___ _______ ______
N= 16 (month/ year) (month/ year)
_ First Lawsuit Begun_ __ _ Last Lawsuit Settled ____
(event/ task) (event/ task) d. Design and construction _ [a] ___ _______
______ _ [a] ___ _______ ______
N= 27 (month/ year) (month/ year)
_Begin Design____ _ _____ _Commission Runway______
(event/ task) (event/ task)
[a] Due to the differences in reporting, summarized responses are not
possible. Event/ task listed is the most common response provided for each
phase.
If necessary, provide clarifying information for your response:
N= 18
2
6. . For each of the tasks listed below, please indicate to what extent it
took more or less time than expected (i. e., as compared to your timeline
and schedule at the beginning of the project). Please indicate *not
applicable* for those tasks that have not yet taken place.
A. Planning Much longer
Longer than Time
Less than Much less than
Not than expected
expected expected
expected expected
applicable
N= 32
(25% longer (up to
(up to (25% less
or greater) 25% longer)
25% less) or greater)
Preparing future forecast 9% 25% 59% 0% 0% 6%
Demand/ capacity analysis 9% 16% 66% 3% 0% 6%
Alternatives analysis 16% 16% 56% 0% 0% 13%
Justification of future development 19% 22% 50% 0% 3% 6%
Development of Airport Layout Plan 3% 19% 69% 3% 0% 6%
Confirmation of financial feasibility 6% 13% 63% 3% 0% 16%
Other (Please specify) 22% 0% 0% 0% 0% 78%
Other (Please specify) 9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 91%
B. Environmental process Much longer
Longer than Time
Less than Much less than
Not than expected
expected expected
expected expected
applicable
N= 32
(25% longer (up to
(up to (25% less
or greater) 25% longer)
25% less) or greater)
National Environmental Policy Act
22% 19% 44% 0% 0% 16%
(NEPA) requirements Environmental Assessment 6% 0% 38% 0% 0% 56%
Finding of No Significant
3% 0% 16% 0% 0% 81%
Impact-- FONSI Noise study 9% 9% 50% 0% 0% 31%
Noise compatibility program
6% 9% 28% 0% 0% 56%
-- Part 150 Noise and access restrictions
0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 97%
-- Part 161 Draft Environmental Impact
22% 19% 28% 0% 0% 31%
Statement* EIS Public comment on draft EIS 13% 13% 41% 0% 0% 34%
General conformity 9% 16% 34% 0% 0% 41%
Environmental Justice 9% 6% 19% 0% 0% 66%
Governor*s certificate issuance 6% 9% 38% 6% 0% 41%
Scope definition 6% 9% 50% 0% 0% 34%
Final EIS 25% 19% 22% 0% 0% 34%
Record of decision 16% 9% 38% 3% 0% 34%
Other federal requirements 16% 6% 31% 0% 0% 47%
State and local requirements 19% 13% 25% 0% 0% 44%
Other (Please specify) 19% 6% 0% 0% 0% 75%
Other (Please specify) 3% 0% 3% 0% 0% 94%
Other (Please specify) 3% 3% 0% 0% 0% 94%
Other (Please specify) 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 97%
Other (Please specify) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
3
Question 6 (con*t.)
C. Litigation Much longer
Longer than Time
Less than Much less than
Not than expected
expected expected expected
expected applicable
N= 32
(25% longer (up to
(up to (25% less
or greater) 25% longer)
25% less) or greater)
Noise 6% 0% 3% 0% 0% 91%
NEPA litigation 3% 0% 6% 3% 0% 88%
Air quality 3% 0% 6% 0% 0% 91%
Land acquisition 6% 9% 22% 0% 0% 63%
General conformity 3% 0% 3% 0% 0% 94%
Environmental justice 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Wetlands 3% 9% 0% 0% 0% 88%
Endangered species 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 94%
Historical site 0% 3% 6% 0% 0% 91%
State legislation 6% 0% 3% 0% 0% 91%
Other (Please specify.) 6% 3% 3% 0% 0% 88%
Other (Please specify.) 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 94%
D. Design and construction Much longer
Longer than Time
Less than Much less than
Not than expected
expected expected
expected expected
applicable
N= 32
(25% longer (up to
(up to (25% less
or greater) 25% longer)
25% less) or greater)
Project engineering 6% 6% 47% 9% 0% 31%
Contracting 3% 6% 56% 3% 0% 31%
Mobilization (facility relocation) 0% 6% 47% 6% 0% 41%
Land acquisition 0% 19% 47% 0% 0% 34%
Site preparation 0% 6% 47% 9% 0% 38%
Noise mitigation construction 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 75%
Project construction 6% 13% 34% 6% 3% 38%
Other (Please specify) 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 94%
Other (Please specify) 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 97%
If necessary, provide clarifying information for your response:
N= 18
4
7. . The following table lists stakeholders that may have been involved in
your runway project. Please indicate the extent to which each
stakeholder*s involvement took more or less time than you expected during
each phase of your runway project. Please indicate *not applicable* for
those stakeholders with which you have not yet interacted.
Using the following scale (without regard to set percentages as used in
question 6), select the one that best describes the impact of this
stakeholder in each phase of the project. Please clearly indicate plus or
minus, as appropriate, next to the number you select.
-2= Much longer than expected -1= Longer than expected 0= Took the time
expected +1= Less than expected +2= Much less than expected NA= Not
Applicable
Stakeholder Planning Environmental Litigation Design &
process construction
FAA Headquarters -. 012 -0. 48 0. 00 -0.43
FAA Region -0. 18 -0.52 0.29 -0. 20
FAA District Office -0. 04 0. 00 0. 00 0. 16
FAA Air Traffic Control 0.00 -0. 14 0. 00 -0.10
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency -0. 50 -0.80 -0. 67 -0.45
U. S. Army Corps of Engineers -0. 25 -0.57 0.00 -0. 58
Department of Justice 0. 00 -0. 17 0. 00 0. 00
Airlines -0. 38 0. 05 -0. 25 -0. 09
State Department of Transportation -0. 27 -0.20 0.00 -0. 25
State Environmental Agency -0. 35 -0.52 -1. 00 -0.46
Local agencies -0. 19 -0.42 0.00 -0. 32
Community Interest Groups -0. 32 -0.50 -0. 43 -0.31
Metropolitan planning
-0. 04 -0.15 0.00 0.00
Organization (MPO) Financial institutions 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0. 11
Contractors -0. 22 -0. 10 -0. 25 0. 13
Other (Please specify.) [a] [a] [a] [a]
Other (Please specify.) [a] [a] [a] [a]
[a] Insufficient number of similar answers to summarize.
If necessary, provide clarifying information to your responses:
N= 12
5
8. . Which of the following geographic characteristics surrounding your
airport had/ will have an impact on the runway project? (Check one column
for each row.)
Some Moderate
Great Characteristic None Impact Impact Impact
a. Lack of open space within airport boundary N= 31 42% 19% 13% 26%
b. Community proximity N= 32 13% 25% 19% 44%
c. Hills, mountains, or other obstructions near airport
50% 28% 6% 16%
N= 32 d. Highways or railroads nearby N= 32 16% 44% 9% 31%
e. Water surrounding area N= 32 56% 25% 12% 6%
f. Wetlands considerations N= 32 25% 34% 9% 31%
g. Other (Please describe) N= 6 17% 17% 17% 50%
If necessary, provide clarifying information for your response:
Responding airports provided additional information to this question. The
airports cited factors not explicitly listed in the question, including
endangered species, landfills, valleys and airspace conflicts and/ or
described how the geographic characteristic affected their projects. (N=
14)
6
9. . Please describe the most critical or significant events or factors
that either delayed or accelerated the completion of your runway project
and briefly describe why or how each one affected it.
Events or factors that delayed the project:
Responding airports generally stated that events or factors that delayed
their projects identified challenges in three major areas* resolving
differences among the stakeholders involved in the runway development
process, completing extensive federal and state regulatory and legal
environmental requirements, and handling site specific challenges related
to the airport*s location. (N= 29)
Events or factors that accelerated the project:
Responding airports generally stated that events or factors that
accelerated their projects focused primarily on improving communication
and coordination with major stakeholders and streamlining the
environmental process. Some stakeholders also identified innovative
construction techniques that they believed accelerated the completion of
their projects. (N= 20)
7
COSTS TO BUILD THE RUNWAY
10. . What were your original cost estimates and actual costs incurred
during each phase of your runway construction project? (Please state
dollars in millions.) 1
Project Phase or step Original estimate Actual costs
Planning N= 32 N= 32
Environmental N= 32 N= 32
Environmental mitigation N= 32 N= 32
Litigation N= 32 N= 32
Land acquisition N= 32 N= 32
Design and construction N= 32 N= 32
Total N= 32 N= 32
11. . What percentage of the funding for your runway project came from or
will come from the following sources?
Sources Percent Not applicable
Airport Improvement Program* entitlement 19% N= 4
Airport Improvement Program* discretionary 25% N= 7
Passenger Facility Charges 18% N= 12
Airport bonds 22% N= 9
State grants 2% N= 25
Landing fee revenue 1% N= 28
Other airport revenue 0% N= 27
Other: (Please specify) 0% N= 32
[a] Figures represent the average of the responses given, and therefore,
do not total 100 percent.
12. . For each of the funding sources listed below, please indicate the
extent to which your project was delayed because of delays in receiving
the funds.
Source Delayed Delayed
No Not
greatly somewhat delay applicable
Airport Improvement Program* entitlement
6% 9% 59% 25%
N= 32 Airport Improvement Program* discretionary
12% 12% 47% 28%
N= 32 Passenger Facility Charges N= 32 0% 0% 50% 50%
Airport bonds N= 32 0% 3% 69% 28%
State grants N= 32 0% 3% 28% 69%
Airport revenue N= 32 0% 3% 41% 57%
Other: (Please specify) [a] [a] [a] [a]
[a] Insufficient number of similar answers to summarize. 13. . Did you
consider constructing this runway project without the use of federal AIP
funds?
Yes [ 9% ] NA= 6%
No [ 84% ] N= 32
Please explain.
1 Due to the various methods used to account for project costs,
summarization is not possible.
8
Responding airports generally stated that they were either required to use
AIP funds, that non- use would present significant financial burden upon
the airport, or that federal funds were necessary to establish the
financial feasibility of the project. (N= 17)
9
IMPACT OF RUNWAY PROJECT
14. . What impact do/ did you expect this runway to have on the maximum
number of operations per hour at your airport?
Maximum number of hourly Estimated maximum number of
Type of weather operations before runway hourly operations after runway
completion completion
a. VFR conditions Range: 75 - 270 Range: 90 - 278
b. IFR conditions Range: 50 - 185 Range: 59 - 216
15. . How did you estimate the maximum number of additional operations per
hour that could be accommodated from building your new runway? (Please
include such information as the model used, which contractor was used to
prepare the estimates, based on what study.)
Responding airports briefly described the models used to construct the
estimates: 25 used SIMMOD primarily or exclusively, and 7 did not expect
capacity to change as a result of the project or did not specify the model
used. Other models cited included TAAM, DELAYSIM, and ADSIM/ RDSIM. (N=
30)
16. . In 2000, what percentage of annual operations was attributed to the
three largest carriers (passenger or cargo) at your airport?
Name of carrier Percentage of total annual operations
a. N= 32 Range: 8% - 78%
b. N= 32 Range: 4% - 32%
c. N= 32 Range: 3% - 22%
10
IMPROVING THE RUNWAY PROCESS
17. . What changes, if any, would you recommend to expedite the overall
process (from planning through construction) for building runways and
which federal, state or local entity would be the most appropriate one to
address each of the changes?
Responding airports provided a number of potential initiatives directed at
expediting the overall process for building runways directed primarily at
improving communication and coordination between stakeholders and
streamlining the environmental process. (N= 31)
18. . Other than building new runways, what can be done to increase the
capacity of the National Airport System?
Responding airports provided a number of potential initiatives directed at
increasing the capacity of the National Airport System including changes
to airspace utilization, technology improvements and ATC modernization and
the continuing construction of new infrastructure. (N= 29)
11
RUNWAY EXTENSION PROJECTS
Answer questions 19 * 21 in this section only if your airport completed
one or more runway extensions from 1991 through 2000 or has one or more
runway extensions planned from 2001 through 2010. ( If you have received
more than one survey, please respond to questions 19 - 21 once. )
19. . Describe the runway extensions you have completed or planned to
complete by 2010.
Runway number Year extension Extension completion
Length of original Length of
completed time-- years/ months runway extension
N= 16 Range: 1991 2010 Range: 00/ 04 * 05/ 00 Range:
Range: 3,000 ft. - 12,636 ft.
489 ft. - 5,500 ft.
N= 6 Range: 1992 2004 Range: 00/ 07 * 05/ 09 Range:
Range: 8,900 ft. - 11,388 ft.
1,000 ft. - 2,012 ft.
N= 3 Range: 1998 Range: 02/ 00 * 06/ 07 Range:
Range: 2005
5,001 ft. - 11,388 ft. 2,000 ft. - 4,769 ft.
N= 0 Range: N/ A Range: N/ A Range: N/ A Range: N/ A
20. . What were you seeking to accomplish by building this extension (e.
g., changed runway from commuter runway to one for only large airplanes)?
What impact did/ will the extension( s) have on the capacity of this
airport?
Responding airports provided information regarding the purpose of their
runway extensions. The primary purpose for the extensions was to
accommodate longer- range aircraft, heavier aircraft (i. e., cargo),
increase safety, and/ or reduce noise impacts. (N= 19)
21. . How is the process for planning and building an extended runway
different from building a new runway at your airport? (Please explain.)
Responding airports stated that the process for building an extended
runway is virtually the same as that for building a new runway, with minor
exceptions. Exceptions included such things as, reduced environmental
impacts, less controversy, fewer legal challenges, and shorter
construction time. (N= 19)
12
IMPACT OF THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, ATTACKS ON THE NATIONAL AIRPORT SYSTEM
22. . How important is it to add capacity to a) your specific airport, and
b) the National Airport System after the terrorist attacks on America on
September 11, 2001? Have your airport*s priorities changed as a result of
the terrorist attacks? If yes, please explain.
Responding airports stated that their short- term focus would shift to
safety and security, however, long- term plans remained largely unchanged.
They also noted that capacity remains important to the nation*s airport
system. (N= 32)
23. . What impact, if any, have or will the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, have on the completion of any runway or runway extension planned
at your airport?
Baltimore Washington International, Charlotte, Dallas, Minneapolis, and
Phoenix experienced delays or deferred airside projects. Several airports
noted that their projects were demand driven and that the extent to which
demand returns to the airport would determine when the project would be
started. (N= 29)
24. . Given the current financial condition of the major airlines at your
airport, what is the likelihood that these airlines will be able to
contribute financially to funding your runway project or repayment of
existing debt?
Responding airports stated that in the short- term, airlines may have some
difficulty in providing financial contributions to the airport. The
airports anticipate that the long- term financial commitment of the
airlines will not be impacted. (N= 32)
Please feel free to include any additional documentation that you believe
will help us better understand your runway project and your experiences
with it.
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. 13
(390007)
GAO*s Mission The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of
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a
GAO United States General Accounting Office
The amount of time airports spend planning and building their runways can
vary because of numerous factors. In light of this variation, for the 32
runway projects we analyzed, we used median rather than average time. The
median time was about 10 years for runways that had been completed and
was estimated to be about 14 years for those not completed. Most airports
and stakeholders we visited and surveyed said they faced a variety of
challenges that had delayed their runway projects. While the level of
challenges that airports faced varied in part depending on the proximity
of the airport to a major city and the amount of community opposition to
the runway, some common themes emerged, including challenges related to
the following:
* Reaching stakeholder agreement on purpose and need for the runway;
Completing the environmental review process; Reaching agreement on noise
mitigation and other issues; and Designing and constructing the runway.
Although there may be no single solution to the challenges involved in
developing runways, the federal government and airport authorities have
undertaken a number of initiatives in this area. Recently, the President
issued an Executive Order that is directed at streamlining the
environmental review of transportation infrastructure projects, including
runways. In addition, two federal legislative initiatives designed to
streamline the runway process were considered in the 107th Congress. In
addition, FAA has undertaken a number of initiatives directed at
streamlining parts of the process. Airports have also undertaken
initiatives in this area, including involving stakeholders such as
community groups early in the process, and reaching early agreement on how
best to mitigate noise and other runway impacts. These initiatives may be
a step in the right direction, but it is too early to assess their impact
on the runway process. Amount of Time Airports Spent or Estimated Spending
to Complete Runways Varied
AVIATION INFRASTRUCTURE
Challenges Related to Building Runways and Actions to Address Them
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 164 To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Gerald Dillingham, Ph. D., at (202) 512- 3650 or via
E- mail at dillinghamg@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 164, a report to
the Aviation Subcommittee, House Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure
January 2003
Aviation experts believe that building runways is one key way to address
airport capacity issues and prevent delays that can affect the entire U.
S. economy, but runway projects are often controversial and time-
consuming. GAO was asked to examine how much time airports spend
completing runways, what challenges airports and other
stakeholders experience during this process, and what airports and other
stakeholders have done to address challenges related to runway projects.
GAO analyzed the results of surveys from 30 airports on 32 runway projects
and visited 5 airports in order to interview numerous runway project
stakeholders.
The Department of Transportation agreed with GAO*s characterization of the
challenges associated with building runways and some of the initiatives
taken to address these challenges. They did express some concerns related
to GAO*s analysis of the time airports spent or estimated spending in
developing
runways, and suggested that GAO acknowledge additional FAA efforts to
improve the runway process. We believe that our
approach was a reasonable assessment of the amount of time taken to build
runways; however, we clarified our discussion about the length of time. We
also added information regarding initiatives undertaken by FAA.
Page i GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure
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Appendix I
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
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Appendix II
Appendix II Airport Site Visits
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Appendix II Airport Site Visits
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Appendix II Airport Site Visits
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Appendix II Airport Site Visits
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Appendix II Airport Site Visits
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Appendix II Airport Site Visits
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Appendix II Airport Site Visits
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Appendix II Airport Site Visits
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Appendix II Airport Site Visits
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Appendix III
Appendix III Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport * DFW, TX
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Appendix III Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport * DFW, TX
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Appendix III Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport * DFW, TX
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Appendix III Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport * DFW, TX
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Appendix III Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport * DFW, TX
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Appendix III Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport * DFW, TX
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Appendix IV
Appendix IV Memphis International Airport
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Appendix IV Memphis International Airport
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Appendix IV Memphis International Airport
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Appendix IV Memphis International Airport
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Appendix IV Memphis International Airport
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Appendix V
Appendix V Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport
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Appendix V Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport
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Appendix V Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport
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Appendix V Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport
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Appendix V Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport
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Appendix V Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport
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Appendix VI
Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport
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Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport
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Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport
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Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport
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Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport
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Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport
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Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport
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Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport
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Appendix VII
Appendix VII Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto, Canada
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Appendix VII Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto, Canada
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Appendix VII Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto, Canada
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Appendix VII Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto, Canada
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Appendix VIII
Appendix VIII Survey of Airports
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Appendix IX
Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects
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Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects
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Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects
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Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects
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Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects
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Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects
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Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects
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Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects
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Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects
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Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects
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Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects
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Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects
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United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001
Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300
Address Service Requested Presorted Standard
Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00
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